

ISLAMOPHOBIA, IMMIGRATION POLICY, AND INTERNATIONAL STUDENT
MOBILITY IN THE TRUMP ERA

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Educational Leadership

Sam Houston State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Education

by

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May, 2021

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the more than 1,500 international students I have taught, advised, mentored, and befriended so far in my career in international education. You have taught me how to be patient, how to listen, and how to not only respect, but celebrate different cultures. You taught me how to wrap a sari, make pupusas, and write Hanzi, but more importantly, you taught me about the beauty of different traditions and perspectives. I have seen you achieve your educational goals and I want to honor you as I achieve mine.

ABSTRACT

Van De Walker, Dana, *Islamophobia, immigration policy, and international student mobility in the Trump era*. Doctor of Education (Higher Education Leadership), May, 2021, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas.

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States on November 8, 2016 set forth a wave of immigration policy changes that would shape the coming years of U.S. international student mobility. Executive Order 13769, known as the Trump travel ban, which was enacted within the same week of President Trump's 2017 inauguration, had immediate consequences for all international students, but particularly those from Muslim-majority countries. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the changes in international student mobility to U.S. institutions as a function of student country of origin (non-Muslim-majority countries, Muslim-majority countries not included by the travel ban, and countries included in the travel ban) and institutional status (elite or non-elite). Grounded in a conceptual framework comprised of Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) and Theory of Choice (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992), this study explored the aforementioned changes using custom data from the IIE Open Doors Report (IIE, 2020) from AY2014-2015 to AY2019-2020. Findings and implications for institutions and policy makers are discussed.

KEY WORDS: International students; U.S. immigration policy; Donald Trump; Trump Administration; 2016 U.S. presidential election; Executive Order 13769; Trump travel ban; Muslim international students; Elite institutions

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

When I was a little girl, I never imagined that I would earn a doctorate or work in higher education, but I always knew that I would go to college. I want to acknowledge my mom for nurturing my passion for reading, and my dad for instilling in me the importance of an education and the grit to persist in the face of educational hurdles. Sara, your guidance and example of returning to school is something I am especially grateful for.

To Dr. Forrest Lane and Dr. Paul Eaton, thank you for being the most patient, helpful, and thought-provoking dissertation chairs a doctoral student could ask for. You have encouraged me every step of the way and challenged me to see a complex issue from different perspectives. Without a doubt, I am a better scholar and scholar-practitioner thanks to your ongoing support and inspiration. To Dr. Burcu Ates, I was thrilled to have you on my committee. Thank you not only for your support, but also for your personal insight as an international faculty member.

Thank you to the faculty and staff in the Department of Educational Leadership. Dr. Ricardo Montelongo- Thank you for making time for me when I needed a mentor. Dr. John Slate- Thank you for entertaining my unorthodox research ideas and for helping me secure my first publication. Dr. Combs- Thank you for reminding me that writing is an art, not a science.

To Cohort 39, thank you for the lively classroom banter, the doctoral student commiserating, and the endless parade of food. Team Awesome—THANK YOU. You have been so much more than accountability partners; you have been a support structure I didn't even realize I needed. We are in this together, and I can't wait to see you finish.

Thank you to Swetha for teaching me how to make chicken curry, blasting the Indian Britney Spears cassette tape in our room, dragging me to Indian Student Association meetings, and generally sparking my interest in working with international students. I will always remember you as the first international student I ever met. I'm so proud to have you as an akka.

Mariana, amor de minha vida, thank you for loving me. My world is brighter because of you and this doctoral program has been manageable because of your dedication and support. You are my best friend and my ultimate partner in crime. I love you to the moon and back.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

On January 27, 2017, newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump enacted Executive Order 13769, the first of three travel ban iterations that would come to be known collectively as the “Trump travel ban” (Redden, 2018). Not long after its enactment, it became apparent to many scholars in the field of higher education that the ban would have devastating impacts on the lives of current international students in the United States, and on the educational goals and opportunities of prospective international students (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017). International student enrollment at U.S. institutions has been on a continuously upward trajectory since the 1950s (IIE, 2020), yet some scholars have questioned if the Trump travel ban and the associated stringent immigration policy and anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric would halt that trajectory (K. Johnson, 2018; Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019; Yerger & Choudhary, 2019).

There has been little research into the effects of the 2016 presidential election and the subsequent Trump travel ban on international student mobility (Bartram, 2018). Some researchers have studied the effect of the Trump travel ban on international student retention (Pottie-Sherman, 2018) and international student experiences and livelihoods (K. Johnson, 2018), yet some scholars, including Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2018), are calling for broad policy research , along with mobility implications for students from Muslim-majority countries (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019) and enrollment implications for U.S. institutions by institutional status or ranking (Pottie-Sherman, 2018). International student mobility is a complex issue. How international students

assess and mitigate risk in pursuit of their educational goals, and their decision-making behaviors, can drastically impact international students enrollment at U.S. institutions (Bartram, 2018; Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Yerger & Choudhary, 2019).

Statement of the Problem

More than one million international students from every corner of the globe currently study or work in the United States (Institute of International Education [IIE], 2020). As such, the study of international student mobility and enrollment has become an important field of research in recent years (Bista, 2016; Bohman, 2014; Altbach & Knight, 2007). Higher education institutions around the world are analyzing their own international student recruitment efforts, along with student services and retention goals, to determine how international student enrollment in their institution can benefit the wider campus community (Altbach & Knight, 2007). International students enhance campus diversity, promote cross-cultural understanding in an increasingly global world, and provide an important source of revenue for institutions (Bista & Foster, 2016; Dreher & Poutvaara, 2011; Macrander, 2017a, 2017b; Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002). International students, too, comprise an economic powerhouse. In Academic Year 2018-2019, international students contributed approximately \$41 billion to the U.S. economy and supported more than 450,000 jobs (NAFSA: Association of International Educators, 2019). Although some international students return to their home countries (Wu & Wilkes, 2017), many stay in the United States as immigrants, fulfilling important roles, for example, in the U.S. science, technology, engineering, mathematics (STEM), medical, and business industries (Cubillo, Sánchez, & Cerviño, 2006; Dreher & Poutvaara, 2011; Teich, 2014).

Not surprisingly, international student mobility to the United States is a complex issue, often influenced by political events, like the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City in 2001, or financial events, like the 2008 recession (Bista, 2016; Choudaha, 2017; Mueller, 2009). During and after such events, international student enrollment can change substantially and students from some countries can be affected more than others (Mueller, 2009). After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was a substantial decline in international students from Muslim-majority countries, and in particular, from the so-called *Axis of Evil* [sic] countries (Iran and Iraq) (Mueller, 2009). If one relates the anti-Muslim rhetoric that proliferated during the 2016 U.S. presidential election and subsequent Executive Order 13769 (also known as the *Trump travel ban*), banning travel into the United States by individuals from seven Muslim-majority countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), to that which proliferated after the 9/11, it is reasonable to assume that another decline in international student enrollment is imminent. It may already be happening (Jackson, 2019; Quilantan, 2018; Usher, 2019).

In the eyes of international students, not all institutions are created equal (Beine, Noël, & Ragot, 2014; Falcone, 2017; Findlay et al., 2012; Marginson, 2006). In AY 2018-2019, of the top 25 host institutions for international students in the United States, 24 were ranked in the U.S. News Best Colleges—National Universities Top 100 (IIE, 2020; U.S. News & World Report, 2020). In addition, all 25 institutions were classified as R1: Doctoral Universities by the by Carnegie Commission on Higher Education (Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.). As such, research on the topic of international student mobility must be keenly focused on institutional

characteristics, including elite or non-elite status. It is likely that non-elite institutions that have a smaller international student population, and as a result, less brand name recognition, will suffer the brunt of the decline in international student enrollment following the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump travel ban. This problem, exacerbated by declining enrollment in students from Muslim-majority countries, will not only impact campus climates and budgets, but will also change the face of immigration to the United States, particularly among skilled and highly educated workers, for years to come (Bartram, 2018; Usher, 2019; Yerger & Choudhary, 2019).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this dissertation was to determine the extent to which the 2016 U.S. presidential election, including the election of Donald J. Trump, and the subsequent Trump travel ban (Executive Order 13769) affected the enrollment of international students at elite and non-elite U.S. institutions. In addition to international student enrollment from non-Muslim-majority countries, changes in enrollment of students from Muslim-majority countries not affected by the travel ban, and of students from the seven countries targeted in the Trump travel ban (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), were investigated. To act as a proxy for the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which occurred in November 2016, and the Trump travel ban, which occurred in January 2017, enrollment data from the following six academic years were analyzed: AY 2014-2015 (two years before the 2016 U.S. presidential election/Trump travel ban), AY 2015-2016 (one year before the events), AY 2016-2017 (during the Trump candidacy), AY 2017-2018 (immediately after the events), AY 2018-2019 (one year after the events), and AY 2019-2020 (two years after the events, time period leading up to the 2020 U.S.

presidential election). Analysis of this data will allow international education scholars and practitioners alike to glean a better understanding of the impact of major political events and sudden, targeted changes in immigration policy on international student enrollment in U.S. institutions by institutional type (elite or non-elite) and students' countries of origin.

Research Questions

The following research questions were addressed in this study: (a) What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment at U.S. institutions and student country of origin?; (b) What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment at U.S. institutions and institutional type (elite or non-elite)?; and (c) What was the three-way interaction effect between international student enrollment, student country of origin, and institutional type? The following two time periods were addressed in this analysis: AY 2014-2015 to AY 2016-2017, which serves as a proxy for time period *before* the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump travel ban, and AY 2017-2018 to AY 2019-2020, which serves as a proxy for the time period *after* the election and travel ban.

Significance of the Study

Myriad scholars have researched the flow of international students by country of origin into the U.S. (Altbach & Knight, 2007; Bista & Dagley, 2014; Bista & Foster, 2016; Choudaha, 2017; Dreher & Poutvaara, 2011; Macrander, 2017a; Thomas & Inkpen, 2017), the unique needs and characteristics of Muslim students and students from Muslim-majority countries (Ali, 2014; Cole & Ahmadi, 2010; Anderson, 2020; Stubbs & Sallee, 2013), and the role of institutional ranking on university selection by international

students (Beine et al., 2014; Falcone, 2017; Findlay et al., 2012). Yet because the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the Trump travel ban are relatively recent historical events, there have been very few empirical studies investigating international student enrollment decline. Of the few studies that do currently exist, some are location-specific (Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019), while one other has investigated students from only one country of origin (Yerger & Choudhary, 2019). Accordingly, there is a serious dearth of empirical research on a national scale. In the years following the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the 2017 Trump travel ban, numerous prominent scholars in the field of international education have called for more research into the effects of these events (Bartram, 2018; Choudaha, 2017; Moser et al., 2017; Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017), and the findings from this dissertation will contribute to answering those calls.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework utilized in this dissertation is an amalgamation of Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) (Stephen & Stephan, 2000) and Theory of Choice, also referred to as choice theory (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992). Each theory serves to address one of the main questions of this dissertation. Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000) allowed me to explore how a student's country of origin, in this case, whether or not the student is from a non-Muslim majority country, a Muslim-majority country, or a country targeted in the Trump travel ban, affects their decisions surrounding educational mobility. Choice theory (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992) further allowed me to investigate the role of institutional ranking, along with perceived elite status and economic value, on international student choice.

Integrated Threat Theory is a theoretical framework developed by Stephan and Stephan (2000) to address psychological and psychosocial underpinnings of xenophobic phenomena. By characterizing attitudes and threats by members of a cultural in-group toward members of a cultural out-group, Stephan and Stephan (2000) sought to explore how racist and xenophobic projections can impact group dynamics and environments. As a framework, ITT consists of four main components: (a) realistic threats, (b) symbolic threats, (c) intergroup anxiety, and (d) negative stereotypes (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Each of these components may help in understanding the concerns that international students from Muslim-majority countries, and particularly those from the countries targeted in the Trump travel ban, have in post-2016 United States. International students from Muslim-majority countries may face realistic threats (actual or perceived), such as fear for their safety in the United States, and symbolic threats (actual or perceived), such as fear around their ability to adapt, make friends, and succeed in their educational program. Likewise, these students may also have to navigate intergroup anxiety, which Stephan and Stephan (2000) term *lukewarm racism*, and negative stereotypes that exist among the American populace about their country of origin or people from that country. Each of these threats may play a role in a student's decision to study or not study in the United States.

Integrated Threat Theory (ITT) has been utilized by a wide variety of researchers in the fields of migration, education, psychology, and sociology. Stephan and Stephan (2000) led the first study utilizing ITT as a theoretical framework. The study explored the in-group/out-group relations of Mexican, Cuban, and Asian immigrants in three U.S. states (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Outside of the United States, ITT has been used as a

framework in investigating the intergroup tension between First Nations members and white Canadians (Corenblum & Stephan, 2001), white and Muslim teenagers in the Netherlands (Velasco González et al., 2008), and Hindus and Muslims in India (Tausch et al., 2009). Several researchers have used ITT to study intergroup relations among international students, including Harrison and Peacock (2010) who studied the interactions of domestic and international students at two British universities, and Charles-Toussaint and Crowson (2010), who engaged in a similar study involving domestic and international students at universities in the U.S. Southwest. The use of ITT allowed me to consider not only economic or political motivations for international student mobility into the United States, but also psychological and psychosocial factors that prospective international students must consider.

Choice theory, introduced and explained by Hargreaves Heap et al. (1992) gave additional insight into the choices made by international students, including but not limited to those from Muslim-majority countries. Choice theory (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992) largely originates out of economics and complex webs of micro-level decisions a consumer may make en route to their macro-level choice of a product or service. Some researchers (Maslow, 1998) have utilized choice theory to investigate the psychological motivations behind choice, while other researchers have explored theory of choice in consumer behavior (Al Balushi, 2018), public administration (Hay, 2004), institutional design (Pettit, 1996; Wendt, 2001), education (Menon et al., 2006), and beyond. Choice theory situates itself quite nicely in this dissertation because international students are making a choice not only about whether or not to study in the United States, but also about what type of institution holds enough value to prompt their mobility to the United

States. In this context, international students, like other consumers, are making a choice based on what is of value to them, and a situational choice based on other variables (e.g. the opportunity to study in one's home country) (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992; Ng & Smith, 2012).

Definition of Terms

Customs and Border Protection (CBP)

Customs and Border Protection is the U.S. federal agency that oversees entry to the United States at more than 300 ports of entry. All international students entering the United States will pass through a CBP checkpoint upon arrival. Customs and Border Protection is a division of the Department of Homeland Security (USA.gov, n.d.).

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

The Department of Homeland Security is the U.S. federal agency tasked with oversight of immigration regulation and enforcement, among other responsibilities. Homeland Security directly oversees the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) and the Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) (USA.gov, n.d.).

Designated School Official (DSO)/Primary Designated School Official (PDSO)

A designated school official (DSO) is a university staff member trained and certified by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to oversee coordination and maintenance of international student records in the Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS). All DSOs at an institution are supervised by a primary designated school official (PDSO), who acts as the primary authority for student record maintenance at that institution. All institutions who are eligible to host international students must have at least one DSO (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

Executive Order 13769

Executive Order 13769, the Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States (also colloquially called the Trump travel ban), was signed by President Trump on January 27, 2017 and prohibited entry to individuals from seven Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Exec. Order No. 13769, 2017).

Executive Order 13780

Executive Order 13780, the Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, was signed by President Trump on March 6, 2017. It was the second travel ban and it superseded Executive Order 13769. It prohibited entry to individuals from six Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Exec. Order No. 13780, 2017).

Form I-17

The Form I-17 is a document within the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) which allows institutions to apply to host international students. Institutions must have an active, approved Form I-17 to host international students. The Form I-17 must include all academic degree programs offered by that institution, along with all campus sites where international students may take classes. Institutions must apply for recertification on the Form I-17 every two years (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

Form I-20

The Form I-20 is a document within the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) which allows prospective international students to apply for an F1 student visa at their nearest U.S. embassy or consulate. The Form I-20 signifies acceptance of the student into an institution and includes information about that student's degree program, English proficiency, estimated expenses, and program duration. An international student in the United States must have an active I-20 at all times (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)

Immigration and Customs Enforcement is a branch of the Department of Homeland Security which deals directly with enforcement of immigration protocol. International students who fail to maintain their F1 visa status are subject to removal (deportation) by ICE (USA.gov, n.d.).

International Student

Broadly speaking, international students can enter the United States on one of three visas: F1, J1, or M1. The F1 visa is a traditional student visa. The vast majority of international students in the United States are F1 visa holders. The J1 visa is an international scholar visa. Holders of J1 visas typically include visiting scholars and professors, but there are some instances in which international students may also study on a J1 visa. The M1 visa is an international student visa specifically for technical or vocational programs. There are some cases in which individuals holding other visas (H1B, H4, L1, L2, TN, etc.) can engage in continuing education or coursework toward a degree in the United States (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019). The datasets

used in this study only include data on F1 student visa holders. As such, for the purpose of this dissertation, an *international student* will refer only to an F1 student visa holder. The following types of students are NOT considered international students: Holders of other visa types, refugees/asylum-seekers, undocumented students, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) students, students adjusting status to permanent residency, U.S. permanent residents, and U.S. citizens (regardless of national origin).

International Student Mobility (ISM)

International student mobility (ISM) is a broadly used term that has been coined to refer to the flow of international students out of their home country and into a host country (Mazzarol & Soutar, 2002). For the purpose of this dissertation, ISM will be used within the context of students inbound to the United States.

Presidential Proclamation 9645

Presidential Proclamation 9645 was the third iteration of the Trump travel ban, signed by President Trump on September 27, 2017. The Proclamation barred entry to the United States for certain individuals from Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (Presidential Proclamation 9645, 2017).

Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)

The Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is the web-based system utilized by the Department of Homeland Security to monitor all U.S. institutions approved to host international students and all international students and their dependents currently in the United States (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)

The Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is the Department of Homeland Security initiative that allows U.S. institutions to host nonimmigrant exchange visitors and their dependents for the purpose of study and research (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019).

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)

The USCIS is a branch of the Department of Homeland Security that is tasked with providing immigration and naturalization services for nonimmigrant and immigrant travelers in the United States. International students may interact with USCIS when they apply for Optional Practical Training (OPT—temporary work authorization), or other nonimmigrant benefits (USA.gov, n.d.).

Literature Review Search Procedure

A literature review focusing on international student mobility, international student visa policy, international student destination and institutional choice, institutional ranking, Muslim international students, and the impact of political events was conducted. All searches were undertaken via the EBSCO Host database for academic, peer-reviewed journal articles and priority was given to articles that were less than 20 years old. Keywords and phrases for the search were split into four categories: (a) international student mobility, (b) institutional ranking, (c) Muslim international students, and (d) the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

In the first category, international student mobility, the following phrases and keywords were used (number in parentheses indicates the results yielded): *international students* (18,228), *international student mobility* (376), *international student enrollment*

(114), *international student decline* (75), *foreign students* (29,092), *foreign student mobility* (23), *foreign student enrollment* (58), *foreign student decline* (14), *student mobility* (2,870), *student visa* (111), *visa policy* (81), *Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS)* (80), and *Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)* (9).

Each of these searches produced useful literature, but in the case of *international students* and *foreign students*, only after *United States* was added as an additional search term to narrow the results.

In the second category, institutional ranking, the following phrases and keywords comprised the search: *institutional ranking* (46), *university ranking* (643), *elite institutions* (126), *elite universities* (173), *world-class institutions* (26), *world-class universities* (192), and *international student choice* (151). To limit the results to those related to international students, the additional search term *international* was included with each search. For the third category, Muslim international students, the search included the following phrases and keywords: *Muslim students* (1,056), *Muslim international students* (15), *Muslim-majority* (121), and *Muslim student enrollment* (6).

Because this dissertation will also address international student enrollment change among students from the countries affected by the Trump travel ban, the following searches were also conducted (each with *United States* included as an additional search term): *Iranian students* (184), *Iraqi students* (27), *Libyan students* (14), *Somalian students* (8), *Sudanese students* (9), *Syrian students* (14), and *Yemeni students* (5).

For the final category, the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a multitude of search terms were used. They included: *2016 U.S. presidential election* (7), *2016 presidential election* (10), *Donald Trump* (50), *Trump* (70), *Trump Administration* (11), *Trump travel*

ban (14), *travel ban* (22), *Executive Order 13769* (15), and *Trump immigration* (4). Each search term included the additional term *international students* to keep the results relevant to the topic of the dissertation. All relevant articles for each category were reviewed. In some instances, additional articles, books, chapters, and governmental and organizational reports were pulled from the articles reviewed.

Delimitations

For the purpose of this traditional dissertation, only international student enrollment numbers for U.S. institutions were analyzed. To reflect the period leading up to, and after, the 2016 U.S. presidential election and subsequent Trump travel ban, only six academic years (AY2014-2015 to AY2019-2020) were included in this study. Because more than 1500 U.S. institutions report hosting at least 10 international students (IIE, 2020), an amount that would be infeasible to study in its entirety, a random sample of institutions will be conducted (discussed in more detail in Chapter III). Likewise, because all 192 United Nations-recognized countries (193 excluding the United States) send international students to the United States (IIE, 2020), and analyzing data from all source countries would be impractical, a random sample of countries will be conducted (which will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter III). Lastly, only one institutional ranking system—U.S. News Best Colleges (U.S. News & World Report, 2020)—will be used in this dissertation.

Limitations

Several limitations to this study exist and they can be broadly classified into two categories: (a) Limitations related to the research design, and (b) limitations related to the nature of the variables analyzed. As this study will be a causal-comparative research

design, it is not possible to establish a cause-effect relationship between any two variables. Likewise, it is not possible to account for all extraneous variables that may affect international student mobility, such as family influence, lack of educational opportunities in a student's home country, or currency fluctuation (Macrander, 2017a). A final research design limitation is that only quantitative data will be analyzed in this study.

A notable limitation, which is related to the nature of the variables analyzed in this dissertation, is the confluence of terms "Muslim international students" and "international students from Muslim-majority countries." These two terms are not one and the same. Muslim international students may come from any of the 192 United Nations-recognized countries that send international students to the United States. The Pew Research Center (2011) recognized 47 countries as Muslim-majority countries, yet students from these countries may not necessarily be Muslim. In this dissertation, international student enrollment from Muslim-majority countries will be analyzed, but this variable, in some ways, serves as a proxy for understanding Muslim international student enrollment, as institutions typically do not collect religious affiliation data on students.

