

TURKEY: NEUTRAL OR ALLY?
THE EVENTS LEADING TO THE SIGNING OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH-TURKISH
MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT, 19 OCTOBER 1939

by

Bruce H. Leslie

A THESIS

Approved:

Mary S. Owen

Charles E. Frazier

Approved:

Bascom Barry Hayes

Bascom Barry Hayes
Dean of the Graduate School

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Bruce H. Leslie

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ABSTRACT

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The signing of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance on 19 October 1939 between the governments of Great Britain, France and Turkey was the culmination of a very complicated series of events and diplomatic negotiations. The founding of the Turkish Republic and the rapid development of a unique national culture, the rise of both Fascism and Communism and the development of a fierce rivalry among the European Powers, particularly between Britain and Germany, all contributed to forming the context out of which the new Republic attempted to find her place in the sun. Turkey found herself the center of all these forces because of her position as guardian of the Straits, which afforded her the remarkable opportunity to pursue a unique diplomatic program. Because the nations of Europe wished for some say in the passage of shipping through the Dardanelles, Turkey used this as bait to play one power against another thereby preserving the economic and technical rewards which were offered by the Powers as a means of gaining Turkish friendship.

Although the Turkish leaders showed remarkable political and diplomatic acumen in their foreign policy a number of factors complicated the negotiations with the British and the French. Italy, because of her designs in the eastern Mediterranean became a serious threat to the Turkish Republic. The Soviet Union joined with Germany

drastically altering the balance of power while certain Balkan states disapproved of the Turkish association with the British and French, and France prevented a rapid completion of a tripartite alliance because of difficulties which arose between herself and Turkey over her control over the Sanjak of Alexandretta.

Of particular importance to the research of this thesis were the Documents on British Foreign Policy and the Documents on German Foreign Policy. Diaries and personal memoirs rounded out the picture. Much of the information also came from the New York Times and a number of other newspapers and magazines.

The study revealed a number of important features of both German and British foreign policy in the Middle East and Europe. It further reflected the political and diplomatic dexterity of the Turkish leaders who, under enormous pressures from all sides, were successful in pursuing their own policy despite the overwhelming resources of the Great Powers, thereby preserving the sovereignty and integrity of their nation. Turkey aligned formally with Britain and France but in reality continued to pursue a policy of neutrality which was the best means by which the Turkish desire for complete independence could be met.

Approved:

Mary S. Owen
Supervising Professor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1923	6
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE TO THE TREATY OF MONTREUX, 1933-1936	42
IV. TOWARD A NEW FOREIGN POLICY	83
V. THE ANGLO-TURKISH DECLARATION OF 12 MAY 1939 . .	132
VI. THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE	167
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	192
BIBLIOGRAPHY	200
VITA	213

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The failure of the Ottoman armies to overrun Vienna in 1683 has been chosen by historians as the event which best represented the turning point in Ottoman history. From that moment until the first World War, in an almost unbroken succession of defeats, the great Empire slowly but steadily sank to impotence. Of course, there was more involved in the decline of an empire than military defeats. The disintegration of Turkey 235 years after the Vienna debacle was the denouement at the end of a period of enormously constructive social, political and economic change which ironically did more to destroy than to strengthen Ottoman power. The fact was that despite significant reform, Turkey was still unable to keep pace with the West and was weakened by assistance from the western powers which she sought. Modernization was an attempt by the Sultans to stave off final defeat, but because of the concessions given to the Europeans in exchange for help in this endeavor, it served rather to encourage the increasingly more blatant intrigues of the Western Powers, whose primary desire was to gather all they could from the remains when the end finally came. It was also ironic that the Turks, defeated and destroyed in the first World War, were able after the war to take advantage of Western disunity which grew out of these intrigues, and ultimately to control their own destiny and the future path of their new nation.

The leaders of the new Republic, however, were faced in the twenties and thirties with enormous internal and external pressures which hampered Turkey's national development and foreign policy. Turkey once more became the center of rivalries and political intrigues among the Great Powers. With the widening rift between the European nations the Straits again took on enormous importance, particularly because of their strategic location as the gateway to south-eastern Europe or to the eastern Mediterranean. Nations competed for a position of influence with Turkey in order to guarantee free passage for shipping through the Dardanelles, and, just as had been done before World War I, they all attempted to gain Turkish concessions by offering financial and technical assistance. Turkey's primary goal, on the other hand, in her dealings with these states was to maintain her sovereignty. Thus, unlike her Ottoman predecessors, the Republic of Turkey responded with few favors in return for generous economic offers, a fact which probably served to increase the rivalry over Turkish friendship. Instead, she pursued a foreign policy of playing one nation against the other, thereby maintaining a somewhat fluid balance of power while reaping the rewards of extensive western economic and technical aid while incurring few obligations of her own.

The two greatest antagonists in the match to win Turkey's favors were Great Britain and Germany. The former was interested primarily in the political and logistic importance Turkey held at the gateway to Asia and British possessions

farther east. Germany, on the other hand, needed Turkish raw material particularly chrome which was important to the development of German armaments. But as the 1930's came to a close, each sought to exclude the other from any participation in the affairs of the Turkish Republic or the Straits and both exerted enormous pressures upon the Ankara government to direct her foreign policy according to their particular wishes.

Complicating the foreign relations were Russia and Italy. The Soviet Union historically had sought to control the Straits as a warm water outlet and for defense of her southern coast. She, therefore, offered a serious potential threat to Turkey's control of the Straits and thus to her sovereignty, but Italy, seeking a rebirth of Roman power in the Mediterranean, became the greatest single threat to Turkey. Because of this, Ankara sought actively to maneuver among the powers in such a way as to receive protection from the Italian threat without losing her own integrity. It was with this objective in mind that the leaders of Turkey concluded a series of treaties with England and France during the 1920's and 1930's which culminated in the Mutual Assistance Pact of 19 October 1939. Although the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano entered in his diary on that day that "the agreement has no anti-Italian character,"¹ it was precisely this Italophobia which was the chief reason for Ankara's decision to move from a policy of strict neutrality to an alliance with the Allied forces.

But there were other highly complex elements which affected both Turkey's decision to conclude an agreement with

Britain and France and the negotiations themselves. These were not only external but internal in nature, and it is to the study of these factors that this thesis is directed. Further, it is necessary to understand how the Anglophobia of post World War I developed into an Anglo-Turkish alliance during World War II while at the same time ties with her former German ally were weakened.

Finally, it is necessary to assess the real purpose of the Anglo-French-Turkish alliance from the Turkish point of view and to analyze its effectiveness in terms of Turkey's long-range goal of preserving her independence. In order to accomplish this, a study must be made of events after the first World War and at the birth of the new Turkish Republic. The political and economic relations of Turkey with Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East need also to be considered and Turkish social, political, religious and economic development, which play such an important role in determining the national character, must all be viewed with a discerning eye for all played a part in the events leading to the signing of the Mutual Assistance Pact of 19 October 1939.

FOOTNOTES

¹ The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943 ,ed. Hugh Gibson (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1946), p. 161.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY, 1919-1923

The initial steps taken by the West during 1913 and 1914 to agree among themselves on the question of Ottoman partition were both economic and political in nature.¹ Discussions between Germany, Austria, and Italy on the one hand, and Germany, Great Britain, and France on the other, were carried on concerning the formulation of spheres of influence, which grew out of economic interest gained from prior concessions from the Ottomans themselves. Germany was primarily interested in her Bagdad concession; France, in her railroad concessions in Syria; and Britain, in the protection of communication and trade routes in southern Mesopotamia. These three nations competed for economic and political prestige, and, in the case of Britain, her major concern was protection of her interest in India.

Austria and Italy also were interested in the Ottoman territories for essentially the same economic and political reasons, although it is difficult to understand Austrian expansionist designs when her own Empire was breaking-up at home.² Italian ambitions are perhaps easier to define: Italy wished to secure a hold on the Dalmation Littoral at Austrian expense, and her failure to do so led to the rupture of the two countries. Fear that the other nations would determine the outcome of the question without her and fear

that they might have designs on her possessions in the Dodecanese Islands made her more aggressive in Eastern affairs.³

There were a number of conflicting interests among the concerned nations and often secret discussions were held between countries which led to a constantly shifting system of alignments and resultant jealousy and bitter feelings.⁴ Much of the time Ottoman division was promoted and discussed openly. Graf von Jagow, German Foreign Secretary, outwardly advanced such division⁵ and, following the London Conference of 1913, he actively dealt with France and Great Britain on respective economic spheres.⁶ An agreement with France was initialed in February 1914, and one with Britain in June 1914.⁷

Russia stood alone in her desire to maintain the status quo for the simple but important reason that any alteration would be unfavorable to her position vis-a-vis the Straits and threatening to her vulnerable southern coast. However, with the entrance of Turkey into the war in October 1914, Russia was forced to reevaluate her stand. The Anglo-French operations in the Dardanelles early in February 1915 also served to impress upon St. Petersburg the immediate necessity of coming to some conclusion on how best to attain her historic objective, control of the Straits.

Russia feared a seizure of this strategic outlet by Britain before Russian troops could be sent. It thus became one of the ironies of the war that after so long a quest for control of the entrance to the Black Sea, Russia was impotent to act when the opportunity presented itself. In fact, it appeared for a time that the almost ageless rivalry between

Russia and Britain would eventuate in a British victory. However, Russian fears were soon alleviated by the Turkish victory in 1915.

The outcome of the Russian concern was a demand to the Allies on 4 March 1915 that Constantinople and the Straits be ceded to her. Britain and France were forced reluctantly to agree but only after the Russians in turn gave complete satisfaction to their designs in Asiatic Turkey. Britain acknowledged her acceptance of the Russian demands on 12 March and France acceded on 10 April.⁸

The "Constantinople Agreements" had the immediate effect of raising anew the spectre of jealous rivalry over the Ottoman Empire, which was reflected in the Secret agreements of 1915-1920. The Treaty of London signed on 26 April 1915 was the second agreement dealing with the division of the Ottoman Empire following the outbreak of the war. Italy, in exchange for her participation in the war demanded and received a sphere of interest in Adalea. The British and French were now more inclined to formalize further their own claims and three more agreements followed.

The Sazonov-Paleologue Treaty of 9 March 1916 dealt with northern Asiatic Turkey whereby Russia claimed 60,000 square miles between Persia and the Black Sea. France, on her side, claimed a zone along the Mediterranean which was to be finalized at a later date. The Sykes-Picot Treaty of May 1916, between France and Britain with Russian approval,⁹ completed this arrangement.¹⁰ At the same time, however, negotiations between the Arabs of the Hejaz under the Emir

Hussein,¹¹ Ibn Saud of the Nejd, and the British proceeded simultaneously,¹² without French or Russian knowledge.

Justification for the Sykes-Picot Treaty was based on the following declaration: "The French and British government, having acquired from information at their disposal the conviction that the Arab populations of the Arab Peninsula, as well as of the provinces of the Ottoman Empire, are strongly opposed to Turkish domination, and that it would be actually possible to establish an Arab State, or a confederation, both hostile to the Turkish government and favorable to the Entente powers, have opened negotiations and have examined the question in common."¹³ This agreement, in reality, divided the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire giving Mesopotamia to Great Britain, and Syria to France.¹⁴ Also included was a solemn agreement (Article 10) that "The British and French governments, as protectors of the Arab state, agree not to acquire, and will not consent to a third party acquiring territorial possession in the Arabian Peninsula. . . ."¹⁵ Ostensibly, this clause was directed against Italy who, upon hearing of her omission from the agreement, demanded further concessions in Smyrna.¹⁶ France and England requiring Italian participation in the war took the necessary steps, as arranged by the Treaty of London, to assign to Italy a broad zone of interest centering in Adalia. This agreement at St. Jean de Maurienne, in April 1917, further bound Italy to the terms of the Sykes-Picot agreement, including Article 10,¹⁷ with the further stipulation that the entire agreement was "subject to the consent of the

Russian Government,"¹⁸ which, as a result of the Bolshevik Revolution, not only did not ratify the treaty, but published its contents along with the others in which she was involved. This renunciation gave the Allies a pretext for contesting the validity of the treaty of St. Jean de Maurienne at the Paris negotiations in 1918-1919. Italy, therefore, received nothing for her efforts, the effect of which was to plague Mediterranean diplomacy for the next two decades.¹⁹

The Sykes-Picot and St. Jean de Maurienne agreements were classic examples of the lack of trust among the Entente and the maze of secret agreements which resulted from, and in turn, promoted this distrust. A further illustration of this lack of confidence may be shown by the instructions the French government sent to Georges Picot, the French Commissary in Syria and Palestine, on 2 April 1917 about the time of the St. Jean de Maurienne agreement. His instructions were to see that the British forces, which at the time had moved beyond Palestine and were routing the Ottoman army, did not forget their obligations to France as stipulated in the Sykes-Picot Treaty. The French, although little able to spare any troops from the western front, sent a small contingent of forces to Picot to "show the population the complete agreement existing between the Allies, as well as to establish the joint character of the action pursued in these regions,"²⁰ and to "see that the colors of both countries shall immediately be flown," whenever occupation followed from British successes.²¹

The end to all of this maneuvering should have followed President Wilson's address at the Peace Conference in January 1918 concerning the Fourteen Points, particularly the twelfth point dealing with settlement of the Ottoman Question.²² Furthermore, on 5 January, Lloyd George stated that the Allies were no longer fettered by the secret treaties in discussing Turkey.²³ However, as far as Britain and France were concerned, the fate of Turkish territory was still to be decided and much still had to be settled concerning their respective claims. A secret meeting held at Lloyd George's Paris apartment on 20 March 1919 with Wilson, Clemenceau and Orlando present, brought to light the fact that even after the 1916 and 1917 settlements with the Italians "there had been a long further correspondence and an exchange of many notes between France and Great Britain"²⁴ concerning Turkish claims. It is apparent from the notes of this meeting that in December 1918, Clemenceau had visited London where Lloyd George confirmed the agreements of 1916 and 1917 but made demands for Mosul and Palestine.²⁵ These problems evidently were not cleared-up by the exchange of notes and thus the meeting of 20 March,²⁶ where a final settlement between Britain and France was sought.²⁷

The lack of agreement between these two major powers, particularly over oil-rich Mosul, between the years 1917-1920, had a most deleterious effect on Allied designs as a whole in the Ottoman territories. The delay of two years between the signing of the armistice of Mudros in October

1918, and the Treaty of Sevres, initialed by the Sultan under protest in August 1920, provided an important part of the necessary impetus to turn the beaten Turks into a unified nationalist force under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha. This development, perhaps the most amazing of the entire war, prompted Lord Curzon to fear that "the weakest and most abject of our foes would end by achieving the greatest triumph."²⁸ He was correct, for in 1923 the victorious Turks successfully negotiated the peace treaty of Lausanne on their own terms, the only nation to do so following the World War.

The Turkish Nationalist movement spanned the years 1918-1923 and can attribute its success partly to Allied delay in negotiating a peace settlement with a people tired of war and totally resigned to accepting any terms offered.²⁹ The failure of the Allies to act promptly on a Turkish treaty can be attributed to preoccupation with the peace settlement with Germany, the settlement of the former Hapsburg lands, the delusive hope that the United States might accept a mandate over an Armenian state or over Constantinople and the straits,³⁰ a widespread feeling on behalf of the Allies that the Turks must accept any terms imposed thus making haste unnecessary, and finally the failure of the Allies to agree among themselves as to the terms of peace.

