

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE NATURE OF GUILT AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE WORKS OF O. HOBART MOWRER
AND WILLIAM GLASSER WITH CLASSICAL FREUDIAN THEORY

BY

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A THESIS

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Wheaton, David K. 1938
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PURPOSE

The purpose of this project was to examine the works of O. Hobart Mowrer and William Glasser and to compare their understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility with classical Freudian theory. It was the purpose of the project to demonstrate that Freud presupposed something about the nature of man with which neither Mowrer nor Glasser agree. The research shows that the nature of man is such that Freud could not deal adequately with the descriptive categories called guilt and responsibility because these are ontological categories and not scientific psychological measurable entities. The research further shows that Mowrer and Glasser presuppose that guilt and responsibility are ontological in character.

METHODS OF RESEARCH

The procedure and method of investigation was to examine the original writings of the psychotherapists being studied. Secondary sources pertinent to the area of study were also examined. Personal interviews and taped lectures of the psychotherapists furthered the research. An investigation of pertinent pamphlets and experiments written for class and public lecture widened the investigation. This

project developed along these lines: (1) examining the nature of man according to Freud (2) examining the nature of man according to Glasser and Mowrer (3) examining the nature of guilt according to Freud (4) examining the nature of guilt according to Glasser and Mowrer (5) examining the nature of responsibility according to Freud (6) examining the nature of responsibility according to Glasser and Mowrer.

FINDINGS

1. Freud presupposed that the nature of man was homo natura and that the body is given unconditional authority in determining man's essential being.


2. Mowrer and Glasser disagree with Freud and presuppose that the nature of man is homo sapien. Man is a bio-socio organism who can formulate interpersonal relationships and bring meaning to those relationships, and formulate moral values and systems.

3. Freud could not deal adequately with the descriptive categories "guilt" and "responsibility" because man is more than a biological machine.

4. Guilt and responsibility are ontological categories and not scientific psychological measurable entities. Guilt and responsibility are given in society and are apart of being as such. Thus they are ontological and not scientifically measurable.

5. Freud pre-supposed that guilt and responsibility were feelings caused by external conditioning. These feelings were conditioned by a powerful force he called the superego. These feelings are caused by a thwarting of the biological drives which are characterized by sex and aggression.

6. Mowrer and Glasser pre-suppose that guilt and responsibility are real. They are an external (societal) phenomenon and not just an internal (guilt feeling) phenomenon. Man is responsible for his decisions and his behavior. Responsibility and guilt are learned phenomena and reside not in the feelings of the organism, but in the reality structures of society. Thus for Mowrer and Glasser guilt and responsibility are ontological in nature--it is given in existence--and not adapted to by biological determinants.

Approved: 





TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
Statement of the Problem	3
Significance of the Study	3
Limitation of the Study	4
Definition of Terms	5
Nature of man	5
Guilt	5
Responsibility	5
Ontology	5
Method of Investigation	6
Related Studies	6
II. THE NATURE OF MAN	7
Freud and the Nature of Man	7
Homo Natura	10
The Theory of the Instincts	11
Theoretical Operation of the Instincts	16
Summary	22
Mowrer and Glasser and the Nature of Man	24
Homo Sapiens	26
The Nature of Interpersonal Ego Development	27
The Nature of Society in the Developmental Process	33

CHAPTER	PAGE
The Need for a Strong Sense of Ego Identity .	36
Freedom of Responsible Choice	39
Conclusion	43
III. THE NATURE OF GUILT	44
Freud and the Nature of Guilt	44
Process of Identification	46
Ego-ideal and the Function of the Superego . .	47
The Energy System and the Superego	48
The Id and the Process of Transformed Energy .	51
The Ego Function	55
Summary	62
Mowrer and Glasser and the Nature of Guilt . . .	62
Ontological View of Guilt	62
Behavior VS. Emotions	63
Two Other Theories for Guilt	69
Two Studies in Support of Modeling Theory . .	74
Glasser's View Supports Mowrer's Theory . . .	77
Psychopath, Psycho-neurotic and Psychopathology	
in the Socialization Process	79
Empirical Studies	84
Kirkendall Study	84
Three Related Investigations by Peterson,	
O'Daniel and O'Connor	87

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. THE NATURE OF RESPONSIBILITY	100
Freud and the Nature of Responsibility	100
Mowrer and Glasser and the Nature of	
Responsibility	104
Comparison and Critique	111
Summary	112
V. SUMMARY AND EVALUATION	114
Summary	114
Evaluation	119
BIBLIOGRAPHY	122

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
I. Means and Standard Deviations of So Scores	93
II. Means, Standard Deviations, and t Tests for the Socialization Scale of the C.P.I.	97

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	PAGE
1. Schematic Representation of Two Conceptions of Psychopathology	66
2. Combination and Elaboration of the Two Diagrams Shown in Figure 1	70
3. Schematic Representation of the "Dynamics" of Neurosis as Conceived by Freud	80
4. A Modified Interpretation of the State Called Neurosis	80
5. Distribution of Character Types on a Socialization Continuum	83
6. Distribution of Character Types in a Corrected Conceptual Scheme	83
7. Distribution of Scores on Gough-Peterson Social Adequacy Test	89

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Questions concerning the nature of guilt and responsibility have long confronted and perplexed the great minds of this world. From Socrates to Freud, from Buddha to Christ, man has sought to find answers to questions concerning his nature. His feelings of guilt confront him with the fact that he has made untenable choices in his behavior, untenable at least to him. Are these also irresponsible choices? What is the relationship between guilt and responsibility? Does an answer to these questions contribute to our knowledge of the fundamental nature of man?

Sigmund Freud spent nearly a lifetime trying to answer these questions. He formulated theories born in the spirit of nineteenth-century materialistic thought. These theories are biological, and called by many thoroughly "scientific," and referred to as "classical Freudian theory."¹

Recently there has been a new emphasis placed upon the nature of guilt and responsibility which is radically

¹Erich Fromm, Beyond the Chains of Illusion (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1962), 31.

different from classical Freudian theory.² Two men who have had much to say about the subject are Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer and Dr. William Glasser. Dr. Mowrer is both an experimental psychologist and a clinician; Dr. Glasser is a psychiatrist. Both have an extensive background in classical Freudian thought and practice, yet have come to conclusions in opposition to their training.

There is a growing feeling that the Freudian approach tends to weaken and break down normal responsibility;³ also that guilt which is at the core of psychological distress is real and not a product of an over-intensive and over-extended socialization, as Freud would have us believe.⁴

This study is the review of Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser on the subject guilt and responsibility as it compares with classical Freudian theory. The research shows that the nature of guilt and responsibility are not scientific measurable psychological entities but are ontological in nature and that Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser understand the nature of guilt and responsibility to be ontological.

²William Glasser, "The Research Frontier," The Atlantic Monthly, XII (March, 1965), 55.

³Ibid., 54.

⁴O. Hobart Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961), 81.

Statement of the Problem

It was the purpose of this study: (1) to demonstrate that Freud presupposed something about the nature of man with which neither Mowrer nor Glasser agree (2) to show that the nature of man is such that Freud could not deal adequately with the descriptive categories "guilt" and "responsibility" (3) to show that guilt and responsibility are ontological categories and not scientific psychological measurable entities (4) to compare Mowrer and Glasser's understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility with classical Freudian theory.

Significance of the Study

The importance of a clear understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility as compared with classical Freudian theory is a problem that confronts many workers in the field of correctional work who have been trained in the Freudian and Neo-Freudian tradition. Counseling and therapeutic procedures depends upon our understanding of the nature of man. Dr. Mowrer feels that the way we view man is essential to our therapeutic techniques. In this researcher's opinion, the way we view man will greatly influence our understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility. This study is significant in that it attempts to define the nature

of man and speaks to the questions: "In what way is man different from just a biological organism?" or "Is he unique?" In other words what does man's nature say about the nature of guilt and of responsibility. This study is significant because there has been no other comparative study done in the field. Many researchers have written on Freud and some have written on both Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser. No one has compared Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser's findings with that of Freud and classical theory. In this way it is a first.

Limitation of the Study

This study was limited to the following areas:

(1) nature of man (2) of guilt (3) of responsibility. This study attempted to answer the following questions:

1. What did Freud conceive to be the nature of man?
2. How did this influence Freud's understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility?
3. In what way do Mowrer and Glasser view the nature of man?
4. How does this view influence their understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility?
5. How do the views of Mowrer and Glasser compare with Freud's on the nature of man?

6. How do the views of Mowrer and Glasser compare with Freud's on guilt and responsibility?

This study did not attempt to answer questions such as:

1. In what way do the biological and cultural determinants affect man and his nature?
2. In what way is man free?
3. What is the nature of freedom as viewed by Freud?
4. What is the nature of freedom as viewed by Mowrer and Glasser?

These are related questions but they were not within the scope of this study.

Definition of Terms

The following are terms which will keep appearing in this study, and their adopted definition. When different definitions are used, the fact is noted. The basic definitions are:

Nature of man. A working theory which will enable us to understand and clarify the specific, distinguishing characteristics which are particularly and uniquely man.

Guilt. A reference to fact, or to responsibility, or to feelings, or to combinations of these.

Responsibility. The ability to make choices for which a person is held accountable.

Ontology. Ontology is the study of being as such

and as distinguished from any one being. In other words it is a way in which human beings as such are understood.

Method of Investigation

The present investigator read widely in the original writings of Freud, Mowrer and Glasser. Also secondary sources which pertained to the topic were examined. The types of material used were: (1) written material book form (2) journals and periodicals (3) tape recorded lectures (4) personal interviews (5) personal papers and research experiments from Dr. Mowrer's file.

Related Studies

The present investigator, in reviewing the material, found no related studies in progress.

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF MAN

Freud and the nature of man

To understand the essence of the scientific work on the nature of man the investigator must go first to the original writings of Sigmund Freud. His writings record what Freud thought, but they are not an entity isolated from the man who produced them.

Sigmund Freud was born in Freilberg, Moravia and died in London, England; yet he spent eighty years of his life in Vienna, Austria. His life span, from 1856 to 1939, was one of the most creative periods in the history of science.¹

When Freud was three years old, Charles Darwin's Origin of the Species was published. This book began the revolution of man's concept of man.² Prior to Darwin, man was set apart from the rest of the animal world because he had a soul. Darwin's evolutionary doctrine made man a part of nature, an animal among other animals.³ "The acceptance of this radical view meant that the study of man

¹Calvin S. Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1954), 3.

²Ibid.

could proceed along naturalistic lines. Man became an object of scientific study, no different, save in complexity, from other forms of life."⁴

The year after the publication of the Origin of the Species, Gustav Fechner founded the science of psychology.⁵

These two men, Darwin and Fechner, contributed greatly to the intellectual development of Freud.⁶ Darwin conceived of man as an animal. Fechner felt that he had proved that the mind of man did not stand outside of science but that it could be brought into the laboratory and accurately measured.⁷

Also the development of the new physics by men such as Hermann Von Helmholtz, Marie and Pierre Curie, and Sir Joseph Thomson resulted in an ever more radical view of man. This view saw man as an energy system, obeying the same physical laws which regulate the movement of the planets and the falling of an apple.⁸ As a young scientist working in the field of biological research, Freud was influenced by the new physics.⁹

As a medical student, Freud came under the influence of Ernst Brucke. Brucke was Director of the Physiology Laboratory at the University of Vienna and one of the

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 4.

⁶Ibid., 5.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

greatest physiologists of the century.¹⁰ His view was that ". . . the living organism is a dynamic system to which the laws of chemistry and physics apply."¹¹ Freud quickly became indoctrinated by this new dynamic physiology.

I experimented--unsuccessfully--with zoology and chemistry, till at last, under the influence of Brucke, the greatest authority who affected me more than any other in my whole life, I settled down to physiology, though in those days it was too narrowly restricted to histology.¹²

Freud was to discover, some twenty years later, that the laws of dynamics which he learned so well from Brucke could be applied to man's personality as well as to his body.¹³ When he made this discovery, he proceeded to create a dynamic psychology. "A dynamic psychology is one that studies the transformations and exchanges of energy within the personality."¹⁴

The theories of Darwin, Fechner, Brucke, and others about the nature of man influenced Freud and his theories. Freudian theory, thus, is not a theory isolated from the man whose name it bears but is a product of that man's scientific heritage. These predecessors and contemporaries influenced Freud's thinking and helped shape his insights.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Enerst Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (New York: Basic Books Publishing Co., Inc., 1963), 27.

¹³Ibid., 29.

¹⁴Hall, op. cit., 8.

I. HOMO NATURA

All his life Freud was engrossed with the great problem of how man came to be man, probably more than with any other problem.¹⁵ For Freud the essence of man is neither homo aeternus nor homo universalis, "universal" historical man. It is rather homo natura--a scientific concept--man as nature.¹⁶

The scientific theorist as a rule, wishes to deny that it is a faith that gives wings to his ideas: Freud is an exception. In one of those many places in his writings that owe their penetrating force to the power and conciseness of his idea, he expresses his basic belief:

We believe that it is possible for scientific endeavor to come to know something of the reality of the world, something which can increase our power and according to which we can direct our lives.¹⁷

This belief in the supremacy of science to give to man the power to find reality toward which he could direct his life brings with it an element contained in every truly productive faith. This element is called by philosophers and theologians

¹⁵Jones, op. cit., 143.

¹⁶Ludwing Binswanger, Being-in-the-World (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963), 150.

¹⁷Sigmund Freud, "The Future of an Illusion," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI, James Strachey (ed.), (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), 55.

"mysterium tremendum" and is best defined as ". . . an element of awe-stricken wonder, even terror, before the immense unknown."¹⁸ There is in Freud, more than in any other biological conception of man, this "unknown" which binds Freud's homo natura to the primal source of all life.

The theory of the instincts

What distinguishes and stamps Freud is his concept of the instincts.

We have always had the feeling that behind these multitudinous little instincts something grave and powerful is buried, something that we wish to approach cautiously. The theory of instincts is, as it were, our mythology; the instincts are wonderfully vague mythical beings. In our work we cannot take our eyes off them for a moment, yet at the same time we never see them clearly.¹⁹

Beginning with the instincts, Freud used a reductive system to construct his theory of man and this system is to the last detail that of natural science. In it, Freud puts his faith that he is discovering something about the reality of the world, and with this faith in natural science there is a sense of awe before the mystery and power of life. Freud was not one to limit his concern merely to the direct object of his investigations without at the same time being

¹⁸Biswanger, loc. cit.

¹⁹Sigmund Freud, "Collected Letters," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XI, 465.

profoundly aware of the intellectual tool that was his method. He gives an excellent description of the method's most essential prerequisites. He speaks of seeking identity beneath differences. Psychoanalytic investigations show ". . . that the deepest essence of man in instinctual impulse, whose elemental nature is the same in all men and which directs him to the satisfaction of certain primal needs."²⁰ He speaks "chemistically" of the great qualitative differences between substances being ". . . traced back to quantitative variations in the proportions in which the same elements were combined."²¹ By elements, Freud means the individual instincts and instinctual components. He does confess:

. . . that all we have are merely scientific hypotheses [which cannot] ". . . provide final solutions to these doubtful problems and which merely provide the proper abstract ideas that, when applied to the raw material of observation, allow order and clarity to emerge."²²

The one statement of Freud's that most concisely articulates the scientific method and mood of Freud is found in this statement. "In our method, observed phenomena must take second place to forces that are merely hypothesized."²³

²⁰Ibid., 322.

²¹Ibid., 168.

²²Ibid., 235.

²³Ibid.

This is the genuine natural-scientific spirit! Indeed the main task of natural science never begins with just the phenomena; the task is to divest the phenomena of their phenomenality as quickly and as thoroughly as possible.²⁴ Wherever Freud speaks of knowing the world, of experience, research and reason, he means this natural-scientific kind of knowledge. He maintains:

. . . there is no other source of knowledge of the universe but the intellectual manipulation of carefully verified observations--that is, what is called research and that no knowledge can be obtained from revelation, intuition, or inspiration.²⁵

Science thus seeks neither to frighten nor console; it recognizes no "tendentiousness" in itself.²⁶ As such, science is an irresistible force. "In the long run, nothing can withstand reason and experience."²⁷ "There is no appeal beyond reason."²⁸ We can characterize the idea of homo natura and the theory of the instincts more precisely by saying:

. . . that it is a genuine natural-scientific biopsychological idea. It is a natural-scientific construct like the biophysiological idea of the organism, the chemist's idea of matter as the underlying basis of the elements and their combinations, and the physicist's of light, etc. The

²⁴Binswanger, op. cit., 156.

²⁵Freud, "Collected Letters," Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XI, 319.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid., 336.

²⁸Ibid.

reality of the phenomenal, its uniqueness and independence, is absorbed by the hypothesized forces, drives, and the laws that govern them.²⁹

How can the natural scientific method as conceived by Freud answer questions of religion, art, myth, etc.