Assumptions

In this dissertation, two primary assumptions are present. First, it is assumed that all U.S. institutions reporting yearly international student enrollments to the Institute for International Education (IIE) Open Door's Report do so honestly and accurately. Secondly, assumptions to the statistical analyses used, which will be discussed in Chapter III, were considered.

Procedures

After receiving approval from the researcher's dissertation committee, an application will be submitted to the Institution Review Board at Sam Houston State University. Once the Institutional Review Board application is approved, the researcher will submit a formal request to the Institute for International Education (IIE) for a custom dataset including the variables to be analyzed in this dissertation. As a graduate student affiliate of the IIE, the researcher already has access to institutional-level data needed, but this data does not include country of origin information, so a separate custom dataset request is required.

Organization of the Study

This traditional dissertation is comprised of five chapters. Chapter I includes the statement of the problem, purpose of the study, research questions, significance of the student, conceptual framework, definition of terms, literature review search procedure, delimitations, limitations, assumptions, procedures, and organization of the study. Chapter II includes a comprehensive literature review highlighting seven main bodies of literature: (a) An overview of international student mobility, (b) A timeline of international student mobility to the United States, (c) International student visa policy and the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP), (d) A history of travel bans in the United States, (e) Muslim international students in the United States, (f) Institutional ranking and international student choice, and (g) The Trump Effect and academic responses to the Trump travel ban. Chapter III includes the research design and methodology.

CHAPTER II

Review of Literature

This review of literature has been divided into seven distinct sections with the goal of highlighting important fields of research and informing the reader of the foundational, background literature for this dissertation. In the first section, “An Overview of International Student Mobility”, the researcher will detail who is classified as an international student, overall trends in international student mobility, and various push/pull factors that may influence a would-be international student’s educational decisions. The second section, entitled “A Timeline of International Student Mobility,” will start with an overview of historical mobility of international students to the United States, and will then include more detailed literature pertaining to three time periods: (a) Before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, (b) Before and after the 2008 recession, and (c) Before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

The third and fourth sections, labeled “International Student Visa Policy and the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)” and “A History of Travel Bans in the United States,” respectively, will include literature on the recent history of immigration policy for international students and a broad overview of previous travel bans in the United States. The next section, titled “Muslim International Students in the United States,” will detail the experiences and struggles of Muslim, Arab, and Middle Eastern students, along with Islamophobia in the field of higher education. In the following section, “Institutional Ranking and International Student Choice,” the researcher will provide an overview of international student decision-making behaviors and the importance of institutional ranking and reputation. Lastly, the section entitled “The *Trump Effect* and Academic

Responses to the Trump Travel Ban” will focus on the impact of the travel ban on international student mobility and higher education in the United States. Key research in this domain will be highlighted, as will the need for further research.

An Overview of International Student Mobility

Who is an International Student?

As the field of higher education in the U.S. has grown, universities have increasingly turned to international student enrollment as a way to globalize their campus, providing not only educational opportunities for international students, but also cross-cultural understanding and global learning opportunities for domestic students (Prinster, 2016). The U.S. Department of State categorizes international students as those students who are not U.S. citizens, permanent residents, or refugees (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a). Although the majority of international students are on F1 student visas, others study in the U.S. on J1 scholar visas or dependent class visas, such as H4 (dependent of a permanent worker) or L2 (dependent of a temporary worker) (U.S. Department of State, n.d.a). All U.S. states except Georgia (Rankin & Stirgus, 2019) now allow undocumented students and student recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) to attend college, yet because these students are not on a visa, they are generally not regarded as international students (Best College, n.d.). Interestingly, Bista and Foster (2016) suggested that international student identity was temporary as many international students who stay in the United States eventually progress to a work visa, permanent residency, or even citizenship.

Trends in International Student Mobility

At present, more than 1,000 U.S. institutions of higher education host international students, including institutions of every level—technical schools and community colleges, along with bachelor’s-, master’s-, and doctorate-granting universities (IIE, 2020). More than one half of international students in the United States hail from China or India, but source countries South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Canada, and Vietnam are also well represented (IIE, 2020). Student enrollment from China and India continues to grow, but those two countries are not an anomaly. Smaller countries like Nigeria are now rising to become major source countries for inbound students to U.S. institutions (IIE, 2020).

The stereotypical view of international student mobility has been that it is uni-directional, specifically that students move from emerging markets like Vietnam or India, to more established destinations of higher education like the United States or the United Kingdom (Choudaha & Chang, 2012). Although this view is accurate on the surface, some scholars have sought to dispel this uni-directional mindset. Macrander (2017b) highlighted regional networks of international student mobility as a contrast to traditional routes of mobility exclusively from emerging markets. Two such examples that she gave include the increasing network of European universities known as the European Region Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS), which allowed students to be more seamlessly mobile within the European Union (European Council, 2017) and the increased mobility of students in the Middle East to regional hubs, such as Dubai (Macrander, 2017b). Verbik and Lasanowski (2007) noted that international student mobility as a whole has largely mirrored economic and political globalization,

with governments placing more emphasis on the need for quality education among their youth. Perhaps the biggest truth in international student mobility is that it is a complex web of opportunities, both for students and the institutions that seek to host them (Bista, 2016).

Push/Pull Factors in International Student Mobility

International student mobility is reliant on an array of push/pull factors that shape international students' decision-making behaviors regarding their educational goals and opportunities. Mazzarol and Soutar (2002) described *push* factors as those that originate “within the source country and initiate a student’s decision to undertake international study” (p. 82) and *pull* factors as those that originate “within a host country to make that country relatively attractive to international students” (p. 82). Although push/pull factors are numerous and vary depending on students’ background and country of origin, some push factors include family expectations, restrictive career and study opportunities, and discrimination in students’ home countries. Some pull factors include the perceived quality of academics, ability to improve language skills, and immigration opportunities in the host country (Macrandar, 2017a).

A prominent push factor for many international students is family influence or pressure. Family influence may show itself in a variety of ways, from family members pushing their student to study in a location where friends or family already live to family members encouraging their student to study abroad to improve his or her career or marriage opportunities. In their 2002 study, Mazzarol and Soutar questioned the degree to which family pressure influenced a student’s selection of a specific study destination in Australia. With students from Taiwan, India, and China, Mazzarol and Soutar (2002)

noted that family members in specific cities, such as Sydney or Brisbane, encouraged students to apply for institutions in those cities. This occurrence may likely be due to the family's trust in their overseas relative (Bohman, 2014). Bohman (2014) further ascertained that many international students opted for U.S. study as a result of parental pressure after they failed to get into a top university in their home country. Bohman (2014) also noted, like Mazzarol and Soutar (2002), that chain migration, or studying in a location where an overseas relative was already living, played an important role in a student's decision-making process. Yakaboski et al. (2014) also suggest that family pressure may be related to marriage decisions, particularly in the Indian international student population. Yakaboski et al. (2014) found that graduate education provided "South Indian men and women with a time-stop on their marriage clocks, a negotiation strategy for love marriages, and a strategy for increased or decreased dowry for men or women, respectively" (p. 53).

Just as family influence can be correlated with marriage decisions for some groups of international students, so too can family influence affect job decisions and students' post-graduation plans. An important pull factor in international student mobility is the opportunity to work in the United States, or another country, after graduation. This factor, while a substantial draw for many students, can manifest itself in many ways. Analyzing trends in international student mobility after the 2008 financial crisis, Macrander (2017a) questioned if fewer foreign students were traveling to the United States for higher education and if perhaps the students were coming from different source countries. After utilizing World Bank data, Macrander (2017a) deduced that students who chose to continue their studies in the United States likely made this decision due to a lack

of suitable job opportunities in their home countries. In this sense, job opportunities can be seen as both a push and a pull factor.

Thomas and Inkpen (2017) advanced Macrander's findings, suggesting that a rise in the youth population and insufficient tertiary education opportunities contributed to a lack of job opportunities in students' home countries. They noticed that demographic changes can affect student mobility in a couple ways. A population boom in lower income countries can lead to an imbalance in tertiary education and job openings for youth upon reaching adulthood. Just as Bohman (2014) suggested that many international students sought education in the United States after failing to get into a top school in their home country, Thomas and Inkpen (2017) suggested that the available spots in top schools, or really any schools, in the home country may not be enough to accommodate the growing youth population. Likewise, the number of available jobs for highly educated students may not meet the demand. In contrast, the researchers also concluded that a decline in the fertility rate may also prompt increased student mobility. In this finding, they note that families in middle-income countries are having fewer children and as a result, are able to invest more in their children (Thomas & Inkpen, 2017).

Highlighting immigration opportunities as a pull factor, some researchers suggest that international students prefer to remain in the country where they are studying, making that country their home. Wu and Wilkes (2017) acknowledged that more and more international students are choosing to make a home in their chosen study destination. In fact, the authors add that since 1978, more than 4 million Chinese students have studied abroad, yet fewer than half have returned to China (Wu & Wilkes, 2017). Also studying migration patterns among international students in the United States,

Dreher and Poutvaara (2011) hypothesized that many international students, though on F1 student (nonimmigrant) visas, stayed in the United States as permanent residents. The data, which included immigration and movement details for immigrants from 78 source countries, suggested that even though international students enter the United States on a nonimmigrant, temporary visa, many end up applying for permanent residency and staying in the country on a pathway to citizenship. Although some international students apply for this status through an H1B work visa for highly skilled workers, many students may be attaining the status through alternative means, such as marrying a U.S. citizen (Dreher & Poutvaara, 2011). Regardless of their path to immigration, or even the country in which they finally settle, immigration opportunities appear to be a strong motivating factor in students' decisions to study overseas.

A Timeline of International Student Mobility to the United States

The United States has played host to international students from around the world since the 18th century (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). Leading up to the culmination of World War II, however, enrollment numbers were modest, topping just 15,000 international students in 1946 (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). By 1950, this number had doubled to nearly 30,000 international students (IIE, 2020). Indeed, as fewer U.S. students chose to study abroad following the War, institutions began to place a great emphasis on the recruitment of international students into the United States (Bevis & Lucas, 2007).

The outbreak of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with the Soviet Sputnik launch, prompted yet another surge in international student recruitment, this time with institutions focusing on the expansion of research activities (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). To aide these efforts, the U.S. Congress passed the Fulbright-

Hays Act, also known as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, in 1961 (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). In addition to establishing the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, a subdivision of the U.S. State Department, the Act promoted institutional internationalization efforts and allowed the United States to draw the brightest students from around the world (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). Prior to this era, study in the United States was largely limited to international students from wealthy and politically prominent families (Dunnet, 2017). With this shift toward research, however, institutions began awarding funding to international students based on financial need and academic merit (Bevis & Lucas, 2007).

The 40-year period from the onset of the Cold War to the late 1990s was a time of great development in the field of international education and international student mobility to the U.S. (Bevis & Lucas, 2007). This period, however, also featured the rise of China and India as major players on the international stage and as consumers of U.S. higher education, particularly as they dealt with their own booming middle classes and subpar, inadequate educational systems (Altbach, 2016). As Altbach (2016) noted, “by 2025, each country will have a middle class of perhaps 500 million” (p. 256), yet there is an “insufficient number of places in elite university for the brightest students” (p. 264) in each country. This trend has continued to present day, with China and India accounting for the top places of origin for international students in the U.S., at 363,341 students and 196,271 students, respectively, for the 2018-2019 academic year (IIE, 2020).

Not unlike the World War II and Cold War eras, the past twenty years has been defined by a series of political and economic events which have influenced the timeline of international student mobility (Gopal, 2016). Choudaha (2017) has categorized

international student enrollment into three waves of mobility: Wave I, 1999-2006; Wave II, 2006-2013; and Wave III, 2013-2020. These waves roughly correspond to the years before and after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City, the 2008 recession, and the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Choudaha, 2017).

Before and After the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks

The late 1990s saw a surge of interest among international students in the United States, and among institutions hoping to host them (Choudaha, 2017). This surge complemented the tech boom of the millennium, which allowed for increased migration of tech professionals into the United States and other OECD countries (OECD, 2001). Similar to the Cold War period, institutions sought out the best international students with research opportunities, ample funding, and promising job prospects (Choudaha, 2017). The terrorist attacks of 9/11 unceremoniously upended the international student enrollment and life in the U.S. for years to come (Choudaha, 2017; Gopal, 2016; Rosser et al., 2007).

One of the first changes in international student policy that resulted from the 9/11 terrorist attacks was the creation of the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) and corresponding Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), a nationwide database for tracking and monitoring international students present in the United States (Rosser et al., 2007). The Student Exchange Visitor Information System was essentially an expansion of the Visa Mantis, a policy that originated in 1998 and required international students studying in one of more than 200 scientific fields to undergo an additional security clearance (U.S. Department of State, 2005). In SEVIS, institutions were required to seek approval to host international students, and international student

advisors at these institutions were suddenly required to provide international students with documentation to apply for their student visa, and track all of their activity, including course enrollment, travel, addresses, work authorization, and more, once inside the United States (Rosser et al., 2007). The new system quickly became a burden for international students and institutions alike (Rosser et al., 2007).

As international students began to report difficulty in securing their student visas in the wake of the SEVIS implementation (Naidoo, 2007), institutions also began to struggle to meet the financial and staffing needs required for SEVIS regulation (Danley, 2010). Visa struggles and perceived discrimination and unfair treatment of students from Muslim-majority countries, along with waning university interest in international recruitment, were paramount in the decline of international student enrollment following 9/11 (Mueller, 2009). Just two years after the attacks, the United States saw the first decline in international student enrollment, a drop of 2.4%, since the 1971-1972 academic year (IIE, 2020; Naidoo, 2007).

This decline was most notable among students from Muslim-majority countries (Gopal, 2016; Mueller, 2009), along with those students from so-called *Axis of Evil* [sic] states, or state-sponsored terrorist states, including Iran and Iraq (Mueller, 2009). Mueller (2009) reported that the decline in international student enrollment from Muslim-majority countries to the United States was 29% and from *Axis of Evil* [sic] countries was 61% for the 2002-2003 academic year alone. Reviewing the change from AY2000-2001 to AY 2003-2004, there was a 44% decline among students from Muslim-majority countries, and a decline in excess of 65% among students from *Axis of Evil* [sic] countries (Mueller, 2009). Over this same period, the largest declines were in students from Algeria (66%),

Mauritania (74%), Qatar (69%), Saudi Arabia (73%), Syria (66%), United Arab Emirates (70%), and Yemen (74%) (Mueller, 2009). The single largest decline from AY2000-2001 to AY2003-2004 was among students from Sudan—a staggering 79% decline (Mueller, 2009).

Another feature of this first wave in international student mobility was the shift of destination interest away from the U.S. and toward Canada, Australia, Europe, and other English-speaking and regional destinations (Choudaha, 2017; Macrander, 2017b; Mueller, 2009). In one such example, the number of international students from Muslim-majority countries to Canada grew by more than 10% in the three-year period from AY2000-2001 to AY2003-2004 (Mueller, 2009). Similar trends were occurring in Europe, beginning in 1999, when the Bologna process and the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) began to be formed (European Higher Education Area, n.d.). Toward the end of this period, the top 10 destination countries for international students included five European states—the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Austria, and Switzerland (Choudaha, 2017).

As the memory of the 9/11 terrorist attacks slowly began to fade, international students began to return to the U.S., first prioritizing enrollment at elite universities with more funding and research opportunities (Choudaha, 2017). This resurgence of mobility began largely with students from Asian countries, including India, Korea, and China (Choudaha, 2017). As the Chinese economy continued to boom, the number of Chinese students pursuing overseas study rose by more than 200% (Choudaha, 2017). The tech boom and the expansion of STEM industries continued to draw high-achieving international students back to the United States (Gopal, 2016).

Before and After the 2008 Recession

The Global Economic Crisis of 2008, also colloquially known as the 2008 Recession, was a time of great economic strife around the world, yet its impact on international student mobility was not all negative (Adams & de Wit, 2009). Rather, the 2008 Recession led to a series of systematic changes in the field of international education that influenced the way U.S. institutions viewed international student enrollment and more broadly, campus internationalization (Choudaha et al, 2013). As some institutions began to view international students, who typically pay non-resident tuition, as an answer to their financial woes, other institutions saw the presence of international students on campus as an alternative form of internationalization in an era of declining study abroad enrollment and reduced faculty travel allowances (Fischer, 2010). Most notably, the period before and after the 2008 Recession was characterized by the following changes: (a) A shift away from graduate enrollment and toward undergraduate enrollment; (b) A movement away from STEM-based programs and toward business programs; (c) An expansion of purposeful international student recruitment; (d) A surge of English as a Second Language (ESL) programs; and (e) Country-specific factors that prompted a growth or decline in mobility to the United States (Choudaha & Chang, 2012).

As U.S. institutions grappled with shrinking budgets and public pressure to spend less on student services (Eggins & West, 2010), focus turned to recruiting self-funded undergraduate students (Choudaha, 2017). Noticeably, institutions found themselves facing shortages in research funding, and relatedly, cuts to graduate student stipends and scholarships, which directly impacted promising international graduate students (Eggins

& West, 2010). This shift away from graduate enrollment and toward undergraduate enrollment was characterized by Choudaha (2017) as a move from “attracting global talent” (p. 827) to “recruiting international students” (p. 827). The cut to research funding, which was largely geared toward STEM programs, also resulted in fewer international students pursuing STEM majors at U.S. universities (Choudaha, 2017; Eggins & West, 2010). Instead, student interest in business programs surged (Choudaha, 2017; Choudaha et al., 2013).

The period before and after the 2008 Recession was time in which institutions began to see international students not only for their intrinsic value, but also as a primary revenue source (Hegarty, 2014). The International Student Economic Value Tool (NAFSA, 2019) is a feature that reports the economic contribution of international students in each state. Beginning in 2008, NAFSA reported that international students contributed more than \$2 billion each to the economies of California and New York, and more than \$1 billion each to the economies of Texas and Massachusetts (NAFSA, 2019). Expanded international student recruitment also contributed to the rise in student mobility to non-traditional locations such as Montana, Oregon, and Colorado (Choudaha & Chang, 2012). These locations, too, benefitted from increased international student dollars, with Oregon and Colorado each surpassing international student economic benefits in excess of \$200 million in 2009 (NAFSA, 2019).

An overemphasis on international student economic benefits also led to changes in international student enrollment management (Huang et al., 2016). Aggressive recruitment of international students led some smaller institutions and institutions in non-traditional locations to use recruitment agents and marketing companies (Choudaha &

Chang, 2012; Huang et al., 2016). Although these recruitment service providers helped bring more international students to campus, they also began fostering problems for U.S. institutions, misrepresenting brand names, complicating the admissions process for would-be students, and recruiting predominately ill-prepared students (Huang et al., 2016).

As quantity trumped quality in the late 2000s, some U.S. institutions moved to form ESL support programs for international students who were linguistically underprepared for academic programs (Andrade et al., 2014; Choudaha, 2017; Choudaha & Chang, 2012; Redden, 2013). The establishment of these programs resulted largely from the inability of many incoming international students to achieve the minimum required score on an English proficiency exam (Andrade et al., 2014). For most institutions, the minimum cut-off score to establish that a student is sufficiently prepared for academic study is a 79 on the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), or a 6.5 on the International English Language Testing System (IELTS) (Andrade et al., 2014). In 2014, however, Andrade et al. reported that the average scores for international undergraduate applicants were 76 on the TOEFL and 6.2 on the IELTS, while the average scores for international graduate applicants were 80 on the TOEFL and 6.5 on the IELTS. To sum up, international undergraduates were not meeting language expectations, and international graduate were only just meeting said expectations (Andrade et al., 2014).

As ESL programs began to proliferate, so too did conditional and pathway admissions programs (Redden, 2013). These programs sought to get international students, including those who were not prepared for academic study, through the door, but any means possible (Redden, 2013). During this time, some scholars (Andrade et al.,

2014; Fischer et al., 2009; Redden, 2013) began to question if U.S. institutions were recruiting international students that they cannot support. As U.S. institutions struggled to cope with the fallout of the 2008 Recession, less funding for student services meant that the expansion of ESL programs and conditional admissions was largely financially motivated (Redden, 2013). In addressing conditional admissions, Redden (2013) noted, “Colleges aren’t typically in the business of creating specialized programs for students who fall on the wrong side of a bright-line requirement, but there is money to be made by recruiting—and retaining—a larger and larger pool of international undergraduate students” (para 7). Andrade et al. (2020) also added that although institutions began to address the varying needs of international students, they also inadvertently contributed to the spread of the deficit stereotype—one in which administrators wrong assume that international students will always trail behind their American peers.

As international student recruitment, admissions standards, and programs of interest changed on the home front (Choudaha, 2017; Choudaha & Chang, 2012), so too did external factors in the students’ countries of origin change (Choudaha et al., 2013). One of the largest developments during this period was the establishment of the King Abdullah Scholarship Program (KASP), administered by the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission (SACM), for Saudi students (Alamri, 2011; Taylor & Albasri, 2014). The scholarship, which was created in 2005 and included a full scholarship covering all academic expenses, a monthly stipend, and health insurance, prompted sudden interest in overseas study among Saudi students (Taylor & Albasri, 2014). This initiative alone led to more than 100,000 Saudi students studying in the U.S. by AY2012-2013 (Taylor & Albasri, 2014). The scholarship program, which only allow students to study in approved

fields and required them to return home after program completion (Alamri, 2011), pushed Saudi Arabia into the top 10 countries of origin among international students in the U.S. (IIE, 2020). Saudi students were prominently featured among those students who were underprepared for academic study and as such, benefitted from ESL and conditional admissions programs (Redden, 2013).

As Japan declined as a source country, plunging from more than 40,000 students in AY1998-1999 to less than 20,000 students in AY2011-2010 (IIE, 2020), China continued to rise as a source country, thanks to its booming economy and rapidly developing middle class (Ghazarian, 2014). Nevertheless, as Chinese student mobility to the United States rose, so too did mobility to other host countries, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and even regional host countries, such as Korea and Japan (Ghazarian, 2014). Interestingly, during this time, both Korea and Japan underwent an identity shift from being primarily a source country, to both a source and a host country, hosting an increasing number of international students from Asia and beyond (Ghazarian, 2014). As Chinese students, and their similar Indian counterparts, went everywhere, Choudaha and Chang (2012) characterized them as “too big to ignore” (p. 3).

