

PERCEPTIONS OF AND EXPERIENCES WITH CONTRABAND IN CORRECTIONAL
FACILITIES: A QUALITATIVE EXAMINATION

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology

Sam Houston State University

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

William L Dittmann

December, 2019

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by

William L Dittmann

APPROVED:

Willard M. Oliver, PhD
Dissertation Director

Jurg Gerber, PhD
Committee Member

Nathan P. Jones, PhD
Committee Member

Phillip Lyons, PhD
Dean, College of Criminal Justice

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my grandfather (Louis Dittmann), my grandmother (Loretta Dittmann), and my mother and father (Bill and Tara Dittmann).

This accomplishment would have never been possible without your support, encouragement, and assistance (emotionally and financially) throughout my life and education. Your constant support of my educational goals and my passion for research and justice has finally paid off.

ABSTRACT

Dittmann, William L, *Perceptions of and experiences with contraband in correctional facilities: A qualitative examination*. Doctor of Philosophy (Criminal Justice), December, 2019, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas.

The presence of contraband within correctional facilities poses a considerable amount of danger to inmates, correctional officers, and correctional staff alike. However, preventing the entry of contraband into correctional facilities has shown to be an ongoing battle in our correctional facilities in the United States. So much so that contraband has remained a problem within our correctional systems for decades. Since the advent of cellular technology, online electronic money transfer systems, and newer and less detectible drugs, we have seen a major evolution in the methods used to bring in contraband, the types of contraband available, the methods of purchasing contraband, and the methods of transfer funds as it relates to contraband. There is a lack of recent information contained within the criminal justice literature that discusses the current forms of contraband in correctional facilities, newer entry methods, the relationship between contraband cellphones and other forms of contraband, the newer methods of transferring funds, the role that contraband plays in the everyday lives of inmates, and the ways in which prison culture and behavioral expectations are shaped by this sub-rosa inmate economy. This study updates the current state of the literature that surrounds the inmate economy and the many facets of contraband by relying on in-depth qualitative interviews with previously incarcerated individuals.

KEY WORDS: Contraband, Inmate economy, Sub-rosa economy, Corruption, Convict code, Contraband smuggling

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to acknowledge my dissertation committee chair, Dr. Willard Oliver, and my committee members, Dr. Jurg Gerber and Dr. Nathan Jones, for their patience, invaluable and endless advice and support, and their unwavering belief in my abilities as a qualitative researcher throughout this dissertation process. You all have collectively served as a strong pillar of academic support and represent the epitome of excellent academic mentorship. Second, I'd like to acknowledge my colleagues who have been there for me and encouraged me throughout this process. Third, I'd like to acknowledge my previous graduate professors for preparing me for this endeavor throughout their courses. Last, but certainly not least, I'd like to thank each and every participant that provided data or played a role in helping develop the sample for this project. Without your trust and honesty, this project would have never been possible. I sincerely thank you all for your participation.

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CHAPTER I

Introduction

On September 11, 2018, 24 year old army veteran Jared Johns was found dead in his apartment due to a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Originally assumed to be related to his depression and PTSD after coming back from a deployment to Afghanistan, his suicide was later found to be linked to a blackmail scam set up by prison inmates incarcerated in South Carolina with the use of contraband cellphones. As it turns out, two inmates were using contraband cellphones to create fake accounts on online dating sites where they posed as young women targeting military personnel. Once contact was made with the military personnel through the dating sites, flirtatious communications began, and eventually nude pictures were sent. Shortly thereafter, the inmates, posing as the girl's fathers, would contact the victim claiming that the girl was underage and they would notify law enforcement if they did not make monetary payments in exchange for silence. Given this blackmail threat, and the supposedly potential, yet fake, charges Johns was scared to face, he took his own life. Upon further investigation, a total of 442 military involved individuals were scammed out of \$560,000 over a three year period ranging from 2015 to 2018 through this inmate-driven scam (Farzan, 2019).

On May 11, 2016, The Department of Justice released information related to the indictment of 50 members of the prison gang, The Ñeta Association, on RICO charges related to drug trafficking and murder committed in Puerto Rico, and within Puerto Rico's prisons, in furtherance of the criminal enterprise. Of particular importance is the amount of drugs and other contraband that was introduced into the prisons by visitors, prison workers, and civilians, referred to as *pitcheos*, who would toss contraband over

prison fences to Ñeta members. This prison gang was suspected of bringing cellphones and multi-kilo amounts of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana into multiple prisons across Puerto Rico. Douglas A. Leff of Puerto Rico's, San Juan FBI Division was quoted saying:

“In reality, their conduct is more accurately described as that of an international mafia than a prison gang. Their network reached throughout Puerto Rico and the continental United States. This enabled them to order hits on rival gang members, corrupt two sworn officers and to move large quantities of drugs and other contraband, effectively turning their prison into a gang-controlled housing project” (Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, 2016).

These stories, and others like them, help highlight the age-old notion that the presence of contraband within correctional facilities poses a significant risk to inmates, the public, and correctional officers (Guenther, 1975; Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974). Both stories also provide evidence that prison contraband can have far reaching and serious consequences both inside and outside of correctional facilities, and that the nature of contraband, especially contraband cellphones, has created new opportunities for criminals, and new challenges for correctional administrators. Despite the dangers associated with prison contraband, preventing the entry of contraband into correctional facilities has shown to be an ongoing battle in our correctional facilities in the United States, and has remained a major issue within our correctional systems for decades (Burke & Owens, 2010; Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). When prison contraband is

discussed in passing, items such as drugs, alcohol, weapons, and more recently cellphones are what typically come to mind. It is true, these are forms of prison contraband, however, when prison contraband is thoroughly examined through a correctional policy lens, items that may be considered contraband become much more widespread and inclusive.

Contraband has been generally defined in Koslover, Hung, Babin, and Mills (2017) as “anything inmates are prohibited from possessing” (p. 2). Contraband may essentially be any item that is not purchased by inmates through the commissary; is not assigned to the inmates by the authoritative agency in charge of the facility; any otherwise approved item that has been altered in any way, shape, or form; and any item that the warden does not approve of the inmates possessing, even items that, at face value, appear to be harmless.

Given this broad definition, the reality is that contraband often plays a role in everyday life for those that are incarcerated, whether it be a cigarette, an extra cookie from the kitchen, or the possession of reading material that was borrowed from another inmate (Kalinich, 1980). Further, the buying and selling of contraband is woven into the fabric of socialization and relationships that are formed within this microcosm of society (among both inmates and correctional staff) (Clemmer, 1940; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958). Understanding the importance of its presence (and lack thereof), role, function, and the method and form of transactions, smuggling, and informal governance that guide and protect this illicit market within the correctional facilities is of particular importance for the study of prison life, correctional policy, and institutional culture (Kalinich, 1980; Ochola, 2015; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974).

Since the advent of cellular technology, online electronic money transfer systems, and newer and less detectible drugs, there has been a major evolution in the methods used to bring contraband into facilities, the different types of contraband now available, the methods used to purchase contraband, and the ways in which funds are being transferred within, and outside of, the sub-rosa inmate economy (Applin, 2016; Burke & Owens, 2010; Dittmann, 2015; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; Northfield, 2018; Sanchez & McKibben, 2015; Waldron, 2017). There is a considerable lack of recent information contained within the criminal justice literature that discusses newer entry methods, the relationship between contraband cellphones and other forms of contraband, the newer methods of transferring funds, and the role that contraband plays in the everyday lives of inmates (Ochola, 2015).

Current research that has examined newer developments in contraband types and entry methods has been mainly quantitative, focusing on the frequency of drug and cell phone seizures, how much or many are seized, and some of the proposed dangers associated with inmates having access to contraband cell phones and the internet (Burke & Owen, 2010; Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016; Department of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, 2018; McGreevy, 2009; Noonan, 2016; Ward, 2017). What is missing from the current research is a qualitative examination of the perceptions of and experiences with contraband from the viewpoint of those who have previously experienced incarceration in correctional facilities. Further, correctional researchers and practitioners may be unaware of the intricacies and newer methods of smuggling contraband into facilities; the role that that cell phones play in accessing contraband and

transferring funds; and the relationships between incarcerated individuals and correctional staff that engage in the contraband market.

The purpose of the current study is to fill these gaps in the literature. By tapping into the perceptions of and experiences with contraband to learn more about the role that contraband played in the everyday life of those who have been previously incarcerated, it hopes to broaden our understanding of this phenomenon. Given the many changes to correctional culture and correctional policy that have occurred over the past 40 years, this topic is worth revisiting (Clemmer, 1940; Hunt, Riegel, Morales & Waldorf, 1993; Skarbek, 2014). For instance, Clemmer (1940) suggests that researchers in the future may want to look back on the standards and values held within correctional facilities to examine similarities and differences that exist within prison culture. Skarbek (2014) contends that prison gangs now have a considerable amount of influence over what goes on in correctional facilities, and he suggests that these prison gangs govern much of what occurs within prison walls. Due to their size and influence, prison gangs are able to dictate behaviors among correctional facility populations because they stand to gain control over the contraband market where profits are large (Skarbek, 2014).

It is argued that by conducting in-depth interviews with people who have experienced or engaged in criminal activity that the richest of descriptive information is obtained and the bigger picture of criminal behavior is uncovered (Bernasco, 2013; Tewksbury, 2013). The significance of this study is that it has the potential to: 1) Fill the gap in the literature regarding contraband in the digital age, 2) Provide a better understanding of the newer types of contraband within these facilities, 3) Identify some of the newer methods of smuggling contraband into facilities, and 4) Inform researchers,

practitioners, and the general public of the role that contraband plays in the everyday lives of those incarcerated, and potential warning signs of efforts employed by inmates to corrupt correctional staff and extort the public. All of these potential outcomes can be used to inform correctional policy in order to create a safer working and living environment for correctional staff and inmates.

It is often through grounded theory approaches to qualitative research that new and useful information is identified, which in turn can allow for the study of dynamic topics, and the development of newer questions about a phenomenon to be explored (Charmaz, 2008). This study relies on qualitative interviews with ex-inmates, and uses a grounded theory approach to derive themes about their experiences and perceptions of contraband and the inmate economy. It aims to examine contraband and the contraband culture in its current state. Doing so also has the potential to provide insight on some of the ways in which contraband and the illicit inmate economy have changed, and how these changes inductively relate to, and can expand on, previous theoretical perspectives related to institutional behaviors.

The second chapter of this dissertation will cover previous literature regarding prison contraband, including: 1) a section that defines contraband using the Texas Department of Criminal Justice policy as an example, 2) the prevalence of the three most common forms of contraband in correctional facilities (cellphones; weapons; and drugs, alcohol, and tobacco), 3) a description of the inmate economy, 4) contraband entry methods and contraband detection, and 5) theoretical perspectives related to institutional culture and institutional misconduct. Chapter three outlines the methodology used to collect and analyze the data used for this study which includes: 1) a section identifying

the research questions, sampling frame, and eligibility criteria for participation 2) the sampling method used, and the sample size obtained, 3) the data collection process and evolution of the sample, 4) the interview settings, and the procedures taken in obtaining the data, 5) the interview questions that participants were asked to answer during the interviews, and 6) a sections on the qualitative coding approach that is used to analyze the data obtained for this study.

CHAPTER II

Literature Review

What is prison contraband?

When examining a topic such as prison contraband, it is important to understand what is meant by this term. Given the broad nature of correctional policies that define contraband, there are a wide range of items that may be considered contraband. The policies that outline and define contraband are relatively stable, yet vague enough to be all encompassing, across local jails, state prisons, and federal correctional facilities. Using the contraband policy outlined in the 2017 Texas Department of Criminal Justice Offender Orientation Handbook as an example, contraband is defined as:

“any item not permitted into the secured perimeter of a unit, or in some cases, on TDCJ property. Also, any item brought into, or taken out of a unit, or in the possession of an offender, visitor or employee as defined in the Texas Penal Code, Section 38.11, is prohibited by the rules and regulations of the TDCJ, may also be considered contraband. These items include, but are not limited to, alcoholic beverages, controlled substances or any drug, firearms or deadly weapons, or any item brought onto TDCJ property with the intent to deliver to an offender, such as paper money, tobacco, lighter, matches, cell phones, pagers, laptop computers, cameras, digital recorders or any other type of electronic or wireless devices” (TDCJ, 2017, p. 89-90).

Contraband may also include:

“a. Any item not allowed when the offender came to the TDCJ, not given or assigned to an offender by the TDCJ, and not bought by an offender for his use from the commissary; b. Any item altered from its original condition; c. Any item which, in the judgment of TDCJ personnel, unreasonably hinders the safe and effective operation of the facility; d. Items in excess of the amounts authorized or stored in an unauthorized manner; e. Any item received or sent through the mail that is not approved in accordance with the TDCJ Offender Correspondence Rules; f. Anything an offender is not supposed to have: such as, but not limited to: (1) Money; (2) Items used for gambling, such as dice and playing cards; (3) Books, magazines or newspapers that are not approved; (4) Clothes that are not approved; or (5) Tobacco or tobacco related items. g. Any item used to violate a TDCJ rule” (TDCJ, 2017, p.12).

Section a. of this policy includes items that an inmate brings with them from a different unit or correctional facility that are not allowed on the new unit or facility, and items that an inmate did not purchase themselves from commissary. For instance, if an inmate purchases a fan at Unit A and gets transferred to unit B where fans are not allowed, the inmate may have to surrender the fan to prison staff at Unit B upon arrival. Further, items that have been given by an inmate to another inmate, or items that have been stolen or borrowed from another inmate, are considered contraband. The transfer of any item from one inmate to another is prohibited and that item may be considered contraband and is subject to confiscation by TDCJ employees. Some items that may be considered contraband under section b. above may include altered clothing such as

cutting the sleeves off of a state issued prisoner uniform; using thread from a state issued item to sew, repair, or alter another article of clothing or state issued cloth; repairs to items purchased from commissary such as fans, radios, televisions, typewriter, etc.; and any other item that an inmate is allowed to possess that has been altered from its original state.

Section c. provides a considerable amount of discretion as to what can be considered contraband as these items can be identified by the judgement of the duty warden so long as the item in question creates an unreasonable risk to safe and effective facility operations. Section d. refers to large quantities of items that can be purchased from commissary that exceed the amount an inmate is allowed to possess, and any item/s that are improperly stored. Section e. specifically refers to correspondence items sent or received through the mail that are not approved by TDCJ, such as letters sent to and from other inmates, and unauthorized letters sent to victims. These items will be discussed in more detail shortly. Section f. covers other items not allowed by TDCJ due to issues that can arise from their presence on a facility such as money, items used for gambling, unapproved reading material, and tobacco and tobacco related items. Finally, Section g. accounts for items that are used to violate any other TDCJ rule.

Related to correspondence in section e., the *TDCJ Offender Orientation Handbook* also contains a detailed section on “Offender Correspondence Rules” (TDCJ, 2017, p. 112-120). Some of these items that may be considered restricted correspondence are letters to and from other offenders. Exceptions to this policy exist if the inmates are immediate family members; have children together and parental rights have not been terminated; if the inmates are co-parties involved in a standing legal matter; or if the

inmate is involved in a legal matter and is providing witness affidavit. Other prohibited correspondence that can be considered contraband include letters sent to victims of a crime for which the offender is currently incarcerated; correspondence sent to, or received from individuals on an offender's Negative Mailing List such as victims of the offender where courts strictly prohibit communication and individuals who have requested, via written documentation, that the offender not correspond with them anymore.

Correspondence that contains material that meet any of the following criteria are also considered contraband and the mail will not be delivered if the contraband cannot be removed from the correspondence:

“Contains threats of physical harm against any person or place or threats of criminal activity; 2. Threatens blackmail or extortion; 3. Concerns sending contraband in or out of the institutions; 4. Concerns plans to escape or unauthorized entry; 5. Concerns plans for activities in violation of institutional rules; 6. Concerns plans for future criminal activity; 7. Uses code and its contents are not understood by the person inspecting the correspondence; 8. Solicits gifts of goods or money under false pretenses or for payment to other offenders; 9. Contains a graphic presentation of sexual behavior that is in violation of the law; 10. Contains a sexually explicit image; 11. Contains an altered photo; 12. Contains information, which if communicated would create a clear and present danger of violence or physical harm to a human being; or 13. Contains records or

documentation held by TDCJ which are not listed in the attachment to the TDCJ *Open Records Act Manual* Chapter 3” (TDCJ, 2017, p. 116-117).

Penalties Related to the Possession of Contraband. Once an inmate is found in possession of an item of contraband in a TDCJ facility, the penalties can vary and the correctional officer can choose how they want to deal with the offense depending on the seriousness of the offense and their ability to informally resolve the issue (TDCJ, 2015). TDCJ outlines the penalties for contraband and other rule infractions in their *Disciplinary Rules and Procedures for Offenders* manual (TDCJ, 2015). TDCJ has three levels of offenses which are summed up below in reference to contraband violations.

Level 1 offenses are the most serious types of offenses. As it relates to contraband, the possession of money in excess of \$20, tobacco in excess of .6 ounces or 20 cigarettes, and the possession or use of marijuana or other controlled substances are all considered Level 1 offenses. Penalties for these offenses can result in offenders losing good-time, or time already spent towards their sentence. The amount of good time lost for a level one offense depends on the number of level 1 offenses the inmate has had in the past twelve months, the seriousness of the offense (resulted in: threat to safety of property, others, unit, or order within the unit), and penalties handed down to other offenders with similar violations. Taking into consideration these items noted above, the amount of good time lost can range from 0 days up to all of their good time being taken.

Level 2 offenses include lesser offenses than those included in Level 1, however these offenses still include contraband related offenses such as use or possession of an unauthorized prescription drug; use, possession, or distilling alcohol; use or possession of tobacco products or intoxicating inhalants; and possession of tattooing paraphernalia. The

penalties for Level 2 offenses takes into account the number of major cases the offender has received in the past 180 days, as well as the seriousness of the offense (resulted in: threats to safety of property, others, the unit, or order within the unit), and penalties handed down to other offenders with similar violations. The penalties for these offenses range from 0 to 730 days of good time lost. Level 3 offenses are the lowest category of offenses and include contraband related offenses such as trafficking or trading, gambling, and unauthorized storage of property. The penalties take into account the same things as Level 2 offenses, however the range for the potential good time lost can range from 0 to 60 days.

One may see these penalties as necessary in order to deter offenders from wanting to obtain, possess, sell, or use contraband. Despite the logic that connects policies and punishment with deterrence, these penalties have not been assessed in terms of the impact they may or may not have on the amount of contraband found in correctional facilities. What is known is that contraband remains a continuous issue within correctional facilities. The following section will highlight the prevalence of three categories of contraband within correctional facilities to illustrate this point.

Prevalence of Cellphones, Weapons, and Drugs/Alcohol in Correctional Facilities

Cellphones. Despite constant efforts by correctional staff to rid correctional facilities of dangerous contraband, (particularly cellphones, weapons, and drugs), correctional facilities constantly struggle to meet this goal. A heavily redacted 2016 Department of Justice (DOJ) Report from the Office of the Inspector (OIG) indicated that between FY 2012-2014, cellphones were the most common form of contraband confiscated in Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facilities (Department of Justice Office

of the Inspector General, 2016). Burke and Owen (2010), note that 2,800 cellphone devices were confiscated in the California prisons in the year 2008. This number soared to 4,130 cellphones confiscated in the year 2009 (McGreevy, 2009). At one particular facility in the State of Texas in 2008, there were approximately 300 cellphones recovered, 18 of which were confiscated from death-row inmates (Burke & Owen, 2010). Further complicating the issue with keeping cell phones out of prison are that some cell phones that are sold on the market can be as small as a human index finger (O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017).

Contraband cellphones have been used by inmates for the purposes of planning and/or carrying out dangerous activities such as intimidating witnesses, murdering individuals including witnesses and public servants, drug trafficking, and overseeing ongoing criminal organizations (Federal Communications Commission, 2010). Recently, inmates in a San Juan, Puerto Rico correctional facility used a contraband cellphone to order the death of a BOP's special investigations section lieutenant after leaving the correctional facility. While working at the facility, the lieutenant was in constant search of contraband and his efforts challenged the leadership structure of the inmates. After communicating with individuals in the community, a monetary amount for the hit was agreed upon, and the plan between the inmates and those in the free community was put into action. Once the lieutenant left the facility after work, a contraband cell phone call was placed to the hitmen who were parked on the side of the road where they tailed the lieutenant and used four ".40 caliber fully automatic Glock pistols" to commit the murder (Department of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, 2018, p. 1).

Inmates have also self-reported using these cellular devices for communicating with family members, viewing pornography, engaging in social media, ordering and setting up the processes for smuggling contraband, and for conducting electronic money transfers with the proceeds earned from the purchase, sale, and/or distribution of contraband (Dittmann, 2015; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). For example, in a study that examined ex-inmate's perception of their experiences in public and private prisons in the State of Texas, Dittmann (2015) conducted in-depth qualitative interviews four with ex-inmates and uncovered contraband smuggling operations that used contraband cell phones to facilitate the process. The processes used to smuggle contraband into these facilities will be outlined later in this chapter.

Weapons Outside of cellphones, other contraband items also pose a considerable and immediate threat to the safety and security of our correctional institutions, the inmates, and the staff that operate these facilities. Scholars have continued to highlight the inherent nature of violence and victimization within prisons (Bowker, 1980; Irwin, 1980; Johnson, 1987; McKorkle, 1993; Wolff et. al., 2007). The DOJ found that between 2000 and 2013, 302 homicides occurred in local jails, and 762 homicides occurred in state prisons between 2001 and 2013 (Noonan, Rohloff, & Ginder, 2017). The violence that occurs within prison takes many forms, one of which is assaults on staff and other inmates using weapons or other items in the commission of the violence. Weapons serve at least two purposes in prison, to commit pre-meditated violence, or to deter it. McCorkle (1992) found in a sample of 300 inmates from Tennessee State Prison in Nashville, Tennessee that 25.1% reported keeping a weapon nearby as a precautionary measure taken to avoid violence. The DOJ has noted that, second to cell phones, weapons

were the most confiscated form of contraband in BOP institutions from 2012-2013, with 6,716 weapons being confiscated between 2012 and 2014 (Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016).

Lincoln and colleagues (2006) surveyed 70 prisons from 13 states in the U.S. in an attempted to quantify and describe the types of weapons confiscated, the types of weapons used on staff, the types of weapons used on other inmates, the source of these weapons, and the number of lost work days and cost of staff injuries due to attacks with these weapons over a one year period (2002-2003). Results suggested that among these 13 prisons, there were 1,326 weapons confiscated. 203 of those weapons were used by inmates to injure other inmates while 37 of those weapons were used to injure staff. Shanks, daggers, razors and saps (something flexible with a heavy weight on the end such as a sock with a padlock inside of it) were the weapons most often used to injure other inmates, while clubs were the most common weapon used to injure staff followed by razors and daggers. Interestingly, the source for many of these weapon was the prison store, also known as the commissary. This study suggests that during this 12 month period, roughly 2,351 workdays were lost due to staff assaults on staff with weapons (\$403,900 in lost wages) and \$721,400 was spent on medical bills associated with these attacks on the staff members totaling \$1,125,300. This research shows that weapons not only pose an immediate physical threat to the safety and security of those within a correctional facility, but they also suggest that there are monetary losses associated with their use.

Drugs, Alcohol, and Tobacco. Correctional facilities also deal with a large amount of drugs, tobacco, and alcohol within their walls (O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017).

According to the DOJ, the third, fourth, and fifth most common types of contraband confiscated in federal prisons between FY2012 and FY2014 are narcotics (3,713), tobacco (1,797), and alcohol (1,152) (Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016). Although there are numerous other narcotic types, the DOJ report only shows data for confiscations of marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, which demonstrates that the report is less than comprehensive when conceptualizing the term narcotics, and as a result, it appears that narcotics may not be as common as cell phones and weapons.

Despite this poor measure reported in the DOJ report and the constant efforts to curb the presence of inebriants in correctional facilities, drugs have remained a major issue within corrections, especially given the increased prevalence of less detectable synthetic drugs such as synthetic cannabinoids K2 (also known as spice or mamba) spice and the popular prescription drug for opioid addicts known as Suboxone (Bodnar, 2017; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). Between 2001 and 2014, there were 595 reported state inmate deaths caused by drugs and alcohol (Noonan, 2016). Furthermore, there are considerable health concerns related to the consumption of prison made alcohol, also known as pruno, as the consumption of pruno can lead to a deadly illness called botulism (Walters et al., 2015).

K2 typically looks like plant material or leaves that have been sprayed with a lab-grade synthetic cannabinoid, and once smoked, produces an intense high that far outweighs the effects of marijuana (the drug that the effects of K2 are supposed to mimic) and can lead to the individual suffering from severe bouts of psychosis, hallucinations, seizures, heart attacks, and aggressive and suicidal behaviors (van Amsterdam, Brunt, & van den Brink, 2015; Walker, 2018). One report suggests that K2 is the fastest growing type of drug-related contraband in Texas prisons, and of the 477 confiscations of drug

contraband in TDCJ in a 6 month period in 2017, 268 of these confiscations included K2 (Ward, 2017). Another study found an almost %640 increase in K2. This now illegal synthetic drug is attractive to inmates as it does not have a strong odor like marijuana, and generic drug tests administered by prison officials cannot detect the substance (Ferranti, 2012). Additionally, this cannabinoid can be sprayed on nearly anything that can absorb it, including correspondence that has been sent to prisoners, thus making it even harder to detect (O'Hagan, & Hardwick, 2017; The RDI Blog, 2017). This paper correspondence, once received by the inmates, can then be smoked to produce the dangerous and euphoric effects of the chemical/s.

Another popular drug that is becoming more prevalent in prisons is Suboxone (Bodnar, 2017). This prescription was created to manage opioid addiction and withdraw symptoms, but it can also be abused as it provides a high similar to opioids. Suboxone can be prescribed in pill form and in a dissolvable strip that is to be taken orally. In 2017, the most common contraband smuggled by inmates held by the Maine Department of Corrections was Suboxone (Bodnar, 2017). The strip form of the drug is easily concealable and is commonly smuggled into facilities through the mail system by placing the small strip under postage stamps on correspondence (Goodnough & Zezima, 2011). Other drugs that have been detected in correspondence include methamphetamine. Gearhart (2006) reported that inmates will receive correspondence that has been soaked in liquefied drugs, such as methamphetamine. Once received, the paper can be used or sold as methamphetamine and can be orally ingested, or smoked.

Drug use by inmates, particularly injection drug use/ers (IDU/IDU's), in correctional facilities pose serious health issues for correctional populations and staff.

Incarcerated populations have much higher rates of blood-borne infections than the general public such as HIV (about four times greater), hepatitis B (two to six times greater) and hepatitis C (close to ten times greater) (Gough et al., 2010). Furthermore, intravenous drug users often rely on needles shared by other inmates to administer the drug intravenously or intramuscularly (Mahon, 1996; Waterhouse, 1995). Mahon (1996) noted that cleaning supplies and bleach are not only difficult to obtain in correctional settings, they can also be considered a form of contraband based on correctional policies. It is important to note that syringes used for diabetic inmates are not left with the inmate after their dose of insulin has been delivered, so any inmate that is in possession of a syringe can receive a contraband related infraction. Correctional staff may also be at risk of contracting a disease if they are poked with one of these needles, get into a violent altercation where open wounds exist and blood may be transferred from a carrier to the staff member, or if they are assaulted with a weapon that was tainted with a blood-borne infection or disease.

Despite a lack of public support, several countries around the world have implemented Syringe Exchange Programs (SEP's) in their prisons in an effort to reduce the public health concerns related to IDU such as the spread of HIV, and hepatitis. Stover and Nelles (2003) examined evaluations from 10 European prisons from three countries that implemented SEP's, and found that eight of the prisons saw no increase in drug use after implementing the SEP's, and two actually saw a decrease in drug use. All ten prisons saw no increase in the injection of drugs after implementation. Of the nine prisons that reported data on needle sharing, seven of them suggested that needle sharing

was strongly reduced while one prison reported no change and one prison reported only a few cases of needle sharing.

The findings in Stover and Nellis (2003) suggest that at least some countries around the world are open to implementing SEP's in their prisons (German, Switzerland, and Spain), the goals of these programs are being met (reduction in needle sharing), and initial concerns over their implementation by critics (increase in drug use, increase in injections) are not supported. There are some underlying themes to these SEP's, one of which is the focus on harm reduction. This focus on harm reduction suggests that, despite strong security efforts, prisons cannot keep drugs out of prisons, so the next best thing would be to enact programs such as SEP's to reduce the harms that are related to drug use, specifically, IDU's. The next section will discuss the dearth of literature that exists on the dynamic inmate economy where contraband is exchanged and sold.

Contraband and the Inmate Economy

Contrary to typical licit economies where goods and services are legally exchanged and are regulated by a formal system, the prison economy, by virtue of prison policies, is illicit and lacks formal mechanisms that guide these exchanges. However, this is not to say that prison economies do not function in similar ways as licit economies. For instance, the basic economic principle of supply and demand are just as relevant to licit economies as they are in prison contraband economies (Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974). The prison economy and the flow of goods within it, in many respects, has also been suggested to have a considerable impact on the stability of the prison environment (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2012; Skarbek, 2014; Williams & Fish, 1974).

The contraband goods exchanged within this economy make up much of the socialization that occurs within correctional institutions, and inmates must rely on the inmate code (set of rules and norms that dictate behavior and socialization) and other informal mechanisms such as coercion, threats, prison gangs and their extralegal governing powers, and violence to ensure that the flow of goods and services is not interrupted (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2012; Skarbek, 2014; Trammell, 2012; Williams & Fish, 1974). Williams and Fish (1974) suggest that the inmate code can be broken at times when engaging in the inmate economy, such as codes related to the exploitation of other inmates. However, Williams and Fish (1974) note that studies have failed to distinguish when exactly these codes can be broken, and the characteristics of the individuals who can break them in terms of the roles they play within the inmate culture. What also goes partially unexamined in current literature is how the rules of the contraband market overlap with the inmate code, how and when these codes are adhered to when engaging in the contraband market, and details about other potential rules or business ethics that dictate behaviors within the prison economy.

Kalinich (1980) suggests that “the flow of contraband contributes to the stability in the prison community by supporting an informal power structure that supports order and to some extent deals with the material and psychological needs of the residents, giving them incentives to comply with the norms of the informal setting” (p. 5). When the flow of contraband is disrupted, the inmates rely less on the informal power structure, and are less cooperative and more disruptive, which leads to instabilities within the prison environment. Guards are by no means disconnected from the prison economy, as they too have a vested interest in maintaining a stable and cooperative inmate population

(Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958). Inmates wish to maintain stability and order in the prison environment as this allows for fewer searches by guards, and less attention being drawn to them, which in turn allows for contraband to flow more freely (Sykes, 1958; Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974). Guards, on the other hand, seek stability and order because they are often reprimanded by their superiors when they cannot control their inmate population, and disruptive and disorderly populations are much more difficult to handle than ones that are stable, cooperative, and orderly (Sykes, 1958).

In fact, those inmates who have influence on the behaviors of other inmates within an area of a prison, and who can maintain a stable and orderly environment amongst the inmates, have been reported to receive special favors by guards such as overlooking the possession and sale of contraband and even supplying contraband to those influential inmates in exchange for their efforts to maintain order amongst the inmate population through whatever means necessary (Kalinich, 1980). This is seen as somewhat of a give-and-take situation, where both parties benefit. Cooperation and the give-and-take approach play a major role in the facilitation of the inmate economy and the stability of both the environment and the illicit market (Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974).

Almost 40 years ago, the medium of exchange that drove the prison economy consisted of primarily cigarettes and what Kalinich (1980) refers to as green, or real money, and commissary items. It was also common for inmates to have bank accounts that they could use to exchange funds through a request sent to an individual outside of the institution. These requests were typically made during visitation or through mail correspondence. Given the advent of technology (specifically electronic banking, prison

phones and contraband cell phones, and electronic money transfer systems), new methods of exchanging funds are becoming more popular, as the exchange can now occur in a shorter period of time, and depending on which method used, are very difficult to trace by correctional investigators. Some of these more modern methods of purchasing contraband and exchanging currency are discussed in the following section.

Contraband Entry Methods

As mentioned, items can be purchased through commissary and later become contraband after alteration or misuse (TDCJ, 2017). Items can also be stolen from the different working environments in the prison (woodworking shop, welding shop, kitchen, etc.) (Sykes, 1958; Kalinich, 1980). Contraband also enters prisons by way of the correctional officers, staff, or trustees bringing in the items on their person (Clemmer, 1940; Davidson, 1977; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Groves, 2016; Kalinich, 1980; Ochola, 2015). Other common methods of contraband entering correctional facilities is through prison contractors, social visits, legal visits, new prisoners coming into the facility, court and hospital visits, throwing contraband over perimeter walls, commercial delivery vehicles, and prison staff (Gearhart, 2006; Ochola, 2015; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). Ochola (2015) found that the three most common ways that contraband entered into correctional facilities in Kenya were 1) prison staff, 2) social visits, and 3) over or through perimeter walls.

As mentioned earlier, drugs are also brought in through the mail (Gearhart, 2006; Goodnough & Zezima, 2011; The RDI Blog, 2017). More recently, drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), have been used to breach correctional facilities perimeters and drop packages of contraband ranging from relatively harmless items such as tobacco up

to weapons that can be used to cause serious injury (Applin, 2016; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; Northfield, 2018; Sanchez & McKibben, 2015; Waldron, 2017). Aside from drone delivery, criminals are becoming extremely creative with other methods of breaching perimeter security with contraband, for example, one woman was recently arrested in Oklahoma for shooting contraband into a prison using a T-shirt cannon, similar to those used at sporting event to distribute t-shirts into the grandstands (Brice-Sadler, 2019).

Staff Corruption and Grooming. Of all of the methods used to enter contraband into correctional facilities, the most common method used, correctional staff, is also, arguably, the most obvious (Kalinich, 1980; Ochola, 2015). Corruption among correctional staff is a major problem in correctional institutions around the globe (O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). Official corruption can come in many forms in correctional facilities, however some of the most common forms of corruption occur when inmates and staff engage in inappropriate relationships (Alleyne, 2012; Beck, Berzofsky, & Caspar, & Krebs, 2013; Blackburn, Fowler, Mullings, & Marquart, 2011; Dial & Worley, 2008; Worley, Marquart, & Mullings, 2003), and when correctional staff bring contraband into facilities (Fox, 1984; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Groves, 2016; Kalinich, 1980; Kalinich, & Stojkovic, 1987; McCarthy, 1984; Ochola, 2015).

Given that inmates and correctional staff spend a considerable amount of time with each other each day, and the prison itself is essentially its own microcosm of society where social interactions and relationships exist and further develop, both endogenous relationships (between staff and inmates) and exogenous relationships (between staff, and inmates' friends, family, and acquaintances) are formed overtime (Goldsmith, Halsey, &

Vel-Palumbo, 2018). These relationships can be built slowly, or can be pre-existing. Together, both endogenous and exogenous relationships provide opportunities for the facilitation of contraband smuggling, and exchanges of contraband and currency with free-world actors (Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018).

Inmates will often begin endogenous relationships with staff through simple communicative relationships with guards, and over time, these simple communications may turn into small favors that later turn into big favors, and eventual breaches of integrity, especially as it relates to contraband (Crouch & Marquart, 1989; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; Kalinich, 1980; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Sykes, 1958). This process of slowly building relationships with guards until the relationship and blackmail opportunities are so apparent that the guard becomes, in a sense, controlled by the inmate, is known as grooming (Liebling, Price, & Shefler, 2011; Mcalinden, 2012). Goldsmith, Halsey, and Vel-Palumbo (2018), suggest that even doing small and menial favors can lead up to doing much larger favors that create serious security concerns for both inmates, staff, and the public. The gradual compromising of correctional staff through small steps is also referred to as a “soft capture” as the correctional officer is not coerced into doing favors at the beginning, but rather the slow corruption can occur without the correctional staff member even being aware of the motives behind what may at first look like simple and kind favors (McIlwain, 2004, p. 118).

One relatively recent and widely publicized example of this grooming process occurring, and the dangers associated with corruption, comes from the Clinton Correctional Facility in Dannemora, New York. Inmates David Sweat and Richard Matt

escaped from this facility in 2015 with the help of a prison employee, Joyce Mitchell. What began as a friendship between Sweat, Matt, and Mitchell, later turned into sexual relationships, which then led to Mitchell being coerced into bring in hacksaw blades and chisels that Sweat and Matt used to cut through cell walls, steam pipes, and eventually escape through an off-site manhole (Marcius, 2018). The key to this successful escape lies in the fact that Joyce Mitchell was slowly groomed into smuggling these tools into the Clinton Correctional Facility, through friendship, sexual relations, and eventual coercion.

In sum, correctional staff corruption continues to be a problem in correctional facilities, especially as it relates to contraband and sexual relationships. By examining the slow evolution of the grooming process and how these relationships are formed and strengthened from inmates' perspectives, researchers may be able to inform correctional policies, training, and identify early warning signs of these relationships occurring, and how to avoid these situations. After all, it is the inmates who identify their targets for grooming, develop the techniques for rapport building, and manipulate correctional staff into compromising the integrity, safety, and security of the facility.

Contraband Detection and Disruption Methods. The presence of contraband in correctional facilities often goes unnoticed by correctional staff, as inmates have numerous methods for stowing away their contraband including but not limited to hiding items in mattresses, books, on or inside their bodies, furniture, inside commissary products, within correspondence, and in and around the facility. Inmates have all day to think about how to get contraband into correctional facilities, and once inside, how and where to hide these items from correctional staff. This section will discuss five methods

of contraband detection that are used in correctional facilities (shakedowns, K9's, perimeter security, informants, and Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging Detection Systems), and will conclude with a brief description of the most up to date cell phone signal disruption technology and the current Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations that serve as temporary roadblocks in implementing these technologies in correctional facilities.

Shakedowns. It is common for searches to occur in correctional facilities on a regular basis, and when information is provided to ranking staff in regards to prohibited items or activities. These searches are referred to as shakedowns, and the ultimate purpose of these shakedowns is to locate contraband, identify its owner, identify and investigate structural vulnerabilities, and collect evidence that may be linked to other illegal activity such as gambling, escape efforts, and rackets (Guenther, 1975). Shakedowns refer to both searches of individuals and searches of the areas of a correctional facility. Regardless of the amount of time spent during a shakedown, and the depth and intensity of the searches, correctional officers are well aware that whatever was found during the shakedown is only a fraction of what is actually present (Gearhart, 2006; Guenther, 1975). Oftentimes, inmates who have built relationships with guards will be informed by that guard as to when the shakedown is going to occur and which areas the search team will target, or the guard will simply search that inmate loosely so that they do not intentionally detect contraband on that inmate (Kalinich, 1980).