Freud distinguishes between homo natura in the sense of the primitive "natural" man of human history and homo natura in the sense of the primitive natural man of the individual's history, the newly born infant.³⁰ The Freudian primal man was not actual man, but an idea. "It is not, to be sure, the result of an ad hoc intuitive insight into nature, but rather it arises from a hardheaded, discursive examination of the mechanics of nature."³¹ In other words this primal man is not the source and fount of human history, but is, instead, a requirement of natural-scientific research.

Homo natura in the sense of the newly born infant is the same primal man, not an actual man but an idea. This idea is not an actual beginning but a necessary requirement of scientific, biological reflection and reduction. The idea is reduced to a unitary principle and operates in the same way a leaf operates in botany according to a "morphological principle."

²⁹Binswanger, op. cit., 157.

³⁰Ibid., 160.

³¹Ibid.

. . . homo natura epitomizes instinctuality, i.e., the drivenness of human existence, a drivenness conceived according to the principle of mechanical necessity. This general notion of a pure, vital life force has, for anthropology, the significance of a unitary "morphological" or formal principle, precisely in the way in which a leaf is a unitary morphological principle for botany. Instinct as conceived by Freud is the primal shape or form underlying all anthropological metamorphosis or transformation.³²

The idea of reduction and biological reflection are both biological ideas and treat man--with regard to his genuine historicity, his capacity for ethics, culture, religion, art,--as a "tabula rasa"--clean slate.³³ The infant is born, however, with certain biological etching on this tablet, a blueprint according to which subsequent cultural development takes place. For science the notion of a "tabula rasa" is never something that comes first in scientific thought, but something that comes last.³⁴

[Tabula rasa] . . . is the end result of a scientific dialectic that limits and reduces the totality of human experience to one particular kind of experience. Dialectically, this notion serves as an indication that knowledge has come up against a point of the totality of human experience, the tabula rasa is thus a symbol of a particular negation, the expression of a dialectical boundary line.³⁵

If to treat tabula rasa as a symbol of the beginning of human history, as natural-science would have us do, it is to

³²Ibid., 168.

³³Ibid., 154.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., 155.

witness a complete reversal of the historical connections of nature, history, and myth.³⁶

Where we find myth in the earliest periods of human history, where we see history emerge from the husks of hieratic mythical traditions and biography and see how late in this history the science of nature arises, we now find natural science turning the tables completely, inserting the product of its own constructions--the idea of homo natura--at the beginning, converting its "biological natural development" into history and then taking this nature and this history as the basis upon which myth and religion are to be "explained."³⁷

Thus, the essential significance of the idea homo natura for Freud was that it clamps man in between instinct and illusion. From the tension that arises between these two forces, art, myth, and religion arise.

What is the effect on our total understanding of man to interpret him as homo natura and to take instinctual impulses as the basis of this interpretation? To answer this question a clearer understanding of the instincts is necessary.

Theoretical operation of the instincts

According to Freud, "an instinct is a sum of psychic energy which imparts direction to psychological processes, and has a source, an aim, an object, and an impetus."³⁸

³⁶Ibid., 159.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Sigmund Freud, "The Sexual Aberrations," The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, A. A. Brill (ed.), (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), 556.

There are as many instincts as there are bodily needs, since an instinct is the mental representative of a bodily need. "The number of instincts is a matter to be determined by biological investigation."³⁹ What is a need? "A need or impulse is an excitatory process in some tissue or organ of the body which releases energy that is stored in the body."⁴⁰ The final aim of an instinct is the removal of a bodily need.⁴¹ An instinct has two aims: (1) its internal aim and (2) its external aim. The aim of the instinct of hunger, for example, is to remove the physical condition of hunger. When hunger is removed the individual returns to a state of physiological and psychological quiescence. However, before hunger can be appeased, it is necessary to find the food and place it in the mouth. The finding and eating of the food are subordinate to the elimination of the hunger. Freud called ". . . the final goal of an instinct is its internal aim and its subordinate goal is its external aims."⁴²

Freud recognized two great groups of instincts, those that are in the service of life and those that are in the service of death. "The ultimate goal of the death instincts

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Ibid., 557.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (London: The Hogarth Press, 1947), 12.

are to return to the constancy of inorganic matter."⁴³

The life instincts are the mental representatives of all of the bodily needs whose satisfaction is necessary for survival and for propagation.⁴⁴

The form of energy used by the life instincts is called "libido;" Freud formulated no special term for the energy of the death instincts.

The life instincts are better known than the death instincts, the major one of these is the sex instincts. The mouth, the anus, and the genital organs are the chief areas of the body where the sex instincts have their source. These areas are called erogenous zones.⁴⁵

The instincts reside in the id, but they come to expression by guiding the processes of the ego and the superego.⁴⁶ The sole function of the id ". . . is to provide for the immediate discharge of quantities of excitation (energy or tension) that are released in the organism by internal or external stimulation."⁴⁷ The id fulfills the primordial or initial principle of life which Freud called

⁴³Ibid., 13.

⁴⁴Hall, op. cit., 35.

⁴⁵Freud, "The Sexual Aberrations," The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, 577.

⁴⁶Hall, op. cit., 38.

⁴⁷Ibid.

the pleasure principle.⁴⁸ The aim of the pleasure principle is to rid the person of tension, or if this is impossible-- as it usually is--to reduce the amount of tension to a low level and to keep it as constant as possible.⁴⁹ In other words tension is experienced as pain or discomfort, while relief from tension is experienced as pleasure or satisfaction. The aim of the pleasure principle is to avoid pain and find pleasure.

The ego is the principal agent of the life instincts. The ego serves the life instincts in two important ways: (1) it obtains satisfaction for the basic bodily needs (it does this by learning to make realistic transactions with the environment) and (2) it transforms the death instincts into forms that serve the ends of life instead of those of death.⁵⁰ For example:

. . . the primary wish in the id becomes transformed in the ego into aggression against enemies in the external world. By taking aggressive action a person protects himself from being injured or destroyed by his enemies. Aggression also helps him to overcome barriers that stand in the way of the satisfaction of his basic needs.⁵¹

When a person is aggressive he often encounters counter-

⁴⁸Sigmund Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 9.

⁴⁹Ibid., 12.

⁵⁰Hall, op. cit., 36.

⁵¹Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 55.

aggression from authority figures and enemies. In order to avoid punishment the person learns to identify with the aggressor. "This means that he becomes aggressive against the very impulses which make him hostile toward others."⁵² In other words he develops a superego which plays the same role in controlling his impulses as an external authority does.

The superego in its role of internalized authority then takes aggressive action against the ego whenever the ego contemplates being hostile or rebellious against an external authority figure.⁵³ Since the ego is the agent of life, the superego by striving to destroy the ego has the same aim as the original death wish in the id: for this reason the superego ". . . is said to be the agent of the death instincts."⁵⁴

The aim of the pleasure principle is to rid the person of tension which is interpreted as anxiety. Anxiety is a painful emotional experience which is produced by excitations in the internal organs of the body.⁵⁵ For Freud anxiety is synonymous with the emotion of fear. He preferred the term

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid., 69.

⁵⁴Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1933), 146.

⁵⁵Freud, "Dreams and Telepathy," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. VIII, 207.

anxiety to that of fear because ". . . fear is usually thought of in the sense of being afraid of something in the external world."⁵⁶ Freud recognized that one could be afraid of internal dangers as well as external ones. He differentiated three types of anxiety: "reality or objective anxiety," "neurotic anxiety," and "moral anxiety."⁵⁷

These types of anxiety do not differ among themselves; they are all unpleasant; they differ only in respect of their source. "In reality anxiety, the source of the danger lies in the external world."⁵⁸ "In neurotic anxiety, the threat resides in the instinctual object choice of the id."⁵⁹ "In moral anxiety, the source of the threat is the conscience of the superego system."⁶⁰

The only function of anxiety is to act as a danger signal to the ego, so that when the signal appears in consciousness, the ego may institute measures to deal with the danger.⁶¹

The principle which governs the ego, Freud calls the reality principle.⁶² Reality means that which exists. The aim of the reality principle is to postpone the discharge of

⁵⁶Ibid., 96.

⁵⁷Ibid., 63.

⁵⁸Ibid., 61.

⁵⁹Ibid., 65.

⁶⁰Ibid., 69.

⁶¹Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 31-33.

⁶²Ibid., 10-11.

energy until the actual object that will satisfy the need has been discovered or produced.⁶³ When the id discharges tension, namely, impulsive motor activity and image formation (wish-fulfillment), this tension does not suffice in attaining the great evolutionary goals of survival and reproduction.⁶⁴ Neither a reflex nor a wish will provide food nor the sexually motivated person with a mate. To secure what is needed, it is necessary to take into account external reality (the environment) and either by accommodation or mastery over it obtain from the world that which the organism needs.⁶⁵ "These transactions between the person and the world require the formation of a new psychological system."⁶⁶

The postponement of action means that the ego has to be able to tolerate tension until the tension can be discharged by an appropriate form of behavior. The institution of the reality principle does not mean that the pleasure principle is forsaken. It is only temporarily suspended in the interest of reality. Eventually the reality principle leads to pleasure, although a person may have to endure some discomfort while he is looking for reality.⁶⁷

Summary

How does it affect our total understanding of man to interpret him as homo natura and to take instinctual impulses

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid.

⁶⁷Ibid.

as the basis of this interpretation? It reduces man to the level of general exigencies or needs and the psychic significance of those needs. This level is that of the body or vitality, and Freud's homo natura could also be described as a homo vita. In Freud's view, the body is given unconditional authority in determining man's essential being. Man is conceived as a machine, driven by a relatively constant amount of life or sexual energy called libido. This libido causes painful tension, which is reduced only by the act of physical release and brings about a liberation from painful tension. After the reduction of tension, libidinal tension increases again due to the chemistry of the body, causing a new need for tension reduction, that is pleasurable satisfaction. This dynamism, which leads from tension to release of tension to renewed tension, from pain to pleasure to pain is the pleasure principle which is the motivation of the individual. This is contrasted by the reality principle which tells man what to seek for and what to avoid in the real world in which he lives, in order to secure his survival. When these two principles come in conflict or out of balance mental illness is the result.

But if physical needs are given authority over the whole man's being, then the image of man becomes one-sidedly distorted and ontologically falsified. For then the only thing that will be seen, experienced, felt, suffered, and

missed as real and actual becomes that which man is qua body, i.e., what he feels "in" or "from" his body, what he perceives with his body and, eventually, what he expresses "with" his body.⁶⁸ "Everything else becomes, of necessity, a mere "superstructure"--a "fabrication," a "refinement,"⁶⁹ or, as Freud would say, an illusion.

II. MOWRER AND GLASSER AND THE NATURE OF MAN

Two men who disagree with the Freudian model of man both come from a Freudian background.⁷⁰ Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer, an experimental psychologist and clinician, was born in a small country town in the mid-west.⁷¹ He graduated from the University of Missouri in 1929 with an A.B. degree in psychology and received his doctorate from Johns Hopkins University, having taught at Yale and Harvard prior to receiving his degree. He has written in the field of personality theory and learning theory.

Dr. William Glasser, the other man who disagrees with the Freudian model of the nature of man is a psychiatrist

⁶⁸Binswanger, op. cit., 160.

⁶⁹Ibid.

⁷⁰O. Hobart Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, Jack A. Vernon (ed.), (Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Company, 1966), 3.

⁷¹Ibid.

who also teaches at the California Youth Authority.⁷² He was born in Cleveland, Ohio, and graduated with his M.D. from the Case Institute of Technology, and Western Reserve University School of Medicine.⁷³ He received his psychiatric training at the Veterans Administration Center and UCLA.⁷⁴

Dr. Glasser is not a personality theorist, but has written two books one of which develops his theories concerning mental health, and the other, his techniques of therapy. Because Dr. Glasser is not a personality theorist, conclusions concerning his views of the nature of man must be inferred from these books.

Both Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser agree that classical Freudian theory does not adequately define the nature of man. Dr. Mowrer says:

Academic psychology (particularly here in America) and Freudian psychoanalysis (an indigenous European movement) were both powerfully influenced by the Darwinian conception of organic evolution, which regarded mind as essentially an "organ of adaptation." This type of approach has, in some ways, been extremely useful. However, there are today signs of acute unrest in both psychiatry and psychology. Personal disorganization and psychopathology persist as great unsolved problems in our time; and there is growing conviction that the principles and conditions of biological adaptation and survival do not necessarily provide the understanding needed for psychological survival.⁷⁵

⁷²William Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), vii.

⁷³Ibid.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵O. Hobart Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1961) 1.

Dr. Glasser says:

Admittedly, the introduction of morality into psychotherapy may draw criticism from many sources. Some people argue that a great strength of conventional psychiatry is that it does not involve itself with this age-old question. It would be easier for us if we could avoid the issue also, but we cannot. People come to therapy suffering because they behave in ways that do not fulfill their needs, and they ask if their behavior is wrong. Our job is to face this question, confront them with their total behavior, and get them to judge the quality of what they are doing. We have found unless they judge their own behavior they will not change.⁷⁶

III. HOMO SAPIENS

Here is a new understanding of the nature of man, demonstrated in a theory of personality (Mowrer) and a technique of administering therapy (Glasser).

Human beings are more than mere bodies, organisms, physiological entities, they are also persons. And personality, it seems, can be properly understood and appreciated only in terms of sociality, i.e., interpersonal and moral values systems.⁷⁷

For Dr. Mowrer man is a bio-socio organism who develops in an interpersonal world which has morals. Dr. Glasser has the same thing in mind when he states:

To develop an effective ego, a person must have a meaningful, two-way relationship with someone

⁷⁶William Glasser, Reality Therapy (New York: Harper & Row Inc., 1965), 56.

⁷⁷Mowrer, Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion, 1.

who has an effective ego--a relationship in which the ego of the giving person is available for use by the receiving person in a consistent atmosphere of some love and a minimum of hostility or anger.⁷⁸

This two-way relationship is interpersonal and has the value of "love" and it is "meaningful." When an interpersonal relationship is established with concern and involvement then a healthy ego develops because ". . . interpersonal relationships are the crux of ego development."⁷⁹

The nature of interpersonal ego development

Interpersonal ego development starts when the infant enters the world and takes his first breath. The child is indulged, waited on and his needs and wishes are gratified by another person (usually his mother) as fully as possible, and no demands are made on him other than that he be comfortable and thrive physiologically.⁸⁰

When an examination is made of the newborn infant, several important observations give clues to his ego development. The infant is either crying or he is sleeping, and he alternates between these two states for twenty-four hours a day. During this twenty-four hour period, he is fed, and food is added to his world. It becomes a pattern to feed

⁷⁸Glasser, Reality Therapy, 22.

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness, 43.

him when he cries, and then after he is fed, a period of contented wakefulness occurs before he goes back to sleep.⁸¹

"Soon four basic patterns are established: (1) discomfort, (2) physiologic need satisfaction, (3) comfort, and (4) escape from reality or the world into sleep."⁸²

When the infant is observed, he is seen to be displaying the basic physiologic needs, i.e., for food, air, water, warmth, but there are also rudiments of the psychologic needs as well, i.e., for love, social needs, achievement. "In some form they are all there and must be satisfied."⁸³ An infant does not have the ego function to satisfy his needs, but he does have the ability to exhibit strong, primitive ego reactions. The infant's howling and thrashing are an example of primitive ego reactions. The mother generally responds to these reactions, thus filling his needs as well as she is able. "In a sense the mother acts as if she were the infant's ego; actually she shares her developed ego with him so he may survive."⁸⁴ The mother's ego responds to the child's ego reactions; when he howls or rages she is there to satisfy him; but she also derives satisfaction when his needs are satisfied, he exhibits peace and contentment. This is a situation in which one ego,

⁸¹Ibid., 47.

⁸²Ibid., 55.

⁸³Ibid.

⁸⁴Ibid., 57.

the mother's, is happily doing the work of the two. She derives pleasure satisfying not her needs but those of the child. In this interpersonal relationship of the mother to the child an essential ingredient to ego development is defined.

In these terms love is sharing ego function and receiving warm feelings when this sharing provides need satisfaction along with pleasant feelings for someone else.⁸⁵

For the infant, the world is the mother or mother substitute. "To the infant the world (i.e., the mother) is a total, loving place, which acts as his ego, satisfies his needs, and provides him with the resultant pleasure."⁸⁶ In this situation everything is fused; the child has no ability to distinguish between his ego, his mother's ego, and the world as it exists around him. Eventually a time comes when this indulgence and irresponsibility must end. The parents begin to act and to say to the child, "You are a big boy (or girl) now and are no longer a small infant."⁸⁷ With these overtures comes a renunciation of infantile pleasure and a demand for obedience and responsibility. This is the onset of socialization, and it marks the first serious attempt that is deliberately made to condition the child,

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., 47.