Chinese, Indian, and Saudi students streamed into the U.S., while other countries were emerging as promising source countries of international students, namely the trifecta of Brazil, Nigeria, and Vietnam (Choudaha & Chang, 2012; Lovett, 2013). In the case of Brazil, a new government program called *Ciência sem Fronteiras*, or *Science Without Borders* in English, provided more than 100,000 scholarships to promising Brazilian students wanting to study in the United States (Clark, 2012). In contrast to their Brazilian counterparts, students in Nigeria and Vietnam were pushed to seek educational

opportunities overseas as the systems of higher education in their countries lacked necessary funding (Lovett, 2013). Lovett (2013) remarked, “Plans to expand the postsecondary sector compete for resources with national goals to eradicate illiteracy, especially in rural areas and among women and girls, and to improve the workplace skills of secondary school graduates” (p. 77). Recruiting students from a wider variety of countries of origin also helped U.S. institutions promote campus diversity and minimize international student enrollment risk (Choudaha & Chang, 2012).

Before and After the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election

Academic year 2015-2016 marked the first year in U.S. history that international student enrollment surpassed one million students (IIE, 2020). In fact, in the mid-2010s, the United States saw a surge of inbound international students, with enrollment numbers rising more than 35% from AY2011-2012 to AY2015-2016 (IIE, 2020). Academic year 2015-2016, however, also marked the first year that enrollment growth began to slow (IIE, 2020). One significant reason for the slowdown in growth was the economic downturn in China, a country that has long served as a source country for U.S.-bound international students (Choudaha, 2017). Some scholars have noted that in the wake of the sluggish economy, Chinese students have questioned the value of a U.S. education, particularly as it pertains to work and immigration opportunities post-completion (Chao et al., 2017; Choudaha, 2017; Choudaha & Hu, 2016). International student enrollment data confirms this trend (IIE, 2020). From AY2017-2018 to AY2018-2019, Chinese international student enrollment rose only 1.7%, whereas just six years earlier, from AY2011-2012 to AY2012-2013, enrollment from China rose more than 20% (IIE, 2020). Nevertheless, Choudaha (2017) argued that two other prominent factors have contributed

to the change in international student mobility to the United States: (a) A surge in nationalism around the world, and (b) A surge in nationalism in the United States, with the 2016 election of U.S. President Donald Trump.

A Surge in Nationalism around the World. The United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, more often referred to as the Brexit referendum, took place on June 23, 2016 and by some standards, may have sent a foreboding message about the coming U.S. presidential election (Choudaha, 2017; Martin & Bowman, 2019; Stephens, 2019). Although critics of the Brexit referendum characterized it as “evidence of the enduring force of nationalist sentiment and imperial racism” (Stephens, 2019, p. 405), the referendum passed in favor of Brexit, or withdrawal from the European Union, with 51.9% of the vote (The Electoral Commission, 2019). The enactment of Brexit was not immediate, but the effect on international student mobility to the United Kingdom was (McLeay et al., 2018). Indeed, a number of researchers have highlighted changes in international student perspectives on U.K. study, particularly among Chinese students (Huang, 2020), Arab and Indian students (McLeay et al., 2018), African students (Langa et al., 2018), and graduate students from around the world (Thomson, 2019).

This swell of nationalism was hardly unique to the United Kingdom (Bieber, 2018). Rather, Bieber (2018) argued that nationalistic rhetoric centered around Brexit in the United Kingdom gave rise to significant growth in nationalist-orientated parties around the world. A few notable examples include the Front National (FN) in France, headed by Marine Le Pen (Bieber, 2018), the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, headed by Narendra Modi (Kaul, 2017), and Social Liberal Party (PSL)/Alliance for Brazil (Aliança), both headed by Jair Bolsonaro (Chagas-Bastos, 2019).

Bieber (2018) further noted that elections of leaders from nationalist parties can quickly lead toward a shift in policies to reflect the goals of the parties. The emergence of nationalist parties in India and Brazil both present an interesting turn toward policy implementation based on dominant religious ideology (Chagas-Bastos, 2019; Kaul, 2017; Kinnvall, 2019). In the case of India, Prime Minister Modi and the BJP advocated for political policies centered around Hindutva, or Hindu nationalism, many of which targeted the country's Muslim minority (Kaul, 2017; Kinnvall, 2019). In contrast, Brazilian President Bolsonaro has called for evangelical Christian-centric policies, many of which are at odds with Brazil's non-evangelical and non-Christian populations (Chagas-Bastos, 2019). For many countries, France, India, and Brazil included, the rise of nationalism has played a particularly strong role in shaping immigration policies, including those affecting would-be international students (Bieber, 2018).

The 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. On November 8, 2016, Republican Donald J. Trump lost the popular vote to Democrat opponent Hilary Clinton, yet succeeded in winning 306 Electoral College votes, enough to secure his place as the 45th president of the United States (The New York Times, 2017). The election of President Trump and the resurgence of the far-right fell hand-in-hand with the nationalist trajectories of countries like the United Kingdom, India, and Brazil (Bieber, 2018). Myriad scholars from all branches of academia have investigated the Trump candidacy and presidency, particularly through his rhetoric and policy (Bobo, 2017; Daniller, 2016; Giroux, 2017; Sides et al., 2017; Walley, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2018). Walley (2017) characterized the Trump candidacy and the 2016 U.S. presidential election as “extraordinarily divisive” (p. 231), while Giroux (2017) added that “the echoes of a fascist past have moved from

the margins to the center of American politics” (p. 887). Without a doubt, this would signal a new era for immigration and international student mobility to the United States (Choudaha, 2017).

For some scholars (Giroux, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2018), the election of President Trump signified not only the rise of nationalism in the United States, but more precisely, the rise of a specific brand of nationalism—white nationalism centered around Christian ideology. According to Whitehead et al. (2018), at the crux of white Christian nationalism and the Trump supporter base is the idea that the United States and Israel share a common history and victimhood. Giroux (2017) added that this perceived victimhood and national superiority has given way to “unapologetic racism” (p. 891). Given such a foundation, racist, xenophobic, and broadly anti-Muslim rhetoric flourished in the Trump campaign (Giroux, 2017). Indeed, in a press release on December 7, 2015, candidate Trump called for a total ban on all Muslims entering the United States (Diamond, 2015).

Travel bans are not unprecedented in the United States, yet a ban of this magnitude could only be likened in size and scale to the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 (Al Jazeera, 2017). The Chinese Exclusion Act, however, only banned individuals from China, whereas Trump’s threat proposed banning all Muslims from entry, regardless of their country of origin (Al Jazeera, 2017; Diamond, 2015). As it happened, Trump’s threat was not an empty one. Just seven days after his inauguration, President Trump issued what would be the first of three travel bans within his first year in office (Redden, 2018).

On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13769, the first travel ban most commonly referred to as the Trump travel ban, which banned entry for visa holders from seven Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Redden, 2018). The impact of the travel ban on higher education was swift (Redden, 2017a). International students, faculty, and staff from the targeted countries, many of whom were just returning to the United States after winter break, were barred from entry, despite holding valid visas (Redden, 2017a). Some institutions, including the University of Washington, which was sponsoring several visiting faculty members from the targeted countries, responded by filing lawsuits (Redden, 2017b). The first travel ban was ultimately enjoined by the federal courts and superseded by a second travel ban (Redden, 2018).

Executive Order 13780, or the second travel ban, was announced and signed by President Trump on March 6, 2017 (Redden, 2018). This time, the ban prohibited entry for individuals from six Muslim-majority countries: Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (Iraq was no longer included) (Redden, 2018). One other major difference in the second travel ban was that it exempted individuals holding valid visas, including F1 student visas (Redden). The ban, which was intended as a 90-day ban, expired (Redden, 2018).

President Trump enacted the final iteration of the travel ban, Presidential Proclamation 9645, on September 24, 2017 (Redden, 2018). The final version, which at the time of writing was still in effect, barred travel by individuals on specific types of visas from Chad, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen (Redden, 2018). International students on F1 visas from Chad, Libya, Venezuela, and

Yemen were exempt from the ban, whereas F1 visa holders from Iran, Iraq, and Somalia were subjected to additional scrutiny (Redden, 2018). International students from North Korea and Syria were banned outright (Redden, 2018). Although understanding a full timeline of the travel bans is important, some scholars have argued that the first iteration of the Trump travel ban had the most serious, lasting impact (Bartram, 2018; Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019).

The Trump travel ban had an immediate and significant impact on international student mobility in higher education in the United States (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017). Braaten (2017) remarked, “The ban struck directly at the global and open exchange of values and ideas that are at the core of the higher education mission in the United States” (p. 8). International student enrollment growth began slowing in AY2016-2017 (IIE, 2020), and Schulmann and Le’s (2018) survey of U.S. administrators in international enrollment management indicated that enrollments and applications are declining at a majority of U.S. institutions. As institutions struggled to respond to the sudden change in immigration policy (Moser et al., 2017; Pyle et al., 2017; Stein, 2018), some scholars identified particular concern for the ban’s impact on medical students (Duvivier et al., 2017), engineering students (Benderly, 2019), and graduate students as a whole (Jackson, 2019; Quilantan, 2018; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019).

Not unlike Brexit, one consequence of the Trump travel ban on international student mobility has been the rise of alternative student destinations and the fleeing of international students from the United States (Altbach & Reisberg, 2018; Choudaha, 2018; Yerger & Choudhary, 2019). Bhattacharyya (2017) and Yerger and Choudhary (2019) have indicated that many international students, including those from top source

countries like India, may be more hesitant to study in the United States due to their uncertainty around work opportunities and immigration policies governing work visa allotment. Data from the IIE's Project Atlas (2019a) supports the notion that international students are turning to new host countries. For AY2018-2019, the United States saw a measly 0.5% growth in enrollment, while Australia saw a 13.1% growth and Canada saw an impressive 17.5% growth (IIE, 2019). In discussing the growing preference among Indian students for Canada over the United States, Yerger and Choudhary (2019) note, "Canadian universities are likely to make further gains compared with U.S. universities in the enrollment of students from India in the 2018-2019 academic year and beyond" (p. 1201).

The shift in international student host countries following the Trump travel ban, however, has not been limited to major English-speaking countries (Choudaha, 2018). Instead, as more and more institutions in non-English-speaking countries move to offer programs in English, international students may consider these destinations, too (Choudaha, 2018). A few such destinations include regional options in Asia, like Japan, whose international student enrollment grew 10.9% in AY2018-2019; options in Europe, like Spain or the Netherlands, whose enrollment grew 10.5% and 12.4%, respectively; or even Latin American options like Chile, whose enrollment grew an astonishing 27.5% in that academic year (IIE, 2019).

The effect of the Trump travel ban on international students in the United States goes far beyond international student enrollment (Bartram, 2018; Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017). Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2017) have called for broad-reaching research into the policy environment, the spectrum of hate-fueled violence and

discrimination, and the emergence of student activism. Bartram (2018) echoes much of Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood's (2017) call for action, adding a request for more research into the experiences of international students in the Trump era. Nevertheless, international student mobility to the United States, or lack thereof in recent years, has wide-reaching implications for the future of higher education (Bhattacharyya, 2017; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019).

International Student Visa Policy and the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)

In the past twenty years, visa policy has been a hot topic of discussion both within the United States (Lowell, 2010; Mau et al., 2015; Neiman & Swagel, 2009; Woolston, 2017) and in countries around the world (Amante & Rodrigues, 2020; Infantino, 2016; Meloni, 2017). As the United States and the European Union in particular move to tighten control of their borders and devote increased attention to visa policy reform, some scholars have questioned who gets a visa, who is determined to be a genuine, trustworthy visitor, and who is not (Rygiel, 2008, Walters, 2006). The question of 'Who is allowed in?' is one that prompts many countries to seek out pre-emptive travel screening, in the form of a visa (Broeders & Hampshire, 2013). Because typically visa applicants must complete an application and/or appear for an interview at a U.S. embassy or consulate, these applicants can be screened to identify individuals who may have ill-intentions for traveling to the United States (Mau et al., 2015). Although visa applicants are screened for terrorist or criminal connections, the most common reason cited for visa ineligibility is failure to identify oneself as a legitimate nonimmigrant visitor (U.S. Department of State, n.d.c). This finding may result from an applicant failing to provide sufficient

connections to their country of origin, failing to show proof of significant funding to support their stay in the United States, or simply by having a significant other stateside, which may indicate to consular officials intention to overstay their visa (Mau et al., 2015; U.S. Department of State, n.d.c).

Visa policy, however, is not merely about countries determining who can or cannot enter (Mau et al., 2015). Policy can be a barrier to would-be immigrants and nonimmigrant visitors, in some cases spurring them to remain in their home countries or seek out other countries in which to study or work (Neumayer, 2011). Moreover, visas are expensive (Mau et al, 2015). At the time of writing, the application fee for the F1 student visa was \$160, which must be paid alongside the \$200 SEVIS fee, totaling \$360 just to apply (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b). Nevertheless, in the past 40 years, the United States has seen a surge of nonimmigrant visa applications, many seeking study or work opportunities (Mau et al., 2015; Urias & Yeakey, 2009).

As was previously discussed, international students have been recorded in the United States as early as the 18th century (Bevis & Lucas, 2007), yet prior to the mid-1980s, prospective students applied for U.S. visas in a similar manner as prospective tourists (Urias & Yeakey, 2009). In 1983, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS], which later became the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service [USCIS], attempted to better track international students in the United States by creating a monitoring system called the Student and School System [STSC] (Wong, 2006). The STSC further led to the development of two forms still used by host institutions today—the Form I-17, which approves institutions to host international students, and the Form I-20, which allows prospective students to apply for an F1 student visa at their nearest U.S.

embassy or consulate (Wong, 2006). Although this new system allowed for more control of international students on the front end, there remained little tracking of international students after their arrival in the United States (Urias & Yeakey, 2009).

The World Trade Center terrorist attack of 1993 prompted calls for investigation into visa policy reform, notably after it was discovered that the driver of the van in the attack entered the United States on an F1 student visa to attend Wichita State University (Alden, 2017; Wong, 2006). In response, the INS created the Task Force on Foreign Students Control, whose report led to the eventual Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 [IIRIRA], signed into law by President Clinton (Kerwin, 2018; Wong, 2006). One main goal, among others, of the IIRIRA was to require U.S. institutions to continually track their own international students (Wong, 2006). In 1997, the INS released a pilot project called the Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS), testing the feasibility of an electronic tracking system at 21 U.S. institutions (Wong, 2006). By most accounts, CIPRIS was a failure, with administrators citing a lack of staff and resources to fully implement the system (Rosser et al., 2007; Wong, 2006).

The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center created a sense of déjà vu for immigration officials. Once again, attackers involved in the atrocity were international students in the United States (K. A. C. Johnson, 2018; U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). This time, one individual entered the United States on a student visa (Johnson, 2018), while two others entered on a tourist visa, but later changed to a student status (U.S. Department of Justice, 2002). What followed the attacks was a series of deliberate, coordinated policies aimed at reimagining international student admission and monitoring

in the United States (K. A. C. Johnson, 2018; Lowell, 2010; Mau et al., 2015; Rosser et al., 2006; Urias & Yeakey, 2009; Wong, 2006).

Just before the 9/11 attacks, in July 2001, CIPRIS was revived and branded with a new name—the Student Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), which became part of a larger program entitled the Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) (Urias & Yeakey, 2009; Wong, 2006). In the months following the attacks, more institutional commitment and financial resources allowed the Department of Homeland Security to expand SEVIS, starting first with beta testing at 10 institutions in the Boston area (Wong, 2006). In October 2001, Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act that had immediate ramifications for U.S. institutions hosting international students (Urias & Yeakey, 2009).

First, the PATRIOT Act mandated that U.S. institutions comply with SEVIS reporting requirements in full by 2003 (Urias & Yeakey, 2009; Wong, 2006). These requirements included submitting a Form I-17 to be able to host international students, providing all incoming international students with a Form I-20 to apply for the F1 student visa, and reporting students' entry to/exit from the United States, along with physical address, course enrollment, academic status, and work authorization while in the United States (K. A. C. Johnson, 2018; Wong, 2006). Notably, the PATRIOT Act also spawned the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2001, which required institutions to report via SEVIS an international student's entry to the United States, but failure to enroll in coursework or maintain progress toward an approved degree plan (Urias & Yeakey, 2009).

Secondly, the USA PATRIOT Act gave rise to the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System [NSEERS], which targeted so-called “high-risk individuals” (p. 79)

from locations deemed source countries of terrorist activity (Urias & Yeakey, 2009). This program gave consular officials at U.S. embassies and consulates enhanced authority to screen certain individuals and allowed for agencies like Customs and Border Patrol [CBP] to collect students' fingerprints and photographs upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry (K. A. C. Johnson, 2018; Rosenblum, 2011; Urias & Yeakey, 2009). For some international students, NSEERS also meant that they were subject to periodic location reporting and additional fee payments (Rosenblum, 2011).

Understandably, these policies were met with backlash among current and prospective international students, along with many in the international education community (Kerwin, 2018; Jackson, 2004; K. A. C. Johnson, 2018; Lee, 2008; Lee & Rice, 2007; Urias & Yeakey, 2009). Lee and Rice (2007) noted that international students became resentful of the stringent immigration policies, with K. A. C. Johnson (2018) further citing this resentment as the result of costly application fees, long wait times, and “debilitating procedures” and “privacy encroachment” (p. 396). The stream of skilled immigrants and nonimmigrants to the United States that had gained momentum in the early days of the tech boom, began facing seemingly insurmountable challenges (Lowell, 2010). Kerwin (2018) stated that the USA PATRIOT Act and associated visa policies “severely punished US citizens and noncitizens of all statuses” (p. 192). Some students were driven away by perceived visa difficulties, delays, or denials (CGS, 2004; K. A. C. Johnson, 2018), while other would-be students felt increasingly alienated (Jackson, 2004). Urias and Yeakey (2009) aptly characterized this era of international education in the United States as highlighted by a “climate of fear” (p. 85)—fear stoked by American xenophobia and internalized by international students seeking an academic home.

At the time of writing, SEVIS remains largely unchanged. All U.S. institutions are required to have an approved Form I-17 listing all degree programs offered and all affiliated campus locations before admitting international students (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019). Additionally, all institutions must employ at least one designated school official [DSO] and primary designated school official [PDSO], whose responsibilities include issuing the Form I-20 for incoming international students and coordinating institutional SEVIS compliance (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019). Acting DSOs are required to keep all student records accurate and current, updating any status or program changes within 10 days (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019). Failure to maintain SEVIS compliance can result in punitive action for a DSO and/or institution, including revocation of the Form I-17, and can have unintended consequences for that institution's international students (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2019). Although SEVIS compliance is the only form of reporting required by the Department of Homeland Security, most institutions voluntarily report annual international student enrollment as part of the Institute for International Education's Open Doors Report (IIE, 2020).

A History of Travel Bans in the United States

The enactment of the 2017 Trump Administration travel ban, Executive Order 13769, and its subsequent iterations, was hardly the first time the United States has instituted travel restrictions limiting mobility for individuals from a particular societal group or country of origin (Al Jazeera, 2017; Maltz, 2018). Rather, the United States has a sordid history of wide-sweeping entrance bans on individuals based on the country of origin, race, religion, political affiliation, and even health status (Al Jazeera, 2017). To be

able to better understand the context, and ramifications, of the Trump travel ban, it is important to understand a basic history of travel bans in the United States.

For nearly 100 years following its independence from England, the United States was largely open to any immigrants who could make their way to U.S. shores, though notably, due to the 1790 Naturalization Act, only “free white persons” could establish citizenship (Lee, 2006). These relatively open borders began to change, however, in the late 1800s with the onset of racial discrimination aimed at the Chinese immigrant community in California and the Western United States (Chen, 2015; Lee, 2002, 2006). Chinese immigrants had originally been drawn to the Western United States to labor on the Transcontinental Railroad, but as the depressed post-Civil War economy began to affect White Americans, Chinese immigrants filled positions in restaurants and households, mining and construction work, accepting lower wages than their White counterparts (Chen, 2015). As these conditions persisted, hostility against the Chinese community grew and California and other states passed a series of anti-Chinese laws (Chen, 2015). One such law was the Page Act of 1875, which prevented immigration of Chinese women to the United States, effectively giving Chinese men no option but to return home or stay unmarried (Lee, 2006). This policy snowballed into the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which prohibited all immigration of Chinese individuals, both skilled and unskilled, into the United States (Chen, 2015; Lee, 2002; Lee, 2006). As Lee (2002) notes, this was the first time that the United States introduced a “gatekeeping” (p. 37) ideology. This devastating immigration policy was only overturned in 1943, after which the doors remained “half-open” (p. 14) until 1965 (Lee, 2006).

The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 led the way to a slippery slope of travel bans that would take place in the following 40 years (Lee, 2006). First, there was the “Gentleman’s Agreement” of 1907, signed into law by Theodore Roosevelt’s Administration, which banned Japanese laborers (Cullinane, 2014). Following was the Immigration Act of 1917, which is widely known as the first instance of the United States implementing a literacy test as part of naturalization requirements, but also seriously limited the number of individuals allowed into the United States from East Asia and the Pacific Islands (Massey, 2016). Continuing this quota system, the Immigration Act of 1921 was the first to establish limitations on immigrants from Europe, the majority of whom were from southern or eastern Europe and were Catholic (Massey, 2016). The Immigration Act of 1924 continued this mission, limiting the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe to only two percent of each nationality’s current population in the United States (Lee, 2006).

Until World War II, U.S. immigration policy and bans were largely country-specific (Lee, 2006). Around this time, the United States also began banning entry for certain individuals based on religion or political affiliation (Gross, 2015; Lee, 2006). Although not an outright ban, the United States famously turned away thousands of Jewish refugees during World War II (Al Jazeera, 2017; Gross, 2015). Not unlike the Trump travel ban, which cited terrorism concerns as the motivation for the ban, the exclusion of Jewish refugees was supposedly based on concerns of Nazi spies hiding amongst the refugees (Gross, 2015). Relatedly, the Internal Security Act of 1950, more commonly called the McCarran Act, prevented the entrance of individuals affiliated with

the Communist Party and marked the first travel ban based on political affiliation (Battisti, 2012).