Initially the Allies proposed a harsh treaty which was not unlike that exacted from Germany. It dealt with four primary issues: the economic partition of Turkey; establishment of a new Ottoman state including settlement of the Straits

question and capitulations;³¹ the reorganization of Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine; and protection of former subject people. The settlement of the last three was made dependent upon the first; thus it was not until Britain and France finally settled the Mosul dispute in the Oil Agreement of 24 April 1920³² that a draft treaty was written at San Remo on 26 April which embodied the British terms for peace. The draft was handed to the Sultan on 11 May who signed it under protest on 10 August.³³

Allied delay in itself was not enough to promote a movement for national self-determination in Turkey. There were a number of other factors growing out of Allied intransigence, Allied transgressions, and perhaps Allied stupidity. Following the armistice of Mudros, British troops under the pretext of establishing a base to fight the Bolsheviks, landed on Turkish soil in January. Their true purpose, however, soon became evident when in February, Greek Premier Eleutherios Venizelos presented to the Peace Conference in Paris a formal claim to possession of Smyrna which contained an important Greek population.³⁴ The Italians had been promised this area in the agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne; so they landed a small force at Antalya on 29 March to support their claim. The Greeks were able, however, to take advantage of an Italian walkout from the Peace Conference on 24 April to attain sanction from the Allies for their claims of February.³⁵ Largely to forestall the Italians,³⁶ a combined United States, British and French fleet supported a Greek landing on 15 May 1919. The Greeks made it immediately clear

that they proposed permanent annexation of western Anatolia into a greater Greek Christian Empire of Constantinople.³⁷

When Mustafa Kemal returned to Constantinople on 3 November 1918 following the disastrous Syrian Campaign and the armistice at Mudros in October, he had the prestige of being the victor of the Dardanelles campaign and the only undefeated Turkish general. He had to face, however, a new Sultan, Mehmed Vahideddin, who succeeded to the throne of Osman the previous July. The two men were of totally differing views concerning the future of Turkey. Kemal was a strong nationalist who, since his days in officer's school, had been working for a new, modern and westernized Turkey.³⁸ The Sultan, on the other hand, strongly opposed nationalism blaming the misfortunes of his multi-national Empire on this Western philosophy.³⁹ He therefore opposed any popular movement against the Allied occupation or the Greek invasion and proceeded to disarm and demobilize the Turkish forces.⁴⁰

Although he may have been unaware of Kemal's influence in undermining his authority, the Sultan did find his popularity in the capital threatened. He sent Kemal on a mission on 30 April as Inspector General of the Ninth Army Base at Samsun on the Black Sea Coast in order to remove him from Constantinople. Kemal's orders were to restore order, settle the Muslim-Christian disturbances, disarm and disperse the semi-military bands operating there, and supervise demobilization in the area. Instead, the general took the opportunity to join with the recently founded "Societies for

the Defense of Rights" to prepare for the defense of Turkey.⁴¹ Kemal's arrival at Samsun on 19 May 1919, only four days after the Greek invasion, is marked as the birthday of the Turkish National Revolution.⁴²

Initially, occupation by the victorious Allies had appeared to the Turks to be a limited affair and thus not too difficult to accept. On the other hand, the thrust of a neighboring and former subject people was beyond endurance;⁴³ therefore their reaction to Greek occupation was immediate and violent. One of the British representatives at Constantinople described the hostility between the Greeks and Turks on 17 August 1919 as "an animosity which has to be seen to be believed, which is as unreasoning as it is rabid, and which is gradually becoming pretty nearly unquenchable."⁴⁴

Originally, Turkish military response to the Greeks was a guerrilla movement which sprang up along the line of Greek advance. Under Kemal's guidance, this movement rapidly became more organized. Assisting the development of the Nationalist organization along political lines was the "Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia"⁴⁵ which held two important conferences. The first took place on 23 July 1919 at Erzurum representing the eastern provinces, and the second, and more important, occurred at Sivas on 4 September where the entire nation was represented. Kemal was appointed chairman of both meetings which served to draw up and proclaim the National Pact, or declaration of independence, on 13 September calling for territorial integrity and national independence.⁴⁶

The spirit of these congresses was directed more toward protecting the integrity of Turkey than toward overthrowing the Sultan, and a reaffirmation of their loyalty to the ruler was proclaimed by the delegates at Sivas. Blame for the problems being faced by the country was placed on the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha and his Cabinet.⁴⁷

The Sultan called elections for the Ottoman Parliament in October 1920. The new body, with a Kemalist majority, met at the capitol on 12 January and promptly enacted the Nationalist Pact. The British reacted with alarm to this challenge to the Sultan, which also appeared to threaten her own position of control over the Straits. On 15 March the British sent a force into Constantinople which proceeded to arrest many prominent Turks and nationalist sympathizers and declared the capital under Allied military control. The Ottoman Parliament held its final session and prorogued itself indefinitely on 18 March.⁴⁸

Immediately, Kemal called for national elections to choose a new assembly to meet at Ankara where the Nationalists had established themselves on 27 December 1919. The delegates, known as the Grand National Assembly, met on 23 April and elected Kemal as the President of the group. Again, loyalty to Mehmed Vahideddin was proclaimed. However, on 11 April, a fetva, Muslim juridical ruling, was proclaimed declaring the Nationalists rebels against the Sultan. Kemal and other national leaders were sentenced to death in absentia on 11 May. The Nationalists, hard-pressed to fight the Allied armies on

three fronts, were now forced to face the "Army of the Caliphate" as well as a Kurdish rebellion against them started by the Sultan with British assistance. Failure of the Allies to stop the Nationalists at this critical juncture can be blamed on their imposition of the Treaty of Sevres in August. This act caused so much revulsion of feeling among all Turks against the regime accepting it that Kemal's position was immeasurably strengthened.

The Treaty of Sevres was extremely harsh. It broke up the Ottoman Empire completely. The part of Thrace which had remained in Turkish hands after 1913 and a few islands in the Aegean Sea were given to Greece. Constantinople and the Straits, which were demilitarized, were given to Turkey but were restricted by international limitations. Syria, Palestine, Arabia, and Mesopotamia, henceforth called Iraq, were lost and Turkish sovereignty in Anatolia was limited. The northern frontier territory was severed and organized into the Armenian Republic, and a Kurd Republic was established in southeast Anatolia. Britain received a narrow zone of influence on the Turkish-Iraq border and France a wider sphere. An Italian zone of influence included about half of Anatolia extending from the southern coast deep into the interior. Greece was given Smyrna and its hinterland. Finally, the capitulations were confirmed.⁴⁹ Italy, Great Britain and France also signed the Tripartite (Sevres) Agreement on Anatolia on 10 August 1920 which recognized their respective spheres of interest.⁵⁰

The Nationalists vehemently denounced Sevres whereupon Lloyd George pressured the Greeks to push further inland in order to force Nationalist acceptance of the Treaty. As early as 28 April 1920, the Nationalists were encouraged, however, by a military understanding with the Soviets and in November ambassadors were exchanged.⁵¹ This relationship served to turn the tide when on 22 November a combined Bolshevik and Nationalist attack destroyed the shadow-state of Armenia. On 3 December, in the Treaty of Alexandropol, the Nationalists recovered the Kars, Ardahan and Armenia for the state of Turkey. Further military successes followed when in January 1921, at the First Battle of Inönü, Ismet Pasha defeated the Greeks.

This battle may be considered as a turning point in the war since from this moment on the Allies were forced to recognize that the National movement was becoming too strong to stop. Their first reaction was to call a conference in London which met from 23 February to 12 March 1921. The representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and Greece on the one hand and the representatives of the Sultan and the Nationalists on the other met in order to modify the Treaty of Sevres but the terms of the agreement fell far short of Nationalist demands.⁵²

Significantly, three important events occurred in and following the London Conference. First, the Sultan's representative recognized the Nationalists as the spokesmen for all of Turkey.⁵³ Second, both France and Italy took the

opportunity of the meeting to make separate settlements with the Nationalists, thus giving de facto recognition to them. The reality of a strong national military movement caused both of these nations to fear a long and costly anti-Turkish crusade. The French had already been pushed far back from their original lines, and Italy was experiencing political disturbances at home. Thus, on 13 March, Kemal and Italy agreed to Italian withdrawal in exchange for extensive economic concessions in Anatolia.⁵⁴ On 20 October 1921, by the so-called "Franklin-Bouillon" or Ankara Accord, the French also agreed to evacuate in exchange for economic concessions.⁵⁵ The importance of the Italian and French withdrawal is that it represented a breakdown of the solidarity of the Entente, since it went against the terms of the treaties of September 1914 and November 1915 which opposed the signing of a separate peace.⁵⁶ Furthermore the situation reopened Anglo-French friction in the area. France's deliberate abandonment of a substantial amount of war material in Cilicia, and the release of Nationalist troops from the former Italian and French fronts for operations against the Greeks on the sole remaining front sealed Turkish success.

The third important result of Turkish successes against the Greeks was the signing on 16 March of the Treaty of Moscow which fixed the border between the Soviet Union and the Nationalists, made agreements of recognition and mutual friendship and arrangements for exchanges of populations.⁵⁷ Thus, by 1921, the Kemalists had succeeded in a brilliant

diplomatic upset, which was of immense value in the continued military successes which followed.

Attempts to reach an armistice between Turkey and Greece began as early as June 1921⁵⁸ but because of changes of government in Greece, France, and Italy, no headway was made immediately. But in March 1922, Lord Curzon and Poincaré met in Paris and issued a pronouncement requesting an armistice in the Greek-Turkish war. Greece who since the Autumn of 1921 had placed herself in British hands alone accepted it.⁵⁹ The Turkish positions were now strong enough to threaten seriously Great Britain's hold on the Straits, maintained only by the sacrifices of the Greek army which had been prodded incessantly by the British for this very purpose. By 18 August, the Turkish army had struck along the entire Greek front throwing the enemy armies back in panic across the Anatolia plateau. By 20 September, there were no more Greek Armies in Asia Minor.⁶⁰

The British control of the Straits was seriously threatened by the Turkish victory. Britain thus turned to France, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Rumania to help maintain this precarious hold; all refused.⁶¹ A military clash between the Nationalists and British at Chanaq was narrowly prevented by the agreement of all parties to an armistice, signed at Mudanya on 11 October 1922. The former Allies with the exception of Russia agreed to return Eastern Thrace to the Turks and recognized Turkish sovereignty over Constantinople. The Nationalists, on their side, agreed to accept neutralization of the Straits under

international control. The Greeks acceded to the Armistice on 14 October.

The Nationalists had won their battle for independence and with the recovery of Eastern Thrace had returned to Europe. Greek hopes for a new Empire were dashed upon the rocks of defeat, and Kemal was in possession of most of the territory claimed in the National Pact three years earlier. Lloyd George's policy of British domination over the Straits ended in fiasco, and partly because of this failure, he was forced to resign the office of Prime Minister on 19 October 1922. France had obtained only Syria, and Italy, like Greece, was crowded out of Asia Minor.

Great Britain made one last attempt to strengthen her waning influence by inviting both the representatives of the Sultan and those of the Nationalists to sit at the Peace Conference scheduled to meet at Lausanne. Kemal, who as early as July 1920 had declared to the Assembly the need to place the government in the hands of the people,⁶² now had an excuse to abolish the Sultanate to prevent the Sultan's participation in the peace conference. The fact remains that the majority of deputies had already favored the appointment of a new Sultan. Thus, in order for the old order to be replaced, and in order to protect Kemal's position as head of the Nationalist government, the Sultan now had to be removed. Mohammed VI (Vahedettin) fled from the capital aboard a British warship to Malta on 17 November. The following day he was declared deposed and his cousin Abdul Mejid became

Caliph, but not Sultan, thus separating the religious from the temporal aspects of the state.

The Conference of Lausanne which opened on 21 November 1922 following the long struggle of the Turks for national independence was one of the great success stories of recent history. It signified a people's victory over centuries of intrigue and imperialism perpetrated by the Western Powers. It further represented the beginning of a new national state whose autonomy and self-esteem could no longer be contested. Ismet Pasha fought hard and obstinately at Lausanne driving the Allies, represented by the "British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State,"⁶³ into almost complete frustration. Lord Curzon broke off the conference on 4 February 1923 after heated arguments over the abolition of capitulations, the status of Mosul, and the payment of reparations by Greece.⁶⁴ To journalists who asked Ismet what had caused the break, he replied, "Nothing. We have refused to accept servitude."⁶⁵ The Allies waited until 23 April before realizing they would have to move to reopen the conference. The treaty, embodying virtually all of Turkey's demands, was initialed on 24 July signifying the end of the Ottoman Empire.

By the terms of the Treaty, Turkey gave up all claims to the non-Turkish territories lost as a result of World War I but recovered Eastern Thrace and settled the frontier with Greece. Turkey also received the Aegean Islands of Imbros and Tenedos but lost the rest to Greece. Italy retained the Dodecanese, and England, Cyprus. The Mosul question was put

off and final settlement was reached only in 1926. The capitulations were abolished in return for promised judicial reform. Turkey accepted treaties to protect minorities, and a separate Turkish-Greek agreement provided for compulsory exchange of populations.⁶⁶ Turkey had to pay no reparations. The Straits question, settled in a separate convention, concluded that they were to be open to ships of all nations in time of peace, and in time of war if Turkey remained neutral. If Turkey were at war, enemy ships could be excluded.⁶⁷ Thus, the Nationalists skillfully succeeded in becoming the only defeated power of the war to settle a negotiated peace on their own terms.⁶⁸

Following the abolition of the Sultanate and the Nationalist victory at Lausanne, fundamental, political, social, and economic reforms began to change the entire structure of the Turkish state and society and to close the gap which had separated the Ottoman world from the West. An old Ottoman state philosophy which stated "There can be no power without an army, no army without adequate sources of revenue, no revenue without prosperity of subjects, and no prosperity without justice,"⁶⁹ probably best expressed the mood of the country which led to the great changes.

Even before the conclusion of Lausanne, the Grand National Assembly dissolved itself on 19 April in order to facilitate the advent of the new government under the "People's Party,"⁷⁰ the only legal political party in the country. New elections for the Assembly were held in June 1923. With completion of political organization, the

government moved to finalize its authority. Ankara was formally chosen as the new "Seat of Government of the Turkish State"⁷¹ on 13 October, and the Turkish Republic was formally proclaimed with Mustafa Kemal as President⁷² on 29 October.