⁸⁷Ibid.

i.e., to create in him social attitudes and emotions which, it is hoped, will lay the basis for good character.⁸⁸

Let us examine this series of events from "infantile omnipotence" (to borrow Freud's term) to mature character formation. In the beginning the mother readily accepts the facts that she must function for her baby; because she loves him, she enjoys doing it. But, for the mother who has a maximum of love for her child, there are times when she does not feel like functioning for him. At these times, Baby's crying irritates her to the point where, if she is honest, she wishes he would be still. At this time, early in the baby's career, by postponing the satisfaction of the need of the child to satisfy her own needs, she shows the child that he lives in the world that is not set up expressly for the satisfaction of his needs.⁸⁹

Thus, a two-way relationship develops early in life, each person respecting both himself and the other person. The child is able to use his own ego in small ways to entertain himself, to see what he can do in the world. Early he begins to realize that in some ways he can achieve something with his own ego.⁹⁰

The infant by doing something with his own ego has learned from his mother (by her not meeting his every need immediately)

⁸⁸Mowrer, Abnormal Reactions or Actions, "Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 27.

⁸⁹Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness, 48.

⁹⁰Ibid., 47.

that he can function apart from her. By enjoying the love of his mother, he can use it as an incentive for his own development rather than as a means for forcing his mother into doing things he should learn to do himself.⁹¹ This function of learning apart from the mother and yet in the loving world of the mother is the interpersonal social structure which develops character.

Dr. Glasser emphasizes a point in the development of the person that Dr. Mowrer does not mention--the importance of hostility or anger.

"No one can completely subordinate his own needs to those of someone else; not even a mother to a child, without feeling some anger."⁹² If a proper interpersonal relationship exists, this anger is minimized, and the child matures with an effective ego. If the mother attempts to respond to all of the protest of the child, she becomes very angry, and even though she continues to care for him, the anger she feels is communicated to the child.⁹³

Unable to handle her hostility--"only a well-developed effective ego can handle hostility,"⁹⁴ and in the baby as yet there is little if any ego development--the child is terrified by the paradox which now exists. Although his needs are satisfied with his mother's ego functioning for him, he feels her anger. "The fear generated by the mother's anger

⁹¹Ibid., 52.

⁹²Ibid., 48.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid.

completely immobilizes the infant so that he is afraid to go further, the anger stopping his progress in its tracks."⁹⁵ The child needs to develop his ego from the pattern set by his mother, but he cannot do so because her anger blocks him. The mother-child relationship, so important to the child's growth, may deteriorate, so that neither gains satisfaction.

Two important concepts can now be delineated. First, ego growth cannot take place in the presence of anger unless the ego is strong enough to handle the situation without fear. Second, it is important to develop relationships which are two-way with each person respecting the other and each deriving satisfaction from seeing the other person fill his own needs.⁹⁶

Dr. Mowrer feels that because the mother has mediated comforts along with other responsive persons, the baby will already have developed strong dependence upon and love for them.⁹⁷ "This cushion of positive feeling seems to be of the utmost importance in later taking up the shock and in making more acceptable the demands and impositions of active socialization."⁹⁸ He feels that the period between the ages of two and six is the period of "negativism" and a good deal of resistance and resentment can be expected.⁹⁹

⁹⁵Ibid., 49.

⁹⁶Ibid.

⁹⁷Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 28.

⁹⁸Ibid.

⁹⁹Ibid.

The normal person is in more or less continuous interaction with his environment, modifying it, being effective, but being in turn modified by it, affected.¹⁰⁰ In the person's world (a relatively small segment of the World) he must learn how his needs can be satisfied and he must learn to abide by the rules of this world.¹⁰¹ "It is important to realize that even in the same geographical area the 'world' is quite variable."¹⁰²

The nature of society in the developmental process

Although both Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser agree that the person or persons is affected and effected by the give and take of the environment they differ in their understanding of the process by which this takes place. For Dr. Mowrer the world is built upon universal principles. He says:

. . . there are principles--universal, consistent, knowable principles--in the domain of human personality and social process which transcend "persons," and that we can know others and be ourselves, in the ultimate sense, only in terms of these principles.¹⁰³

Dr. Mowrer is not sure just what these universal principles are but he feels that it is the task of science and religion to tell people what these principles are, and he says, "For myself--and here I think I speak for many others--what I want is a clearer knowledge of principles, which we can

¹⁰⁰Ibid., 30.

¹⁰¹Glasser, Reality Therapy, 59.

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry, 182.

learn to obey and hereby live abundantly or, if ever we choose, disobey and suffer the consequences."¹⁰⁴ To discover the universal principles . . . this is a capital challenge to both contemporary social scientists and to clear-minded and courageous religious leaders, such as Niebuhr."¹⁰⁵ Dr. Mowrer is saying that there are universal principles in the universe by which man must live to remain healthy and socially integrated. These principles are moral, and yet they are in accord with human personality development. It is the task of the social scientist and the theologian to identify and describe these universal principles.

Dr. Glasser, more Freudian oriented than Mowrer in his thinking at this point says:

In theory each person must obey the same legal rules, but when a person breaks the law the punishment may vary widely. In the South this is graphically exemplified in the case of a Negro and white person breaking the same law, e.g., rape of a person of the opposite race. We must therefore understand that the world of reality or society is constant in a very broad sense only. In any particular instance, it may be extremely variable and it is this variation which is so confusing to the person trying to satisfy his needs. Thus we can see the immediate problem facing the human being in trying to establish a normal pattern. He has constant needs to satisfy. He is given to understand by the many institutions which comprise his environment that the segment of reality which

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., 187.

surrounds him is constant, but this is not so; he must always be alert to cope with many variations in the world.

.....
 Thus the world, both in a narrow family sense and in a large (common) sense, is variable and inconsistent, but it consistently exists this way.¹⁰⁶

Dr. Glasser believes that there are some psychological needs as well as physiological needs which need satisfaction. The psychological needs are fulfilled in the world of reality, i.e., the social world. He believes that love and affection are closely related to the social needs, but he differentiates them:

Although they are closely related, social needs should be differentiated from the need for love and affection. Almost all people have a need for other people. Sometimes we yearn to "get away from it all," but when we do, we often become lonely. It is an unusual person who can comfortably tolerate any extended period without companionship.¹⁰⁷

Another need which is fulfilled in the social world is the need for "achievement." "There are many indications that humans have a strong need to achieve something, to have the feeling that they are accomplishing something worthwhile. Even if no praise or love accompanies our achievement, we still strive continually in many directions."¹⁰⁸ The need for other people and achievement are met in the world. For Dr. Glasser, the expression of these two needs are relative, but the principle behind them is universal.

¹⁰⁶Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness, 7.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 6.

The need for a strong sense of ego identity

The development of the ego as a bio-socio process is not complete until a strong sense of identity is achieved. Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser both strongly agree upon this point. The feeling of "I am I" is built into the ego with a strong sense of character which keeps the ego unshaken by changes in the world.¹⁰⁹

An effective ego is one that has a well-established set of values or ideals in which the person strongly believes. These values are attained in many situations where choices must be made. "In the establishing of strong positive identity these choices are made."¹¹⁰

We are likely to think of strength of character and so-called will power as something we have or exercise deep down inside us. And we are likely to try to improve this capacity in others by admonishing, scolding, lecturing them. I am increasingly persuaded that will power or self-control is not nearly so much of an individual matter as we sometimes think. Instead, is it not basically a social phenomenon? Here, in society, is where the norms and values reside, and the person whose life is open to social supports and sanctions. But the individual who embarks upon a policy of covertness and secrecy does not have this source of strength and soon finds himself the victim of uncontrollable temptation and he is likely to experience it as weak will.¹¹¹

Much of what is considered to be good in our world is wrought by people who are willing under pain and pressure

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 13.

¹¹⁰Ibid., 15.

¹¹¹Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 27.

to stand for what they believe to be right--their values.

"They were not willing to change their beliefs for a different, more comfortable identity."¹¹² They kept the support of the society and its sanctions.

A good sense of identity implies knowing where you are in respect to time, place, and social environment. A person with a good sense of identity knows the dimensions of his world and where he stands relative to them.¹¹³

The average man does not know who he is and this is one of the great problems of all times. This not knowing "who we are" is a sign of neuroticism. Feelings of depersonalization and a sense of unreality are typical of the experience of severely disturbed persons. How else would we expect it to be?¹¹⁴

If our Mowrer thesis is correct, the essence of psychopathology is systematic denial of who one is, and if we misrepresent ourselves to others, it is not surprising that we soon begin to appear alien, strange, and "unfamiliar" even to ourselves.¹¹⁵

Today it seems that at long last there is in process the development of a real "science of man" and a sound appreciation of his inveterate need for community and the disastrous result of alienation, loss of self-identity and estrangement.¹¹⁶

The starting point here, it seems, is personal integrity, faithfulness to the commitments one has explicitly made or tacitly accepted, and the capacity to come into an identity crisis when one

¹¹²Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness, 15. ¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 36.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

secretly violates these commitments. In short, I think we are here concerned with the psychology of conscience--and with religion as I have defined it.¹¹⁷

What Dr. Mowrer calls "loss of identity through alienation and estrangement," Dr. Glasser called "emptiness." "Emptiness is a specific ego reaction which accompanies the failure of the ego to establish identity."¹¹⁸ Emptiness is a self-descriptive term and is rather common as an ego reaction in our society. It implies a feeling of nothingness, lack of personal worth or esteem and a lack of confidence in oneself as a person. "To the empty person the world is without rewards, life is dull and humdrum."¹¹⁹ With this feeling of emptiness there is no feeling of belonging.

Almost all people who seek psychiatric help do so partly because of emptiness. They look to the psychiatrist to supply in a measure what they lack, and in proper psychiatric treatment he does this. When the patient finally begins to establish a real feeling of identity, the empty feeling leaves and the person begins to become alive and vital. He begins to function more effectively, establishing new ego patterns which lead to new relationships.¹²⁰

Both Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser see the need for relationships with others in which the feeling of identity is predicated upon a need for honest community, and in which a person feels

¹¹⁷Ibid., 28.

¹¹⁸Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness, 24.

¹¹⁹Ibid.

¹²⁰Ibid., 26.

he belongs because he is committed to those significant others.

Freedom of responsible choice

The key concept for man and his nature which both Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser stress is the human being's freedom of responsible choice.

Within the last decade or two, it has become increasingly apparent that the so-called neurotic individual has considerable responsibility both for having gotten into his emotional difficulties and for getting out of them. In other words, an identity crisis arises because of foolish, short-sighted decisions which the individual himself has made (to do deviant things and then hide them) for which no one but himself can be properly blamed. Such a person has had some freedom of choice and has exercised it badly.¹²¹

In their unsuccessful effort to fulfill their needs, no matter what behavior they choose, all patients have a common characteristic: they all deny the reality of the world around them.¹²²

In the final analysis, it is the capacity to choose wisely between these two types of behavior we call reason; . . . and the other consequences.¹²³

The idea that man is a free being who makes choices about his behavior and is responsible for those choices is the main emphasis of both Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser.

¹²¹Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 29.

¹²²Glasser, Reality Therapy, 59.

¹²³Ibid., 60.

Dr. Mowrer develops the theory of man's freedom to choose his behavior in what he calls the "Two Factor Learning Theory." He says:

The Freudian conception of repression holds that this process is the intrapsychic equivalent of earlier interpersonal events. The parents apprehended the child gratifying tabooed impulses and punished the child. The parent, being more powerful than the child, is thus able to inhibit disapproved behavior. But the process does not stop here. Since the child has in some measure identified with the parent, i.e., has incorporated ("introjected") many parental values into the superego there is an internal repetition of this drama: the tabooed impulses appear in consciousness, are disapproved by the superego, and the ego (being poorly developed and inferior to the powerful superego) is compelled to reject these impulses and deny them further access to consciousness. Social intimidation is thus assumed to be the forerunner of psychic repression, which, in turn, sets the stage for subsequent neurotic developments.

Little attention has been given to another possibility, one which is equally logical and indeed clinically better supported. It, too, starts with the observation that parents punish their children for displaying certain forms of behavior. But there is an immediate divergence. Instead of assuming that parental discipline always has the intended effect of blocking the behavior toward which it is directed, the alternative possibility is that very commonly--perhaps uniformly in situations which are to lead to neurosis--parental discipline has the effect of merely teaching the child to be evasive and deceitful! Gratification of the forbidden impulses may in this way be restricted but not entirely stopped, and each surreptitious indulgence will now be followed, not only by fear of discovery, but also by the knowledge that to the first act of disobedience and defiance has been added a second one of duplicity. Most children are taught that they must be truthful and overt with their parents; and if they thus compound their disobedience with dishonesty they are likely to have guilt that is all but intolerable. Conscience

becomes a constant tormenter in such situations, and one of two consequences is likely to ensue: the child will either bring his suffering to an end by confessing and taking whatever chastisement may be in store for him, or he may further extend the strategy of duplicity and social isolation by an attempt to deceive the internal representative of parental authority. This takes the form either of rationalization or repression but repression that is turned toward the conscience, in the interest of preserving the possibility of continued impulse gratification, rather than toward the id, as Freudian theory would hold.

Let us examine this point of view in the light of two-factor learning theory (see Mowrer, 1947, 1953c). We see at once that problem solving activity which takes the form of social duplicity and conscious deception and repression amounts to an attack upon the sign-learning functions. Parents are the source of much social conditioning, and conscience is the reservoir of that conditioning. Self-protective strategies of the kind just described are thus designed to neutralize the second form of learning in large and important areas of the individual's life. To put the matter somewhat enigmatically: the neurotic is an individual who has learned how not to learn. What such a statement means is that the neurotic is a person in whom solution learning is directed against sign learning, instead of these two forms of learning functioning harmoniously and complementing each other. E. B. Holt once remarked that conditioning or associative learning "brought mind into being." It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the individual who systematically attempts to keep this mechanism from operating commonly complains of "poor memory" and of the feeling that he is "loosing his mind." Perhaps a more apt formulation is that he is destroying his mind, or at least an essential part of it!

Personality disturbances, especially the more severe forms, are often referred to as "mental disease." Much misunderstanding has resulted from the use of this phrase, but in a limited sense it is opposite. Neurosis represents a kind of malignancy, which bears more than a superficial similarity to that which attacks the body. As good a theory of cancer as any is that it starts as a response to and

solution of some minor irritation of bodily tissue. Cells begin proliferating and in this way eliminate the irritation, but the process which provides the solution becomes self-perpetuating and is soon, in its own right, a problem--one which is far more serious than the one which initially set the "protective" process in motion.

In like manner, neurosis seems to start as an attempt on the part of a person to control by means of rationalization or repression a limited source of psychological irritation or conflict, but the success of this strategy requires that it be constantly expanded in its scope, until a point is reached where the "solution" has itself become a "problem." Medical pathologists have pointed out that a cancer involves a normal process, namely growth; in like manner, neurosis involves the same adjustive powers of the individual as those which, when turned in other directions, make for effective, successful living. More specifically, when an individual directs his abilities toward finding solutions both to biologically given (id) impulses and to the socially derived (superego) drives, he may be, on occasion, frustrated, conflicted, and unhappy, but he is essentially "normal." But when an individual begins to use his problem-solving abilities either to avoid new emotional learning or to paralyze existing emotional reactions, he is embarked upon a career of abnormality.¹³¹

In other words man can choose to "avoid new emotional learning" and he can "paralyze existing emotional reactions." This freedom to learn or not to learn is a decision to go against the conscience function or against sign learning.

The task of recovery from the paralysis of emotional reaction is to work not on the emotions, but on the behavior.

¹³¹Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 28-29.

"Attempts to deal with the neurotic's (emotional) problems either directly or indirectly have not brought very satisfactory results...."¹²⁵ The task of recovery is not re-educating the person emotionally, but of helping him establish problem-solving habits which will enable emotions to operate as they are normally intended. This problem-solving task is at the level of his behavior, his actions, and his irresponsible choices.¹²⁶

Conclusion

In the understanding of Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser the nature of man is not man as homo natura but man as homo sapien. Homo sapien man is a bio-socio organism who can formulate interpersonal relationships and bring meaning to those relationships, and formulate moral values and systems. For them, man is determined as much by his social nature as by his biological nature. Man has freedom to choose even though it is a conditional freedom. For them man's (disease) of the mind and his mental conditions represent not his inability to express his instinctual drives, but his decision to make irresponsible choices, which do not meet his needs for self worth, acceptance, and achievement.

¹²⁵Glasser, Reality Therapy, 28.

¹²⁶Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 35.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF GUILT

Freud and the nature of guilt

The Freudian understanding of the nature of guilt has at its base the reductive system used by Freud to construct his nature of man.¹ This chapter will deal in depth with the superego.

The phenomena Freud described as the moral or judicial branch of personality he called the superego. It is the third major institution of personality. The superego represents the ideal rather than the real, and it strives for perfection rather than for reality or pleasure.