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act marked a significant change in U.S. visa policy and attitudes toward immigrants (Lee, 2006). The Act not only eliminated country of origin quotas, but also paved the way for family reunifications, work and study opportunities, and sanctuary for those fleeing conflict around the world (Capps et al., 2015; Lee, 2006; Lee, 2015). This relatively open period in U.S. immigration history once again came to a halt following the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, in which 52 American citizens were held hostage in the U.S. embassy in Tehran for more than 400 days (Al Jazeera, 2017). President Carter issued Executive Order 12172, which called for the exclusion of Iranian nonimmigrant visitors (Dabashi, 2017). The following decade saw the expansion of travel bans to include individuals banned on the basis of health status—in the case of the Helms Amendment, a ban was instituted to prohibit entry of HIV-positive individuals (Finitsis et al., 2014). Remarkably and concerningly, this ban was only lifted in 2009 during the Obama Administration (Preston, 2009).

Though not as commonly known, all presidential administrations from Reagan to Obama have enacted at least one travel ban, most of which aimed at individuals from specific countries of origin (Manuel, 2017). Unlike the Trump travel ban, however, each of these bans was narrowly focused (Manuel, 2017). In Proclamation 5517 (1986), President Reagan suspended entry of certain Cuban nationals (those affiliated with the Communist Party), while in Proclamation 5887 (1988), he suspended entry of certain Nicaraguan nationals (those affiliated with the Sandinista National Liberation Front) (Manuel, 2017). During the Clinton Administration, individuals connected to rebel

groups and those impeding “transition to democracy” (p. 9) in Haiti, Zaire, Nigeria, Angola, Burma, and Sierra Leone were banned, as were members of the government of Sudan (Manuel, 2017). The Bush Administration meanwhile targeted individuals responsible for wartime atrocities in the Western Balkans, along with members of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe (Manuel, 2017).

Most recently, the Obama Administration issued a number of proclamations and executive orders which targeted individuals from specific countries involved in very specific criminal activities (Manuel, 2017). Two such examples are Executive Order 13606 (2012), which banned individuals who gave technological assistance to human rights atrocities committed by the Iranian and Syrian governments, and Executive Order 13685 (2014), which prohibited entry to individuals who materially or financially supported certain transactions in the Crimea region of Ukraine (Manuel, 2017). Perhaps most well-known during the Obama Administration was Proclamation 8693 (2011), in which President Obama temporarily suspended the issuance of visas to certain Iraqi nationals for a period of six months (Manuel, 2017; Mark 2017). The difference between the narrowly-focused aims of the travel bans of these administrations, and the broad, far-reaching aim of the Trump travel ban, however, is pronounced (Mark, 2017). Although copious research has been done into the effects of U.S. immigration policy as a whole (K. A. C. Johnson, 2018; Lee, 2006; Mau et al., 2015), because of their specificity, the travel bans of the Reagan through Obama administration have not garnered as much academic attention.

At the time of writing in 2020, some three years after the three iterations of the Trump travel ban, there has been a curious surge in travel bans, this time related to the

COVID-19 pandemic (CDC, 2020). A series of presidential proclamations have established travel restrictions for individuals coming from China and Iran, two of the first countries impacted by COVID-19, along with the European Schengen area, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Brazil (CDC, 2020). These travel restrictions differ from the Trump travel ban in that they only apply to individuals who have been in the affected countries for a period of 14 days, yet interestingly enough, they are having a similar effect on the ability of individuals to freely move (UNWTO, 2020). Not surprisingly, one of the primary groups affected is international students (NAFSA, 2020c).

On July 6, 2020, ICE and SEVP issued a guidance for COVID-19 and fall enrollment, which stated that international students enrolled in institutions going fully online for the fall semester due to COVID-19 would not be able to stay in the United States to complete their online course (NAFSA, 2020a). This guidance, which quickly became the subject of multiple lawsuits, was rescinded on July 24, 2020 (NAFSA, 2020b). Yet still, the damage was done. The original guidance sent international students throughout the United States into a stage of panic, with many students facing only online enrollment options for the fall semester and no way to leave the country (Lee, 2020). Indeed, some students faced the possibility of violating their F1 visa status while some scholars questioned if international students were being used as pawns by the federal government to force universities to offer face-to-face courses (Lee, 2020). It may still be too early to study the full effects of COVID-19, and its affiliated travel restrictions, on international student mobility, but taking a holistic view of travel bans in U.S. history can help readers better understand the nature and consequences of the 2017 Trump travel ban.

Muslim International Students at U.S. Institutions

The experiences of Muslim students at colleges and universities is a growing field of research both in the United States (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010; Ezzani & Brooks, 2019; McGuire et al., 2016; Seggie & Sanford, 2010; Stubbs & Sallee, 2013; Whitehead et al., 2019), and around the world (Possamai et al., 2016; Rissanen, 2014; Shah, 2019; Wang, 2018). Stegmeir (2017) noted that although more Muslim students, including native-born Americans, immigrants, and international students, are attending university, they are also navigating their identity, both in terms of how they are perceived as a college student and as a Muslim. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York City, an increasing number of Muslim students on university campuses have reported hate crimes and anti-Muslim rhetoric (Stegmeir, 2017). This trend is heightened among female Muslim students, and especially those who wear the hijab, or Islamic head covering, as “common stereotypes include the belief that all Muslim women are uneducated and lack control over their lives” (Stegmeir, 2017, p. 37). Understandably, confronting this stereotype on a university campus can be a monumental task.

The focus of this dissertation is Muslim international students, but it is important to note that many Muslim students at U.S. colleges and universities are American (Stubbs & Sallee, 2013). Indeed, Muslim students are increasing intersectional and diverse as a community in their own right (McGuire et al., 2016; Stubbs & Sallee, 2013). Studying American Muslim students at a U.S. institution, Stubbs and Sallee (2013) ascertained that the students’ dual, or multiple, identities allowed them to weave seamlessly among different social groups on campus. One interviewee added, “being Muslim does not preclude membership in mainstream American culture, and embracing her Americanism

does not diminish her Muslim values and heritage” (Stubbs & Sallee, 2013, p. 459). Still, other interviewees felt that their Muslim identity othered them—one student noting that “most college students are unlikely to see beyond her hijab” (Stubbs & Sallee, 2013, p. 459).

McGuire et al. (2016) and Seggie and Sanford (2010) also remarked on the importance of identifying and respecting the intersectionality that exists within the Muslim student community. One such example of diversity within the Muslim community is the way in which Muslim students present themselves, often seen as Muslim women who wear the hijab (Seggie & Sanford, 2010). Seggie and Sanford (2010) observed that female Muslim students who wore the hijab had a substantially different campus experience than those students who did not wear the hijab. McGuire et al. (2013) found that this experience was amplified among female Muslim students at predominantly white institutions (PWIs). Dress and presentation is one aspect of community diversity and Muslim intersectionality, but such intersectionality can also be represented in other identifying characteristics such as national origin, immigrant status, sexual orientation, gender identity, level of religiosity or religious practice, and more (McGuire et al., 2013).

Understanding this intersectionality is an important place to begin in understanding the roles that Muslim students play on U.S. university campuses (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010; Whitehead et al., 2019). Cole and Ahmadi (2010) argued that the movement toward campus diversity can and should extend beyond racial lines. Rather, institutions should strive to not only promote acceptance and understanding of Muslim students, but also acknowledge the role that Muslim students play in expanding non-

Muslim students' understanding of the world (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010). Indeed, on many campuses, including PWIs, religious and ethnic diversity can be as important and impactful as racial diversity (Cole & Ahmadi, 2010).

Muslim International Students. Unlike the emerging field of research in Muslim student experiences, there has been a dearth of literature specifically on the Muslim international student experiences (Anderson, 2020). Only a handful of scholars (Abu Rabia, 2017; Anderson, 2020; Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013) have researched the broader category of Muslim international student experiences at U.S. institutions. Likewise, there has been very limited research into the mobility behaviors of Muslim international students and international students from Muslim-majority countries (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019). Interestingly, other scholars have focused their attention on Muslim international students from specific countries, like Iraq (Fahad, 2015), Iran (Hefner-Babb & Khoshlessan, 2018), and Turkey (Duru & Poyrazli, 2011).

Tummala-Narra and Claudius (2013) provided one of the foundational pieces of literature on Muslim international students, exploring the ways in which these students adjust to the U.S. campus environment, make sense of their religious identity, and cope with harassment and discrimination. Their article, which focused on graduate students, highlighted some of the key differences between American graduate students and Muslim international graduate students, including the ways in which the students remained resilient in the face of ongoing stress and social isolation (Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013). These findings were corroborated by Abu Rabia's (2017) study on the experiences of Arab international students at U.S. institutions. Although not all Arab students are

Muslim, and not all Muslim students are Arab, the study revealed similar themes of cultural differences, stress, and social isolation among students (Abu Rabia, 2017).

Anderson (2020) has been the only scholar to date who has investigated the impact of the 2016 presidential election and subsequent Trump travel ban on the lives of Muslim international students in the United States. The findings of Anderson's (2020) study were telling—not only did Muslim international students experience daily discrimination, but they also identified a plethora of microaggressions that added to the perception of campus as an unwelcoming environment. One such microaggression was the general unfamiliarity among faculty members about the student's religion and country of origin (Anderson, 2020). Nevertheless, the students persisted despite being stereotyped and showed evidence of resiliency (Anderson, 2020).

A number of scholars have researched the experiences and behaviors of Muslim international students from specific countries, including two of the largest Muslim-majority source countries of international students in the United States, Turkey (Duru & Poyrazli, 2011; Bektas et al., 2009) and Saudi Arabia (Yakaboski et al., 2017). Much like studies of Tummala-Narra and Claudius (2013) and Anderson (2020), which explored experiences of Muslim international students from a wide variety of countries, both Duru and Poyrazli (2011) and Bektas et al., (2009) found that Turkish international students struggled at first to adapt culturally and reported significant levels of discrimination. Such discrimination was tempered once students became more active in a variety of social groups (Duru & Poyrazli, 2011).

The study by Yakaboski et al. (2017) has been one of the only studies to explore decision-making in international student mobility among a specific group of students, in

this case, Saudi students. Yakaboski (2017) notes that Saudi students' decision-making factors extended far beyond those of Mazzarol and Soutar's (2002) traditional *push-pull* factors. Instead, Saudi students employed a collectivist decision-making process, placing great value on the input of their family and the institutional ranking and reputation of a U.S. university in Saudi Arabia (Yakaboski et al., 2017).

Literature on international students from the Muslim-majority countries affected by the Trump travel ban (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) is extremely limited (Anderson, 2020; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019), but there has been some research into the experiences and lives of Iranian (Hefner-Babb & Khoshlessan, 2018), Iraqi (Fahad, 2015), and Syrian (Abu Rabia, 2017) international students at U.S. universities. Much of this literature focuses on narrow aspects of overall cultural adjustment, like language acquisition and linguistic difficulties (Abu Rabia, 2017; Fahad, 2015). To date, there has been no literature on Libyan international students in the United States, and all literature on Somali, Sudanese, and Yemeni students has been focused on K-12 education (Brooks, 2008; Oikonomidoy, 2007, 2009; Pereira et al., 2017; Sarroub, 2001).

Iran has routinely served as one of the largest Muslim-majority source countries for international students in the United States and as such, serves as an interesting case study, despite the limited literature (Hefner-Babb & Khoshlessan, 2018; IIE 2019b). Every year since AY2012-2013, Iran has ranked in the top 15 source countries (among all countries, not just Muslim-majority countries) for international students in the United States (IIE, 2020). This status came about largely as the result of a growing youth population and increased competition for places at Iran's prominent universities (Ortiz,

2014). In particular, Iranian students have historically been drawn to STEM programs in the United States (Ortiz, 2014), and in recent years, some estimate that more than half of Iranian international students in the United States are enrolled in engineering programs (Matthews & Lord, 2017). Hefner-Babb and Khoshlessan (2018) observed that Iranian graduate students have a particularly difficult time navigating the U.S. university admission process and are often stymied by the hurdles they must jump through to get a U.S. student visa. Because there is no functioning U.S. embassy in Iran, Iranian students must go to the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, or further afield to apply for an F1 student visa (Hefner-Babb & Khoshlessan, 2018). Describing the process as an “obstacle course” (p. 26), Matthews and Lord (2017) added that in light of the Trump travel ban, Iranian students have been subjected to additional scrutiny in their visa applications, with some would-be students in aerospace, chemical, materials, or nuclear engineering simply deciding to study in another country, knowing their U.S. visa rejection is “all but certain” (p. 26).

Islamophobia. Calling Americans “bad Samaritans” (p. 1791), Sherkat and Lehman (2018), remarked that “Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election was sparked by an openly anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim campaign” (p. 1800). According to the Pew Research Center (Lipka, 2017), Muslims now constitute more than 1% of the U.S. population, and likewise, Muslim student populations are growing on U.S. university campuses. Alarming, however, has been the surge in Islamophobia and anti-Muslim rhetoric that has occurred leading up to, and following, the 2016 U.S. presidential election (Beydoun, 2017). Beydoun (2017) noted that such occurrences of “political Islamophobia” (p. 1733) served to further cast Muslims as outsiders. Sherkat

and Lehman (2018) added that because Muslims were considered members of a cultural out-group, Americans have developed a hostile view toward Muslims, and particularly Muslim immigrants.

These views bleed into higher education, and some scholars have addressed Islamophobia on college campuses in the United Kingdom (Harrison & Peacock, 2010) and in the United States (Ali, 2014; Rockenbach et al., 2017). Studying the presence of Islamophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes on U.K. college campuses, Harrison and Peacock (2010) reported that white international students, and those students from the European continent, were more likely to be accepted in British social circles than their non-white, non-European peers. Likewise, Muslim students, and those from Muslim-majority countries, were more likely to be stereotyped and have difficulty forming friendships with British classmates (Harrison & Peacock, 2010).

Rockenbach et al. (2017) studied perceptions of Muslim students and Islam among U.S. college students, finding that non-Muslim students' religious affiliation, or lack thereof, greatly influenced their acceptance of, or hostility toward, their Muslim peers. In particular, students who identified as Unitarian Universalist or agnostic were most likely to have positive perceptions of Muslim students, while students who identified as Eastern Orthodox or evangelical Christian were more likely to have hostile views toward Muslim students (Rockenbach et al., 2017). Even writing before the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump travel ban, Ali (2014) analyzed the ways in which Muslim students cope with hostility on campus and observed that some non-Muslim students perceived Muslim students as a physical threat. Interesting, too, were the gendered perceptions of Muslim students. Ali (2014) noted that although non-Muslim

students characterized Muslim men as dangerous, they often characterized Muslim women as “submissive” or “uneducated” (p. 1255). According to Ali (2014), Islamophobia on campus was rooted in deeper xenophobic and Islamophobic trends in politics and law. Summarizing his study, Ali (2014) wrote, “The students stated that their peers believed it is not simply some Muslims who are dangerous, but that every Muslim runs the risk of ‘becoming radicalized’ and is thus dangerous” (p. 1257). He continued, “beyond simply feeling culturally dislocated and isolated, the students stated that they were treated as if they embodied a singular, unchanging, ‘Muslim other’” (Ali, 2014, p. 1257).

Institutional Ranking and International Student Choice

As students around the world are becoming increasingly mobile, some scholars (Beine et al., 2014; Falcone, 2017; Findlay et al., 2011; Friedman, 2018) have investigated the ways in which university ranking and institutional status (elite v. non-elite, selective v. non-selective) influence international student destination choice. Moreover, some researchers, including Friedman (2017), opt to study the ways in which political and economic events, like Brexit in the United Kingdom or the 2016 presidential election in the United States, affect institutions differently based on their ranking or elite/non-elite status. To understand this phenomenon better, one should be familiar with the recent history of institutional rankings, the rise of world-class institutions, and how institutional ranking acts as a determinant in international student choice.

A Recent History of Institutional Rankings

Marginson (2006) defined access to elite institutions through the framework of Hirsch's (1976) theory of positional goods, aptly noting that "Given the absolute limit on the number of high value positional good, there is an absolute limit on the number of high value institutions, and on the size of individual institutions within the prestige grouping" (p. 4). In other words, the scarcity of elite institutions and the number of seats available for students at each institution, fosters their inherent value and prestige (Marginson, 2006). Interestingly, in comparing elite and non-elite institutions, he added, "The acid test is that when faced by a choice between a prestigious university with known indifference to undergraduate teaching, and a lesser institution offering better classroom support, nearly everyone opts for prestige" (Marginson, 2006, p. 3). Although university prestige and name recognition are not new concepts, present-day systems for ranking universities are a relatively recent creation (Vieira & Lima, 2015).

According to Hazelkorn (2011), institutional ranking systems have been in place in the U.S. since the late 1950s, but most of the early systems focused on graduate and professional education only. Two such examples include the 1966 *Assessment of Quality in Graduate Education* and the 1973 *Ranking of Professional Schools*, featured in *Change* magazine (Hazelkorn, 2011). Only in 1979 did the first comprehensive ranking of institutions in the U.S., which was featured in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*, appear (Hazelkorn, 2011). Just a few years after, in 1983, the *US News and World Report Best Colleges and Universities* (USNWR) rankings debuted (Hazelkorn, 2011).

Rankings systems spread globally as two worldwide ranking systems were established in the early 2000s—the *Academic Ranking of World Universities* (ARWU) in

2003 and the *Times Higher Education (THE) World University Rankings* in 2004 (Vieira & Lima, 2015). The ARWU originated at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, at the request of the Chinese government, and is often referred to as the *Shanghai Ranking* (Vieira & Lima, 2015). The THE World University Rankings, in contrast to the ARWU, were not affiliated with any institution, but were based in the United Kingdom (Vieira & Lima, 2015). This global spread of institutional rankings indicated a shift in the idea that only U.S. institutions could be globally competitive (Findlay et al., 2011; Marginson, 2006; Vieira & Lima, 2015).

As the USNWR, ARWU, and THE World University Rankings rose to prominence, some scholars began questioning the reliability of such institutional rankings and role they should play in student choice (Amsler & Bolsmann, 2011; Anowar et al., 2015; Soh, 2016). Although the ranking indicators vary somewhat from system to system, the aforementioned systems all use some of the following indicators to establish institutional rankings: Institution size, faculty qualifications, research and publications, student employability, and student qualifications (entrance exam scores, grade point averages, etc.) (Anowar et al., 2015; Vieira & Lima, 2015). Despite these limitations, university ranking systems have given rise to the quest for institutions to become “world-class” (Findlay et al., 2011).

The Rise of World-Class Institutions

Historian Adam Nelson (2007) remarked the emergence of world-class institutions began when U.S. scholars, as early as the 1800s, traveled to other countries to conduct research. These scholars forged partnerships with their peers (and the peers’ institutions) around the world, sparking a spirit of internationalism, but also began to take

pride in their own home institutions, leading to a feeling of nationalism (Nelson, 2007). This dichotomy of internationalism and nationalism prompted U.S. institutions to not only reach out and partner with institutions in other countries, but also to try to exceed them in terms of institutional reputation (Nelson, 2007).

In attempting to define “world-class” universities, Altbach (2015) put it nicely, “Everyone wants a world-class university. No country feels it can do without one. The problem is that no one knows what a world-class university is, and no one has figured out how to get one” (p. 5). Nonetheless, the development of the AWRU and the THE World University Rankings were clear challenges to the idea of U.S. hegemony in elite higher education (Deem et al., 2008). Deem et al. (2008) asked, a world-class university is drafted in “whose image?” (p. 83), and questioned the one-size-fits-all approach of the USNWR ranking. The emergence of global ranking systems forced U.S. institutions to analyze not only how they measure up to one another, but also how they measure up to comparable institutions in Europe, Asia, and beyond (Deem et al., 2008).

This competition for higher education dominance and respect had two interesting side effects. First, such competition led to the emergence of more research universities outside the United States (Mohrman et al., 2008). Secondly, it necessitated that U.S. institutions become more global (Friedman, 2018). Mohrman et al. (2008) suggested that although the development of a world-class university is “rooted in the American experience” (p. 6), there are an increasing number of research institutions located outside the United States. These institutions, which Mohrman et al. (2008) classified as part of the Emerging Global Model (EGM), featured eight common characteristics: Global mission, intensity of research, diversified funding, worldwide recruitment, new roles for

professors, new government and industry relationships, increasing complexity, and international partnerships with similar institutions. As more and more universities outside the United States began to fit into these criteria, U.S. elite universities felt pressure to increase their global capacity (Friedman, 2018). Friedman (2018) described this shift as a move away from the image of elite flagship institutions as a source of national pride, and toward the emergence of a global academic community. In other words, what does a Yale or Stanford alum look like? How has this image shifted in the past 50 years?

Institutional Ranking and International Student Choice

As Macrander (2017a) noted, one of the largest *push* factors in international student mobility is family expectations. Several scholars (Findlay et al., 2011; Kim & Gasman, 2011; Lee & Wright, 2016; Waters, 2005) have identified the importance of the role that family plays not only in international student destination choice, but also specifically in choosing elite, or highly-ranked, institutions. In discussing family influence within the context of China, Findlay et al. (2011) suggested parents might increase their children's social capital (and in turn, their own) by sending their children to international elite universities, such as those in the United States. Waters (2005) added that parents of international students may explore spatial strategies in the pursuit of academic credentials, class reproduction, and migration opportunities for their children.

Institutional ranking and brand name recognition go hand-in-hand for international students who seek to study in the United States (Falcone, 2017). In fact, branding and reputation management are so important for the recruitment of international students to the United States that some U.S. institutions have engaged in country-specific marketing campaigns (Falcone, 2017). Of course, most elite U.S. universities (Harvard

University, Yale University, and many others) already sport global brand-name recognition, a characteristic that satisfies parents and their would-be international students (Falcone, 2017). Falcone (2017) suggested that some countries, like China, that value domestic university rankings, may be even more inclined to ascribe to U.S. university rankings and associated value. Spilimbergo (2009) took this idea one step further, suggesting that if international students could not get into the elite U.S. university of their choice, they may very well have remained in their home country. Indeed, because students' university selection can be tied to their future work or migration opportunities, institutional ranking serves as a dynamic magnet for international student mobility (Beine et al., 2014; Macrander, 2017a).