The office of the Caliphate remained the last vestige of Ottoman political control in Turkey. The Caliph's authority extended far beyond the borders of the state, affecting the faithful of all the Muslim world where God was recognized as the only legitimate source of both power and law. Thus, the Caliph, God's vice-regent on earth, wielded enormous power and was the only one who could challenge the leadership of the new regime.⁷³ Kemal was determined to crush this threat, and did so through a number of directives closing religious schools and courts. The Grand National Assembly under his pressure announced the abolition of the office of the Caliphate on 3 March 1924.⁷⁴ The Assembly adopted the new Republican Constitution on 20 April which finalized these actions.⁷⁵ Further decrees in 1925 repressing religious orders continued this process of secularization which was completed in April 1928 when the Grand National Assembly amended the Constitution of 1924 by abrogating Article II which had made Islam the state religion.⁷⁶

In the legal and social sphere, reforms were made which resulted in the adoption in 1926 of the Swiss Civil Code, Italian Penal Code, and the German Commercial Code which replaced the Koran as the basis of law.⁷⁷ The Arabic alphabet was replaced by the Latin in November 1928. Surnames were required by everyone in the country in another move to remove Islamic practices. Kemal took the name Attatürk,

father of the Turks. Women were given suffrage in March 1930, the same year Constantinople and Angora were renamed Istanbul and Ankara respectively.⁷⁸ All of these changes reflected the attempt to take enormous strides in transforming the country as quickly as possible into a strong, modern state capable of defending itself and preventing a recurrence of the past.

The Nationalist War, however, had left the nation with enormous problems of reconstruction and development and hardly any means at hand for accomplishing the rapid westernization desired. Under the Ottomans there had been increased westernization but modern manufacturing and mining industries, as well as railroads and utilities, had been mainly controlled by the West. The Turks, who had limited themselves principally to military and government service, and farming,⁷⁹ had depended upon the Armenians, Kurds, and Greeks, now slaughtered or dispersed, to run most of the native industries. Thus, the Turks were lacking in both experience and technical knowledge and were therefore at a great disadvantage in facing the task of redevelopment.

Furthermore, capital in the 1920's was almost impossible to obtain. The Turkish economy was exceedingly backward. Four-fifths of the population farmed using the most primitive methods. Most peasants lived off their own crops, and urban centers were fed by the immediate, surrounding countryside.⁸⁰

Modern means of transportation were almost completely non-existent. Therefore, trade was restricted to bazaars and transactions in the coastal cities. Turkish products

were predominantly handicrafts; most machine-made goods had to be imported. Almost the entire export trade consisted of agricultural products such as raisins, cotton, tobacco, and nuts. However, their luxury nature made them vulnerable to the vagaries of world economic conditions. The situation was mitigated somewhat by the fact that Turkey was not dependent on one cash crop.⁸¹

The country had only one important domestic bank, the Ziraat (agricultural) Bank, but it had never served as a commercial bank.⁸² All other financial establishments were foreign-controlled and as suspicious of the Republic as the Republic was of them.⁸³ Thus, there existed a critical shortage of skills and materials with which to build a nation. However, to entrust the foreigner with the task of rehabilitation was out of the question, since it might jeopardize not only Turkish dignity but also the social and economic gains which had been achieved at a great cost in the suffering of the people. The Turks smarted under the memories of Ottoman economic sujugation to the West, particularly epitomized by the hated capitulations which the Allies had attempted to continue even at Lausanne. The Republic was thus reluctant to contract large loans from abroad. There was at the same time a curious but strong desire in the Turks to achieve technological equality with the West, to be actually recognized as Europeans, and to be assimilated into European civilization.⁸⁴ Perhaps this desire caused them to face the fact that without foreign help westernization was impossible. Kemal thus decided

to grant limited concessions to the United States, which had not been at war with Turkey and whose policies appeared to be in opposition to political imperialism. The result was the "Chester Concession Plan" ratified in April 1923 by the Grand National Assembly.⁸⁵ Failure of the plan, however, drove Kemal to a position of attempting redevelopment solely on the meager resources of the national budget.⁸⁶

A series of reforms in the agricultural, industrial and banking spheres followed during the 1920's. Land reform which redistributed property and improvised the old tax system was instituted. In 1924, the İs Bankasi (workers' bank) was created, and in 1927 a law offering tax advantages to private industrial firms attempted to promote private investment. Turkey began to end her colonial, economic status as a source of national riches for others by purchasing the French and Italian companies which held pre-World War I concessions in coal and utilities.⁸⁷ These companies were so inefficient the Turks knew they could do better.⁸⁸

Unfortunately, Turkey's ability to purchase foreign-owned companies and proceed with her programs was hampered by the decision of the Board of Arbitration at Lausanne that Turkey must pay \$401,195,247 or 62.25 per cent of the old Ottoman debt.⁸⁹ At the same time by a commercial treaty due to expire in 1929, Turkey was compelled to admit a long list of imports from the Allies at the low rates of duty obtained during Ottoman rule. Thus, although Turkish trade flourished her foreign debt steadily increased on account of substantial

imports.⁹⁰ Furthermore, outstanding internal loans of about \$9.25 million, a floating debt of almost \$48 million, and a paper currency of \$82.5 million existed. As Peter F. Sugar in Political Modernization of Japan and Turkey pointed out: "When one considers that until 1947 when the Ottoman public debt was finally cancelled, Turkey poured an average yearly sum of \$10.25 million into the old Imperial debt alone while the government's income of 1928 amounted to only \$105.5 million one can better understand the financial difficulties of the government."⁹¹ It is not surprising that despite all the attempts of private investment, Turkish expansion fell far short of its goals.

Further difficulties arose when the world economic crisis of 1929 struck. Two steps were taken in an attempt to counter the collapse of Turkey's financial base. First, a \$10 million loan from The Swedish Match Company was negotiated in exchange for a match monopoly granted to the United States subsidiary of that company.⁹² Second, a private American loan was accepted, and the services of United States engineers and economists were engaged to survey the entire economy and draw up detailed plans to improve economic efficiency. The result was the Henes-Don-Remmerer Plan. However, the distrust toward the West as well as the economic failures of the capitalist countries had reinforced a feeling of contempt for the West. On the other hand, Turkish leaders thought that great economic strides, without foreign capital, were being made in Soviet Russia where the depression appeared to have less effect. At a time when help could not be forthcoming

from the West, the Soviets were able to fill the vacuum and offer a method of economic expansion, capital to initiate it, and the experts to assist in its application.

Mustafa Kemal spelled out the new policy of economic development planned with the assistance of the Soviets and initialed it on 21 April 1931.⁹³ Etatism, as it was officially termed, was defined by the President as the duty of the state to participate in the economic life of the nation in order to guide it to prosperity in the shortest possible time.⁹⁴

Despite the association with the Soviets, etatism was not a political system and was not identified with socialism. Instead, it was thought of as a pragmatic intermingling of state and private enterprise with the former providing the necessary infrastructure and filling in the gaps in investment.⁹⁵

Because of the failure of private enterprise, the unavailability of foreign capital, the world depression, the absence of domestic public opinion to oppose it, and the necessity of channeling what little available capital there was into projects of highest social reform, etatism fitted well into the historical, social, political, and economic environment of Turkey.⁹⁶

FOOTNOTES

¹ British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914, ed., G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1967), X, Part 1, No. 463, p. 413; No. 477, p. 425; No. 478, p. 427; No. 499, pp. 444-45; No. 553, pp. 493-4.

² Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey, 1913-1923, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 52.

³ Ibid; British Documents, X, No. 152, p. 138; No. 157, p. 142; No. 167, p. 152; No. 168, p. 153; No. 172, p. 156; No. 230, p. 217; No. 270, p. 251; Italy sought political rather than economic concessions. Howard, p. 56.

⁴ Howard, pp. 47-60.

⁵ British Documents, X, Part 2, No. 223, p. 354; No. 454, p. 659; No. 532, p. 772.

⁶ Negotiations with the French had begun as early as May 1913, but all negotiations were pursued on strictly economic not political grounds as each nation feared to upset the balance of power by politically partitioning the Ottoman Empire. Howard, p. 56.

⁷ Ibid; "Anglo-German Convention Regarding the Bagdad Railway," Edward Mead Earle, "The Secret Anglo-German Convention of 1914 Regarding Asiatic Turkey," Political Science Quarterly, March 1923, 22-44.

⁸ Howard, pp. 129-131.

⁹ Negotiations were carried on in St. Petersburg in February 1916.

¹⁰ Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1960), I, 67.

¹¹ Letter from Sir Henry McMahon to King Hussein from the secret conference of 20 March 1919, *Ibid.*, III, 10.

¹² Howard, p. 184.

¹³ Text of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, "The Partition of Turkey," Current History, 11 (March 1920), 499.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, in a letter to M. Briand, French Foreign Minister, pointed out that Baron Sonino was being attacked by the entire opposition press because he failed to secure for Italy a share in Asia Minor.

¹⁷ Article 7, Treaty of St. Jeanne de Maurienne.

¹⁸ "The Partition of Turkey," Current History, p. 450.

¹⁹ According to the London and St. Jean de Maurienne agreements, Italy should have received the southwestern part of Anatolia and the territories to the north as her sphere of

influence including Izmir, Antalya and Konya with the right of administration and occupation. The Treaty of Sevres ceded these territories to Italy. However, following the Turkish National Liberation movement, Italy received only small border extensions in Libya and Italian Somaliland.

²⁰ "The Partition of Turkey," Current History, p. 450.

²¹ Ibid.

²² "The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees." Baker, III, 3.

²³ Ibid., I, 70.

²⁴ Ibid., III, 3.

²⁵ Mosul had originally been placed in the French sector as a buffer zone between Turkey and Iraq.

²⁶ The meeting was even secret from the others of the Council of Ten which at that time was the official body of the Peace Conference. Baker, I, 71.

²⁷ It appears that President Wilson first learned of the secret talks here and was quite annoyed. Baker, III, p. 10.

²⁸ Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, 1st Series, ed., E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), V, 880. Hereafter cited as DBFP.

²⁹ The Sultan is supposed to have signed a secret agreement with Britain in 1919 according to which Turkey would become a British mandate. Barbara Ward, ed., Hitler's Route to Bagdad (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1939), p. 520; the newly-formed Wilsonian League asked for an American supervision of Turkish affairs, or a protectorate for 15 to 25 years. Matthew S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (New York: St. Martins Press, 1966), p. 364.

³⁰ Wilson was asked to assume an American mandate by Lloyd George. The President did submit the question to the Senate on 24 May 1920, but it was rejected on 1 June 1920. Howard, p. 243.

³¹ The hated privileges dating from the sixteenth century granting economic and legal privileges to foreigners made Turkey dependent upon these powers.

³² France acquired 25 per cent interest in concessions to exploit Mosul's oil reserves, and Great Britain was given control of the territory. Jacob C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), II, 75-79.

³³ Richard D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic: Area Study in National Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 288.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 283.

³⁵ Sir John A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963), p. 526.

³⁶ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 241.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Kemal had been co-founder in 1906 of the "Fatherland and Freedom Society," a Young Turk group in Damascus, but he kept aloof from the politics of the Young Turk Unionist Party. Dankwart Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic," World Politics, 11 (1959), 522.

³⁹ Lewis, pp. 40-75. Nationalism in multi-national states contributed to the break-up of the empires into their various ethnic entities. The Ottoman Empire was experiencing the same national forces as were the Austrian and Russian Empires.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 245.

⁴¹ Rustow, pp. 513-52.

⁴² Ward, p. 278; For Kemal's interpretation of the Nationalist Revolution, Kemal Attaturk, A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustaphe Kemal, October 1927 (Leipzig: K.F. Koehler, 1929), passim. However, care should be taken when using this English translation which, as Dankwart Rustow points out, is "a retranslation from the French and German and is both inaccurate in detail and inadequate in style." Rustow, p. 355.

⁴³ Lewis, p. 261.

⁴⁴ DBFP, p. 733.

⁴⁵ First called the "Association for the Rights of the Eastern Provinces," Lewis, p. 248.

⁴⁶ The National Pact: (1) self-determination; (2) a plebiscite for Kars, Ardahan and Batum; (3) security of Constantinople; (4) opening of the Straits; (5) rights of minorities; (6) abolition of capitulations. Complete text in Hurewitz, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁷ Howard, p. 255.

⁴⁸ The Sultan formally dissolved the Ottoman Parliament on 11 April 1920. Robinson, p. 286.

⁴⁹ "Political Clauses of the Treaty of Sevres," (10 August 1920), Hurewitz, pp. 81-87.

⁵⁰ "Tripartite (Sevres) Agreement of Anatolia: The British Empire, France and Italy," (10 August 1920). Ibid., pp. 87-89.

⁵¹ Robinson, p. 287; Anderson, p. 369.

⁵² Robinson, p. 289.

⁵³ This recognition of the Ankara delegate by the Istanbul delegate as the official Turkish representative was the Nationalists' first diplomatic victory. Rustow, p. 530; Ward, p. 270.

⁵⁴ Robinson, p. 290.

⁵⁵ "Agreement (Ankara) for the Promotion of Peace: France and the Provisional (Nationalist) Government of Turkey," (20 October 1921), Hurewitz, pp. 97-100; of greatest importance for the future relations between the two countries was the agreement in Article 7 that "a special administrative regime shall be established for the district of Alexandretta." Ibid., p. 98.

⁵⁶ Mariott, p. 530.

⁵⁷ "Treaty of Friendship, Turkey and Russia," (16 March 1921), Hurewitz, pp. 95-97.

⁵⁸ Howard, p. 264.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid; Robinson states that the Greeks were evacuated from Izmir by Allied ships on 11 September. Robinson, p. 391.

⁶¹ Howard, p. 270; Robinson, p. 391.

⁶² On 20 June 1921, the "Law of Fundamental Organizations" declared "sovereignty belongs . . . to the Nation," and declared the Grand National Assembly as "the only real representative of the people, and as holder of both legislative and executive powers." Lewis, p. 256.

⁶³ "The (Lausanne) Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the accompanying Straits Convention," (24 July 1923), Hurewitz, pp. 120-127.

⁶⁴ Robinson, p. 292.

⁶⁵ Geoffrey Lewis, Turkey (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 73.

⁶⁶ The Convention was signed on 30 January 1923.

⁶⁷ Hurewitz, p. 128.

⁶⁸ The U.S. Ambassador to Lausanne, Joseph Grew, stated that the Turkish victory at Lausanne was probably the "greatest diplomatic victory in history." He based this statement on four reasons: (1) Turkey had a victorious army; (2) the army was in perfect condition and ready to fight; (3) no one of the Great Powers intended to fight, and Turkey knew it; (4) the Allies could not present a solid front. Joseph Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years 1904-1945, ed., Walter Johnson (Cambridge: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), I, 569-70.

69 Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 69.

70 Lewis, Turkey, p. 75; Lewis, Emergence, p. 260.

71 Lewis, Emergence, p. 260.

72 Robinson, p. 293.

73 Ibid., p. 265.

74 Ibid., p. 294.

75 Lewis, Turkey, p. 82.

76 Robinson, p. 297.

77 Albert Howe Lybyer, "Turkish Reactions to Mosul Decision," Current History, 23 (Feb. 1926), 765.

78 Robinson, p. 298.

79 Hedley V. Cooke, Challenge and Response in the Middle East: The Quest for Prosperity, 1919-1951 (New York: Harper Brothers, 1952), p. 266.

80 Max Weston Thornberg, Graham Spry and George Soule, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), p. 20.

81 Ibid., p. 165.

⁸² Peter E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1964), p. 165.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Vali, p. 69.