The super-ego has the ego at its mercy and applies the most severe moral standards to it; indeed it represents the whole demands of morality, and we see all at once that our moral sense of guilt is the expression of the tension between the ego and the super-ego.²

The superego, which is known as conscience, is not innate. It has not been there from the beginning, and in this sense it is the opposite of sexuality which is present from the very beginning of life. Look at the child. "Small children are notoriously a-moral. They have no internal

¹Cf. 11.

²Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 89.

inhibitions against their pleasure-seeking impulses."³ Parental authority is the role which the superego takes over in later life. Parental authority is an external power, regulated and enforced by the parents.

The influence of the parents dominates the child by granting proofs of affection and by threats of punishment, which, to the child, mean loss of love, and which must also be feared on their own account. This objective anxiety is the forerunner of the later moral anxiety; so long as the former is dominant one need not speak of super-ego or conscience.⁴

The external restrictions are introjected, so that the superego takes over the parental function thus enabling the child to control his behavior in line with their wishes, and by doing so, to secure their approval and avoid their displeasure.

Freud observed that the superego seems to have made a onesided selection. It chooses only the harshness and severity of the parents, their preventive and punitive function, while their loving care is not taken up and continued by it.

If the parents have really ruled with a rod of iron, we can easily understand the child developing a severe super-ego, but, contrary to our expectations, experience shows that the super-ego may reflect the same relentless harshness even when the up-bringing has been gentle and kind, and avoided threats and punishment as far as possible.⁵

³Ibid., 89.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., 90.

Fear of punishment and desire for approval cause the child to identify himself with the moral precepts of his parents. This identification with the parents results in the formation of the superego.

I am myself not at all satisfied with this account of identification, but it will suffice if you will grant that the establishment of the super-ego can be described as a successful instance of identification with the parental function.⁶

I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONALITY

Process of identification

Identification is a process that is not to be confused with object-choice. It is a process by which one ego becomes like another, and incorporates, in certain respects, behavior of the ego with which it has identity. The difference between identification and object-choice is best described this way: a boy makes his decision to be like his father and so he identifies himself with his father; when the boy makes his father the object of his choice he wants to have him, to possess him; in the first case his ego is altered on the model of his father, in the second case that is not necessary. Identification and object-choice are, broadly speaking, independent of each other; but one can identify oneself with a person, and alter one's ego accordingly, and take the same

⁶Ibid., 91.

person as one's sexual object.⁷

It can be easily observed in children as in adults, in normal as in sick persons. If one has lost a love-object or has had to give it up, one often compensates oneself by identifying oneself with it; one sets it up again inside one's ego, so that in this case object-choice regresses, as it were, to identification.⁸

Ego-ideal and the function of the superego

Another important function of the superego is that of ego-ideal. "The super-ego is also the vehicle of the ego-ideal, by which the ego measures itself, towards which it strives, and who demands for ever-increasing perfection it is always striving to fulfill."⁹ Its energy is invested in "cathecting ideals" which are the internalized representatives of the parents' moral values. These ideals represent perfectionistic object-choices. A person who has a lot of his energy tied up in the ego-ideal is idealistic and high-minded. By identifying with the ethical object-choice of the ego-ideal, the ego experiences feelings of pride. Pride is the reward that the ego-ideal confers upon the ego for being good. It is analogous to the feelings that the child has when he is praised by his parents. On the other hand, when the ego identifies with or chooses an object that is considered unworthy by the superego, the superego punishes the ego by making it feel ashamed and guilty.¹⁰

⁸Ibid., 110.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Freud, The Ego and the Id, 38.

The energy system and the superego

The superego is within the organism and is a resultant phenomena of an energy system. Any descriptive terms concerning the superego must be seen as arising out of a biological need within the organism. Freud felt that the human organism is a complicated energy system.¹¹ The form of energy which operates the personality system is called psychic energy. An adequate understanding of the nature of guilt according to Freud depends upon an understanding of the distribution and disposal of psychic energy.

The energy of the id is used for instinctual gratification by means of reflex action and wish-fulfillment. In reflex action, as exemplified by the eating of food, the emptying of the bladder, and the sexual orgasm, energy is automatically discharged in motor action. "In wish-fulfillment, energy is used to produce an image of the instinctual object."¹² The aim of both of these processes is to expend the instinctual energy in a way that will eliminate the need.

If all of the tensions that occur in the organism could be discharged by reflex action, there would be no need for any psychological development beyond that of the primitive reflex apparatus.¹³ Such is not the case, however. Many

¹¹Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 70.

¹²Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 73.

¹³Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 45.

tensions occur for which there is no appropriate reflex discharge. For instance, when hunger contractions appear in the stomach of the baby, these contractions do not automatically produce food. Instead they produce restlessness and crying.

The hungry baby is not equipped with the necessary reflexes by which to satisfy its hunger, and were it not for the intervention of an older person to feed the baby, it would die. When food is brought to the babies mouth, sucking, swallowing, and digestive reflexes carry on unaided and bring the tension of hunger to an end.¹⁴

"There would be no psychological development if every time the baby began to feel the tension of hunger it was immediately fed."¹⁵ Because the baby has to learn to endure discomfort which produces a degree of frustration, these experiences stimulate the development of the id.

The new development (a result of frustration) takes place in the id and this is called by Freud the "primary process." "In order to understand the nature of the primary process it will be necessary to discuss some of the psychological potentialities of the human being."¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Sigmund Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. IV, 15.

¹⁶Ibid., 19.

The human being has four basic systems: (1) the sensory system (2) the motor system (3) the perceptual system (4) the memory system. The perceptual system receives excitations from the sense organs and forms mental pictures or representations of an object that is being represented to the sensory system. These mental pictures are preserved as memory traces in the memory system. When the memory traces are activated, the person is said to have a memory image of the object that he originally perceived. The past is brought into the present by means of these memory images.

The perception is a mental representation of an object, while the memory image is a mental representation of a perception. When we look at something in the world, a perception is formed; when we remember what we once saw a memory image is formed.¹⁷

In the example of the baby, whenever the baby was hungry it was eventually fed. During the feeding, the baby sees, tastes, smells, and feels the food, and these perceptions are stored in its memory system. Through repetition, food becomes associated with tension reduction. Then if the baby is not fed immediately the tension of hunger produces a memory image of food, with which it is associated. Thus there exists in the id an image of the object which is capable of reducing the tension of hunger. "The process which produces a memory image of an object that is needed to reduce a tension

¹⁷Ibid., 21.

is called the primary process."¹⁸

The primary process attempts to discharge tension by establishing what Freud called "an identity of perception," by which Freud meant that the id considers the memory image to be identical with the perception itself. For the id, the memory of food is exactly the same as having the food itself. "In other words, the id fails to distinguish between a subjective memory image and an objective perception of the real object."¹⁹ When the memory image of an object of perception is needed to reduce tension, this image is called wish-fulfillment. "The formation of an image of a tension-reducing object is called wish-fulfillment."²⁰

It is obvious that a person cannot make a meal of food images and still live and thus the primary process is not sufficient. Because the primary process by itself does not reduce tensions effectively, a secondary process is developed which will be discussed later under ego function.

The id and the process of transformed energy

Freud speaks of the id as being the true psychic reality. By this he means that the id is the primary subjective reality, the inner world that exists before the individual has had experiences of the external world. "It

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹Ibid., 22.

²⁰Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 42.

is the foundation upon which the personality is built."²¹
 The id retains its infantile character throughout life. It cannot tolerate tension. It wants immediate gratification. It is demanding, impulsive, irrational, asocial, selfish, and pleasure-loving.²²

The id is omnipotent because it has the magical power of fulfilling its wishes by imagination, fantasy, hallucination, and dreams. It is said to be oceanic because like the sea, it contains everything. It recognizes nothing external to itself.²³

When the id fails to obtain relief from tensions a new line of development occurs which lays a foundation for the formation of the ego. The ego has no energy of its own. "Indeed it cannot be said to exist until energy has been diverted from the id into the latent processes that constitute the ego."²⁴

We must understand that the ego is always the main reservoir of libido, from which libidinal cathexes of objects proceed, and into which they return again, while the greater part of this libido remains perpetually in the ego. There is therefore a constant transformation of ego-libido into object-libido and of object libido into ego-libido. But if this is so the two cannot differ from each other in their nature, and there is no point in distinguishing the energy of the one from that of the other; one can either drop the term "libido" altogether or use it as meaning the same as psychic energy in general.²⁵

When the id is not successful in directly finding outlets

²¹Freud, The Id and the Ego, 12.

²²Ibid., 14.

²³Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 21.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 141.

for instinctual energy, the energy is taken over by the ego or the superego and used to energize the operations of these systems. This energy potential is latent in the ego.

The activation of these latent ego potentialities lies in the identification mechanism. It will be necessary to go back over some of the ground we have already covered. The id being a reflex mechanism makes no distinction between subjective imagery and objective reality. The id cathects an image of an object, "that is, when energy is invested in a process which forms a mental representation of an object, it is the same as cathecting the object itself."²⁶ The id being only reflexitive sees object as image and object as external reality as identities, and not as separate entities.

When the id fails to relieve itself from tension, a separation between the real object and the mental image of the object takes place. They are no longer regarded by the id as identities.

What happens as a result of this differentiation is that the purely subjective, internal world of the id becomes divided into a subjective, inner world (the mind) and an objective, outer world (the environment). If a person is to be properly adjusted, the person is now confronted with the task of bringing these two worlds into harmony with one another.²⁷

²⁶Ibid., 30.

²⁷Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 89.

The secondary process of the ego is to make the contents of the mind faithful and accurate replicas of the contents of the external world. When the idea of an object agrees with the object itself, the idea is said to be identified with the object.

"The identification of thoughts with reality must be close and exact in order that the thought-out plan of action should actually bring the person his goal."²⁸ The result of the mechanism of identification is logical thinking. When energy which was invested by the id in images without regard for, and indeed with no conception of, reality is diverted into the formation of accurate mental representation of the real world, logical thinking takes the place of wish-fulfillment. "This diversion of energy from the id into cognitive processes marks the initial step in the development of the ego."²⁹

It is important to keep in mind that this new adaptation of the personality is contingent upon the separation of subject (mind) and object (matter). For the id there is no such separation. Consequently, no identification is possible.

By identification with the objects of the external world, the subjective representations of

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Freud, The Id and the Ego, 31.

these objects receive the cathexes that were formerly invested by the id in the objects themselves. These new cathexes are called ego-cathexes to distinguish them from the instinctual object-choice of the id.³⁰

By means of identification, then, energy is made available for the development of realistic thinking (the secondary process), which takes the place of hallucinatory wish-fulfillment (the primary process). This redistribution of energy from the id to the ego is a major dynamical event in the development of personality.³¹

The ego function

Under normal conditions, the ego pretty much monopolizes the store of psychic energy. When enough energy has been attracted away from the id by the ego, the ego can use this energy for other purposes than that of satisfying the instincts. "Energy is used to develop the psychological processes of perceiving, attending, learning, remembering, judging, discriminating, reasoning, and imagining."³²

Some of the energy of the ego has to be used to inhibit the outflow of excitations through the motor system. The purpose of this postponement is to permit the ego to work out a realistic plan of action before it acts. "When

³⁰Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functions," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. IV, 20.

³¹Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 91.

³²Ibid.

energy is used to block the flow of energy in the direction of final discharge, these blocking forces are called anti-cathexis."³³ An anti-cathexes is a charge of energy that opposes a cathexis.

The boundary region between the ego and the id might be likened to the boundary between two countries, one of which is trying to invade the other. The country which is threatened with invasion erects fortifications (anticathexes of the ego) by which to repulse the invader (id-cathexes). When the anti-cathexes fail to hold, the object cathexes of the id overwhelm the ego and produce impulsive behavior.³⁴

Another way of looking at the concept of anti-cathexis is to view it as internal frustration. The resisting force frustrates the discharge of tension. This type of frustration is to be distinguished from another type which is called external frustration. In external frustration the goal object cannot be obtained for reasons over which the person has no control. "External frustration is a state of privation or deprivation, while internal frustration is a state of inner inhibition."³⁵ When a person wants to do something but an external obstacle stands in his way, that is external frustration. When a person wants to do something but his ego or superego prevents him from doing it, that is

³³Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 44.

³⁴Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 46.

³⁵Ibid.

internal frustration. Freud observes:

. . . internal frustration anti-cathexis does not come into existence until external frustration prepares the ground for it.³⁶

That is, a person has to experience privation or deprivation before he can develop inner controls. In the case of the superego, for example, the child does not develop self-discipline until he has had an opportunity to identify with the moral prohibitions of his parents. "A child has to learn what is bad by being punished before he can establish inner controls over his conduct."³⁷

For Freud, the concept of urging and checking forces enables us to understand why we think and act as we do. In general, if the urging forces are stronger than the checking forces, some action will take place or some idea will become conscious. If the anti-cathexes outweigh the cathexes, the action or the thought will be repressed.³⁸

One of the major tasks imposed upon the ego is that of dealing with the threats and dangers that beset the person and arouse anxiety. "The ego may try to master danger by adopting realistic problem-solving methods, or it may attempt to alleviate anxiety by using methods that deny, falsify, or

³⁶Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functions," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. IV, 20.

³⁷Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 20.

³⁸Ibid.

distort reality and that impede the development of personality."³⁹ The latter method Freud called defense mechanisms of the ego.

A cathexis which produces anxiety may be prevented from registering itself in consciousness. This cathexis can come from the id, ego, or superego. When this cathexis is opposed by an anti-cathexis, the nullifying or restraining of a cathexis by an anti-cathexis is called repression.⁴⁰

Primal repression and repression proper are the two types of repression. Primal repression prevents an instinctual object-choice which has never been conscious from becoming conscious.

Primal repressions are innately determined barriers which are responsible for keeping a large part of the contents of the id permanently unconscious. These primal repressions have been built into the person as a result of racial experience with painful situations. For example, the taboo against incest is said to be based upon a strong desire for sexual relations with one's father or mother. The expression of this desire is punished by the parents. When this happens over and over again during the racial history of mankind, the repression of the incestuous desire is built into man and becomes a primal repression.⁴¹

What this means is that the next generations do not have to learn to repress the desire since the repression itself is

³⁹Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 100.

⁴⁰Ibid.

⁴¹Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 21.

inherited. The dangerous instinctual object-choices are kept out of awareness and thus are unable to evoke anxiety. This process operates on the principle that what we do not know will not hurt us. These object-choices may affect behavior in various indirect ways, or by association with material which does become conscious. When this happens there is a sensation of anxiety.⁴² "The ego may then deal with the disguised penetration of threatening id-cathexes into consciousness or behavior by instituting repression proper."⁴³ "Repression proper forces a dangerous memory, idea, or perception out of consciousness and acts as a barrier against any form of motor discharge."⁴⁴

In the well-adjusted person, the ego is the executive of the personality, controlling and governing the id and the superego and maintaining commerce with the external world in the interest of the total personality and its far-flung needs.

Instead of the pleasure principle which regulates the id, the ego is governed by the reality principle. "The aim of the reality principle is to postpone the discharge of

⁴²Ibid., 13.

⁴³Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 109.'

⁴⁴Ibid.

energy until the actual object that will satisfy the need has been discovered or produced."⁴⁵ This postponement of action means that the ego has to be able to tolerate tension until the tension can be discharged by an appropriate form of behavior.

The institution of the reality principle does not mean that the pleasure principle is forsaken. It is only temporarily suspended in the interest of reality. Eventually, the reality principle leads to pleasure, although a person may have to endure some discomfort while he is looking for reality.⁴⁶

The ego is the principal agent of the life instincts.⁴⁷ It serves the life instincts in two ways: (1) to obtain satisfaction for the basic bodily needs (2) to transform the death instincts into forms that serve the ends of life instead of those of death.⁴⁸

For example, the primary death wish in the id becomes transformed in the ego into aggression against enemies in the external world. By taking aggressive action a person protects himself from being injured or destroyed by his enemies. Aggression also helps him to overcome barriers that stand in the way of the satisfaction of his basic needs.⁴⁹

Freud believed that the mental processes which are most likely to undergo repression are the instinctual forces of sexuality and hostility or aggression. It has been stated, that the pleasure principle regulates the id and the reality principle

⁴⁵Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 22.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., 23.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., 56.

governs the ego.⁵⁰ When the discharged instinctual energy from the id being characterized as sex and aggression cannot discover an object to satisfy this instinctual need through postponement or the reality principle, then it is repressed (repression proper) by the governing force of authority (superego). The governing force of authority is characterized as aggressive.

When a person is aggressive, he often encounters counter-aggression from authority figures and enemies, and in order to avoid punishment, the person learns to identify with the aggressor. This means that he becomes aggressive against the very impulses which make him hostile toward others.⁵¹

In other words, he develops a superego which plays the same rôle in controlling his impulses as an external authority does.