The *Trump Effect* and Academic Responses to the Trump Travel Ban

The election of U.S. President Donald J. Trump on November 8, 2016 marked the beginning of a new era for international education and international student mobility to the United States. The subsequent travel bans (Executive Order 13769, Executive Order 13780, and Presidential Proclamation 9745), directed at nonimmigrant travelers from seven Muslim-majority countries, wreaked havoc on the educational goals and aspirations of would-be international students from those countries (Bartram, 2018). Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2017) wrote, "We are living in troubling and uncertain times" (p. I). They continued, "The international student community is currently living in a *precarious world of insecurity* (italics in original) in which international students are increasingly becoming the targets of violence and discrimination based on race, religion, ethnicity, and national origin" (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017, p. II). This insecurity is heightened not only by policy decisions,

but also by hate-filled anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant rhetoric, unconventional communication styles, and rash decision-making that some scholars have termed the *Trump Effect* (SPLC, 2016). Studying the reverberations of the *Trump Effect* and Trump immigration policy is a unique opportunity for academics in the field of higher education (Bartram, 2018).

The *Trump Effect*. Although now commonly used both in academia and the media, the Southern Poverty Law Center was among the first to use the term *Trump Effect* in their 2016 study on the rise of bullying in U.S. schools. The SPLC (2016) found that not only was there a rise in bullying cases attributed to the heightened racial tensions and political divisiveness sowed by the Trump campaign, there was a clear rise in anti-immigrant, and specifically anti-Hispanic and anti-Muslim, sentiment among students. The SPLC (2016) documented that the slur *Trump* was often used against Hispanic students, along with mocking threats about deportation, while the slur *ISIS* was commonly used against Muslim students (and even non-Muslim students who were perceived to be Muslim or Middle Eastern).

Use of the term *Trump Effect* quickly spread to other academic circles, as scholars in sociology (Crandall et al., 2018), political science (Love, 2017), and medicine (Brady et al., 2017), among other fields, began studying how the term represented a shift in cultural ideology in their practices. Within the field of education, some researchers (AAUP, 2017) have explored the *Trump Effect* on faculty academic freedom and targeting, while other researchers (López & Pérez, 2018; Muñoz et al., 2018) have studied its impact on students in the Latinx community. All of this research posed unique

questions about the *Trump Effect*, however the term is particularly compelling in discussions of Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Even in the early days of his candidacy, Donald Trump was posting anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim rhetoric and graphics on Twitter, in his unconventional communication style (Hossain, 2020). In December 2015, nearly one year before his election, he posted "The United Kingdom is trying hard to disguise their massive Muslim program. Everybody is wise to what is happening, very sad! Be honest" (Trump, 2015). Just one week later on an interview show, Trump referenced Muslims as "sick," adding "There's a sickness. They're a sick people. There's a sickness going on. There's a group of people that is very sick" (Fox News, 2015). In describing Trump's anti-Muslim rhetoric, Alsultany (2020) noted, "Islamophobia in the U.S. did not start with Trump, but his tweets perpetuate a long history of equating Muslims with terrorism" (para 1).

Interestingly, even many media sources, including *CNN*, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*, which are typically keen to remain impartial and apolitical, have denounced Trump rhetoric in scathing opinion pieces (Hossain, 2020; Klaas, 2019). Hossain (2020) characterized Trump's rhetoric and social media presence as "hateful and shameful" (para 13), adding that "Americans, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, are owed an apology for this filthy language coming from the highest level of our government" (para 13). Writing for the *New York Times*, former national security adviser Susan E. Rice (2019) called Trump an "unabashed bigot" (para 7), while *Washington Post* contributor Brian Klaas (2019) labeled Trump an "Islamophobic bigot" (para 3). Academics have followed suit in condemning Trump's rhetoric and the actions of the Trump Administration as a whole, with some scholars calling the administration a "racist

regime” (Moser et al., 2017, p. 175), and advocating for “resistance against exclusionary, Islamophobic, xenophobic, and patriarchal nationalism” (Gökariksel, 2017, p. 470).

Academic Responses to the Trump Travel Ban. At the time of writing, there have been fewer than ten empirical studies directly investigating the impact of the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump travel ban within the field of higher education (K. Johnson, 2018; Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Pyle et al., 2018; Todoran & Peterson, 2019; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019). The titles of these manuscripts, along with editorial pieces, are telling in and of themselves. Titles like “Should They Stay or Should They Go? How the 2017 U.S. Travel Ban Affects International Doctoral Students” (Todoran & Peterson, 2019), “Unwelcome on Campus? Predictors of Prejudice Against International Students” (Quinton, 2019), and “Has President Trump Scared Away All the Foreign Students?” (Usher, 2019) indicate that the election and the travel ban have had a monumental impact on higher education in the United States.

In one of the first higher education empirical studies following the announcement of the Trump travel ban, Pyle et al. (2017) investigated the institutional responses to the travel ban. Broadly categorizing the responses of U.S. universities into five groupings, ranging from informational to condemnation of the executive order, Pyle et al. (2017) concluded that institutional responses were key in building and maintaining relationships with important stakeholders, including prospective international students, current international students, and the wider international and Muslim communities. Specifically, they noted that institutions perceived to be “acting rather than simply speaking” were seen as most supportive to their students (Pyle et al., 2017).

A number of studies focused on the effect of the Trump travel ban on the international student community have included the consequences for international student mobility, including international student retention and recruitment (K. Johnson, 2018; Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Todoran & Peterson, 2019; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019). Looking qualitatively at international student retention at one university in Ohio, Pottie-Sherman (2018) remarked that “In the age of Trump, international students in the United States are navigating new everyday landscapes of exclusion” (p. 35). This was particularly true for international students intending to stay in the U.S. after completing their degree program, as part of the Optional Practical Training (OPT) program (a program provides work authorization for international students post-graduation) (Pottie-Sherman, 2018). As the political landscape became increasingly hostile, international students felt uncertain about their job and immigration prospects (Pottie-Sherman, 2018). Now, Pottie-Sherman (2018) adds, students must navigate “a new axis of risk in the education-migration nexus” (p. 37).

Todoran and Peterson (2019), like Pottie-Sherman (2018), found that international students were increasingly concerned about their job prospects in the United States following the Trump travel ban. In their qualitative study on international doctoral students, they deduced that students were wary to travel to the United States for education if there were insecurities, perceived or actual, to their safety, overall well-being, job prospects, and migration opportunities (Todoran & Peterson, 2019). Studying international students at the University of North Dakota, and utilizing a qualitative methodology, K. Johnson (2018) affirmed the balancing act that international students must engage in when considering educational opportunities in the United States in the

Trump era. She reported that most international students, but particularly those from Middle Eastern countries, identified their anxieties around their international status and the broad uncertainty over their future in the United States (K. Johnson, 2018).

To date, there has been only one quantitative study on the effect of the Trump travel ban on international student mobility to the United States (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019). Examining the change in applications from international graduate students at two Texas public universities in the period before and after the Trump travel ban, Van De Walker and Slate (2019) reported a slight decline in applications from students from non-Muslim-majority countries, and a steep decline in applications from students from Muslim-majority countries. Most notable was the change in applications from students from the countries included in the Trump travel ban (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen)—a shocking 53.93% decline (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019).

Need for Further Research

In light of the sudden immigration policy changes following the election of Donald Trump, some immigration experts have attempted to make sense of the situation, outlining the changes for immigrant and nonimmigrant travels, as well as predicting possible consequences of the Trump travel ban (Pierce, 2019; Pierce & Meissner, 2017). Within higher education, Usher (2018) has questioned the impact of the *Trump Effect* not only on international student mobility, but also on the predicted revenue fallout from a downturn in international student enrollment at U.S. institutions. Some scholars (Reardon, 2017a, 2017b) have also questioned the ways in which declining international student enrollment may be particularly problematic for the STEM industry in the United States. Reardon (2017a) noted that Silicon Valley's entrepreneurial tech start-up scene

“draws heavily on foreign science and engineering talent” (p. 158), suggesting that the effects of the travel ban may be longer lasting than most people anticipate.

One scholar (Fischer, 2017) has suggested that “it isn’t all Donald Trump’s fault” (para 1), pointing to the fact that the Obama-era policy extending Optional Practical Training (OPT) for STEM majors to 36 months may be in part to blame. Fischer (2017) argued that the OPT STEM extension falsely inflated international student enrollment numbers in the three years leading up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election as international students enrolled in OPT remain on F1 student visas hosted by their institution. There is no empirical evidence to support this and at the time of writing, the OPT STEM extension was still in effect (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, n.d.b). Choudaha (2018) also suggested that a decline in international student enrollment was likely, regardless of the Trump electoral win and travel ban, due to a rise in interest in alternative study destinations like Canada or Australia. Nevertheless, some international education experts (K. Johnson, 2018; Yerger & Choudhary, 2019) note that there is still considerable interest in studying in the United States among prospective international students.

Just six months after the first iteration of the Trump travel ban, Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2017) wrote an editorial in the *Journal of International Students*, which has served as the foundational and guiding call to action for researchers interested in the convergence of international student mobility and immigration policy. Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood (2017) outlined a new research agenda in the wake of the travel ban, focused on five key areas: (a) The policy environment, (b) The socio-political atmosphere, (c) The continuum of violence and discrimination, (d) The degree of student

activism and resistance, and (e) The research positionality effect. Within the policy environment area, they posit, “What implications do government policies have for the international student community?” (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2017, p. IV). The answers to such questions are complex, but they draw attention to the devastating consequence of irrational immigration policy on international student mobility.

Several scholars (K. Johnson, 2018; Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Todoran & Peterson, 2019; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019) have answered Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood’s call for action, specifically as it pertains to the impact of the Trump travel ban on immigration policy and international student mobility and each scholar has called for further research into this new agenda. Todoran and Peterson (2019) urged stakeholders to continue research on the effects of an unpredictable political climate on international students. K. Johnson (2018) encouraged further research into the consequences of “discrimination, violence, travel restrictions, and limited job opportunities” (p. 440) in the wake of the Trump travel ban. Van De Walker and Slate (2019), whose study focused on international student mobility among students from Muslim-majority countries to Texas, compelled researchers to study international student enrollment change on a national level. Lastly, Pottie-Sherman (2018) called for more research into the unequal effects of the Trump travel ban on international student mobility at institutions based on their institutional type, geographic region, or ranking.

This dissertation will serve as a direct response to Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood’s (2017) call for a new research agenda. To do this, the researcher will directly answer Van De Walker and Slate’s (2019) call for more research into the mobility of students from Muslim-majority countries throughout the United States for the period

before and after the Trump travel ban, and Pottie-Sherman's (2018) call for more research into the disparities of institutions affected by the travel ban. In doing so, this dissertation will directly fill a substantial gap in the literature.

CHAPTER III

Method

The purpose of this traditional dissertation was to analyze the extent to which enrollment of international students at U.S. institutions changed, or did not change, in the years leading up to and after the 2016 U.S. presidential election and 2017 Trump travel ban, specifically AY2014-2105 to AY2019-2020. Two variables were investigated as part of this analysis—student country of origin and institutional ranking. For the first variable, three groups were analyzed: (a) International students from selected non-Muslim-majority countries, (b) International students from selected Muslim-majority countries not included in the Trump travel ban, and (c) International students from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (the seven countries affected by the Trump travel ban). For the second variable, two groups were analyzed: (a) Student enrollment at elite universities, and (b) Student enrollment at non-elite universities. This chapter outlines what was studied and the procedures of the study.

Research Questions

The following research questions were addressed in this study:

1. What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment and student country of origin?
2. What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment and institutional type (elite or non-elite)?
3. What was the three-way interaction effect between international student enrollment, student country of origin, and institutional type?

The following two time periods were addressed in the analysis: AY 2014-2015 to AY 2016-2017, which served as a proxy for time period *before* the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump travel ban, and AY 2017-2018 to AY 2019-2020, which served as a proxy for the time period *after* the election and travel ban.

Research Design

A quantitative, non-experimental, longitudinal, causal comparative research design was utilized (Creswell, 2014; Menard, 2008). This study was non-experimental because only archival data was used for comparison and because the Trump travel ban was not specifically and directly aimed at international student mobility. Menard (2008) noted that longitudinal designs can be implemented to help better understand data from two or more time periods. This study can be classified as longitudinal because two distinct time periods were examined (AY2014-2015 to AY2019-2020). Lastly, this study employed a causal comparative approach. Although studies with causal comparative research designs cannot establish true cause and effect, they can be useful in offering a possible cause for an event or phenomenon that has already occurred (Creswell, 2014; Johnson & Christensen, 2014). Indeed, causal comparative research designs are often characterized as *ex post facto* designs (Creswell, 2014). This was a suitable research design for this dissertation because the three research questions examined international student enrollment trends based on two events—the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the Trump travel ban—that had already occurred.

Data Source

For more than 70 years, the Institute for International Education [IIE], a division of the U.S. Department of State, has collected international student enrollment data from U.S. institutions as part of their annual *Open Doors Report* (IIE, 2020). All institutions that are SEVP-approved to host international students and have at least one designated school official (DSO), are invited to report their yearly international student enrollment to the U.S. Department of State. This data can be disaggregated by student country of origin, status (e.g. undergraduate, graduate, non-degree-seeking), major, gender, marital status, and funding status (e.g. self-funded, government-sponsored) (IIE, 2020). All institutions with at least 10 international students are included in the final yearly report (IIE, 2020).

Each year in November, the IIE releases a public version of the *Open Doors Report*, which includes aggregated enrollment data on international student country of origin and status, along with other mobility trend data, such as sponsored student and study abroad (U.S. outbound students) mobility (IIE, 2020). The public report also highlights the Top 25 host institutions for international students each year (IIE, 2020). The *Open Doors Report* also contains data on student demographic characteristics (major, gender, marital status, etc.), which is restricted for institutional privacy. For the purpose of this dissertation, the *Open Doors Report* for institutional-level enrollment data was used, as well as student country of origin data. Access to institutional-level data is by request only. It was recommended by IIE research staff that the number of countries in the request be limited to 25 (J. Baer, personal communication, February 20, 2020). The

fulfillment of the custom data set request took approximately one month. The details of this non-disclosure agreement are provided in Appendix B.

Sample and Sampling Procedures

Over one million international students currently study in the United States, hosted at more than 1,500 institutions. Given the constraints accessing this data from IIE, a purposive sample of 25 countries was selected for inclusion in this study. The goal of this purposive sample was to include all seven countries impacted by the Trump travel ban, seven of the top Muslim-majority source countries not included in the Trump travel ban, and 11 of the top non-Muslim-majority source countries for international students in the United States.

Table 1

Purposive Sample of 25 Countries

Countries affected by the Trump travel ban	Muslim-majority countries not affected by ban	Non-Muslim-majority countries
Iran	Bangladesh	Brazil
Iraq	Indonesia	Canada
Libya	Kuwait	China
Somalia	Nigeria	Germany
Sudan	Pakistan	India
Syria	Saudi Arabia	Japan
Yemen	Turkey	Mexico
		South Korea
		Taiwan
		Thailand
		Vietnam

Each of these countries, except for those in the first group, were selected because they appeared among the top 10 source countries for international students in the United States at least once from AY2014-2015 to AY2019-2020 (IIE, 2020).

It was anticipated that these groups would not be equal in the number of cases, and attempts to balance the groups may have defeated the intended purpose of understanding their differences. Using AY2014-2015 aggregated data from all institutions as an example, there were 16,216 international students from Group 1 countries, 108,194 students from Group 2 countries, and 644,794 students from Group 3 countries (IIE, 2020). This discrepancy is illustrated in Table 2.

Table 2

Inequality of Group Sizes Using AY2014-2015 Example

Group 1 countries and AY2014-2015 enrollment		Group 2 countries and AY2014-2015 enrollment		Group 3 countries and AY2014-2015 enrollment	
Iran	11,338	Bangladesh	5,455	Brazil	23,675
Iraq	1,727	Indonesia	8,188	Canada	27,240
Libya	1,578	Kuwait	9,034	China	304,040
Somalia	32	Nigeria	9,494	Germany	10,193
Sudan	233	Pakistan	5,354	India	132,888
Syria	792	Saudi Arabia	59,945	Japan	19,064
Yemen	516	Turkey	10,724	Mexico	17,052
				South Korea	63,710
				Taiwan	20,993
				Thailand	7,217
				Vietnam	18,722
<i>n</i> = 16,216		<i>n</i> = 108,194		<i>n</i> = 644,794	

Note. Enrollment data from the Open Doors Report (IIE, 2020).

Although theoretically I could have attempted to balance the groups by number of countries (having seven countries in each group), this could have inadvertently excluded non-Muslim-majority countries that contributed a greater number of students than Muslim-majority countries from AY2014-2015 to AY2019-2020. Using AY2014-2015 aggregated data again as an example, Pakistan was the selected Muslim-majority (Group 2) country with the lowest number of students—5354 students (IIE, 2020). Meanwhile, Thailand was the selected non-Muslim-majority (Group 3) country with the lowest number of students—7217 students (IIE, 2020). To exclude Thailand in an attempt to balance the number of countries in each group would have misrepresented the top source countries of international students for this time period.

The Open Doors Report provides institutional-level data for international student enrollment, yet it does not include information on institutional ranking (IIE, 2020). For the purpose of this study, the researcher utilized the U.S. News & World Report (2020) Best National University Rankings to create two groups of institutions, termed *elite* and *non-elite*. The *elite* university grouping included the universities ranked #1-#100 on the Best National University Rankings list (U.S. News & World Report, 2020). The *non-elite* grouping included a random sample of 100 universities ranked #101 or lower on the list. Thus, the final sample included a total of 200 institutions. The random sample was generated by inputting all eligible universities into a random generator computer application.

In order to minimize external factors that may have caused misrepresentation in the data, the following types of institutions were excluded: (a) Institutions that are not eligible to host international students; (b) Institutions that are not classified doctoral

universities (R1, R2, or D/PU) by the Carnegie Commission (Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.); and (c) Special focus institutions (e.g. seminaries). Inclusion of institutions that are ineligible to host international students, along with special focus institutions, could have resulted in an unintentional misrepresentation of student enrollment. For example, as a special focus institution, a Christian seminary may be significantly less likely to host students from Muslim-majority countries than a regular institution. Likewise, institutions that are not classified as doctoral universities (Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, n.d.) may be less likely to be categorized as *elite*. Community colleges, many of whom have large international student populations, may have misrepresented international student enrollment at *non-elite* institutions.

Variables

Independent Variables

The independent variables are the aforementioned time periods, which act as a proxy for the events in question—the election of Donald Trump on November 8, 2016 and the subsequent Trump travel ban on January 27, 2017. The years that were analyzed include: AY 2014-2015 to AY 2016-2017 (three years), which served as a proxy for the time period before the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and AY 2017-2018 to AY 2019-2020 (three years), which served as a proxy for the time periods after the events. Because university student enrollment is cyclical, and international student enrollment is reported based on the academic year, using academic years as independent variables can give insight into enrollment trends leading up to the 2016 presidential election and Trump travel ban, and its aftermath.

Dependent Variables

In this dissertation, two dependent variables were studied: (a) International student enrollment by student country of origin, and (b) International student enrollment by institutional type. Within each variable, several categories, or levels, were considered. These levels will be indicated in the analysis.

Student Country of Origin. For this category, data were classified into three groups (levels)—student enrollment from non-Muslim-majority countries (11 countries), Muslim-majority countries not affected by the Trump travel ban (seven countries), and countries affected by the Trump travel ban (seven countries). For the purpose of this dissertation, a Muslim-majority country is defined as a country in which more than 50.0% of the population identifies as Muslim, according to the Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life report (Pew Research Center, 2017).

Institutional Type. For institutional type, data were categorized into two groups (levels)—elite institutions (100 institutions), and non-elite institutions (100 institutions). The *elite* university grouping consisted of those institutions ranked #1-#100 on the Best National University Rankings list (U.S. News & World Report, 2020). The *non-elite* grouping included universities ranked #101 or lower on the list. The term *elite* is used in this dissertation not as a representation of the researcher’s opinion of certain universities, certainly institutions can be prestigious in different ways and students can value universities for a variety of reasons, but rather as a metric by which many international students make choices about their educational opportunities (Falcone, 2017).

Procedure

Research approval was requested from the Sam Houston State University Institutional Review Board (IRB). Because this study utilized archival data that is publicly available (with a custom data set request) through the Institute for International Education, the IRB application was for an exempt study. After the IRB approval [IRB-2020-311] was obtained, the researcher submitted the custom data set request through the Institute for International Education. The IIE research office mandated that the researcher sign a non-disclosure agreement, as institutional-level data was not de-identified prior to fulfilling the custom data set request. As such, I complied with both IIE non-disclosure requirements and the data security measures outlined on the IRB application.

Data Collection

In order to use Open Doors Report data disaggregated by country of origin, I was required to submit a custom data set request to IIE. Because of the cost associated with data curation, IIE staff recommended that the request be limited to 25 purposefully selected countries (J. Baer, personal communication, February 20, 2020). The custom data set request was submitted in November 2020 and took approximately six weeks to be delivered.

Once I received the data set, I first identified institutions that were missing country of origin data for at least one academic year. Some institutions needed to be excluded and as such, the sample for this study was refined (Please see the “Missing Data” section below). Second, I assigned all institutions an institutional status grouping, “1” for elite and “2” for non-elite. Next, I combined the total enrollment figures for each institution by year into three country groups, non-Muslim-majority countries (11),

Muslim-majority countries (7), and travel ban countries (7). After that, I combined the total enrollment for each institutions' country groupings by year, before the 2017 Trump travel ban (AY2015-2017) and after the ban (AY2018-2020). Lastly, I calculated the total enrollment figures for all countries or origin before and after the ban. This data was then imported into the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) to compute descriptive and inferential statistics.

Missing Data

Missing data was carefully considered and treated in this study. Elite institutions that had significant missing data were excluded from the sample. Because the elite grouping is a fixed sample containing institutions ranked #1-100 in the Best National University Rankings list (U.S. News & World Report, 2020), it was not possible to replace institutions in this group. Non-elite institutions with significant missing data were excluded and replaced with randomly selected alternate non-elite institutions. Non-elite institutions with limited missing data, however, underwent data imputation.