⁸⁵ The Chester Plan called for the construction of railroads giving the rights to exploit all minerals within a distance of 20km. on each side of the line. The capital required (\$3 million) was too much for the Ottoman-American Development Company to raise and the concession had to be cancelled. Cooke, p. 267.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Unfortunately, Turkey was not able to escape the German economic expansion and penetration into the Balkans. German scientists were the first to explore Turkey's mineral deposits in the 1920's, and until the late 1930's, were the only ones with any complete source of information. This interest in Turkey's mineral deposits reflected German desires to exploit. Thornberg, p. 24.

⁸⁸ Ibid; Robinson, p. 187.

⁸⁹ Ward and Rustow, p. 165.

⁹⁰ Ward, p. 323.

⁹¹ Ward and Rustow, p. 165.

⁹² Cooke, p. 268.


⁹³ Kemal's manifesto, the six "Fundamental and Unchanging Principles," was incorporated into the Constitution in 1937. Robinson, p. 108.

⁹⁴ Ward and Rustow, p. 167; for the most extensive and detailed analysis of Turkey's economic development with particularly valuable sections on reconstruction, the economic implications of the Lausanne Treaty and etatism, Z.Y. Hershlag, Turkey, The Challenge of Growth, 2nd ed., rev. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1968), *passim*.

⁹⁵ Leo Tonsky, U.S. and USSR Aid to Developing Countries, a Comparative Study of India, Turkey and the U.A.R. (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 37.

⁹⁶ Robinson, p. 105. Economists have on the whole been severe in judgment of the economic achievements of Turkish etatism. Although many new industrial enterprises resulted, all too often the efforts of Turkish planners were inept, confused, and misdirected and much waste, shoddiness and inefficiency resulted. Thornberg, p. 39, 109 ff.

ANNEX I



PARTITION OF TURKEY RESULTING FROM SIX SECRET AGREEMENTS

CHAPTER III

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY FROM THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE TO THE TREATY OF MONTREUX, 1933-1936

The successful War of Independence and the Lausanne Treaty were rude awakenings to the European states which found it difficult to accept the reality of a new Turkish state which had acted independently and resisted all forms of foreign interference. Attempts to influence the character of the new regime in Turkey continued nevertheless into the 1920's.¹ It appeared impossible for the West to recognize the Nationalist government as valid and permanent. Rather they continued to await the internal collapse of the state which they considered to be imminent. "The Turkish question," said Neville Chamberlain in 1926, "is a question of waiting. . . ."²

The Turkish reaction to western interference was an intense nationalism which came to dominate both domestic and foreign policy. Suspicion and animosity towards her former enemies became for Turkey almost a phobia which led Joseph Grew, the United States Ambassador at Lausanne, to observe that "friendly contact would inevitably be interpreted as intervention."³ This fact, led most Europeans to conclude that Turkey was being drawn into the Soviet fold. Yet President Mustafa Kemal Attatürk had the vision to see where the best interests of his country lay, and as early as 1923, he pointed out that "the West has always been prejudiced against

the Turks and has always tried to destroy us, but we Turks have always and consistently moved towards the West. . . . In order to be a civilized nation, there is no other alternative!"⁴ Thus, under Attatürk's shrewd guidance the Republic set out on a policy of westernization, modernization and internal reconstruction which the President believed was the only means of developing a strong national entity free from future western interference. Upon Turkey's national integrity, depended her ability to develop her resources and her people. "Our desire," said Dr. Tewfik Rustu Aras, Turkish Foreign Minister, "is to live peacefully and freely without being troubled within the limits of our territory."⁵ Attatürk expressed this aim as being "Peace in the country, peace in the world."⁶

Although Attatürk realized some rapprochement with the West, a special relationship had developed between Turkey and Soviet Russia which grew out of their numerous points of similarity. Both states were outlawed nations whose interest was "The common struggle which both peoples had undertaken against the intervention of imperialism."⁷ Both nations found a common bond in anti-western sentiment, in the Straits question, and in a common desire to remove the Transcaucasian republics which were the unwanted outcrops of western intervention.⁸

Soviet support of the Turkish Nationalist campaign fit well into the Russian security system. Thus a strong aid program both to bolshevize the Turks and bolster their position vis-a-vis the Straits began as early as 28 April, 1920. A

military understanding was concluded on that date whereby the Nationalists, who sent a mission to Moscow on 11 May, were to receive Russian military supplies.⁹ Soviet assistance was, not unselfish, for it was directed toward her own safety which would be assured by the realization of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits.¹⁰ Attatürk, who opposed bolshevism, accepted out of necessity.¹¹ It was soon evident, however, that communism was a serious threat to Kemal's movement which was based on the western ideal of an independent nationalist state.

The Turkish communist movement was made up of three different groups: Turkish prisoners of war still in Russia, Spartacist exiles from Germany, and some Turkish citizens not strictly communist in doctrine but professing a vague sympathy for the communist ideals and the Soviet form of government.¹² The latter group was fostered by Attatürk to insure its continuing loyalty to the Nationalist cause, to appease the Soviets, to placate those Turkish politicians committed to the "Eastern Ideal," and to assure that all communist activity was controlled by Turkish Nationalists.¹³ In the spring of 1920, Attatürk organized this element into the Turkish Communist Party which was called the "Green Apple."¹⁴ It had no connection with the Third International and engaged in no political activity.¹⁵ In fact, according to an article in the London Times of 6 July 1920: "Nationalist leaders cynically avow the artificiality of the movement, created with the object of intimidating the Allies."¹⁶ Within the year, however, the appointed leader of the "Green Apple," Cerkes Edhem, threatened

to separate from Attatürk's leadership, forcing the general to remove this potential source of rivalry by issuing a decree dissolving the party.¹⁷ Although Edham resisted, Kemal succeeded in militarily defeating him and forced him to flee to the Greek lines, thereby destroying the organization on 6 January 1921.¹⁸

Dissolution of the "Green Apple" was followed immediately by a crash program to destroy the entire secret communist movement which had been founded in June 1920 by the German and Russian groups under the leadership of Mustafa Suphi.¹⁹ Suphi was seized along with sixteen other leading Turkish communists and was reported drowned in the Black Sea near Trapezunt.²⁰ After 1925, Communism was legally outlawed and continued only in exile.²¹

Yet Attatürk's drastic action was overlooked by the Soviet Union which decided that good relations with the Nationalists were more important than their bolshevization.²² Turkish-Soviet relations were thus little affected, and on 18 February 1921, the Turkish delegation for the negotiation of a Soviet-Turkish treaty arrived in Moscow. Although disagreements over claims in the Caucasus were voiced,²³ these were not permitted to disturb the harmony of the negotiations. Settlement was reached and on 16 March the Treaty was initialed.²⁴ Close cooperation between the two nations followed a brief chill during the Lausanne Conference of 1922-23 and significantly improved in 1925 when a clash between Turkey, Great Britain, and Italy over the Mosul question resulted in the signature of a Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship on 17 December 1925.²⁵

During the late 1920's, Turkey did begin to veer away from Russia despite a commercial treaty signed in 1927 which at the time was hailed by the Soviet press as "another mark and evidence of Turkish-Soviet solidarity."²⁶ Turkish suspicion of Soviet underground activities as well as the dumping of Russian goods on Turkish markets were partly responsible.²⁷ Turkey thus began gradually to shift toward a rapprochement with the West as witnessed by the Treaty of Ankara of 1930 between Greece and Turkey which opened a long period of friendly cooperation between the two former enemies.²⁸ Furthermore, reevaluation of Turkish policy toward Britain following the settlement of the Mosul question and the Italo-Turkish Treaty of 1928, and discussions concerning the formation of a Balkan alliance furthered this development.

These events frightened the Russians into pursuing a more cautious policy which would not antagonize the Republic. The Treaty of Friendship was renewed in 1931 for five more years,²⁹ and on 8 May 1931, Ismet İnönü signed in Moscow an agreement for an interest-free loan of \$8 million (later increased to \$18 million).³⁰ The money was to be used for the purchase of Russian machinery and material for industrialization.³¹ The Soviet credits had the effect of temporarily preventing a complete rapprochement between the Turks and the West, but renewed fears in Turkey that the real object of Soviet diplomacy was control of the Straits³² again turned the Turks to the West when world economics stabilized. It was perhaps this renewed fear among the Turks which prompted Karl

Radak, editor of Isvestia, to write in 1934: "The attempt to represent the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a continuation of Tsarist policy is ridiculous. Bourgeois writers who do so have not grasped even the purely external manifestation of this policy. It used to be an axiom of Tsarist policy that it should strive by every available means to gain possession of the Dardanelles and of an ice-free port on the Pacific. Not only have the Soviets not attempted to seize the Dardanelles, but from the very beginning they have attempted to establish the most friendly relations with Turkey."³³

Relations between Turkey and Britain and France remained anything but cordial for at least a decade following the Lausanne Conference, although as previously pointed out there were signs of a gradual improvement during the late 1920's following settlement of border questions. But it was precisely these border questions which prolonged Turkish suspicion toward Britain and France which were attempting thus to restrict Turkish sovereignty. The only disputed territories to which Turkey laid claim after the peace settlement were the Vilayet of Mosul, tentatively assigned to the British mandate of Iraq,³⁴ and the Sanjaq of Alexandretta, attached to the French mandate for Syria.³⁵

The Sanjak of Alexandretta, called Hatay by the Turks, formed part of the Turkish Vilayet of Aleppo before World War I and covered an area of 1,500 square miles. It occupied a highly important strategic position which militarily controlled a key point in Asia Minor and was considered to be an integral

part of the great empire which pan-Arab leaders under Ibn Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, envisioned.³⁶ Two cities, Antioch, where Paul and Barnabus taught and Ben Hur raced, and Alexandretta were of great importance. The port of Alexandretta is still regarded as being the finest in the Levant, offering anchorage for large vessels in a gulf thirty-five miles in length. It is a natural outlet for the hinterland of the upper Euphrates valley and is connected by rail to Ankara, Istanbul, Bagdad, and the Suez Canal.

The Sanjak was composed of 22,000 people divided racially, linguistically and religiously. The Turks, the largest homogeneous group, numbered 85,000 in 1936.³⁷ The Arabic-speaking population, however, was larger, about 99,000, but these people were divided by religious differences.³⁸ The Turks, using the excuse that language was the basis of group identity, counted the 29,000 Turkish-speaking Armenians as Turks and thus claimed a majority in the region.³⁹ The French and Syrians, on the other hand, claimed the Turkish element made up no more than 40 per cent or 17,000 people.⁴⁰

The mandate for Syria was allotted to France at San Remo but without the frontiers being delimited. This was accomplished with the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement of October 1921, which also placed the Sanjak in the French mandate.⁴¹ But in recognition of Turkey's legitimate claims, Article 7 of the Franklin-Bouillon Treaty provided that, "a special administrative regime shall be established for the district of Alexandretta. The Turkish inhabitants of this district shall

enjoy every facility for their cultural development. The Turkish language shall have official recognition."⁴² In Articles 16 and 27 of the Treaty of Lausanne, the final step in detaching the Sanjak was taken when Turkey was compelled to divest herself of all sovereign or political rights and claims to territories detached from her.⁴³ The French pledge in Article 7 in the Ankara Agreement was carried out and a special regime was instituted on 8 August 1921.⁴⁴ When General Maxime Weygand's Arrete on 5 December 1924 merged the states of Aleppo and Damascus into the single state of Syria, it was provided that the special regime would be unaffected other than ceasing to be attached to the Vilayet of Aleppo.⁴⁵

For the next two years, it appeared that settlement of the issue would be permanent. However, during the 1926 elections in the Sanjak, political events led to the demand of the Turkish element that complete separation from Syria be carried out. The deputies of the Sanjak formed themselves into a Constitutional Assembly and proclaimed their independence in March. However, Syrian and French representatives were able to induce the assembly to rescind its declaration and to remain in the framework of the Syrian mandate.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the French High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Twefik Rushdi Bey, concluded in February 1926 a comprehensive agreement which settled minor border questions. However, because of some difficulties concerning use of the Bagdad Railway, the treaty was not officially signed until 30 May,⁴⁷ only six days before the signature of the Anglo-Turk-Iraqi Treaty ending the danger of war over Mosul. With the settlement

of both geographic and political questions in the Sanjak, it appeared that the way had been cleared for improved Franco-Turkish relations. The French on their side continued to preserve scrupulously the autonomy of the Sanjak within the Syrian political framework. Despite the fact that the Turks still made no secret of their determination to recover the territory,⁴⁸ good relations between France and Turkey continued until the issue was renewed in 1936.

The other territory claimed by Turkey on the basis of the National Pact was the Mosul Vilayet which Britain insisted be awarded to Iraq despite the predominately Turkish population. The importance of Mosul to both countries was great. Mosul was located at the crossroads of three important routes to India and controlled the defense of all the routes opening on the plain of Mesopotamia; therefore it served to block any attempt of invasion into the East.⁴⁹ The fact that Turkish control of the area would threaten English and French possessions and that the area contained large reserves of oil was well known to Attatürk. During the Lausanne Convention, an impasse between Britain and Turkey had been reached, but on 26 June 1923 the two agreed to settle the question within nine months by direct negotiations, or failing that, the problem was to be referred to the League.⁵⁰ Settlement could not be reached and the problem was sent to the Council of the League on 6 August 1924.⁵¹ On 31 October a Commission was appointed to investigate the situation. Its report on 3 September 1925 favored uniting Mosul with Iraq to form

a British mandate for twenty-five years, but Tewfik Rusdi Bey refused to accept on behalf of his country. This forced the issue before the permanent Court of International Justice which decided on 21 November 1925 that the League had full powers to decide the question. Again the Turks refused to accept,⁵² but on 16 December 1925 the League decided finally to award Mosul to Britain as a mandate to which Attatürk responded that "Mosul is Turkish and nothing can ever change that fact, even bayonets."⁵³ The following day, 17 December, Turkey and Russia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality.⁵⁴

Attatürk convoked a Supreme Military Council on 18 December which threatened war over the League's decision. But they wisely decided against such a move on 25 December fearing that if Soviet troops assisted in a war with Great Britain, they might not retire without difficulty.⁵⁵ Great Britain meanwhile concluded a treaty with Iraq on 13 January 1926⁵⁶ embodying her new obligations concerning the Mosul. But before Britain could settle with Turkey, Paris and Ankara concluded their difficulties over the Sanjak on 30 May.⁵⁷ Not until 5 June did Turkey accept the fait accompli and recognize the mandate of Iraq including the Mosul decision. In return, Iraq was to pay ten per cent royalty on oil rights in Mosul or pay Turkey the sum of £5,000,000. It was announced on 17 June 1926 that Ankara would accept payment in lieu of royalties.⁵⁸ The settlement of the Mosul question was a milestone in Turkish foreign policy, for

although it took time to erase the remnants of anglophobia from the Turkish mind, a point had been reached whereby the Turkish desire for a rapprochement with England could be realized.

The Mosul dispute did have another side, however, one dark with the growing threat of a militant Fascist nationalism pressing to retrieve its losses in Anatolia if the Turks went to war with Britain.⁵⁹ The Italians, who had been among the first to recognize Nationalist Turkey, had in the meantime become imbued with the idea of Mare Nostrum, a philosophy which the Turks believed directly threatened their national security and so affronted Turkish national sensibilities that it influenced Turkish foreign policy during the entire inter-war period.