An internalized authority, the superego takes aggressive action against the ego whenever the ego contemplates being hostile or rebellious against an external authority figure.

The sequence of events may be summarized as follows: (1) the child is aggressive toward the father, (2) the father retaliates by punishing the child, (3) the child identifies with the punishing father, (4) the authority of the father is internalized and becomes the superego, and (5) the superego punishes the ego when it disobeys a moral rule of the superego.⁵²

⁵⁰Cf. p. 20.

⁵¹Hall, A Primer of Freudian Psychology, 78.

⁵²Freud, "Civilization and Its Discontents," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI, 127.

Summary

For Freud, man feels guilt because he has gone against the powerful punishing force of the superego. The nature of guilt for Freud is external conditioning of that punishing authoritarian force to control the ideal drives which are characterized by sex and aggression.

Conscience is a function we ascribe, among others, to the superego; it consists of watching over and judging the actions and interactions of the ego, exercising the function of a censor. The sense of guilt, the severity of the superego, is therefore the same thing as rigour of conscience. . . . It conscience is the direct expression of the dread of external authority.⁵³

In our investigation and our therapy of neurosis, we cannot avoid finding fault with the superego of the individual on two counts: in commanding and prohibiting with such severity it troubles too little about the happiness of the ego and it fails to take into account sufficiently the difficulties in the way of obeying--the strength of instinctual cravings in the id and the hardships of external environment. Consequently in our therapy we often find ourselves obliged to do battle with the super-ego and work to moderate its demands. Exactly the same objections can be made against the ethical standards of the cultural super-ego.⁵⁴

II. MOWRER AND GLASSER AND THE NATURE OF GUILT

Ontological view of guilt

Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser both feel that guilt is

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid., 139.

real and not just guilt feelings. Mowrer states his position:

In essence Freudian theory holds that anxiety comes from evil wishes, from acts which the individual would commit if he dared. The alternative view here proposed is that anxiety comes, not from acts which the individual would commit but dares not, but from acts which he has committed, but wishes that he had not. It is, in other words, a "guilt theory" of anxiety rather than an "impulse theory."⁵⁵

Dr. Glasser will grant that it is not always clear precisely what is right and wrong; but he nevertheless holds that ethical issues cannot be ignored. He says:

To be worthwhile we must maintain a satisfactory standard of behavior. To do so we must learn to correct ourselves when we do wrong and to credit ourselves when we do right. If we do not evaluate our own behavior or, having evaluated it, if we do not act to improve our conduct where it is below our standards, we will not fulfill our needs to be worthwhile and suffer as acutely as when we fail to love or be loved. Morals, standards, values, or right and wrong behavior are all intimately related to the fulfillment of our needs for self worth. . . .⁵⁶

Behavior VS. Emotions

In classical analysis, the therapist is always much interested whenever the patient reports anything about siblings, parents, or other "authority figures" which might be interpreted as having had a "traumatic" effect upon the

⁵⁵Mowrer, The Crisis in Religion and Psychiatry, 17.

⁵⁶Glasser, Reality Therapy, 57.

individual during his childhood. But if, by chance, the patient says anything about the mistakes or irresponsibilities which he himself has manifested, these tend to be dismissed as reflecting "deep," underlying emotional disorder, i.e., they are interpreted as mere symptoms.⁵⁷ In the Freudian scheme no one would accuse the individual himself of being directly and intentionally responsible for such inappropriate and crippling emotional states or reactions. They can only have been produced, through conditioning, by the misdirected or malevolent efforts (or perhaps neglect) of others.⁵⁸ In this Freudian scheme it is assumed that symptoms are caused by emotional pressures and disturbances which are "unadaptive conditioned anxiety reactions"⁵⁹ or what Freud calls the "irrational moral fears and scruples" which constitute the archaic superego.

Mowrer and Glasser have become quite disenchanted with this one-sided view of the matter and have begun to wonder why it is, if others can behave unwisely and irresponsibly toward us, that we ourselves can't be given the "credit" for a few foolish, irresponsible actions and choices.

⁵⁷O. Hobart Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies, with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation" (paper read at the Sixth Gutheil Memorial Conference of the Association for the Advancement of Psychotherapy, New York City, October 31, 1965), 12.

⁵⁸Infra, p. 35.

⁵⁹J. Wolpe, Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 9.

From time immemorial, human beings have not been held accountable for what others do to them--this, we say, they cannot help--but the very concept of social order is founded on the proposition that individuals can and must be responsible for what they do or fail to do. Thus, we are confronted by the possibility that, by concentrating upon the misbehavior of others as the cause of neurosis in a particular individual, we have seriously missed the mark not only in the matter of treatment but also diagnosis.

This is not, of course, to deny the influence that others manifestly have in all our lives; but it does suggest that we are far less likely to be "wrecked" psychologically and emotionally, by what others do to us than by the dishonor and insecurity we bring upon ourselves by our own misconduct and duplicity.⁶⁰

Mowrer represents this concept in Figures 1 and 2. Accordingly, in Figure 1b the second arrow, indicating causation, is rotated from its horizontal position in Figure 1a down into the vertical position and there connected with what Mowrer has labeled "Deviant, Ab-normal Behavior" on the part of the individual himself. Note that he has hyphenated the word "ab-normal" to imply, ". . . not abnormality in the sense of disease or illness, but deviation from the established norms of the individual's reference group or groups."⁶¹

⁶⁰Ibid., 12.

⁶¹Ibid.

Figure 1-a




Figure 1-b




Figure 1. Schematic representation of two conceptions of psychopathology. According to the more conventional of these (diagrammed at the left), the essence of "neurosis" which is also called "mental illness" is an emotional disturbance or disorder on the part of others (parents, teachers, husbands, wives, employers, etc.). The alternative position (depicted on the right) holds that the crux of the problem is not emotional but behavioral. Given the deviant, duplicitous life style of the individual himself, his emotional suffering (insecurity, anxiety, inferiority feelings, guilt) is seen as thoroughly natural, appropriate, normal. The abnormality in the situation consists of the individual's secret deviations from the norms, standards, rules, "values" of his reference group. In the first conceptual scheme, one's own behavior is never seen as "causal," only the behavior of others (which, if one is consistent, must in turn have been caused by others, and so on to an infinite regress). And whatever the individual does, if it is in any way objectionable or "bad," is interpreted as "merely symptomatic to deep, underlying emotional problems." Thus, attention is focused almost exclusively upon emotions, with little or no responsibility accruing to the individual. In the other frame of reference, so-called symptoms (see Figure 2) arise from emotional discomfort which is appropriate and well "earned," considering what the individual has done in the past, is still doing, and is hiding (a fact denoted by the parentheses). Attention is thus shifted from emotions to conduct and from what others have done to one's own actions.⁶²

⁶²Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies, with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 6.

However, it is not our assumption that such behavior will, of itself, lead to the kinds of emotions and symptoms we associate with psychopathology. A second condition must be met: namely, the deviant behavior must be concealed, a fact indicated in the diagram by the large parentheses.⁶³

Dr. Mowrer, on the next page, goes on to say that the individual comes into a state of chronic insecurity, i.e., he becomes vulnerable, first of all, to the possibility of being "found out" and called to account by his reference group; and if he has an active, well-developed conscience, he is also in trouble with it, regardless of whether he is caught or in danger of being caught by the external society. "This, I suggest is the essence of what we have previously called a 'neurosis' but might better refer to as an 'identity crisis' (Erickson) or 'Sociosis' (Van den Berg). Dr. Glasser puts it this way:

An effective ego is one that has a well-established set of values or ideals in which the person strongly believes. These values are attained in many situations where choices must be made. In the establishing of strong positive identity these choices are made.

.
At the time when he makes his choice his values are established and his identity solidified. . . .⁶⁴

Identity comes in the social situation when a person has to choose whether or not he will maintain his values as a part of himself.

⁶³Ibid., 14.

⁶⁴Glasser, Mental Health or Mental Illness, 9.

Note that in Mowrer's note, with reference to Figure 1b, the emotions arising from hidden misbehavior are not labeled "abnormal." Given a knowledge of the individual's total life situation, Mowrer feels these emotions, however turbulent or painful, are essentially reasonable, normal, and, if responded to in the right way, potentially helpful.⁶⁵ What has been off, or "crazy," is not the individual's emotions but his conduct, which he has further complicated by concealment and denial. Thus the center of emphasis and interest shifts from "Abnormal Emotions" in Figure 1a, to "Ab-normal, Deviant Behavior" in Figure 1b.

And if the latter conception is the correct one, it becomes apparent that many of the would-be therapeutic procedures which have been used in the past have been irrelevant, even misleading or actively harmful. On the assumption that the so-called neurotic person is suffering from "wrong" emotions, efforts to eliminate or correct them have often involved medication, electro-convulsive shock, surgical intervention, suggestion, reassurance, extinction procedures, and psychoanalysis.⁶⁶

Dr. Mowrer continues: "If the real problem lies, not in the area of involuntary "wrong" emotions but in that of deliberate choice-mediated "wrong" behavior, it is perhaps not surprising that past remedial efforts have not produced satisfactory results,"⁶⁷ There is the possibility that

⁶⁵Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies, with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 16.

⁶⁶Ibid., 17.

⁶⁷Ibid.

concrete, specific misbehavior, which has been kept hidden, is the problem; and if this is the case, then the therapy of choice becomes what is here designated as an alternate theory of guilt.

Two other theories for guilt

Figure 2 represents a combination of Figures 1a and 1b, which have been presented as a means of depicting two additional theories of causation and etiology. These two theories briefly are:

(1) Wolpe enunciates principles and procedures; . . . which simply states: since neurotic behavior demonstrably originates in learning, it is only to be expected that its elimination will be a matter of unlearning. . . "most neuroses are basically unadaptive conditioned anxiety reactions." Therefore rational therapy will involve the elimination of these unadaptive conditioned anxiety reactions either by extinction or by counter-conditioning. . . .⁶⁸

(2) B. F. Skinner states his theory in two basic presuppositions, which are:

(a) An effective approach to the field of psychopathology must be predicated on the assumption that, practically speaking, there is only stimulus and response, with no intervening variables such as are commonly denoted by the terms thought and feeling. In other words the organism, in this frame of reference is essentially "empty" or if there are internal, subjective activities, they are ephiphenomenal. In other words, the individual organism simply reacts to its environment, rather than to some inner experience of that environment.

(b) An effective approach to the field of psychopathology methodologically, will involve selective reinforcement of desirable behavior

⁶⁸Wolpe, Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition, 9.




Figure 2. Combination and elaboration of the two diagrams shown in Figure 1. If, in the conventional frame of reference, the basic problem is an abnormality of emotions which has been produced by others, then "therapy" (a-a') would require some sort of treatment by others which would offset the mistreatment to which the individual has been previously exposed. Oddly, this is precisely what the individual's own symptomatic efforts (b-b') are designed to do: i.e., make him feel better, without necessarily being better. Thus, "symptoms" may be defined as an individual's own attempt at self-cure which, like most professional treatment, assumes that the basic problem is wrong emotions, bad "nerves." If, however, the other hypothesis is correct and if the neurotic individual's emotional reactions (considering his on-going life style) are essentially normal, we see how sadly misdirected such treatment is. Surely it is suggestive in this connection that, on the average, the apparent effective-remissions is in untreated persons. But if it is really the individual's "Therapy," i.e., the efforts of others to help him, ought to be directly toward behavior change (c-c'), rather than emotional re-education. And to the extent that this point of view begins to make sense to the suffering person himself, he will then start letting his emotional discomfort motivate him (d-d') to eliminate the questionable behavior and life strategies which have been producing the emotional upset, rather than seeking to eliminate the emotional discomfort directly (b-b').⁶⁹

⁶⁹Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 18.

patterns and extinction of undesirable patterns according to a procedure which Thorndike called "successive approximation" and what I call "explicit shaping of behavior repertoires." Because there are no inner states the concept of symptoms becomes meaningless. There is only more or less "troublesome or dangerous" behavior, which is subject to change by appropriate structuring or rewards contingencies.⁷⁰

With these two other theories in mind, Figure 2 will be used in the ensuing discussion.

As suggested by arrow b-b' in Figure 2, "symptoms" are the attempts made by the individual to "treat" himself, on the assumption that his problem is wrong emotions. "Symptoms," thus conceived, are what Freud called "defense reactions." This is to say, they are the individual's own efforts to make himself feel better without being better.

Much professional help given neurotics in the past has been predicated on the same doubtful assumption as to where the trouble lies; the neurotic himself has been accepting this. "Both therapist and patient have been concentrating on feelings, emotions,"⁷¹ Dr. Glasser writes, ". . . in reality therapy, emotions and happiness are never divorced from behavior."⁷²

If Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser are correct, the

⁷⁰B. F. Skinner, Cumulative Record (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), 66-67.

⁷¹Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies, with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 16.

⁷²Glasser, Reality Therapy, 29.

neurotic's problem is not at the level of wrong emotions but of wrong actions which have been systematically concealed, what does therapy or help in this changed frame of reference imply? "Others," as represented at the right of Figure 2 will be involved, but in a way very different from that implied by arrow a-a'. The therapist in this revised frame of reference, will direct attention, not to the patient's emotional discomfort, but to his deviant and duplicitous behavior. Mowrer writes:

Sometimes, by merely suggesting to the neurotic individual that his emotional suffering may reflect unacknowledged and unresolved personal guilt, another can start the process of self-disclosure and self-authentication which will restore the individual's sense of identity and his social integration. But not infrequently, "modeling" of radical honesty by the therapist will be necessary. This procedure is, of course, a radical innovation as far as conventional psychotherapeutic practice is concerned.⁷³

Glasser writes:

The therapist must be a very responsible person--tough, interested, human and sensitive. He must be able to fulfill his own needs and must be willing to discuss some of his own struggles so that the patient can see that acting responsibly is possible through sometimes difficult. Neither aloof, superior, nor sacrosanct, he must never imply that what he does, what he stands for, or what he values is unimportant. He must have the strength to become involved, to have his values tested by the patient, and to withstand intense criticism by the person he is trying to help.⁷⁴

⁷³Mowrer, "Abnormal Reactions or Actions," Introduction to Psychology: A Self-Selection Textbook, 25.

⁷⁴Glasser, Reality Therapy, 22.

The involvement process for Glasser is part of the modeling that Mowrer is referring to in his theory. Mowrer feels that in psychotherapy conditions are deliberately created which are designed to foster identification; the therapist models the behavior he expects the patient to learn, identification with the therapist is actively encouraged, and acting like the therapist and "getting well" are one and the same process, not antithetical. Mowrer says:

That is to say, by this process of identification or imitation, the patient begins taking down the parenthesis around his life, not just with the therapist but with Significant Others, and begins changing.⁷⁵

Moreover, as a result of the therapist calling attention to the area of duplicitious behavior rather than mere emotions, the patient's erstwhile efforts as self-cure, i.e., his "symptoms" Figure 2 (a-a'), change into constructive efforts at self-modification at the level of behavior, as shown in Figure 2 by the arrow d-d'. And once the individual comes to understand that here is where his real problem lies, he can take the initiative and manage his own "therapy," with a minimum of further treatment by anyone else.⁷⁶

⁷⁵Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies, with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 18.

⁷⁶Ibid., 19.

Two studies in support of modeling theory

There is experimental evidence to support Mowrer's theory and practice. Two lines of support will be presented.

In a series of ingenious studies with children, Dr. Albert Bandura has shown the great effectiveness of modeling behavior on the part of a teacher, as opposed to the mere rewarding of successive approximations to the desired behavior on the part of the child without modeling by the teacher. Bandura's report will suggest the tenor of his own thinking here:

I shall present some research supporting a theory of no-trial learning, a process of response acquisition that is highly prevalent among Homo Sapiens, exceedingly efficient and, in cases where errors are dangerous or costly, becomes an indispensable means of transmitting and modifying behavioral repertoires.

While operant conditioning (trial-and-error learning) methods are well suited for controlling existing responses, they are often exceedingly laborious and inefficient for development of new behavior repertoires. The fact that a patient and persistent experimenter may eventually develop a novel response in an organism through the method of successive approximations, provided he carefully arranges a benign environment in which errors will not produce fatal consequences is not proof that this is the manner in which social responses are typically acquired in everyday life.