All U.S. institutions that host international students are required to participate in the Institute for International Education's [IIE] annual *Open Doors Report*. The data for this report is typically submitted by a staff member in each institution's international student office. In addition to submitting overall international student enrollment numbers, staff who participate in the survey are strongly encouraged to submit additional data disaggregated by country of origin, gender, degree level, funding status, and even marital status (IIE, 2020). It is estimated that more than 90% of reporting institutions include data disaggregated by the aforementioned categories (IIE, 2020). This dissertation relied on the IIE *Open Doors Report* data disaggregated by country of origin.

Although all institutions purposefully and randomly selected for inclusion in this study participated in all six years of the IIE *Open Doors Report*, there were 31 institutions out of total of 205 (200 selected institutions and 5 alternate institutions) that did not report data disaggregated by country of origin for at least one academic year. Among these 31 institutions, four were elite institutions and 27 were non-elite institutions. As a result of the missing data, efforts were made to assess the extent of the problem and identify an appropriate solution, while maintaining the overall integrity of the data set.

Although IIE does not provide details about why information may be missing, a likely explanation for the missing data was staff turnover. This problem may have resulted in a staff member less familiar with the reporting process to complete the *Open Doors Report* submission, as the majority of institutions missing data were missing only one or two years. To purposefully exclude institutions with excessive missing data from the study, while maintaining equal institutional groups, I excluded institutions in two rounds. In the first round, I excluded institutions that had three or more years of missing country of origin data. This eliminated one elite institution, two non-elite institutions, and one alternate (non-elite) institution. In the second round, I excluded institutions that had two consecutive years of missing country of origin data. This action eliminated one additional elite institution, along with four non-elite institutions. Information about the excluded institutions is delineated in Table 3.

Table 3*Institutions Excluded from the Study due to Missing Data*

Institution	Institutional Grouping	<i>n</i> of Years Missing Data	Years
Institution A	Non-elite	5	2015-2019
Institution B	Alternate (Non-elite)	5	2015-2019
Institution C	Elite	3	2018-2020
Institution D	Non-elite	3	2015-2016, 2020
Institution E	Elite	2	2019-2020
Institution F	Non-elite	2	2015-2016
Institution G	Non-elite	2	2016-2017
Institution H	Non-elite	2	2016-2017
Institution I	Non-elite	2	2018-2019

Note. Institutions have been deidentified.

In total, nine institutions were excluded from this study due to excessive missing country of origin data. This calculation resulted in a sample total of 98 elite institutions and 94 non-elite institutions. In an effort to keep the groups equal in size, the four remaining alternate (non-elite) institutions were included, which resulted in a sample size of 196 institutions, 98 elite and 98 non-elite. See Table 4.

Table 4*Institutional Sampling by Status—Before/After Excluding Institutions for Missing Data*

Institutional Grouping	<i>n</i> of institutions in original sample	<i>n</i> of institutions excluded	<i>n</i> of institutions in final sample**
Elite	100	2	98
Non-elite	100	6	94
Alternate* (Non-elite)	5	1	4
Total	205	9	196

Note. *All alternate institutions were non-elite. **Additional institutions were removed as outliers, which is detailed in the “Normality” section below.

In order to maintain equal group sizes, and to utilize as much of the provided data as possible, 22 institutions, including two elite and 20 non-elite, with one or two years of missing data were included in the study. It was not possible to exclude all institutions with missing data. Data imputation was utilized to maximize sample retention in cases where data was missing. Values to replace missing institutional data were generated in one of two ways. For an institution missing a value in between two years of known values (e.g. missing 2016 value, with 2015 and 2017 values known), a simple mean was computed from the bordering years and input into the missing data field. For an institution missing a value on an edge year (e.g. 2015 or 2020), in which data for one bordering year (i.e. 2014 or 2021) was unknown, a mean of all years’ data was computed and input into the missing data field.

Assumptions

Assumptions for the Repeated Measures Mixed ANOVA. Important in executing inferential statistical procedures, including the repeated measures mixed ANOVA, is checking assumptions of the analysis. Among the foundational assumptions of ANOVA are the presence of a continuous dependent variable, and one or more categorical independent variables (Field, 2018). The analysis conducted in this dissertation met that assumption because the dependent variable, enrollment before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban, was continuous and the independent variables, institutional status and student country of origin, were both categorical. In addition, one of the categorical variables represented repeated measures or “matched pairs” (ie. the institutions and countries were the same at each time point).

Assumptions for Parametric Inferential Statistics. Assumptions on inferential statistical procedures were executed on data acquired from the Institute for International Education (IIE) to determine if parametric or nonparametric analyses should be used. Before using a parametric analysis, one must confirm that four assumptions are met. These assumptions include: (a) Linearity, (b) normality, (c) homogeneity of variance, and (d) independence (Field, 2018). First, linearity and normality were checked for the variable of enrollment. Scatterplots were used to establish linearity and meet the requirements of the first assumption. Standard skewness and kurtosis coefficients (i.e. the skewness value divided by the standard of error skewness and the kurtosis value divided by the standard error of kurtosis, respectively) were computed to test normality. This assumption is met when the coefficients generate values within the range of normality (i.e., ± 3) (Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2002). Lastly, for the categories of student country

of origin and institutional type, checks for homogeneity of variance and independence were executed using the Brown-Forsythe test, an appropriate equality test for studies with unequal group sizes (Sheng, 2008). The results of these assumptions checks and the decision to use a parametric repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) are detailed below.

Linearity. A scatterplot was performed for each research question prior to conducting inferential statistical procedures. All three scatterplots were interpreted as providing evidence of a linear relationship between the variables in each research question. As no evident departure from a linear relationship was present in any of the scatterplots, I continued checking the assumptions for this analysis.

Normality. Verifying normally distributed data is a critical step in using inferential statistics procedures (Field, 2018). Data is typically considered to be normally distributed with standard skewness and kurtosis coefficients generate values within the range of +/-3 (Onwuegbuzie & Daniel, 2002). Initial checks of skewness and kurtosis coefficients in this study revealed data that violated the assumption of normality. Indeed, before taking any corrective actions, all skewness and kurtosis coefficients exceeded +/- 10.

Due to the presence of non-normally distributed data, I analyzed box plots to look for major outliers among the institutions in each institutional status group. There were several institutions that were serious outliers. I attempted to reach a more acceptable skewness and kurtosis coefficient range by removing outliers and re-running the checks for normality in rounds. In each round, I removed two institutions—the most serious elite institution outlier and the most serious non-elite institution outlier. I did this over the

course of four rounds, with a total of eight institutions removed in Round 4. The skewness and kurtosis coefficients computed after Round 4 revealed much more normally distributed data, with the majority of coefficients in the ± 5 range.

Careful study of the box plots suggested that the non-elite institutional outliers removed in Rounds 1-4 were more notable outliers (ie. more extreme) than the elite institutional outliers. Indeed, only one elite institutional outlier was extreme. As a result of this discovery, I opted to check skewness and kurtosis coefficients with only five outliers removed, one elite and four non-elite institutions. This Round 5 resulted in skewness and kurtosis coefficients that closely mirrored those in Round 4, but with few cases removed. A decision was made to use the sample of institutions from round 4 to maximize sample retention.

The strict assumption of normality (± 3) in this analysis was violated, but by carefully and deliberately removing extreme outliers, including one elite and four non-elite institutions, the resulting skewness and kurtosis coefficients approached normality. Although this resulted in slightly unequal groups, it allowed for the inclusion of more institutions in the analysis. The universities that were removed were unique in size, geographical location, and a variety of other institutional characteristics. Table 5 shows the one elite and four non-elite institutions excluded as outliers.

Table 5*Institutional Sampling by Status—Before/After Excluding Institutions as Outliers*

Institutional Grouping	<i>n</i> of institutions in sample	<i>n</i> of institutions excluded	<i>n</i> of institutions in final sample**
Elite	98	1	97
Non-elite	98	4	94
Total	196	5	191

Homogeneity of Variance. Sheng (2008) suggested that the Brown-Forsythe test was an appropriate option for testing homogeneity of variance in research designs that feature unequal group sizes. As such, the Brown-Forsythe test was conducted prior to carrying out the repeated measures ANOVA. The test generated a result of $p < .001$, which revealed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance had been violated.

Sphericity. Important in a repeated-measures ANOVA is the assumption of sphericity, denoted as ϵ , described by Field (2018) as “assuming that the relationship between scores in pairs of treatment conditions is similar (i.e., the level of dependence between means is roughly equal)” (p. 481). Unlike most repeated measures analyses, which investigate change over three or more time periods, this analysis carried out in this dissertation investigated only two time periods, before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban. As such, sphericity could not be computed. Field (2018) acknowledged that a repeated measures analysis can still be a suitable choice for a research design with two time periods.

The violations to the assumptions above, specifically normality and homogeneity of variance, represent a unique challenge in using a large custom dataset with institutions from across the United States. Certainly there are a wide variety of factors that can influence international student enrollment, or lack thereof, to particular universities, which can contribute to non-normally distributed data. Such factors might include available academic programs (e.g. engineering or nursing) or whether or not the institution is locating in a metropolitan area with established ethnic or international communities. These unknown factors represent limitations in this study and may be partly responsible for the violation of assumptions that are not easily addressed. Limitations will be further discussed in Chapter V.

To proceed with this study, I had to make a decision to utilize nonparametric statistical procedures, or to proceed with a parametric repeated measures ANOVA despite the violations. The decision was made to proceed with the parametric procedures because the repeated measures ANOVA is a particularly robust analysis that can sustain some violation of its assumptions, including normality (Field, 2018). Because violations to homogeneity of variance can underestimate statistical significance, this will be discussed as a limitation in Chapter V.

Data Analysis

A mixed repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) statistical procedure was used to answer the research questions in this dissertation. Repeated-measures procedures are suitable for comparing differences across multiple points in time (Field, 2018). The design was mixed because it also included comparisons of categorical or between-subjects variables (country of origin, institution type) (Field, 2018). Because the

focus of the study is on the interaction of time (enrollment) by group (county of origin and institution type), a simple effects analysis was used to test the effect of these interactions. Specifically, differences between groups were compared at each level of time. Both effect sizes and statistical significance were used in the interpretation of results. Omega squared was used as a measure of effect size given that it typically produces a less biased estimate of the effect (Howell, 2012). Table 6 delineates the contrasts used for each research question.

Table 6

Contrasts for Each Research Question

Research Question	IV	DV	Simple Contrasts
1. What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment at U.S. institutions and student country of origin?	Before/After Travel Ban (Binary)	Country Type (3 levels)	<p>1. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from non-Muslim-majority countries.</p> <p>2. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from Muslim-majority countries not included in the travel ban.</p> <p>3. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from countries included in the travel ban.</p>
2. What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment at U.S. institutions and institutional type (elite or non-elite)?	Before/After Travel Ban (Binary)	Institution Type (2 levels)	<p>1. Before/after travel ban enrollment at elite institutions.</p> <p>2. Before/after travel ban enrollment at non-elite institutions.</p>

(continued)

Research Question	IV	DV	Simple Contrasts
3. What was the three-way interaction effect between international student enrollment, student country of origin, and institutional type?	Before/After Travel Ban (Binary)	Country and Institution Type (6 levels)	<p>1. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from non-Muslim majority countries at elite institutions.</p> <p>2. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from Muslim-majority countries not included in the travel ban at elite institutions.</p> <p>3. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from countries included in the travel ban at elite institutions.</p> <p>4. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from non-Muslim-majority countries at non-elite institutions.</p> <p>5. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from Muslim-majority countries not included in the travel ban at non-elite institutions.</p> <p>6. Before/after travel ban enrollment of students from countries included in the travel ban at non-elite institutions.</p>

The repeated-measures ANOVA was performed and results that were statistically significant (at the .05 level) were reported. Johnson and Christensen (2014) have acknowledged that statistical significance at the .05 level is suitable for most educational research. Because the results revealed a statistically significant change, a Scheffé post hoc procedure was also conducted.

CHAPTER IV

Results

International student enrollment before and after the 2016 presidential election and subsequent 2017 Trump travel ban has been the topic of interest for many scholars in the field of international education (Anderson, 2020; K. Johnson, 2018; Todoran & Peterson, 2019). Some scholars have questioned if international student enrollment by country of origin (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019) or by institutional type (Pottier-Sherman, 2018) has been particularly affected by the travel ban. The results reported in this chapter serve to answer Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood's (2017) call for more research into the impact of the travel ban on international students at U.S. institutions.

The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the extent to which international student enrollment at U.S. institutions changed, or did not change, from AY2014-2015 to AY2019-2020, as a function of student country of origin and institutional status (elite or non-elite). The aforementioned time period was divided into two groups, AY2014-2015 to AY2016-2017, which represented the period *before* the 2017 Trump travel ban, and AY2017-2018 to AY2019-2020, which represented the period *after* the ban.

The first variable studied, enrollment by student country of origin, was comprised of the following three groups: (a) International students from selected non-Muslim-majority countries (NMM), (b) International students from selected Muslim-majority countries not included in the Trump travel ban (MM), and (c) International students from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen (the seven countries affected by the Trump travel ban- TBC).

The second variable studied, enrollment by institutional status, was comprised of the following two groups: (a) Student enrollment at elite universities, and (b) Student enrollment at non-elite universities. Lastly, the three-way interaction effect of time, student country of origin, and institutional status was explored.

A mixed repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed as part of this quantitative, non-experimental, causal comparative research study (Creswell, 2014; Menard, 2008). An ANOVA can be appropriate choice for research designs involving the comparison of two or more independent means (Field, 2018). Presented in this chapter are the research questions for this study, along with data collection information, data analysis procedures, descriptive statistics, ANOVA results, and a summary of the findings.

Research Questions

The following research questions were addressed in this study:

1. What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment and student country of origin?
2. What was the interaction effect between international student enrollment and institutional type (elite or non-elite)?
3. What was the three-way interaction effect between international student enrollment, student country of origin, and institutional type?

The following two time periods were addressed in the analysis: AY 2014-2015 to AY 2016-2017, which served as a proxy for time period *before* the 2016 U.S. presidential election and Trump travel ban, and AY 2017-2018 to AY 2019-2020, which served as a proxy for the time period *after* the election and travel ban.

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics were calculated for all outcome measures in this study, including international student enrollment for the time periods before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban by student country of origin and institutional status. See Table 7.

Table 7

Descriptive Statistics for International Student Enrollment by Country of Origin and Institutional Status Before and After the 2017 Trump Travel Ban

			Before		After	
Institutional Status	Country of Origin Grouping	<i>n</i> of institutions	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Elite	NMM	97	8982	7367	10690	9070
	MM	97	693	525	696	498
	TBC	97	199	160	202	157
	Total	97	3291	5861	3863	7124
Non-Elite	NMM	94	1811	1758	1724	1909
	MM	94	551	530	451	392
	TBC	94	96	100	89	98
	Total	94	819	1283	755	1325
Combined	NMM	191	5453	6469	6277	7971
	MM	191	623	531	575	465
	TBC	191	148	143	147	143
	Total	191	2075	4445	2333	5386

The mean enrollment for students from all 25 countries of origin, at both elite and non-elite institutions, was 2075 students before the Trump travel ban and 2333 students after the ban. This change represented an 12.43% increase in mean international student enrollment from the sampled countries from AY2015-2017 to AY2018-2020.

This increase was particularly notable among elite institutions, which had a mean international student enrollment of 3291 students before the Trump travel ban and 3863 students after the ban, a 17.38% increase. The greatest increase in enrollment at elite institutions occurred among students from non-Muslim-majority countries, such as China and India, with the mean enrollment of these students rising from 8982 students to 10,690 students, a 19.02% increase. In this category, an increase in variability in enrollment was also revealed, with the standard deviation of the mean increasing by nearly 2000 students. Mean enrollment among students from Muslim-majority countries, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and travel ban countries, such as Iran and Iraq, however, was much more constant. Indeed, enrollment at elite institutions by students from Muslim majority countries only rose from 693 to 696 students, a mere 0.43% increase, and likewise, enrollment by students from travel ban countries rose from 199 to 202 students, a 1.51% increase.

International student enrollment at non-elite institutions before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban represented a much different trend. The mean enrollment for students from all samples countries at non-elite institutions was 819 students before the travel ban, and 755 students after the travel ban, which represented a 7.81% decrease. Enrollment by students from non-Muslim majority countries shifted from a mean of 1811 students to

1724 students, a 4.80% decrease. Students from Muslim-majority countries represented a mean enrollment of 551 students before to 451 students after, an 18.15% decrease.

Lastly, the mean enrollment of students from travel ban countries decreased from 96 to 89 students, or 7.29%.

Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)

Research Question 1: International Student Enrollment by Country of

Origin. With regard to the first research question on international student enrollment before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban as a function of student country of origin (i.e. students from non-Muslim-majority countries, Muslim-majority countries, and travel ban countries), the analysis revealed statistical differences in international student enrollment by group, $F(2, 567) = 158.343, p < .001, \omega^2 = .356$. This result indicates a very large effect size (Field, 2018). Results of the omnibus test are included in Table 8.

Table 8

Repeated Measures ANOVA Summary Table (Between Subjects) for Research Question 1

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	ω^2
Country of origin	7544379221.39	2	3772189611.70	158.343	<.001	.356
Error	13507604071.65	567	23822934.87			

A Scheffé post hoc test was computed to determine specifically how the groups differed in international student enrollment. There were statistical differences between students from non-Muslim-majority countries and students from Muslim-majority countries and travel ban countries. There was no statistically significant difference in

enrollment between students from Muslim-majority countries and travel ban countries.

Table 9 details the results of this post hoc test.

Table 9

Scheffé Post Hoc Results for Research Question 1

				95% Confidence Interval		
Country	Groups	<i>M</i> Difference	Std. Error	<i>p</i>	Lower Bound	Upper Bound
NMM	MM	5265.67	353.17	<.001	4398.91	6132.42
	TBC	5717.62	353.17	<.001	4850.86	6584.37
MM	NMM	-5265.67	353.17	<.001	-6123.42	-4398.91
	TBC	451.95	353.17	.441	-414.80	1318.70
TBC	NMM	-5717.62	353.17	<.001	-6584.37	-4850.86
	MM	-451.95	353.17	.441	-1318.70	414.80

Statistical differences also existed for both the main effect of time $F(2, 567) = 32.236, p < .001, \omega^2 = .052$ and in the interaction effect between time and student country of origin $F(2, 567) = 39.094, p < .001, \omega^2 = .118$. The result was indicative of a medium effect size (Field, 2018). Table 10 contains the ANOVA results.

Table 10

Repeated Measures ANOVA Summary Table (Within Subjects) for Research Question 1

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	ω^2
Time	18392959.14	1	18392959.14	32.236	<.001	.052
Time x Country of origin	44612552.49	2	22306276.25	39.094	<.001	.118
Error	323516510.03	567	570575.86			

Enrollment by students from non-Muslim-majority countries rose from a mean institutional figure of 5453 students before the travel ban to 6277 students after the travel ban, an increase of 15.11%. Mean enrollment by students from Muslim-majority countries decreased from 623 students before the ban to 575 students after the ban, a change of 7.70%. Lastly, mean enrollment by students from travel ban countries featured a slight change from 148 students to 147 students, a 0.68% decrease. Included in Figure 1 is a visual representation of these changes.




Figure 1. Change in enrollment before and after the travel ban by country of origin.

Research Question 2: International student enrollment by institutional

status. Regarding the second research question on international student enrollment by institutional status (ie. elite or non-elite institutions), the analysis revealed statistically significant differences in international student enrollment by institutional type. A test of between-subjects effects revealed a result of $F(1, 567) = 93.589, p < .001, \omega^2 = .140$, which represents a large effect size (Field, 2018). See Table 11 for the between-subjects effects results.

Table 11

Repeated Measures ANOVA Summary Table (Between Subjects) for Research Question 2

Source	<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	ω^2
Institutional	2229554529.66	1	2229554529.66	93.589	<.001	.140
Status						
Error	13507604071.65	567	23822934.87			

In addition, the ANOVA revealed a statistically significant difference, $F(1, 567) = 50.775, p < .001, \omega^2 = .080$, for the interaction effect of time and institutions status. The effect size for this result was medium (Field, 2018). Readers are directed to Table 12 for the ANOVA results for this research question.

Table 12

Repeated Measures ANOVA Summary Table (Within Subjects) for Research Question 2

Source	SS	df	MS	F	<i>p</i>	ω^2
Time	18392959.14	1	18392959.14	32.236	<.001	.052
Time x Institutional Status	28971029.04	1	28971029.04	50.775	<.001	.080
Error	323516510.03	567	570575.86			

Elite institutions saw an increase in mean enrollment from 3291 students before the 2017 Trump travel ban to 3863 students after the ban, an increase of 17.38%. Meanwhile, non-elite institutions saw a 7.81% decrease in mean enrollment from 819 students before the ban to 755 students after the ban. Figure 2 details the change in enrollment by institutional type.




Figure 2. Change in enrollment before and after the travel ban by institutional status.

Research Question 3: International student enrollment by country of origin and institutional status. Regarding the third research question, results from the ANOVA indicated there were statistically significant differences between country of origin and institutional status, $F(2, 567) = 83.745, p < .001, \omega^2 = .225$. This result indicates a large effect size. Results of this test are expressed in Table 13.

Table 13

Repeated Measures ANOVA Summary Table (Between Subjects) for Research Question 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	<i>p</i>	ω^2
Country of origin x Institutional Status	3990126244.16	2	1995063122.08	83.745	<.001	.225
Error	13507604071.65	567	23822934.87			

A test of within-subjects effects also indicated the relationship above varied by time. There was a statistically significant three-way interaction among the variables of time, country of origin, and institutional status. The analysis yielded the following result, $F(2, 567) = 42.183, p < .001, \omega^2 = .126$. The medium effect size was indicative of a moderate relationship (Field, 2018). Contained in Table 14 are the ANOVA results.

Table 14

Repeated Measures ANOVA Summary Table (Within Subjects) for Research Question 3

Source	SS	df	MS	F	p	ω^2
Time	18392959.14	1	18392959.14	32.236	<.001	.052
Time x Country of origin x Institutional Status	48137421.07	2	24068710.53	42.183	<.001	.126
Error	323516510.03	567	570575.86			

Among the institutions and countries sampled, the largest increase in mean international student enrollment following the 2017 Trump travel ban came amongst students from non-Muslim-majority countries at elite institutions. For this population of students, mean enrollment rose from 8982 students before the ban to 10,690 students after the ban, representing an increase of 19.02%. The largest decrease in mean enrollment following the travel ban was among students from Muslim-majority countries at non-elite institutions. This decrease, of 18.15%, was characterized by a drop in mean enrollment from 551 students to 451 students. These changes in enrollment at elite institutions are

detailed in Figure 3, while those changes in enrollment at non-elite institutions are detailed in Figure 4.