K9's. There are numerous places to hide contraband in correctional facilities, so search teams will sometimes use K9's to help locate contraband items, most commonly drugs (Gearhart, 2006; Neocleous, 2016; Prendergast, et al., 2004). Aside from their

ability to detect many types of illegal narcotics, K9's have also been trained to detect cellphones (Gearhart, 2006). In 2016, these K9's were being used in California, Texas, New Jersey, Maryland, Ohio, Virginia, and Florida to locate contraband cell phones in correctional facilities (Chammah, 2016). The dogs are trained to detect specific scents that exist in cell phones. For instance, these K9's will be specifically trained to detect the smell of lithium niobate, commonly found in cell phone batteries.

K9's that are used to detect contraband in correctional facilities are not always successful in uncovering contraband, as they are searching for a scent that may have been present previous to the search but the contraband was re-located before the search began. This is not necessarily a total loss for the dog or prison investigators, as this information can be used to help understand networks of individuals involved with contraband by gathering intelligence on where the contraband has been, who may have possessed it, and who may have knowledge of its origins (Chammah, 2016). Despite the excellent scent detection skills that dogs possess, one challenge correctional agencies face is a shortage of drug dogs for contraband detection in prisons (Penfold, Turnbull, & Webster, 2005).

Perimeter Security and CCTV. Other methods for combatting both escapes and contraband being thrown over perimeter fences at correctional facilities is by deploying perimeter security units and through the use of technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) (Wortley, 2002). Perimeter patrol units round the perimeter of the facility in search of perimeter and structural vulnerabilities, escapees, and to deter or detect citizens tossing contraband over perimeter fences. Other target hardening options for perimeter security measures include seismic detection technologies and infrared devices (Wortley, 2002). CCTV can supplement these efforts by maintaining constant

visualization of the perimeter, and can also play a significant role inside the prison as it relates to safety, security, and surveillance.

Although perimeter security measures and CCTV may, at face value, appear to be promising, CCTV displays must be constantly monitored by well-trained and attentive staff members, and perimeter technologies require staff training and constant maintenance. Furthermore, previous studies have suggested that the process of smuggling contraband by tossing it over perimeter fences requires diversionary tactics, in-depth planning, and the use of contraband cell phones for effective and timely communication (Dittmann, 2015; Ochola, 2015). Referring back to the use of drones for smuggling prison contraband, depending on the altitude of the drone, CCTV and many other perimeter security measures such as high fences may show to be less effective than expected. In addressing these shortcoming, German technology, called DroneShield, has been deployed in some German Federal prison (O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017). This technology uses a host of signal detection methods (infrared, acoustic, wireless, and video) to identify and disrupt drones that approach the airspace over these German correctional facilities.

Informants. Another method of contraband detection relies on informants providing correctional staff with information regarding individuals involved in the smuggling, storage, selling, and purchasing of contraband. Informants will often send notes to correctional officials, referred to as kites, with information regarding numerous types of illegal activity that is occurring in the facility including but not limited to: contraband, gambling, sexual victimization, planned riots and escapes, the presence of weapons, and planned assaults (Guenther, 1975; Worley, 2011). They can also meet with

correctional staff, however this may be more risky as being labeled as a snitch is a serious accusation and violation of the inmate code, which can put that individuals life in jeopardy. Guenther (1975) suggests that while some information turned over to correctional staff by informants can be useful, most times the information proves to be fruitless and of little value, which begs the question of whether or not the efforts were a diversionary tactic, and what kind of behavior was actually going on while the correctional staff was busy investigating the informants valueless accusations.

Concealed Weapon and Contraband Imaging Detection Systems (CWCIDS).

The National Institute of Justice released a guide to CWCIDS for correctional staff and law enforcement (Paulter, 2001). CWCIDS are systems intended to help detect contraband and weapons, and can vary in price, effectiveness, and purpose. This guide outlines the many different types of detection technologies available for use including: hard object detectors, walk through metal object detectors, hand-held metal object detectors, magnetic imaging portals, MRI body cavity imagers, gradiometer metal detectors, gradiometer metal object locators, microwave holographic imagers, microwave dielectrometer imagers, x-ray imagers, microwave radar imagers, pulse radar/swept frequency detectors, terahertz-wave imagers, millimeter-wave radar detectors, electromagnetic pulse detectors, millimeter-wave imagers, infrared imagers, and hybrid millimeter-wave and infrared imagers. These technologies rely on several different energy sources to detect weapons and contraband including: acoustic, magnetic, and electromagnetic waves.

As comprehensive as the guide to CWCIDS is, all of these detection technologies are not available at all correctional facilities, partially due to their cost associated with the

initial purchase and the cost associated with the maintenance of these technologically advanced devices. As is the case with many issues related to corrections, budgetary constraints often explain the lack use of these more advanced types of technologies in correctional facilities. Some states, such as Pennsylvania, have encountered situations where correspondence was being soaked in liquefied drugs. To combat this approach to contraband smuggling the State of Pennsylvania has partnered with the company Smart Communications, which scanning all of the mail, stores it electronically, and provides inmates with photocopies of the correspondence during mail call (Michaels, 2018).

Cellphone Signal Disruption and the FCC. Considered one of the top issues related to prison contraband, cell phones pose a considerable amount of danger to the prison environment, the staff, and the general public. Aside from some hand held radio frequency detection technology that can be used during a shakedown to find contraband cell phones, some of the more promising approaches rely on the disruption or jamming of cell phone signals within a correctional institution with the use of signal jamming technology. These jamming technology essentially deny service to all cellphone users within a certain radius. At face value, this sounds quite efficient and as if it would be a valid option for handling issues related to contraband cell phones, but there is one major road block that makes this technology illegal to use, the Federal Communications Act of 1934.

The FCC places regulations on jamming technology in The Federal Communications Act of 1934 as this technology can interfere with important radio communications necessary for emergency personnel, law enforcement, and other authorized cellphone calls. These jamming technologies vary in terms of their ability to

identify the area in which the signals will be jammed. A test of jamming technology for prison cellphones conducted at one prison showed that cellphone signals were also jammed for close to 200,000 local residents as well (Burke & Owen, 2010), while in 2018 in Cumberland, Maryland micro-jamming technology was able to jam signals within a prison, yet calls made 20 feet away from the prison were unaffected (Kinnard, 2019).

For close to eight years, congress has considered federal legislation that would allow states the ability to jam cell-phone signals for the purpose of rendering prison contraband cellphones useless. To date, these propositions have not been adopted, thus prison officials have relied on other methods of combatting the use of cellphones in prisons through the use of managed access technology. Managed access technology allows prison officials to essentially block calls that are made from unapproved cellphones, while allowing calls made from approved cellphones to go through. Managed access technology acts like its own cell tower with the strongest signal given its proximity to a specific location. When cell phone calls are made in close proximity to managed access technologies, they automatically connect to that strong signal, which allows for the device to filter through and determine which cell phone signals are approved and unapproved through a process that involves cell phone carrier companies (Grommon et al., 2018).

Grommon and colleagues (2018) conducted a process evaluation on managed access technology used within a correctional institution, and found significant challenges related to implementation, cost (ranging from \$200,000 - \$1,000,000), routine management and maintenance, personnel, carrier technology upgrades, and strong

partnerships with cell carrier companies. Given these challenges, it is reasonable to assume that these technologies may be the most effective, yet challenging, method of combatting the use of contraband cell phones within correctional facilities until legislation is passed that allows states to use some of the more effective and up to date jamming technologies available. Recently, a companion bill introduced by U.S. Senator Tom Cotton and U.S. Representative David Kustoff that would allow for jamming technologies to be used in correctional facilities (Kinnard, 2018). Despite these consistent legislative efforts to allow for the disruption of prison contraband cell phone signals, the current state of their use is still unlawful.

Case Studies of Two Contraband Smuggling Operations.

One recent case study of two contraband smuggling operations comes from a follow up analysis of data used in Dittmann (2015), and relied on in-depth interview data with two previously incarcerated individuals and crime script analysis to determine the steps taken to successfully smuggle contraband into two different correctional facilities, both of which relied on the use of contraband cellphones to facilitate the processes. Crime script analysis essentially outlines the decisions made and the steps taken in the commission of a crime, and can be used to help develop crime prevention and investigative techniques. The first smuggling process relied on a contraband cell phone, the United States Postal Service (USPS), Western Union money orders, and four actors: two inmates (Inmate 1 and Inmate 2), one Hybrid Actor (a medical staff worker at the facility), and a Free-world Actor (family member of Inmate 1). The actors and their roles are shown below:

- Inmate 1- contraband purchaser, contraband secondary receiver

- Inmate 2- contraband primary receiver, contraband distributor
- Hybrid Actor- Western Union money order purchaser and Sender
- Free-world Actor- Western Union money order receiver, Free-world contraband purchaser, contraband smuggler

Crime script analysis identified the following actions for the first smuggling operation, listed in order, that were taken to successfully smuggle marijuana and tobacco into a correctional facility:

1. Inmate 1 called out to a Free-world Actor on a contraband cellphone and asked them to purchase a Western Union money order for X amount with an arbitrary signature.
2. The Free-world Actor then sent the money order via USPS to an address with a fake return address.
2. The Hybrid (prison nurse) actor retrieved the money order from address, purchased contraband, brought contraband into facility, and handed off the contraband to inmate 2 who had a work assignment and routine interactions with the prison nurse.
3. Inmate 2 gave Inmate 1 his desired contraband, distributed/sold the remaining contraband at the facility (currency = commissary items), and split proceeds with Inmate 1.
4. Process repeated

The data for this smuggling operation did not allow for the distribution process to be examined in depth. However, data collected about the second smuggling operation, discussed next, was extensive and allowed for an in-depth examination into the

sophistication of this smuggling operation, and the nearly untraceable methods of currency transfer using contraband cell-phones, pre-paid debit cards, an electronic money transfer system, and meticulous planning and coordination.

The second operation, also uncovered in a secondary analysis of data used in Dittmann (2015), relied heavily on contraband cell phones and General Purpose Reloadable pre-paid debit cards (GPR's) and an electronic money transfer system, specifically Greendot Gold Cards, and Greendot MoneyPaks. GPR's are available for purchase at local gas stations, grocery stores, etc., and function like a debit card. These Greendot Gold cards can be used to pay bills, withdraw money from ATM's, make online purchases, and send and receive money. The most attractive reason that these GPR's are used for criminal money transactions is that the account can be set up online using false identities and information, thus anonymizing the actor's identities involved in the transaction process. Greendot MoneyPak's serve the same function as a money order and can typically be purchased at the same locations where Greendot Gold Cards are sold, however the money does not need to be in hand for cash-out or transfer. The Greendot MoneyPak contains 14 digits. Once the Greendot MoneyPak has been purchased and loaded with a certain amount of money at the location of purchase, the 14 digits can be used to transfer the money onto a Greendot Gold Card via telephone or the internet. In a sense, those 14 digits represent, and are worth, the same amount that has been loaded onto the Greendot MoneyPak.

This smuggling operation and distribution process relied on weak perimeter security, contraband cellphones, and GPR and Greendot Gold Cards and Greendot MoneyPaks to transfer currency. The smuggling and distribution process included a total

of 7 actors- 3 inmates and 4 Free-world Actors. The Actors and their roles are shown below:

- Inmate 1-contraband orderer, receiver and distributor
- Inmate 2- inside contraband purchaser
- Inmate 3-“jigger” or lookout and contraband cellphone runner
- Free-world Actor 1- free-world contraband purchaser, sender, and Greendot Gold Card Holder
- Free-world Actor 2- free-world contraband receiver
- Free-World Actor 3- free-world contraband drop mule
- Free World Actor 4- Greendot Money Pak purchaser.

The actions taken in the second smuggling operation, listed in order, are shown below:

1. Inmate 1 (distributor) would receive an order for contraband by Inmate 2 (purchaser) and a monetary amount was agreed on. Inmate 1 (distributor) then made a contraband cellphone call to free-world actor 1 (contraband purchaser and sender) and asked them to purchase X contraband and send it via shipping company to another free-world actor 2 (contraband receiver) near the prison location.
2. Free-world actor 2 (contraband receiver) retrieved the contraband package from the mail and handed it off to Free-world Actor 3 (drop mule) to repackage and drop over the prison perimeter fence at specified time and location provided by Inmate 1 to free-world Actor 1 (contraband purchaser and sender), which was relayed to Free-world Actor 3 (drop mule).

3. Free-World Actor 3 (drop mule) tossed the repackaged contraband over the perimeter fence at a specified location, and on a specific date and time.
4. Once the drop occurred, Inmate 2 retrieved the package and smuggled the package in to the dorm on their person.
5. Once inside of the dorm, a currency transaction occurred between Inmate 1 (contraband distributor) and Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser) and the contraband was distributed to Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser).

The actions taken to purchase the contraband once inside are shown, in order, below:

1. Inmate 2 (inmate purchaser) and Inmate 1 (inmate distributor) met and discussed a date, location, and time of transaction.
2. Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser) called out to free-world actor 4 (moneypak purchaser) on a contraband cellphone and asked them to purchase a Greendot Moneypak for X amount.
3. Inmate 2 (contraband purchaser) called out to free-world actor 4 (Moneypak Purchaser) on a contraband cellphone thereafter and asked them to give them the Moneypak's 14 digits.
4. Inmate 1 (inmate distributor) and Inmate 2 (inmate purchaser) then met in pre-determined cell at a specific time and had Inmate 3 "Jigger" (lookout and cell phone runner) bring the contraband cell phone into the cell and stand at a vantage point location to watch for correctional staff conducting rounds.
5. On the contraband cellphone, the Inmate 2 (inmate purchaser) called the Greendot information line and confirmed the amount on the Greendot moneypak (14 digits) either on speakerphone or in earshot of Inmate 1 (distributor).

6. Once the amount was confirmed to be on the Greendot MoneyPak (14 digits) by Inmate 1 (inmate distributor), the contraband transaction occurs.
7. Inmate 1 (inmate distributor) then immediately uses the contraband cellphone to call out to Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) to relay the Greendot Moneypak's 14 digits to the Free-world actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder).
8. Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) then immediately transfer the funds (14 digits) onto the Greendot Gold Card via the Greendot website.
9. Once the funds had been transferred to the Greendot Gold Card, the cell phone call history was deleted and the phone was given to Inmate 3 "jigger" (cell phone runner and lookout) to remove from the cell.

Precise coordination using contraband cell-phones proved to be quite important to this network for both the smuggling process, and the transaction process. The actions/steps taken were said to be extremely time sensitive and required a significant amount of time to plan and execute without running into issues, especially once the contraband was thrown over the perimeter fence. To expand on this point, the drop location and timing of the drop had to be predetermined and extremely accurate, as once the contraband made it over the fence, any inmate could pick it up and claim it for themselves. In other words, Inmate 1 had to be very quick when retrieving the package. If not, this would not only result in a loss of contraband, but would also result in serious violent altercations among different races and gangs if they claimed the package for themselves. This required Inmate 1 to know in advance when their dorm would be released for recreation time in

order to relay this info to Free-world Actor 2 (contraband receiver) which would be relayed to Free-world Actor 3 (drop mule).

The interviewee mentioned other issues that could also arise that were related to the transfer of funds. For instance, if the 14 digits were not sent to the Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) in a timely manner by the Inmate 1 (inmate distributor), and if the Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) did not immediately transfer the MoneyPak funds onto the Greendot Gold Card, Inmate 2 (purchaser) could try to scam the distributor by having the Free-world Actor 4 (MoneyPak purchaser) immediately transfer the funds off of the MoneyPak before the inmate distributor could relay the MoneyPak's 14 digits to Free-world Actor 1 (Greendot Gold Card holder) to be transferred to the Greendot Gold Card. Also, if the jigger did not do their job correctly, then both Inmate 1 (distributor) and Inmate 2 (purchaser) could be caught with a contraband cellphone and large amount of contraband and could face what was referred to as a "free world case", or charges that are handled in a county court of law and would result in extra charges and prison time added on top of the ones for which they are already serving prison time. This extra charge would also result in a loss of good time that the inmate/s have already served.

Inmates having access to the 14 digits on the back of Greendot MoneyPaks was also found to create other issues within the correctional facilities related to theft, and corruption among correctional officers. It was reported that inmates would sometimes find and steal each other's MoneyPak numbers, creating issues between inmates, and resulting in potential race and rival-gang conflicts. It was common for these numbers to be written down on very small pieces of paper, and instances were discussed where

guards would confiscate these numbers without reporting the incident to their superiors. Instead, the guards would transfer the money onto a Greendot Gold Card upon leaving their work assignment for the day.

In sum, these two smuggling operations ranged from having very few actors to having numerous actors, and can involve quite simple transactions or extremely specific, time sensitive, and sophisticated currency transfer methods. What was consistent across both smuggling networks was the reliance on contraband cell phones, and the role that they played in the successful smuggling and transfer of funds within the inmate economy. There is a dearth of literature that examines these processes in current times, and given that more smart phone currency transfer applications have become more popular, there is room for further research to identify other methods of currency transfer into, and out of, the sub-rosa inmate economy.

Theoretical Perspectives on Prison Adaptation, Culture and Inmate Roles, and Institutional Deviance

Prison misconduct can come in many forms, from assaults on prison staff and other inmates, to not following orders, to escape, to being out of place, to discretionary infractions such as defiance, and possession of contraband, to name a few. Previous researchers have detailed explanations that describe the prisonization process and socialization; the liberties that inmates are deprived of upon entering prisons; the culture and inmate-roles that exist in prison; and how these facets of prison-life are linked to inmate deviance (Clemmer, 1940, Sykes, 1958). Studies have also suggested that there are theoretical explanations for inmate deviance that are based on pre-prison experiences and individual characteristics, as well as situational explanations that serve as predictors

of inmate deviance and misconduct (Endler & Mangusson, 1976; Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Steinke, 1991). This section will discuss the process of prisonization, adaptation, and the convict code, as well as three theoretical perspectives that may serve as explanations for inmates engaging in the contraband market and contraband-related misconduct: deprivation model, importation model, and situational model.

Prisonization, Adaptation, and the Convict Code. Beginning with Prisonization, Donald Clemmer's book, *The Prison Community* (Clemmer, 1940), highlights that over time, prisoners adapt to their incarceration, the prison culture, and their lack of autonomy by adopting the attitudes, behaviors, dogmas, norms, and values of the prisoner population through socializing with both prisoners and staff. He refers to this process as prisonization, which begins with the inmate being stripped of their birth name, and given a prisoner identification number instead (resulting in a loss of personal identity). Upon arrival at the institution, they are also stripped of their clothes and are given standardized uniforms, becoming what Clemmer refers to as "an anonymous figure in a subordinate group" (Clemmer, 1950, p. 315). This adaptation to prison life also includes the eventual understanding and adoption of terms and language used by inmates, referred to as argot. These steps eventually lead to most inmates assimilating to the prison culture as they learn how to eat, dress, speak, distrust and despise staff and the parole board, and engage in prison misconduct.

Clemmer (1940) also touches on the prisoners' code, also known as the convict code or the inmate code, which he suggests is a social control that is not written down, yet nearly everyone in prison becomes aware of the code as they are engrained in the culture of every prison. He suggests that this code brings a sense of stability to the prison

environment and includes a set of culturally defined and culturally regulated norms, values, and behaviors that provide a framework for social interactions among inmates and staff. The codes identified in Clemmer (1940), suggest that: 1) prisoners should never help institutional officials or government officials in disciplinary affairs, including those that may lead to another inmate's discipline, 2) there is a sense of loyalty among the prisoner population when handling matters amongst themselves, 3) prisoners should never talk to guards except for business purposes and for other necessary reasons, 4) prisoners should not steal from each other, 5) prisoners should not take advantage of or exploit other inmates by misrepresenting an item of contraband as something it is not.

Researchers have examined prison socialization and the inmate code for decades (Cloward, 1960; Crewe, 2005; Irwin, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Thomas & Pool, 1975; Tittle & Tittle, 1964; Trammell, 2012; Wellford, 1967; Wheeler, 1961), but perhaps the most up to date and comprehensive research on the convict code can be found in Mitchell (2018). Data used for this longitudinal mixed-methods study came from the National Institute of Justice funded LoneStar Project, and included 802 TDCJ inmate participants (2014-MU-CX-0111). One of the foci of the LoneStar Project was to examine how inmates organize in prison and the role that gangs play in inmate organization. Recent research has noted that gangs play a large role in the organization of prisoners, and “form and operate to provide essential extralegal governance institutions” within correctional communities, particularly as it relates to the illicit market and behavioral expectations (Skarbek, 2014, p. 168).

Important for the current study was the series of questions asked in the survey that attempted to quantify the convict code by measuring participant's adherence to the

convict code. A portion of Mitchell (2018) explored the dimensionality of the convict code using 799 inmate responses to 16 survey items, and factor analyses. The factor analyses suggested that 12 of the 16 items intended to measure the convict code loaded well into 4 components: Social Distance (do your time, never talk with prison staff, never get too friendly with prison staff), Masculinity (strength and toughness, never show fear, defend your reputation), Invisibility (keep to yourself, mind your own business, do not leak information), and Survival (do not help prison staff, be loyal to inmates, do not help other inmates).

Despite these well-understood codes, research suggests that the codes are not adhered to by all inmates, especially as it relates to the contraband market, but rather adherence to these codes is based on the situational context of the matter at hand (Clemmer, 1940, Sykes, 1958; Thomas, 1970; Wellford, 1967; Williams & Fish, 1974). What goes relatively unexplored in modern research is 1) the potential overlap between the convict code and the norms and typical behaviors associated with the inmate economy, 2) if there are specific rules or codes associated with the inmate economy that fall outside of the purview of the convict code, and 3) the level of adherence to these sub-rosa economy rules among inmates, and the situations in which a lack of adherence, or a violation of the norms, goes unpunished by informal governing bodies such as gangs.

Additionally, Clemmer suggests that the prisonization process and values held by prisoners, if fully adopted, can breed criminality and make the reentry process back into society much more difficult, thus leading to recidivism. He also notes that not all inmates will adopt the norms and behaviors of the prison population, especially if: 1) their sentence is short; 2) they have a stable personality formed by positive pre-prison

relationships and acceptable socializations before incarceration; 3) positive relationships are maintained with those outside of the prison; 4) they refuse or are unable to assimilate to a smaller social group in prison; 5) they blatantly refuse to adopt the norms and behaviors or the prison culture; 6) they are fortunate enough to have a work partner or cellmate who has not assimilated completely to the prison culture; and 7) they refrain from engaging in prison misconduct such as sex and gambling, and are willing to participate heavily in work activities and recreational pastimes. Clemmer (1950) also outlines the characteristics that may increase one's likelihood to fully experience prisonization and the adoption of prison culture norms and behaviors, and they conversely mirror the above mentioned seven influencing factors.

In sum, Clemmer (1950) suggests that *prisonization* is a social learning process that looks quite similar to what happens in any social group. It includes social interactions with others of a different culture and abiding by that culture's norms, values, dogmas, and behaviors in order to gain the acceptance of the group by abiding by the inmate code. Goffman (1959) refers to these social interactions as the interaction order, and the process as a face-to-face performance (similar to theatre) for the purpose of developing and maintaining a respectable impression of one's self in the eyes of others. Goffman's comparison of these social interactions in everyday life to theatre performances developed into what is known as the dramaturgical perspective.

These sociological researchers, and others, have laid some ground work for researchers to expand on perspectives related to prison culture, prisoner adaptation, prisoner misconduct, inmate socialization, and eventually the examination of the role prison gangs play in the inmate contraband market. Although Clemmer's seminal work

was done during the mid-20th century, he suggests that researchers a century later may wish to look back on the standards and values that were held by the inmates in his research, and which governed the correctional institutions in the 1940's and 1950's.

The *Society of Captives* and the Deprivation Model. Preceding Clemmer, sociologist and criminologist Gresham Sykes began research for his seminal work *The society of Captives* (Sykes, 1958) in 1954. In *The Society of Captives*, Sykes conducted an exploratory study over a three year period of the social system of the New Jersey State Maximum Security Prison to further uncover the patterns and behaviors of inmates within the prison's social system, the failures of total control of a prison population and the power dynamics between the guard and the prisoners, the deprivations inmates experience in a total institution as compared to free society, and the various roles played by inmates in everyday prison life. This work builds on Clemmer's understanding of the social order of prisons and extends what was known about life in prison in the 1950's.

In regards to the total control of the prisoners by the guards, Sykes suggests that the power that the guards attempt to have over the prisoners by enforcing hundreds of policies and regulation is complicated, and these guards often fail to establish this power dynamic in the way that the administration suggests it should be established. Not only are some prisoners deliberately defiant, they also disobey orders, constantly break minor rules, and test guards on their level of adherence to these rules and regulations. Important for the purpose of the study is the fact that guards are often unwilling to enforce certain rules. They may allow certain prisoner behaviors to go unpunished, and they may have trade-offs with prisoners in an attempt to maintain a sense of order and compromise. Most importantly, as it relates to this power dynamic and the failures of controlling

prisoner populations, is the fact that many guards, in order to reduce conflict between themselves and the prisoners, will deliberately ignore certain offenses or ensure that they are in no way visually aware that a policy is being broken. These realities, along with low pay, high turnover, and an unwillingness to enforce rules seriously threatens the authoritative regimes efforts to establish total control, and in turn, places a large amount of informal institutional control in the hands of the prisoners.

First, when guards do not enforce certain offenses, the inmates use this to their advantage and quickly learn what they can get away with in front of certain guards. This quickly develops into a type of moral blackmail, and is used to further test the guards. If the guard refuses to allow further or more serious infractions, they are condemned by the inmates on a personal level and inmates may threaten to tell the guard's superiors about their inability to maintain order and enforce policies by exposing their leniency and behaviors that were meant to create compromise with the prisoners.

Second, once the authoritative regimes power dynamic is corrupted in this manner, and the power of the guards have been subverted by trade-offs, deals, and leniency, the originally-intended power dynamic is threatened as social distance is reduced. Reducing this social distance allows the prisoners to further corrupt the guards through grooming processes, coercion, and blackmail. What goes unexplored in Sykes (1958) is the relationship between this slow and incremental reduction of social distance between guard and inmates and the lengths to which this loss of control can go, especially as it relates to contraband.

Sykes also extended the work of Clemmer on the prisonization process. Sykes (1958) identifies five important facets of normal life that inmates are stripped of, or

deprived of, during incarceration, and he terms these deprivations or frustrations the pains of imprisonment. In other words, Sykes suggests that there are five categories of experiences or freedoms in the free society that are taken from inmates once incarcerated, and the deprivation of these liberties while incarcerated makes life in prison excruciatingly painful. These categories are 1) deprivation of liberty, 2) deprivation of goods and services, 3) deprivation of heterosexual relationships, 4) deprivation of autonomy, and 5) deprivation of security. Each of these categories are detailed below.

First is the deprivation of liberty, which refers to the fact that upon confinement, prisoners are rejected from society and are restricted to the confines of the prison. They are not allowed to leave the facility; see their families and loved ones at will; engage in society as they normally would; or move freely about the facility as mobility within this prison was highly restricted. Sykes (1958) suggests that the deprivation of liberty threatens the prisoner's self-conception and creates a sense of loneliness, boredom, and feelings of rejection. The fact that society has deemed these individuals, based on their criminal acts, as morally inferior and worthy of punishment wears on the prisoner and leads to them having to find ways to reject their rejectors in order to psychologically endure their confinement. Couple this rejection and isolation from society with the loss of many rights upon returning to society, and the inmate often develops a hostility towards both their captors and the society they were once a part of.

The second pain of imprisonment noted by Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of goods and services. It is true, that while incarcerated, prisoners are clothed, given shelter, provided with arguably adequate healthcare, and are fed three meals a day that meet a standard caloric intake. When Sykes discusses the deprivation of goods and services, he

is not concerned with whether or not the prisoners receive these necessities of life, but rather he highlights that 1) These standards may not be perceived by the prisoners as adequate, and 2) Beyond these necessities, the deprivation of material amenities is perceived by prisoners as a painful loss. Given that Western societies place a great deal of importance on material possessions, and in turn these material possessions help one establish themselves in a society, being deprived of these material items in prison is considered by Sykes to be an attack one's self-image. Once these material items have been stripped from the prisoner upon entry into a prison, this can have an effect on one's feelings of adequacy, self-worth, and societal merit. Sykes suggest that prisoners cope with this deprivation of good and services by finding alternative ways of establishing merit.

This deprivation is of particular importance for the current study, as contraband are highly sought-after commodities in prison that can, once received, both alleviate this pain of imprisonment, and establish merit in a prisoner population (Kalinich, 1980). For example, the possession of a pack of cigarettes in society may be seen as a normal possession or amenity and may provide very little in terms of one's merit or social status in society. In prison, possession of a pack of cigarettes has far more symbolic importance, for both the possessor's self-image (as this may temporarily reduce this pain) and for their merit among the other prisoners. Similar to the way possessions operate in society, when a prisoner possesses an amenity that is rare and valued among other inmates, they may too feel, in some ways, superior, privileged, or better off than their counterparts. Furthermore, possessing the amenity also provides them with something of tangible value

that can be used to bargain or trade for other amenities that may help them gain further comfort and merit among the prisoner population.

The third pain of imprisonment discussed in Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of heterosexual relationships. Sykes suggest that this lack of access to female companions in a perverse male prison setting is nothing shy of dangerous, as masculinity is constantly challenged and homosexual relations are not uncommon. The deprivation of heterosexual relationships has major implications for one's self-image, as having a heterosexual partner is often seen as a sign of adequacy and worthiness in a free society. Sykes also notes that the desire for sexual gratification creates an environment where individuals may be exploited for sexual favors. This not only places certain inmates in a greater risk of sexual abuse, but it may also place correctional officers, particularly female correctional officers, in a position of potential sexual victimization. In short, this deprivation is an attack on one's self image and creates hostile prison environments where prisoners are more inclined to do what they deem necessary to alleviate their sexual frustrations.

The fourth pain of imprisonment mentioned in Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of autonomy. Once incarcerated, the prisoner's life is now controlled by far more, rules, regulations, policies, and procedures. Their daily routines, movements, and behaviors are strictly controlled by their captors. Sykes suggests that the triviality of many of these controls begins to wear on the prisoner over time as they lose any and all say-so in how they will go about their day, what they will choose to eat, who they will choose to live with, and so on. With this level of total control over them, the prisoners become dependent, weak, and helpless. Over time, these strictly regimented routines enforced by

the captors becomes monotonous, and the prisoner again loses a sense of what it is to make decisions for one's self.

Sykes suggest that this strict level of control over the prisoners leads to a lack of autonomy and increased feelings of hostility towards their captors. Sykes suggests that prisoners become increasingly hostile towards their captors when these strict rules, regulations, and policies simply do not make sense, and/or are not explained to the prisoner. This is an important point as it relates to contraband, as many material items are illegal to possess in a correctional institution, yet their illegality may seem trivial and often come with subjective enforcement and no explanation. From a prison management standpoint, explanations for policies may bring about feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the policy among the prisoner population. Sykes suggests that this lack of explanation for policies by the captor is logical, as the prisoner is in no position to challenge institutional policies, and because the situation may actually create further hostility if the prisoner population is dissatisfied with the justification given for the policy. Sykes mentions that the deprivation of autonomy experienced by prisoners is damaging to one's self image as a self-determining adult member of society. They become dependent on the captors to decide their daily routines and soon forget what it is like to make decisions for themselves, thus making reentry back into society much more difficult.

The fifth pain of imprisonment noted in Sykes (1958) is the deprivation of security. This pain of imprisonment refers to the constant threat to the safety and security of prisoners in a penal institutions. As one of Sykes study participants put it, "The worst thing about prison is you have to live with other prisoners" (Sykes, 1958, p. 77). Prisons

house criminals from all walks of life, who have criminal histories that range from fraud to rape and murder. These prisoners cannot rely on the correctional officers for protection from those who seek to abuse, violate, and exploit other prisoners. The constant reminder that any prisoner, at any time, may attempt to harm another prisoner is a looming thought, which applies to not only the weak, but the strong as well.

Sykes suggests that the deprivation of safety and security is shared by all prisoners. Prisoners who do not fare well in a physical altercation or do not stand up for themselves will thereafter be seen as an easy target and will have to continue to defend themselves and their possessions. Prisoner who have developed a reputation of being tough are also at risk of victimization, as other prisoners may want to bolster their reputation by attempting to harm or exploit them in front of other prisoners. Sykes suggests that this constant lack of security wears on the ego of men in prison and challenges their ability to cope with these deprivation.

Rarely are prisoners able to escape these derivations through psychological retreat or physical escape from prisons. Sykes lays out the extreme situations in which prisoners may find themselves able to somewhat cope with these pains of imprisonment. One extreme is that the prisoners could, in theory, bind themselves to one another with “ties of mutual aid, loyalty, affection, and respect, firmly standing in opposition to the officials” (Sykes, 1958, p. 82). The other extreme is that prisoners could “enter into a war of all against all” where the prisoners are concerned only with their individual well-being and possessions, and have no concern for the other prisoners (Sykes, 1958, p. 82). It is important to note that: 1) the patterns of daily social interactions in prison fall somewhere between these extremes, and 2) these pains of imprisonment cannot be eliminated, but

can only be, at the most, mitigated by the social interactions and patterns among the prisoners, and the social roles prisoners adopt in daily prison life.

Inmate Roles. Inmate often adopt roles and engage in certain behaviors while incarcerated, that may or may not mirror their behaviors on the outside. Sykes (1958) identified a number of categories of typical behaviors and activities that inmates engage in. These roles, identified by Sykes, are labeled based on prison language, or argot, and include “rats”, “center men”, “gorillas”, “merchants”, “wolves”, “punks”, “fags”, “ball busters”, “real men”, “toughs”, and “hipsters”. *Rats* pose a considerable danger to the flow of illegal goods within an institution, as their role in prison is to turn over information to correctional officers that they would otherwise be blind to. The presence of rats, also referred to as squealers, suggests that the flow of communication among prisoners must be closely guarded and shared only with those of certain social groups. These individuals are ostracized from the social groups as they have betrayed their fellow prisoners.

The *center men* are individuals who do not betray their fellow prisoners by leaking information to the correctional officers, but rather betray the unity and solidarity that they are expected to have with others prisoners as captives. The center men are known to share views with their captors, relate to their captors, readily obey any requests made by their captors, and publicly identify themselves as sharing the values and virtues of their captors. Although center men are not rats or squealers, prisoners despise them for their “slavish submission” (Sykes, 1958, p. 91). Although the reasoning behind this slavish submission may be a ruse to manipulate the guards, the prisoners in Sykes study suggest that this is not the case, and that center men actually do share the values of their

captors. This social interaction between these two social roles among captives (rats and center men) and their captors is worthy of modern inquiry and will be revisited in the results section of the current study.

The argot term, *gorilla*, refers to those prisoners who are willing to decrease their pains of imprisonment (deprivation of goods and services) by taking goods from other prisoners by force or through the simple threat of force. Given the scarce nature of material goods within prison (either obtained legally or illegally), gorillas seek to exploit weaker inmates who will choose to meet the gorillas requests as opposed to fighting. These individuals who use coercive exploitation to gain material items from others have established themselves as violent, and are typically not a part of prisoner social groups due to their behaviors.

The argot term *merchant*, also referred to as a peddler, is an individual who does not rely on coercive exploitation to reduce their pains of imprisonment. Instead, these individuals rely on their access to commissary items and items that have been stolen from the institution, and selling them to other inmates to mitigate their personal pains of imprisonment. Sykes suggests that it is typical for prisoners to share or gift small scale commissary items to other prisoners when the other inmates do not have them. He also found that this was not uncommon to do with items that were stolen from the institution. Merchants and peddlers will financially exploit other prisoners by selling these stolen or legally purchased material goods at high costs. The merchant is despised by other prisoners for their hard bargaining and impersonal dealings, especially as it relates to items stolen from the institution. As one inmate mentioned in Sykes study, “The man

stealing stuff from the institution is stealing from me. He shouldn't try to sell it to me" (Sykes, 1958, p. 94).

In other words, both gorillas and merchants violate the solidarity among captives in different ways, but are nonetheless hated by the rest of the prisoner population for their exploitative behaviors that destroy any sense of mutual-aid and understanding that exists among the other captives as it relates to the sharing of both commissary items and items that were stolen from the institution. The merchant role is also worthy of modern inquiry, especially as it relates to contraband items. It can be argued that desired goods in prison are even scarcer than before due to increases security at modern prisons and the lack of access to commissary items such as tobacco due to legislation that has prohibited the sale or consumption of tobacco in many modern prisons. Given this reality, the merchant role will also be revisited in the results section of the current study.

In so far as wolves, punks, and fags are described in Sykes (1958), *wolves* are those who aggressively seek out other male prisoners for homosexual acts in an effort to mitigate their pains of imprisonment (deprivation of sexual relationships) by exploiting both punks and fags. By engaging in homosexual relations with other men, they are reasserting their masculinity through the only other means available, other males. This behavior can be coercive or based on mutual benefit such as exchanging sexual favors for material items, other favors, or simply for pleasure. *Punks* are those who are coerced into sexual acts with wolves either through violence or the threat of violence. *Fags* are those who are genuinely homosexual and exhibit feminine characteristics. Wolves are not considered feminine by their peers due to their aggressive and coercive pursuit of, by default, a male object to sexually exploit. However, punks and fags are not considered

masculine as the punk lacks the manliness and toughness to stand up for himself, and the fag publically displays feminine characteristics to their peers.

Ballbusters are described as those inmates who openly defy, disobey, and often assault their captors, either verbally or physically. They are also the prisoners who frequently create disturbances in the prison and “keeps things all shook up”, resulting in increased surveillance and further restrictions for his fellow captives (Sykes, 1958, p. 100). Explained by a lack of self-control, their difficulty in coping with the pains of imprisonment, and an outright refusal to accept their lack of loss of liberty and autonomy, the ballbuster essentially makes the lives of their fellow captives more difficult by “calling down the wrath of the rulers” for their selfish and childish behaviors (Sykes, 1958, p. 100). This role too is worthy of inquiry as it relates to a lack of self-control and self-containment, and the expectation to “play it cool” in prison when engaging in the contraband market (Sykes, 1958, p. 100). This role will also be revisited in the results section of this study in light of the behavioral expectations in the contraband market and the outcomes that can result from defying these expectations.

Those who do not exhibit the behaviors of ballbusters and “play it cool” are referred to by the argot term *real men* (Sykes, 1958, p. 100). Real men do their time, endure the pains of imprisonment with dignity, maintain self-control, and do not respond to their captors with either slavish compliance or explosive and disruptive behaviors. Those who are considered real men in Sykes’ study help maintain the behavioral status quo of the captives. As Sykes describes, this type of prisoner “regains his autonomy, in a sense, by denying the custodians’ power to strip him of his ability to control himself” and he is respected and gains the approval of other inmates for these behaviors (Sykes, 1958,

p. 102). Again, this role will be revisited in light of the contraband market in the results section of this study.

The last two argot roles described in Sykes (1958) are the tough and the hipster. The *tough* is described as different from the gorilla, as the tough responds to insults directed towards him by other inmates with violence, while the gorilla uses violence, or the threat of violence, to gain material items. Considered masculine and courageous, and feared by the other captives, the tough is quick to respond to other captives with calculated violent acts when disrespected. The *hipster*, can be described as a wanna-be tough, who acts much more tough than they are in reality, and is constantly attempting to fit in with social groups in prison to which he does not belong. His lack of toughness, compare to the argot role of the tough, is evident by the other prisoners and he is often quickly dismissed as a fake.