In cases in which a behavioral pattern contains a highly unique combination of elements selected from an almost infinite number of alternatives, the probability of occurrence of the desired response, or even on that has some remote resemblance to it, will be zero. Nor is the successive-approximations shaping procedure likely to be of much aid in altering this probability value. It is highly

doubtful, for example, that an experimenter could get a mynah bird to sing a chorus of "Sweet Adeline" during his lifetime by differential reinforcement of the bird's squeals and squawks. Nevertheless, a recent appearance of a gifted mynah bird on television demonstrated how a young housewife who had employed modeling procedures succeeded, not only in training her feathered friend to sing this sentimental ballad with considerable fidelity but also developed in the bird an extensive verbal repertoire.⁷⁶

Bandura's work with children and Mowrer's earlier work with talking birds clearly demonstrate the extraordinary effectiveness of modeling and imitation, in comparison with most other known teaching or training procedures.⁷⁷

Although Bandura is critical of what can be accomplished by operant conditioning (trial-and-error) methods in contrast to the modeling-imitation procedure, several investigators who operate within the Skinnerian framework are also providing a remarkable form of support for some of the presuppositions of Mowrer's theory. As already indicated, he assumed that once the patient's attention has been appropriately re-directed from the b-b' type of concern to the d-d' objective he comes capable of self-directed change, and thereafter requires very little in the form of therapeutic guidance by others, except as that is forthcoming

⁷⁶Behavior Modification through Modeling Procedures p. 58, cited by O. Hobart Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies, with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 21.

⁷⁷Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 22.

in the natural, open interaction with the Ordinary Others in one's life.⁷⁸ (See also Dabrowski's concept of "self-education" and autotherapy as set forth in his book, Positive Disintegration, 1956).⁷⁹

Dr. Mowrer's theory, as well as that of Wolpe and Skinner have one thing in common: they all assume that "neurosis" involved, in one way or another, anomalies of learning, and by the same token, the elimination of such a condition calls for some form of teaching. According to Wolpe, "neurosis" always involves the adventitious or traumatic learning of unrealistic fears; and the preferred means of eliminating them involved teaching the subject to relax and then association, in imagination, the thing or situation feared with the relaxed state.⁸⁰ In Skinnerian behavior therapy, the assumption is not that the individual has learned false fears, but that he has failed to learn effective and socially acceptable overt behavior; and change is sought through altered reinforcement contingencies, i.e., the structures of rewards and punishments, in the subject's environment.⁸¹ In Mowrer's theory (known as Integrity Therapy), the assumption is that the subject has mistakenly

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Ibid., 23.

⁸⁰Behavior Modification through Modeling Procedures p. 58, cited by Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 24.

⁸¹Ibid., 25.

decided that deception, denial, "phoniness" is a good personal strategy; and here the greatest "help" another can give is to encourage, persuade, inspire such a person by means of sharing and modeling to try honesty and openness as an alternative personal strategy.⁸²

Thus, all three types of behavior therapy, as they are here thought of, assume that neurosis is not really a neur-osis, i.e., disorder of the nervous system. "The problem is rather that of a structurally normal nervous system functioning in inappropriate ways."⁸³

And what is the criterion of "appropriateness?" By and large it is social. In Mowrer's behavior therapy, the problem of "neurosis" involved socially deviant behavior which has been carefully concealed from the person whom Sullivan has aptly called "the Significant Other." And here the subject's neurotic insecurity and fears are assumed to be in the nature of personal guilt and to be quite realistic and objective. In Skinner's behavior therapy, the condition to which therapy is applied is again social. Skinner says, ". . . The essence of a symptom is that it involves behavior that is troublesome or dangerous to some one or more human beings."⁸⁴ And Wolpe concedes that neurotic responses are

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., 26.

⁸⁴Skinner, op. cit., 68.

often "conditioned to situations involving direct interpersonal relations . . . personal relationships . . . the mere presence of a particular person."⁸⁵ It should be added that for Wolpe this is not invariably the case; neurotic response may also become conditioned to animals and inanimate objects and situations. Nevertheless, the condition with which all three forms of behavior therapy are concerned is more aptly described by the term "sociosis" (Van Den Berg) than by "neurosis."⁸⁶

Glasser's view supports Mowrer's theory

The whole thrust of Dr. Glasser's method of "reality therapy" (from the viewpoint of the present investigator) is that of society. Glasser says in so many words that human beings get into emotional binds, ". . . not because their standards are too high but because their performance has been, and is, too low."⁸⁷ Freud held that psychological disorders arise when there has been a "cultural" interference with the instinctual, biological needs of the individual, whereas Glasser is now holding that the problem is rather an incapacity or failure at the interpersonal social level of

⁸⁵Wolpe, Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition, 13.

⁸⁶Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," ²⁹.

⁸⁷Glasser, Reality Therapy, iv.

human functioning.⁸⁸ If Mowrer and Glasser are correct then guilt is real and its nature and structure are defined by the social and moral structure of any given time. If this is true, then guilt is given in society and real and is ontological in character, and not biological. Guilt is part of the interpersonal process, and its phenomenal character is part of group (significant others) process and for these reasons Freud could not deal adequately with the problem.

For some time now an increasingly sharp difference of opinion has been developing concerning the nature of psychopathology, but only within the past five years has research begun to appear which bears directly upon the central point at issue. The point at issue is the Freudian understanding of guilt as being an over-extended socialization or a too intensive punitive force. "On the basis of continued clinical experience and common observation, an alternative hypothesis has emerged to the effect that psychopathology actually reflects under-socialization: in extreme form in the sociopath, in more moderate form in the neurotic."⁸⁹

One way of representing the difference between the two contending theoretical systems which are under examination

⁸⁸Ibid., vii.

⁸⁹O. Hobart Mowrer, New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology (unpublished paper, 1966), 2.

here are represented by Mowrer in Figures 3 and 4. In this context, the question is mainly one of the direction of repression and the content of the "unconscious."

The two schemes represented in Figures 3 and 4 have certain logical implications which, until recently, have been generally neglected.

Psychopath, Psycho-neurotic and Psychopathology in the socialization process

One of the problems that Mowrer faces is the problem of the degree of intensity of the guilt. Dr. Mowrer states:

Probably the most universal and characteristic trait of psychoneurotic persons is their tendency to withdraw from contact with other people. This tendency may be massive and pervasive, as in back-ward "schizophrenics;" or it may be highly segmentalized, as, for example, in persons who manage ordinary interpersonal relations well enough but who have trouble in the more demanding and intimate roles of marriage partner or parent. However, "withdrawal" seems to be present and critically important in all cases, the difference being merely one of degree.

If Freud has been correct in his assumption that the neurotic is a person with an unusually strong and powerful superego, such a person, being dominated by this part of the total personality should be unusually wellintegrated socially. Since the superego, by Freud's own definition, is the "internalized voice of the community" (Freud 1930), anyone in whom this agency is exceptionally well developed and powerful ought to be bound to other people and to community life in general in a very intimate and effective way. The empirical, "clinical" facts are, of course, quite to the contrary. Social alienation, not integration, is the hallmark of psychopathology. If Freud's basic thesis were valid, this ought not to be the case. If it were the




Figure 3. Schematic representation of the "dynamics" of neurosis as conceived by Freud. A "hypertrophied" superego or conscience, supposedly lays seige to the ego and takes it captive. Then the superego forces the ego to reject the claims of the id for any expression or satisfaction of its "instinctual demands." The result is that a sort of "iron curtain" is constructed between ego and id (see wavy line) and dissociation or "repression" is said to be in force. Neurosis proper ("anxiety") consists of the "unconscious danger" that the forces of the id will succeed in breaking through this "wall" and overwhelming the ego; and a constant devitalizing expenditure of energy by the ego is necessary to keep up its defenses.⁹⁰




Figure 4. A modified interpretation of the state called neurosis. Here it is assumed that the ego is taken captive, not by the superego, but by the id, and that it is now the "voice of conscience" that is rejected and dissociated. "Anxiety" thus arises, not because of a threatened return of repressed energies of the id, but because of the unheeded railings and anger of conscience. Here is not assumed that there is any difference in the "size" or strength of these three aspects of personality, unless it is that the ego is somewhat weak and undeveloped.⁹¹

⁹⁰Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 25.

⁹¹Ibid., 26.

id that become unacceptable and been rendered "unconscious" the individual ought to feel particularly well identified with society as the source of the superego which has achieved this victory. Thus the neurotic, instead of being socially alienated and estranged, ought to be very "close" to other people and happily united with them. According to Freud, it is from the id, not the superego and the community which it represents, that the neurotic has dissociated himself. Yet it is conscience and community that the neurotic characteristically tries to avoid.⁹²

Mowrer diagrams this in Figure 3; if he is correct, one important implication follows with respect to (a) what conscience is trying to accomplish in a "neurosis" and (b) what the proper strategy of therapy is. Instead of seeking conscience as a sort of monster and tyrant (Figure 3), which is trying to destroy its possessor or at least "take all the fun out of life," and now Figure 4 sees the so-called neurotic's conscience as trying to "reach" him, save him, bring him back into community and restore him to fully human status and functioning.

From the standpoint of research possibilities, the most important implications which derive from these two conceptual schemes are in the realm of character typology. These implications have been previously delineated, as follows:

Figures 5 and 6 are used to represent, respectively the character typology which flows from classical

⁹²Ibid., 18.

Freudian theory and that which derives from the alternative conception which has seemed to me more defensible. In both of these diagrams, the baseline represents a continuum of socialization, ranging from the low at the left to the high end at the right; and in both the "sociopath" (formerly known as "psychopath") is placed at the low end, indicating minimal socialization and characterlessness. Such an individual has the capacity to act in quite anti-social ways and feel little or no inner compunction (guilt) about it. But beyond this the congruence of these two schemes ends. In fact, the position of the "normal" and the "neurotic" character types is exactly reversed, with the neurotic appearing at the extreme right, representing the highest degree of socialization (or superego development) in the Freudian system and in an intermediate position, between the sociopath and the neurotic, in the other system. . . .

One of the most obvious weaknesses in the Freudian scheme is this. It has long been known that there is a clinical character type known formerly as "psychopath" mixed type, i.e., a person with an admixture of anti-social and neurotic characteristics, which is most dramatically exemplified by the "criminally insane." If the Freudian scheme were valid, an admixture of sociopathy and neurosis, in roughly equal parts, ought to produce a normal person. Manifestly it does not! Also there is the not inconsiderable complication that psychoanalysis, as a therapy, commonly has one of two results: it is technically unsuccessful, that is, the superego is not "weakened" and the individual goes on being neurotic; or the analysis is technically successful, but the individual then develops a "Character disorder," i.e., flips over into sociopathy. If formal Freudian theory (as depicted in Figure 5) were correct, this ought not to happen, in that movement of the neurotic individual to the left, as a result of therapy, ought to take him to normality and stop there.

In the modified scheme shown in Figure 6, these two difficulties do not arise. Since sociopathy and neurosis are here seen as adjacent rather than as antithetical conditions, the "mixed-type psychopath" neatly and logically drops into place at the point




Figure 5. Distribution of character types on a socialization continuum (long arrow), according to psychoanalytic theory. Here "therapy" (short arrow), involves an attempt to undo some of the effects of a presumed over-socialization of the neurotic individual. This theoretical system involves a number of paradoxes, which are discussed in the text.⁹³




Figure 6. Distribution of character types in a corrected conceptual scheme. Here therapy is toward the right, or high, end of the socialization scale and is compatible with socialization in general. The prardoxes which arise in connection with the scheme depicted in Figure 5 are satisfactorily resolved in this revised frame of reference. The distribution of character types shown by the dashed curve would represent a "sick society."⁹⁴

⁹³Ibid., 28.

⁹⁴Ibid., 29.

marked "X!" And if, in this system, as a result of psychoanalytically oriented therapy (dashed arrow), a neurotic is moved significantly to the left, it is obvious that he will become sociopathic rather than normal. In this system the direction of effective therapy is exactly opposite to what it is assumed to be in the Freudian framework. Here the attempt (solid arrow) is to help the neurotic person get better (psychologically) by being better (morally), not "worse."⁹⁵

Empirical studies

A variety of empirical studies have been made which bear upon the conceptual issues raised in the preceding discussion.

Kirkendall study

Dr. Lester Kirkendall, Professor at Oregon State University, after extensive counseling with college men, made this observation:

There is a striking correlation between a student's general social adjustment and the degree of normality in his sex life. If a man has good social relations, the chances are very high that he will report no serious conflict, perversion, or the like in the sexual realm. But if there is seclusiveness and uneasiness with people, there is likely to be some anomaly in the matter of sex.⁹⁶

In other words, the suggestion here is that highly socialized, outgoing young men tend to be well-adjusted and

⁹⁵Ibid., 3.

⁹⁶Lester A. Kirkendall, Pre-Marital Intercourse and Interpersonal Relations (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1966), 85.

normal in the sexual area and not "neurotic" as psycho-analytic theory would imply.

Stimulated by Kirkendall's observation, C. H. Swenson (1962) soon published a more specific study of the same problem. Twenty-five female college students who had recently come to the Psychological Clinic at the University of Tennessee for help with emotional problems were compared with twenty-five matched controls. The controls were found to differ significantly from the clinic group in showing (a) a lower incidence of unconventional, deviant sexual behavior and (b) a higher index of social affiliation (membership in organizations, extra-curricular activities, etc.). "Kirkendall's observation of a positive correlation between socialization and psychological normality is thus supported by Swenson."⁹⁷

Other studies have been made which substantiate Mowrer's theory of under socialization as a prime factor in understanding the nature of guilt. These studies have been summarized as follows:

In a book entitled Psychopathy and Delinquency, McCord & McCord (1956) report that on a simple, but apparently meaningful, test of capacity to show guilt

⁹⁷Mowrer, New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology, 19.

in the face of misconduct, three groups of individuals, with different clinical diagnosis, ranked as follows: psychopaths, 46%, neurotics and psychotics, 67%; nondelinquent, "normal" school children, 87%. Boisen (1930) reports a study in which it was found that most hospitalized catatonic individuals from Chicago come from the same metropolitan areas as also produce the most delinquents (again suggesting that, in terms of socialization and moral adequacy, neurotics and psychotic individuals are between sociopaths and normals, rather than above normals). And Becker (1962) has just completed a study of the MMPI profiles of a group of depressed individuals which indicates that "the psychopathic deviate scores for this psychopathological group are surprisingly high despite their being repeatedly characterized in recent literature as quite conforming (cf. Cohen et al, 1954; Becker, 1960; Mowrer, 1964, p. 198).⁹⁸

In the same context an investigation by Zigler and Phillips (1960) has been summarized:

Zigler and Phillips come to the conclusion that the so-called sociopath is indeed the least well socialized type of individual and that schizophrenics and depressives lie intermediate between sociopathic and normal persons. . . . This ordering of different personality types--sociopaths, schizophrenics, depressives, and normal--along a continuum of personal maturity. . . socialization, or social adequacy has highly important consequences. . . . It is quietly but emphatically repudiating the Freudian assumption that psychological normality is an intermediate state on a scale of socialization and underscores the view that man is preeminently a social creature who can be psychologically normal only when he is socially normal (Mowrer, 1964, p. 210).⁹⁹

⁹⁸Ibid., 21.

⁹⁹Social Effectiveness and Symptomatic Behaviors, pp. 231-238, cited by O. Hobart Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology" (Unpublished paper, 1966), 24.

Three Related Investigations by Peterson, O'Daniel
and O'Connor

The evidence already reviewed, although clearly supportive of the thesis that "both neuroticism and sociopathy represent under-socialization," is nevertheless fragmentary, incidental and by no means crucial. Several studies are now available which are much more systematic and decisive. Three of these are closely related.

In a paper entitled "The insecure child: Over-socialized or undersocialized?" Peterson (1962) has formulated the theoretical issue to which his study is addressed as follows:

In a series of books and papers, Mowrer has taken issue with Freud on the origin of neurotic anxiety. According to Freud, anxiety rises when the ego apprehends a danger; and the critical danger, in the case of neurotic anxiety, is that repressed impulses will get out of control. Under pain of punishment, children learn that certain urges must not be expressed and that certain ideas are evil. The impulses are henceforth inhibited, and fantasies about the urges are repressed. Neurotics, according to Freud, have learned society's lesson too well. They are over-socialized. Their moral standards are unrealistically stringent, their tendency to repress impulses derivatives is over-generalized and overly severe.

Out of his own clinical experience and some personal and ideological disenchantment with Freudian theory, Mowrer has proposed an alternative view, namely that ". . . anxiety comes not from acts which the individual would commit but dares not, but from acts which he has committed and wishes he had not." Conscience is disregarded or repressed, not the instincts. The neurotic has in fact misbehaved. Impulses arose and he expressed them. He has gratified his wishes and hurt others in the doing,

but his misconduct has neither been acknowledged nor redeemed. If he is anxious, it is realistic and socially useful for him to be. If he feels some emotional distress, it is because he has done wrong, and he has every right to the guilt he suffers (pp. 1-2).¹⁰⁰

The Peterson study, because of its basic simplicity and directness of approach, is not difficult to describe. Some years ago Gough and Peterson (1952), starting with the Pd (psychopathic deviate) items on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, went on to develop a special test of social adequacy-inadequacy, which distributes individuals, according to their scores on this test, along a continuum such as the one constituting the baseline in Figures 5 and 6. In the investigation here under consideration the Gough-Peterson test was administered by Peterson to 680 junior high school students (about equally divided as to sex). Then the home-room teachers of these students were asked to assign each of the students to one of three categories or personality types: Conduct Problem (CP, delinquent); Personality Problem (PP, neurotic); No Problem (NP, normal). A frequency distribution of the students who were classified by their teachers as having No Problems is shown in Figure 7 by the solid line.