Figure 3. Change in enrollment before and after the travel ban at elite institutions by country of origin.




Figure 4. Change in enrollment before and after the travel ban at non-elite institutions by country of origin.

Planned contrasts were computed as a post-hoc approach for testing the three-way interaction effect. Two comparisons were made in the data. This included testing the interaction between Muslim-majority countries (MM) and travel ban countries (TBC) and non-Muslim-majority countries (NMM) and travel ban countries (TBC) over time by elite/non-elite universities. For differences between students from non-Muslim-majority countries (NMM) and travel ban countries (TBC), the following result was yielded, $F(1, 189) = 44.879, p < .001, \omega^2 = .187$. This result was indicative of a large effect size (Field, 2018). For differences between students from Muslim-majority countries (MM) and travel ban countries, the following result was yielded, $F(1, 189) = 12.691, p < .001, \omega^2 = .058$. This result included a medium effect size (Field, 2018). Delineated in Table 15 are the contrasts results for the third research question.

Table 15

Contrast Results for Research Question 3

Source	Country		<i>SS</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	ω^2
	Groups							
Three-way contrast	NMM	TBC	75917605.03	1	75917605.03	44.879	<.001	.187
	MM	TBC	201705.07	1	201705.07	12.691	<.001	.058
Error	NMM	TBC	319712049.70	189	1691598.15			
	MM	TBC	3003970.81	189	15894.03			

To better understand the three-way interaction effects, the mean differences for enrollment before and after the travel ban by country of origin and institutional status

have been computed. Table 16 includes the mean differences for elite institutions before and after the travel ban. Additionally, Table 17 includes the mean differences for non-elite institutions before and after the travel ban.

Table 16

Mean Differences for Elite Institution Interactions in Research Question 3

Time	Country Groups		Mean	Standard Deviation
			Difference	
Before	NMM	MM	8288.21	6841.39
	NMM	TBC	8783.01	7206.99
	MM	TBC	494.80	364.60
After	NMM	MM	9993.80	8571.83
	NMM	TBC	10487.25	8912.97
	MM	TBC	493.45	341.09

Table 17*Mean Differences for Non-Elite Institution Interactions in Research Question 3*

Time	Country Groups		Mean Difference	Standard Deviation
Before	NMM	MM	1259.60	1227.92
	NMM	TBC	1714.67	1658.13
	MM	TBC	455.07	430.20
After	NMM	MM	1273.26	1516.86
	NMM	TBC	1635.49	1811.60
	MM	TBC	361.78	294.74

For elite institutions, the gap between mean enrollment of students from non-Muslim-majority and travel ban countries increased 19.40%, while the gap between mean enrollment of students from Muslim-majority countries and travel ban countries decreased slightly, or 0.27%. For non-elite institutions, the first gap concerning enrollment from non-Muslim-majority and travel ban countries decreased 4.62%, while the second gap concerning enrollment from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries decreased 20.50%. Figure 5 serves as a visual representation of the finding of the first contrast, $F(1, 189) = 44.879, p < .001, \omega^2 = .187$. Figure 6 includes the statistical data for the second contrast, $F(1, 189) = 12.691, p < .001, \omega^2 = .058$.




Figure 5. Results of the first contrast, enrollment of students from non-Muslim-majority and travel ban countries before and after the ban.




Figure 6. Results of the second contrast, enrollment of students from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries before and after the ban.

Summary

The results of this quantitative, nonexperimental study showcase unique trends in international student enrollment before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban. A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to investigate the relationship between international student enrollment by student country of origin and institutional status and the time period before and after the travel ban. Regarding the first research question, about the relationship between enrollment before and after the ban and student country of origin, a statistically significant ($p < .001$) result was revealed. This indicated that country of origin was noteworthy in the overall change in international student enrollment at all institutions. Specifically, the country category, which included students from non-Muslim-majority countries, Muslim-majority countries, and travel ban countries, was statistically different, with students from the Muslim-majority country category most heavily impacted.

In relation to the second research question, which pertained to the relationship between enrollment and institutional status (elite or non-elite), the analysis produced a statistically significant result ($p < .001$). This result signaled that elite institutions were less affected overall by the 2017 Trump travel ban than non-elite institutions.

Lastly, in response to the third research question, which investigated the three-way interaction of enrollment, country of origin, and institutional status, another statistically significant result ($p < .001$) was generated. When observing all interactions of the variables, the largest increase of international students occurred among students from non-Muslim-majority countries at elite institutions, whereas the largest decrease of international students was among students from Muslim-majority countries at non-elite

institutions. In Chapter V, a discussion of the findings and their relationship to the literature and conceptual framework will be presented, along with implications and recommendations for international students, international education professional, higher education administrators, and policy makers.

Chapter V

Discussion, Implications, and Recommendations

Writing not long after the 2016 presidential election and the enactment of the 2017 Trump travel ban, which disproportionately targeted individuals from Muslim-majority countries, Moser et al. (2016) characterized the Trump administration's immigration policies as "impulsive, sweeping, inconsistent, and racially charged" creating a "new terrain for residents of and visitors to the United States" (p. 178). Indeed, the 2017 travel ban ushered in a new era in international student mobility to the United States, affecting not only would-be international students, but also current international students, scholars, faculty, and staff. In 2017, Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood challenged the international education community to study the wide-ranging impacts of the travel ban, from increased logistical mobility issues to the rise in racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic cultures on U.S. college campuses.

The goal of this dissertation was not only to respond to Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood's (2017) call to action, but also to analyze the impacts of the travel ban on international student enrollment at U.S. universities as a function of both student country of origin and institution type (elite or non-elite). In sum, were students from non-Muslim-majority countries less likely to be impacted than their peers from Muslim-majority or travel ban countries? Were elite institutions less likely to be impacted than non-elite institutions? This chapter will begin by exploring the results from each research question, including associated limitations, connections to the literature, and relevance to the conceptual framework. Following that, implications and recommendations for

international students, international education professionals, higher education administrators, and policy makers will be highlighted.

Discussion of Findings

Research Question 1

The first research question, which concerned the change in enrollment before and after the 2017 travel ban as a function of student country of origin, revealed a statistically significant result ($p < .001$). In this study, data from 25 countries were analyzed and the said data were grouped into three country of origin categories: Students from non-Muslim-majority countries, students from Muslim-majority countries not included in the travel ban, and students from the seven travel ban countries. The statistically significant within-subjects result also generated a medium effect size ($\omega^2 = .118$), revealing that there was a relationship between the change in international student enrollment before and after the travel ban and country of origin. Collectively, the between subjects and interactions effects explained approximately 47% of differences in international student enrollment. This result sheds important light on this relatively new area of research.

The within-subjects result indicates that individual differences in international student enrollment were associated with the travel ban, while the between-subjects result indicates that which country category a student belonged to mattered. A Scheffé post hoc analysis revealed that there was a statistically significant ($p < .001$) difference between students in the non-Muslim-majority country grouping and students in the two other country groupings. The post hoc analysis also revealed that there was no statistically significant difference ($p = .441$) between students from Muslim-majority countries and students from travel ban countries. In short, students from non-Muslim-majority countries

were clearly less impacted by the travel ban than their peers from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries. In fact, enrollment of students from non-Muslim majority countries rose by more than 15% in the years after the travel ban. Conversely, enrollment of students from Muslim-majority countries declined 7.70% and students from travel ban countries declined 0.68% over the same time period.

The original research in this study is noteworthy for a variety of reasons. First, there has been a dearth of literature about enrollment by students from Muslim-majority countries in the wake of the travel ban, and this study acts as one of the of first to analyze this important research area. Second, in contrast to previous studies which focused on geographically limited data (Pottie-Sherman, 2018; Van De Walker & Slate, 2019), this study featured use of a custom nationwide data set. As such, the broadness in scope allows readers to understand the full impact of the travel ban on international student mobility. Lastly, the effect sizes generated in this study, and particularly in the first research question, suggest these differences are noteworthy. These effect sizes will be detailed later in this chapter.

Traditionally, students from non-Muslim-majority countries, including global powerhouses like China and India, have accounted for the vast majority international students in the United States (IIE, 2020). Indeed, although AY 2019-2020 represented the first year of overall decline of international student enrollment at U.S. institutions on record, mobility from countries like China and India has been on the rise for decades. One interpretation from the findings of the first research question is simply that mobility by students from non-Muslim-majority countries is continuing to follow along an upward trend line, unaffected by the 2017 travel ban or other restrictive immigration policies.

There is a thought among some in the international education community that international students will continue to find value in U.S. universities, and opportunities for work and immigration after graduation, regardless of the political climate. Yerger and Choudhary (2019) acknowledge this reality for Indian students, but also note that U.S. universities need to be aware of what their Canadian counterparts can offer these students. They suggest that in the coming years, more and more Indian students will forgo U.S. universities in favor of Canadian universities (Yerger & Choudhary, 2019). Nevertheless, the results of the first research question suggest that Chinese and Indian students, along with their peers from non-Muslim-majority countries, have been largely unaffected by the travel ban.

The decline in enrollment among students from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries after the 2017 travel ban likely comes as no surprise to those who work in the field of international education. One interesting takeaway from this study, however, is that the decline in enrollment among students from travel ban countries was marginal (only 0.68%). Instead, the majority of the decline was among students from Muslim-majority countries not included in the travel ban (7.70%). Myriad scholars have suggested that Muslim students, Muslim international students, and students from Muslim-majority countries have been adversely impacted by the travel ban, even if they were not from a travel ban country (Anderson, 2020; Beydoun, 2017; K. Johnson, 2018; Stegmeir, 2017; Whitehead et al., 2019).

This finding speaks broadly to the rise of Islamophobia in the United States during the Trump administration and reinforces the connection to the conceptual framework, specifically to Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). In

detailing ITT, Stephan and Stephan (2000), acknowledge how realistic threats, symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes can characterize the environment in which one is living (or seeks to live). With regard to students from Muslim-majority countries, the decline in enrollment following the travel ban suggests that students from these countries may have faced not only logistical hurdles (e.g. visa denial), but also made calculated risk analysis decisions in regard to actual or perceived realistic and symbolic threats. Indeed, these risk analysis decisions may have covered the scope of ITT, with students from Muslim-majority countries questioning their physical safety in Trump's America, along with their ability to be themselves, practice their faith, make friends, and generally adapt to life in their new environment.

Anderson (2020) investigated how Muslim American and Muslim international students cope with threats to their physical safety in the U.S. college environment, while also highlighting the variety of microaggressions that many Muslim students face on a daily basis. Pottie-Sherman (2018), in contrast, put forth the idea that international students must make risk-based decisions about in regard to their future work and immigration opportunities. In short, the students in Anderson's (2020) study questioned if they could be safe and thrive in the United States, whereas the students in Pottie-Sherman's (2018) study questioned if they could be successful in their careers and migration goals. The results of first research question in this study add credence to the risks and threats outlined in ITT. Indeed, the results herein suggest that study in the U.S. is increasingly a risk that international students from Muslim-majority countries are not willing to take.

Research Question 2

The second research question, which focused on international student enrollment at elite and non-elite institutions before and after the 2017 travel ban, yielded a statistically significant result ($p < .001$). The intention of this research question was to investigate enrollment change among international students from all 25 countries of origin at a sample of 97 elite institutions and 94 non-elite institutions. The within-subjects analysis revealed a medium effect size ($\omega^2 = .080$), indicating that the variable of institutional status was impactful on the change in enrollment before and after the travel ban. Meanwhile, the between-subjects analysis, which yielded a large effect size ($\omega^2 = .140$), suggested that status as an elite institution was important in enrollment changes. In fact, the changes in enrollment by institutional status before and after the travel ban were notable—elite institutions saw an international student enrollment increase of 17.38%, while non-elite institutions saw an enrollment decrease of 7.81%.

The findings of the second research question confirm what many scholars in international education have previously noted—international student institutional choice is greatly impacted by ranking, brand name recognition, and perceived value (Falcone, 2017; Findlay et al., 2011; Macrander, 2017a; Marginson, 2006). Macrander (2017a) acknowledged that international students place a high priority on work and migration opportunities in their host country following graduation and are likely to choose institutions that they feel can help them access those opportunities. Falcone (2017) added that international students, when generally unfamiliar with U.S. institutions, tend to rely predominantly on university brand name recognition and ranking. Indeed, some students

may even opt to stay in their home country if they cannot gain admission to an elite university in the United States (Spilimbergo, 2009).

The findings of the second research question remind us that the decision to study in the United States is in part a value-based decision. Is an education in the United States worth the price, literally or figuratively? Is it worth the price in a politically turbulent era? These questions connect back to choice theory (Hargreaves Heap et al., 1992), part of the conceptual framework of this study. Broadly speaking, choice theory serves to explain the influences behind individual choice decisions and has been used widely to investigate consumer behavior (Al Balushi, 2018) and education (Menon et al., 2006), among other areas.

These findings suggest that international students may have made value-based decisions in their choice to study, or not study, in the United States. Al Balushi (2018) notes that although cost of a product is influential in a consumer's decision to purchase it, perhaps more important is the perceived quality of that product. Indeed, when international students research their educational opportunities abroad, they are in reality making a complicated decision about not only affordability, but also the quality of the product they are purchasing and its return on investment (Macrander, 2017a). Findlay et al. (2011) and Waters (2005) add that although the decision to study abroad may appear to be an individual choice, it is a decision seldom made without the opinions and contributions of a student's family.

There are a handful of major, non-elite universities that host more than 5,000 international students, but it is perhaps not surprising that the majority of the top 25 host institutions for international students in the United States are elite institutions (IIE, 2020).

These figures show that international students have long prioritized elite institutions in the U.S., but the findings of this study add a layer of complexity. Not only do international students favor elite institutions, the enrollment gap between elite and non-elite institutions can widen during times of political crisis and immigration uncertainty. The 2017 Trump travel ban forced many students to make a decision about the value of a U.S. education in a turbulent time. Although the value of elite institutions remained constant, and possibly even grew, the value of non-elite institutions dissipated. International students made their choice.

Research Question 3

The third research question of this study centered on the three-way interaction of student country of origin and institutional status on international student enrollment before and after the 2017 Trump travel ban. The final research question revealed a statistically significant result ($p < .001$) and the within-subjects analysis yielded a medium effect size ($\omega^2 = .126$). This result suggested that there was a relationship among the three variables.

The descriptive statistics for this research question added important insight into the results. Only one three-way interaction, the convergence of students from non-Muslim-majority countries at elite institutions, revealed an increase in student enrollment—up 19.02% after the 2017 travel ban. The remaining five interactions all revealed a decrease in international student enrollment after the travel ban, the largest of which was a 18.15% decrease among students from Muslim-majority countries at non-elite institutions. Interesting, too, were the contrast results of the third research question. The contrast for enrollment of students from non-Muslim-majority and travel ban

countries by institution type before and after the travel ban produced a statistically significant result ($p < .001$) with a large effect size ($\omega^2 = .187$). The second contrast, for enrollment of students from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries, also produced a statistically significant result ($p < .001$), with a medium effect size ($\omega^2 = .058$) These important contrast results are discussed later in this section.

The findings of this particular question expose important takeaways for both students from non-Muslim-majority countries and Muslim-majority countries, and for both elite and non-elite institutions. First, these results further the argument that students from non-Muslim-majority countries, such as China and India, have been largely unaffected by the travel ban, but we can see that these students are making value-based decisions about enrollment in U.S. institutions. The nearly 20% rise in enrollment by students from non-Muslim-majority countries at elite institutions suggests the continuation of an upward trend in mobility to the United States, but it also suggests that students from these countries still value U.S. education and view a degree from a U.S. institution, particularly an elite institution, as a pathway to career or migration opportunities in the United States.

The picture was a little blurrier for students from non-Muslim-majority countries at non-elite institutions. Indeed, enrollment among students in this category decreased 4.80% after the travel ban. Although this may appear to be a marginal decrease, it is notable decrease for source countries like China, India, and South Korea, all of whom have seen steady increases in mobility in recent years (IIE, 2020). This result reinforces the findings of Spilimbergo (2009), who suggests that students who cannot access elite institutions may rather stay home. The results of this study cannot confirm that these

students are staying home, but it may suggest that they are increasingly pursuing educational opportunities outside the U.S. market.

An additional point of consideration in this study is the way in which Chinese student enrollment may be influencing the overall enrollment of students from non-Muslim-majority countries. Indeed, the findings of the third research question reinforce what some scholars have revealed about Chinese international student institutional choice (Findlay et al., 2011; Waters, 2005). Findlay et al. (2011) found that Chinese families were critical in the enrollment decisions of Chinese international students, and that Chinese families strongly valued elite institutions as a way to increase social capital. Waters (2005) also remarked that families, and particularly Chinese families, were focused on the broader implications of higher education—the ability to get a good career and salary—and as such, prioritized enrollment in elite institutions. The findings herein support this idea and further suggest that social mobility for students from non-Muslim-majority countries, like China, cannot easily be impacted by political events.

The interaction effect of students from non-Muslim-majority countries at elite universities also revealed an interesting point—There was large variance, nearly 2000 students, in the standard deviation of the mean among institutions in this category. This finding suggests that institutions responded differently to recruitment challenges posed by the travel ban, or that students from countries within this country grouping behaved differently. Variance among elite institutions may have occurred as some institutions doubled down on their international student recruitment efforts while other institutions scaled back their recruitment efforts in the wake of the travel ban. Because the students from non-Muslim-majority countries grouping consisted of students from 11 countries, it

is also possible that students from different countries behaved differently following the travel ban, with some countries continuing their upward trend and other countries leveling off.

Yerger and Choudhary (2019) theorized that although the 2017 Trump travel ban was largely harmful for international students, many still wanted to study in the United States. Although it is not possible to disprove the desires of prospective international students, the findings of this study clearly revealed that students from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries were impacted by the travel ban and enrolled in U.S. institutions at lower rates following the ban. This finding was true for students from the aforementioned country of origin categories at both elite and non-elite institutions, but the decrease in enrollment was more profound at non-elite institutions. This result suggested that students from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries were making the same value-based decisions as their peers from non-Muslim-majority countries, but that the perceived value of a U.S. education and quality of U.S. institutions did not sufficiently counteract the perceived risk or uncertainty of U.S. study. In short, the risk was not worth the reward.

Another important consideration in the interpretation of the findings in this study is student participation in Optional Practical Training (OPT), or post-graduation work authorization. Because students on OPT are still sponsored by their host institutions on an F1 student visa, they are still considered international students and are included in IIE international student enrollment data (IIE, 2020). Likewise, students on OPT were included in the custom data set utilized in this study. This is important to acknowledge because a possible explanation for the decrease in enrollment among students from

Muslim-majority and travel ban countries is not only fewer new students coming to the United States, but also fewer students staying in the country. For example, the 18.15% decrease in enrollment among students from Muslim-majority countries at non-elite institutions after the travel ban may be in part from these students choosing to not apply for OPT (instead leaving the country after their program) or applying to OPT and being denied. Because international student enrollment decisions are so tightly connected to career and migration opportunities (Macrandar, 2017a), the idea of OPT fallout and international students leaving the United States should also be acknowledged.

In reviewing the results of the contrasts computed for the third research question, another noteworthy finding was revealed. Among all contrasts, in only one instance was the gap regarding change in enrollment widened. The gap in enrollment among students from non-Muslim-majority countries and travel ban countries at elite institutions widened by 19.40% after the travel ban. Interestingly, this same gap decreased between students from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries at elite institutions (a decrease of 0.27%) and at non-elite institutions (a decrease of 20.50%). To better understand this question, it is paramount to consider how students from Muslim majority and travel ban countries make their educational decisions.

Students from Muslim-majority countries, both at elite and non-elite institutions, may have more flexibility to decide where they want to study. In some ways, they may have more passport power. For example, a Turkish international student may find it easier to pivot from a U.S. education to an education a European Union country. A student from Yemen, or another travel ban country, may lack that same passport power. A second explanation is related to wealth among students from travel ban countries,

particularly those who attend elite institutions. Students from travel ban countries who can afford to study at elite institutions (not including those who may be on scholarships), may have the purchasing power to leave the United States if they want to, or pursue education in other markets. Graduates of elite institutions may also find themselves more globally marketable.

In contrast, the comparatively small decrease among students from travel ban countries at non-elite institutions (and indeed, the difference between students in this category and their Muslim-majority peers), may simply be because these students were already studying in the United States and opted not to leave. In this situation, the 2017 travel ban did not prevent these students from seeking education at U.S. universities, it took away freedom of travel for students from those countries who were already here.

The findings of this study serve as a response to Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood's (2017) call for more research into the implications of the 2017 Trump travel ban on international students at U.S. institutions, but the findings also serve to highlight the damaging effect of rash and inconsistent immigration policy decisions on subsets of the international student population. Like Todoran and Peterson (2019) and K. Johnson (2018) noted, an unpredictable political climate in the United States may prove too risky for some international students contemplating their educational opportunities. Pottie Sherman (2018) suggested that the travel ban may impact certain institutional types more than others, while Van De Walker and Slate (2019) commented that the travel ban may impact students from Muslim-majority countries more than other students. The findings of this study confirm both of these ideas and draw further attention to the complicated decisions that prospective international students face.

Effect Sizes

One notable strength of this study are the effect sizes revealed in each of the research questions, ranging from medium to very large ($\omega^2 = .080$ to $\omega^2 = .356$). Prior to this study, only one peer-reviewed study utilized quantitative data in reviewing the impact of the travel ban on international student mobility (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019). This study, narrowly focused on international graduate students at two Texas institutions revealed Cramer's V effect sizes in the very small range (Van De Walker & Slate, 2019). Other quantitative studies more broadly focused on other U.S. university enrollment among other student populations have typically featured small to medium effect sizes. Studies that featured small effect sizes included quantitative analyses on enrollment of first-generation students (Bui & Rush, 2016; Katrevich & Aruguete, 2017; Wright et al., 2013) and at-risk students (Capstick et al., 2019), while studies that featured medium effect sizes included those on enrollment of African American (Blackmon & Jones Thomas, 2014) and Latinx (Berbery & O'Brien, 2018) students. By contrast, the medium to very large effect sizes in this study represent its significance to the literature base.