The Society of Captives (1958) provided future researchers with an understanding of five important deprivations felt by prisoners, general yet ever-changing argot roles, behavioral expectations of prisoners, a description of the us-versus-them mentality that is shared by many prisoners and creates a sense of solidarity and mutual aid, and the relationship between cohesive social interactions among prisoners that slightly reduce the pains of imprisonment and create an environment where further restrictions and surveillance can be controlled, to a certain extent, by the captives. In fact, these deprivations have also set the stage for numerous studies to quantitatively examine inmate deviance, albeit it has been argued that there is variability across these study findings due to issues with model specification and the operationalization of deprivation-related predictor variables (Butler, 2017). In an effort to illustrate this point, Butler

(2017) provides a comprehensive list of previous quantitative studies and their findings that were conducted between 1980 and 2015 which examine deviance from the deprivation theoretical perspective.

An area of inquiry that has remained relatively unexamined through the pains of imprisonment lens is how these deprivations relate to contraband in correctional facilities. These deprivations, argot roles, behavioral expectations, and cohesive responses to these deprivations and conditions provide partial grounds for theoretical explanations that surround the contraband market and culture that will follow in the results section of the current study.

The Importation Model. Another perspective that has been used to explore the predictors of inmate deviance and misconduct is referred to as the importation model. Following Clemmer (1940) and Sykes (1958), Irwin and Cressey (1962) suggest that inmate behaviors within correctional institutions can be explained not by the prison experiences of adaptation and deprivation, but rather through the individual behavioral patterns and characteristics that inmates bring with them into the institution from the free-world. This perspective quickly challenged the deprivation perspective by positing that although prison adaptation, socialization, and the pains of imprisonment are likely felt by most prisoners, it is the carry-over of inmates' pre-prison individual, social, and cultural characteristics that have the greatest influence and explanatory power as it relates to inmate culture and deviant behavior.

Irwin and Cressey (1962) suggest that the pre-prison socialization (especially with criminal sub-cultures and criminal networks) and individual histories of inmates are what matter far more in terms of inmate culture and deviance than the actual pains of

imprisonment. They also note that inmates import these characteristics which place them loosely into one of three sub culture: the criminal subculture, the thief subculture, and the legitimate subculture. Irwin and Cressey's work outlined this importation perspective, and by the late 1970's other researcher began to conceptualize and operationalize these pre-prison factors.

Butler (2017) comprehensively outlines the importation variables that have been included in quantitative studies between 1980 and 2015. Some of these factors now include: age, sex, race, prior incarcerations, foreign citizen, IQ, self-control measures, education level, marital status, parental status, employment prior to incarceration, age of first criminal justice system contact, religiosity, anti-social attitudes and beliefs, pre-prison drug, physical, and sexual abuse, time of first arrest, pre-prison single and comorbid mental health issues, neighborhood disadvantage, juvenile incarceration, severity of offense, type of offense, community supervision violations, length of sentence, and custody level of previous incarceration.

Interestingly, what is missing from both quantitative and qualitative studies on inmate deviance and misconduct in regards to these imported characteristics, is the relationship between the geographic distance between the prisoner's pre-prison residence and where they were incarcerated. This is of particular interest as it relates to prisoners engaging in the smuggling of contraband and playing a large role in the contraband market based on the following three logical assumption: 1) visitations are more likely to occur when the prisoner is held in a correctional institution that is near their previous residence due to the burden of travel distance, 2) criminal networks and criminal subcultures (including friends, family, and fellow gang members) are often developed

and reside near where the prisoner most recently resided (save the rare nationwide criminal groups and gangs), and 3) inmates who are housed in correctional facilities close to where they came from are more likely to have social ties (of varying degrees) with correctional officers that work at the correctional facility where they are housed.

Given these assumptions and the dearth of modern prison contraband research, this potential relationship is worthy of inquiry from a qualitative perspective first. The current study will also tap into the potential for this phenomenon to come to reality in the results section. It is only by conducting qualitative research on this phenomenon that research can identify if it actually exists, if and why it matters in relation to correctional safety and security, and how it can be quantified in the future with statistical analyses.

The Situational Model. Another perspective on inmate deviance and misconduct suggests that within-prison factors partially explain inmates' behaviors and it is the situation in which the behavior developed that explains why it happened (Endler & Mangusson, 1976). The situational model explains inmate deviance and misconduct by focusing on: 1) where in the prison the incident occurred and the type of wing the incident occurred on, 2) when the offense or deviance occurred in terms of the time of day and the temperature, and 3) with whom the offense or deviance occurs, the officer who wrote the infraction, and if the incident involved more than one inmate (Steinke, 1991). In other words, the situational model takes into consideration the where, when, and with whom the deviance or misconduct occurs (Drury & DeLisi, 2011; Goldstein, 1994; Jiang & Fisher-Giorlando, 2002; Steinke, 1991).

Factors such as the temperature at the time of the incident, crowding, geographic location of the facility (climate), staff characteristics, prison architecture, prison

organization and management style, and social systems between staff and inmates are all considered situational factors. Given some distinct differences and some apparent overlaps between deprivation, importation, and situational factors, it is difficult to suggest that one particular theory works better as an explanation than the others. In fact, it has been suggested that inmate misconduct of all types should be examined by including factors from multiple theories (Morris & Worrall, 2014; Wooldredge, 2003) and that it is important to consider all three perspectives when providing theoretical explanations for inmate behaviors. This approach is particularly relevant when examining contraband related activity. Unfortunately, most quantitative studies that examine inmate misconduct either do not include a contraband measure, and those that do typically aggregate the type of contraband to violent, non-violent and drug, dichotomize the measure, or simply include the contraband measure as a count variable.

In short, quantitative studies provide us with very little information outside of whether or not someone received a misconduct ticket for contraband, and how many they received. What remains unexplored in modern research are the situational factors such as prison architecture, social systems between staff and inmates, and the importance of geographic location as it relates to contraband smuggling and deviance that surrounds the sub-rosa inmate economy.

Current Study

This study seeks to fill gaps in current literature regarding the role that contraband plays in everyday life; the prison contraband market; the contraband economy culture; the nature of contraband smuggling and dealing; and the relationship between staff and inmates who engage in contraband. This will be achieved by relying on in depth semi-

structured qualitative interviews with male and female ex-inmates who were incarcerated in either jails, prisons, or federal facilities. By approaching the current contraband issue from a qualitative perspective, and by focusing on the perceptions and experiences of those who have lived and experienced the deprivations of imprisonment, fruitful information about the current state of the contraband market, culture, and the nature of smuggling, dealing, and handling proceeds can be obtained and used to inform policies, procedures, and methods to make our prisons safer, more secure, and less vulnerable to issues related to contraband.

CHAPTER III

Data Collection and Methods

The first section of this chapter will discuss the research questions, sampling frame, and eligibility-criteria that were used to identify potential participants. The second section will be followed by a discussion of the qualitative method of sampling and the sample size obtained. The third section will identify the data collection process and the data security measures that were taken to ensure that the data and the participant's identities remain confidential, private, and secure. The fourth section discusses the interview questions that were asked to the participants and the key topics of interest that these questions attempted to expand on in terms of providing new and useful information. The sixth section of this chapter will discuss the coding approach that was used to analyze the data obtained from the interviews.

Research Questions, Sampling Frame, and Eligibility Criteria

The following qualitative research questions are addressed in the current study:

1. What were your experiences with contraband while incarcerated?
2. What were your perceptions of contraband while you were incarcerated?

The sampling frame for this study consisted of both male and female ex-inmates, who have been previously incarcerated in at least one correctional facility in the United States, including facilities owned and/or operated by either a public or private entities. The term correctional facility includes: county jails, city jails, state prisons, pre-parole transfer facilities, intermediate sanction facilities (ISF), developmental disabilities programs (DDP), substance abuse felony punishment facilities, state jail facilities, and federal corrections facilities. To be eligible to participate in the study, individuals must

have been between 18 and 64 years of age and could not have been under any form of correctional supervision such as probation, parole, or electronic monitoring at the time of the interview. This eligibility criteria was chosen due to the fact that those under the age of 18 and over the age of 64, and those that are currently involved in the criminal justice system, are considered members of an at-risk group per ethical guidelines that dictate special population that are at-risk for participating in research studies. These eligibility criterion are put in place to ensure that the welfare and well-being of participants are protected, and that their participation in the study in no way interferes with their current status as it relates to criminal justice matters. Individuals that did not meet the sampling frame and eligibility criteria were not be able to participate in this study.

Sampling Method and Sample Size

The participants for this study were identified using a non-probability purposive sampling method commonly known as a snowball sampling, or chain referral sampling (Biemacki & Waldorf, 1981; Berg & Lune, 2012; Sudman, 1976; Watters & Beirnacki, 1989). This sampling technique has also been referred to as respondent driven sampling (Heckathorn & Jeffri, 2003). The process of snowball sampling begins with asking one, or a few, key informants/participants, or gate-keepers, that share similar characteristics and are relevant to the research question/s at hand to participate in the study. Once data is collected from the gate-keeper/s, they are then asked to provide information about, or help recruit, other potential study participants to participate. This results in a sample that is based on referrals and the sample is developed and driven by previous participants/respondents.

Snowball sampling is commonly used in social science research when the research is aimed at collecting data from hard to reach or hidden populations such as armed robbers (Wright & Decker, 2011), residential burglars (Wright, Decker, Redfern, & Smith, 1992) active crack-dealers (Jacobs, 1996), drug users (Kaplan, Korf, & Sterk, 1987; Waters, 2015) and gangs and gang members (Bubolz & Lee, 2018; Decker, 1996; Decker & Van Winkle, 1994; Densley, 2011; Fagan 1989; Tapia, 2015). Snowball sampling is beneficial when pre-existing datasets to draw probability samples from are not available, and in research studies where participants may be hard to come across or identify for recruitment. Thus, this sampling technique does not rely on a probability sampling, but rather new participants are referred to researchers by previous participants. This snowball sampling technique produced a total sample size of 16 participants (2 females- 1 white, 1-white and Hispanic; 14 males- 10 white, 4 Hispanic).

The fact that there were no African Americans in the sample is likely an artifact of snowball sampling and a product of the nature of social ties, in that the gatekeeper was a white male and typically individuals are most strongly connected to others that are most like them, in this case the likeness is expressed by the color of one's skin. When analyzing the interviews for this study and discussing the findings from these interviews, it is important to note that 1) these findings in no way reflect the experiences and perceptions of anyone outside of the participant's, including African American males or females, since, unfortunately, none were interviewed for this study. In other words, this study does not tap into any perceptions or experiences of African American's in any way, and findings only apply to the perceptions and experience expressed by the participants who all happened to be White, Hispanic, or a mixture of White and Hispanic. Also, given

the size of the sample used for this study, it would be unreasonable to suggest that the findings are in any way generalizable to the larger population of ex-inmates experiences and perceptions, nor is that the purpose of this study.

Data Collection Process

Data collection for this study began with an initial phone call to an acquaintance of the principle investigator requesting their participation in the study. The researcher's acquaintance agreed to participate and serve as the solitary gate-keeper for the rest of the sample. A time and location where the interview took place was agreed upon between the researcher and the gate-keeper. Once the consent form was read and consent was obtained (See consent form in APPENDIX A) and interview had taken place, the principle investigator gave several recruiting flyers to distribute to those individuals that the gate-keeper thought might be interested in doing an interview (see recruiting flyer in APPENDIX B). Potential recruits were either introduced in person by the gatekeeper, or were asked by the gatekeeper to contact the principle investigator via telephone to discuss the purpose of the study and set up an interview time and location, if they were interested. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 and a half hours, depending on how much the participants elaborated on their responses to the questions, and how much experience the participants had with contraband and the sub-rosa contraband economy. Once those interviews took place, the same recruiting process was explained to those participants and they were asked if they knew individuals who fit the selection criteria and may want to participate. This process continued until a sample size of 16 was reached. Figure 1 below provides a visual representation of the evolution of the snowball

sample, the names on the participants are pseudonyms and do not, in any way, identify the participants.




Figure 1. Evolution of Snowball Sample.

Interview Setting and Procedures

The interviews occurred in an agreed upon private setting (residences) where only the principle investigator and the participant were present. The location was determined based on the level of convenience for the participant in terms of travel and the level of privacy provided by the location. The researcher did his best to ensure that the agreed upon interview settings provided a highly private environment that significantly reduces risks associated with breaches of privacy and confidentiality when compared to interviews collected in public settings where others may see, overhear, audio-record, or video-record the conversation. Upon arriving at the interview locations, the researcher formally introduced himself and the purpose of the research. They were then asked to read the informed consent document explaining their rights as a participant. After the participants read the document, they were told that they were be free to ask questions before the researcher asked them again if they were willing to participate.

Pre-determined protocols were in place in the event that the individual, for any reason, did not decide to participate after the interview instructions. If this occurred, the

protocol was to provide them with a copy of the "Consent for Participation in Research" document to keep for their records. At that time, the principle investigator was to thank the participant for their time and depart the meeting location. However, all participants that the researcher met with chose to participate in the full interview. Once the participants agreed to participate, they were asked to check the box on the back of the informed consent document that states: I understand the above and consent to participate. The participant were not asked to provide a signature as this would increase the risks associated with breaches of privacy and confidentiality. Once the box was checked, the audio recordings and interviews began with the principle investigator reading the interview instructions to the participant. The interview instructions are as follows:

I will be asking you some questions about your perceptions of, and experiences with, contraband while you were incarcerated in a correctional facility. I want you to understand that your participation is completely voluntary, and that the information collected during this interview will be kept confidential and your identity will remain anonymous. I will not be asking you for any names of inmates, correctional officers, correctional facilities, or any identifying information that can be traced back to you or anyone else. There will be no incentives given for your participation and you can choose to not answer any questions during the interview. You may also choose to stop the interview at any time. This interview will be audio recorded using a password protected Ipad. The audio files will then be transferred to two encrypted external hard drives until they are transcribed into text. At that time the original audio file will be deleted

from the iPad. The two encrypted hard drives containing the audio file will be stored in a secure location under lock and key until they have been transcribed into text. Once the audio files have been transcribed and any identifying information has been anonymized, the audio files will be deleted from the external hard drives to ensure confidentiality.

At the beginning of each section of questions, the principle investigator, per IRB request, reiterated the individual's rights as a participant to ensure that informed consent had been maintained throughout the interviews. Upon completion of the interviews, the audio recording was stopped and the participant were asked if they knew other individuals who might fit the selection criteria and may be willing to participate in this research. Participants that stated that they did know other who may want to participate were given as many recruiting flyers for the study as they felt needed to pass on to those individuals. Those participant that did not know anyone else that may want to participate were still given 3 recruiting flyers in case they later thought of someone who may be willing to participate. The participants were also be reminded that the study will be available for them to read upon its completion and they were left with a copy of the informed consent form for their records.

Interview Questions

There were 27 interview questions that the participants were asked to answer, two of which were demographic questions that asked the participant to self-identify their race/ethnicity and their gender. The other 25 questions were separated into three general sections. Given that these interviews were semi-structured, probing questions and follow-up questions were often asked when appropriate so that the most detailed and used data

could be obtained. The first section of questions focused generally on perceptions of contraband and included questions that aimed to tap into the role that contraband played in everyday life while incarcerated, the perceived relevance of the type of correctional facility, and other relevant factor such as race and gang membership that the participants perceived to be related to the availability, accessibility, and pricing of contraband.

Questions for Section 1 (perceptions of contraband) are listed below:

1. What role, if any, did contraband play in your everyday life while incarcerated?
2. Did the custody level of the unit or wing you were on play a role in the type of contraband available? If so, in what way?
3. Did the type of facility (either public or private) play a role in the availability of contraband? If so, in what way?
4. Did the type of facility (either public or private) play a role in the price of contraband? If so, in what way?
5. What factors do you believe had the most influence on the price of contraband in correctional facilities?
6. Did ones gang membership or affiliation seem to matter in terms of accessing contraband? If so, why do you believe it mattered?
7. Did race play a role in access to contraband? If so, in what way?

Section 2 questions are related to participant's knowledge of contraband and contraband networks. These questions aimed to tap into specific details about the knowledge participants had in regards to the methods that were used to bring contraband into facilities; methods of contraband purchase and distribution among the offenders including specific details about the use of electronic money transfer systems; any

knowledge of corruption occurring among correctional officer or staff that involved contraband; the relationship between these officers and contraband involved offenders and any common individual traits that were apparent among correctional officer and/or staff and the inmates that were involved in contraband (race, gender, age, years of service, gang affiliation, family ties, neighborhood ties, proximity of facility to residence); and any knowledge of unwritten rules that govern contraband access, purchasing, possession, or distribution. Questions for Section 2 (knowledge of contraband and contraband networks) are listed below:

1. Do you have any knowledge about how contraband was being brought into the facility/ies where you were incarcerated? If so, could you elaborate on how this task was carried out?
2. How was contraband purchased by other inmates once it entered the prison?
3. Do you have any knowledge of the use of electronic money transfers to pay for contraband, including but not limited to JPay, Greendot cards, PayPal, or any other form of electronic money transfer? If so, can you explain how this works and any issues with doing so?
4. Did you have any knowledge of corruption occurring among the correctional officers or staff at any of the facilities you were incarcerated at that is specific to contraband? If so, could you elaborate on your perception of what happened?
5. Can you describe the relationship between the inmates and the correctional officers or staff members involved in the contraband market? What did this look like?
6. Do you have any knowledge about how these relationship were formed?

7. Was it common for the inmates to know which officers or staff members were involved in corruption as it relates to contraband? If so, did these correctional officers or staff members behave any differently than correctional officers or staff members that were not known to engage in contraband?
8. Do you believe that the gender of a correctional officer or staff member is in any way related to the probability that they will be corrupted into engaging in the contraband market? If so, can you explain why and how you believe the gender of the correctional officer plays a role?
9. Were there any common traits among the correctional officers or staff that were involved in corruption as it relates to contraband such as race, gender, age, years of service as a correctional officer, family member of someone incarcerated?
10. Was there anything in common among the inmates involved in the contraband smuggling such as gang membership/ affiliation, race, family ties, neighborhood ties, number of previous incarcerations, or the proximity of their residence to the facility/ies?
11. Do you have any knowledge of “unwritten rules” that govern contraband access, purchasing, possession, or selling? If, so, what were some of these un-written rules?

Section 3 questions pertained to participant’s personal feeling and experiences surrounding contraband. These questions touch on the relationship between violence and contraband, and the dangers of engaging in the contraband market while incarcerated; whether or not the presence of correctional officer or staff corruption, as it relates to contraband, had an impact on the way they viewed their punishment (incarceration) and the criminal justice system as a whole; and their beliefs about how offenders’ and their institutional behaviors may change if it was possible to completely eradicate contraband

from prisons. Section 3 questions (personal feelings surrounding contraband) as listed below:

1. Can you describe the relationship between contraband and violence within correctional facilities?
2. Are there any dangers of engaging in the contraband black market in correctional facilities? If so, can you describe the potential dangers of doing so?
3. Did the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff have an impact on the way you view incarceration as punishment? If so, in what way?
4. Did the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff have an impact on the way you perceive the criminal justice system? If so, in what way?
5. Based on your perception of the role that contraband plays in everyday prison life, if it was possible to remove all contraband from a facility, how do you believe the inmates would respond to this?
6. Based on your perception of the role that contraband plays in everyday prison life, if it was possible to remove all contraband from a facility, do you believe this would change inmates' institutional behaviors, and if so, how?
7. Do you have any ideas about how correctional facilities can best keep contraband out of prisons?

Qualitative Coding Approach

Grounded Theory Qualitative data can be coded and analyzed from many different angles and can take many forms. Qualitative data analysis approaches help the researcher outline the method used to organize and make sense of qualitative data. Qualitative interview data that is collected is oftentimes analyzed using a grounded

theory approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This method of qualitative data analysis, and the modified version of it, are suggested to be extremely common in qualitative research (Charmaz & Belgraves, 2002). Grounded theory is very much an inductive approach to research. Contrary to deductive research designs where hypotheses are developed and tested based on pre-existing theories, inductive researchers “take empirical social phenomena as their starting point and seek through the process of research and analysis to generate broader theories about social life” (Gilbert & Stoneman, 2015, p. 99).

In other words, deductive research takes a data-first approach to theoretical development, while inductive research is developed based on pre-existing theory/ies. The current study relied on the grounded theory approach to qualitative data analysis, which suggests that theories that describe or explain a phenomenon will be grounded in the qualitative data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). By coding the data, interpreting the codes, and re-reading and comparing these codes and interpretations researchers are able to draw theoretical explanations for the responses provided in the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). The idea behind grounded theory approaches to data analysis is that the researchers will read a piece qualitative data, then re-read the data while simultaneously gathering and coding the data into categories and concepts that will be compared across other pieces of data in hopes of developing a theory that explains the social phenomenon or behavior, or relating the findings back to pre-existing theories.

When analyzing qualitative data using grounded theory, the process begins at the outset of the first interview or piece of qualitative data and is an ongoing process as more data is collected. Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded theory has been well accepted by many fields that use qualitative data and has experiences some modifications since its

inception (Charmaz, 2014). The current study relies on one of these modifications presented in Corbin and Strauss (1998) and is referred to as the three-step method. The first step to this three step process is known as open coding. Open coding begins by reading the first qualitative document and identifying and labeling concepts and properties that are related to the research questions at hand. As the researcher continues on to reading the next interview, conceptual codes will be created for this interviews as well and will be constantly compared to previously-identified conceptual labels, altering these labels as necessary. This process will result in new concepts, conceptual labels, and concept properties which are key to making sense of qualitative data when using this method.

The second step is referred to as axial coding. During this step of the analysis the researcher will compared the conceptual labels and combine them into larger overarching categories. (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). These categories are also constantly being compared with other conceptual concepts to determine if and how they can be combined into other larger overarching categories. The last step to the three step process is referred to as selective coding. This step requires the researcher to reexamine all of the conceptual labels, and categories for the purpose of identifying main categories or themes that develop from these overarching categories. The idea here is to collapse the categories into main themes or “central categories” that address the research questions at hand and can be used to develop new theory or theories or to relate back to pre-existing theories if no new theories or explanations for the phenomenon arise from this process.

The key to the grounded theory approach is to constantly compare concepts, conceptual labels and their properties, and collapse these concepts into larger categories

which will then be further collapsed into larger over-arching themes. Throughout this process, it is possible that the researcher may identify new concepts or areas of inquiry that may drive the interview questions in slightly different directions or provide insight on questions that were not included in the original interview questions. Semi-structured interviews, as oppose to structured interviews, allow for these new concepts and areas of inquiry to be explored with the use of follow-up questions and/or probing questions. The constant reexamination and analysis of the data as the data is being collected provides the researcher with this insight and the opportunity to explore these concepts further (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).

Crime Script Analysis Section 2 of the interview questions asked participants about their knowledge of contraband and contraband networks while incarcerated. Aside from using grounded theory approaches to analyzing qualitative responses, qualitative data that examines the detailed involvement of actors, their roles in a scene, processes, and actions taken to complete a task can also be analyzed using script analysis (Schank & Abelson, 1977). Schank and Abelson (1977) define a script as “a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of actions that define a well-known situation in a particular context” (Schank and Abelson, 1977, p. 41). When researchers attempt to use script analysis to further understand the process of criminal activity, this is referred to as crime script analysis.

As noted in the literature review section of this dissertation, crime scripts are used in “highlighting the procedural aspects of crimes” (Cornish, 1994, p. 175). Crime script analysis can be used to further understand the steps taken in crime-commission and can be used to create crime prevention techniques. Given that the actions that were discussed

in each interview are criminal in nature, when appropriate, crime script analysis will be applied for the purpose of understanding the ties between actors, the processes involved in smuggling contraband, and the process of contraband distribution and transferring money out of the correctional facility to the free-world in an effort to inform crime prevention methods as they relate to contraband in correctional facilities.

This process may involve identifying the actors involved, their roles, the flow of resources and/or communications, and any decisions made about when and how to move forward with, stall, or abort these criminal operations. If data obtained from the interviews is shown to be fruitful after analyzing the data in detail, link analysis (using UCInet software) will also be used to visualize the smuggling network, the actors, and the ties between them.

CHAPTER IV

Results

The following chapter of this dissertation will discuss findings from the 16 interviews that were collected, beginning with a brief description of the types of facilities participants experienced. This chapter will then outline the main themes and subsequent sub-themes that emerged from the data. A total of seven main themes were discovered from the data, which include: the role of contraband in everyday life; the inmate economy; the unwritten rules of the contraband market; grooming and inmate-correctional officer relations; contraband smuggling methods; the impact of contraband and corruption on perceptions of punishment and the criminal justice system, and perspectives on curbing contraband in correctional facilities. These themes are ordered in a way that allows readers to understand prison contraband and the inmate economy phenomenon from a bottom-up approach. In other words, the order of the main themes are not reflective of their importance or frequency of mention, but rather they are presented in a way that introduces readers to these phenomena and then progresses in an orderly narrative interpretation of the participant's perceptions of and experiences with contraband in correctional facilities as the chapter progresses through the main themes and subthemes.

Although interview questions did not focus specifically on the types of units participants were incarcerated in, it was common for participants to name both the unit and the type of facility in an effort to provide context as they discussed their perceptions and experiences surrounding contraband. Out of concerns for anonymity and confidentiality, and in accordance with Sam Houston State University IRB protocol, the

names of facilities and locations will not be discussed. With that said, participants experienced numerous types of correctional facilities including small county jails (3 participants), large county jails (14 participants), court-mandated county drug rehabilitation facilities (2 participants), state prisons across 4 southern states (13), and federal correctional facilities in two southern states (2 participants). It was common for participants who experienced state and federal prison to also have experienced county jails as well, as participants are held in these types of jails upon arrest and after conviction in a court of law until they are transferred to either a state prison or federal prison. In other words, all of the participants did not experience prison, but every participant experienced either a small or large county jail at least once. Only two participants were held in privately owned correctional facilities (pre-parole transfer units).

Main Theme 1 - The Role of Contraband in Everyday Life

The first theme that emerged was the role that contraband played in everyday life while incarcerated. The interview data suggests that contraband indeed played a large role in the lives of the participants. This is not to suggest that each participant actively engaged in the buying, selling, and/or smuggling of major contraband every day (although six participants were heavily and constantly involved in at least one of these activities). However, all 16 participants, at one time or another during the interviews, made it a point to note the breadth of items that can be considered contraband, and given this reality, nearly everyone in prison, including hyper-religious inmates, were perceived to engage in the contraband market to some extent, which highlights the first sub theme: contraband's wide net.

Subtheme 1 - Contraband's wide net. As mentioned in the literature review section of this dissertation, based on correctional policies, contraband essentially includes anything inmates are not allowed to possess. In other words, if an inmate did not purchase the item from commissary, or was not given the item by the correctional agency, the item was considered contraband. For instance, one participant mentioned:

Chris: The guys in the kitchen will cook extra cookies and sell them out of the kitchen floor for a couple of stamps. That's one of the little contraband hustles. Or cheeseburgers – guys in the kitchen, you know, whatever the guys in the kitchen cook, the guys will work it out so that they are throwing a bunch of cheeseburgers, patties of cheese, throw that together, then they give it to the guys working out on the floor in the kitchen, ten of them selling them for three stamps a piece which is \$1. You keep \$7 and I get \$3 – whatever. That's a form of contraband – illegal cheeseburgers, cookies, brownies, shit like that. Almost everybody in there is going to – you know, even the hardcore, dedicated, carry a Bible with them everywhere they go, they will buy a cookie from the kitchen.

Other forms of contraband that were not necessarily considered major contraband by the participants included Koolaid; bleach (highly sought-after item); any food items from the kitchen including meats, yeast, sugar, vegetables, and desserts; books with someone else's inmate ID on them; magazines over 3 months old; pornographic images showing penetration; any commissary items that were exchanged between inmates for which the recipient did not have a receipt; a free-world click pen; wife beaters (tank tops); non-issued thermals for the winter; and altered agency-distributed clothing. Both

female participants highlighted the value of small “girly stuff” such as women’s head bands, good hair ties, and the necessity for higher quality free-world tampons compared to the cardboard applicator tampons given out by the correctional agencies. One female participant discussed issues related to women’s menstrual cycles and the value of high quality women’s products.

Kim: you have to use these cardboard applicators, as a female they’re horrible, the tampons there are absolutely terrible, they don’t work so if you do have heavy periods like, some of the girls there would take and make diapers out of pads because the tampons sucked so bad... ya and some of the girls there have endometriosis where it like, you have a miscarriage pretty much (heavy bleeding), so I felt really bad for them once they stopped the tampons from coming in, some of them really needed them, some of them were crying like “what the fuck am I going to do?” It was just horrible it really was, like I felt sorry for the laundry people.

Although all of these items were considered contraband, these items were not always confiscated and disciplinary cases were not always written for possession of these items because their presence was either of little consequence to the safety, security, and order of the prison, or because the participants had good rapport and/or pre-existing relationships with the correctional officers. Participants also suggested that contraband was a form of entertainment (especially sports gambling), a way of getting to know the inmate population and who is in charge, and a way of passing time or staying busy,

which highlights and introduces the next subtheme: contraband as a form of entertainment and socialization.

Subtheme 2 - Contraband as forms of entertainment and socialization.

Nine participants discussed the entertainment role that contraband played in their everyday life while incarcerated. These participants suggested that contraband provided them with an outlet and something to think about and look into besides the rumors and gossip of everyday prison conversations. Gambling, sports betting, and the wheeling and dealing of commissary items also allowed them to spend their time doing something other than politicking and fighting. Prison was described by several (n=8) participants as being especially boring, and contraband helped alleviate their boredom by giving them something to do. Interestingly, two participants (Chris and Jack) mentioned the age old phrase, “idle hands are the devil’s playground,” in that when inmates were engaged in some form of contraband, they weren’t fighting and causing larger problems within the facility. As one participant noted, contraband simply keeps inmates busy:

Frank: You know, if you have never been inside, you don’t see how much of the day is controlled by fucking contraband. Look, everybody in jail wants to believe they are a hustler. These people will fucking hustle over a goddamn packet of salt. You know? “No, no, it’s soup. It’s two soups.” I mean, they just want to argue and talk and fucking deal and wheel about everything. Literally from a fucking toenail clipper to a \$500 cell phone. They will hassle and deal and that keeps them busy and gives them something to do. It might not be the most constructive thing to do but it’s

keeping them from killing each other... If I can talk to you about making money off you, I don't want to kill you.

Contraband was also expressed to serve as a way to socialize, network, and understand the nature of the pecking order among the inmates. This was said to be important since inmates must get along (to some extent) with each other, even if they do not particularly like each other. The presence of contraband and the existence of this sub-rosa system allows for inmates to network and socialize with each other, even if this socialization occurs only for the purpose of making a profit and establishing a sense of credit and respect among the other inmates. Contraband also served as a way to get to know who is in charge in a particular part of the facility, who to watch out for, and who you would need to get to know if you wanted a particular type of contraband. Being able to "read a hustle" was expressed by four participants as a very important skill when it comes to socialization, gaining access to contraband, and self-preservation. As Frank put it:

Frank: it's a good way to network. Anytime you hit a new block, you need to find out what's going on, who is in charge, who does what, who runs it, and an easy way to find that out is through contraband. Aside from tattoos and simple stuff like that, the easiest way to find out who is in charge is through the contraband game. If you can read a hustle in the free world, you catch onto it sooner or later. You would figure it out sooner or later. It might take you two or three weeks. If you are young – you are 17, 18, 20 – whatever, you know, you are not necessarily going to be able to pick up on it quick. Somebody is going to have to tell you, but if you've seen it in the

free world, it's easy enough to pick up on after a couple of weeks if you are paying attention.

The presence and availability of a wide range of contraband items within correctional facilities allow inmates numerous opportunities to engage in socialization, profit-making, and activities that keep them entertained. However, some participants mentioned that both the presence and absence of contraband can also vastly impact the culture and order within a correctional facility as well, which lead to the next subtheme: contraband, culture, and order.

Subtheme 3 - Contraband, culture, and order. Perhaps one of the most interesting subthemes of main theme 1 is the ways in which both the presence and absence of contraband shapes the culture and order of correctional populations. Participants were asked probing questions in regards to the ways that contraband affects everyday life while incarcerated when it is both present and abundant (referred to as “flooded” by some participants), and when contraband is absent or scarce (referred to as “dry” by some participants). Not surprisingly, inmate culture, behaviors, and order within the prison are all shaped in drastically different ways when correctional facilities are flooded with contraband when compared to when facilities that are dry. Almost unanimously, participants suggested that inmate culture and the correctional environment is calmer and less violent when correctional units have a large quantity of contraband within them. There were two reason given that explain this phenomenon.

First, when inmates have access to contraband (particularly marijuana), six participants suggested that others would keep to themselves and not cause many issues because they are high, and for those few hours, simply zoned out and enjoying

themselves. Frank discussed his experience in a large county jail where marijuana was not only readily available, but correctional staff were aware of it and did nothing. Juan considered the change in inmate culture and the lack of correctional staff response to the marijuana to be a win-win for both inmates and staff.

Frank: When we had marijuana on my block, we didn't have a fight for four months. And not everybody was smoking every day. I mean, to them, that's a benefit. That's a net gain to a correction officer. "I don't have to go in there and whoop anybody's ass or worry about me getting hurt." My experience, however, personally, was when marijuana was available and freely available, violence went down significantly. Like I said, this is a place where fights happen twice a day and in a block of 50 people twice a day somebody is beating the shit out of each other.

Second, when contraband was available, particularly drug-related contraband, five participants noted that inmates would not want to draw any attention to their area of the facility by fighting and causing disturbances because those behaviors would likely lead to shakedowns and lockdowns, which in turn would result in their contraband being confiscated. Not only would these shakedowns and lockdowns upset and discomfort the inmate population because they would be confined to their cells and would no longer have access to these luxuries, but this often resulted in numerous inmates getting caught with contraband, and a scarcity of contraband thereafter until more contraband was introduced to that area of the facility. In sum, the presence of contraband was seen by numerous participants as a way of establishing normative and acceptable behaviors, and keeping order within the facility, especially as it relates to violence.

On the contrary, when contraband was not readily available, especially drug-related contraband, nine participants suggested that the environment becomes more hostile and violence was much more common. There were four reasons given that explain this phenomenon. First, and related to subtheme 2, when contraband was not readily available, inmates needed to fill the extra time they would spend entertaining themselves through wheeling and dealing contraband with other activities such as conversing and arguing over politics and getting into physical altercations. Juan discussed what happens when contraband is scarce and inmates have extra-time on their hands.

Juan: So, when you take away all that time and you take away all that communication, you literally leave hours and hours and hours of the day for the inmate to, you know, find what else they need to do to supplement that time for, and when you are in a jail and there ain't nothing to do. Can you imagine what trouble you could probably get into if you have an extra four or five hours?... What am I going to do to kill five extra hours? I guarantee you, it isn't reading. So, you know, they are going to talk to each other and when inmates talk to each other... they don't agree on something and the next thing you know it starts getting loud and they start arguing with each other and one person wants to be physical with the other and the next thing you know a fight is breaking out over Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton, who should be the president, and the next thing you know you have a big brawl.

Second, it was expressed that inmates have an incentive to behave when contraband is readily available because poor behavior and disturbances will lead to

shakedowns, lockdowns, and free-world charges (charges handled by local county courts). When contraband is not readily available, or the area is “dry,” inmates have very little incentive to behave because they have very little to lose in terms of those contraband luxuries. Third, when contraband is not available, participants noted that inmates do not have their escapes and ways of relieving the deprivations of prison life. The effect of being deprived of those contraband luxuries was described by Chad as, “taking a bottle away from a baby, they’ll cry, and it leads to a lot of violence because there’s no reason to act right anymore.” Fourth, when contraband is scarce, or the unit is dry, especially regarding drug-related contraband, the heavy drug-using inmates begin to withdraw, which can lead to violent outbursts and fights over the very few drugs that are available.

This change in behavior and culture based on the presence or absence of contraband (particularly marijuana) is partially illustrated in the following comments made by Jake:

Jake: When you have weed on you, you aren’t going to pick a fight with someone and let these guards rush in on you... What are you going to do? You got it in your sock or something and now you are busted. You got a free-world charge, so you aren’t going to dabble around and do anything stupid. And when you don’t have it, it’s just like I said, idle hands are the devil’s playground. You are going to find something to entertain you or give you some kind of emotion and whether it’s nervousness, fear, or adrenaline, or whatever it is, you know, you push buttons.

The reasons given for buying, selling, and using contraband while incarcerated were wide spread, but two things that were relatively consistent across the interviews were the feeling of relief that participants got from having certain luxuries (n=10), and the desire to make money (N=6), which leads to the next subtheme: motivations for engaging in contraband.

Subtheme 4 - Motivations for engaging in contraband. Throughout the interviews, participants discussed why they engaged in contraband, and what purpose it served in their everyday lives while incarcerated. The most common response (n=10) was that contraband items made them feel that as if they had some attachment to the outside, as it provided a sense of freedom and comfort in a place of deprivation, where freedom and comfort are highly sought-after feelings, yet rare to come by. Contraband was also suggested to serve as an escape from prison, and an avenue to remove one's self from the realities of incarceration. The following quote sums up these feelings held by many participants:

Jake: So contraband is kind of your hold on the outside world. You feel kind of normal when you can smoke weed or smoke cigarettes or dip, you know, because you can do that in the world. It gives you a little freedom. So, I think that contraband is kind of a way to escape prison.

Aside from alleviating their boredom and creating an avenue for entertainment noted in sub theme 2, participants suggested that having contraband, especially drug-related contraband and cleaning products (bleach), gave them some form of control over their situation and allowed them to do things that they would normally do in the real world, such as using drugs and tobacco and cleaning their own clothes. As mentioned in the literature review and Subtheme 1, bleach is a hot commodity in correctional facilities,

and something as simple as bleach in the free world can make all the difference to an incarcerated population. One participant, Todd, discussed his obsession with washing his own clothes and how the simplicity of doing so made him feel especially hygienic, different from a large portion of the prison population that did not do so, and gave him some form of agency over his own health given the lousy nature of prison laundry services.

Another participant, Jack, went into depth in regards to the value he placed on consistently making prison wine (3 gallons every 3-4 days) and trading a portion of his yield for marijuana. These illegal luxuries allowed him to escape from the deprivations he experienced in solitary confinement.

Jack: So, if I had some gallons, one was usually for a joint – to trade for a joint and the other two or three gallons would be sold and me and a dude – a [name of prominent prison gang] next door to me on this side we would all get drunk, fucking talk shit, and be drunk and there was that escape. Or, I could light up a joint, drink me some wine, put on my headphones, and I'm out of prison. It's that escape, I can put on my headphones and listen to my music and be stoned, drink me a fucking glass of wine and have me a buzz, and for a few hours, I'm cool. I feel good... It just gives you that feeling of a joint that's going to make me feel like I'm not in there for a little while.