¹⁰⁰The insecure child: Over-socialized or under-socialized? pp. 1-2, cited by O. Hobart Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology" (Unpublished paper, 1966), 26.




Figure 7. Distribution of scores on Gough-Peterson social adequacy test as a function of whether the subjects (680 junior high school students) were classified by teachers as showing conduct problem, personality problem, or no problem. These categories correspond to "sociopathy" or delinquency," "neurosis" and "normality." The mean scores for the three distributions are, respectively, 36.34, 37.91, and 42.56.¹⁰¹

¹⁰¹Mowrer, "The Behavior Therapies with Special Reference to Modeling and Imitation," 33.

The mean score for this group of the Socialization scale is 42-56. A frequency distribution of the students whom the teachers classified as having Conduct Problems is shown by the dotted line. The mean Socialization score for this group is 36.34. The frequency distribution of the students classified as having Personality Problems is shown by the dashed line. This group has a mean Socialization score of 37.91, which is intermediate between the means for the Cp and NP groups.

Although there is much overlap in the frequency distributions for these three groups, the differences in the means for the PP and the NP groups and for the CP and NP groups are highly significant (.01 level of confidence or better). The means for the CP group and the PP group fall in the correct order on the Socialization scale, but the difference between these means does not meet conventional standards of statistical significance. This, however, is not the main point which is at issue. What is important here is the finding that the PP group falls below the NP group, not above it. In this respect the Peterson findings are clear-cut and highly cogent.¹⁰²

¹⁰²Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology," 27.

In 1964, Mrs. Regina G. O'Daniel completed a Master's Thesis at the University of Louisville which is essentially a replication of the Peterson study, but with high school students as subjects. The procedure was as follows:

Rating sheets were distributed to five faculty members who had daily contact with the students (44 male and 44 female high school seniors). To prevent the occurrence of the halo effect, separate rating sheets were sent to each faculty member who would rate the student independently. The name of the student to be rated was at the top of each page, and instructions for rating followed. Twenty items consisting of ten characteristics of the behavior pattern representative of Peterson's Conduct Problem classification and ten characteristics representative of his Personality Problem classification were randomly assembled in a column, with space by each item to check. Each item checked would obtain a score of one and the total score would indicate the predominate behavior pattern of each subject.¹⁰³

The socialization scale of the California Psychological Inventory was administered to all eighty-eight subjects during a regular class period in school (p. 11).¹⁰⁴

In reporting her results, Mrs. O'Daniel says:

Twenty--of the eighty-eight students had no problem characteristics checked. Personality-problem characteristics were checked for thirteen of the pupils. Eighteen subjects were judged to have conduct problems. Thirty-seven students had both conduct and personality-problem characteristics.¹⁰⁵

The So (socialization) scale scores for all subjects ranged from 23 to 57, with a mean of 40.92. Rating scale scores were correlated with So-scale scores (p. 14).¹⁰⁶

¹⁰³The Disturbed Adolescent: Over-socialized or Undersocialized, p. 8, cited by O. Hobart Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology," 30.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid.

The mean So scores and standard deviations for the conduct-problem, personality-problem, and no-problem groups are shown in Table I. In the O'Daniel study, the normal (NP) subjects rated highest on the So scale (of the California Psychological Inventory), the students with sociopathic (conduct-problem) tendencies scored lowest, and the neurotic (PP) subjects fell in between. This finding is parallel to that reported by Peterson for his Decatur study--and inconsistent with what would be expected on the basis of Freudian theory.¹⁰⁷ The significance of the differences between the means for these three groups was not computed by O'Daniel. Instead a correlational measure was used, which suggests that the difference between PP and NP scores on the So scale, though substantial and in the right direction, does not meet the common criteria of statistical significance, whereas the differences between the CP and NP scores and the CP and PP scores are significant, at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively.

The data for the 37 students who "had both conduct and personality problem characteristics" did not enter into the final analysis. According to the Freudian conceptualization, as represented in Figure 5, this group should have a

¹⁰⁷Ibid., 31.

Table I

Means and Standard Deviations of So Scores

(O'Daniel)

	CP	PP	NP	Total Sample
So Mean	32.20	41.25	45.00	40.92
So SD	6.07	8.62	5.54	7.41

mean So score about equal to that of the normal subjects; whereas, according to the scheme suggested in Figure 6, this group should fall well below normal subjects, somewhere between the personality-problem and the conduct-problem groups.¹⁰⁸ Here is an additional source of evidence which O'Daniel did not exploit.

"In response to a request for more detailed information concerning the O'Daniel study, Professor Willard A. Mainord, under whose direction this study was carried out, has written as follows:"¹⁰⁹

Mrs.O'Daniel apparently made the mistake of including nine dropped subjects in order to come up with her figure of 37 students with both neurotic and sociopathic problems. In any case, you will see that she gives the scores of 28 subjects mixed as to checked behaviors. If you will notice both in her neurotic and sociopathic groups, a substantial number of items have been checked so that the fewest items checked for any subject added up to 12 or more--in most cases a good deal more. Thus, if we demand at least a total of 10 items checked, we end up with 21 subjects for a mixed-problem group. The socialization mean for that mixed group is a little more than two points below the neurotic group and almost seven points above the sociopathic group. In other words, the mean is located as you would predict: between the two problem groups but much nearer the neurotic than the sociopathic group--thus, providing more suggestive evidence in support of your position.¹¹⁰

The O'Daniel study thus directly confirms the results reported by Peterson and provides, in addition,

¹⁰⁸Ibid., 32.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., 33.

¹¹⁰Ibid.

original date concerning the location of a Socialization scale of a person showing an admixture of sociopathic and neurotic traits ("psychopaths mixed-type"). These findings agree, in every respect with the theoretical scheme posited in Figure 6.

In 1966 John J. O'Connor came to the University of Illinois from the University of Ottawa, Canada, to begin his Ph.D. thesis research. He chose, as his research task, to duplicate the Peterson and O'Daniel studies, with college students as subjects.

The sample for this research was chosen from a small midwestern liberal arts college for girls. Since the entire college, that is, the freshman, sophomore, junior and senior classes were involved, no matching was required. Because of sickness and absence from class 13 girls of the total sample of 404 were not included. This left a total of 391 in the sample. Their ages ranged from 18 to 28 years. Their socioeconomic background was mostly middle-class. Part-time students were not used in this study because the instructors felt they did not know them sufficiently well to make the required personality ratings (O'Connor, p. 23).¹¹¹

As in the O'Daniel study, the So (Socialization) Scale of the California Psychological Inventory (which is an extension of the Gough-Peterson scale) was administered to all students. The C.P.I. So Scale has been shown to have

¹¹¹The Over- or Under-socialization of three Phenotypic Patterns as Dimensional Constructs in Relation to the Freudian and Mowrerian Hypotheses, p. 23, cited by O. Hobart Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology," 35.

both high reliability and high validity (Gough, 1960), and seems ideally suited to research of the kind under discussion.

In the O'Connor study, each student was evaluated by an instructor, who knew her well, on the Personality and Character Problem Checklist previously employed by Peterson and O'Daniel. Of the total sample of 391 students, 190 were adjudged to have No Problems. (One hundred and twenty-four students did not meet the criteria of these categories and were not included in the analysis.)¹¹²

The results, in terms of mean scores for the three groups on the So scale of the C.P.I. are shown in Table II. Of these findings the author says:

The location of the Personality Problem group in between the No Problem group and the Conduct Problem group supports Mowrer's hypothesis. If Freudian theory had been correct, the Personality Problem group would have been more socialized than the normal group, and thus would have obtained higher scores on a socialization measure. Such was not the case. Mowrer's hypothesis that the Personality Problem group is under-socialized has been confirmed by the present research (p. 45).¹¹³

O'Connor also carried out a correlational analysis with his data. The findings were as follows:

The correlation of $-.44$ for Conduct Problem group and the correlation of $-.25$ for the Personality Problem group indicates a tendency for both groups to be under-socialized. However, subjects with Conduct Problems have a tendency to be less socialized than those with Personality Problems. The Pearson

¹¹²Ibid., 36.

¹¹³Ibid.

Table II

Means, Standard Deviations and t Tests for the
Socialization Scale of the C.P.I.

(O'Connor)

Groups	N	Means	Standard Deviation	Groups Compared	t Test	Significant Level
No Problem (N.P.)	190	41.45	3.84	N.P. vs. P.P.	3.24	.01
Personality Problem (P.P.)	51	37.80	4.74	N.P. vs. C.P.	8.32	.001
Conduct Problem (C.P.)	26	32.88	5.04	P.P. vs. C.P.	4.08	.001

correlation coefficients. . .were computed from the entire population of 391 girls. According to Freudian hypothetical reasoning, there should have been a positive correlation between the socialization measures and indices of Personality Problems because the neurotic person is postulated as being over-socialized. Likewise, according to Freudian theory, the measure of socialization for the Personality Problem group should correlate negatively with this measure for the Conduct Problem group.¹¹⁴

According to Mowrerian theory, subjects with Conduct Problems are undersocialized, and thus both of the obtained correlations should have the same negative sign, with the Conduct Problem group having a higher negative correlation than the Personality Problem group. Mowrer's hypothesis has been confirmed by this study (p. 43).¹¹⁵

Thus, using two quite different means of analyzing his data, O'Connor obtained results which consistently, and with a high level of statistical significance, support the view that neurotic (Personality Problem) persons are typically under-socialized, although not as much so as sociopathic (Conduct Problem) persons. "This finding is in complete agreement with the results previously reported by Peterson and O'Daniel."¹¹⁶

The various research studies which have here been examined consistently and powerfully (in this researcher's opinion) support Mowrer's view that neurotic persons, instead of falling at the high end of the social continuum (as

¹¹⁴Ibid., 38.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology," 40.

CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Freud and the nature of responsibility

The Freudian scheme already shown, is a scheme to free the individual from the overly strict superego which is causing him to suffer from "feelings of guilt," and thus from anxiety. Dr. Rollo Mays puts it this way:

One inadequate solution was the assumption, popular a decade or two ago, that our task in counseling and psychoanalysis was simply to set the person "free," and, therefore, the values held by the therapist and the society had no part in the process. This assumption was bolstered and rationalized by the then popular definition of mental health as "freedom from anxiety." The therapist most under the influence of this assumption made a dogma out of never making a "moral judgment" and saw guilt as always neurotic and therefore a "feeling" that ought always to be relieved and gotten rid of in the psychoanalytic process.¹

Or as Freud would say:

We analysts are not reformers. . . ; we are merely observers; but we cannot avoid observing with critical eyes, and we have found it impossible to give our support to conventional morality which demands more sacrifices than it is worth. We do not absolve our patients from listening to these criticisms. . . ; and if after they have become independent by the effects of the treatment they choose some intermediate course our conscience is not burdened whatever the outcome²

¹Dr. Rollo Mays, Psychology and the Human Dilemma (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1967), 84.

²Freud, "Formulations Regarding the Two Principles of Mental Functioning," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. IV, 106.

For Freud and his followers the task of the therapist is to set the client free from the oversocialized moral restraint of his conscience. The question then comes to mind; what responsibility does the client have for his anxious predicament? The Freudian answer to this question is "none." ". . . man puts up with civilization indeed, evolved it , not because it merely increases his security."³ What Freud meant by security when taken in context is objective rather than subjective security; i.e., that social, as opposed to solitary, living makes man physically more secure, although subjectively less so, and more "anxious."

Freud explicitly held that the neurotic is a rank conformist, a purist, a perfectionist, an over-conformist, and that the psychologically normal person is indeed one who "deviates" from the norms, in the idealistic or sociological sense, and who works out some sort of compromise between these norms and his own instinctual predilections.⁴

A recent article, "The Apathetic Ethic," states the Freudian position on responsibility quite cogently:

In the Freudian concept, man is not born free with the right to pursue life, liberty, and happiness;

³Freud, "Civilization and Their Discontents," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI, 124.

⁴Freud, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XVIII, 38.

he is shackled by biological urges that can never be freely expressed and that set him in constant and grievous conflict with his society. Life for him must be an unhappy and unending struggle to reconcile, both within himself and between himself and others, forces that are inherently antagonistic.

As a code of conduct the Freudian ethic, as it will be termed hereafter, is entirely negative. It is composed of sentiments and attitudes regarding man's capabilities that, if literally applied, would keep him from attempting anything positive, to say nothing of attempting to devise anything new. Some appreciation of this state of mind, can, perhaps, be gained from the terminology used by those who subscribe to it. In their discourse there is recurrent reference to guilt feelings, personal insecurity, unstructured personality, instability, frustration, trauma, and "tensions." Such terms are used in reference not only to recognizably abnormal individuals but to everyone. Still more revealing is the total absence in the Freudian discourse of such terms as self-confidence, personal integrity, self-reliance, responsibility, or such an earthy term as "guts."⁵

Freud and the Freudians do not deny that man may possess positive personality attributes. But if they do, they are either the product of the inevitable clash between the individual and society or the consequence of traumatic experiences that have befallen the individual in the course of conflict.⁶

Freud insisted that he was interested in developing--or "discovering" the laws governing all of human conduct, not

⁵Richard La Piere, "The Apathetic Ethic," Saturday Review (August 1, 1959), 41.

⁶Ibid., 43.

just those that govern, or fail to govern, the conduct of psychologically abnormal individuals. With these laws of cause and effect which Freud hypothesized governed human behavior, came irresponsibility.⁷

One of the laws which Freud claims controls human development and our understanding of morality and ethical precepts, is here set forth in this statement:

The third main point of the religious programme, its ethical precepts, can also be realted without any difficulty to the situation of childhood. In a famous passage, which I have already quoted in an earlier lecture, the philosopher Kant speaks of the starry heaven above us and the moral law within us as the strongest evidence for the greatness of God. However odd it may sound to put these two side by side--for what can the heavenly bodies have to do with the question whether one man loves another or kills him?⁸

If what Freud says is true, then there is no individual responsibility, for the part that an overdeveloped superego plays in a person's behavior when he want to fulfill his idnal cravings for sex and aggression. Freud attempts to answer this question of choice and responsibility. He says this:

. . . nevertheless it touches on a great psychological truth the truth of the question Kant raises about God . The same father parental function who gave the child his life and preserved it from the dangers which that life involves, also

⁷Ibid., 44.

⁸Freud, "The Future of an Illusion," The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XXI, 49.

taught it what it may or may not do, made it accept certain limitations of its instinctual wishes, and told it what consideration it would be expected to show towards its parents and brothers and sisters, if it wanted to be tolerated and liked as a member of the family circle, and later on of more extensive groups. The child is brought up to know its social duties by means of a system of love-rewards and punishments, and in this way it is taught that its security in life depends on its parents and, subsequently, other people loving it and being able to believe in its love for them. This whole state of affairs is carried over by the grown man unaltered into his religion. The prohibitions and commands of his parents live on in his breast as his moral conscience; God rules the world of men with the help of the same system of rewards and punishments, and the degree of protection and happiness which each individual enjoys, depends on his fulfillment of the demands of morality; the feeling of security, with which he fortifies himself against the dangers both of the external world and of his human environment, is founded on his love of God and the consciousness of God's love for him.⁹

Man's responsibility for his actions and decisions in the Freudian scheme is total causal determinism. The nature of responsibility for Freud is the same as his model of human nature, Homo Natura, man as mechanized system. If the system should happen to be out of order, it is not the fault of the system, but of the determinate forces that created and shaped it.

Mowrer and Glasser and the nature of responsibility

Mowrer and Glasser agree on the other hand, that man

⁹Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Freudian Psychoanalysis, 224.

is responsible for his decisions and his behavior. Dr.

Mowrer says:

But now, in our reaction against this patent overextension of "moral" principle, have we not gone too far in the other direction? There is, as we know, a widespread tendency--sometimes called "scientism"--to assume that human beings cannot be "responsible" for anything, that we are all just cogs in a vast cause-and-effect complex and are in no way accountable for anything we do or anything that happens to us. Such a doctrine, aside from its lack of genuine scientific justification, is devastating: no society could long endure which thoroughly accepted it--and neither can an individual human being.¹⁰

Dr. Glasser speaks to the subject of man's decisions and his behavior as being his (man) responsibility in this way:

Understanding the obstacle does not produce a change in his behavior: that happens only through learning better and more responsible ways to act now. Unfortunately, once he learns about an unconscious obstacle that can justify his behavior, he uses it as an excuse not to change. He is even less able than before to get close to others because he now has a psychiatric reason, reinforced by the prestige of the psychiatrist. Avoiding his present responsibility by escaping into the past, he has become weaker, not stronger, through therapy.¹¹

For Mowrer and Glasser responsibility is a learned phenomenon. A person must learn to behave in a responsible way to fulfill his needs.