Italian interests in the Near East stemmed from the Middle Ages when Italian cities carried on lively trade with the area. Large Italian colonies and institutions, including schools, hospitals and missions, existed in many Arab states.⁶⁰ In an attempt to reestablish her old influence in Africa, Italy attacked Libya in 1911. Turkey, unable to obtain foreign assistance, receded before the Italian armies.⁶¹ As a result of the Treaty of Ouchy, the Ottoman government surrendered the provinces of Tripoli-Benghazi but retained the spiritual jurisdiction of the Sultanate.⁶² With control of Libya, Italy secured herself a place in Africa bordered on one side by Egypt, and by French North Africa on the other. Her further seizure of the Dodecanese Islands in 1912 offered her a

strategic position at the crossroads of east-west trade and communication lanes placing her in close proximity to the decaying Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the African colonies on the Red Sea gained by Italy at the close of the nineteenth century offered her a strategic location adjacent to the Arabian Peninsula.

Waning Italian prestige which had suffered after World War I partly because of the failure to obtain territory aside from some minor border extensions in Libya and Italian Somaliland,⁶³ played a primary part in stimulating the Italian drive for territorial conquests. The Italian desire to dominate the Mediterranean Sea based partly on nationalism and partly on Italian economic dependence on that area became clear and frightening to Turkey.

With a land frontier of 1,219 miles and a seacoast of 5,312 miles, Italy has been likened to an island. Lord Balfour said during the Washington Naval Conference that "Italy is not an island, but for the purpose of this debate she almost counts as an island. . . . I doubt whether she could feed herself or supply herself or continue as an efficient fighting unit if she were really blockaded and her commerce were cut off."⁶⁴ That concern over being blocked off from the outside was an uncomfortable reality and was illustrated in a speech by Admiral Ranieri Biscia in October 1936 before the First National Conference for Studies of Foreign Policy. Admiral Biscia explained that because 86 per cent of Italy's imports came by sea, Italy must either dominate, or be the prisoner of the Mediterranean.⁶⁵

Domination apparently meant to the Italians control of more than the sea, for as Dr. E. W. Eschmann in Die Aussenpolitik des Faschismus pointed out, Italy's role in the Mediterranean must be viewed in a broad sense as control of the hinterland including the Balkans as far north as Austria and Hungary. In this wider sense, too, Italy's resolution to re-populate with Italian citizens Libya and much of North Africa and the consolidation of her position in the Levant, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, were aspects of her determination to live on equal terms with any other power in the Mediterranean.⁶⁶

Thus, following World War I, Italy immediately began an aggressive foreign policy directed toward territorial aggrandizement in the Mediterranean area and the Middle East.⁶⁷ At Lausanne, she attempted to develop a relationship with Turkey which would open the door to future exploitation in the Levant. Italian title to the Dodecanese already offered a strategic position to promote this endeavor.⁶⁸ At the conference, Italy, represented by Giulio Montagna, attempted to play a mediatory role between Britain and Turkey thereby building a foundation of trust. He obviously believed his act was successful for he was prompted to write: "As for our relations with Turkey, it may be asserted that not only have these emerged from the conference improved, but perhaps Italy among all the states represented here stands to derive most advantage. Now we have to exploit and realize these advantages in other fields."⁶⁹

Montagna realized, however, that Italy was at a disadvantage in attempting to penetrate the Middle East which had been carved up already by Britain and France. He therefore contacted Joseph Grew soon after the United States received the Chester concession and suggested: ". . . that Italy and the U.S. could work together in the Near East . . . and reach some sort of understanding between the two governments with a view to economic exploitation. . . ." ⁷⁰ Montagna proceeded to explain to Grew that "it was no secret that Italy desired to infiltrate into Asia Minor. This was a perfectly natural and logical policy . . . She must expand and overflow and if she was not permitted to do so gradually an explosion would some day automatically occur." ⁷¹

Despite Italian attempts to cultivate Turkish friendship at Lausanne, her control of the Dodecanese Islands and the new talk of Mare Nostrum caused alarm among the Turks. Fears of Italian emmigration to the Near East spread rapidly among the press and government circles following Mussolini's speech of 4 November 1922 at the Fourteenth Anniversary of Italy's success at the Battle of Victorio Verreto. ⁷² The speech contained a patriotic message to Italians living in the Near East recalling the days when that part of the world lived under the Roman Empire and later under Italian City States. ⁷³ The Franco-Italian Accord for Near Eastern Cooperation signed in 1923 but not in effect until 1924, suggested further designs by the Italians. By May 1924, reports of an Italian troop build-up on Sicily and Rhodes brought to a climax these fears with

rumors of imminent invasion. Although the Duce disclaimed any such intention, his belief that the Greeks, British and Soviets would remain neutral in the event of a Turco-Italian conflict, led him to press closer to such a war.⁷⁴ However, the domestic upheaval, the Matteotti Affair in June 1924, suddenly took Mussolini's attention away from Turkey.⁷⁵ However, as Alan Cassals in Mussolini's Early Diplomacy points out, "the incident served the Duce's ends of producing abroad an attitude of respect based on fear."⁷⁶

The Mosul dispute also raised the spectre of Italian intervention, and Mussolini took advantage of the situation by offering any necessary assistance to Great Britain. Austin Chamberlain, who had met with the Italian dictator at the Council of the League at Rome in December 1924, had agreed to pursue a common line of conduct and close cooperation with Italy "according to their ancient traditions."⁷⁷ This support of British designs in Mosul⁷⁸ provided the Italians with the occasion to demand that if the British received Mosul then Italy required an equivalent gain at Turkey's expense.⁷⁹ Apparently, some agreement was achieved since Mussolini told his embassy in Constantinople: "The policy of cordiality toward Great Britain which the national government has seen fit to follow and which has assured for Italy complete English support in International questions of notable interest to Italy, especially in the colonial and Mediterranean fields, could not permit us to assume an attitude of open hostility to Great Britain in the Mosul question."⁸⁰ Spurred on by this professed

offer by Britain, the Italian attitude toward Turkey turned rapidly bellicose. Rumors quickly spread of an imminent attack by the Italians who, they said, planned to retrieve their loss of Anatolia by occupying Smyrna and Adalia.⁸¹ Attatürk responded by threatening to mass four army corps in that area⁸² and for additional insurance began negotiations for admission into the League of Nations. Furthermore, attempts were made by Turkey in 1925 to 1926 to reach some accord with the Italians and therefore stave off any threat of invasion from the west. Mussolini's rejection of these efforts was embodied in a speech during his Libyan trip in April 1926 calling for "a suitable colonial outlet for the Italian population."⁸³ The effect, however, may have played a large role in the settlement of the Mosul question in June which thereby ended any threat of Italian accord.⁸⁴

Italy did not receive any direct compensation from Britain as she had demanded, and it appears that British concern over Italian activities in the Near East was growing. An Italian treaty of Commerce and Friendship was signed with the King of Yemen on 2 September 1926 and was construed as a set back for British ambitions in Arabia. Nevertheless, experts from Britain and Italy did work out an arrangement in January 1927 for cooperation in exploiting this area. British reaction to the growing presence of Italy in the eastern Mediterranean was to encourage Roman eyes to focus their attention on Albania where penetration had a species of international sanction. The Christian Science Monitor of

2 October 1935 disclosed in a published confidential memorandum that Mussolini had contemplated action against Abyssinia as early as 1925. But Great Britain did not like the idea and was reported to have told the Duce in a friendly way: "Instead of wasting so much effort and money in a country so distant from Italy, and where you might easily encounter diplomatic difficulties with the two countries which have interests in Ethiopia, why don't you seek pacific penetration much nearer at hand? What about Albania? The British government would leave Italy a free hand to consolidate her position in Albania, provided that she did not seek to change the status quo in the Red Sea area."⁸⁵ Italy did just that in 1926 by signing the Treaty of Tirana with Albania gaining economic concessions in return for guaranteeing "the status quo, political, juridical, and territorial of Albania."⁸⁶ By the next year, Italy was carrying out internal improvements with Italian loans, reorganizing the army and signing a twenty-year defensive alliance. Thus, within two years Italy had obtained the protectorate over Albania which she had been seeking since the first World War. Plans to extend her influence in the East continued with Italian attempts to sign a tripartite pact with Greece and Turkey. Separate treaties were signed in 1928, and Italy was instrumental in opening negotiations for the Greco-Turkish Treaty of 1930 and for the Balkan Pact of 1934. But Greece and Turkey continued to eye Rome with suspicion.⁸⁷

The depression had an enormous effect upon Italy which was forced temporarily to limit her foreign escapades. Monetary and trade problems resulted in part from extensive public works projects. In order to maintain her trade balance, however, Rome again came to feel the need to obtain territories which would provide the needed resources and a place to absorb surplus population.⁸⁸ A renewed program of foreign expansion commenced in 1933 with Mussolini's assertion that "Italian eyes must turn eastward, that Italy's manifest destiny lay in Africa and Asia."⁸⁹ The Duce again proclaimed in 1934 that "Italy's 'historical' objectives are Africa and Asia."⁹⁰ Both statements created a profound impression upon the Turks who recognized in them a renewed effort by Italy to exert her influence over the Republic. Although Mussolini acted to quell these fears by explaining that Italian destiny lay outside the sphere of Turkey who was in Italian eyes, "a European, not an Asiatic state,"⁹¹ Attatürk was not reassured, and the Italo-Turkish Friendship Pact of 1928 which had been renewed in 1932⁹² did little to allay his suspicion. Furthermore, Mussolini's demand that "we require and wish those who are satiated into desire to retain their possessions to refrain from blocking the cultural, political and economic expansion of Italy,"⁹³ was directed at the French and British and gave the impression that the Duce would stop at nothing to attain his goal of Mare Nostrum.

The winter of 1934 also contained a threat from another quarter. The rapprochement of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia

threatened Turkey's Thracian frontier because of the revisionist designs of Bulgaria. Turkey further menaced by the Italian threats found herself forced to seek allies who could offer some form of protection. Not only was the balance of power in the Mediterranean shifting dangerously, but the status of the Balkans was threatened. Turkey acted to check these developments by concluding negotiations with Yugoslavia, Greece and Rumania for the Balkan Pact on 9 February 1934.⁹⁴

This pact, however, was directed primarily against Bulgarian revisionist attempts in the Balkans; it offered no protection from a threat outside the area. Turkey, therefore, still stood alone before any attack which might be forthcoming from the Italians. Events in Ethiopia in 1935 suddenly forced Ankara to face this disturbing reality. Any change in the status quo in the Mediterranean would most surely be to Turkey's detriment. The Abyssinian affair, therefore, had four results. Turkey abandoned strict neutrality as a national policy. Because of Italian military build-up in the Dodecanese Islands, she also began to build fortifications along her coast at a cost difficult for her to manage.⁹⁵ Furthermore, she drew closer to her Balkan Allies⁹⁶ and sought rapprochement with Britain.⁹⁷ By November 1935 Turkey, in exchange for British guarantees, announced that she would place at England's disposal Turkish ports and ships to help in blocking any Italian attack on the British fleet. Turkey added, however, that British assistance in recovering the Dodecanese Islands from Italy was implicit in the agreement. Britain, however, balked, eventually offering Cyprus instead.⁹⁸

By the end of 1935 the agreement for mutual assistance had been extended to cover not only Turkey and Britain, but France, Yugoslavia and Greece as well.⁹⁹ The reaction of the Italian government was a curt protest to Turkey claiming her agreement with Britain ran against the spirit of the Italo-Turkish Friendship Treaty of 1928.¹⁰⁰ Turkey replied that the League subordinated all previous private agreements to the League Covenant but assured Italy of her friendly feelings.¹⁰¹

The final effect of the Abyssinian crisis was to make clearer than ever the need for a revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention, since the protection offered to Turkey by the Treaty had broken down.¹⁰² The Turks realized that the Allies could no longer enforce the Lausanne specifications regarding demilitarization. Turkey therefore prepared to approach the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty to request a revision which would permit remilitarization of the Straits.¹⁰³ In April 1936 following the German march into the Rhineland, the signatories were handed a note requesting revision; all but Italy complied with support.¹⁰⁴

Turkey's approach to the problem was particularly significant in view of the Italian upset in the Mediterranean and the denouncement by Germany of the Locarno Treaty and her march into the Rhineland. Turkey correctly believed that world opinion would favor a diplomatic approach rather than the resort to force used by the two Fascist powers, although force could be used if necessary. Therefore, Turkey worked solely on the diplomatic level to accomplish the desired end. There were a

number of other factors favoring the Turkish diplomatic approach to the problem. First, Great Britain, fearing the loss of her dominant position in the Mediterranean, was more amenable to revision of the Lausanne Treaty which would serve as a point d' appui to reestablish her position in the Levant.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, the Turkish request for remilitarization of the Straits offered an excellent opportunity to wean her away from Soviet influence, the fear of which had in the past been one of Britain's principal reasons for refusing the Turkish request.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, because of Turkish pledges against Italy the previous year and support of British interests in the League of Nations, London was, in fact, obligated to support Ankara.¹⁰⁷ Britain also recognized the benefit of having the Straits controlled by an ally who could also serve as a buffer against Russian, Balkan or Italian expansion; a friendly Turkey behind Italy's Dodecanese Islands which threatened the Suez and communications to the east was of immense value.

France and Russia also favored revision but for reasons quite opposite to those of Britain. France was inspired by a desire to see an increased Soviet influence in the Mediterranean which would strengthen the Franco-Soviet Pact. Strongest support, however, came from Russia who was concerned with the vulnerability of her southern coast under the current convention.