Some participants (n=6) were motivated to engage in contraband because it both provided a sense of excitement while incarcerated and made them feel as if they were getting over on the correctional officers when they got away with buying, selling, using

contraband, and engaging in illegal activities. Referring back to the extreme boredom that participants experienced while incarcerated, the consumption of contraband such as drugs, alcohol, and tobacco gave them something to look forward that was exhilarating and fun. One participant, Blake, mentioned that he made a phone call on an administrator's office phone while working as a floor worker. He was not motivated by the nature of the phone call per se because he was set to be released within two weeks anyways, but rather he was motivated by the excitement of sneaking into the office, and getting away with making this illegal phone call. Blake also discussed the excitement he got from getting away with smoking cigarettes and marijuana, and taking pills.

Blake: In a way it was a little exciting, you know, to be able to get away with doing something like that. I mean, just the character that I am. It's like a little rush, man. Now, we do it because as I said the sense of adventure and to get away. I was fortunate. I smoked tobacco in there. I took pills in there, you know? I smoked weed in there and I never got caught with it. I didn't put myself out there, but it was a little exciting to be hiding and be smoking.

Another motivation for engaging in contraband was for the potential to earn profits from the sale of contraband and to survive in prison if they do not have commissary money. Depending on the contraband item being sold, one participant reported making up to ten times his initial investment after selling the contraband to other inmates. Jordan mentioned, "I made a killing on things like spice and marijuana, like ten times as much as you can on the streets." Several participants (n=6), were continuously involved in the selling of contraband. They ran what was referred to as a "store box" or

“store.” A store was described as a one stop shop for scarce commissary items, and numerous other forms of contraband. These participants sold contraband in order to afford commissary (n=3), purchase or trade their contraband for other contraband for personal use (n=4) (as shown in Jack’s quote above), and/or to make money that they could give to their families during visitation or send to their families through other means that will be discussed later in this chapter (n=3). For example, Frank mentioned why other inmates would sometimes engage in the selling or trading of contraband.

Frank: I mean, there is a lot of people in there that don’t have money on their books, that don’t have ways – the way they survive and get commissary and get food is by fucking doing contraband.

Carlos specifically mentioned that he himself sold contraband so that he could purchase and eat food that was sold in commissary instead of relying solely on the regular daily meals provided by the correctional agency.

Carlos: It played a big role in my life because for a large time while I was incarcerated, I sold contraband, or I would get contraband in to sell it just so that I could eat. You know?

Chris told a story about a fellow inmate who saved a large sum of earnings from selling contraband cellphones, and was able to smuggle the earnings to his family during visitation. An excerpt from this story is shown below.

Chris: The largest amount of cash that I have even seen in my life was in prison. He had \$10,000 in cash. He had been there like 20 years and he had just been saving money and he got out of seg [solitary confinement]

and he finally got visitation, so he was going to take all that money and he was going to give it to his family.

In sum, motivations for engaging in contraband ranged from feelings of escapism and normalcy, to individual survival and familial financial support.

Main Theme 2 - The Inmate Economy

Interview data suggests that the sub-rosa inmate economy operates in a somewhat similar fashion as licit economies in the free-world. Similar to economies in the free-world, in the inmate economy there are several factors that direct business practices. One large difference is that licit economies are often regulated by regulatory agencies and legislation that comes with specific penalties for illegal business practices, while the inmate economy is a self-regulating economy with a large amount of variation in discretion and potentially life threatening penalties enforced by those who control this sub-rosa economy. Main theme 2 and its sub-themes shed light on the current state of the inmate economy in terms of who governs this economy and why; the characteristics of those who typically sell contraband; the types of major contraband that are available; who can buy contraband; factors that dictate how much an individual is charged for contraband; and the means by which contraband is currently purchased.

Subtheme 1- The governing body. Male participants unanimously (n=14) mentioned that the governing body/ies of the contraband market are typically prison gangs. These prison gangs vary mainly by race/ethnicity, however several gangs do exist within each race/ethnic category. Furthermore, some prison gangs are not race specific at all, but rather defined by one's religion. For example, Chris stated that, "Religion, religions are gangs in prison now [Muslims]. They are definitely like a militarized

criminal organization in the penitentiary. They have a whole ranking structure. They do things like sell drugs even though it's completely against their religion." These prison gangs are not only largely in charge of gaining access to contraband, but they also dominate the market, control the flow of contraband, govern the dealing within the inmate economy, and maintain order within the facilities by correcting behaviors through the enforcement of punishments handed down for frowned-upon business practices. As Jessie explained, "it is basically run by the gangs, it's all gang related, ya, gangs have power over the contraband market for sure." Jordan mentioned that, "A lot of it was race and gang related, they just had the connects [resources to smuggle and deal] and the power." Participant also suggested that both the power of numbers and the threat of violence that prison gangs exhibit allow them to rule over the inmate economy. One participant noted:

Jake: Yeah, typically all gang. You know, it's kind of like with the mafia... the mafia is just known to deal in criminal activities and organized crime. Same thing in gangs. Just because if you are not in a gang in prison, you really have no power, or you have no say-so. You are just overpowered. It's kind of a monopoly... So, I mean, every single time that I have ever seen or purchased or dealt with contraband, it's always been with someone who has been affiliated with it just because you have the power. You are the ones. It's kind of like if someone was solo or by himself that did it, you know, I mean, people are just going to – who is to stop anybody from coming to take his stuff? Nobody, because if they did,

nobody is going to back him up unless he's paying someone, of course.

So, it's pretty much 100 percent run by the gangs.

These prison gangs were said to dispute over contraband related issues, however this was often settled through discussions among the leaders, since money is involved and these issues can escalate quickly into seriously dangerous situations, as Chris mentioned: "But yeah, that [unresolved contraband issues between gangs] would just be a war and it would probably turn into a killing war. And that is what keeps most of the violence from happening". Despite the extremely violent nature of prison gangs, and their hunger for power over the inmate economy, Chris mentioned that it is in the best interest of the prison gangs and the inmate economy to avoid violent confrontation, as this only created issues with gang and race relations, lockdowns, shakedowns, and disruptions in the flow of contraband, all of which negatively affect their profits. Certain prison gangs especially dominate the inmate economy near facilities where a large portion of their members lived or did business previous to their incarceration. As one participant noted:

Jake: So there are so many of them, [prison gang name], on the unit and there is going to be a ton of them from [large city], and that's a major city and they typically tend, not to sound prejudice in any way, but they typically tend to deal in the world in drugs and trafficking and buying and selling and so they know all these people and they live right there so they can get them things [drug-related contraband (Xanax)].

Furthermore, several participants (n=8) suggested that the proximity of an inmate's residence to the correctional facility was a major indicator of whether or not they were getting contraband brought into the facility, or if they were involved in the

smuggling and selling of contraband, especially as it relates to gang members. Frank mentioned that, “Ya, the proximity of their residence to the actual facility was a factor at times.... the neighborhood they were raised in was also factor.” This was explained to be due to the fact that these individuals simply had connections to the outside world near the facility, and they had much more access to a large number of known associates who might be willing to help them get contraband into the facility. Three participants discussed situations in which guards and inmates knew each other from neighborhoods, high school, and family. These ties between inmates and correctional officers were important in regards to contraband, and will be discussed later on in this chapter.

When situations arose where two or more gangs wanted to sell the same type of contraband, conversations between gang leaders occurred in an attempt to reduce gang conflict, maintain respect, and mitigate risks associated with potential interruption in the flow of contraband. Todd illustrated this point clearly in the following quote:

Todd: I know [prison gang name] brought in a shit load of weed, but they had to make sure it was cool, they didn't have to make sure it was cool with everybody, but they had to make sure you know the three [prison gang name] dudes, or the [prison gang name] dudes didn't have a problem with it.

Four participants suggested that certain gangs had power over certain types of contraband. This was first determined based on who had the connection to the free-world actors who would help get the contraband inside the facilities, and then by negotiations between two separate gangs if both had a particular type of contraband for sale. For instance, Frank mentioned that the gang who is in charge of a particular type of

contraband, “is based on who is bringing in the contraband.” Jake mentioned that, “and with Whites, I would say the majority of them were more meth – with meth, you know.”

Carlos said:

Carlos: The ese’s [Latinos] had the fucking tattooing and the fucking cigarettes where I was at. Let’s see – tattooing, cigarettes, and the weed. The brothers [Blacks] had the fucking dope and cigarettes. The [White prison gang] and all them had the fucking, you know, the white girl – crystal [methamphetamine].

Unsurprisingly, the two female participants did not experience prison gangs while they were incarcerated. Instead of being governed by gangs such as in male correctional facilities, the inmate economy in female facilities was described as more of a barter system, where favors were common and hard bargaining and set prices were rare, especially for hygiene products. Dialogue from the interview with Kim (shown below) illustrates these points.

Kim: Girls were pretty cool about not charging but they’d just let you use it, if they did charge you anything it was like a Snickers bar or something like that, it wasn’t like a “hey give my money now.”... Ya, but that would be for little stuff, like, that was more like “if you let me use this I’ll let you use this,” it’s just girls, the way they barter and trade is not like the men, at all, like the men have like a set price, “this is what you are going to pay,” it’s not really like that with girls. Girls are more of a, “I’ll let you use my lotion, I’ll let you use my tampons because we’re females,” you kind of have to understand that.

The main reason given (n=13) by male participants for why prison gangs run the inmate economy was because they had the numbers and power to informally enforce order within the facilities through violence or the threat of violence. Jessie suggested that without contraband, it would “remove organization and reduce the power and control that the CO’s have over inmates... gangs would have to find small shit to enforce and maintain order.” The relationship between contraband, prison gangs, and order was quite evident in the interviews, and given the level of power that these prison gangs had over the inmate economy and other gang members in the free-world, it appeared that nearly any item of contraband was possible to bring into a facility.

Subtheme 2 - Types of major contraband. When participants were asked what types of contraband were available, common responses can be summed up in one quote provided by Jessie, “If you can afford it, and you can find someone to get it to you, it’s available.” All participants mentioned either seeing, buying, selling, or playing some role in smuggling some of the following major contraband items: cocaine, marijuana, heroin, methamphetamine, LSD, Suboxone, Xanax, alcohol, tobacco, K2 or spice, Creatine, cell phone with and without internet access, cell phone sim cards, hooch, real-world cash, knives and shanks, guns, and zip guns (homemade guns). Chad noted:

Chad: I saw more drugs and more types of drugs in prison than I’d ever seen on the outside, and I sold drugs, that’s why I went to prison, that shit was crazy man, anything you wanted you could get if you knew who to go to.

Jordan discussed a situation that occurred while he was incarcerated in a state prison that led to a prison lockdown and the then Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and

Firearms (ATF) agents spending hours searching the recreation yard for a particular item with shovels and metal detectors. As it turned out, an inmate had tipped off correctional officers that there was a gun buried somewhere in the recreation yard. Jordan said that after the ATF agents had torn up nearly the entire recreation yard, they finally located a pistol with one bullet in it. Described as likely gang related, the pistol had not been used inside of the prison, but the fact that it was inside the facility and buried in the recreation yard was shocking to the participant. Probing questions during the interview did not lead to the origins or purpose of the pistol, but rather a humorous response of, “I have no idea, but it probably wasn’t for show and tell.”

Another participant discussed that while he was in a high security prison, he saw high ranking gang members of a particular prison gang in possession of zip guns (homemade guns), Todd said, “Ya, I saw like 3 zips... ya homemade pistols, seeing the zip guns was probably the craziest shit I’ve ever seen in my life.” These instances and others further support the common notion that if you can afford it, and find someone to get it to you, it’s available. One female participants told a story about two female inmates who bunked across from her in a rehab correctional facility, and how they would stay up all night consuming methamphetamine and coloring in the dark. Other contraband that was common among the male inmates were cell phones, which could be purchased in the free-world for less than \$100 and would range in price in the inmate economy from \$200 to more than a thousand dollars depending on the type of phone and whether or not it had internet access. Along the lines of contraband access and pricing, participants discussed at length the factors that are considered when an inmate or prison gang considers selling contraband to an individual, and for how much.

Subtheme 3 - Pricing dynamics and contraband access. Interestingly, and different from most real-world economies, there are several factors that come into play in the inmate economy when it comes to pricing and the decision to provide a service. For example, it would be illegal for a company like Walmart to deny a sex offender the opportunity to purchase a particular item, or to charge him more for that item than someone who was not a sex offender. Similarly, it would be illegal for a Texaco gas station to charge a White man \$2.50 for a gallon of gas and a Black man \$10 for that same gallon of gas, or to deny him the opportunity to purchase that gallon of gas based solely on the color of his skin. However, in the sub-rosa inmate economy, individual factors such as race, gang affiliation, previous criminal history, and other individual characteristics can dictate how much an inmate will have to pay for a particular item of contraband, and whether or not an individual can even purchase contraband.

First and foremost, it was noted that the price of contraband is based on the age-old economic law of supply and demand (n=13). It was common knowledge among all participants that the price of contraband was first based on how much was available and how sought-after a particular item of contraband was by the inmates. This applied to major forms of contraband as well as scarce commissary items such as toothpaste, ice cream, and deodorant. One participant mentioned that he would purchase a lot of the rare commissary items that he knew would later become hot commodities. Bernie Madoff's is also known for doing this in the prison he now sits in. Madoff is known for buying up all of the hot chocolate and later naming his price on the prison yard (Marks, 2017). Doing so allowed him to sometimes triple his investment once the supply of that contraband was

low and he could name his price. Another participant explained the pricing dynamics based on supply, demand, and risk:

Jake: You know, if there is very little bit on the unit obviously you are going to pay higher prices. When it's flooded, it's just if everybody has got it and you can get it from each one, you know, nobody wants to hold onto it because it's free-world time, so prices start lowering and they are getting rid of it quick, you know.

Outside of the principle of supply and demand, participants noted that there were individual characteristics that determined what a particular inmate would have to pay for a given item of contraband. Some characteristic that played a role in the price of a particular item was if they were a prison gang member or not (n=4), what gang or race the seller and buyer were a part of (n=5), and if there were any internal conflicts between the buyer and the sellers races or gangs, or within the same races or gangs (n=3). Both Frank stated that, "yeah, gang affiliations and color affiliations do affect your access to it [contraband]." Jack described the pricing difference for fellow gang members as a discount in the following quote:

Jack: So, yeah, and then if you are in a gang, it's cheaper.... because he's your homeboy, he's going to give it to you for 75 cents or 50 cents. You are automatically going to get that discount because you are in the gang.

Chris mentioned that gang members would often sell the contraband to their fellow gang members at a discounted rate for the purpose of providing their fellow gang members an opportunity to make some money as well by selling the contraband to non-fellow gang members at a higher rate.

Chris: All right, so if the [Black prison gang] have the plug [person bringing in the contraband], the Blacks are going to get cheaper prices. They are the people that are going to get it, but anybody else that wants it is going to have to buy it from them second-hand or third-hand. When I was getting things, all of my homeboys would get a good deal on it. But anybody that bought from them, they are obviously going to charge more and I'm not going to skip them to go to anybody else.

Carlos (among other participants) noted that even within gangs and races, there was sometimes conflicts that led to pricing differences.

Carlos: It can, yeah, especially if there was like beef [conflict] or whatever. This dude said this about this or this clique, or you got the big group but then you have the little sections inside of each one of them, sometime they fight with each other or they fight with another section or another group or whatever and, you know, if they have what you need or whatever and they just happen to be beefing at the time well, then you are probably going to pay for it more than you would at any other time. Yeah, internal conflicts within the races or within their own organization made a difference in getting it at a good price, or if they'd sell it to you at all.

Based on some of the interviews (n=4), loyalty to one's gang or race played a pivotal role in pricing and access to contraband in correctional facilities. However, one participant suggested that sometimes it wasn't about deciding whether or not they would sell the contraband to an individual because they were unlike them by race or gang

affiliation, but rather the decision was based on the threat of what that gang or race might do once they know who has the contraband. Todd mentioned that:

Todd: you could say ya race was definitely a huge factor, but you know it wasn't necessarily "oh they are Black I won't sell it to them," it was a misconception of "oh they don't have access to this so if we did give them access what would be the side-effect if they did snitch or if they did try to blackmail in a way," and now you have a full scale riot on your hands, over a cell phone or over a thing of bleach or, you know.

There were also exceptions to the race and gang loyalties that sometimes superseded these powerful access and price-dictating standards of inmate business. In some instances, the decision to sell contraband to another inmate was based on preconceived notions and stereotypes of particular races. For instance, Jack mentioned:

Jack: But you will give preference... I would rather do business with you bro, say you are a White dude. I would rather do business with you rather than deal with these fucking Black dudes because you know they are going to fuck you over or whatever. You know what I mean? And then there are times where, I've seen this, where Black dudes would rather do business with a White dude or a Mexican dude because they have a higher moral standard or ethics. They would say, "I don't want to fuck with these niggas, man. They liable to not have – but I know if I front you something – I know if I give a White boy something, he's going to pay me. He's going to have the money. I know if I front a Mexican something, he's going to pay me."

Completely separate from one's race, level of gang affiliation, and preconceived notions about one's morals, ethics, and ability to settle a debt, participants also mentioned that there are some inmates who have undesirable individual characteristics that will completely remove their opportunity to engage in the contraband market. For example, some participants (n=8) mentioned that, depending on the crime the individual is incarcerated for, the entire population of inmates would not be allowed to do business with them. This was particularly true for inmates convicted of crimes against children such as molestation and rape, and other sex crimes such as sexual assault and rape against women, as Jack stated, "nobody is going to go in business with a child molester on contraband." These individuals were known as "no sales" or referred to as "off limits." One participant explained how and why this decision was made by those involved in contraband:

Juan: There was one guy who was brought in and we ended up finding out he was a child molester because they laid the paperwork out on his bed before he even showed up to the unit and every guy in the unit got to read the paperwork and, you know, when we found out who the guy was, nobody sold commissary to him – not a single person. He wasn't allowed to converse with anybody selling any type of contraband. That's pretty much, you know, the people that have the contraband – they talk to each other and they know who each other are. So, when one person says, "I'm not selling it" usually, most of the group talks about it and they agree as a group that they aren't going to sell anything to this type of person.

Another group of inmates that were described as being "no sales" and were "off limits" were inmates suspected of snitching, or telling correctional officers about dealings

that occur among the other inmates (n=9). If there was one type of inmate that contraband-active participants appeared to dislike most, it was snitches. These individuals were not allowed to engage in the contraband market for obvious reasons. As Carlos mentioned, “But if you have that bad rep about you or if somebody knows something about you, like you a snitch, you ain’t getting shit, bro.” The results that come along with dealing contraband to snitches, and the violence that snitches experience due to their behaviors, will be covered later in this chapter, but for now, it is important to note that these individuals are, to say the least, not well-liked by the rest of the inmate population, especially those who stand to gain financially from the sub-rosa inmate economy.

Subtheme 4 - Financial transactions. When participants were asked about how contraband was purchased from other inmates, every participant suggested that for most contraband items (outside of high ticket items) commissary items were the main form of currency and payment. Another form of payment was other contraband (n=11), as Jessie explained, “Mostly it was contraband for contraband or commissary for contraband.” Commissary also served as a symbol wealth or prestige, however having too much commissary was considered risky. The following quote explains this issue in a story told by Jack during a time when he and another inmate were selling large quantities of tobacco.

Jack: So, it was just a lot of commissary – if you had too much commissary that you couldn’t eat, too much coffee that you couldn’t drink... So, it just got to where it was too much... In a sense, you are like what’s his name, Johnny Depp on *Blow* [movie about a cocaine kingpin]. You got too much money and you got nowhere to put it. That’s how it

was, you got so much commissary and then if they come in your cell and they don't have a receipt, if you've got \$300 worth of fucking commissary in your cell, they can take all that shit because you don't have a receipt for it.

Another method of purchasing contraband was to do what participants (n=9) commonly called "putting money on someone's books." "Books" equate to one's commissary account, where money can be sent or transferred to in order for inmates to be able to purchase items from commissary. Money can be placed on an inmates books electronically in modern times. Juan explains the process below:

Juan: Yeah, and say I wanted to, you know, get rid of some pills but the guy didn't have no commissary, but he has a friend that he talks to on the outside that is willing to put money on my books. I just give them my book information and hold the item until I get confirmation of the commissary balance – which I can do almost daily. So, once I found out that the balance has been updated in my account, I go ahead and give him what we agreed on.

Jake mentioned how the communication with a free-world actor could occur during visitation and how the money could be placed on one's books.

Jake: You just write, you know, whoever you are going to have do it or on the phone you just kind of work it out in visitation. Say, "Hey, I'm going to tell you a name and SPN number and we aren't going to elaborate on it anymore." So, you just write it to them and put their name and SPN

number or their TDC number and they will wire the money onto their books with that information.

Kim discussed another method that she used to put money on other's books, but for the purpose of being able to obtain extra commissary.

Kim: My mom would send e-coms in other people's names and I would give that person so much money off of that just so I could get it because you were only allowed a certain amount of money on your spend... I would just write her a letter and put it in someone else's name and give her their TDC number and do it that way. It's \$30 I think or \$60, ya \$60, and you would just give them like \$10 of that and you'd keep \$50 for yourself.

Modern money transfer systems and the ease and brevity of transferring funds to an inmate's books has changed over the years. Jack, who had experienced the before and after of these new commissary account systems, describes how transferring money onto someone's books used to be much more difficult and slower (compared to Juan, Jake, Kim, and others' experiences), thus affecting the timely nature of selling contraband.

Jack: Back then when I was in there, all you had was money slips [used to transfer money across books] and while I was in there, they started coming up with a way where somebody could just send money without a money slip, just send it to you, but now there is all kinds of different ways. There is a bunch of different shit now the email and the JPay... so it was a hassle and it took a while. Yeah, you had to have a money slip and you had to

send that home. You know, and that had to be filled out and sent in with the money order to a place in Huntsville and it took a couple of weeks for that to process sometimes. That's the way it all went then. You know, I'm going to write this letter and I'm going to wait for this letter to get there and if your people were reliable enough and they got this letter soon, they would put money on somebody's books and you would hope that it would be before the next commissary day and then go, "Yeah, the money is there." And if not when I went there was no money on my books, so that was a hassle back then. Now they got JPay (electronic commissary system) where it's like shit happens a lot quicker... it's like a whole different world.

The newer methods of transferring money onto someone's book also comes with some risk, as this is often not allowed based on correctional policy. One participant described a situation in which he had someone transfer money onto his cellmate's books and the actions resulted in negative formal consequences.

Jake: And you just couldn't be blatantly out in the open and say, "Hey, I need you to send money to this guy in here." Because you can get in trouble, and I actually almost got in trouble one time. [Name of friend] had put money on my cellie's books and got caught. He got the case and I didn't because there was nothing saying that I actually sent it to him, but we had the same transactions from the same person in the same cell... He ended up getting a major case for it.

Although illegal to possess in a correctional facility, actual U.S. currency in the form of cash was also used as a form of payment. Despite the scarcity of cash in newer units due to updated security measures during visitations, cash was described as the best form of currency to have as it was worth twice the value of that same monetary amount of commissary. In other words, it was described as having more purchasing power when compared to commissary, thus appearing as if the purchaser was receiving a discount on the contraband by paying with U.S. paper currency. Cash was also described as being more enticing to correctional staff to accept as a form of payment for smuggling in contraband when compared to other methods of payment because it was easy to transfer, easy to hide, and easy for the correctional officer to use to purchase the contraband in the free-world. Participants shed light on the phenomena that surrounds the value of U.S. paper currency and the impact its presence was described to have on the flow of contraband and order within correctional facilities.

Jack discussed the relationship between the age of the correctional facility and the amount of cash that was in circulation.

Jack: If you were on an older unit, everybody had cash. Like me, whenever my dad came to see me every once in a while, he would bring me \$40, \$50, \$60. Because on certain units and certain farms, the visitation is different. So, if you go to older units like [name of facility] or [name of older facility], whether you are on closed custody or you are on minimum custody, you can get money slipped to you through the screen in visitation. Whereas if you are on a new unit, when I say newer, they were built in the 90's... the only way you can have contact and get something is

minimal custody visit, a contact visit. Other than that, it's all Plexiglas.

That's what affects contraband, the flow of contraband, is cash.

Jake mentioned the benefits of having cash as it often led to discounted prices due to its value.

Jake: There was not a lot of cash flow in prison... So, cash was king to be honest with you because when you are dealing with a guard and you don't have someone out there that is going to take care of you and meet up with them and send money to them or wire or whatever, you got to have cash. And cash would also get you a discount. So, whereas, if you were going to buy a pack of cigarettes, it would cost me normally \$50 commissary for one pack whereas I would get three packs for sometimes even four packs for a 100-dollar bill. Just because it's easier for them to get their cartons with that... I would say the value of cash to commissary, like, would be probably, I mean, two to one. I would say it would take you \$200 worth of commissary to get \$100 cash.

Jack further elaborated on the relationship between cash flow, contraband, and levels of violence and disorder among the inmate population.

Jack: On [name of prison unit] when I was there, there was all youngsters and there was a lot more fighting, a lot more stabbings, a lot more shit going on there and there wasn't much cash flow on that unit because it was a newer unit so there was a lot more shit, whereas [name of prison

unit] where there was more cash flow and there was more contraband, there wasn't as much shit happening violent wise but when it did happen, it was bad.

When cash was not available to use as a form of payment to purchase contraband, or when the contraband items or quantity of contraband far exceeded a feasible amount of commissary for trade, electronic money transfer systems were often used to exchange funds. The electronic money transfer systems that were discussed during the interviews included PayPal (n=3) and Greendot cards (n=4). Jessie noted, "for bigger ticket items, they used Greendot because it was "untraceable". These methods of transferring funds oftentimes relied heavily on having access to contraband cell phones in order to transfer the money, especially when paying with Greendot cards. Greendot cards were described as being the most preferable source electronic money transfer as they provided more anonymity when compared to other sources; they provided a very quick way of handling monetary transaction within the sub-rosa contraband economy; and they were easy to hide since the 14 digits served as actual digital currency and could be written down on something or even memorized in some instances.

The following quotes and conversation describe the benefits of using Greendot cards and the phenomena that surrounds this newer, rapid, and nearly untraceable form of monetary transfer. Jordan mentioned that, "Greendots were the main way to send money for the big stuff. It's just some numbers and that's money. I knew some people who memorized the Greendot and the Gold card numbers so they couldn't get caught with shit." Chris explained the security and brevity that comes with having a contraband cell phone to do these types of monetary transactions.

Chris: Most of the people that are doing the contraband are the ones that are going to know where to get it and they will have phones. You will have to have a phone with the Green Dot because you will have to call to verify the numbers... I mean, I guess you could use the payphones and try codes, or you could use letters and wait days, but if you want to do a drug transaction, you don't want to wait three to five days. You don't want to send somebody the money and then have to wait five days for them to verify it or give somebody the stuff and then three to five days to see if the money actually comes. So yeah, that cell phone plays a big part.

Tucker described how he would check the Greendot numbers for funds when he did not have a contraband cell phone to use and how he was eventually able to get the funds into the hands of his family members.

Tucker: Ya Greendots and PayPal were a thing, but PayPal was pretty easy to trace. When I took Greendots and I didn't have a cell phone, I had a guard that I was cool with check the numbers for me to make sure the money was right. I couldn't check the money or transfer it without a cell phone, so I just gave the numbers to my family when they visited and they'd do the transfer.

It was evident from the interviews that monetary transactions could occur in many different ways and these methods of transferring funds have changed over time. It was also clear that some methods of transferring funds were more suitable and/or less detectable for certain situations and certain types of contraband when compared to other methods.

Main Theme 3 - The Unwritten Rules of the Sub-rosa Inmate Economy

Similar to most business dealings in free-world economies, in the inmate economy there are also business ethics, etiquettes, and standards of behavior. When these standards are not followed in free-world economies, the consequences may range from a loss of opportunity for repeat business to rumors, gossip, and the seller or company itself earning a bad reputation. However, when these standards or rules of business are not followed in the inmate economy, the consequences can be much harsher. There is no rule book for these standards of business in the inmate economy, but rather these rules are assumed, taught to newer inmates by older inmates, or are learned through trial and consequence. Furthermore, these rules are not always set in stone and exceptions to these rules may exist.

Finding for main theme 3 are derived from participants' responses to question 11 in section two of the interview schedule (Do you have any knowledge of "unwritten rules" that govern contraband access, purchasing, possession, or selling? If, so, what were some of these un-written rules?), follow-up questions, and other instances during the interviews where participants discussed things that you do and do not do when engaging in the inmate contraband economy. Ultimately, participants suggested that the unwritten rules of the inmate economy are based on a need for respect, and are in place to ensure that inmates respect each other and their respective races and prison gangs in order to avoid conflict and unwanted attention. Participant responses were categorized into the following subthemes which identify 14 unwritten rules of the contraband market, when exceptions to these rules may exist, and for some rules, the consequences that inmates may expect to face when they are broken. Again, the following subthemes are not ordered

by their frequency of mention per se, but are rather presented in a fashion that allows readers to understand the culture that surrounds the inmate economy in a logical and orderly narrative fashion.

Subtheme 1 - Rule #1 Don't snitch. Explained as the golden rule of prison in many respects, snitching, or sharing information with correctional officers, is highly regarded as a behavior that is disliked within the prison culture, especially when it comes to the contraband market. When asked about the unwritten rules, or the do's and don'ts of the sub-rosa contraband market, every participant (N=16) mentioned that snitching, and even being falsely labeled as a snitch, was something that was to be avoided at all costs. Despite this being the golden rule of behavioral expectations in prison, snitching does occur, however this snitching behavior is often times handled through severe informal punishments handed down by the other inmates. Jake mentioned, "Of course, no snitching. That's golden rule in prison, period. But it happens, of course." This rule was unanimously suggested to be an obvious rule of prison life in general.

Participants (n=9) also suggested that once a person was labeled as a snitch, that individual would be ostracized from the rest of the inmate population; would not be allowed to converse with or engage with anyone who was involved with contraband; and would not be allowed to purchase or sell contraband to any other inmates. Harsher forms of punishment for snitching were also discussed by participants, especially in relation to their actions interfering with the flow of contraband. For example, Jack discussed a collective action that was taken by numerous inmates in order to address the impact that snitches were having on the flow of contraband"

Jack: We would talk about how everybody was so respectful on that wing, but that was the wing that came up with the idea of this cleansing of getting rid of a bunch of known snitches and child molesters because they were slowing down the flow of contraband and there were dudes on that wing that were going, “Look, what we need to do, you know this dude is a snitch but he’s still here. Why? This dude over here in this wing we know he’s a snitch.” There were known snitches, and nobody was doing nothing to them, and it was those dudes on that wing that called a little pow-wow on the rec yard amongst the Whites and the Blacks and all the gangs and goes, “Look man, there are too many snitches. When was the last time you got 10 packs of cigarettes for \$100? Right? So, it’s slowing it [contraband] down. Let’s do something about this. Let’s do a cleansing.” It was that wing that came up with that idea.

The actions taken by the group of individuals that enforced this rule in Jack’s experience were described to have a temporary negative impact on the flow of contraband as everyone was placed on lockdown. However, after the lockdown was lifted, the flow of contraband increased as a result of the snitches being removed from that wing of the facility, albeit for their own safety. Along the same lines as unwritten rule #1 (do not snitch), is rule number two: own up to your mistakes.

Subtheme 2 - Rule #2 Own up to your mistakes. The inmate economy is a risky business that comes along with harsh formal punishments and sometimes informal punishments administered by other inmates. Rule number two shed light on what participants (n=7) suggested an inmate must do if they are caught by correctional staff

with contraband, commonly referred to as “taking your lick.” If an inmate is caught with contraband, or has broken any other unwritten rules, they must “take their lick,” or take their formal or informal punishment, accept full responsibility for the contraband, and should do whatever is necessary to reduce the chances that others will get caught due to their mistake. This included willfully giving one’s self up and walking their property out of their cell towards the correctional officer that witnessed them with contraband. Frank describes how this is supposed to play out based on his experience:

Frank: Yeah, if you get caught and there is fucking people sitting right next to you doing the same thing, but they caught you, you walk the fuck out in that main room and take their attention away and ‘Yeah, it’s me, fine. You got me.’ I mean, it’s the same thing as snitching, man. If I fucking sit there – it’s just a different version of snitching.

Frank expanded on this and explained that not owning up to your mistakes can lead to other’s not trusting you in future deals within the contraband market, and perhaps being labeled as a snitch. He also suggested that you can earn some respect from other inmates by “taking all the heat” in order to save others from getting caught, almost like a self-sacrifice for the greater good of the rest of the inmates. Frank said, “When they see that you handle up and take the heat, they know you can be trusted.”

Also falling under the notion of taking one’s lick, is the requirement for inmates to accept their informal inmate-administered punishment for their wrongdoings. Regardless of how connected, respected, or important an inmate is in the eyes of other inmates, according to Todd and others, inmates were still required to take their lick,

sometimes in the form of an informal punishment administered by an individual's own prison gang, or family, as described in the quote below:

Todd: No matter who you were or who you were connected with, you'd take your lick, you could be the speaker (wing leader) of the [name of prison gang] but you got someone caught up, they'll [your prison gang] handle you in their own way ... and you have to respect that, especially through family [prison gangs].

Blake mentioned that informal punishments administered by inmates or gangs was necessary to reduce tension between inmates after a conflict, or to reduce tensions between gangs and races by "bringing everything back to zero." He suggested that when an inmate feels offended or disrespected, they must take their frustrations out on the offender and the offender must take his lick in the form of an informal punishment. Participants (n=9) mentioned that fights would usually be arranged between the offender and the offended and they would settle their differences through physical violence, usually in the form of a quick scuffle. Once those differences were settled, Blake said that the inmates would often be seen a few days later hanging out together, as the issue was considered "handled."

Subtheme 3 - Rule #3 Don't ask or go looking for contraband. Still related to snitching, Rule #3, identified by nine participants, suggests that inmates should not go out of their way to ask to purchase contraband. This refers to inmates that are seeking to find a particular type of contraband when they do not know where to find it, or who to talk to in order to find out who is selling the desired item/s. As Carlos put it:

Carlos: It's one of those things or one of the rules that you don't ask type of shit. It is what it is. Just let it be. If you happen to come across a connect or whatever, then so be it, but don't go asking about it (contraband).

Todd described the nature of inmates coming across contraband for sale in a correctional facility, suggesting that sometimes inmates hear about contraband being available, or are told that it may be available, but to never go out of your way by asking inmates if they can find or sell you contraband.

Todd: you didn't really ask for it, it was kind of like one of those untold things like, I know this person and they are like "on Tuesday shop is open" or something like that, maybe not that exact words, but you did not go up (to someone), you'd be like can anyone get me Kool-Aid can anyone get me bleach, stuff like that, but when we get like drugs or whatever usually, one person would be like "hey I'm taking orders, it'll be here in two weeks" and then that was it, you didn't fuck with anyone anymore, you didn't "hey man is it still coming, is it going, like blah blah blah," "hey you said on Monday", it was more be approached than approach.

Exceptions to this rule existed if an inmate was already well connected or is a well-respected prison gang member. One participant, a well-respected prison gang member during his tenure, noted the difference between his situation and a child molester's situation as it relates to entering a new area of a prison and asking around for contraband:

“If I rolled up on a wing and I had \$100, I could talk around, “Hey, does anybody got this? Can I buy some cigarettes? I got some money.” And you can do a deal. Child molester rolls up on a wing and he couldn’t do that. He couldn’t just find somebody to do a deal with him. You know, he would have to take a lot of time to build trust with somebody.

The above quote provides the context for situations where this rule may not apply. When inmates have a well-established history of trust and/or are gang affiliates, they are allowed to ask around for contraband, while inmates with undesirable characteristics and a lack of trust by other inmates may not be able to do the same. Doing so may suggest to other inmates that the inmate is a potential snitch and should not be trusted. Also, asking around for contraband can lead to violent altercations. The following quote sums up this unwritten rule and what can happen if this rule is violated by someone who is not trusted:

Carlos: Yeah, you can’t just walk up to somebody, “Hey, let me get some dope.” They will fuck you up. Yeah, like get the fuck away from me, or I’ll split you, or I will fucking fuck you up... you fucking cop or snitch, narc. You can’t just go up to somebody and be like, “Hey, man, do you got this?” You have to know somebody that knows somebody that basically knows somebody. I saw somebody get poked (stabbed) because they were like, “Hey man, somebody told me that you got fucking tattoo ink.” He was like, “get the fuck away from me.” “Yeah, I got this piece (tattoo) I’m trying to get.” He was like, “get the fuck away from me, dude.” “Dude, I need it.” Popped him one good time right in the fucking right here (pointed to kidney area)... Yeah, with a little fucking shank...

he just fucking popped him because he was like, “dude, get the fuck away” and he kept on. I guess he knew there was something up so he was just like, yeah. It was just a little pop, “mother fucker.”

In regards to inmates that may have a harder time than others gaining access to contraband, lies Rule number 4, don't sell to those who are off limits.

Subtheme 4 - Rule #4 Don't sell to those who are off limits. It is beneficial for inmates to sell contraband to other inmates as there are many incentives for doing so, however, there are also inmates who are not allowed to purchase contraband and were referred to as “off limits” or “no sales” by ten participants. Some of these inmates who are cut off from the inmate economy were identified as snitches; those who had done bad deals in the past; those who disobeyed orders from those who ran the contraband market; those who were out of control in terms of their desire to have a particular item of contraband; and those inmates who were incarcerated for undesirable crimes such as sex crimes involving children. For instance, Jordan mentioned, “child molesters and snitches couldn't get contraband, and if you sold it to them the other inmates would, or they could if they chose to, cut you off too.” Those who run the contraband market decide who can and cannot purchase contraband, and who other inmates can and cannot sell contraband to. The quote below helps illustrate this rule.

Juan: There was one guy who was brought in and we ended up finding out he was a child molester because they laid the paperwork out on his bed before he even showed up to the unit and every guy in the unit got to read the paperwork and, you know, when we found out who the guy was, nobody sold commissary to him – not a single person. He wasn't allowed

to conversate with anybody selling any type of contraband. That's pretty much, you know, the people that have the contraband –(gang members) they talk to each other and they know who each other are. So, when one person says, "I'm not selling it." Usually, most of the group talks about it and they agree as a group that they aren't going to sell anything to this type of person, or this person is getting too crazy over cigarettes, you know, nobody sell him cigarettes because he's probably going to rat everybody out and nobody is going to get any type of contraband or commissary that way.