Limitations

There exist a number of limitations in this study which should not be ignored or understated. These limitations broadly fall into three categories: (1) Data collection limitations, (2) Inferential statistical procedure limitations, and 3) Limitations related to independent variables and research design. First, as a researcher, I experienced some limitations within the data collection plan and data set request. Although ideally this dissertation would have included data about international students from all recognized

countries of origin, communication with the IIE research team revealed that this would not be feasible (J. Baer, personal communication, February 20, 2020). Because the custom data set needed to be compiled by an IIE staff member, and because I was charged a fee for the data set, I had to limit my request to data from 25 purposefully selected countries. A larger country sample may have provided additional insight into international student enrollment before and after the travel ban.

Two limitations related to the inferential statistical procedures used in this study emerged during data analysis. First, the assumption of normality was violated. In an attempt to correct for this violation, I excluded five institutions that were identified as extreme outliers. Second, the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated. Violations of homogeneity of variance can underestimate statistical significance, and although certainly this exists as a limitation, it may also foster greater confidence in the findings of this study. Because the repeated measures ANOVA is a particularly robust analysis (Field, 2018), I opted to proceed with the analysis. Nevertheless, these statistical limitations should be acknowledged.

Lastly, there exists inherent limitations when using any independent variable to investigate changes in international student enrollment. Although the findings of this study reveal that there were strong correlations between the independent variable (the time periods before and after the travel ban) and the dependent variables (student country of origin and institutional status), we cannot definitively say that the 2017 Trump travel ban caused these changes. Indeed, causal comparative designs cannot establish true cause-effect relationships, but rather offer an explanation for a phenomenon or trend (Creswell, 2014). There are many, many variables that may also impact a student's

decision to study in the United States. These variables include, but are not limited to, scholarship and funding opportunities, institutional partnerships, currency fluctuations, political or economic strife in a student's home country, and educational opportunities in other countries. Although this study provides an explanation for changes in international student enrollment, it cannot address all possible variables.

Implications and Recommendations

Readers of this dissertation may take note of the varied implications that the findings of this study may have on them. Certainly, international students may question what Trump-era immigration policy may mean for their educational goals, while higher education administrators may question the tuition fallout of decreased international student enrollment or the impact on campus diversity and inclusion initiatives. While international student advisors and other professionals in the field of higher education find unique ways to support their international students, policymakers at the local, state, and national level will undoubtedly question how international student mobility trends fit into the broader picture of immigration to the United States. In this section, the implications and recommendations for five groups of individuals are discussed. These groups include international students, international education professionals, higher education administrators, higher education researchers and scholars, and policy makers.

International Students

Both current and prospective international students have taken note of what the 2017 travel ban and other Trump-era immigration policies have meant for them. For many of these students, the United States is simply not the land of opportunity that it used to be. The findings of this study suggest that international students, and particularly those

from Muslim-majority countries, are less interested in studying at U.S. institutions. These findings corroborate the descriptive statistics released by IIE (2020) which indicate that international student enrollment during AY 2019-2020 decreased for the first time in IIE's history.

Only time and further research will tell what happened to these international students—whether they stayed in their home countries or pursued higher education in another, more welcoming country like Canada or New Zealand. As was previously discussed, international students find themselves faced with a complex decision regarding their educational goals. Some of the questions they may ask themselves include: 'Will I feel safe, welcome, and celebrated at a U.S. institution?,' 'Will I be able to adjust to a new environment, practice my faith openly, and make new friends?,' 'What type of U.S. institution provides good value and return on investment for me?,' and lastly, 'How will attending a U.S. institutions help or hinder my future career and migration goals?' These questions can only be answered when students carefully consider the educational opportunities available to them both in the United States, and further afield.

With regard to the final question about future career and migration opportunities, students must realize that the decision they face is not one that will impact the next four years of their lives. Instead, it is a decision that may determine where they spend the rest of their lives, including where they start a family and where they retire. Students considering long-term migration opportunities have to consider not only the potential for Optional Practical Training (OPT), but also opportunities for work visa (H1B) and green card sponsorship. Lastly, they have to consider if their host institution and community is a place they want to be. Are there people in that community from the student's home

country? People who speak the same language? People who share the same faith? Are there ethnic grocery stores and restaurants? Is the American community welcoming or hostile? These are questions that extend beyond any one presidential administration, but they are questions that will define the coming decades of international student mobility and immigration.

International Education Professionals

International student advisors, including SEVIS-verified designated school officials (DSOs) and other professionals in the field of international education, are impacted in many ways by sudden shifts in immigration policy, not unlike current and prospective international students. The primary job function of an international student advisor is to maintain F1 international students' SEVIS records and to help them interpret and understand SEVIS and USCIS guidelines. When the Trump travel ban was announced on January 27, 2017, international student advisors around the country saw their inboxes flooded with emails from students stranded overseas or with family stranded overseas, students with upcoming travel plans, and from students generally posing, 'What does this mean for me?'

Having experienced both the 2017 Trump travel ban and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic just in the past five years, there are several important takeaways for international education professionals. First, immigration policy and SEVIS rules and regulations are not set in stone. Policies can change at any time and when they do, international student advisors need to be able to quickly respond and distribute essential information to their students. One way that advisors can be prepared is by joining NAFSA: The Association of International Educators, or similar international education

professional organization. NAFSA maintains a community discussion board which can be very useful for advisors seeking quick information or answers to problems. Likewise, maintaining contact with advisors from neighboring colleges and universities can be important in responding to sudden changes. In short, if you are not sure how to interpret a policy change, there is at least strength in numbers.

Second, if your institution is facing a decrease in international student enrollment, it can be useful to partner with other campus entities to broaden the scope of your international services office. For example, your office may collaborate with the study abroad office to promote study abroad participation, and in turn, an increase of inbound exchange students to your institutions. Alternatively, your office may opt to partner with student activities or programming boards on campus to promote internationally-inclusive diversity and equity programming. For some institutions, a decrease in international students may also signal an opportunity to better serve other underrepresented student populations, like DACAmented and undocumented students.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, international student advisors are in a unique position to offer support to international students, including those from Muslim-majority and travel ban countries, who are facing increasing uncertainty. International student advisors do not exist in a silo. Instead, they should coordinate with other offices on campus, such as the counseling or advising centers, to ensure that students in crisis have access to necessary resources. Shortly after the travel ban was announced in 2017, a large consortium of U.S. institutions adopted the slogan ‘You are welcome here’ to show support for their Muslim, international, and Muslim international students (K. Johnson, 2018). This support does not go unnoticed by students.

Higher Education Administrators

Higher education administrators, including university presidents and provosts, occupy a space within international education arguably possible of affecting the most change. This top-down approach can see funding and institutional priorities reallocated. Related to the findings of this study, higher education administrators should focus on three major takeaways: (1) There is a need for different international recruitment models and a decreased focus on tuition generated from international student recruitment; (2) There should be a shift in focus toward study abroad and increased institutional partnerships; and (3) Support for international students, along with students from a variety of underrepresented populations, is critical.

Current international recruitment models, which typically see a large amount of money spent on marketing campaigns or face-to-face fair recruitment, may not be the most effective option for would-be international students considering the United States as a study destination. Institutions should consider not only how much they market, but also *how* they market, and to whom. Students from major source countries, such as China and India, may not need as much direct marketing because they are likely to seek educational opportunities in the United States regardless of the political climate. Students from Muslim-majority countries, on the other hand, may benefit from more personal, targeted recruitment that focuses on the safety of the area, the institution's commitment to diversity, and the existing Muslim community. Institutions may also benefit by turning their attention to international student recruitment from local community colleges, where international students are already attending on an F1 student visa.

If the 2017 Trump travel ban, and subsequent COVID-19 pandemic, has taught higher education administrators anything, it should be that they cannot rely on tuition revenue from international students. It is true that international students, who often pay double the tuition of local resident students, can be an important source of revenue for an institution. Yet, international students provide unstable revenue. A travel ban, a pandemic, or even something as simple as the closing of a local consulate can have devastating impacts on international student enrollment at any given institution. International students need to be viewed as so much more than a source of revenue. They are a piece of internationalization on campus, a future part of a global network of alumni, and most importantly, regular students in our classrooms.

For many institutions facing decreased international student enrollment, a lingering question is ‘What now?’ In other words, ‘How can we, as an institution, rebound from this decrease?’ Although the answer to this question may vary from institution to institution, or by institutional status, one option is to shift institutional focus to international partnerships and study abroad. If you cannot bring international students to your campus, send your students abroad. The underlying theme of international education is not any kind of one-way mobility, but rather a mutual sharing of ideas and perspectives. Indeed, sending an American student to China can accomplish much of the same goal as hosting a Chinese student on an American campus.

Building and fostering international partnerships also has logistical benefits for institutions. Many study abroad programs are reciprocal exchange programs, which allow for students from two partner institutions to exchange places. In this sense, promoting study abroad among American students can also result in short-term international

exchange students on campus. In an era of increasing political and immigration uncertainty, short-term study in the United States may be a great option for some international students, allowing them the experience with less of a risk.

It should go without saying that support for international students can and should come from the very top of an institution's organizational chart. A university president's leadership influences the campus environment and can greatly impact if and if so, to what extent, international students feel welcome on campus and make enrollment decision based on this feeling of belonging. This culture of inclusivity can be fostered in a variety of ways, but progressive university presidents may seek to appoint a campus diversity officer (CDO), push for increased diversity programming on campus, advocate for more equitable hiring practices to achieve a faculty and staff that is representative of the student body, and ensure culturally inclusive campus resources such as, but not limited to, an interfaith prayer space, halal and kosher food options, and international student peer counseling. After all, an institution may broadcast 'You are welcome here,' but do they mean it?

Higher Education Researchers and Scholars

There exists a need for significantly more research in the field of international student mobility, particularly as it pertains to the effect of the 2017 Trump travel ban and other domestic and global crises. To date, much of the research related to international students in the United State, in the wake of the travel ban, has been qualitative in nature. Although this research provides valuable insight into the experiences and perceptions of international students, more quantitative research is needed to analyze large trends in international student mobility and immigration policy. Furthermore, it is recommended

that scholars in higher education research the ways in which restrictive immigration policy and bans can affect students with other statuses, including those who are asylum seekers, along with DACAmented and undocumented students. Scholars are also encouraged to study the long-term effects of Trump-era immigration policy on visiting scholars (typically on a J1 visa) and international faculty and staff (typically on H1B or O1 visas). Such research may indicate that the 2017 travel ban has impacted far more than just international students on an F1 visa.

Complimentary to this study, higher education scholars should investigate international student enrollment trends to other major host countries, like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, along with European Union countries and regional education hubs like Dubai. If fewer international students are studying in the United States, where are they studying? Likewise, comparative studies, such as a study comparing the effect of the Trump travel ban in the United States and Brexit in the United Kingdom on international student enrollment may be warranted.

Policy Makers

Policy makers at the highest levels of the U.S. government should take note of the broad-ranging effects of rash, ill-conceived immigration policy, like that of the 2017 Trump travel ban, and its impacts on current and future international student mobility to the United States. Most concerning with the 2017 travel ban was its utter lack of specificity with regard to who would be impacted. Indeed, in the early days of the ban, there was substantial confusion about which visa types were impacted, with reports of even U.S. permanent residents from the affected countries initially prohibited entry to the United States (Redden, 2017a).

Moreover, immigration policy has the ability to affect amazing change in the United States. Positive immigration policy can bring talented employees to the U.S. workforce, create an incentive for entrepreneurs to do business in the country, reunite families, and allow the United States to reemerge as a world leader in global hospitality. Policy makers should ensure that the Statue of Liberty continues to face out.

Conclusion

I would be remiss if I didn't refer to the travel ban at least once in this dissertation as the 'Muslim ban.' That is what it was intended to be and that is what it was. Countless Muslim Americans, Muslim international visitors, and non-Muslim individuals from Muslim-majority countries have suffered the effects not only of racist and xenophobic immigration policy, but also of a disturbing rise in Islamophobia in the United States. It will be years, maybe even decades, before the full magnitude of the Trump administration's damage to U.S. immigration policy and society is revealed.

On January 20, 2021, Joseph R. Biden assumed office as the 46th president of the United States and on that same day, issued Proclamation 10141, overturning the 2017 Trump travel ban, along with a slew of other damaging Trump-era executive orders and presidential proclamations on immigration (Presidential Proclamation 10141, 2021). This marks the beginning of a new era for U.S. immigration policy, but also the beginning of new work for those in the field of international education. How do we get international student interested in the United States as a study destination again? The findings of this dissertation show the scale of the problem, particularly for non-elite institutions and those institutions seeking to host students from Muslim-majority countries.

The damage from the 2017 Trump travel ban on international student mobility to the United States has been done and is on full display in this dissertation, yet the COVID-19 pandemic is ongoing and it, too, poses unique challenges for both U.S. institutions and international students. The findings of this dissertation outline how Islamophobic and nationalist immigration policy can be damaging to international student mobility, but the lessons learned here can be easily adapted immigration policy centered around a pandemic. The problem and the solution may be different, but the fallout is similar. By studying these important trends in international student mobility, and the political and global crises that impact them, international students can make more well-informed decisions about their educational goals and institutions can better serve the needs of their international students.

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APPENDIX A



Date: Nov 11, 2020 4:55:29 PM CST

TO: Dana Van De Walker Paul Eaton

FROM: SHSU IRB

PROJECT TITLE: Islamophobia, Immigration Policy, and International Student Mobility
in the Trump Era PROTOCOL #: IRB-2020-311

SUBMISSION TYPE: Initial

ACTION: No Human Subjects Research

DECISION DATE: November 11, 2020

This letter is provided in response to your IRB request regarding human subjects involvement in your proposed research titled, "Islamophobia, Immigration Policy, and International Student Mobility in the Trump Era (IRB #IRB-2020-311)."

This study does not appear to fit the regulatory definition of human subjects research. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) regulations 45 CFR 46.102(D), defines research as "a systematic investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable knowledge." Thus, this study does not require IRB oversight as specified in DHHS regulations 45 CFR 46, subpart A. Further, since identifiers do not exist, this is not human subjects research.

This determination means that there are no restrictions on your research and you may proceed with your study without IRB oversight. If I need to provide further information, please let me know.

Sincerely,
Chase Young, Ph.D.
Chair, IRB

Hannah R. Gerber, Ph.D.
Co-Chair, IRB

APPENDIX B



NON-DISCLOSURE AGREEMENT

Nondisclosure Agreement dated as of November 2nd, 2020 between the Institute of International Education, Inc. (“IIE”), a New York not-for-profit corporation, and Dana Van De Walker, Sam Houston State University. (“Recipient,” together with IIE, the “Parties”).

You have requested certain data from IIE’s Open Doors survey, which is confidential and proprietary information belonging to IIE (the “Information”). In order for IIE to provide you with such Information, Recipient hereby agrees as follows:

1. Recipient will use the Information solely for the purpose for which it was intended, as indicated in Recipient’s original request to obtain the Information attached as Annex A hereto (the “Permitted Purpose”), and not for any other purpose. Recipient further agrees that (a) Recipient will not redistribute the Information in any form without prior written authorization from IIE, (b) to the extent Recipient reports or publishes any data based on the Information, (i) such data will be reported or published in aggregate form and (ii) Recipient will appropriately cite IIE in any publications or reports in which the Information is directly or indirectly used.

2. Except to the extent permitted by Paragraph 5 hereof, Recipient will keep such Information strictly confidential, provided, however, that Information may be disclosed to Recipient’s directors, officers, employees, subsidiaries, auditors and advisors (collectively, the “Representatives”) who need to know such information in connection with the Permitted Purpose. Recipient shall take and cause each Representative to take all reasonable steps necessary to restrict access to such Information and to guard its confidentiality. Recipient will advise its Representatives that such Information is confidential and that by receiving such information such Representatives are agreeing to be bound by this Agreement and not to use the Information for any purpose other than as described herein. Recipient agrees to be responsible for any breach of this Agreement by any Representative.

3. Except to the extent permitted by Paragraph 5 hereof, for a period of seven years from the date hereof, Recipient shall not, and will direct its Representatives not to, disclose to any person (other than another Representative) any of the Information or this Agreement.

4. The term "Information" shall be deemed not to include information which (i) is or becomes generally available to the public other than (a) as a result of a disclosure by Recipient or its Representatives or any other person who directly or indirectly receives such information from the Recipient or (b) in violation of a confidentiality obligation to IIE known to the Recipient, (ii) is or becomes available to the Recipient on a non-confidential basis from a source which, to the knowledge of the Recipient, is entitled to disclose it, (iii) was known to the Recipient prior to its disclosure by IIE or (iv) is verifiably developed by the Recipient without the benefit of or reliance on the Information provided by IIE.

5. In the event that Recipient or its Representatives is required by governmental investigation, court order, deposition, interrogatory, requests for information or documents, subpoenas, civil investigative demand or similar legal process to disclose the Information or any other information the disclosure of which is restricted by the terms of this Agreement, Recipient shall (i) provide IIE with prompt prior written notice of such requirement so that IIE has a reasonable opportunity prior to disclosure to seek an appropriate protective order or similar undertaking and (ii) if so requested by IIE, assist IIE in obtaining a protective order or similar undertaking. If in the absence of a protective order, Recipient is nonetheless, in the reasonable written opinion of its counsel, required by law to disclose Information, disclosure may be made only as to that portion of the Information is advised in writing by counsel is legally required to be disclosed. Recipient will exercise its best efforts to obtain assurance that confidential treatment will be accorded such Information.

6. It is further understood and agreed that money damages would not be a sufficient remedy for any breach of this Agreement and that IIE shall be entitled to specific performance, including, without limitation, injunctive relief, as a remedy for any such breach by Recipient or any Representative. Such remedy shall not be deemed to be the exclusive remedy for breach of this Agreement but shall be in addition to all other remedies available at law or equity. Recipient agrees to reimburse IIE for costs and expenses (including, without limitation, reasonable attorneys' fees) incurred by IIE in connection with the enforcement of this Agreement against Recipient or any Representative judicially determined to be in breach hereof.

7. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and their respective successors and assigns.

8. If any provision of this Agreement is not enforceable in whole or in part, the remaining provisions of this Agreement shall not be affected thereby. No failure or delay in exercising any right, power or privilege hereunder shall operate as a waiver thereof, nor shall any single or partial exercise thereof preclude any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right, power or privilege hereunder.

9. This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the law of the State of New York. The parties hereby agree that any action arising out of this Agreement shall be brought in the state or federal courts located in the City of New York, irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of any such court and waive any objection that such Party may now or hereafter have to the venue of any such action or proceeding in any such court or that such action or proceeding was brought in an inconvenient court and agree not to plead or claim the same.

10. This Agreement may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute one and the same instrument.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the authorized representatives of the parties have executed this Agreement as of the day and year first written above.

Sam Houston State University c/o Dana Van De Walker

By: 
 Name: Dana Van De Walker
 Title: Doctoral Candidate, Higher Education Leadership

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, INC.

By: 
 Name: Jonah Kokodyniak
 Title: Senior Vice President,
 Program Development & Partner Services

VITA

Dana Van De Walker

EDUCATION

Ed.D. in Higher Education Leadership Sam Houston State University	2021
M.A. in Political Science Illinois State University	2006
B.A. in Political Science , Magna Cum Laude Illinois State University	2005

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

International Student Recruiter and Special Programs Coordinator Sam Houston State University	2015-Present
Assistant Professor/Interim Assoc. Director of International Affairs Daegu University	2012-2015
Native English Instructor Chinju National University of Education	2010-2012
Native English Teacher Chilbo Elementary School	2008-2010
Development Coordinator Common Ground Outdoor Adventures	2007-2008
Editorial Assistant Palestine News Network, English Department	2006

SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS

- Walling, M., Van De Walker, D., Gilbert, K., Olmstead, M., & Lane, F. (2020). Perceptions of students enrolled in an online first-year seminar paired with remedial mathematics. *The Journal of College Orientation, Transition, and Retention*, 27(1), 1-26. <https://doi.org/10.24926/jcotr.v27i1.2442>
- Van De Walker, D., & Slate, J. R. (2019). The 2017 Trump Administration travel ban and international graduate applications at two Texas public universities. *Higher Education Politics & Economics*, 5(1), 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.32674/hepe.v5il.1173>

PROFESSIONAL AND UNIVERSITY SERVICE**Professional**

JCSHESA Journal Reviewer	2019-2021
SERA Graduate Student Representative	2019-2020
SERA Annual Meeting Reviewer	2019-2020
NASPA Region III Summer Symposium Reviewer	2018
ACPA18 National Conference Volunteer	2018

University

Co-Chair, SHSU LGBTQI* Faculty & Staff Network	2019-2021
Committee for Student Food and Housing Insecurity	2018-2021
English Proficiency Review Committee	2017-2021
International Education Committee, College of Education	2016-2021
Study Abroad Scholarship Committee	2016-2021
Good Neighbor Scholarship Committee	2016-2021
International Community Welcome Dinner Planning Committee	2016-2021
International Week Planning Committee	2016-2021
New International Student Orientation Planning Committee	2015-2021
International Programs Advisory Committee	2015-2021
Staff Affairs Chair, Staff Council	2019-2020
Academic Affairs Representative, Staff Council	2018-2020
Nominations and Elections Committee, Staff Council	2018-2019
Fundraising Coordinator, SHSU LGBTQI* Faculty & Staff Network	2017-2019
Lavender Graduation Emcee	2017
Staff Representative, SHSU LGBTQI* Faculty & Staff Network	2016-2019
SH ELITE Advisory Board	2016-2019
China University of Mining and Technology Beijing Scholarship Committee	2016-2019
Global Ambassador Program Staff Advisor	2015-2018
International Student Organization Staff Advisor	2015-2018

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

American Educational Research Association (AERA)	2019-2021
Association for the Study of Higher Education (ASHE)	2019-2021
Southwest Educational Research Association (SERA)	2018-2021
NAFSA: Association of International Educators	2017-2021
American College Personnel Association	2017-2018
NASPA: Student Affairs Professionals in Higher Education	2017-2018
KOTESOL (Korean TESOL)	2008-2015