The remainder of the countries involved, except Italy, welcomed the Turkish request for revision, for it showed that

one nation had succumbed to unilateral repudiation of treaty obligations and still respected its international agreements.¹⁰⁸ Italy objected to revision basically to protest the sanctions imposed upon her by the League. She also realized the Turks were motivated by fear of her and that Britain wanted Turkey in the British camp opposing Italy. By holding out, Italy believed perhaps she could strike a bargain which would end sanctions and bring about recognition of her empire. Furthermore, Italy knew that without her signature revision of Lausanne would not be fully valid.¹⁰⁹

The signatories of the Lausanne Treaty, except Italy, met at Montreux, Switzerland, from 22 June until 20 July 1936. Mussolini, protesting the League sanctions, boycotted the meetings and promised to reject any decision of the Convention arrived at without Italian consent.¹¹⁰ The Italian paper Giornale d' Italia stated the Italian excuse for non-attendance by claiming that Italy occupied first place in the traffic through the Straits and, therefore, was "anxious to keep free from any entanglements on the highway, the opening of which during the World War cost her so many sacrifices."¹¹¹ Ironically, a number of delegates hoped that Italy would not come to the convention because they feared she would obstruct and envenom the discussions.¹¹²

It soon became apparent however, particularly to Britain, that it was necessary for Italy to be present in order to legalize and finalize the Convention. Rumors developed that England might invite Italy into the Mediterranean Mutual

Assistance Pact¹¹³ in order to prepare the way for Italian attendance. London soon began to remove her fleet and lift her sanctions in an attempt to accomplish this.¹¹⁴ France became the first nation to renounce all sanctions by 9 July 1936, and although the Balkan states procrastinated, they followed France's lead.¹¹⁵ Turkey told Rome on 19 July that the treaty between Britain, France, Turkey, Yugoslavia and Greece was over. However, the Anatolian News Agency on that same date wrote that "the agreement concluded in November 1935 between Turkey and Britain about mutual assistance in the Mediterranean has ended with the raising of sanctions against Italy, but that during this period of readjustment the assurances given by Turkey will stand."¹¹⁶ The Turkish government was not ready officially to cancel the agreement until Italy adhered to the new covenant. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons on 27 July that "There is no longer any need for continuing assurances of protection to Turkey and Yugoslavia in the event of attack by Italy."¹¹⁷

In response to these changes toward Italy, Mussolini assured Turkey and Yugoslavia of her friendship and reported this to London.¹¹⁸ It appeared then that by the end of July 1936 a definite rapprochement between Italy and the Mutual Assistance Pact members was in the offing even though the Montreux Treaty allowing Turkey to fortify the Straits altered the situation in the Mediterranean to the detriment of Italy. It took another five months for definite talks to be initiated

between Italy and the others. In the meanwhile Mussolini refused to accept the dissolution of the Straits Commission¹¹⁹ and claimed correctly that Montreux was in reality a step backward to the pre-war status. As the Italian press pointed out, substituting exclusive Turkish sovereignty over the Straits for supervision by an international commission subject to the League removed another instrument of international supervision and with it a precedent for the internationalization of various key strategic positions on the earth which might have become of great value in the future evolution of the system of collective security.¹²⁰ Yet more than anything else, Italy protested because she feared the possibility of Russian influence increasing in the eastern Mediterranean and disliked British success in winning Turkish friendship. Turkey's position, however, was strong enough that she had little concern over Italian protests. Now, she could discriminate against Italian merchants passing through the Straits. Italy realized the weakness of her position and in an attempt to draw Turkey away from Britain, altered her attitude by giving assurances to Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey and informing the latter that she felt bound to the Turco-Italian Pact of 1928.¹²¹ These assurances completely terminated the Mediterranean military agreements against Italy and saw the temporary improvement of Turco-Italian and Anglo-Italian relations. A "Gentleman's Agreement" was concluded between Britain and Italy in January 1937. Unfortunately, the temporary clearing of the Mediterranean

air was short-lived due to the almost simultaneous outbreak of the Spanish Civil War on 18 July. However, the interested powers were quite content with the new Straits settlement especially the Turks who welcomed it with riotous celebration.¹²²

The Montreux Convention greatly changed the power structure in the Mediterranean area and the future direction of Turkish foreign policy which, although still based upon the motto "peace in the country, peace in the world," was forced to alter the means by which these ends were to be achieved. This change in Turkish policy was symbolized by the obviously improved relations between Turkey and Britain which grew out of the events surrounding the convention. Both countries now had in common foreign policies based upon maintaining the status quo.¹²³ The visit of King Edward VIII of England to Turkey on 3 September 1936 was the climax to this process of rapprochement¹²⁴ which was a blow to the designs of both Italy and Germany in the Balkans. They now saw themselves restricted by not only Soviet but British friendship with the Turks, and Germany took the occasion blindly to attack the convention which permitted free passage of Soviet ships.¹²⁵ The Turks' concern over this sudden German intervention prompted Ankara to retort that "Germany was neither a signatory to the Convention nor a Mediterranean power and the matter was thus of no concern to her."¹²⁶ Germany, like Italy, therefore, realized the folly of her attitude and began a policy of amity which she hoped could work to lessen British influence. Yet, unbeknown both to Rome and Berlin,

the settlement at Montreux served to cool Russo-Turkish relations.¹²⁷ Although the Convention was a success for Soviet Diplomacy in that control of the Straits was placed in Turkish hands, this fact in itself, concerned Ankara who shied away from a Franco-Russian association and veered toward Great Britain. This shift in attitude toward Russia had the effect of neutralizing some of Moscow's gains which were in part dependent upon Turkey's consistent friendship.¹²⁸

The process of normalizing relations with Italy initiated by England yielded some temporary fruits. By January the successful conclusion of the "Gentleman's Agreement" whereby the two nations proclaimed their intention of respecting the status quo in the Mediterranean¹²⁹ opened the way for direct conversations between Italy and Turkey. Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, and Tewfik Rhustu Aras, Turkish Foreign Minister, met in Milan where Ciano laid down two conditions for their talks: first, that Italy would not be discriminated against for being a late-comer to the Montreux settlement, and second, that any discussion which might have to be referred to the League Council under Article 21 of the Convention would also be referred to Italy in view of Italy's de facto absence from Geneva.¹³⁰ Italy was in reality using Montreux again as a lever; in this case she was thinking in terms of weakening Russian influence over Turkey,¹³¹ a move Germany approved.¹³² Turkey, on her side, desired Italian adherence to Montreux and the disarmament of the Dodecanese Islands.¹³³ Ciano assured Aras on the latter issue by contending that Italian build-up on the islands was not directed against

Turkey but was meant to protect Italy's sea routes to east Africa in the same way that Britain used Malta. He continued by assuring the Turkish representative that Italian ambitions for Turkish Anatolia cherished since 1917 had been abandoned by a "satisfied" Fascist Empire.¹³⁴ It appears that Ankara's fears were somewhat mollified, for the following day it was announced that the two states would discuss a trade treaty between their governments at some future date;¹³⁵ these talks never materialized.

It is apparent that a new orientation of Eastern diplomacy was begun by the Straits Convention particularly in regard to the policies of Britain, Russia and Germany. These three nations carried on a silent, though not invisible, struggle to win Turkey's confidence and friendship which as Max Beloff concludes in The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929 to 1941, reproduced for Turkey a situation not unlike that existing prior to 1914. Henceforth, Axis pressure signified not merely Italy's Mediterranean ambitions but also the German Drang Nach Osten, and Ankara became a focus of political and economic diplomacy of first importance.¹³⁶

FOOTNOTES

¹ Following the announcement that the capital would be permanently moved to Ankara there was a joint demand made by England, France, and Italy that this not occur. An attempt was also made to influence the curriculum of the Turkish schools and to name a Greek Patriarch who would be subservient to the interests of the Allies. Altemur Kilic, Turkey and the World (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p. 47.

² Cassals, p. 309; Signor Giulio Montagna at Lausanne expressed to Joseph Grew, the United States Ambassador to Lausanne, his feeling that Turkey was like "a mummy which so long as it remains sealed in its tomb retains its normal state but as soon as the tomb is opened and it comes into contact with the outside it immediately begins to decompose and to crumble away. . . ." Grew, I, 568.

³ Ibid., II, 87.

⁴ Kilic, p. 49.

⁵ Howard, "Turkish Foreign Policy," Asia, 38 (1938), pp. 29-31.

⁶ Lewis, Turkey, p. 114.

⁷ "Turko-Russian Treaty of Friendship," (16 March 1921), Hurewitz, p. 95.

⁸ Edward H. Carr, A History of Soviet Russia (N.Y.: The MacMillan Co. 1953), III, 294.

⁹ Robinson, p. 287.

¹⁰ Howard, Partition, p. 294; One of the cardinal points in Soviet policy was to cultivate Turkey's good will in order to show exploited nations of Asia that Moscow was their only true friend. George Lanczouske, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 129.

¹¹ Emissaries from Russia who were intent on carrying the new gospel to the Nationalists mysteriously disappeared on their arrival in Turkey. Howard, Partition, p. 264.

¹² Carr, III, 298.

¹³ Robinson, p. 287.

¹⁴ Carr, III, 300; Kemal tried to use pro-Communist and Panislamic leanings among his followers in a bid for formal and material support from Russia. Rustow, p. 545.

¹⁵ Robinson, p. 287.

¹⁶ Lewis, Turkey, p. 113.

¹⁷ Carr, III, 301; Rustow, p. 546.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Robinson, p. 288.

²⁰ Turks were reputed to throw their enemies into the Black Sea off the high cliffs. Vali, p. 168; Carr, III, 301.

²¹ Vali, p. 168.

²² It appears that many, particularly the Menshevik elements, desired a break with the Turkish nationalists. Stalin was among those who favored such a break. Carr, III, 300.

²³ On 28 February 1921, the Nationalists occupied the port of Batum, an implied claim strongly contested by the Soviets, who were, however, willing to give up Ardahan. Carr, III, 303.

²⁴ See below Ch. II, p. 19.

²⁵ "Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality: Turkey and the USSR," (17 Dec. 1925), Hurewitx, pp. 142-43.

²⁶ Kilic, p. 57.

²⁷ Ibid. In June 1929 Kemal suppressed all Communist propaganda in Turkey. Robinson, p. 298.

²⁸ Robinson, p. 299.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Tonsky, p. 38; Robinson, p. 299.

³¹ The most important aspect of the agreement was Russia's

part in preparing Turkey's first five-year plan. Thornberg, pp. 123, 126.

³² Kilic, p. 58.

³³ Karl Radak, "The Basis of Soviet Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, Jan. 1934, p. 194.

³⁴ The League awarded Mosul to Iraq on 16 December 1925.

³⁵ Sykes-Picot and San-Remo agreements.

³⁶ Time, 3 July 1939, p. 15.

³⁷ Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1938, I (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 480.

³⁸ Ibid. The largest were Alawi Muslims, with minorities of Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodox and other Christian sects.

³⁹ Ibid. The Armenians, who had fled Cilicia to the Sanjak when the former province was returned to Turkey in the Franco-Turkish agreement of 1921, were not of Turkish political feeling. This had the effect of actually reducing the total Turkish political element.

⁴⁰ Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1936 (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 767.

⁴¹ "Agreement (Ankara) for the Promotion of Peace: France and the Provisional (Nationalist) Government of Turkey," (20 October 1921), Article VIII, Hurewitz, p. 98.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ "The (Lausanne) Treaty of Peace with Turkey and the Accompanying Straits Convention," (24 July 1923), Ibid., p. 120.

⁴⁴ Arnold J. Toynbee, ed., Survey of International Affairs, 1925, I (London: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 457.

⁴⁵ Ibid. At Lausanne, a letter was handed to the Turkish delegate on 24 July 1923, but the French declared there would be no change of the provision of October 1921. Stephen Heald, ed., Documents on International Affairs, 1937 (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 466.

⁴⁶ Toynbee, Survey, 1925, I, 459.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay): Its Impact on Turkish-Syrian Relations (1939-1956)," Middle East Journal, 10 (1956), 379-394.

⁴⁹ Howard, Partition, p. 298.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 301.

⁵¹ Robinson, p. 295.

⁵² Howard, Partition, p. 338.

⁵³ New York Times, 5 Feb. 1937, p. 20, col. 3.

⁵⁴ See below Ch. II, p. 19.

⁵⁵ Albert Howe Lybyer, "Turkish Reactions to Mosul Decision," Current History, Feb. 1926, p. 765; Lybyer, "Official View of Mosul Decision, Current History, March 1962, p. 922.

⁵⁶ Howard, Partition, p. 339.

⁵⁷ "Frontier Treaty: The United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey," (5 June 1926), and Special Arrangement Affirmed by Exchange of Notes. Hurewitz, p. 146.

⁵⁸ New York Times, 17 June 1926, p. 32, col. 2.

⁵⁹ Alan Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 305.

⁶⁰ Lukas Herscowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East, ed., Michael Hurst (Great Britain: W. and J. Mackay and Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 13.

⁶¹ According to Winston Churchill, Enver Pasha, Turkish Foreign Minister, wrote to him offering an alliance in return for protection against Italy. The political environment made it difficult for Britain to accept, and the resulting chain of events leading to the onslaught on the Ottoman Empire caused Turkey to ascribe to Italy the responsibilities for the misfortunes. Winston Churchill, Step by Step (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 320.

⁶² Arnold J. Toynbee and Kenneth P. Kirkwood, Turkey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 169.

⁶³ Hirscowicz, p. 14.

⁶⁴ Maxwell Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914 to 1937 (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 2.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

⁶⁷ Cassels, p. 24.

⁶⁸ Italy had at first promised to cede the islands to Greece. However, on 8 October 1922 Italy announced that she considered her agreement to have lapsed because of the non-ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres. F. Lee Bennis, Europe Since 1914 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949), p. 405.

⁶⁹ Cassels, p. 226.

⁷⁰ Grew, I, 567.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Cassels, p. 24.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 229.

75 Socialist deputy Giacomo Matteotti, who threatened Mussolini's position by attempting to offer evidence which would discredit him, was killed on 10 June 1924 causing serious problems for the Duce. Laura Fermi, Mussolini (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 227-44.

76 Mussolini had considered seizing the opportunity to attack Turkey and instructed the Italian War Minister "To study the modality of an eventual war against Turkey and to estimate the means for conducting it." Cassals, p. 227.

77 Macartney and Cremona, p. 174.

78 This would appear to complete a series of agreements desired by the Italians to permit them at least an equal opportunity to expand in the eastern Mediterranean. The Franco-Italian Treaty of 1923 may be considered as part of this system. Cassals, p. 227.

79 Cassals, p. 307.

80 Ibid., p. 305.

81 New York Times, 5 Feb. 1937, p. 20, col. 3.

82 Ibid.

83 Cassals, p. 307.

84 Ibid.

⁸⁵ Reported in Macartney and Cremona, p. 290. This raises the question as to whether this could have been the agreement of which Mussolini spoke in his note to the Italian embassy in Constantinople.

⁸⁶ Benns, p. 233.

⁸⁷ Kilic, p. 68.

⁸⁸ Macartney and Cremona, p. 283.

⁸⁹ Melvin Hall, "Turkey's Fear of Italy," Asia, 3, No. 11 (1935), 707.

⁹⁰ New York Times, 5 Feb. 1937, p. 20, col. 3.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 601.

⁹³ Address to the Second Quinquennial Assembly of the Fascist Party (18 March 1934). Macartney and Cremona, p. 7.

⁹⁴ The four Powers had been carrying on discussions since 1930. Final settlement of the pact contained mutual guarantees of their Balkan frontiers and agreements to take no action with regard to any Balkan nonsignatory without previous discussion. Robinson, p. 300.

⁹⁵ Newsweek, 25 April 1936, p. 17.

⁹⁶ Maxine Weygand, Recalled to Service (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1952), p. 13.

97 "In no other country perhaps, has the British stand been more fully appreciated and supported." "Turkey in Dilemma in Rhine Dispute," New York Times, 22 May 1936, p. 31, col. 3.

98 "Turks Will Rearm Straits Tomorrow," New York Times, 20 July, 1936, p. 2, col. 4; George Waller, "Pact with Britain Worrrying Balkans," New York Times, 6 Feb. 1936, p. 10, col. 3.

99 Clarence K. Street, "Five Powers Join Pact to Offer a United Front Should Italy Attack One," New York Times, 23 Jan. 1936, p. 1, col. 1.

100 Ibid.

101 New York Times, 31 Jan. 1936, p. 11, col. 6.

102 Turkey speeded up coastal military precautions in response to Italy's increased naval concentration. "Six Italian Fliers Desert From Leros Island Base," New York Times, 12 Jan. 1936, p. 28, col. 2.