In concert with what Jordan suggested may happen, another participant discussed what happened to him when he did sell contraband to someone who was "off limits" after being told not to by those who ran the contraband market in his particular area of the facility:

Diego: They (gang members- those who ran the contraband market) would say, "Hey, don't trade with this motherfucker, period." "Don't sell him shit and don't accept nothing from him." I remember one time I was like, "Fuck that, who are you to tell me who the fuck I can trade with?" So, I did and that actually ended up causing some shit between me and one of the guys. He came up to me and was like, "Hey, did you give him this?" And I'm like, "Yeah, what's it to you?" and he was like, "Oh, it's this." And he went and took some of my shit and he was like "whenever you go get that shit back then I'll give you your shit back" and I was like, "Damn." So, yeah, I had to go over there and talk to old boy and I was

like, “Look, apparently people in here don’t like you.... So, you are cut. I can’t trade with you. I can’t sell to you. I can’t buy from you.” You know? And he was like, “Yeah, shit. My bad. Sorry, I didn’t know they were going to get on you like that.” They were like, “Hey, man, you know, don’t do this.” And he was like, “No, fuck y’all.” So, he did it and they were like, “Well, now you are cut, and nobody is going to fuck with you, and nobody is going to give you shit.” And I became him basically next because I fucking traded with him. They were like, “Don’t fuck with him now.”

Similar to the Diego’s experience, Todd provided an example of what may transpire if an inmate sold contraband to another inmate who was “off limits,” using the principle investigator as an example:

Todd: If you got caught messing with them you were now cut off too, you know what I mean so, so if I was like “hey Layne (principle investigator) no one is fucking with you, but here is some shit, I got you,” and someone found out, they’d be like “oh we are going to beat your (principle investigator) ass if you don’t tell us where you got it,” and you were like “oh [Todd] gave it to me,” that’s it, now I’m done, and now I’m under scrutiny or whatever.

Interestingly, the informal punishments for not following this rule were handed down by those who were in charge of the contraband market, which were typically gang members. However, these punishments discussed (being “cut off”) were dulled out in a way that did not bring formal authoritative attention to the issue, yet they resulted in

further deprivations being felt by the inmate who did not follow this rule by removing their opportunities to purchase contraband in the future. When an inmate does successfully purchase, they are held to a standard of secrecy, which leads to rule number five, don't show and tell.

Subtheme 5 - Rule #5 Don't show and tell. Six participants suggested that once they had purchased contraband they were told to not show anyone their contraband and to remain quiet about where they obtained the contraband. This rule emerged as a way of reducing their chances of getting caught with the contraband and as a way to protect the seller. This rule was also followed for the purpose of protecting the price of the contraband as illustrated in the quote below.

Todd: Ya and don't show and tell, there would be dude that would just "ya man I've got this bud (marijuana)" and they bring it out under their bed and now they are getting a million and eighteen questions "how'd you get it, do you have any more, how much is it," and if you think about it the dorm room is the size of where we are at right now, a couple TV's, tables, whatever, so if I asked you where you got it from and you are like I can't really talk about it, and you get up and I'm watching you and I see you went to [cell number]. Like okay [cell number] is the guy that now has it, so it's one of those, just be careful with what you have an you don't want to talk about it, you don't tell anybody who you are getting it from, you don't want anyone to see you because that could screw you over, it's like buying stuff in the outside world, you know? Say I'm only buying a joint from you for me every week, the guys that just asked where I get my weed

from he me say “I want to buy an ounce,” so what are you going to do? You are going to sell the guy the ounce to get rid of all of your contraband because that’s a free-world charge, you are going to get rid of it like that and then I’m gonna go, “ok you, you just bought all this shit from him and I used to get a joint for ten bucks, and now you want to sell me the joint for 20?” So, it was one of those, you kind of, you want to be secretive about who you have.

Participants often mentioned that the contraband market was one where if you are in the know, then you are in the know, and if you are in the know, you do not let others in on what you know, unless they are trusted potential buyers. Likened to organized crime activity in the free-world, Chris mentioned that, “from like an organized crime perspective, it’s the same, you just keep your business to yourself, it protects you and your business.”

Along the lines of protecting business and maintaining a desired free flow of contraband in a correctional facility is rule number six, don’t bring attention to your living quarters.

Subtheme 6 - Rule #6 Don’t bring attention to your living quarters. As noted in the literature review section of this dissertation, it is suggested that maintaining order in a correctional facility allows for the flow of contraband to go relatively uninterrupted. The interviews for this study suggest that order maintenance, especially at the individual level, is an unwritten rule of engaging in contraband. Ten participants mentioned the importance of engaging in contraband without the knowledge of correctional officers, and when consuming contraband (especially odorous contraband like marijuana), doing so

without bringing attention to that area of the facility. Fighting was also halted when contraband was available, as this behavior also brought unwanted attention to an area of the facility. When inmates did not follow this rule, it resulted in everyone paying the consequences as these behaviors would lead to shakedowns and lockdown which significantly affect the flow of contraband and increase the deprivations of prison. Jake sums up this rule and provides a great example of the relationship between order maintenance and contraband in correctional facilities in the following quote:

Jake: And then, like a dorm rule will be do stuff responsibly and that you don't do what you call crash dummy stuff. I'm not going to go blow up the dayroom full of weed smoke (make the dorm smell heavily of marijuana) knowing the guards are going to come through because that's going to bring heat to the dorm. It's going to bring them in there to do shakedowns and stuff. Also, like fighting or heart check stuff (testing a new gang member's ability to stand up and fight), we are going to put those on hold until this (contraband) isn't circulating around.

Not abiding by this rule led to consequences for all of the individuals in that area of the facility, and would lead to everyone getting caught, or what Todd referred to as "crashing out." When this happened, Todd and Jake suggested that the individual/s that were responsible for bringing what they referred to as "heat" (unwanted negative attention by the guards) to the area, were dealt with through violence and/or were ostracized.

Subtheme 7 - Rule #7 Do square business. When engaging in the illicit contraband economy, five participants mentioned the importance of doing fair business,

or what Frank referred to as “square business.” This was explained as a necessity in the contraband market as it created a sense of trust among the inmates and was associated with repeat business. Given that in many correctional facilities, the only way an inmate can earn money is to sell contraband or scarce commissary items. If an individual is known for selling tainted products or misrepresenting an item as something it is not, then they reduce their chances of having future customers and repeat business, and will often be avoided by other inmates thereafter. For instance, Todd mentioned a situation in which fellow inmates were taking stamps off of envelopes using steam, washing them off, and selling them as unused stamps. Once it was found out that the inmates were doing this, no one trusted those inmates, no one would purchase anything from them, and no one would sell anything to them.

Todd: There would be people that would take hot water cups and try to steam off stamps from envelopes and they would try to reuse them, so then you found out a couple of days later this stamps is not real this stamp has already been used, cool, so now it’s you know that so and so screwed you over, and everybody now knows, and they won’t fuck with them (sell or trade with them).

As it relates to repeat business, Frank explains the importance of repeat business in correctional facilities in the quote below:

Frank: If you do square business, it’s just like any business. You know, if you give people what you tell them you are going to give them for a price that they agree to pay, you will get repeat business. You know, and repeat business in fucking jail, there is nothing else to do except repeat business.

Along the lines of square business is understanding the going rate for certain contraband items that are available on the market and understanding who else is selling that type of contraband. In other words, if an inmate obtains a certain type of contraband and wants to sell the contraband, there are two important things that the inmate must do, which leads to rules eight and nine.

Subtheme 8 - Rule #8 Don't step on others' toes. In the case that there is a gang that is already selling a particular type of contraband in a part of a correctional facility and another inmate obtains and wants to sell that same type of contraband, four participants noted that they must first get permission from the other gang in order to sell their contraband. Not getting permission was suggested to be a form of disrespect and can lead to pricing conflicts, inter-racial and inter-gang conflicts, unwanted attention by correctional officers, and potentially violence. Todd describes a situation that he saw unfold where permission was necessary for more than one gang to sell the same type of contraband.

Todd: I know [prison gang] brought in a shit load (a lot) of weed, but they had to make sure it was cool, they didn't have to make sure it was cool with everybody, but they had to make sure you know the three [another prison gang] dudes, or the [another prison gang] dudes didn't have a problem with it, because when you do that you could crash out everybody... If you crash and get caught they'll lock down the unit and we'll be on lockdown for a month, and you got to own up to that, so it's a lot on the seller, the buyer, and the bringer, to the finder, everyone involved has to follow the rules.

In fact, Frank suggested that price fixing happens in this sub-rosa economy and is actually a good thing as it reduced potential conflicts. Aside from tattooing, which was expressed as an art form without a set price, a price structure existed for most commodities and deviating from that price, especially when there is more than one gang selling the same contraband, can be problematic.

Frank: Yeah, price fixing happens all the time. Hell yeah. Not so much in the tattoo thing. That's more of an artistic process. People can name what they want for tattoos. That's different. But as far as commodities like, you know drugs, tobacco, shit like that, yeah there is a set price understood.

Another participant discusses one way in which conflict can arise when more than one gang is selling a particular type of contraband at the same time, even after prices have been fixed.

Jack: Or this one gang is selling this much and doing this kind of business and then somebody else comes along and starts doing it too and starts making just as much money or making more and taking away from that and the next thing you know it's like, oh no... the ego of the two gangs are going at it.

Despite rivalries between prison gangs, two participants suggested that rival gangs would often agree on prices and agree to allow each other to sell the same contraband to avoid conflicts and maintain a flow of contraband, however, as shown in the quote above, the egos of competing gangs sometimes get in the way. Not separate from an understood pricing structures for most typical contraband items, is rule number nine, don't undercut the market.

Subtheme 9 - Rule #9 Don't undercut the market. In licit businesses, reducing the price of your product can be an effective way to capture more market share and is considered a common business practice. However, in the inmate economy, this practice is highly frowned upon. Similar to licit businesses, reducing the price of your product can help you sell your product quicker, but in the inmate economy, doing so can come with consequences handed down by those who manage the market (prison gangs). Exceptions to this rule do exist in cases where the seller is respected by the inmates, is a high ranking gang member, or when it may simply be too much trouble to address their business practices. Jack discusses this phenomenon by using the example of papers that are used to roll tobacco and marijuana cigarettes, which often times were fashioned out of blank pages from a Bible.

Jack: Don't try to fuck up the market that there already is. If we are selling Bible papers for 75 cents... even though it's pure capitalism, it's kind of fucked up for you to come in here and start selling Bible papers for 50 cents. People get pissed off about that... but if you got enough respect and you are too much to fuck with, nobody is going to do nothing about it, but if you are a little punk-ass dude trying to do that, they (prison gangs) are going to shut you down (tell you to stop or correct the price).

This phenomenon was further discussed by Frank as he mentioned the nature of undercutting the market, and how this is handled.

Frank: I mean, yeah, tomorrow this guy might have cigarettes for one soup versus two, you know, but that's not going to last because they (prison gangs) are going to talk to him. "No, our price is two and your price is

two, you aren't going to come in here and undercut the market." Yeah, when there is supply, the price goes down and when there is not enough supply, the price goes up, but they (prison gangs) regulate it so they can keep making their money.

These findings suggest that prison gangs not only dominate the contraband market, but they also govern the dealings in terms of dictating the price that should be charged for certain contraband.

Subtheme 10 - Rule #10 Don't steal. Similar to the free world, stealing is frowned upon in correctional facilities. Eight participants noted this as an unwritten rule, some of which suggested stealing another inmate's commissary or contraband is a major form of disrespect, and must be handled through violence or some form of compromise. As previously noted in Diego's situation where his property was taken because he traded with another inmate who was off limits until he retrieved what he had traded, stealing does happen. Also, stealing may happen if an inmate has too much contraband or is a vulnerable/undesirable inmate, such as in the case of inmates who were charged with child molestation, commonly referred to in the interviews as "chomos", short for child molesters. Frank suggested that, "if you have too much contraband, you are a target." Jack mentioned that:

Jack: A child molester, they are going to jack (steal) you for your shit, and nobody is going to care. Nobody is going to stick up for you and nobody is going to give a fuck that you just got jacked for \$100. Nobody is going to care, and if you try and do something about it and you are a child molester, it's going to be even worse for you.

Frank also mentioned what can happen if an inmate has too much contraband for personal use, and the dangers of stealing from another inmate:

Frank: If you screw up bad enough or you steal from somebody you can get fucking killed. Very quickly, if the wrong person sees you, or you know, the thing about jail is not letting people know what you have. It's kind of a dance because you got to let them know what you have so you can sell it, but you don't want them knowing how much you have because if they think you have too much for your personal use they could come take it, and if enough people want to, they are going to take it.

Even in cases where things are stolen from inmates and the inmate stands up for themselves, the property is not always returned and the action can go unpunished, such as in the case of Blake.

Blake: I got stuff stolen from me, but I didn't cause a riot. Yeah, I fucking caused a fuss in my tank and I fucking called people out, but I lost my shit (contraband). You know? And I know who it was – the floor workers. When they came in to do the fucking raid that followed the cops, but anyway, so, you know, shit like that would happen.

Chris described stealing as an inherent aspect of prison life, given the criminal nature of the inmates and the fact that inmates aren't going to say anything to the correctional officers if they are stolen from. In other words, theft happens and it is up to the victim to handle the issue as noted in the quote below.

Chris: They are murderers, thieves, rapists, they are selling drugs to each other and they know that they don't call the cops. So, a lot of people just

try to jack people (steal), so that happens too, and when that happens usually violence occurs somewhere because you don't let people disrespect you.

Protecting one's self from theft was much easier if the individual was a part of a prison gang, as their gang status provided protection from others as noted by Chris, "I mean, because if you are not (in a gang) or if you don't have somebody backing you, what's going to keep somebody from just coming and taking everything, you got?" These findings suggest that stealing another inmate's contraband is frowned upon in correctional facilities and can result in severe consequences, however, there are exceptions to the rule, especially for "chomos", those who are not in prison gangs, and those that have too much contraband that a larger group of individuals (prison gang) desires.

Subtheme 11 - Rule #11 Don't get in debt with guards or inmates.

Unsurprisingly, and consistent with previous studies, study participants also noted that guards were largely responsible for bringing contraband into correctional facilities (n=16). In doing so, a financial transaction must occur between the guard and an inmate. Rule number eleven, mentioned by four participants, deals with this situation and participants warned about the dangers of getting into debt with guards who are bringing in contraband. An inmate with debt owed to another inmate is also not something an individual wants looming over their head either as unpaid debts can lead to violent altercations, while getting into debt with guards can have retaliatory formal consequences. Jack mentions:

Jack: You know, getting in debt with a guard, and you don't have the money to pay the guard and the guard gets mad, all that guard has to do is go shakedown your cell and say "look, 'I found this joint." Next thing you know you have more time. A joint out here, that is a misdemeanor, in there it will get you more time in prison. You could get a couple more years stacked on top of your sentence.

Debt owed between inmates was suggested to result in violence, as owing money to someone and not paying them is a form of disrespect, and the longer the debt is held the more disrespect the debtor is exhibiting. Jack describes what happens when debts are owed and go unpaid between inmates in the quote below:

Jack: Ya there is a lot of violence due to contraband for people not paying debts... Pay up or shit is going to be done, or you know, you get so much in debt because your addiction – yeah, "I'll pay them this later" and then the next thing you know you are owing a bunch of money and there is violence behind that.

Carlos discussed the potential consequences of not paying debts that were owed to other inmates as well.

Carlos: If you don't pay your shit, you will get split. It's that simple. If you don't pay up, you will get split or you will be in debt big time and you will be doing favors. You will be somebody's bitch, holding on to their fucking pant loop type shit (suggesting sexual victimization).

Participants made it very clear that owing money to both guards and other inmates was not a favorable position to be in, and the consequences for not paying one's debt can range from formal administrative punishments and free-world charges to physical violence and sexual victimization.

Subtheme 12 - Rule #12 Don't interfere with correctional officer and inmate dealings. Another unwritten rule of the contraband market deals with staying to yourself and not interfering with other's business dealings, especially when these business dealing are between inmates and guards. Jack noted that interfering with an inmate and a guard's business dealings is considered to be extremely disrespectful. The time and effort that goes into building a business relationship with a guard is something to be cherished, and when that guard is helping inmates make money in the contraband market, they are well guarded by that inmate and his fellow gang members. As Todd notes:

Todd: "Say the [prison gang] had the officer (guard who was bringing in contraband), like, if I went and tried to, "Hey, will you bring me this?"

They are going to have an issue with it. If you weren't aware and say, that officer pissed you off and you slapped him, the next thing you know, you are getting beat up by a bunch of [prison gang members]."

Jack discussed how interfering with an inmate and guard's dealings was a significant form of disrespect and how this could lead to violence.

Jack: You don't want nobody knowing about your business because if one guy thinks you got guards bringing in stuff for you, he can go to that guard and be like, "Man, you are bringing in something for him." Which is a major form of disrespect. If I got a lot of respect and I can handle my

business right in there and I found out that you are going to my guard and putting my “Hey, man, you are already bringing it in for him.” That’s a major form of disrespect. I recorded prison rules and ethics. I got the right to put something upside your head for disrespecting me and my game or my hustle. You are fucking with my hustle by doing that.

What this relationship looks like, how they are formed, and how this relationship turns into a moneymaking adventure for both the inmate and the guard will be covered in main theme four of this chapter, but for now, it is important to note that interfering with this relationship can be dangerous and is a major form of disrespect.

Subtheme 13 - Rule #13 Always have a fall guy. When selling contraband in correctional facilities, emphasis was placed on never getting caught with that contraband, especially contraband such as drugs and large amounts of tobacco as these can result in free-world charges. In attempting to avoid being caught in possession of contraband, those who are the main sellers of contraband will often have what was referred to as a “fall guy,” discussed by four participants. This person would be responsible for possessing the contraband, and sometimes selling it on behalf of the main seller. In other instances, individuals may be set up to take the fall for contraband without knowing it. Jack discussed how he was the fall guy and was responsible for selling a higher ranking fellow gang member’s tobacco, from which he made profits as well.

Jack: Yeah, I would have a bunch of packs of cigarettes and weed on me and I would be selling it and [higher ranking gang member] would be like, “No, I don’t fuck around no more (sell contraband), but [Jack’s prison

nickname] does.” That was my nickname, “[nickname] got it.” Then I would do it and I would sell ten packs or whatever and give the money to [higher ranking gang member] and I just stayed in weed and a house full of commissary.

In regards to having a fall guy who was either willing or unaware that contraband was being planted on them, Frank discussed the following situations:

Frank: ...Always have a fall guy. There is always some bitch on the block that is stupid or that is young or that doesn't fucking know or that wants to act cool. You know what? The shit stays with him because in case something fucking happened, you guys get raided or they come in unannounced, you know, that's your fall guy, man. They don't know. They think they are being cool, and they think they are playing their part... You know, occasionally they would throw a red herring out there. “Man, this guy has been fucking up on the block, nobody likes him, fuck that shit. We are going to set his ass up and send him down.” So, they put some shit, you know, in his bag. They know we are getting searched tomorrow, so they put all the shit in his bag and hang him out to dry and the fucking detention officer is in on it because they know, okay, if we move him out and he catches a case then they are going to lay back on the whole block and everything will be okay.

In this instance, a fall guy could serve as what Mexican drug smugglers call *decoys*, or what are commonly referred to as *suicide loads* or *blind mules*; effectively serving as a proxy or cut-out in network analysis positioning terms.

This person may not have been chosen for the exact purpose of being a cut-out in the same way that drug smugglers would be considered one, however, the concept is very similar.

Subtheme 14 - Rule #14 Keep the peace. Although problems between individuals and groups may occur within correctional facilities in regards to the inmate economy and contraband dealings, five participants specifically mentioned that maintaining some sense of peace was necessary. Doing so allowed for fewer issues to arise and for problems to be solved without drawing unwanted attention from guards. It also provided opportunities to access contraband and for life while incarcerated to have as few deprivations as possible. Some participants noted that although you are surrounded by people in prison that you do not like and would never associate yourself with in the free-world, getting along with fellow inmates was expressed to be important. For instance, Blake discusses a time where his cell was out of view of the guard shack, and thus his cell and bed was a desirable place for other inmates to do tattoos. Although he wanted to sleep on his bed at times, he simply allowed the other inmates to use his bed to tattoo in exchange for commissary.

Blake: I let them use my bed and sometimes they would turn me on to a soup or a spread – make friends. A lot of times in jail, man, you got to make friends with people you don't even want to make friends with just to keep the peace and to get commissary too – contraband, you know?

It was not only the inmates that wanted to keep the peace in regards to contraband, but guards also wanted to keep the peace and would let inmates trade commissary, as noted by Blake below:

Blake: Trading, that's contraband and as soon as you trade something that's contraband, but there were guards to keep the peace in the tank and to be cool because there were some guards that made friends with you. You know? They just do it and keep an eye on the tank and learn what's going on in the tank. You know, there is people that talk. There is talkers. I'm pretty sure they got to know you from intel and also to keep the peace in the tank, but they would let guys trade shit.

In sum, the unwritten rules of the contraband market, as identified in the interviews, suggests that they were mainly established to reduce conflict; reduce unwanted attention that may lead to shakedowns; protect one's profits; ensure personal responsibility; protect knowledge and assets from snitches and thieves; established fixed prices; ensure respectful dealings; provide justifications for informal punishments and consequences; ensure self-preservation; and to maintain a steady flow of contraband. Interestingly, after the twelfth interview, no new unwritten rules emerged or were mentioned by the rest of the participants, suggesting that at least as far as the unwritten rules are concerned, saturation was likely reached.

Main Theme 4 - Grooming and Inmate-Correctional Officer Relations

Main theme four that emerged from the interviews surrounds the relationships that are formed between correctional officers and inmates as it relates to contraband and contraband smuggling. As noted in chapter two, inmates and correctional officers spend several hours per day, and several days per week, together, so it is only natural for communication to take place and some form of relationship to exist. The extent of this relationship and how these relationships are formed were one of the main focuses of

inquiry in the interviews, particularly as it relates to contraband. The most fruitful data obtained from the interviews regarding these relationships were collapsed into four subthemes: 1) rapport building, 2) the grooming process, 3) blackmail, and 4) the ties that bind.

Subtheme 1 - Rapport building. As noted in chapter two, grooming refers to the process of slowly corrupting guards in an effort to receive favorable treatment, whether it be something small like extra time out of the cell, or something more severe and illegal such as smuggling in contraband for an inmate. When asked about the grooming process and how the process unfolds, seven participants provided some insights on how grooming is often done in correctional facilities, either because they themselves had groomed correctional officers or they had witnessed someone they knew grooming correctional officers. Consistent with previous studies, all seven of these participants mentioned that this was a gradual process that began with rapport building. As Jack mentioned, “You can’t groom a guard in a day. It takes a little while. It takes some work and it takes some talking to.” Jordan said, “Ya you would just talk to them, try to build a relationship slowly overtime.” Todd mentioned the following approach at rapport building:

Todd: It just started off normal like if you were on the streets or something, if you think about it this way, out of a seven day work week, you are seeing this person 5 days a week 12 hours a day, so eventually there is conversation that happens, I’ve conversated with plenty of guards, you know “what are you in here for?” “What are your plans when you get out?” You know, that just starts the process and it keeps going, and you see how far you can get with them, like hey “tell me more about you

guard, are you married, do you have kids, how many kids do you have, do you have boys do you have girls how old are they, blah blah blah, where are you from, do you live around here, why did you do this (job)?”

Participants also noted that simple conversations about something the inmate and correctional officer may have in common is often a good way to begin the rapport building process that leads to eventual grooming. For instance, Chris suggested that:

Chris: You just talk about the same things and just happen to get on the subject... Yeah, especially during football season it gets real easy, but especially as (resident of a particular state). You know, everybody is either [name of city and football team] fan or [name of city and football team] fan.

Making small talk and connecting on something like football was a common way of building the rapport necessary to begin the grooming process. Connecting with correctional officers about football and sports was also mentioned by Jack as a way to build rapport:

Jack: Whatever the sports team the C.O. would like, he would look them up real good. Yeah, man, we watched so and so run the ball last night, and like groom people into making it seem like that's your homeboy or your friend, convince him that hey, we are cool.

Another common method used to build rapport was through making sexual comments to female guards, letting the female guards know that the inmate finds them attractive, and/or letting the female guards know that they are interested in them. This was suggested to be done for the purpose of building rapport that could lead to grooming for the purpose of trying to convince a guard to provide sexual services to an inmate or to

convince them to smuggle contraband into the facility. This was suggested by seven participants to be most successful on female guards who were unattractive, had low self-esteem, or who were not given enough attention at home. The following three quotes illustrate this phenomenon.

Jack: You always seen females get in trouble for (bringing in contraband), and it sounds fucked up, and I hate to say it, but if you are an unattractive woman by whatever standards you want to call attractive and you come in there and you all of a sudden you are getting attention – you got to understand, you are coming in a place full of dudes and a lot of them are in shape because that’s all they do is work out. They are not ugly dudes, and you got this dude that would never talk to you in the free world and now he’s just talking to you, saying the sweetest shit. The best conversation, always got something nice to say. You are pulled into that. You know what I mean?

Frank also discussed why he believed female correctional officers were easy targets.

Frank: She could be 450 fucking pounds – somebody has been in down (incarcerated) for ten years is still going to talk to her and smell her when she walks by. You know? They like to flirt, you know, maybe they feel, for whatever reason, maybe they don’t get enough attention at home or whatever fucking reason it is, but they’re easy targets.

Jack's comment below also sheds light on this phenomenon as he explains the thought process held by those inmates who wished to begin the grooming process on unattractive female correctional officers, and why.

Jack: There was a lot of dudes that were into that (pulling female guards for sexual purposes). If you can get a female guard, you know what I'm saying? "Oh, the CO's are coming in. She's a short little fat one. I bet I can get some pussy from her. She probably has low self-esteem... short, fat, probably ain't that good looking, I can get pussy from her."... Now if you have one that is going to start giving you pussy, what else will she do?

When asked about grooming, Chad suggested that I talk to his friend Tucker (who was later interviewed) about grooming, as he described him as having, "a silver tongue" when it came to grooming female guards. Chad said:

Chad: Man I never did it (groomed a guard), but my friend [Tucker] was the king of doing that, he had a silver tongue and he would have these girls (female correctional officers) bringing in food, candy bars, all kinds of shit, he had one bring in a Reese's (peanut butter chocolate candy) for me once.

During the interview with Tucker, he mentioned that he indeed had a way with talking to female guards and having them bring in numerous forms of minor contraband for him including Fabuloso (cleaning product), shrimp gumbo, women's perfume, and pornography. Tucker said,

Tucker: when no one is around, you just chop it up with them (start up conversations), the fat chicks were really easy to pull, you just show them

compassion and make them feel like your conversation is special. People at the end of the day want to feel special and wanted, you know, put them on a pedestal. If they like it you might show them your dick, get sexual with it over time, you know? If they like it you'll know it and then you just work them from there, the fat ugly ones were the easiest (to groom and corrupt)...

Presenting one's genitalia to a female guard during the rapport building process may seem to be absurd, but Tucker was not the only participant that mentioned this as a form of rapport building in the grooming process. In fact, five participants noted that this was a method used in rapport building. Jake suggested that it was sometimes an effective way of building rapport and starting a sexual relationship, whether it was only visual or evolved into something physical. Jake said, "Sometimes you have these guys that masturbate on these women and they don't care and there are women that let them do it and they are into it, and it works." Jordan also told a story about a female correctional officer (described as an "ugly ass bitch") that would do favors for inmates if they would masturbate in front of her.

From small talk about a football game, to common connections about similar interests, to sexual and esteem building comments and behaviors exhibited by inmates, these techniques were discussed as ways to build rapport with correctional officer with the ultimate goal of eventually grooming the guards into bringing in contraband and/or providing special favors for the inmates. Once the rapport was built and trust was established between the correctional officers and the inmates, the grooming process would proceed.

Subtheme 2 - The grooming process. Once a sense of trust was built between inmates and guards, participants suggested that the small favors would start. The participants (n=7) who discussed grooming in-depth, said that it typically started with something small like a cheeseburger, cigarettes, or a can of snuff tobacco. Jack mentioned what this looks like in the following quote.

Jack: So, when you get them started with something like cigarettes, or I know one guy he would talk to a guard and tell him like, “Man, I know we ain’t supposed to have no money in here, but I got cash and I just want a fucking bad-ass cheeseburger. If you bring me a fucking cheeseburger, I’ll give you \$50.” Dude (correctional officer) thinks,” man it’s just food... fuck it, man.” And whatever amount the dollar is, he brings him in a cheeseburger and fries, now you have that guard on your hook. He just broke a rule for you. He just brought in something that is benign and harmless. It’s redundant, I guess, but something that’s harmless as a fucking cheeseburger, now this guy got it. Now he’s got that trust. Now they crossed that line. Now you can be like – and you get to talk to him more and, you know, “I got some more cash, and I want some cigarettes.”

... It starts out with some food, then cigarettes, then whatever.

Frank also provided an examples of what this grooming process looks like and describes using little tests to identify their “trigger points”.

Frank: Yeah, grooming might have been as little as escorting the nurse in one day. You know, the first she escorts the nurse in to dispense medication or something, and he knew goddamn well that guy got two

doses. He was standing right there but he doesn't say anything. That could have been the first step. Okay, well now we know he's looking but he doesn't care or for whatever reason he didn't report it. If that's step one, step two might be that I'm going to smoke a cigarette in front of him from 50 feet away and see what happens. You know, and if he doesn't say anything about that – okay, cool. Now we are going to talk and see what we can do. And it's an incremental step-by-step process... You just have to figure out what their trigger points are.

Todd talked about ways that inmates can feel out a correctional officer's level of integrity and policy enforcement in an effort to determine how likely it is that the correctional officer will let them do something contraband-related that is against policy. Todd provided the following dialogue as an example:

Todd: Ya, and it's almost like you are dry testing them, to see what they'll say, like "hey I'm gonna bring in some bleach"

Officer: "Oh no nah you are not going to fucking do that," okay cool, now I know this guard is not about it (willing to allow it).

Todd: or "Hey I'm gonna bring in some bleach."

Officer: "Alright man as long as it's not a lot."

Todd: "Okay cool," and now you know, you can work on him.

Another participant had groomed a guard over a period of time into bringing in snuff tobacco for him to sell. In this instance, this correctional officer was an avid snuff tobacco user and would often bring snuff too work and use it while he was inside of the prison, which was against policy. Overtime, the inmate developed a relationship with this guard that evolved from the correctional officer bringing in one can of snuff, to seven cans, and later other forms of contraband. This participant referred to tobacco as the “gateway contraband,” which led to correctional officers bringing in other forms of contraband. In other words, they would sometimes start the grooming process with something relatively minor such as tobacco and slowly groom them into bringing in other forms of contraband.

Chris: Like the dude I brought up, he dipped snuff so he could understand wanting one. And that’s exactly how it started. So, he brought it in. Yeah, that’s how it started (one can of snuff) and then after, I guess, he just got used to it. He got comfortable with it so that it wasn’t a big deal to bring anything in. So yeah that’s exactly how it started. That gateway drug, tobacco, was that gateway contraband. It started him off. It was that and Creatine. We had him start bringing that because we worked out a lot. Yeah, even that, he was worried at first, but we talked him into it... Like we see him every single day at work for six out of his twelve-hour shift. We were his friends...

Another effective way of beginning the grooming process after rapport building was discussed by Jack. Jack suggested that “money talks” and the dialogue he provided highlights a more brazen attempt at grooming a guard and how this transpired.

Jack: [name of cellmate] just started talking to him (correctional officer) and working with him and mentioning shit, and this, that, and the other, and at one point when [name of cellmate] felt like he could trust him... his simple move was like.

Cellmate: "Man, I just want to get some cigarettes in here and make some money."

Jack: And he showed him a wad of money. Dude (correctional officer) was like,

Correctional Officer: "Wow, shit, how much is that?"

Cellmate: "Don't worry about it, but if you want to make some money, you can make money and all I want is some cigarettes." Do you know what I mean? If you can help me out, I can sell cigarettes in here for cash and we can keep it rolling and we can make extra money."

Again, what began as simple conversations quickly evolved into a situation where both individuals benefitted financially. The rest of this story will be told in main theme five, as a detailed explanation was provide by Jack about the creative method used to smuggle this tobacco into the prison. Ultimately, many ways of grooming guards were discussed by participants. The participants also discussed methods that were used to coerce the guards into bringing in other forms of contraband, despite the correctional

officers desire to stop smuggling contraband, which leads to the third subtheme of main theme 4, blackmail.

Subtheme 3 - Blackmail. Of the seven participants that discussed the grooming process, five mentioned that blackmail played a large part in coercing the correctional officers into continuing to do favors and smuggle contraband into correctional facilities. As described by Todd below, once they break one rule for an inmate, the inmate might use the threat of telling the warden about their behaviors if they choose to stop helping the inmate. Todd uses an example based on Greendot money transfers, and describes what this blackmail looks like after transactions have been made.

Todd: but a lot of them (guards) would do it, it was just how far could you push that person (guard) to go, and then once they start obviously you have blackmail on them, you have proof that “hey my family has wired this guy this money, okay you want to stop? Okay cool, now we are going to go to the warden.” I’ve never seen a crooked warden, so, it one of those.

Chris discussed how this transpires in relation to male inmate and female correctional officer relationships in the quote shown below. Chris suggested that a combination of a weightless threat of blackmail and a guilty conscience on the part of the female correctional officer for having sexual relations with an inmate was enough “leverage” to have the correctional officer continue to bring in contraband for an inmate.

Chris: Like I said, it starts with like a relationship. Some sort of flirting with some sort of guy who just happens to have enough of a mouthpiece (smooth talker) to talk her into whatever. Maybe some sexual relationship and then after that he’s got leverage to get her to bring things in... Like I

said, that sexual relationship starting it and giving leverage played a big part. They would just feel some sort of attraction that they shouldn't have and cross a line and after they cross the line, there is no going back. Right? Or they would feel that way, and like realistically, they (female correctional officer) couldn't get in trouble anyway because what's the guy (inmate) going to say, "oh, I had sex with her." Prove it. All she has to do is deny it, but just the guilt of it makes it leverage enough to get them to do something else.

Jack also talked about how sexual relations between female guards and inmates were a form of blackmail and how this blackmail was used.

Jack: If she will come to your cell and blow you real quick (oral sex), or pull down her pants and let you fuck her real quick, what else will she do? It's like, "You are already fucking me, you might as well be bringing me in some cigarettes."

Chris further discussed how he coerced the guard who brought him snuff and Creatine into continuing to bring in contraband. In the following quote, Chris mentions that personal information about the guard's life outside of prison was helpful in blackmailing the correctional officer into bring in more contraband, as it provided him with more money to spend during his leisurely, yet nefarious, activities on his days off.

Chris: His four days off – he was taking all the money he made (from contraband), and he was laying up in motel rooms smoking crack with prostitutes. He would come back and tell us (the other inmate workers) all

about it. Yeah, so after that like we busted him wide open (used this information, along with rapport, as leverage).

The grooming process in Chris' case began with a common bond over snuff and later evolved into other forms of contraband with the looming threat of blackmail based on what the correctional officer's personal life and leisurely activities included. When asked about ways of obtaining blackmail, Carlos mentioned that a good way to gather blackmail was to have a way to prove communications had occurred outside of prison between an inmate and a female correctional officer via telephone.

Carlos: Ya it's like, you know, talking to them on the outside type shit or getting a cellphone brought in, getting their number, and then you calling them off the phone that they brought in for you at their house while they are off shift, that's good blackmail, now you got her.

There were some instances that were discussed throughout the interviews, where blackmail wasn't necessary, in fact, some correctional officers were reported to have pre-existing ties with inmates (endogenous relationships), which leads to subtheme four, the ties that bind.

Subtheme 4 - The ties that bind. It was not uncommon for participants to see other inmates who either knew correctional officers from school, the neighborhood they were raised in, correctional officers that were family members, and even correctional officers that were gang members in the free-world. These endogenous relationships between inmates and guards came along with pre-existing loyalties and levels of trust that did not require rapport building, grooming, and blackmail. Jordan mentioned, "ya if you were from the area that the prison was, and you had people (correctional officers that you

knew), you could get damn near anything over that fence.” Frank discusses this phenomena based on what he experienced in a large local jail.

Frank: a lot of correction officers that I ran into had ties to the communities that these people were from. You will have correction officers, like I said earlier, that have neighborhood ties – even gang affiliations. There were multiple former blood detention officers. It was pretty freaking obvious, you know, once you observe the relationships and how the stuff came it that way... Definitely community ties with that guy.

Chris discussed how female gang affiliates and members would get jobs at correctional facilities on behalf of the gang in order to operate prostitution business within the walls of correctional facilities. He too mentioned that proximity to one’s residence played a large role in these inmate-guard relationships that could potentially lead to contraband smuggling. At the very least, the endogenous and/or exogenous relationships made it okay to ask the correctional officer without fear of being reported for the solicitation.

Chris: Like a lot of the women that were prostituting, they were part of like some [gang name] or [gang name] and they, you know, some chick was told to get a job here and make money or whatever. Because, I mean, that’s a big money-making opportunity, too. \$200 a pop. You know what I mean? For a blowjob. Five minutes, 200 bucks. Especially these people who have been in prison for years, it doesn’t take long... A lot of times, the people had some sort of relationship prior to that. Or, like the male officers would have known the person before, or known somebody that

knew them and that makes it, you know, that's another thing that makes it okay to kind of ask (for them to bring in contraband) and if they shoot you down, they are not going to put you on blast (tell their superiors about the solicitation)... because they know your family, or they went to church with your grandma. A lot of people got sent to the small-town prisons where they were living in that small town... So then you are in your hometown and if your hometown is [name of small town], that small little town where everybody either works in the prison or knows somebody who does, yeah.

Along with neighborhood ties and gang ties, Carlos discussed situations where he would see other inmate and correctional officers from previous facilities where he had been previously incarcerated, and the endogenous relationships would follow and benefit him as it relates to contraband.

Carols: Yeah, if you knew somebody from like before – if you saw somebody from a previous bid, if you are on your same bid and you saw somebody come back in from a previous bid, yeah, y'all are going to kick it (be friends) right off the bat. If you saw somebody from your [neighbor]hood that got transferred onto your unit, yeah, y'all are already in good. Same thing with like CO's and shit like that. If you knew a CO from the street and you got incarcerated, he is going to look out for you type of shit – most of the time. I saw the CO that was at the jail, at that prison that I was at and he was like, “Yo, what's up, dude. Do you need anything? I got you”... because he saw me from before.

As mentioned in main theme two subtheme one, neighborhood ties and gang ties played a large role in gaining access to contraband by having guards that knew the inmate or their family before incarceration, and the closer an inmate was to their hometown, the better chances they have of getting a correctional officer to help them get contraband into the facility. Taken together, these results suggest that smooth talking, the power of large amounts of cash, manipulation, sexual relationships, blackmail, and endogenous and exogenous relationships all play a large part in inmate-correctional officer relationships that were associated with contraband. It was evident from the interviews that building and/or exploiting endogenous and exogenous relationships was an effective way to get correctional officers and free-world actors to agree to bring contraband into correctional facilities. However, the process of doing so was considered the main challenge and the most risky for all actors involved, which leads into main theme five, contraband smuggling methods.