Dr. Mowrer defines responsibility as "not committing sin," and feels the word "sin" could be used to denote

¹⁰Mowrer, The Crisis in Psychiatry and Religion, 282.

¹¹Glasser, Reality Therapy, 38.

irresponsible acts and decisions. "Irresponsibility, wrongdoing, immorality, sin; what do the terms matter if we can thus understand more accurately the nature of psychopathology. . . ." ¹² Have psychotherapists and analysts not been taught on high authority that personality disorder is not one's own fault, that the neurotic is not "responsible" for his suffering, that he has done nothing wrong, committed no "sin"?

Mental illness, according to a poster which has widely circulated, is no disgrace. I might happen to anyone. An behind all this, of course, was the Freudian hypothesis that neurosis stems from a "too severe superego," which is the product of a too strenuous socialization of the individual at the hands of harsh, unloving parents and an irrational society. The trouble lay, supposedly, not in anything wrong or "sinful" which the individual has himself done, but in things he merely wants to do but cannot, because of repression. ¹³

Dr. Glasser weaves his therapeutic technique around the whole concept of responsible need fulfillment and defines responsibility thusly:

Responsibility, a concept basic to Reality Therapy, is here defined as the ability to fulfill one's needs, and to do so in a way that does not deprive others of the ability to fulfill their needs. ¹⁴

¹²Mowrer, The Crisis in Religion and Psychiatry, 44.

¹³Ibid., 46.

¹⁴Glasser, Reality Therapy, xv.

For Dr. Glasser the ability to fulfill one's needs is a learning task. It is not an easy task but a complicated lifelong problem. "Although we are given unchanging needs from birth to death, needs which, if left unsatisfied, cause us or others to suffer, we are not naturally endowed with the ability to fulfill them."¹⁵

Of all the tasks, the teaching of responsibility is the most important. Except for man, the task of learning responsibility is performed primarily under the pressure of an instinct--for all the higher animals--"instinct is related directly to the continuation of the species."¹⁶

Animals have only a few months to learn to survive; if the time is not spent in intensive training, they do not live. The coyote is a wonderful example of a species that has persisted despite unfavorable conditions. Even the ingenuity of man has not succeeded in destroying the coyote because it is wary and wise. The coyote mother impresses her pups almost from birth with the need to take care of themselves, to depend on their physical and mental capacities, and above all, to be aware of danger. The pups evidently sense the intensity of their teacher and learn their lesson well. They survive considerable odds and continue to live under the most adverse conditions.¹⁷

Man is not driven by instinct, as many instances of child abandonment show, to care for and teach responsibility to his children. Man has developed, however, the intellectual capacity to be able to teach responsibility which

¹⁵Ibid., 8.

¹⁶Ibid., 17.

¹⁷Ibid.

takes the place of instinct.

By means of a loving relationship children ordinarily learn responsibility from their parents. The major factor in this loving relationship is involvement which implies parental teaching and parental example. Also there is the influence of "significant others," i.e., relatives, teachers, ministers, and friends, who become involved with the child and teach him responsibility through involvement. "The responsible parent creates the necessary involvement with his child and teaches him responsibility through the proper combination of love and discipline."¹⁸

Dr. Glasser feels that this involvement should come at an early age.

Although the means by which every responsible man was exposed to love and discipline may not be apparent, careful investigation will, we feel, always show that it did occur. People who are not at some time in their lives, preferably early, exposed intimately to others who care enough about them both to love and discipline them will not learn to be responsible. For that failure they suffer all their lives.¹⁹

The words "preferably early" used above are important; they mean that the younger we are exposed to love and discipline the easier and the better we will learn responsibility. Dr. Glasser does feel that it can be taught to anyone at any age. "That it can be taught only to the young is not

¹⁸Ibid., 19.

¹⁹Ibid., 21.

true--responsibility can be learned at any age."²⁰ It is however easier to learn responsibility or any other task at an early age.

It will be agreed by most parents that children do not learn responsibility easily. Children do not know that what they feel is easy will not fulfill their needs, so almost from infancy they struggle against the reality that they must learn from their parents how to fulfill their needs. "Later, when they are old enough to recognize reality, they test their parents with irresponsible behavior in the same way that psychiatric patients test their therapists."²¹ Thus the child learns through discipline tempered by love that the parent is concerned and in this involvement the child learns responsible behavior.

The parent must show the child by example the correct course, and show them the responsible way to behave. "Parents who have no self-discipline cannot successfully discipline a child."²² The child must learn through example and instruction. A parent who never demonstrates any of the values he or she is trying to teach will be hard pressed to teach anything.

When discipline is reasonable and understandable,
and when the parents' own behavior is consistent with

²⁰Ibid., 25.

²¹Ibid., 19.

²²Ibid., 18.

their demands on the child, he will love and respect them even though his surface attitude may not always show it. The parents must understand that the child needs responsible parents and that taking the responsible course will never permanently alienate the child. An appreciation of this one simple fact greatly aids parents in teaching their children responsibility.²³

Through love we gain a closeness to others and this closeness gives us a self-respect but it comes through discipline.

Discipline must always have within it the element of love.

"I care enough about you to force you to act in a better way, in a way you will learn through experience to know, and I already know, is the right way."²⁴ Similarly, love must always have an element of discipline. "I love you because you are a worthwhile person, because I respect you and feel you respect me as well as yourself."²⁵

The nature of responsibility is such that it must be learned. It is learned from "significant others" who are concerned enough to be involved in a relationship with the person to teach him discipline and responsible behavior. Responsibility is not instinctual, as in the animal, but comes about through discipline and training.

Responsibility is also societal. Dr. Glasser says this:

A further important difference between Reality Therapy and conventional psychiatry concerns the place of morality, or to be more specific, the place of

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., 19.

²⁵Ibid.

right and wrong in the process of therapy. Conventional psychiatry does not directly concern itself with the issue of right and wrong. Rather, it contends that once the patient is able to resolve his conflicts and get over his mental illness, he will be able to behave correctly. We have found that this view is unrealistic. All society is based on morality, and if the important people in the patient's life significant others especially his therapist, do not discuss whether his behavior is right or wrong, reality cannot be brought home to him.²⁶

Comparison and critique

Some would raise the cry: "But the society is wrong, pathological." "First, it should be pointed out that it probably is neither precise nor meaningful, from a strictly semantic point of view, to speak of a society being 'pathological,' in the same sense that this term is applied to individuals. . . ."²⁷ Yet this is the excuse of many of the neurotics that this researcher has worked with during the year. To blame society for his ills has a strong appeal to the neurotic individual himself, since therapy based upon this presupposition promises to relieve (anxiety) and release (instincts) simultaneously. Here, in the Freudian framework is a way of delivering the neurotic from any and all responsibility--but it also takes away any hope of helping himself. Freud's view coincides so nicely

²⁶Ibid., 56.

²⁷ Mowrer, "New Evidence Concerning the Nature of Psychopathology," 48.

with the way the neurotic would like to see and rationalize his situation. The chances are that he has already been compromising with, cheating on, his "society," and his solemn social commitments; so classical psychoanalysis promises, in effect, to help him "get well" on his own terms, i.e., without really changing or "reforming."

This researcher has been working for over a year at the Texas Department of Corrections. Over and over again, the neurotic is only too willing to believe that he is the victim of "trauma," and mistreatment, and is thus justified in taking moral matters into his own hands, and behaving as he pleases. For Freud, the neurotic is an instinctually deprived person, and the purpose of psychoanalytic therapy is to help him become less so. This researcher finds on the contrary, that this view of the problem has not generated a therapy with real power; the empirical as well as logical contradictions are flagrant and numerous.

Summary

For Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser the issues of right and wrong behavior are essential in the development of responsible choices. Because "all society is based on morality," responsible behavior and the nature of responsibility are apart of society's interest. Responsibility is given as a prerequisite to an ordered community, The ordering of this

community demands standards both moral and civil. "A reality therapist treating a patient is not afraid to pose the question, 'Are you doing right or wrong?' or, 'Are you taking the responsible course?'"²⁸

Responsibility like guilt is a learned phenomenon that resides, not in the feelings of the organism, but in the reality structures of society. Responsibility is real, and because it is real it demands disciplined choices which produce good behavior. Responsibility is thus ontological in nature--it is given in existence--and not adapted to by biological determinants.

²⁸ Glasser, Reality Therapy, 58.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

The purpose of this study was to examine the work of O. Hobart Mowrer and William Glasser and compare their understanding of the nature of guilt and the nature of responsibility with classical Freudian theory. It was the purpose of the work to demonstrate that Freud presupposed something about the nature of man with which neither Mowrer nor Glasser agree.

Chapter I introduced the problem and established the significance of the study. The importance of a clear understanding of the nature of guilt and responsibility is a problem that confronts many workers in the field of correctional work. Counseling and therapeutic procedures depend upon our understanding of the nature of man. Dr. Rollo Mays says, "The way we view man is essential to our therapeutic techniques."¹ In this study the researcher examined the nature of man and defined his nature according to Freud, Mowrer and Glasser. This study was significant because it spoke clearly to the questions: "In what way is man unique?" "Is he unique?" In other words, this study attempted to show what man's nature says about the nature of guilt and responsibility. This study was also significant because it was the first to compare the findings of both

¹Mays, op. cit., 25.

Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser and compare them with Freud and classical theory.

Chapter I also contained the definition of terms which were important for a clearer understanding of the nature of the problem.

Chapter II reviewed the literature on the nature of man according to Freud. Also a review of the literature according to Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser on the nature of man was presented in this chapter. The writer utilized the following research facilities:

1. Original books, letters, articles, and lectures, tape recordings, and personal interviews where possible of Sigmund Freud, Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer Dr. William Glasser.
2. Secondary sources which related directly to the topic of research.

In chapter II, it was demonstrated that Freud viewed the nature of man as homo natura, or man as a biological machine. This view sees the body as the unconditional authority in determining man's essential being. Man is a machine driven by a relatively constant amount of life or sexual energy called libido. The libido causes painful tension, which is reduced only by the act of physical release. From pain to physical release back to pain again is labeled the pleasure principle. Contrasted with this is the

reality principle, which tells man what to seek and avoid in the real world. When these two principles come in conflict or out of balance, mental illness is the result.

In chapter II, the material was also reviewed on the nature of man according to Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser. It was demonstrated that Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser viewed man and his nature as homo sapiens, or man as a bio-socio organism who can formulate interpersonal relationships and bring meaning to those relationships, and can formulate moral values and systems. For Mowrer and Glasser, man is determined as much by his social nature as by his biological nature. Man is free to choose, even though it is a conditional freedom. For Mowrer and Glasser, man is a being who interacts with certain "givens" which are "being" as such; thus his nature is ontological. When man makes irresponsible choices he does not fulfill his needs for self worth, acceptance, and achievement. This unfulfillment of self causes a loss of integrity and authenticity.

In chapter III, a detailed review of the literature on the nature of guilt according to Freud was given. It was demonstrated that Freud saw the nature of guilt as feeling of guilt. These feelings are a product of over socialization. The id impulses are not able to express sex and aggression because the human organism has internalized authority, which it has learned by identification. This

internalized authority is called the superego. According to Freud, the superego becomes overly punitive, and when the id impulses become conscious, or when a person behaves in a way that is against his superego, he feels guilty. His feelings of guilt are caused by his harsh superego punishing his ego for letting his id impulses become conscious. The ego then represses the id. Thus the nature of guilt is a feeling of punishment from an overly harsh superego.

In chapter III, a review of the material on the nature of guilt according to Mowrer and Glasser was presented. It was demonstrated that Mowrer and Glasser see the nature of guilt as being real. Guilt is real because it is an external (societal) phenomenon. Guilt is derived from action against society and its moral norms, thus it is deeds done (behavior) against "significant others," who are representatives of society that is the source of guilt. It follows, then, the nature of guilt is ontological (given in society as such) and, not biological (given in the organism).

In chapter III, a review of the material on the various experiments on the nature of guilt was also presented. It was found that Dr. Albert Bandura's studies with children show the great effectiveness of modeling behavior on the part of the teacher, supporting the hypothesis that learning comes by modeling and imitation. The Bandura study shows the

significance of modeling and imitation as opposed to mere rewarding. Dr. Mowrer hypothesized that when a person conceals his wrong actions from "significant others" he represses his superego, and he is guilty. The significance for Dr. Mowrer's hypothesis is that concealment is a learned reaction which remains hidden. What is needed is an exposure of the wrong behavior to "significant others," and with this exposure, comes a change of behavior into constructive efforts at self-modification. This self-modification process is learned through modeling and imitation.

Dr. Lester Kirkendall's study with college men showed that highly socialized, outgoing young men tend to be well-adjusted and normal in the sexual areas and not "neurotic" as psychoanalytic theory would imply, tending to support Dr. Mowrer's theory that undersocialization, not over socialization is at the core of "neurosis," and that the neurotic person gets better by being better (morally), and by being in step with society, not out of step or undersocialized. Studies by Zigler and Phillips also supported Mowrer's hypothesis and showed that sociopaths are the least socialized of all. Three studies by Peterson, O'Daniel and O'Connor, clearly supported Dr. Mowrer's thesis by showing that both neuroticism and sociopathy represent undersocialization.

In chapter IV, a detailed review of the literature on

the nature of responsibility according to Freud demonstrated that Freud believed that the nature of responsibility is not the behavior of the person nor his responsibility for making decisions but that society which represents the harsh over punishing superego is the agent of responsibility. Man being homo natura is totally conditioned to behave the way he does. If he behaves poorly, it is not his fault, but the fault of poor conditioning. Thus the nature of responsibility is poor biological adaptation. The solution for Freud was to modify the society.

Also in chapter IV a review of the literature on the nature of responsibility was made in the writings of Mowrer and Glasser. It was demonstrated that Mowrer and Glasser believe that responsibility has an ontological basis, it is "being" as such which means given in society. Man has limited freedom, and is responsible for his decisions. Thus responsibility is at the core of the existence of society. Man must learn to be responsible, and learning is more than just conditioning. Self-worth, self-actualization, and achievement are value judgements, and thus are validated by society (significant others). This validation is a part of the learning process.

Evaluation

This investigator feels that the question of man's nature is central to any understanding of personality theory

and psychotherapeutic techniques and methodologies. At the core of this question is a second question which follows by logical inference. Depending upon how we view man's nature, we will interpret man and the phenomena of guilt, and responsibility. There seems to be a combination of descriptive and proscriptive terms. The first term (feelings) is descriptive, and the other term (behavior) is proscriptive. How these two interact is the crucial issue. Freud says that behavior is at the feeling level and determined. "Man feels these urges and executes them or controls them." Dr. Mowrer and Dr. Glasser say that man behaves badly by irresponsible choice, and then feels badly for his actions. "You cannot separate man's behavior from his emotions." Mowrer and Glasser also say that behavior is a learned phenomenon, and guilt and responsibility are real; the person behaved irresponsibly and badly, and this behavior caused the emotional feeling. The interaction of behaving and feeling is either a biologically oriented phenomenon (Freud) or an ontological oriented phenomenon (Mowrer and Glasser). According to Dr. Mowrer's research and other research in this area, behavior, not feeling, is the key to personality integration. It would also follow that guilt and responsibility are real, and not just feelings. Man is bio-socio and not homo natura.

David the psalmist of the Old Testament must have had behavior in mind, not feeling, when he wrote the 32nd Psalm:

Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven,
whose sin is covered. (exposure to significant others)

²Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputes no
iniquity, and in whose spirit there is no deceit. (total
integrity)

³When I declared not my sin, my body wasted away
through my groaning all day long. (repressed superego)

⁴For day and night thy hand was heavy upon me; my
strength was dried up as by the heat of summer. (neurosis)

⁵I acknowledged my sin to thee, and I did not hide
my iniquity; I said, "I will confess my transgressions to the
Lord." Then thou didst forgive the guilt of my sin.
(exposure to significant others and involved acceptance)

⁶Therefore let every one who is godly offer prayer to
thee; at a time of distress, in the rush of great waters, they
shall not reach him. (self actualization)

⁷Thou art a hiding place for me, thou preservest me
from trouble; thou dost encompass me with deliverance.
(security and relatedness)

⁸I will instruct you and teach you the way you should
go; I will counsel you with my eye upon you. (learning new
behavior to meet your needs, and to become more responsible)

⁹Be not like a horse or a mule, without understanding,
which must be curbed with bit and bridle, else it will not
keep you. (total under-socialization, i.e. psychopath)

¹⁰Many are the pangs of the wicked; but steadfast love
surrounds him who trusts in the Lord. (freedom from irresponsible
behavior and involvement to learn new behavior)

¹¹Be glad in the Lord, and rejoice, O righteous, and
shout for joy, all you upright in heart! (integration,
freedom, and self-actualization)

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