103 Turkey actually had begun this process as early as 1933 at the Disarmament Conference of 23 May, but France put her off. Turkey again raised the issue at the bilateral Greco-Turkish negotiations in Rome in July 1933 which led to the Balkan Pact. Here she had the idea of the formation of a "Euxine Pact" which would consist of only those powers immediatly concerned with the Straits Question, but Bulgaria and Yugoslavia opposed. The matter was raised again in April

1935, during the League's discussion on Leval's resolution regarding Italian sanctions. The matter was brought up again in May 1935 at a meeting of the Balkan Entente and in November during further League discussions on sanctions against Italy. Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 603.

104 Ibid., p. 610.

105 Beloff, II, 46.

106 See the excellent discussion by D.A. Routh in Toynbee, Survey, 1936, pp. 584-651; Eliot Janeway, "Trade Currents," Asia, 38(1938), 625.

107 Howard, "Turkish Foreign Policy," p. 30.

108 D.A. Routh conjectures that remilitarization was based on a desire of Kemal for prestige, a supposition he says is born out by the obstinacy with which Turkey refused to accept at the conference the last vestige of the International Commission which Great Britain was anxious to maintain. This writer does not believe that this was the main motivation, but as was the case in the Lausanne Conference, the Turks were moved by a desire for complete independence. Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 606.

109 Ibid., p. 611.

110 "Turkey Sets Her Price," Literary Digest, Jan. 1936, p. 14.

111 Clarence K. Street, "Turkey Demands Control of Straits," New York Times, 23 June 1936, p. 4, col. 5.

112 Clarence K. Street, "Pro-Italy Trend Disturbs Balkans," New York Times, 11 July 1936, p. 30, col. 6.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid.

115 "Turks Will Rearm Straits Tomorrow," New York Times, 20 July 1936, p. 2, col. 4.

116 Ibid.

117 Charles A. Selden, "British End Pact in Mediterranean to Placate Italy," New York Times, 28 July 1936, p. 1, col. 6.

118 Ibid.

119 "Straits Body Quits on October 1," New York Times, 11 Aug. 1936, p. 6, col. 3.

120 Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 586. For a full analysis of the Montreux Convention as a precedent for treaty revision see article by L.W. Jenks in The New Commonwealth Quarterly, Sept. 1936.

121 Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 648.

122 "Turks Celebrate Occupation of Straits," New York Times, 22 July 1936, p. 5, col. 1.

123 Part of the British successes in promoting closer cooperation can be attributed to the British Ambassador Sir Percy Loraine, who had achieved a close personal relationship with President Attatürk. In a country where the head of state is as worshipped by the populace, this friendship was enough to evoke pro-British sentiment. Joseph M. Levy, "Turkey Revealed as British Ally," New York Times, 4 Sept. 1936, p. 1, col. 3.

124 "Edward is Welcomed by Turkish Warships," New York Times, 4 Sept. 1936, p. 21, col. 6; Nihat Erim Kocaeli, "The Development of the Anglo-Turkish Alliance," Asiatic Review, Oct. 1946, p. 348.

125 "Turks Ban Reich Plan," New York Times, 1 March 1937, p. 8, col. 2; New York Times, 4 March 1937, p. 5, col. 2; Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 647.

126 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, ed. Raynond Sontag (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Printing Office, 1953), V, 707, n. 7. Hereafter cited as DGFP.

127 Beloff, II, p. 46.

128 Ibid.

129 As interpreted by Mussolini in an interview published in the Voelkischer Beobachter of 17 Jan. 1937, this agreement and the preceeding exchange of notes entitled Italy to see that Franco's government was enabled to exert itself over the

the entire country without a rival Catalonian government. It appears that Britain was again trying to keep Italy occupied elsewhere as it had in 1926. Beloff, II, 86.

¹³⁰ Article 21 allows the League Council to overrule Turkey's closing of the Straits when she felt threatened by a two-thirds vote. Hurwitz, "Montreux Straits Convention," p. 201; Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 649.

¹³¹ "Italy and Turkey Open Talks," New York Times, 3 Feb. 1937, p. 4, col. 5.

¹³² Arnaldo Contesi, "Italy and Turkey Find Accord Basis," New York Times, 4 Feb. 1937, p. 5, col. 1.

¹³³ New York Times, 3 Feb. 1937, p. 4, col. 5.

¹³⁴ Contesi, p. 5, col. 1.

¹³⁵ Ibid. The official communique by Aras stated: "Italy and Turkey examined in the spirit of their treaty of 1928, the various questions of interest and it appears there is no cause for any but sentiments of mutual confidence." Documents of International Affairs, 1937, ed. Stephen Heald (London: Oxford Univerdity Press, 1939), pp. 416-17.

¹³⁶ Beloff, II, 46.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARD A NEW FOREIGN POLICY

When refortification of the Straits began, all of the major European industrial powers vied with one another in an attempt to win Turkey's political favor and thereby receive a contract for construction of the fortifications. According to the Turkish paper *Vreme*, Ankara invited both Russian and German bids for refortification¹ although it is doubtful whether the Russian invitation was more than political in view of the Turkish dislike for Russian equipment.² However, competition was not limited solely to Germany and Russia, since Schneider-Creusot of France and Vickers-Armstrong of Britain were also involved.³ Germany, although initially protesting the new Straits Convention, received a large part of the rearmament contract.⁴ However at the same time, Krupp lost a contract worth about £3 million to the British firm of Brassert and Company for the construction of an iron and steel plant at Karabuk.⁵ The German loss may be attributed partly to Turkish reaction to the growing economic penetration of the Reich into the Republic. Furthermore Ankara found herself greatly restricted by the system of settling the Turkish debt developed by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, German Economic Minister.⁶ The Turks were becoming unwilling to be tied exclusively to the German system and attempted to turn more toward their new ally, Great Britain. It was partly in order to counteract this

growing Turkish concern that Dr. Schacht made a visit to Ankara in 1936, but his primary mission was to counteract Britain's growing influence by offering German assistance in Turkey's second Five Year Plan.⁷

Turkey was important to Germany not only because of her strategic position but also for her mineral deposits, particularly chromium and copper.⁸ Berlin had been able to take advantage of the world depression of 1930 by developing barter arrangements with Turkey which effectively monopolized Turkish exports for the Reich.⁹ In return for resources, Germany gave technical assistance, and during the ten years preceding the Second World War, German experts swarmed over the nation as advisers, teachers, archaeologists, engineers and agronomists.¹⁰

German influence extended to military and educational areas of Turkey as well. This was no new fact, for German influence had long been known under the Sultans who had relied greatly upon the Prussians for military training. Turks often sent their sons to Germany for education and technical training. Under the Republic, the increased need for these skills reinforced this trend which was affected by a stepped-up campaign on behalf of Berlin to promote German influence. The main effort was in emphasizing German achievements in both the sciences and the arts and familiarizing the Turkish youth with the National Socialist outlook. There were German academic exchanges and invitations for Turkish teachers to furlough in Germany which many accepted.¹¹ As a result of these efforts, and because of the Montreux Convention, there developed a

subtle battle among the powers to win Turkish political favors through economic means. One might view it as a trade war which was economically dominated by Germany and politically dominated by Great Britain.

The Allies had controlled Turkish trade prior to the depression,¹² but with the termination of the Allied Trade Agreement developed at Lausanne in 1929, and after the economic collapse of 1930, Germany was able to share part of the economic vacuum with Soviet Russia. In 1928, Germany supplied 14 per cent of Turkey's imports and took 13 per cent of her exports,¹³ thus accounting for more Turkish trade than any other major individual country.¹⁴ By 1935, both had risen to 40 per cent as a result of Dr. Schacht's trade policies, while England, France and the United States, which together furnished 37 per cent of Turkey's imports in 1928, supplied only 22 per cent in 1935.¹⁵ The German demand for raw materials contributed to Turkish export surplus, of which the German share in 1936 was estimated by The Economist of 1937 to be over one-half of Turkey's total foreign trade.¹⁶

There existed one serious flaw in Berlin's policy toward Ankara which later had great effect on Turkey's foreign policy. The heart of the Turkish economic policy was, like her political policy, based on the desire for self-sufficiency, while Germany's effort was directed toward developing Turkish resources for her own use and thereby imposing a semi-colonial status on Turkey. This very fact, as well as growing German aggression and belligerence, forced Turkey to attempt liberation from the German economic system which was utilizing the Turco-German

trade clearings as a means of purchasing and selling goods often at artificial prices.¹⁷ Turkey thus acted to restrict her imports from 49 per cent in 1936 to 39 per cent in 1937.¹⁸

On the other side of the picture, Germany was forced to restrict her own trade with Turkey in the summer of 1937 in reaction to the Turkish move.¹⁹ In a memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department, Carl Clodius, on the German-Turkish economic negotiations in June 1938, it was pointed out that the economic negotiations carried on in July and August of 1937 were difficult because as a result of Germany's large unfavorable balance in clearing payments resulting from the Turkish restrictions there had developed a balance of 96 million reichmarks in favor of Turkey, which threatened to paralyze the entire exchange of goods. "We were, therefore, forced last year to deprive the Turks of the right to export unlimited quantities to Germany and reduce German imports from Turkey to 60 per cent of those of the previous year. This agreement was so favorable for Germany that in the period 1 September 1937 to 31 March 1938, our exports amounted to 90 million reichmarks and imports to 45 million reichmarks while in the corresponding seven months of 1936 to 1937, it was reversed. Thus in the first seven months last year we shifted the balance to 90 million reichmarks in our favor."²⁰ The Germans were completely successful in offsetting the Turkish attempts to limit German economic influence and bound Turkey even closer to the Reich over the vain protests of Ankara.²¹

The United States and Great Britain quickly took advantage of the initial Turkish restrictions of German exports to increase their own share of Turkish trade in an attempt to offset Germany's economic stranglehold. American and English imports increased from T£22,412,000 in 1936 to T£36,498,000 in 1937 and exports from T£12,459,000 to T£16,898,000 respectively.²²

Competition particularly between Great Britain and Germany for Turkish political alignment, or at least for Turkish neutrality in the developing European power struggle was growing keener by 1938. Turkish attempts, however, to restrict German trade were short-lived because of the 1938 recession. The percentage of German trade with Turkey thus rose to 47 per cent of her imports and 43 per cent of her exports,²³ and with the Anschluss, an extension of Danubian traffic appeared likely to increase these figures further. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, supplied only 11 per cent of the imports and 3 per cent of the exports.²⁴

Britain's attempt to stem the tide of German penetration in 1937-38 coincided with a political change in Turkey. Prime Minister Ismet İnönü was replaced by Celal Bayar, former Minister of Economics, who decided to accept the first foreign credits since the Soviet assistance in 1934 in order to finance the second Five Year Plan.²⁵ In May 1938, London was successful in inducing the Turks to accept a British credit of £10 million which was given to Turkey for mining, roadway and port equipment and a further loan of £6 million for the purchase of war material.²⁶ The political success and nature of the transaction

was discussed in the Financial Times of 30 May 1938 in an article stating that: "If activities of this kind bear a suspicious resemblance to those followed by the Great Powers before 1914, the necessities of the time must be blamed."²⁷ The move shows the significance London was attaching to the development of a strong Anglo-Turkish accord, in that England, suffering deficiencies in her own rearmament program, signed expensive contracts in the United States for the very equipment she was exporting to Turkey.²⁸ The Germans, obviously aware of the political aspect of their defeat in this competition, criticized the arrangement in the National-Zeitung as being without any justification.²⁹ Other German papers condemned the "political credits" as having no relation to normal economic development in southeastern Europe. The credits could be interpreted, they argued, only as an attempt to sabotage the German efforts to increase the volume of their world trade.³⁰

German official response to the British move was not long in the making. In March 1938 shortly after the Anschluss an invitation was presented to the Turks to send a delegation to Berlin for negotiations on the question of including Austria within the scope of the current German-Turkish economic agreement which was scheduled to expire on 31 August 1938. The Germans were suggesting a one-year extension of the agreement. Negotiations completed on 25 July resulted in Ankara's promise that deliveries of ores and wheat should be as large as in 1937.³¹ Actually, Germany was not totally successful in her negotiations, however, for Joachim Von Ribbentrop, German

Foreign Minister, was intent upon allying Turkey to Germany politically as well as economically. Numan, the Turkish delegate, however, attempted to make it clear to Ribbentrop that relations between their two countries should be based on a broad principle of benevolent neutrality. He declared that the credit agreement with Britain was not intended to reduce German-Turkish trade, and Turkey was prepared at any time to conclude a similar agreement with Germany.³² Nevertheless the fact that Numan suggested that he came to Berlin to expand German-Turkish trade, despite the fact that there were those who opposed any extension³³ and that proof of his sincerity lay in his very presence in Berlin, was evidence of considerable German success. Numan did request that all restrictions on importing Turkish goods made the previous July, be lifted,³⁴ to which the Germans agreed.³⁵

The Germans quickly took Numan's lead and on 15 September 1938 the Turks were told a credit of 150 million reichmarks would be extended for the purchase of armaments and industrial equipment. It was to be repaid in ten years at five per cent interest.³⁶ On 6 October, Walter Funk, Dr. Schacht's successor at the Ministry of Economics, on a tour to the capitals of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey, arrived in Ankara to sign the agreement. The visit was played-up in the German press as a counter to the "political credits" of the Western Powers,³⁷ and in an attempt to neutralize any rumors that Turkey would be the next Czechoslovakia, it was claimed that the credit was merely the outcome of the recently concluded trade agree-

ment.³⁸ Nevertheless, the effect of the agreement, only six months after conclusion of the British credits, was quite favorable to Berlin, for despite the fact that British trade had increased from 8 to over 9 per cent, the Reich's share rose sharply from 45 per cent during the first eleven months of 1937, to 51 per cent in the corresponding months of 1938.³⁹

Although Berlin appeared to have reaped the economic harvest, politically Great Britain had come out ahead. London, by supplying the loan in May, had scored a great victory which prompted the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdu Aras, to comment, even while Numan was in Berlin, that "No matter what happens, never will we be found in a camp opposing Britain... . Imagine! Here is a country granting us a loan of 16 million, mostly in armaments, without asking anything in return. She showed that she has faith in us. We will show her that this faith is not misplaced. . . . Britain may lose a battle, but never a war. She has money, a navy and character, thus always certain of being victorious."⁴⁰ For all practical purposes, by the close of 1938 Turkey had chosen to ally herself with Britain, for British and Turkish policies were aligned perfectly. If Turkey was to prosper in time of peace and see the prevention of war, she believed it necessary to maintain the strongest relations with the "world's greatest power." By asking nothing in return for her loan, London had presented herself as an ally, not as an imperialist and the political results were worth the effort. The Germans, though responding to Turkey's initiative in Berlin, had acted late and for their

own obvious gain. Berlin now realized the need for prudence and the necessity of avoiding any action which might offend Ankara.⁴¹

Turkey did continue to offer Berlin various defense projects and certain concessions at the expense of the Allies, and the percentage of German-Turkish trade continued to increase reaching a high of over 55 per cent by 31 August 1939.⁴² In April 1939, two German companies, Gutt Hoffnang's Hutte and Phillip Holzmann, were contracted to build an arsenal at Geuljuk near Ismid for £2,300,000, winning out over British and Dutch competition.⁴³ That same month, Luftanze also was given sole rights to carry on commercial flights into Turkey.⁴⁴

As a result of Turkish economic policy which favored first one side and then the other in the emerging world balance of power, Turkey's commerce became clearly subject to political uncertainties.⁴⁵ The Republic, however, became a classic case of a small nation using this maneuver to obtain the most of what it needed and wanted from the larger countries while at the same time maintaining its independence in the midst of big-power politics. This became more than evident during the Second World War when Ankara was successful in remaining non-belligerent, although unofficially by 1938 she had aligned herself politically with the British. It is reported that Attatürk told his people just before his death on 10 November 1938 "to be as ready as possible and then come what might, to stay on England's side, because that side was certain to win in the long run."⁴⁶ His advice was followed and the "political uncertainties" thus appeared to be less striking.