Main Theme 5 - Contraband Smuggling Methods

Despite the existence of high perimeter fences, metal detectors for correctional officers as they enter correctional facilities, surveillance cameras, watchtower, and correctional officer's supervising inmates in the agriculture fields, contraband still finds its way into correctional facilities. Participants were asked if they had any knowledge of how contraband entered correctional facilities, and several methods were discussed. These methods will be grouped into three subthemes that are separated by the main smuggling actor/s involved: 1) employees, 2) free-world actors, 3) inmate trustees. To be clear, these smuggling methods and operations may involve more than one actor type (identified above) to complete the successful smuggling of contraband, so they are

separated not by who was involved per se, but rather who was responsible for actually smuggling the contraband into the facility. Unfortunately, the smuggling networks and processes discussed in the interviews either did not include more than 3 actors, or extensive knowledge of the parties involved was not provided. Thus, social network analysis and link analysis will not be used to analyze these operations. However, crime script analysis will be used to outline the processes when appropriate and when substantial knowledge of these operations was provided.

Subtheme 1 - Employees. As previously noted, a large amount of contraband that is found in correctional facilities is indeed smuggled in by employees and correctional officer based on arrangements made with an inmate or inmates. As previously noted, participants suggested that guards were mainly responsible for the majority of contraband in the facilities where they were incarcerated. Chris describes the nature of correctional officers bringing contraband into facilities and how easy it was for correctional officers to bring in even large amounts of contraband at a time.

Chris: They (guards) don't have to worry about getting strip searched.

There is so many things that a woman can fit between her breasts or a guy can fit between his legs and just walk in, especially if it's not metal because they go through a metal detector. This guy (correctional officer) brought in a pound of marijuana one time compressed, strapped to his stomach. He pretended like he had a backache when he walked through and walked hunched over to cover the bulge in his stomach and walked it all the way through and ended up burning (getting someone caught) [name of prison gang] and then quit like two weeks later.

Going back to Jack's situation in main theme two subtheme four where he and another inmate were able to get large amounts of tobacco brought in by a correctional officer, he described the elaborate process the correctional officer went through to package the tobacco in a way that was inconspicuous to other guards. A lengthy excerpt from Jack's interview is provided below for this process followed by a step by step breakdown of the actions taken in the form of a crime script analysis based on further details he provided.

Jack: He would bring them (packs of Bugler tobacco) in in sets and he would make a vest out of bugler. He told us that he would drive to an Indian reservation a little ways away and buy them because them because it was cheaper and no taxes and he would buy them by the case... and he would make a little bitty pin hole in each one of them and then drive over them with his car real slowly to where it would smash them down even flatter and then he would take five of them and stack them on top of each other with a little piece of tape so that it wouldn't go in different directions and roll over them again to where they were even flatter and then put tape around that and he had a vest and it was like four rows – four or five rows across its belly and one like mid and one across his chest and the same thing on the back and then two straps made with five here and five here on his shoulders and then the same thing on the back. Picture a bulletproof vest going over you. And you would tape it around the sides with a little small piece of tape here so that it was all formed to his body and he would wear that in, and I remember sitting lookout. I would go to the cell door

and he would step in the cell and [inmate nickname] would help him take it off and it would be so tight that you would have to get a razorblade and cut the tape on the sides and pull it off of him like a bulletproof vest and it would be all these cigarettes, and that deal was done and we had to hide all those and then start selling them.

The following crime script analysis based on the interview with Jack is provided below beginning at the stage of agreeance to smuggle tobacco in to the unit between the inmate and the correctional officer:

1. A monetary amount and amount of tobacco was decided on between the inmate and the correctional officer and the money was exchanged.
2. The correctional officer would travel to an Indian reservation and purchase the tobacco, tax free.
3. The correctional officer would then make small holes in each Bugler package and then run them over with his vehicle tire to flatten them.
4. The packages were then taped together in groups of five and flattened again with a vehicle tire.
5. Multiple groups of five packages were fashion with tape into what was described as a tight fitting bullet proof vest.
6. The correctional officer would enter the facility and go to the cell of the co-conspirator inmate.
7. While Jack would serve as a look out, the correctional officer would enter the co-conspirator's cell and he would use a razor to cut the vest off of the correctional officer.

8. The tobacco was then distributed.

Jack also described a time where a parole employee was bringing in water bottles full of vodka that she had repackaged to look as if they had not been tampered with. Jack describes how she did this in the excerpt below and what led to her getting caught for this behavior.

Jack: the representative for your parole visit... she got busted bringing in shit. She was going and buying Ozarka water and opening it up and filling the bottles up with vodka and then shrink wrapping the plastic except it didn't have the red Ozarka shrink wrap on it. It was just clear shrink wrap and she would heat it up with the blow dryer and shrink the plastic down so that it looked like a sealed case of water that she was bringing into work and then one day she fucking thought they knew what was going on and said something about it and when she got past the little guard booth at the front gate and then you walk down a long walk until you get into the building, well, she got past that and she got to the first trashcan and she was so paranoid that she just threw all the water away and the guard seen her do that and was like, why did she just throw away that case of water? And he went over there in the trashcan and looked at it and opened it up and took it back to the guard shack and was just going to keep it there for water, somebody opened it up and fucking realized one of these bottles is full of fucking vodka so that made them go start investigating her and watching her and they caught her bringing in some shit – bringing in weed for them and shit.

Instances such as Tucker's, mentioned in main theme four subtheme one, simply required the female correctional officer to bring in the food and perfume in her lunch sack. It was apparent that the relaxed nature of searching correctional facility employees was a major factor that led to the ease of correctional employees smuggling contraband into these facilities.

Subtheme 2 - Free-world actors. For the purpose of this study Free-world actors include individuals who do not have entry access to correctional facilities outside of visitation hours. Visitors, like correctional facility employees, are not strip searched either, which creates a vulnerability in security as it relates to contraband. Further, vulnerabilities in the architecture of visiting areas, as described by Jack in main theme two subtheme four and in the following excerpt from Frank's interview provide some insight into the lack of structural integrity in visitation areas that lead to contraband being smuggled into correctional facilities.

Frank: When you have your visits, there is a glass window and there is a circle with holes in it that... the intent was to talk through it, now they have installed phones and we talk through those. Well, the metal that covered the hole on one of the visit things had been taken out. So, people were bringing in straws full of everything from cocaine to heroine to meth and somebody in my block got a visit every fucking day. And they would pack the contraband inside of that and slide it through the holes... they would come back with 20 or 30 straws every day... it was like a freaking bizarre when they got back from visits. I mean, they were literally

bringing in between \$1000 and \$2,000 worth of drugs a day in one cell for 50 to 60 people.

Jake also described how contraband is sometimes passed to inmates during visitation and the method used to conceal the contraband when the inmates return from visitation and go through a strip search.

Jake: They get them in little balloons, and they swallow them, and you drink a lot of soda when you get back in the dorm. If you catch them in time, you can just throw up and get them out. If not, you shit them out and they just pick them out of their shit.

This method of smuggling contraband into the facilities was commonly mentioned by participants (n=7), however the downside of this method was the amount of contraband that can be swallowed at a time, so the contraband was typically high ticket contraband such as heroin and cocaine. Jake also described a time where contraband was coming in through visitation by an inmate's girlfriend. During visitation, she would visit the restroom and place a condom full of contraband in a bathroom trashcan under the trashcan liner. A trustee would later clean the restrooms, grab the condom, and smuggle the contraband back into general population by placing the condom in a mop head and put the mop head back in the mop bucket.

Jake: The guy had his girlfriend from [city name] come visit him every Sunday and she would take whatever it is she was getting in. It could be Xanax or weed or whatever and she would put it in condoms, right? And she would like double wrap them three times or whatever and she would throw them in the trashcan on Sunday.

Well, that next Friday, bathrooms don't get cleaned until that next Friday. And that janitor went in there and cleaned them and he put them in his mophead – the condoms. Put them right in the mop bucket and walked them straight out of there because they are never going to think to check the trashcans.

Kim was also quite aware of the way that a woman was gaining access to methamphetamine in a correctional facility where she was incarcerated. Given the nature of the facility, visitors were allowed to bring certain items to the inmates, mostly described as hygiene products. This female inmate was relying on what Kim referred to as her “sugar daddy” to bring her a quarter ounce (7 grams) of methamphetamine during visitation each visit.

Kim: Okay the only drug smuggling, I guess you could call it, that I saw was the bunkies right next to me, um they were bringing in meth, she was having this guy, it was her sugar daddy, bringing it in through tampon boxes... he would come see here every Saturday, and bring her a quarter ounce every Saturday.

Several participants also discussed how contraband would come in through the mail system. Jake, Blair, Jack, Chris, Jessie, Jordan and Todd all told stories of contraband coming in through the mail. Carlos mentioned receiving both LSD and Suboxone through the mail system and described how this process worked in the excerpt below:

Carlos: Through packages, mail, letters, books. I got some acid and Suboxone in from stamps... yeah, under the stamps, or a postcard. Slide it

up in there and then on the letter that you receive before or after tells you where it's at. Or they will dip it and they will tell you that that part is dipped.

Blair also mentioned that Suboxone was being sent into the facility via the mail system where she was incarcerated.

Blair: The mail, ya they would get Suboxone melted down on post cards, they stopped allowing post cards after that was found out.

Jake witnessed instances where free-world actors were liquefying methamphetamine, spraying the liquid onto coloring book paper, and cleverly disguising the watermarks and scent by coloring the paper and melting wax over the area where the liquefied methamphetamine was sprayed before sending it through the mail to inmates.

Jake: I've actually seen it on some weird stuff. I've seen meth on a coloring book paper where they had turned it to liquid and sprayed it on the paper and covered it with wax and they would cut these sheets off and they put it in their coffee and drink it. Wiped out, dude. Strangest shit you ever seen. Yeah, they sell these little pieces of paper. It's like they have their kid color a picture, but really, it's covered in damn meth and they put another wax all over it and get it straight through the mail.

Other methods used by free-world actors to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities exploited poor perimeter security. Along with Carlos, six other participants described how easy it was to simply throw contraband over perimeter fences of facilities. Jake describes instances where this was commonly done.

Jake: So, the guy had his people put it in whatever they would put it in a tennis ball, and they would just chunk it because it was that close to the road onto the rec yard. The rec yard was massive, and it was way away from the actual prison. Like the prison was there and the rec yard came back towards the road. So, they would throw it out there and the guards can't walk this huge massive field, looking for it and they would get their stuff and they would smuggle it back in. Keester it (place inside the rectum), or tuck it (between their legs near their genitalia), or however.

Both Carlos and Tucker, mentioned that they witnessed contraband packages coming over the perimeter fence via drone (quadcopters), and packages being shot over the fence by what Carlos called air rockets, or three-man slingshots typically sold to launch water balloons long distances.

Carlos: Yeah, and they did the slingshots. You know, the two-man, three-man slingshots – the air rockets. Yeah, or droning it over, I saw drones drop stuff a few times, they were loud. They will shoot it over before break or before door break and then hopefully you are the first one out on that door break and know where to go pick it up or somebody doesn't see it before you get out there because if somebody sees it before you get out there, well then guess what? You just lost your shipment.

Based on the interviews, architectural vulnerabilities, the mail system, a lack of searching visitors, and perimeter security vulnerabilities were all factors that were exploited by free-world actors in their efforts to smuggle contraband into correctional facilities.

Subtheme 3 - Inmate Trustees. Contraband was also smuggled into facilities by those inmates that were trusted to work outside of the correctional facilities on road crews, clean-up crews, and the proverbial “hoe squads,” (groups of inmates that would work in the agriculture fields of state prisons). When these inmates would bring contraband into facilities, this typically required cooperation with a free-world actor, where an agreed upon location was discussed between the inmate and free-world actor and a drop would take place. Chad described a time where a prominent prison gang would have free-world actors drive by the fields that he was working in and throw duffle bags full of contraband out of the back of a truck near the fields, including drugs and cellphones. When the correctional officers on horseback were not looking or were not in plain sight, member of this prison gang would go retrieve the duffle bags, divvy up the contraband between numerous other prison gang members in the field, and they would smuggle it back into the facility on or in their bodies. Chad noted that contraband cellphones were used by this prison gang in the fields to coordinate the drops without detection.

Chris told a story about an inmate truck driver who was smuggling pounds of marijuana into correctional facilities on his food delivery truck.

Chris: I’ve seen pounds before. Like, for a while there were people getting like the trucks – they had the truck driver for one of the – Yeah, for the kitchen, the supply. He was a TDC inmate. He was a trustee but somehow, they were getting it sent on this truck, pounds, and they would bring it in, and they would unload it in boxes, and they would come back and get it later.

While working on a roads and bridges crew, Juan witnessed inmates picking up drops made by real-world actors and smuggling the contraband back into a correctional facility with the help of trustee inmates who were responsible for checking in the inmate's shoes and uniforms after a day of work.

Juan: But usually, when you go into the jail it's full body search... Well, the easiest part of the loophole in that situation is even though they do a full body cavity search, get you butt naked and bend over and they don't find anything, but they have trustees that clean the clothes and move the shoes and do all that so it's up to the person smuggling it into the jail to get in touch with the trustees that do the shoe cleaning and the uniform changing because when you hide it in your shoe or hide it in your uniform and you put your uniforms up and your shoes up, they are not checking the shoes. They are not checking the uniforms. They are just checking your person, they just check you in and, you know, if you already talked to the trustees, all the uniforms are all numbered so you just have to relay your uniform number and they will go and you tell them where the location is (where the contraband is hidden in the uniform or shoes) so that that way they go and it looks like they are organizing but really they are pulling out all the contraband from the shoes and uniform. They (the trustees checking in the shoes and clothes) are not going to be searched because they never leave the unit so there is no reason to ever search them again once they are back in the trustee population, but by that time they have it and by dinner

time they are passing everything out to whoever is ordered or whoever paid these guys because usually that's how it goes.

Juan also suggested that contraband cellphones were necessary to set up the drop locations. This was possible because Juan mentioned that inmates would often ask the correctional officers where they would be working that day and what they would be doing, acting as if they were simply curious. If rapport was established between the correctional officer/s and the inmates, the correctional officer would tell them, and in turn this information along with a contraband cellphone would be used to set up an effective drop location. Juan's extensive knowledge of this process allows for the following crime script analysis.

1. Inmate would talk to the shoe and uniform trustee and an inmate that would receive the contraband from the trustee, warning them to be ready for a package to soon come through.
2. Inmate would learn from the correctional officer/s where their roads and bridges crew would be working that day.
3. A contraband cell phone call would be placed by the inmate to a free-world actor regarding the location that the roads and bridges crew would be working that day.
4. The free world actor would make the drop near the roads and bridges crew.
5. The inmate would retrieve the contraband package and store it on his person.

6. Before arriving back at the correctional facility, the inmate would hide the contraband either in his shoes or somewhere in the uniform.
7. While checking his shoes and uniform into the uniform and shoe trustees, the inmate would tell the trustee his uniform or shoe number.
8. The trustee would then secretly retrieve the contraband from the uniform or shoe/s and pass it to the inmate who was expecting to receive it from the trustee.

Based on the interviews, inmates who were allowed to leave the correctional facility were also responsible for smuggling contraband into facilities. Relaxed security protocols and surveillance, good rapport between the correctional officers and the roads and bridges crew, and the use of contraband cellphones allowed for these smuggling efforts to prove effective.

Main Theme 6 - The Impact of Contraband and Corruption on Perceptions of Punishment and the Criminal Justice System

Based on the interviews, it came as no surprise that participants were well aware of correctional officer involvement in the smuggling of contraband into correctional facilities. As noted in main theme five sub theme 1, numerous (n=12) participant suggested that guards were the main source of entry for contraband. When participants were asked if the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff had an impact on the way they viewed their incarceration as punishment and/or the criminal justice system as a whole, responses varied, and when the interviews were analyzed as a whole, two subthemes emerged: 1) critical perspectives, 2) c'est la vie perspectives (such is life).

Although some participants were coded as primarily having a *c'est la vie* perspective, some of these individuals also made critical statements about their experiences with contraband and their perceptions of punishment and the criminal justice system. This was also seen in those who held mainly critical perspectives, in that they too would occasionally make *c'est la vie* type comments. This was interesting as it suggested mixed feeling and/or contradictory perspectives. However, many of these participants were very good at rationally explaining both sides of an issue, which often result in what may appear to be contradictions at face value, or cognitive dissonance. In other words, deciding which subtheme an individual's responses fit under was difficult and would be misleading. In turn, the following subthemes and quotes do not necessarily suggest that each participant held only one perspective, but rather highlight the many perspectives held by participants.

Subtheme 1 - Critical perspectives. Five of the participants expressed their opinions and beliefs regarding the presence of contraband in correctional facilities and correctional officer corruption by taking a primarily critical perspective. Participant responses for this subtheme revolved around the hypocrisy that surrounds the correctional officers smuggling contraband into facilities (especially the same types of contraband for which people were incarcerated- drugs); the capitalistic nature of the prison industry; the lack of rehabilitation and criminalistics nature of prison culture; the relationship between contraband and the maintenance of prison order; and how these things play into what was considered to be an intentional revolving door put in place for profit and control by those with immense amounts of wealth and power. Some of the quotes in this subtheme are quite lengthy as participants provided several reasons why their perceptions of

punishment through incarceration and the criminal justice system as a whole have been impacted based on their experiences. The following quote by Frank highlights some of these sentiments.

Frank: Yeah, it's a fucking joke. I mean, look, if you have a dope case, you don't need to be incarcerated... maybe you need a fucking jobs program... You know, back in the day, fucking John Dillinger went to prison and he turned into a badass in prison because all of the people there were fucking badasses... Like I said, all it does when you see everything coming in (contraband), all it does it show you that it's all just a fucking game, man. It's just a fucking joke system set up by a whole bunch of fucking rich-ass power hungry mother fuckers that are just trying to perpetuate their own fucking wealth and power. I mean, when you see the people that are supposed to be there to enforce the laws breaking the laws on a daily basis it kind of jades you to the law. It kind of makes you like, "hold on a second here." The fact that you have to sit there in county jail and watch the exact same game that is going on in the free world go on in here, you know, with just double the prices and, you know, it jades you on the whole fucking process. We didn't get rid of slavery. We just created a new fucking slave class... criminal justice is a fucking oxymoron. It's not built for justice. It's built for control, and that's the problem. I think that's why contraband is at the level that it is. Because the people that run the prisons and the county jails and stuff, they know. They know if I keep them (inmates) busy with their bullshit (sub-rosa economy), then we don't

have to worry about riots... They are going to come in and get somebody every once in a while to make a fucking example and make it look like they are doing something, but every fucking person above and beyond the basic level of correction officer, they know it's a delicate balance and it affects the entire prison ecosystem (the presence of contraband).

Carlos expressed how his perceptions have changed since his incarcerations as it relates to contraband and corruption as well. Carlos also took a very critical perspective by highlighting the money-making aspect of the correctional industry; the hypocritical phenomenon of correctional agencies stake in "rehabilitation" as it relates to correctional officer involvement in contraband smuggling (by comparing it to his understanding of the CIA's involvement in smuggling cocaine into the U.S.); and how these actions are a self-feeding system that perpetuates crime, especially drug crimes.

Carlos: Yeah, the United States criminal system is a money maker... The more people they can incarcerate, the more money they get. It's not like other countries that are actual rehabilitative, you know, places... This is just a revolving door, and yeah, being that I see fucking CO's bringing in fucking cell phones, bringing in heroin, coke (cocaine), and all that kind of shit, and then disbursing it amongst the prison population which is the reason why 90 percent of them mother fuckers are in there, that's like, really? If that's not the biggest slap in the face and hypocrisy, I don't even know what to call it. For real, because you are enabling the behavior of somebody that got them into that situation by giving them what got them into the situation so that they can perpetuate that lifestyle in the system so

that when they get back out, they go back in because that's what they were doing while they were in... So, fucking on the streets, the CIA brought the fucking coke into the United States. Right? Yes, we all know that... CIA, fucking brought in the cocaine. Then those mother fuckers get to distributing it to the inner city, inner city then gets addicted and gets fucking arrested and then while they are arrested, the CO's then give the fucking people that were just arrested for the cocaine, they give them cocaine so that they can go on and continue the fucking cocaine that they were just arrested for by the CIA, which is now with the fucking CO's. It's like, are you fucking kidding me? But this is a system for the people to rehabilitate, make better, no it's not. Yeah, it's the criminal system is broken from the inside out and it starts with all what your report is about – contraband and contraband being brought in, the majority of it, by the CO's. They are not breaking the cycle, it perpetuates into keeping the cycle going, keeping us in that system and rotating fucking rotunda... a fucking carousel.

Jesus was not only perturbed by correctional officers bringing in contraband, but the fact that sometimes an inmate has to face the same correctional officer in disciplinary hearing, after that correctional officer wrote them up for the contraband that they smuggled in for them. Jesus also suggested the punishments handed down for correctional officer corruption were not substantial and did not serve as a deterrent. He suggests that the guards are just as corrupt as the inmates, and this corruption reduces the

legitimacy of the correctional system and led to him losing respect for the system as a whole.

Jesus: I mean, um, it has to in a way, because you are thinking okay here I am in incarceration for something I did on the outside, like for me I was in for selling drugs, however though, here is a guy that is supposed to be the keeper of my punishment bringing in drugs, so what the fuck, like what am I really learning in here, you know what I mean?... And secondly, like if you get caught with like a thing of bleach you have to go to court in jail and you are sitting there with the same dude that brought it in and he is now telling you “ya I’m going to take away all your rights, no commissary, no phone calls for 30 days,” so you are kind of like, what just happened?... So even outside the lack of legitimacy you seen, once you seen this corruption going down and now you have to go into the courts system inside and deal with the same people... but it’s almost like a double edged sword, like damn, this guy right here is a CO that’s supposed to be, you might even say someone you should be able to trust if something was going down, but you can’t because this guy that you trust is the one that is bringing in contraband... So there is no, people say there is convicts in prison, and guards in there, they are all cons, that’s all it is is a con farm, you know what I mean, crooks and criminal man, you are a criminal if you are incarcerated, you are a crook if you are a guard, you just haven’t been caught yet, and if you do get caught, I’ve seen guards get caught, they don’t go to jail, they just get sent to a different unit. I saw a

guard almost kill an inmate and the FBI came in there, state troopers, and investigators and everything, and a couple of months later we found out that this dude went from the 7th floor to the 3rd floor, that was their punishment... I learned more about how to get things done in there than anywhere else, like convict things more than anything else. So the return rate is crazy, I remember when I left the [name of release unit] you had someone who was like, CO: "this is like motel six, we'll leave the light on for ya"... you can't really say that someone is getting punished whenever, if you know the right people, what did you really take away? So are they really doing punishment or are you really just learning that as much as the prison system wants to say they are rehabilitating or succeeding a bunch, they are not, because half your fucking guards are worse than anybody else... so you know you lose respect for the system.

The five participants that held these general sentiments towards corrections and the criminal justice system suggests that these individuals lost a sense of respect and legitimacy for the system, and the experiences they had jaded them to the ultimate goals of the criminal justice system and the correctional component, so much so that they appeared to have lost all faith in the system and were genuinely upset and mad at what they witnessed.

Subtheme 2 - C'est la vie perspective. Despite these primarily critical views held by five of the participants, the other eleven participant's responses suggested that their experiences did not have much of an effect on their perceptions of incarceration as a form of punishment or the criminal justice system as a whole. Again, this is not to say

that those with critical perspectives did not also have these preconceived notions of crime, justice, and punishment, but rather to suggest that the other eleven participants took more of a *c'est la vie* perspective to their experiences. Furthermore, some of these eleven participants occasionally took critical perspectives or made critical statements, but took an overall *c'est la vie* perspective. Results from the interviews suggest that *c'est la vie* participants already knew what to expect; were already jaded to the system; expected corruption to exist everywhere as a natural phenomenon; were aware of the nature of greed in all parts of society; were aware that everyone in prison (guards and inmates) is criminal in some form or fashion; or had come to terms with their punishment and accepted it regardless of the environment where the punishment took place.

As Kim noted, "I mean, things are going to be what you make it, so there is going to be corruption in every facility, so it didn't really take my view point away." Blair actually appreciated the little favors that correctional officers did her while she was incarcerated as they relate to small arbitrary forms of contraband and suggested that both her incarceration and her subsequent community corrections experiences on probation actually saved her life from drug addiction and the possibility of death by overdose.

Blair: not really, it was really just little favors, which were nice, it didn't really change the way I thought about it, if anything, the county I was in had an awesome drug program, and that saved my life. The jail part helped me get sober, but the real rehab came from the classes and meetings and probation officer staying on my ass, and just wanting to stop using.

Blair later went on to express her respect for the system she was passed through. She said, "ya it sucked, but I wouldn't be doing this interview if I wasn't arrested and had to

sober up and do all of that probation shit, seriously, I know it probably sounds crazy, but it saved my life.”

Juan also held this *c'est la vie* perspective as he mentioned that corruption will happen in any setting so long as the human element is present, and that everyone is always out to make a little extra money.

Juan: No, it just lets you know that when you apply the human aspect to that type of system that there is always going to be room for flaw, because in that sense any human person can be corrupted no matter if it's through friendship, through a positive relationship, you know, through sexual or intimate relationship, your character can be broken down in some way... everybody either has that price or that one thing that they can work with or live with and getting something smuggled in for a certain something. Yeah, it's just the human element. I mean, that's the human condition. Everybody is going to want something for themselves. They are always going to try to make it better for themselves, no matter if you are an officer or if you are a garbage clean-up guy, you are going to do whatever makes your job easier and whatever gives you that extra bump in your pocket.

Chris also suggested that his perception was not changed by what he saw and experienced as it relates to contraband and official corruption.

Chris: Not really, man, because I mean, when I was 18 and I first went to prison, I had a completely different perspective about it, but after a couple of years of just realizing that all these people are just regular people that

didn't get caught doing whatever they were doing or just didn't, you know, have the courage to follow that impulse that one time, like, they are people. Definitely capable of selling drugs or prostitution or killing somebody and it happens all the time. Most of these people are just G.E.D. graduates that can't get a job elsewhere or that feel comfortable with these 4-12's and four days off and their \$2,000 a month paycheck with all their benefits. So it didn't really change the way I saw things in a bad way, it just made me more aware, I learned a lot about people in prison.

Blake shared a perception that was similar to Chris' in that he was not surprised by what he saw and it did not necessarily change his perception of jail as expressed in the excerpt shown below:

Blake: It didn't surprise me at all because I already knew. I was a grown man when I went to jail for the first time. The first time I went to jail I was 38 years old. I was a grown man and I heard stories. It didn't surprise me.

When Jake was asked this question, his response suggests that he was also not surprised by what he saw occurring as it relates to contraband and corruption. He suggested that everyone does some crime and corruption happens everywhere, but the inmates were just the ones that got caught.

Jake: No, because I've always grown up with the philosophy that everybody does this shit. Everybody commits crimes and everybody does something wrong, just some people get caught and some don't, you know what I mean? So, it didn't really – I always knew that there was dirty cops

and dirty guards and no matter what position you are in there is corruption.

So, no.

Jordan's perception of punishment and the criminal justice system was also unmoved, as he mentioned that the corruption is the same as it is in the free-world but it is more apparent given that it is occurring in such a confined space.

Jordan: Not really, I knew what I did was wrong and I was just doing my time and trying to make the best of it. It didn't surprise me at all. It's the same shit as out here, you just see it more there because it's so confined.

Participants that were coded as primarily having a *c'est la vie* perspective suggested that their experiences did not impact their perceptions of corrections and the criminal justice system in a negative way per se, as they noted that guards are human's too, and their job is just a job; greed and corruption happens in these facilities in the same way it occurs in the free-world; and as Chad put it, "I mean it is what it is. It was actually a relief to know that it was just as corrupt and business is run in the same way as out here (in the free-world)."

Main Theme 7 - Perspectives on Curbing Contraband in Correctional Facilities

Towards the end of the interviews participants were asked if they had any ideas about how correctional facilities can best keep contraband out of prisons. Responses to this question, subsequent probing questions, and other times where the nature of contraband and its presence in correctional facilities were discussed led to the emergence of main theme seven and its two subthemes. Participants expanded on the prison and contraband culture and provided reasons as to why they believed that correctional

agencies will never be able to fully stop contraband from coming into their facilities, or why they sometimes will use discretion in their enforcement of contraband policies, which make up subtheme one. Study participants also provided some perspectives on safeguards that if employed by the correctional agencies may partially help facilities better control the amount of contraband, which makes up subtheme two.

Subtheme 1 - On why this is not feasible. The vast majority of participants (n=13) suggested that contraband will always be a part of the correctional system and there is little that can be done to completely remove contraband from prisons. However, most participants (n=12) provided at least some ideas (covered in subtheme two) for how to stop contraband from coming into correctional facilities (either hypothetic or realistic), but these suggestions were typically followed with perceptions of how contraband is defined by correctional policy, its enticing profitability, and the numerous ways in which contraband can be smuggled in their efforts to explain to me why this is simply not possible. For example, Carlos and eight other participants discuss the issue with stopping contraband, based on how contraband is defined in correctional policy:

Carlos: Like we were getting onions from the kitchen – that’s considered contraband in the system. If you take contraband in its literal sense you couldn’t do that (get rid of all types of contraband) because contraband in its literal sense is if I grab that onion from the fucking kitchen and bring it into the dorm, that’s contraband because that wasn’t [agency name] or [agency name], you know, it’s already in the prison.

Participants (n=10) also mentioned that crime and criminality are inherent in the inmate culture, and that if there is a will to get contraband into facilities, the inmates will

find a way. When asked about removing contraband from correctional facilities, Kim suggested that “It’ll never happen (chuckles), it’s never going to happen, if there is one thing about criminals, we will find away.” Chris noted that if contraband was magically removed from correctional facilities overnight, “Immediately a large percent of the population would go about getting those things again. They would find a way, every single time, they would find a way.” Chris provided an example of inmate’s always finding a way to get contraband, and when it was confiscated, they simply got more contraband.

Chris: I was on a unit, like the extra clothes thing (contraband), they would come through and every single week, they would search everybody and take any extra clothes you had. As soon as it was gone, they would go get more and every week they came and got it and you can’t just keep writing them cases. There is only so many places to put people in maximum security units unless you lock all of [name of state] down. Yeah, so eventually, they just have to let it go. You can’t take contraband out because the point of making it contraband is to take it out of prison, and the whole point is to get it back in for all of these other people. I mean, it’s what they do. It’s what they survive off of. It’s how they live life outside. It’s how they live it now. You can’t give somebody enough of an incentive if prison didn’t stop them from doing it in the first place, being locked up in prison definitely isn’t going to.

Jack couldn't picture prison without contraband. He suggested that the criminal mentality that inmates possess combined with the constant desire for contraband and endless efforts to corrupt guards explains why this is not possible.

Jack: I don't know, bro, something would happen because somehow, somehow, there is people that will sit in there and that's all they got is time to think about things and they would think of a way. That's what they would do, they would come up and think of a way to get it in there. It's always going to be there. I just couldn't imagine there not being contraband in there... It's a building full of people who broke the rules in life and the majority of the people that are like that are not, "Oh, I broke the rule, I'm going to prison and I'm getting out and I'm being right." You know, there is recidivism, everybody in there is criminals and they got that criminal mentality, and I just couldn't imagine no contraband being in prison... I don't know if there could ever be a way because there is a million ways, they do it. So no, there is too many avenues to get that shit in. They are always going to want something. So, it's not going to go away.

Other participants suggested that contraband will always be in correctional facilities because of the low wages that correctional officers earn, the profitability that is associated with smuggling contraband and into correctional facilities, the nature of human behavior as it relates to balancing risks and rewards, and because of the relationship between contraband and order that its presence establishes (also noted in main theme two subtheme three). Contraband appeared to provide both correctional

officers and inmates with profit incentives that far outweighed the deterrent effect that punishments for smuggling and possession carried. Interestingly, a commonly repeated phrase by the participant's in relation to correctional officers smuggling contraband was "everybody has a price." Carlos said, "Everybody has a price, and everybody has a breaking point. It's just, what is that for you." Frank noted, "The money you can make off contraband, they (correctional agencies) can't pay their people enough." Jack spoke about the profitability of correctional officers smuggling contraband, and how relaxed security with correctional officers reduced the risk of getting caught.

Jack: Like I said, that's how I seen people talk and groom correctional officers into bringing in contraband, was the fact that they didn't make very good money and they were able to make as much money in one month in a matter of days. Maybe searching them (correctional officers), I guess. They could just walk in – like I said, that guy had a vest that he made and wore that in. you know what I mean?

Chris also discussed the profitability of smuggling contraband as a correctional officer and the low risk of getting caught for this behavior.

Chris: Yeah, especially if this guy is the guy that's moving the contraband in there and he realizes how much money you can make being one of the guards bringing it in because that's the biggest incentive. There is a shit ton of money to be made and you really – the risk, if you do it quietly, isn't very great. Because like I saw however many people get walked off. I saw so many more that didn't, and the contraband never stops, so you

know that was always somebody that you didn't know about that was always bringing it in.

Both Frank and Jack described situations where correctional officers overlooked drug and alcohol related contraband, as the presence of contraband created a sense of order and calmness which was described as being a better option when compared to the lack of order that results from removing the contraband, or because it was more of a hassle to write up an inmate than it was to let them continue having the contraband while more drastic things are occurring elsewhere. For instance, Frank described a situation where marijuana was being openly and obviously smoked in a wing of a correctional facility that was historically known for extreme violence. His story of this instance follows:

Frank: Like the last facility that I was at, I was there for six months and for the first four, we didn't have a fight – there was none – fifty, sixty people – people moving in and out, gang affiliations, color affiliations, all the different shit, there wasn't a fight for four fucking months because we had weed almost every day. Everybody, they knew what was going on... The captain walked in at one point and was like, "Hey, um, this whole goddamn floor smells like fucking marijuana. You guys need to, um, you know, exhale and blow it down the toilet." His reason for saying that, I'm pretty darn sure, was well, you guys haven't fought in four months, so we are going to go ahead and let you get away with that as long as you kind of keep it on the down low a little bit.

Jack told a story about an experience he had when an officer caught him in the act of drinking prison wine, his second favorite past time activity.

Jack: I've had a captain catch me drinking wine and just look at me, "Goddamnit [Jack], you are doing good because I can't smell it, but keep it like that" and just walk away because it was more of a hassle for him to have to deal with me and bullshit wine when he had a current gang war going on or something was going on. He was more worried about shit like that, some violence, than he was some guy not bothering anybody sitting in his cell drinking some wine.

When taken as a whole, the participants' comments and explanation for why contraband will always be a part of correctional facilities and prison culture were nothing shy of compelling.

Subtheme 2 - Ideas on how to best stop contraband.

Despite the participants' strong beliefs that contraband will never disappear from correctional facilities, some did provide ideas on how to best tackle the issue of contraband. However, many of these suggestions were immediately followed with explanations on why those ideas would not work, or were not feasible as expressed in the following quote by Jordan, "Nah, it'll always be there. Everyone has a price. Maybe paying them (COs) more money, but again everyone has a price and they don't make much as COs." Frank also discussed the notion of paying guards more and increasing training, but he then explained why neither option would be effective.

Frank: Maybe they could increase their pay and it would increase the percentage of correction officers that don't compromise themselves for

that. They might be able to increase the pay, but that comes down to the state budget. Training might have something to do with it, but at the same time, it's just a fucking personal decision. That's all it is. These people know what's right and wrong. They know the policy. They know exactly what's going on. It's just a personal decision they make, sometimes it's a personal decision based on profits. Sometimes it's a personal decision based on self-preservation, sometime it's a personal decision based on laziness. You know, they could try to pay their people a little better and might be able to cut down on it a little bit... but training has nothing to do with it. They know what the fuck they are doing... So, training and classes has not a goddamn thing to do with it.

Other ideas seemed like reasonable suggestions, but also required more money to be spent on deploying these measures. For instance, Blair mentioned that mail scanning technology may decrease the presence of contraband coming through the mail, while Kim suggested paying the guards more money and providing them with better training, such as drug recognition training, may be helpful.

Kim: unless they start paying the guards more, a lot of the reason the guards do it is for money, so unless they start paying the guards more, it's going to happen because, it's a hustle... Ya, I'd say if corrections officers were better trained and paid more then ya, maybe, it might help a little bit.

Jesus provided one of the more policy-oriented suggestions by raising issue with how correctional policy defines contraband, and provided a suggestion that may reduce

the amount of contraband by reexamining and redefining contraband based on the impact that the item in question has on daily correctional facility operations.

Jesus: Maybe what they should do is just really think about what contraband is, reevaluate what it is, if this guy is washing his clothes in his sink and goes to lay down in his bunk and read a book, is that really fucking up the day to day system? Is it really? Or this guy made cards out of his own paper that he bought from commissary, taking that away, is that seriously messing up anything, this guy is sitting on his bed playing solitaire. So maybe that's what they should do at the end of the day is reevaluate what is what... But ya that's what I feel, is if you want to positively change it, then you should positively change what contraband is. Like fight that fight first, and then go on to the next thing.

Other suggestions were based around compromises between staff and inmates, and providing inmates with certain privileges in order for them to come to a middle ground with their captors and to keep the peace among the inmates. Blake suggested paying inmates an hourly wage "25 cents an hour" so that they could afford commissary and didn't have to sell contraband to afford commissary items. Jake provided a suggestion for curbing the smuggling of tobacco into correctional facilities that relied on a compromise between gang leaders and staff. He also points out how the inmate's system of self-governance (re-enforced by prison gangs) would correct itself in an effort to maintain privileges discussed in that compromise.

Jake: If you speak to the right people in prison systems and these guards know who they are. They the ones that have been there forever. They can

cause a movement at least across one unit. Say, "Look guys, we are going to come together. They are talking about giving us electronic cigarettes, but we got to cut all this violence down, this fighting, and this shit down or they are going to snatch them right back from us." All these other gangs who want this stuff aren't going to let any of these other things happen or it's going to be problems. So, now it won't be one gang versus another. It's going to be all these gangs that disagree with what this one gang is doing to fuck over their rights. So, the system would correct itself... The people would correct themselves. You know, and it doesn't necessarily have to be like electronic cigarettes. Like I was on a unit forever. I mean, [agency name], the worst thing is most of them don't have A/C, and when you are hot and like I'm in [location of city with high summer temperatures], and it's 110 degrees, and you are inside a brick building that is just baking, right? People's fuses get real short. You know, and you are aggravated and pissed off and you can't get cool. You can't do it. All you got is a fan. They could be like, "hey, we will bring in A/C, buy y'all got to blah blah blah." They (correctional officers) would have to talk to them eye-to-eye instead of them being up here and we are down here. They (correctional officers) will just have to kind of level with you for it to really work.

In sum, outside of increasing spending for scanning and detection technology, and increasing drug recognition training efforts, reevaluating contraband related policies, and creating compromises between gang leaders and staff, participants seemed to agree that

in the end contraband will always be a part of the correctional system, and regardless of how many safeguards are put in place, correctional agencies suffer from far too many points of vulnerability and issues with order maintenance and integrity for contraband to ever be fully removed for the prison culture.

CHAPTER V

Discussion and Conclusion

This dissertation aimed to examine contraband in correctional facilities, the inmate economy, and the many facets of the culture that surrounds this sub-rosa economic system. By delving into the experiences and perceptions of individuals who had been previously incarcerated through the collection of primary data in the form of semi-structured in-depth qualitative interviews, findings from this study have provided opportunities to expand previous perspectives on inmate deviance, the inmate economy, inmate and staff relations, advancement that have been made in terms of contraband smuggling methods, and newer and less detectable forms of contraband and currency transfer. Given the grounded theory approach to this dissertation and the themes that were identified in the results section, this chapter will address each of the seven themes in relation to previous findings and theoretical perspectives that surround the inmate economy, prison culture, and inmate deviance in the key findings section. Each theme will be addressed in the order that they appeared in the results section, and will, per theme, be inductively examined in light of previous theories and findings on inmate deviance and the perceptions, experiences, and realities of the inmate economy and sub-rosa economic culture. This will be followed by a section that notes the limitations of the study and areas for future research, and a section that identifies policy implications. Finally, the chapter will end with a conclusion that highlights the broader meaning of the study's findings.

Discussion

Key Findings and Theoretical Relevance.

The role of contraband in everyday life. Consistent with previous research, finding from the current study also suggest that contraband played a large role in the everyday lives of the participants (Clemmer, 1940; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958, Williams & Fish, 1974). Study participants continuously drew on correctional policy definitions of contraband and the wide net that these policies cast when identifying contraband. When policies are in place that essentially make anything that is not given to the inmate by the correctional agency contraband, it comes as no surprise that every participant in the study was in some way, at some point in time during their incarceration, involved with contraband and the inmate economy. Whether it was extra state issued food from the chow hall, a borrowed book, a higher quality hair tie, an article of clothing that an inmate had mended or altered, or something more serious such as drugs and alcohol, results suggest that at the most basic policy level contraband inadvertently played a large role in the lives of participants.

Participants also suggested that contraband and the inmate economy served as way to socialize and that contraband was indeed interwoven into the daily patterns of socialization within correctional institutions. This finding is consistent with previous studies of contraband and inmate culture that suggest contraband serves as a tool for socialization among inmates (Clemmer, 1940; Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958).

Interestingly, some participants provided explanation of how observing the contraband market, the major players, and the inner-working of the social aspect of this sub-rosa economy was useful for the purpose of understanding the pecking order among inmates;

learning the ropes of prison culture; and for identifying and developing self-preservation techniques during their incarceration. This was evidenced by both first-timer participants who learned lessons based on their decisions and behaviors in the inmate economy while incarcerated, and by participants who were quite familiar with prison culture and what many called, being able to “read a hustle.” This finding provides some current insight into the role that contraband plays in the lives of participants, and expands what was previously known about the relationship between contraband, socialization, and adaptation.

One’s ability to “read a hustle” in the free-world, and how this can prove beneficial while incarcerated, can be partially explained through the importation model (Irwin & Cressey, 1962). A portion of the importation model suggests that inmate behaviors are influenced by their experiences with societies, cultures, and sub-culture that they bring with them into correctional facilities. Participant’s explanations of the benefits of being able to read a hustle, i.e. cultural experiences that were learned and imported, suggest that this imported knowledge of the criminal-culture influenced their behaviors when engaging in the inmate economy. In other words, the knowledge that some participant’s had of the free-world criminal-culture/s informed and shaped the way that they behaved and the decisions they made surrounding contraband and the inmate economy.

In further examining the role that contraband played in the everyday lives of participants, individuals suggested that contraband served as a form of entertainment and provided them with a sense of normalcy that made them feel as if, even for a short period of time, they were not incarcerated. From simple and benign contraband items such as

bleach, to intoxicants such as marijuana and alcohol, participants noted that having these luxuries allowed them some form of control over their individual situations and provided them with an avenue to escape the deprivations of prison life. Having contraband while incarcerated alleviated the deprivations of goods and services, provided them with a sense of autonomy and individualism, and gave them a sense of freedom and liberty over their daily routines.

Given this finding, participant's responses surrounding the role that contraband played in their everyday lives and why they engaged in contraband supports three of the five aspects of the deprivation model of inmate deviance, and previous studies that have connected motivations for engaging in contraband with this perspective (Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). Data from this study also suggested that contraband served as a way for participants to obtain some of the goods and services that they would otherwise be deprived of while incarcerated. Having these goods and services gave them something to do, helped them make money in the inmate economy, and made them feel more connected to the outside world and the routines they once had.

In so far as the effect that contraband has on order within a facility, findings from theme one support previous findings as they relate to contraband presence and inmate violence (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2014; Trammel, 2012; Williams & Fish, 1974). In concert with findings from these previous studies, findings from the current study also suggested that there is a strong connection between the level of contraband that is available and the level of violence and order within correctional institutions. Participants noted that when contraband was readily available, or it was "flooded", violent altercations were rare, and inmates were calmer and less disruptive. This phenomenon

was explained by participants as a way of keeping unwanted attention away from areas where contraband was present in order to reduce the chances of shakedowns and lockdowns, which ultimately disrupt the flow of contraband. On the contrary, when contraband was not present, participants suggested that inmates had no incentives to behave in an orderly fashion and violence and disorder increased.

Taken together, the findings from main theme one provide support for three of the components of the deprivation model of inmate deviance (deprivation of liberty, goods and services, and autonomy) (Sykes, 1958). These results also shed further light on minute aspects of the importation model that have gone unexplored in relation the importation of pre-prison knowledge regarding criminal culture and the ways that this influences inmate behaviors in terms of contraband and the inmate economy (Irwin & Cressey, 1962). Lastly, finding from main theme one are consistent with, and show support for, the body of literature that discusses the relationship between contraband presence and order within correctional institutions (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2014; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974).

The inmate economy. As participants described the inmate economy, it became very apparent that the governing body of the illicit contraband market was typically prison gangs. These prison gangs ranged from well-known and commonly discussed criminal gangs/organizations to religious groups. The male participants noted that these prison gangs were able to dictate and govern many aspects of this sub-rosa system because their members were great in number and they employed violence or the threat of violence in order to maintain power and influence over the inmate population. These findings are consistent with previous studies that have described the relationship between

prison gangs, informal governance, and the contraband market (Skarbek, 2012; Skarbek, 2014). Interestingly, and despite the constant threat of violence that prison gangs present, some participants noted that there were times where different prison gangs would sit down and negotiate with one another in order to reduce gang conflict and continue the flow of contraband. These findings also nudge this body of literature forward by providing context as to how and why this phenomenon exists and how it plays out.

Another contribution to the literature that this study provided surrounds prison gangs, contraband, and access in that some participants noted that an inmate's gang-membership in conjunction with the proximity of the correctional facility played a large role in whether or not the inmate was involved in contraband smuggling. This was said to often be the case as these inmates would not only have power, but would also have access to, or import with them, connections with a number of free-world associates that may take the risk of smuggling contraband into the correctional facilities. This finding provided some qualitative support for the importation model of inmate deviance, and may suggest an extension of the importation model factors typically included in quantitative studies to include a measure that captures the distance between the inmate's residence and the correctional facility. This finding also provides qualitative support for the importation model in terms of imported networks and criminal subcultures (Irwin and Cressey, 1962). In other words, quantitative predictive models of inmate misconduct may be able to improve their model-fit by including measurements that capture this phenomenon.

In so far as who controls what type of contraband, participants noted that certain types of contraband were controlled by certain prison gangs, and when more than one

prison gang wanted to sell the same contraband, meetings would be held and rules were negotiated. Again, these meetings were described as being necessary to best address and avoid the possibility of conflict and violent confrontation, which in turn could draw unnecessary attention from the correctional staff and lead to shakedowns, lockdowns, and the eventual disruption of the flow of contraband. This self-governing market approach to the inmate economy is consistent with previous studies that describe how and why the inmate economy operates the way that it does (Kalinich, 1980; Skarbek, 2012, 2014; Williams & Fish, 1974). Furthermore, among the female participants, this system of self-governance enforced by prison gangs was not seen, which extends the dearth of literature on contraband and the sub-rosa economy within female correctional facilities.

Within the inmate economy, participants mentioned the breadth of items that were available which ranged in severity from shrimp gumbo, to tobacco and drugs, to cellphones, to homemade guns (zip guns) and handguns. When asked about the items that were available, the consensus among the participants was that if an inmate could afford a particular item and find someone to smuggle it inside of the facility, the possibilities were endless. This finding is particularly troubling as it suggested that there is no limit to the contraband items that are available at any given time in a correctional facility.

Additionally, in relation to the homemade guns and hand gun discussed in the interviews, these items were described as being controlled by or related to prison gang activity, which further highlights the dangers of prison gangs and provides some insight into the level of power and influence that prison gangs have over the inmate population. Although frequencies were not explored in this study in relation to contraband type, these findings provide support for results from federal and state reports, and previous studies of the

inmate economy in that contraband, as a whole, is quite abundant and there is still a large amount of variation in the types of contraband items available (Bodnar, 2017; Burke & Owen 2010; Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, 2016; Dittmann, 2015; Kalinich, 1980; McGreevy, 2009; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; Ward, 2017; Williams & Fish, 1974).

Perhaps one of the largest contributions to the body of literature that has examined the inmate economy were findings that surrounded the pricing dynamics of the contraband market in so far as who dictates prices; who can, and cannot, purchase contraband; the relationship between gang affiliation, access, and pricing; and the relationship between race, access, and pricing. It came as no surprise that first and foremost, participants suggested that the price of any particular contraband item (including the trade of rare or scarce commissary items) was based on the principle of supply and demand. Beyond the principle of supply and demand, participants provided a wealth of information that further explained under what circumstances prices would change and when access to contraband may be denied to an inmate or a group of inmates based on race, gang-affiliation, and criminal history.

Results from the initial interview questions and follow-up questions surrounding pricing and access suggested that cheaper prices were often given to fellow gang members, and those fellow gang members would have first access to the newly arrived contraband as either a gang-loyalty discount or for the purpose giving the fellow gang members an opportunity to earn some money by selling the item/s to other inmates at a higher price. Interestingly, there were exceptions to the access and pricing phenomenon. Sometimes, access was not based on one's gang affiliation, but on the sellers previously

conceived notions of one's race and ability to settle a debt or pay the seller in full upon receipt of the item/s.

Participants also noted that there were individuals that, due to their criminal history involving sexual crimes against children, were not allowed to engage in the contraband market. Inmates who were labeled child molesters or "chomos" were considered at large to be off limits in terms of having access to the inmate economy. Others inmates suggested to be off limits were those who were perceived to be snitches and those who would share information with correctional staff regarding inmate dealings. "Chomos" were denied access because of the nature of their crimes, while snitches were said to pose a threat to the flow of contraband within correctional facilities. Inductively related to the deprivation model, an interesting phenomenon that may be worth examining further emerged from this finding in regards to being denied access to contraband as an informal punishment enforced by those that govern the contraband market, and the inmates at large. According to Sykes (1958), one of the five components of the pains of imprisonment is the deprivation of goods and services that is felt by all inmates and influences one's institutional behaviors (misconduct and prison experiences). This deprivation is handed down by the correctional staff in the form of correctional policy that denies certain luxury items as a formal punishment inherent in correctional facilities. Also, Kalinich (1980) suggests that inmates seek out contraband items (luxury items) while incarcerated in order to alleviate this pain of imprisonment.

Interestingly, once individual's obtain contraband and establish a power dynamic among the inmates and prison culture, snitches and inmates with criminal histories of undesirable crimes against children then receive an extra deprivation of goods and

services handed down by those who dictate the contraband market and who identify these inmates as off limits. Based on the participants' perceptions and experiences with contraband access, these findings may be an indication that for some inmates (snitches and "chomos") there could be a compounding deprivation effect, which may, in turn, influence their institutional behaviors in different ways than those who only feel the formal deprivation of goods and services based on correctional policy, yet still have informal access to these luxuries in the inmate economy. Based on this logic, quantitative studies may consider examining criminal histories and official data that identifies both of these types of inmates. These measures can then be examined through statistical models in conjunction with measurements of deprivation (goods and services-contraband) to further explore this phenomenon as it relates to predicting inmate misconduct and institutional deviance.

When asked about financial transactions and forms of payment for contraband that occurred in the inmate economy, participants unanimously suggested that the most common form of payment (especially for low ticket items) was commissary. Participants mentioned that it was very common to simply trade an agreed-upon amount of commissary for contraband or other items of commissary. For those that sold low ticket contraband, they would either ask for commissary as payment or would trade an item of contraband for another item of contraband. Although commissary was most often the medium of exchange in the inmate economy, there were issues mentioned with having too much commissary. Participants suggested that having too much commissary in your possession could be problematic since you must have a receipt for the commissary you have in your possession. Having commissary without a receipt for that commissary is

against most correctional policies, and thus the extra contraband that an inmate does not have a receipt for is considered contraband and is subject to confiscation. Furthermore, some participants noted the dangers that are associated with having too much commissary and/or contraband as it could increase one's chances of victimization in the form of theft or extortion by other inmates. This finding is consistent with previous studies that have suggested that the common medium of exchange in the inmate economy is commissary, and extends what is known about the reality of violence that is inherent in prison culture and the inmate economy.

Another method of purchasing and selling contraband that was discussed during the interviews was referred to as "putting money on someone's book", or placing money onto another inmate's commissary account. Different methods of doing so were identified, and the main difference in these methods were the speed at which the money was transferred, which in turn, affected one's ability to sell contraband in a timely manner in order to avoid being caught with the contraband by correctional staff. Before electronic systems that allow an individual to transfer money into someone's commissary account almost instantaneously, inmates relied on phone calls, face-to-face visits, and money slips to have money sent, which could take a few weeks. Newer technologies now allow for money to be placed on someone's books very quickly and with ease, again affecting the brevity of sales and purchases within the inmate economy which dictate the flow of contraband. This finding provides some further details as to the newer methods of money transfers and how this is related to the inmate economy (Kalinich, 1980).

Despite the illegality of possessing real-world paper currency in correctional facilities, some participants noted that cash was not only present but was also extremely

valuable in correctional facilities as 1) it was an enticing form of payment for guards, 2) it's purchasing power was roughly two times that of other forms of payment, 3) it was easy to hide, 4) it allowed for quick transactions to take place. Given these realities noted by some participants, the flow of cash was also said to drastically affect the flow of contraband. Interestingly, participants noted that the presence of cash in a particular facility was based not on the level of security of the facility per se, but rather on the age of the facility. It was mentioned that in older facilities with architectural vulnerabilities in their visiting areas, cash was easily passed from visitors to inmates and vice versa. Even more interesting is the relationship that was uncovered between the presence of cash, and the order and behaviors among the inmate population. Some participants noted that when cash was present so too was contraband; and when contraband was present inmates tended to be less violent. On the other hand, when cash was not present and contraband was scarce, inmates were more violent. This finding can be partially explained under the deprivation model, in that it qualitatively explains the relationship between being deprivation of goods and services (in this case, both cash and contraband) and how and why this affects inmate culture, and institutional behaviors. This finding provides further qualitative insight into both the importance of proper safety and security measures, and the relationship between cash, contraband, and order within correctional facilities (Kalinich, 1980).

In cases where cash was not available, or the quantity and/or price of contraband far exceeded the possibility to trade commissary, some participants noted that electronic money transfer systems were used, including both PayPal and Greendot cards. Although both methods provided nearly the same speed of transfer, the big difference described

between both methods was the level of anonymity that each provided. Greendots were described as being nearly untraceable, while PayPal transfers were considered easier to trace. Participants noted that having access to a contraband cellphone to make the transaction, and/or having the ability to verify the funds for Greendot numbers and make transfers was paramount for the use of both PayPal and Greendot's. This finding is consistent with findings in Dittmann (2015), and provides insight into why one may choose one option over the other, and how these electronic money transfers occur.

Ultimately, participants responses that make up main theme two provide an up-to-date inside look at the inmate economy; who governs the market and market access; the many types of contraband that are available; the relationships between inmates in terms of pricing dynamics; the many ways in which monetary transactions now take place; and the effect that different types of currency and transactions can have on both the flow of contraband and institutional behaviors such as violence. Based on the participants' responses, the inmate economy has similar facets as before but has also changed quite a bit in relation to major works that have focused specifically on the inmate economy and the sub-rosa contraband market, such as Kalinich (1980). Participants' responses suggested that the inmate economy still seemed to play a pivotal role in their everyday lives. Given this reality, it may behoove researchers and correctional administrators to continue to look at this market in the future as the ebb and flow of contraband was suggested to be strongly related to order within correctional facilities.

The unwritten rules of the sub-rosa inmate economy. Given that contraband is suggested to play such a large part in prison culture, examining the specific behavioral expectations of individuals that engage in this market provides an opportunity to extend

what previous studies have identified as the convict code (Clemmer, 1940, 1950; Cloward, 1960; Crewe, 2005; Irwin, 1980; Mitchell, 2018; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Thomas & Pool, 1975; Tittle & Tittle, 1964; Trammell, 2012; Wellford, 1967; Wheeler, 1961), and when and under what circumstances these behavioral expectations might be relaxed (Clemmer, 1940, Sykes, 1958; Thomas, 1970; Wellford, 1967; Williams & Fish, 1974). In response to calls for a more in-depth examination on the convict code, the current study included questions regarding specific dos and don'ts of the inmate economy and contraband dealings. The context in which these rules are mentioned is likely the largest contribution to the convict code literature that this theme offers. When asked specifically about these *unwritten rules* of the inmate economy and contraband dealings, participants responses were coded into 14 separate categories. Here, each unwritten rule will be briefly discussed in relation to its meaning, its overlap or expansion of the convict code; and whether or not, and/or under what circumstances these unwritten rules may be broken.

Unwritten rule number one (don't snitch) was the most obvious rule mentioned. Noted as the golden rule in prison, snitching referred to leaking information about other inmates and their dealings to correctional staff. This unwritten rule overlaps directly with previous studies that have examined the inmate code as it relates to leaking information to correctional staff. Despite this being considered the golden rule of prison by participants, participants noted that snitching did occur, however the circumstances in which this behavior occurred and went unpunished did not emerge from the interview data. Perhaps the most important contribution this study has to offer in regards to

snitching is the way that snitches are handled in the inmate economy and the impact that they can have on the flow of contraband noted in main theme two.

At first glance, unwritten rule number two (own up to your mistakes) appeared to be an unwritten rule that is unique to the inmate economy. This behavioral expectation, commonly referred to by participants as “taking your lick”, involves inmates accepting full responsibility for their actions and possessions (contraband) and accepting one’s punishment (both formal and informal) without involving other inmates. After an inductive comparison of this unwritten rule with previous studies of the convict code, it seems to fit somewhat in line with previously identified behavioral expectations. For instance, Clemmer (1940) noted that prisoners should not help correctional staff in disciplinary affairs, especially as it relates to information that could lead to the discipline of another inmate, or other inmates. Also, Mitchell (2018) suggests that being loyal to other inmates is an important aspect of the convict code. Loyalty, as it relates to this unwritten rule, can be interpreted as being similar to “taking the heat” as to reduce the chances that other inmates may also get involved in the disciplinary process.

This rule is also not wholly separate from the golden rule of no-snitching, and in fact was mentioned as simply a different form of snitching. Despite these overlaps with previously identified convict codes, this finding extends the literature by providing qualitative insight into why this code exists, and how it applies to the contraband market. There were no instances discussed in which this rule did not apply which suggests that all participants were not only aware of this unwritten rule, but based on their experiences, this rule was adhered to in all cases of disciplinary response, both formal and informal.

Even being a high ranking leader of a prison gang did not exclude someone from the expectation to own up to their mistakes.

Unwritten rule number three (don't ask or go looking for contraband) referred to the expectation that an inmate should not approach, with the intent of seeking contraband, inmates they do not know or those with whom they have not established previous relations. This rule also may fall under previously identified convict codes such as keeping to yourself, and minding your own business identified in Mitchell (2018). This finding contributes to Mitchell (2018), and other convict code literature as it provides some qualitative context and explanations as to why this expectation exists, and how this general code specifically relates to the contraband market. Despite this unwritten rule being mentioned, instances were discussed where this rule was not adhered to and did not apply. For instance, if an inmate was well-respected or was a known ranking prison gang member, that individual had a reputation that allowed them to enter a new area of a facility and obtain contraband by asking those that he did not know or had not conducted business with in the past. This finding further extends the convict code and situational model literature in so far as it identifies instances where the convict code is not strictly adhered to, and that the adherence is more so based on who the individual is and what their reputation is rather than a strict adherence to the behavioral expectations loosely outlined in the convict code (Clemmer, 1940, Mitchell, 2018; Steinke, 1991; Sykes, 1958; Thomas, 1970; Wellford, 1967; Williams & Fish, 1974).

The fourth unwritten rule that was identified in the data (Don't sell to those who are off limits), referred to the expectation that those who engage in the sub-rosa economy are not to sell or trade contraband with individuals who have been labeled as off limits.

Inmates labeled as snitches and “chomos” were typically labeled as off limits, and selling or trading contraband with these individuals sometimes resulted in the seller or trader being also labeled as off limits. This finding is partially related to the situational model as well (with whom the offense occurred), as a major factor here is the reputation or label an inmate has been given (Steinke, 1991). This unwritten rule identified by some participants falls outside of the purview of typical convict code behavioral expectations, and seems to be a rule that is specific to the sub-rosa economy. Given that contraband plays such a large role in the everyday lives of those that are incarcerated, perhaps this finding is worthy of further exploration through primary data collection in an effort to expand what is currently known about this expectation; the effects it has on prison culture; its relationship with deprivation, violence, and victimization within correctional cultures; and whether or not (if also found in future studies) this expectation should be kept separate from typical convict code expectations or added as a variable and measured in future studies that focus on prison culture and the convict code.

Unwritten rule number five (Don't show and tell) that was identified in the data suggested that when inmates do possess contraband, they are not to share information with everyone regarding their holdings or from whom they obtained the contraband. There were no instances mentioned in the data where this rule was considered to be a strict rule, but rather it appeared to more of a “best practices” suggestion. This rule appeared to exist for at least three reasons. First, and likened to similar mentalities held in organized crime circles in the free-world, keeping the contraband or business to oneself served as a self-protection mechanism from snitches and those who may want to deprive that person of their possessions through violence and theft. Second, keeping this

information to oneself also protected the seller of the contraband from exposure to potential snitches and correctional staff. Third, and likely the most interesting reason as it relates to the inmate economy, is that keeping one's contraband holdings and seller secret can help protect the price of that contraband in the future.

Expectedly similar to licit business, when a product makes its way down a supply chain from the original source to second and third-hand salespersons, the price almost always increases. Exposing one's source of contraband in the inmate economy presents the possibility that another inmate may buy the seller out of all of their contraband product. In turn, this would force that individual, and everyone else who was previously purchasing contraband from the original source, to pay more for the same product since the product now sits with a second hand seller who is selling it for more. This unwritten rule partially overlaps with previously identified convict codes, such as not leaking information, however that convict code typically refers to not leaking information to correctional staff. This finding extends the convict code literature by suggesting that the leaking of information may also include the leaking of information to other inmates as well, and may not only be related to self-preservation, the protection of sources, and contraband pricing, but also other unexplored types of carefully guarded information held by inmates.

Unwritten rule number six of the sub-rosa inmate economy (Don't bring attention to your living quarters) summed up the behavioral expectation that when engaging in the sale, purchase, or consumption of contraband (especially odorous products such as marijuana and prison wine) inmates are expected to do so in a manner that does not put other inmates at risk. In other words, maintaining composure while intoxicated and

masking odorous forms of consumption such as smoking marijuana should be done so in a way that does not draw attention from correctional staff. Failing to do so could lead to unwanted shakedowns and exposing other inmates and their contraband holdings to correctional staff in the process. This rule appeared to be strictly adhered to, and no inmate was immune from informal punishments that would be handed down if their behaviors led to others being caught with contraband.

This unwritten rule extends what is currently known about the convict code, and reaches further than the contraband market and contraband consumption. This expectation also refers to violence and is closely related to findings in Kalinich (1980) in that with contraband presence comes a sense of order and an expectation to behave. This finding is also related to both the deprivation model and the importation model as drawing attention to one's living quarters may lead to further deprivations since contraband may be confiscated. Being deprived of luxuries in the form of contraband, again, was shown to have an effect on intuitional behaviors thereafter.

Unwritten rule number seven (Do square business) referred to selling contraband at the agreed upon price without changing that price, and not selling contraband items that are misrepresented as something they are not. This rule was not strictly adhered to, as Todd mentioned a time when inmates were selling used stamps, however their behaviors did not go unpunished. The main reason that this unwritten rule was said to exist was because "square business" led to trust and repeat business. Despite the criminal nature of individuals in correctional settings, trust appeared to be an important factor, at least as it relates to the inmate economy. This finding overlaps completely with, and shows support

for, early convict codes and inmate culture expectations identified in Clemmer (1940) in regards to not exploiting other inmates or misrepresenting an item as something it is not.

The eighth unwritten rule of the sub-rosa inmate economy (Don't step on other's toes), referred to the expectation that a prison gang should not sell the same form of contraband in the same area of a correctional facility where another gang is already selling that type of contraband, unless permission was given by the other prison gang. Doing so was a major form of disrespect and could potentially result in gang and race conflicts, violence, and unwanted attention by correctional staff. This unwritten rule boiled down to issues of respect and pricing/price-fixing, and there were no instances mentioned in the interviews where this rule was violated. This is not to suggest that this rule is always strictly adhered to, but rather to note that the interview data for this study only identified instances where this rule was followed, and why. Respect within a correctional institution appeared to be a very important component of the contraband market as well, especially as it relates to mutual respect among gangs who were engaged in the smuggling and selling of contraband. This finding appeared to be specific to the sub-rosa inmate economy. It also supports previous findings regarding the power and influence that prison gangs have over the contraband market (Skarbek, 2014), and extends what is currently known about the current state of this market by providing context for certain agreements and respect boundaries between prison gangs that participants experienced in relation to the inmate economy.

Unwritten rule number nine (Don't undercut the market) that was identified outlines the expectation that an individual should not sell a common form of contraband, such as rolling papers, for a price that is below the going rate. This rule appeared to be

separate from other previously identified convict codes/behavioral expectations within correctional facilities, and was unique to the sub-rosa inmate economy. This finding extends Sykes (1958) work in regards to merchants receiving disdain from other prisoner for charging very high prices for items, as this finding also suggests that merchants should not deviate their price of a common item from the typical going rate. Instances were discussed where this behavior was tolerated such as when an inmate was well respected and correcting that individual would cause more issues than what it was worth. Outside of this situation, interview data suggests that prison gangs would correct an individual if they were found to be undercutting the market. This finding further supports Skarbek (2014) in that prison gangs exhibit a large amount of power and control over the contraband market and the sub-rosa inmate economy, and extends what is currently known about this power and influence by providing qualitative explanations of how and why this occurs.

Unwritten rule number ten (Don't steal) of the sub-rosa inmate economy was commonly mentioned by participants, which suggests that one of the five convict codes mentioned in Clemmer (1940) still holds true in modern times despite the fact that this rule is not always adhered to and can go unpunished depending on the victim's individual characteristics. The notion behind this unwritten rule is that theft is a major form of disrespect in correctional institutions, and one must defend their dignity once they are stolen from, often times in the form of violence or compromise. Common targets for theft were inmates that were labeled "chomos", and those who had too much contraband and did not have anyone to help defend their property (non-gang members). Prison gang membership was noted as a way to reduce one's chances of being stolen from, which

supports Skarbek (2014) in that prison gang membership can serve as protective measure. Additionally, “chomos” were not only considered off limits by participants, but they were often the victim of theft as well, which may suggest support for the aforementioned concept that the level of deprivation these individuals experience may be much higher than inmates who are not “chomos”.

Unwritten rule number eleven (Don’t get in debt with guards and inmates) suggested that there is a behavioral expectation within the sub-rosa inmate economy to not go into debt with either inmates or guards. Furthermore, if an inmate does accumulate a debt they are expected to pay that debt in a timely fashion. Probing questions led to context being provided for the potential consequences of going into debt with both guards and inmates. For debts owed to inmates, consequences ranged from violent victimization to sexual victimization, while consequences for debts owed to guards were described as retaliatory in nature in the form of planted evidence resulting in false misconduct reports and formal punishments being handed down by administration. This finding supports a portion of the situational model as it relates to the officer who is writing the misconduct ticket (Steinke, 1991). This rule appeared to be specific to the contraband market, however, debts can also accumulate from illegal institutional behaviors such as gambling on sporting events, which suggest that this unwritten rule extends beyond the contraband market. Again, this unwritten rule centered around respect and the idea that one must defend their reputation if they are disrespected, which is consistent with and shows support for the masculinity component found in Mitchell (2018).

Unwritten rule number twelve (Don’t interfere with inmate and correctional officer dealings) appeared to be unique to the sub-rosa inmate economy and the

contraband market, and shed more light on the many ways in which an individual can disrespect another individual or group of individuals in a correctional setting and the consequences of doing so. This unwritten rule suggested that inmates should not try to ask a correctional officer that is already bringing in contraband for another inmate or group of inmates to do the same for them. Another tenant of this unwritten rule was to not hassle or assault a correctional officer who is bringing in contraband for an inmate or group of inmates. Participants suggested that both of these instances would result in physical violence, since this valuable inmate-guard relationship is one that takes time to develop; and essentially stealing another inmate's or groups of inmates' contraband connection is a serious form of disrespect.

This finding also shows partial support for the situational model (with whom the offense occurs), and extends what is currently known about inmate-guard relations by suggesting that correctional staff involvement in the contraband market may partially explain what at first might appear to be random inmate-on-inmate assaults. Given this possibility, detailed investigations regarding inmate-on-inmate assaults may consider investigations into correctional staff as well to help illuminate the causes behind some of these violent misconduct incidences. Doing so has the potential to provide a detailed report of the incident with a sense of due diligence, and it may also help identify problematic correctional officers that may be involved, in some capacity, with the contraband market and the inmate economy. Evidence that would allude to the level of adherence to this behavioral expectation, unfortunately, did not emerge from in the interview data.

Unwritten rule number thirteen (Always have a fall guy) referred to identifying an individual within a correctional setting that is tasked with, whether they know it or not, taking responsibility for the possession of contraband and/or selling contraband on behalf of someone else. This rule was expressed as a self-protection mechanism, and those who were “fall guys” were typically lower ranking gang affiliates or gang members compared to the ranking of those for which they were holding and/or selling contraband. This rule appeared to be specific to the contraband market and does not overlap with previously identified convict codes. However, it is not uncommon for lower ranking prison gang members to also be tasked with assaulting other inmates on behalf of a gang, and in turn, they earn credit or an increased sense of respect among their gang. In common instances such as this, they too are considered a fall guy, as high ranking prison gang members do not want to bring attention to themselves. Some participants who ran a “store”, explicitly stated that they were not gang affiliated and were in sole possession of the contraband, which suggested that this is more of an unwritten rule for the purpose of discretionary self-protection/preservation, rather than a hardfast principle of the sub-rosa inmate economy.

Unwritten rule number fourteen (Keep the peace) referred to the notion that both inmates as individuals and as a whole benefit from reducing the chances that conflicts may arise from disagreements by coming to some common-ground effort at peacekeeping. Doing so reduced both conflicts and the possibility that any distractive behaviors may bring unwanted attention to that area of a facility, thus resulting a potential shakedown and a disruption in the flow of contraband. In turn, this disruption would also lead to increased deprivations felt by the inmates. Guards were also said to

benefit from keeping the peace by allowing certain contraband related behaviors to go unpunished. This was perceived by participants as being an approach to order maintenance used by correctional staff. Every participant noted, at least once, an instance where guards relaxed the enforcement of contraband-related correctional policies for one reason or another; and several participants noted instances where they had to keep the peace with other inmates to either get along or to avoid drawing extra unwanted attention to their area of the correctional facility. This finding shows support for previous studies that suggest that guards may relax their enforcement of some policies through a give-and-take compromise simply for the purpose of ensuring some sense of order among the inmate population (Sykes, 1958; Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974). Based on the many stories of violent encounters discussed by the participants, this rule was obviously not strictly adhered to.

These findings suggest that these unwritten rules are not always strictly adhered to, and in some cases are simply rules-of-thumb for ensuring self-protection and self-preservation. Even in case where rules appeared to be steadfast principles, participants noted exceptions to these principles, which typically revolved around the individual's social rank and reputation within the inmate's social system (potential situational-model factors for future studies of inmate deviance and misconduct). These findings partially address issues noted in Williams and Fish (1974), where exceptions to behavioral expectations and the convict code were noted, but context was not provided. These findings provide some context for these exceptions, and help move this body of literature forward by identifying situations in which the more steadfast unwritten rules can be broken. Some of the unwritten rules slightly overlap with, or fit comfortably under the

umbrella of, previously identified convict codes while others were identified as behavioral expectations that are specific to the sub-rosa inmate economy and the contraband market.

These unwritten rules that participants identified were said to exist for at least one of the following reasons: to reduce the chances that conflict may arise; to eliminate unwanted attention and subsequent shakedowns; to protect an inmate's profits and preserve their illegal behaviors from detection; to guarantee responsibility for one's behaviors; to protect information and contraband from those who may pose a threat to their business (snitches and thieves); to establish fixed prices and protect one's seller and the market value of a particular item; and to ensure honorable and respectful business practices. Collectively, these rules, if followed by all inmates within a correctional institution, serve the inmates best by maintaining respect among the inmates and by ensuring a steady flow of contraband without disruption. Both of these overarching goals can lead to a reduction in the deprivations felt by the inmate population, and show support for previous studies that connect contraband with deprivations (Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974).

Grooming and inmate-correctional officer relations. A large component of prison life revolves around communication and socialization. These actions occur between inmates and between guards and inmates. On one hand the communication and socialization between guards and inmates is considered taboo in prison culture, as Clemmer (1940) and Mitchell (2018) state that an element of the convict code is to not talk to or become too friendly with correctional officers. However, Clemmer (1940) includes an exception to this rule where he suggests it is okay to do this for business

purposes and other necessary reasons. In instances where participants became friendly with correctional officers for the purpose of grooming them into becoming potential contraband smuggling actors and/or passive participants in the inmate economy, this behavior was acceptable so long as that correctional officer was not already working with another inmate or prison gang, as noted in unwritten rule number twelve (Don't interfere with correctional officer and inmate dealings).

In section two of the interview schedule, participants were asked to describe the relationship between inmates and guards that were involved in contraband smuggling and the contraband market, how this relationship was formed, and if there were any common traits among correctional officers involved in contraband smuggling and the contraband market. Participants' answers to these questions and follow up questions provided a plethora of information regarding four areas of inquiry: 1) rapport building tactics used by inmates, 2) the grooming process, 3) how inmates influence and coerce correctional officers, and 4) endogenous and exogenous relationships between inmates and correctional officers. Much of the data collected during the interviews supports previous research into correctional officer corruption and grooming. The data also extends some of the literature in terms of the role that acts of sexual misconduct can play in this process.

Beginning with rapport building, data for this study was quite consistent with previous research that suggest efforts to groom a correctional officer often begin with small talk and rapport building (Crouch & Marquart, 1989; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; Kalinich, 1980; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Sykes, 1958). Participants suggested this small talk can include: 1) personal questions about a correctional officer's family, 2) why they chose to become a correctional officer, 3)

learning what sports team a correctional officer likes best and striking up conversations over recent games played by that sports team, 4) making flirtatious, charming, and self-esteem-building comments to female correctional officers, and likely the least obvious 5) exposing one's genitalia to a female correctional officer. All of which are done for the purpose of building some form of rapport or trusting relationship with a correctional officers that they could later exploit. These findings extend previous studies by providing qualitative context for how these rapport building tactics play out, and which correctional officers are most often targeted, especially as it relates to those who share personal information with inmates, and female guards who may have low self-esteem and/or may fall below a certain level of attractiveness and above a certain body-weight preference. Based on the interviews, maintaining a consistent and professional social distance from inmates, refusing to share personal information with inmates, reporting and any and all sexual advances made by inmates may be the best way for correctional staff to stave off these rapport building tactics. Surely, training efforts to help correctional staff pick up on these tactics can be improved upon.

Participants also provided information that was consistent with previous research on grooming and the grooming process in that it begins with small favors that may seem menial at best, and slowly larger favors are asked of the grooming victim (Crouch & Marquart, 1989; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; Kalinich, 1980; Liebling, Price, & Shefler, 2011; Marquart, Barnhill, & Balshaw-Biddle, 2001; Mcalinden, 2012; Sykes, 1958). Small favors such as providing an inmate with a cheeseburger, cigarettes, or a can of snuff were noted. Interestingly, one participant noted that tobacco was the "gateway contraband", as he described inmates would often ask guards to first bring in

tobacco in order to get them familiar with the process and to warm them up to later bring in other forms of contraband. Another participant suggested that simply showing a correctional officer a large amount of cash was a quick and effective, yet risky, way of building rapport and grooming/convincing a correctional officer into smuggling in contraband, in this case it was numerous packages of loose tobacco.

Participants also discussed the importance of small tests and efforts to find trigger points that help them identify certain correctional officer's level of integrity and/or willingness to bend or ignore contraband-related correctional policies. Doing so allowed them to learn which correctional officers would allow what type of infraction to go unreported. In turn, this allowed them to navigate the contraband market unnoticed and helped them identify which guards to target for future potential grooming. This finding suggests that perhaps consistent individual policy enforcement (single correctional officer) and consistent group-level policy enforcement (all correctional officers in a facility) may be the best way to avoid these grooming tactics employed by inmates.

Once a correctional officer had breached policy and allowed their integrity to be compromised through the grooming process and the smuggling of contraband, participants suggested that they would use blackmail, reminders of the correctional officer's guilt, information about the correctional officer's personal leisurely activities (drug use and solicitation for sexual services), and evidence building practices such as creating phone records between the inmate and the correctional officer in order to influence and/or coerce them into continuing their illegal institutional behaviors. Interestingly, many of these blackmail tactics were admittedly baseless (save the phone records and a potential random drug test for the drug using correctional officer), however

participants said they were often effective as some suggested that a guilty conscience provided enough leverage for them to maintain power over the correctional officer.

Participants also provided context and supporting evidence of the role that both endogenous and exogenous relationships played in rapport building and efforts to corrupt correctional officers into smuggling contraband into facilities. Participants suggested that gang ties, neighborhood ties, and the proximity of one's previous residence to the correctional facility played a large role in whether or not they could either develop or exploit both endogenous and exogenous relationships with correctional officers and free-world actors for the purpose of obtaining contraband. These findings extend what is currently known about contraband smuggling (Kalinich, 1980; Williams & Fish, 1974), and may show support for the necessity to include measures such as these in future studies of inmate deviance and misconduct under both the importation (imported criminal network ties) and situational models (the officers involved) (Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Steinke, 1991). Doing so may serve the field of correctional research well as it could provide more explanatory variables that may help predict certain forms of misconduct and institutional deviance, particularly contraband related misconduct.

Contraband smuggling methods. Interview data from this study also provided useful detailed information regarding the smuggling of contraband and how this is sometime done. Analysis of the data led to the emergence of three subtheme, which identify the main actor responsible for bringing or sending the contraband into the facility: 1) employees, 2) free-world actors, and 3) inmate trustees (those who work outside of the facility during the day, and return back to the facility). Consistent with previous studies, participants also noted that correctional employees were largely

responsible for the smuggling of contraband into the correctional facilities (Kalinich, 1980; Ochola, 2015; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974). Three participants provided descriptions of how correctional employees would go about smuggling contraband (tobacco, vodka, free-world food, and perfume). A crime script analysis was formed based on detailed information provided that allowed for a step-by-step examination of the preparation and smuggling process which involved fashioning a tight-fitting vest made of tape and Bugler tobacco packets that was worn into a correctional facility by a correctional officer. Another participant provided an example of a correctional employee smuggling contraband and involved an individual who worked with the parole division who was smuggling vodka into a facility in Ozarka water bottles that had been repackaged to look as if they were in their original packaging. The last example provided by a participant suggested that he had guards bringing him contraband by simply placing the contraband in their lunch sacks. These examples provide some insight into the detailed planning that is often required for employees to successfully smuggle contraband into correctional facilities, and may provide real-life examples that may be used to help identify specific security concerns.

Interview data also suggested that Free-world actors were partially responsible for bringing or sending contraband into correctional facilities. Visitation was commonly mentioned as a way for free-world actors to smuggle contraband into facilities, especially during contact visits. This was also said to be easily done in facilities with structural vulnerabilities in visitation areas where contact visits were not allowed. Contraband was also said to be smuggled inside of products such as tampons that were allowed to be given to inmates by visitors at some female correctional facilities. Also consistent with

previous research, free-world actors also exploited the mail system to send contraband into facilities (Gearhart, 2006; Goodnough & Zezima, 2011; The RDI Blog, 2017). Several participants told stories of drugs coming in through the mail system such as LSD, Suboxone, and methamphetamine. Interestingly, one participant mentioned that he saw the same exact method of smuggling methamphetamine discussed in Goodnough and Zezima (2011), which involved liquefying the substance, spraying it on a coloring book page, coloring the picture, and putting wax over the watermarks. Michaels (2018) discussed likely the best approach to curbing this type of smuggling method by having all correspondence scanned and the scans being sent to the inmates rather than the actual document.

Two other smuggling methods were also discussed and required assistance from a free-world actor, and their willingness to exploit poor perimeter security measures. One method required a free-world actor/s to simply throw, or shoot a package with an air rocket (three-man sling shot) a package over the perimeter fence of a facility. The second method required a free-world actor to fly a UAV and drop a package inside of the perimeter fence. Both methods are consistent with previous research and required the package to be dropped in a pre-determined location and at a predetermined time, so that the inmate who ordered the drop could retrieve the package (Applin, 2016; Gearhart, 2006; Goldsmith, Halsey, & Vel-Palumbo, 2018; O'Hagan & Hardwick, 2017; Northfield, 2018; Ochola, 2015; Sanchez & McKibben, 2015; Waldron, 2017).

The last category of main smuggling actors discussed were inmate trustees. These methods typically required inmates to have efficient communication with free-world actors who would make drops of contraband at pre-determined locations, or

communications between inmates who work in uniform receiving when trustees return from their work detail. One participant mentioned a time when trustees who were prison gang members were retrieving drop of large quantities of contraband while working in the fields and out of eye sight of correctional officers who were in charge of supervising the trustees. These gang members would then divvy up the contraband among themselves and smuggle the contraband back into the facility on or in their bodies. Another participant discussed trustee truck drivers who were bringing in pounds of marijuana into facilities in the trucks they were driving, while another participant discussed, in extreme detail, the exact process of smuggling contraband into a facility with the cooperation of inmates who worked in trustee uniform receiving. This participant's detailed account of the smuggling process led to the development of a crime script analysis that outlined the steps taken to successfully smuggle contraband into a facility through this avenue.

In sum, findings from this main theme are consistent with previous studies, however they also extend the literature by providing some detailed accounts of the smuggling process and identify specific vulnerabilities in security currently employed by correctional facilities including perimeter security issues, structural vulnerability issue, visitation supervision, mail system issues, the presence of contraband cell phones, and trustee supervision. All of which are addressable issues, although addressing these vulnerabilities may require varying levels of funding.

The impact of contraband and corruption on perceptions of punishment and the criminal justice system. Participants were also asked questions about whether or not the presence of corruption among correctional officers or staff had an impact on the way they viewed incarceration as punishment and how they perceived the criminal justice system?

Responses to this questions were coded into two subthemes: the critical perspective, and the c'est la vie perspective. Interestingly, the responses given by participants suggested that many participants often held both critical perspectives and c'est la vie perspectives and were very rational and thorough in explaining how their experiences and perceptions had shaped their views of both incarceration as punishment and the criminal justice system as whole. This finding is important because it suggests that the participants were both passionate and frustrated by their experiences, yet rational in understanding the human element that plays a pivotal role in correctional facilities and the activities that occur within them. Given these common two-sided responses, it was not appropriate to categorize each participant under one sum-theme or the other. Instead, the responses were categorized in a way that reflect several perspectives held by participants, and shed light on the realities of their perceptions and experiences.

Participants that made critical perspectives focused on five areas of concern. First, some participants noted the hypocritical nature of correctional officers smuggling contraband into facilities. The fact that these individuals were responsible for ensuring that a punishment is handed down to the inmates for committing a crime, while at the same time committing crimes themselves by smuggling contraband (often the same products many inmates were incarcerated for possessing), was something that did not seem to sit well with some participants. Some suggested that this jaded them to the idea of a criminal justice system and noted that it was not built for justice, but rather control. Second, participants made critical comments of the contradicting nature of prison as a mechanism for rehabilitation. Given the criminal nature of both inmates and correctional officers, and the level of non-rehabilitative activities that occur with the correctional

facility environments, some participants were convinced that incarceration, at least in the U.S., does not come even remotely close to meeting the goal of rehabilitating inmates.

Third, many participants throughout the interviews noted the relationship between contraband presence and order maintenance (noted in main theme one), and some were critical of this reality, suggesting that guards are well aware of this relationship and simply allow contraband related activities to occur in order to maintain some type of order within the facility. In an attempt to present a front to administration that correctional officers were indeed enforcing correctional policy, guards would occasionally catch an inmate with contraband and write a misconduct report for the incident, but the perception was that this was a ruse. Lastly, participants showed resentment for the capitalistic nature of the prison industrial complex, and allowing contraband in facilities was simply another way of keeping some form of control over the inmate population by creating a revolving door for future tenants.

These perceptions held by some of the participants ultimately led to what some called a lack of faith in the system as a whole, and a jaded perspective on the system. Their experiences also led some of them to believe that prison, as a form of punishment, was a joke, and correctional officers were just as corrupt as the inmates they supervised. What some of these participants saw and experienced greatly reduced their perceptions of legitimacy for the criminal justice system as a whole. Despite these strongly held beliefs and perspectives, these participants also were rational in understanding why they experienced what they experienced.

Those who made *c'est la vie*-type comments also made some critical comments as well. These participants were less perturbed at the corruption they witnessed and

suggested that they either knew what to expect from the criminal microcosm of prison; their level of perceived legitimacy for the system as a whole had already been deflated or jaded; they expected corruption to occur as it does everywhere in society based on profits and the human instinct to better one's financial situation (inmates and guards); and/or they were accepting of their punishment and had come to terms with the realities of prison. These types of responses suggested that some participants were unaffected by the corruption they witnessed. Their perception of incarceration as a form of punishment appeared to be stable, and the way they viewed the criminal justice system as a whole was just as it was before their incarceration. This is not to say that they fully approved of the corruption they witnessed, but rather some participants simply explained their experiences and the corruption they saw as a part of life and human nature, thus this subtheme was named the *c'est la vie* perspective.

Perspectives on curbing contraband in correctional facilities. The last theme that emerged from the interviews focused on participants' perspectives on reducing the presence of contraband and ideas of how this may be possible. Interestingly, a vast majority of participants suggested that contraband will always be a part of correctional facilities and provided several reasons why they held these beliefs. First, when contraband is confiscated or smuggling avenues are disrupted, participants mentioned that inmates will simply find another way to obtain contraband because there are many more ways that this can be done aside from the original avenue. Some suggested that they can't imagine correctional facilities not having contraband. Second, participants noted that contraband will always be a part of prisons due to the way that correctional policies define contraband. From an extra onion taken from the kitchen, to a book borrowed from

another inmate, these small and arguably undisruptive forms of contraband will always be present.

Third, some participants noted that the combination of low wages, the low risk of correctional getting caught smuggling in contraband, and the profitability of smuggling contraband into facilities is simply too enticing to some correctional staff who wish to capitalize on this opportunity. Participants often noted that it is human nature to want to better one's financial situation. Participants commonly mentioned that everyone has a price, and that when a correctional officer can make ridiculous profits from completing a relatively low risk act, it is simply too enticing for some correctional officers to refuse such an opportunity. Fourth, some participants mentioned instances in which they themselves, or other inmates were caught red-handed with contraband and they believe correctional officers overlooked their illegal behaviors because writing up a misconduct ticket was too much of a hassle, or because they had larger issues to handle such as violent assaults.

Finally, some participants explained that when contraband was present, there was a sense of informal social control that existed among the inmate population, which resulted in far fewer violent assaults and confrontations and fewer disruptive behaviors among the inmates. This relationship was suggested to be glaringly apparent to both inmates and correctional staff. Ignoring certain contraband infractions was suggested to benefit correctional officers as it reduced instances that may require them to intervene (such as assaults and disruptive behaviors) and would cause unwanted attention to their area of the facility where they are responsible for maintaining order. These findings are

quite consistent with previous research that contend that contraband will likely always be present in correctional facilities (Kalinich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Williams & Fish, 1974).

When participants were asked about their ideas for best curbing the presence of contraband in correctional facilities, many of them provided suggestions, however these suggestions were typically followed by explanations as to why their ideas would either not work, were not feasible, or would only partially address the contraband issue. Some participants noted that paying corrections employees higher wages may partially reduce the presence of contraband, while other suggestions centered on improvements in correctional officer training (drug recognition training). Two of the more promising suggestions that was mentioned focused on the mail system and adopting similar mail scanning technologies used in Pennsylvania and noted in Michaels (2018), and corrections officials redefining what exactly contraband is and is not based on sort of litmus test of the danger that an item poses to inmates, staff, and the day-to-day operations in a correctional facility.

Other suggestions that were provided included paying inmates a small hourly wage for their work so that they do not have to engage in the contraband market to be able to purchase commissary; and reasoning with influential groups of inmates (prison gangs) in the form of a give-and-take compromise where inmates would receive certain luxuries such as air conditioning or electronic cigarettes if they were willing to address certain inmate behaviors. Again, all of the suggestions (aside from mail scanning technologies, drug recognition training, and redefining policies) were discussed more so in a hypothetical manner rather than being actual realistic suggestions, as the participants were either well aware of the budget constraints that correctional facilities, the overly

hopeful or absurd nature of their suggestions, or the beneficial role that contraband played in order maintenance. In sum, participants suggested that contraband will always find its way into correctional facilities, despite any and all methods that may be deployed to curb its presence.

Limitations and Future Research.

Limitations. As with all studies, this dissertation also has some limitations. First, there were only two participant race categories that were examined (White and Hispanic). This is problematic because the perceptions and experiences of a large portion of inmates (particularly Blacks) were unexamined in this study. This unfortunate outcome was likely the result of snowball sampling, as individuals typically have relationships with those that are most like them (in this case race and skin color) and the sample, based on participants' references, naturally evolved in this manner. Given this limitation, the findings from this study can only speak to the experiences and perceptions of the participants included in the study, none of which were Black. It would be unwise to suggest that the experiences and perceptions of potential Black participants, as it related to the sub-rosa inmate economy and the contraband market, would be the same as the other 16 non-Black participants without interviewing any Black participants. To avoid this issue in future studies, researchers that are interested in collecting in-depth qualitative interview data through snowball sampling for the purpose of examining perceptions and experiences of individuals of major race categories should consider beginning their study with at least one gatekeeper of each race, if possible.

Second, this study was conducted in the free-world and included participants who were previously incarcerated and fit the selection criteria for the study. This is a partial

limitation because there may be very recent developments in smuggling methods that are now being used, and without interviewing current inmates, these methods were not discussed, and thus were not able to be included in the study findings. This is not to say that the data is outdated by any means, but rather that perceptions and experiences of the participants' were not extremely recent. This limitation most likely exists because of the inherent administrative and bureaucratic barriers that make correctional research challenging in general, particularly for studies of this nature that examine sensitive topics that may shed unwanted light on a large problem that is, arguably for good reason, kept in the dark, such as contraband and correctional officer corruption.

Despite this being considered a limitation, it can be argued that this study actually benefitted from the interview setting (at the participants' leisure and preferred location), as it allowed for a more relaxed atmosphere; it provided a sense of comfortability for the participants as they were in their own element; it gave them a sense of ownership and agency over the study as it was being conducted on their turf and on their time; and in many cases it allowed for the principle investigator to build a more natural rapport with the participants. For example, before one of the interviews began, the interviewer and the participant played two quick games of billiards (8-ball) in the participant's garage. This rapport building activity created a very friendly atmosphere and undoubtedly strengthened the relationship between the participant and their subsequent references. In sum, it is safe to say that trust, rapport, and the level of depth that participants were willing to go into regarding their perceptions and experiences would have been far less if these interviews were conducted in a correctional setting. Nonetheless, this study was

limited to previously incarcerated individuals, and thus may have missed out on the most recent developments in regards to smuggling and currency transfer methods.

Third, some researchers may suggest that that the sample size is relatively small (N=16), and the findings, in turn, are subjective and ungeneralizable. These individuals would be correct, if the purpose of the study was to come to findings that were based on participant objectivity and were generalizable to the broader population of all individuals incarcerated in the United State of America. However, the aim of this study was not to come to generalizable findings, but rather to examine individuals' perceptions and experiences (obviously subjective) in order to learn more about a relatively unexamined and neglected aspect of their lives while incarcerated. Crouch and McKenzie (2006) argue that not only are in-depth qualitative interviews extremely valuable, but exploratory and analytically inductive qualitative in-depth interview studies of individual's perceptions and experiences are best done with smaller samples, so long as they are relevant to the field and are conducted for the purpose of knowledge-building. Based on this notion, it can be argued that sample size, in this study, is irrelevant, however a larger sample would have been nice.

In line with concerns over sample size, is the concern over whether or not saturation was reached. Given the focus on individual experiences and perceptions in this study, and the reality that everyone perceives and experiences their social world differently, saturation might never have been reached, and the data collection process may have never ended. However, based on the data, saturation could be partially measured when examining the unwritten rules of the contraband market. As analysis progressed through the interviews (grounded theory approach) it came to the attention of

the principle investigator that after twelve interviews, redundancy was abundant and there were no new rules being mentioned, even though the remaining four participants had years of in-depth knowledge and experience with the inmate economy and the contraband market. This finding by itself is not intended to suggest that saturation was reached for all elements of the interview schedule, but it can be used to support the contention that saturation, at least as far as the unwritten rules are concerned among the sample of 16 White and Hispanic participants, was most likely reached.

Redundancy and saturation in qualitative studies is important to ensure that the study is not missing any important aspects of a social phenomenon. Reaching saturation with relatively small sample sizes is not extremely uncommon in qualitative research. In fact, one qualitative study of 20 female prostitutes in Pakistan reached saturation at just 16 interviews (Khan, et al., 2010), while another study of reproductive health and social desirability using a sample 60 in-depth interviews with women from West African Countries reached saturation at just 12 interviews, and meta-themes were identified after the first six (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). The fact that this portion of the current study (unwritten rules) reached saturation at just 12 interviews is likely an artifact of targeted recruiting efforts by participants. Several participants asked the interviewer what type of person he would like to speak to, to which he typically replied in words similar to the following: “Anyone who fits the selection criteria really, but hopefully you can refer people who have done a lot of time and might have the most experience with contraband.” Given that they often referred those who were well experienced, the information received in the interviews was not only fruitful, but thorough as well.

Future Research. In regards to future research on the inmate economy, researchers may consider further examining experiences and perceptions of contraband and the inmate economy from ex-inmates of other race categories such as Blacks, Asians, Middle Easterners, Pacific Islanders, and Indigenous populations. This study focused, albeit by a default of the snowball sampling method, on the perceptions and experiences of White and Hispanic males and females. For those that choose to use a snowball sampling method to collect such data from multiple races, it would be wise to begin with several gatekeepers of varying races in order to avoid the limitation that the current study experienced. Beyond the experiences and perceptions of those who have endured incarceration, future research may also consider examining the experiences and perceptions of other individuals who may be knowledgeable of prison culture, contraband, and the inmate economy such as correctional officers, medical staff, wardens, OIG investigators, and perhaps even family members or criminal associates who have engaged in the smuggling of contraband on behalf of incarcerated individuals. Both of these areas of research may provide this field of study with a better understanding of the ins and outs of this market and whether or not experiences and behavioral expectations vary by race.

Although data for the current study included many findings regarding the relationship between prison gangs and the inmate economy, this specific area of inquiry is ripe for future research. Future studies might benefit from examining these relationships in much greater detail in an attempt to shed further light on the role that prison gangs play in this economy, and the power and control they have over the contraband market. It is not enough to say that prison gangs simply play a role.

Answering how, why, and under what circumstances and context (situational) they play a role would certainly advance the body of literature surrounding prison gangs. This area of research remains relatively untapped, outside of a few important works noted in the literature review of this study.

Lastly, future research that focuses on inmate misconduct and institutional deviance (especially contraband related misconduct) may benefit from including theoretically relevant variables (deprivation, importation, and situational) that were identified in this study, such as the proximity of an inmate's previous residence to the correctional facility they are housed in; the relationship between co-conspiring inmate and correctional officer; differences across original offense type in comparison with sex-crime offenders; and differences among confirmed gang members of different rankings. Doing so may allow for researchers to explore the fit of their models, and can either confirm or refute the importance of such variables as having or lacking quantitative explanatory power. Gaining access to official data that would allow for these measures to be developed may prove to be challenging, or may not exist, which may require primary data collection. However, confirming or refuting qualitative findings of relatively unexplored areas of inquiry with quantitative data are often the beginning stages of solid theoretical developments and advancements, and thus may be necessary to move the field forward. After all, quantitative researchers must know how certain variables may be relevant to a research question, and why, before they can be logically included and accurately measured. This study provides some useful information that may further justify the use of such measures.

Policy Implications. Findings from this study have the potential to provide policy implications and ways to prevent contraband and contraband related issues from arising, however these suggestions certainly come with their own challenges. Many suggestions and their subsequent challenges in implementing them are noted in this section. First, corrections agencies may consider requiring more training for CO's on how to spot inmate and guard behaviors that may be related to contraband, contraband smuggling, and the inmate economy. Expanding training in this manner may provide correctional staff with examples and the necessary knowledge to pinpoint specific behaviors and relations between guards/staff and inmates that may help identify individuals for the purpose of further investigation and disrupting contraband smuggling and dealing. Challenges to this suggestion include funding; the oftentimes immediate need for correctional officers, the time it takes to train them, and agencies unwillingness to sacrifice short staffed facilities for more training; and the level of willingness of correctional staff to out one of their co-workers for illegal and/or suspicious activity once they are identified.

Second, and also related to training, is the need for expanded training on the importance of correctional staff not sharing details of their personal life with inmates, as this can often lead to targeting for grooming and blackmail. Again, this requires more funding and more time spent training correctional staff on best practices; something that also requires willingness and financial capability. Third, OIG investigators may need to attend seminars on new technologies used in the smuggling of contraband, such as the use of electronic money transfer systems, contraband cell phone uses, and UAV's for the purpose of strengthening their investigative methods, bolstering the level of evidence

they may be able to collect for future prosecution, and to disrupt the smuggling of contraband by UAVs. This can prove to be challenging as it also requires funding and OIG investigators to take time away from their already busy schedules. Furthermore, since technology changes at astronomical rates, these seminars may need to be attended quite frequently.

Fourth, agencies may consider applying for funding for more drug and rare earth-metal sniffing K9s, managed access systems for blocking contraband cell phone calls, mail scanning technologies to curb contraband being sent through the mail, and perimeter security technologies such as DroneShield that can disrupt signals used to navigate contraband smuggling UAV's. The most obvious challenge to these suggestion is funding. Although correctional agencies often have extremely large budgets, these budgets are mostly allocated to healthcare needs and other human rights and operational necessities, not advanced security measures. Also, technologies such as managed access systems and DroneShield require immense amounts of training and maintenance in order to operate effectively and efficiently; something that also requires more funding, and in turn, a higher rate of correctional officer retention to reduce the amount spent over time with training.

Fifth, OIG investigators may be able to strengthen their relationships with common electronic money transfer system companies through MOUs (memorandum of understanding), and may benefit from inter-organizational coordination efforts with these companies. Although systems such as Greendot are nearly untraceable, this type of coordinated effort may provide OIG investigators with more useful meta-data that may lead to more effective party-identification for prosecution in the laundering of contraband

proceeds. This approach could prove challenging as these coordinated efforts, if made public, may negatively impact these electronic money transfer companies' profits. Aside from this concern, OIG investigators may find this approach to be useful, but it may require court orders in some instances where fourth amendment violation of free-world citizens may be violated. Nonetheless, this is an avenue worthy of inquiry.

Sixth, correctional agencies may consider examining their facilities, especially older facilities, for structural vulnerabilities in their visitation areas where contraband may be passed from visitors to inmates. Doing so may help identify facilities that need reconstruction to curb the entry of contraband. Not surprisingly, funding will need to be secured and allocated to this reconstruction effort including, at the very least, funds for inspection, engineering, materials, installation, and maintenance. Seventh, agencies may consider strengthening security and supervision measures in exchange areas where trustees and inmates work in conjunction to turn over their uniforms and work-related artifacts upon return to the facility from their off-site job duties. Employing extra correctional officers to conduct strip searches of uniform intake inmates and oversee their duties is one suggestion that may prove to be useful in disrupting the flow of contraband. This suggestion may fall on deaf ears as correctional agencies have a tremendously hard time finding individuals that want to work for their agency to being with.

Eighth, agencies may consider paying their correctional officers a higher salary. These agencies may benefit from doing this in the following ways: Higher salaries may lead to less turnover; higher salaries may lead to more individuals wanting to apply for a job position with correctional agencies; and higher salaries may slightly reduce the enticing financial incentives that contraband smuggling offers correctional officers. This

suggestion, while at face value seems logical, requires, again, large amounts of funding to incorporate. Additionally, this wage increase may not stop those correctional officers who are already smuggling from continuing their illegal behaviors. Ninth, legislation can be improved to heighten the level of punishment correctional officers may receive for being found guilty of smuggling contraband into correctional facilities by relying on the age old principle of general deterrence.

Lastly, given the broad and overarching nature of correctional policies surrounding contraband and contraband related activity, correctional agencies may consider revisiting these policies and re-focusing them on contraband that are most dangerous to the safety and security of employees and inmates and pose considerable dangers and disruptions to the day-to-day operations of a correctional facilities. Items such as high quality feminine hygiene products, headbands, durable hair ties, shared books and magazines, tank-tops, cleaning supplies such as Fabuloso, and extra slices of cheese are things that, arguably, pose little to no danger to safety and security and do not disrupt day to day operations. In fact, some of these items could even be sold in commissary for a profit.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study's findings suggest that many facets of the inmate economy and prison culture still hold true decades after they were identified (Clemmer, 1940; Davidson, 1977; Irwin, 1980; Irwin & Cressey, 1962; Kanich, 1980; Sykes, 1958; Sykes & Messinger, 1960; Thomas & Pool, 1975; Tittle & Tittle, 1964; Wellford; 1967; Wheeler, 1961; Williams & Fish, 1974). Evidence emerged in regards to the consistent relationship between contraband and order within correctional facilities, in that informal

social control exerted by the inmates encourage good behavior and fewer disruptive acts so long as contraband is present. Interestingly, as prison gangs have grown in number, presence, power, and influence, these gangs appear to control the contraband market by way of dictating the rules of the inmate economy; punishing those who do not follow their rules; dictating prices and coming to compromises with other gangs who engage in the contraband market; and maintaining connections to the outside world and their criminal networks which allow them more opportunities for financial gain. These gangs were, by and large, suggested to serve as the overseers of the inmate economy.

Findings for this study showed support for previous perspective of inmate misconduct, institutional deviance, the inmate economy, and prison culture (deprivation model, importation model, situational model, and the convict code), by contributing contextual evidence that broadens these perspectives to include other relevant factors that may partially explain the how and why of behavioral expectations, the inmate economy, and the complicated political environment that exists in correctional facilities.

These findings show support for these perspectives and can partially extend these models to include other potentially relevant measures that, if held true through future studies, may prove to be beneficial in improving model-fit for quantitative studies that seek to predict inmate behaviors.

Results from this study also suggest that correctional officer-inmate relations are still present, however advances in technologies make the development of exogenous and endogenous much easier. These advances in technologies have also led to more opportunities to communicate and coordinate both the smuggling of contraband and the transfer of proceeds earned through the wheeling and dealing of contraband within

correctional facilities, especially big ticket items. These big ticket items have also changed a bit over time, and now include less detectable drugs such as K2 and Suboxone, which further complicate detection by correctional staff and the few K9s they have access to for this purpose. Undoubtedly, the two most notable differences that have revolutionized the contraband market are the presence of contraband cell-phones and the advent of electronic money transfer systems.

As technologies have advanced, so too have contraband smuggling methods. Results suggested that the use of cell phones for coordinating drops are crucial for successful smuggling operations, while two participants noted the use of UAVs as being a new development. UAVs, may prove to be the biggest threat in the future, as they are quickly becoming smaller and quieter, and can travel longer distances and carry larger payloads. This may seem quite trivial to corrections officials at first glance, as these UAVs typically carry contraband such as cell phones, drugs, tobacco, and alcohol. However weaponized UAVs are increasingly being used around the world to cause damage to infrastructure, such as in the case of the Iran-backed Huothi attacks on the Khurais oilfield and the Abqaiq oil processing facility in Saudi Arabia on September 14th 2019 (Safi & Wearden, 2019). Given the rare use of signal disruption technologies in U.S. correctional facilities, such as DroneShield, similar attacks that may breach perimeter security and damage structures intended to keep inmates confined and the public safe may become serious issues in the future.

When taken together, the findings from this study suggest that prison gangs literally dictate and shape just how much order is present in a facility by controlling the contraband market and inmate economy. As contraband increases, so too does their rule-

enforcement and their handling of disruptive behavior through violence or the threat of violence. When contraband is not present, it is still clear that gangs have some influence over the behaviors of both inmates and guards as they try to reduce deprivations and unwanted attention, and coerce or groom guards into smuggling in more contraband. Given this dynamic, it may be right to say that prison gangs serve as the real influencers of institutional order. Based on these findings that connect prison gangs with the contraband market and the power that follows, it may be safe to say that most modern institutional behaviors are shaped, and corrected by extremely violent criminal enterprises that operate not for the purpose of rehabilitation, but for profit, secrecy, and control; all while the agency/ies in charge of handing down a punishment willfully provide them with this power through smuggling in contraband. So long as this remains true, perhaps correctional agencies will continue to serve as breeding grounds for violence, crime, and perceptions of illegitimate authority/captors; instead of rehabilitation, law-abiding behavior, and respect for one's authority.

Considering together the issues that contraband can cause (safety, security, conflict, corruption, reductions in perceptions of legitimacy, gangs as institutional order-influencers and dictators of behavior), and the lack of funding for the more promising ways in which contraband can be partially stopped (drone signal disruption technology, mail scanning technology, addressing structural vulnerabilities); the perception that contraband will continue to play a large role in correctional facilities is likely here to stay — especially as long as prison gangs exist and corruption occurs. If correctional agencies do not have the wherewithal to address the issue of both prison gangs and official corruption, then perhaps the goal of correctional agencies to ensure the *safety and*

security of their inmates may very well continue to rely on the presence of this decades-old order maintenance mechanism — contraband — or now, and by proxy, those who have near-full control over both institutional order and the contraband market — prison gangs.

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APPENDIX A

Sam Houston State University**Informed Consent for Participation in Research**

Perceptions of, and Experiences with, Contraband in Correctional

Facilities:

A Qualitative Examination

My name is William Dittmann, and I am a doctoral candidate in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Sam Houston State University. I would like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a research study that focuses on your perceptions and experiences with contraband in correctional facilities. I hope that data from this study will better inform practitioners, researchers, and the public of the role that contraband plays in the everyday lives of those incarcerated. You have been asked to participate in this study because 1) you are between the ages of 18 and 64, 2) You have been previously incarcerated in a correctional facility, and 3) You are not currently involved with the criminal justice system, which includes being on parole, probation, or electronic monitoring.

The research I am conducting is very straightforward, and I do not expect the research to pose any risk to any of the volunteer participants. If you consent to participate in this study, you will be asked to check the box on the back of this document that says “I understand the above and consent to participate”. You will not have to provide your signature. Once you have agreed to participate, an audio-recorded interview will begin where you will be asked questions about your perceptions of, and experiences with,

contraband while you were incarcerated. Any information you provide during the interview will only be used for research purposes. Under no circumstances will you or anyone else who participates in the study be identified. I will not be seeking the names of inmates, correctional officers, facilities, or any other identifying information that can be traced back to anyone or any facility discussed during the interview. In addition, the information you provide will remain confidential and any identifying information that can be linked back to you will be de-identified in order to maintain confidentiality and protect your identity. Participation in this research will require up to an hour and a half of your time, depending on how much you want to elaborate in your response to the questions. Participants will not be paid or otherwise compensated for participating in this study. Upon completion of the interview, participants can choose to review the recording. Once the audio files have been transcribed, the audio files will be destroyed in order to further protect your identity.

Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. Your decision whether or not to participate in this study will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may refuse to answer any questions, and you may discontinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. If you are interested, the results of the study will be available at the conclusion of the project.

If you have any questions about this research, please feel free to contact me William Dittmann, or my faculty supervisor Dr. Willard Oliver using the contact information provided below. If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights

as a research participant, please contact Sharla Miles, Office of Research and Sponsored Programs, using her contact information provided below.

William Dittmann SHSU Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology Huntsville, TX 77341 Phone: (---) --- ----	Dr. Willard Oliver SHSU Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology Huntsville, TX 77341 Phone: 936-294-4173	Sharla Miles Office of Research and Sponsored Programs Sam Houston State University Huntsville, TX 77341 Phone: (936) 294-4875 Email: irb@shsu.edu
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- I understand the above and consent to participate.

- I do not wish to participate in the current study.

A copy of this consent form is available for your records

Institutional Study Information: IRB-2018-94/October 31, 2018/October 31, 2019.

APPENDIX B**Sam Houston State University****Recruiting Flyer for Study Participants**

*Perceptions of, and Experiences with, Contraband in Correctional
Facilities:
A Qualitative Examination*

What am I being asked to do?

You are being asked to participate in a study that examines your perception and experiences with contraband while incarcerated in a correctional facility. This study is being conducted by William Dittmann who is the principal investigator and a doctoral student in the Criminal Justice program at Sam Houston State University. This study is being conducted as a as part of a dissertation and the faculty supervisor/sponsor who will be overseeing this study is Dr. Willard Oliver. Your participation is completely voluntary and will consist of you meeting with the principal investigator and participating in an audio taped interview which seeks to understand your feelings, perceptions, and experiences with contraband while incarcerated.

What are the qualifications to participate in this study?

This study is looking for male and female individuals who have experienced confinement in a correctional facility. These facilities include county or city jails, state prisons, state jails, and federal facilities. You cannot currently be under any form of law enforcement supervision including parole, probation or electronic monitoring and your participation must be voluntary. You must also be between the ages of 18 and 64 to participate.

What kind of questions will be asked?

Questions will cover the following topics: 1) Experiences and perceptions of the contraband market 2) Knowledge of, and experience with, contraband and contraband networks, and 3) Personal feelings towards contraband and contraband markets.

How long will the interview last?

The interview will last up to an hour and a half depending on how much information you are willing to provide. If you volunteer to be in the study, you may withdraw at any time without consequence of any kind. You may also refuse to answer any questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study. This study should be completed by May of 2019.

What about privacy and confidentiality?

No one besides the PI conducting the interview will have access to your individual responses and your identity will be strictly protected. Any information that is obtained through this interview and that can be identified with you will remain confidential and will not be disclosed in order to protect your rights and welfare. All data will be kept in a secure location under lock and key on two encrypted and password protected external hard-drive, accessible only to the principal investigator. All identifying information will be de-identified, recoded, and properly destroyed. When the results of the study are published or discussed, no information will be included that would reveal your identity. Your answers will be combined with other participants so that no one can be identified. In all phases of the study your identity will be protected or disguised. I value your honesty and your privacy.

How do I participate?

If you choose to participate in this study please contact the principal investigator conducting this study, William Dittmann at (---) --- -----.

VITA

W. LAYNE DITTMANN

EDUCATION

- 2015- Current **Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice**
 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX
 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology
 Dissertation Title: *Perceptions of, and Experiences with Contraband in Correctional Facilities: A Qualitative Examination.*
 Chair: Dr. Willard Oliver
 Committee Members: Dr. Jurg Gerber and Dr. Nathan Jones
- 2015 **Master of Arts in Criminal Justice and Criminology**
 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX
 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology
 Thesis Title: *Ex-Inmates' Perceptions of Experiences in Texas Public and Private Prisons*
 Chair: Dr. Jurg Gerber
- 2011 **Bachelor of Arts in Criminal Justice**
 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX
 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

- 2017- 2019 Doctoral Teaching Fellow
 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX
 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology
- 2013- 2019 Graduate Assistant and Teaching Assistant
 Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, TX
 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology

PUBLICATIONS

Articles in Refereed Journals

- Jones, N.; **Dittmann, L.**; Wu, J., & Reese, T. (2018). A Mixed Methods Social Network Analysis of a Cross-Border Drug Network: The Fernando Sanchez Organization (FSO). *Trends in Organized Crime, 1-29.*

Dittmann, L., & Gerber, J. (2016). Framing legitimacy: A qualitative analysis examining Texas local print media portrayals of an immigrant family detention center. *Journal of Qualitative Criminal Justice and Criminology*, 4, 217-243.

Hu, X., & **Dittmann L.** (2016). Gangs in the print media: Description, crime, and intervention. *Journal of Gang Research*, 23, 29-50.

Franklin, T. W., **Dittmann, L.**, & Henry, T. (2015). Extralegal disparity in the application of intermediate sanctions: An analysis of U.S. District Courts. *Crime & Delinquency*, 63, 839-874.

Book Chapters

Dittmann, L. (2018). Exploring the Potential Benefits and Unintended Consequences of Harris County's Misdemeanor Marijuana Diversion Program (MMDP): A Cause for Concern Regarding Access. In N. Marion & J. Hill J. (Eds.), *More on Legalizing Marijuana: Ongoing Shifts in American Policies*. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press.

Textbook Additions

Dittmann, L. In B.K., Payne, W. M., Oliver, & N.E. Marion, (2 ed.) (2017). Ethical Dilemmas in Decision-Making: Private Prisons. *Introduction to Criminal Justice: A Balanced Approach*, (p. 388). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Media Publications

Dittmann, L. & Henry T. (2016, October, 18). Half-Truths and False Equivalencies: Understanding the Role of Race in the Criminal Justice System. *The Houstonian*, p. 6.

PRESENTATIONS AT PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

- 2018 Dittmann, L. (November, 2018). *What's a Greendot? Examining Two Prison Contraband Smuggling Networks and Methods of Currency Transfer: Informing a Dissertation*. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Atlanta, GA.
- 2018 Jones, N., Dittmann, L., Wu, J., Reese, T., (March, 2018). *A Mixed Methods Social Network Analysis of a Cross-Border Drug Network: The Fernando Sanchez Organization (FSO)*. Presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, New Orleans, LA.
- 2017 Dittmann, L. (November, 2017). *From the Horses Mouth to the Headlines: Examining Contraband Smuggling Processes and Networks in Texas Public and Private Prisons*. Presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Philadelphia, PA.

- 2017 Dittmann, L. (October, 2017). *The Spatial Relationship Between Methadone Treatment Centers (MTC's) and Drug Crimes: Exploring the Not-in-My-Backyard Phenomenon (NIMBY)*. Presented at the Southwest Division of the American Association of Geographers (SWAAG), Huntsville, TX.
- 2016 Dittmann, L., Blasko, B. L., Rudes, D. S., & Magnuson, S. (November, 2016). *Measuring Neutrality in Custodial Decision-making: Prisoner Perceptions of One Procedural Justice Element*. In B. L. Blasko (Chair), *Relationships matter: Legitimacy, procedural justice, and the working alliance in prisons and jails*. Symposium conducted at the meeting of the American Society of Criminology, New Orleans, LA.
- 2016 Jones, N., Dittmann, L., Wu, J., & Reese, T. (April, 2016). *Coding Operational Ties in Dark Networks from RICO Indictments: Methods for Further Social Network Analysis Research*. Poster presented at the 3rd Annual Sam Houston State University Graduate Research Symposium, The Woodlands, TX.
- 2016 Dittmann, L., Tasca, M. (March, 2016). *So Goes the Nation? U.S. Media Portrayals of the Use of Solitary Confinement*. Presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Denver, CO.
- 2015 Jones, N., Dittmann, L., Wu, J., & Reese, T. (November, 2015). *Coding Operational Ties in Dark Networks from RICO Indictments: Methods for Further Social Network Analysis Research*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, Washington, DC.
- 2015 Dittmann, L. (October, 2015). *Ex-inmates' Perceptions and Experiences in Texas Public and Private Prisons*. Presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Association of Criminal Justice, South Padre Island, TX.
- 2015 Dittmann, L. (March, 2015). *Ex-inmates' Perceptions and Experiences of Safety and Security in Texas Public and Private Prisons*. Presented at the annual Sam Houston State University Graduate Research Exchange, Huntsville, TX.
- 2015 Franklin, T.W., Dittmann, L., & Henry, T. (March, 2015). *Reducing Prison Terms Through Intermediate Sanctions: Who Benefits in the Federal Courts?* Presenter and Panel Chair: Presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Orlando, FL.

- 2014 Dittmann, L., & Gerber, J. (November, 2014). *Ex-inmates' Experiences and Perceptions of Public and Private Prisons*. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology, San Francisco, CA.

ACADEMIC AWARDS

- 2013- Current Graduate Student Fellowship, Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology and Criminal, Sam Houston State University.
- 2018 SHSU Graduate Studies' Outstanding Teaching Assistant Award
- 2016 Summer Research Fellowship
- 2013, 2015, Summer Scholarship, Summer school tuition funded by
2016, 2017 Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology at Sam Houston State University.
- 2015 Travel Scholarship, Research Presented at the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Orlando, FL.

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

American Society of Criminology
Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences
Southwestern Association of Criminal Justice