Perhaps of greater importance to the development of Turkish foreign policy than the economic and political competition between Germany and Britain was the threat of Italy which continually forced Ankara to secure her borders, particularly in the Middle East. Pan-Turanianism had been a source of friction along the frontier shared with the Soviet Union but efforts were made to alleviate the problem and secure the nomadic tribes who roamed the border.⁴⁷ But the Balkan Pact concluded in February 1934 and the Saabad Pact between Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq, signed on 8 July 1937 and based upon the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, made Turkey "the pivot of an embryonic security system, spreading from the Danube to India,"⁴⁸ serving in effect as a buffer against Italian expansion.

It was Italy more than Germany which threatened Turkish security from the south and which thus played the significant role in affecting Turkish policy, although for a brief period in 1938 relations between the two states were amicable. Following the decision reached at the Balkan Conference on 25-27 February 1938 that Turkey and Greece would follow Yugoslavia and Rumania in recognizing the Italian Empire,⁴⁹ relations between Rome and Ankara were stabilized especially with Italian accession to the Montreux convention.⁵⁰ By April, relations had been significantly improved,⁵¹ and Ciano spoke of making a visit to Ankara in the autumn.⁵² The meeting, however, never took place, probably due to renewed friction with Turkey and Britain over Mussolini's Arab policy.

On the eve of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, the suspicions of Turkey, Britain, and France had been aroused when Rome had launched a concentrated propaganda campaign directed to the Arab peoples from Radio Bari, the first European station to transmit such broadcasts. The program, which was supplemented by subversive activities, played on prevailing anti-British and anti-French sentiment.⁵³ By supporting the Pan-Arabism led by King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, Italy had sought to replace French and British influence in the Near East.⁵⁴ The formation of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936 as well as Mussolini's Libyan trip in the spring of 1937 where the Duce appealed to the Muslims as "Defender of Islam," greatly concerned London.⁵⁵ By early 1938, Britain became especially restive over the inflammatory role of radio Bari in the Palestine question.⁵⁶ In the hope of removing the Italian pressure, London concluded an agreement with Rome on 16 April 1938, whereby the signatories mutually agreed to respect and guarantee each other's spheres of influence. Annex 4 of the treaty dealt with the propaganda issue.⁵⁷ Nevertheless, the Axis, particularly Italy, continued to intrigue in the Arab territories selling arms and offering Italian technical assistance.⁵⁸

Desiring to lessen their dependence upon Great Britain, the governments of Iraq and Saudi Arabia were easily persuaded to accept Italian offers of aid, particularly in the form of arms. Weapons were viewed as necessary for the maintenance of internal order in these countries and with the increased German and Italian expansion, Britain's ability to supply the

materials declined.⁵⁹ Actually, most of the Arab leaders did not take the Duce's role as "Defender of Islam" very seriously, or rather considered it in terms of a threat to their own claims of Pan-Arabism.⁶⁰ The attack on 1 April 1939 upon Albania, a country with a large Muslim population, served only to reinforce these fears resulting in hard feelings and general condemnation from the Arab states.⁶¹ Mussolini thus acted to destroy any success he might have had among the Arab nationalists.

The direct Axis threat along Turkey's southern coast in Anatolia had even stronger repercussions in Ankara. On 9 September 1936, just after the Ethiopian invasion and simultaneous to the growing Pan-Arab movement, a treaty was signed between Syria and France making the Mandate independent within three years.⁶² This immediately presented Turkey with two concerns: first, fear for the future of the Turkish community in the Sanjak,⁶³ and second, fear of Italian designs on the region once France had left.⁶⁴ There had been no conflict between the Turks, French, and Syrians since the 1920's over the Sanjak, but the latest events caused Turkey to work toward annexation of the area as essential for her own security.

Pierre Vienot, French Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, attempted to quell Turkish fears that the Syrian Treaty would alter the special regime in Alexandretta. He reported to Attatürk that under Article 3 of that treaty "Syria would . . . be liable for the undertakings that France had contracted towards Turkey in respect of the Sanjak of Alexandretta as soon as she had obtained her independence

and was endowed with sovereignty."⁶⁵ Attatürk's response did not reflect satisfaction with Vienot's statement, for on 9 October he demanded that France, in the spirit of the treaty of 1921, organize the Sanjak into an independent territory tied to France with a treaty analogous to that just completed with Syria.⁶⁶ On 1 November, Attatürk expressed to his people the significance he attached to the issue by exclaiming that "The important topic of the day . . . is the fate of the district of Alexandretta . . . which in point of fact belongs to the purest Turkish element. We are obliged to take up the matter seriously and firmly."⁶⁷

The French, however, believed they would not be defaulting on their pledges to Turkey by transferring responsibility over the Sanjak to Syria. They also considered themselves bound by the terms of Article IV of the Mandate's provisions which stipulated that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria and the Lebanon (of which the Sanjak was an integral part) is ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign power."⁶⁸ Therefore, any recognition of a separate existence for Hatay was illegal.

In November 1936, France proposed that the question be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, and Turkey agreed on 4 December. The League appointed a committee to work out an agreement,⁶⁹ and a team was chosen which proceeded to the Sanjak in January 1937. Conversations between France and Turkey continued at Geneva and by 26 January an accord had

been reached.⁷⁰ On the following day, the Council adopted a report by the committee which embodied the terms agreed upon by the Turks and the French. These included the organization of the Sanjak into a separate political entity with a Statute and Fundamental Law of its own. It was to enjoy full independence in internal affairs but remain in a customs and monetary union with Syria which would be responsible for the conduct of the Sanjak's foreign relations.⁷¹ There were to be no army or fortifications, and territorial integrity was to be guaranteed first by France and Turkey in a treaty between them, and second, by a treaty between France, Turkey and Syria.⁷²

News of the agreement was met with relief in France, jubilation in Turkey, and mortification in Syria, although the Arab community in Hatay received it better than their compatriots. Final adoption of the settlement by the League occurred on 29 May 1937, when the League modified the original Syrian Mandate as it pertained to the Sanjak, adopted the Statute and Fundamental Laws, and recorded the Franco-Turkish Treaty.⁷³

Final settlement was not reached, however, because of increased breakdown of order in the Sanjak particularly among the Arab elements throughout the summer of 1937. But this atmosphere neither prevented the Turkish Grand National Assembly from ratifying the Franco-Turkish Treaty on 14 June, nor the arrival in Istanbul on 25 June of the President of the Syrian Republic for conversations with the French and Turks;⁷⁴ nor did it prevent the preparation for elections to be held in accordance with the Statute.

An International commission, organized to supervise the first elections to be held in the spring of 1938, visited the Sanjak,⁷⁵ not however without a Turkish protest which claimed that the commission represented an attempt by the French to influence the elections to the detriment of the Turks. Discussions in the League Council on 28 January 1938 made some changes in the procedure, but increased tension came to a climax on 30 May with mass meetings of Turks and retaliatory general strikes by the Arabs which caused postponement of the elections.⁷⁶ Ankara, more aware than ever of the threat from Italy, used her control of the Straits as a lever to pressure the French into an accommodation, and further declared that good relations between the two nations were contingent upon developments in Hatay.⁷⁷

France found herself in an awkward position in view of the developing bifurcation of Europe in the spring and summer of 1938. Britain was trying to tighten her relations with the Turks by offering their credit loan in May,⁷⁸ a move which indirectly involved the French. Furthermore, any combined Franco-Russian response to Axis aggression or fulfillment of French pledges to the Balkan states, depended upon Turkey's control of the Dardanelles. Paris, therefore, found it necessary to concede to Ankara's "Grievances." On 3 June, Paris declared martial law in Hatay and agreed to the admission of Turkish troops under the pretext of assisting in the maintenance of law and order during the elections. Conversations were begun concurrently in Paris which were directed toward a

new Franco-Turkish Treaty of Friendship to replace the Friendship Treaty of 1926 which had guaranteed the inviolability of the frontier between Turkey and Syria but had been denounced by Ankara during the December 1937 crisis.⁷⁹ On 4 July 1938, the new treaty was initialed⁸⁰ but was never ratified. Instead, the original treaty of 1926 was retained for another twelve months with the hope that it would be broadened into a tripartite treaty with Syria. The Syrians, however, broke off negotiations on 7 July after only a few days of talks.⁸¹

Elections were finally held in the Sanjak in August and the results reflected the Turkish success in controlling the entire process. The percentage of Turkish electors rose from 46 to 63 per cent of the total.⁸² The system of proportional representation provided by the Fundamental Law⁸³ gave the Turks 22 of the 40 seats in the Assembly.⁸⁴ This controlling position in the legislature resulted in the election of a Turkish president and head of state who chose a Turkish cabinet. Even the Turkish name Hatay was chosen for the new Republic.⁸⁵ The parliament adopted Turkish criminal and civil codes in January 1939, and Turkish officials were sent to reorganize Hatay's fiscal system.⁸⁶ The border between Turkey and Hatay rapidly faded as these policies were implemented. Peace was restored, and the French troops withdrew. It appeared that with the accession to Ankara's demands the issue was closed. Unfortunately this was not the case, for Turkey sought total annexation of the new Republic, and it was to this

end that events tended, precipitated primarily by the increasingly real Italian menace.

In January 1939, following Numan's visit to Berlin for the signing of the German credit of 150 million reichmarks,⁸⁷ the new Turk government of Ismet Inönü⁸⁸ renewed the invitation to Count Ciano to visit Turkey. The Italian Foreign Minister neither accepted nor rejected this new Turkish overture. Instead, Ciano said to the Turkish ambassador: "I had not gone previously because I had become aware that the Turks themselves preferred that the visit be postponed. I had read it in a decoded telegram. . . ."⁸⁹

This rebuff coincided with the printing of a map in the Turkish newspaper Tan on 10 February purporting to show the possible range of Italian expansionist ambitions which included the Turkish district of Adalia promised to Italy by the Allies in 1915 and 1917.⁹⁰ Turkish public concern about the reawakening of Italian aggression was driven to a climax by Mussolini's demands for certain French possessions. Turkish papers began devoting space to the "Italian danger," and the renewed fears of an attack from the Dodecanese drove the population into a state of Italophobia.⁹¹ They reasoned that if Italy was ready to claim the possessions of a large country like France she would also covet the territory of a weaker nation. Although the semi-official Turkish newspaper Vlos objected to the anti-Italian campaign,⁹² it can be surmised that this was merely a move to weaken any Italian claim that the outbreaks against Italy were officially condoned, for on 10 March, Tan again

returned to the offensive by attacking the broadcasts from Radio Bari.⁹³

Other developments followed the Turkish mission to Berlin for there was a growing concern among the Allies over the German economic and diplomatic advances into the Balkans which coincided with Italy's saber-rattling expansionism in the East. The Turks rapidly found themselves the locus of pressure from both the Axis powers and the Allies each of which desired that Ankara throw in her lot with them in the Balkans.

On 17 and 19 March, following the German demands to Rumania, Sir Hugh Knatchbul-Hugesson, British Ambassador to Ankara, asked for a statement on Turkey's position should Rumania, which was closely tied to France and Britain, be forced into the German sphere through Nazi aggression.⁹⁴ Britain was concerned with Turkey's position in view of the necessity of using the Straits should the Allies wish to go to Rumania's aid. Saracoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, at first hedged by replying that Turkey would abide by the Balkan Pact. In other words, she would only act in the event of Bulgarian aggression, which was a possibility because Bulgaria and the Reich shared common revisionist ambitions. Ankara wished a clearer definition of London's plan of action for Rumania before she pledged herself.⁹⁵

The Germans, meanwhile, were carrying on parallel talks in Ankara ⁹⁶ through Numan who was now Secretary General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Numan told Hans Kroll, Counsellor of the German Embassy in Ankara, that "Turkey was ready to

cooperate actively in order that the Balkans . . . might become more than ever an economic hinterland of Germany and also be at her disposal in times of political crisis as a reliable . . . source of supplies."⁹⁷ This was in return for Germany refraining from "insisting on a unilateral . . . partisan attitude by the Balkan states in the ideological struggle."⁹⁸ Although this appears to be a total capitulation to the Axis, it was rather an attempt politically to neutralize the Balkans, a step which the Turks hoped would remove any threat from this region by maintaining the status quo.

Support for the above contention may be found back in London where Aras was meeting with both Viscount Halifax and George Bonnet, Foreign Ministers respectively of Britain and France.⁹⁹ There Aras told them that as soon as Turkey was assured of Allied assistance in the event of Axis aggression, Turkey "would go to all lengths with Great Britain,"¹⁰⁰ and that the Turks would "only depart from neutrality if they were on the same side as Great Britain."¹⁰¹ When Halifax inquired whether Turkey would follow if England went to war outside the Balkans, Aras responded in the affirmative although Turkish activity, he warned, would be limited to southeastern Europe.¹⁰² These conversations in London completed the first step in a long period of negotiations which ultimately resulted in the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of October 1939 between Britain, France and Turkey.

Although containment of Germany was the issue motivating the Allies in these negotiations, it was Italy which offered

the greatest threat to Turkey and thus fear of Rome rather than Berlin lay behind Turkey's willingness to change her long-standing policy of complete neutrality. On 1 April 1939, Italy invaded Albania offering a direct threat to Anatolia. In addition, only 100 miles now separated the Albanian frontier from Salonika, a key point in the defense of the Dardanelles.¹⁰³ Turkey was now threatened from the west as well as the south by Roman armies. And though Premier Refik Saydam professed Turkish neutrality throughout the crisis,¹⁰⁴ it was evident that Ankara had been shaken by the event. Her initial fear was that Britain would continue to appease Italy as she had done since January 1937, for the guarantees to Poland, Greece, and Rumania had been arranged prior to the Italian campaign and were thus basically anti-German in character.

The British, however, were quick to move and began making unilateral guarantees in preference to the unified general system of collective defense of which she had been previously the chief proponent. London considered the latest Italian aggression to be a breach of the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1937, a threat to freedom of the seas, and the modification of the status quo in the Balkans which further damaged traditional French policy.¹⁰⁵ Unfortunately, failure of the two allies to agree on a common mode of action against both Germany and Italy resulted in what General Maxim Weygand later described as "fear of Germany and lack of confidence in Allied support."¹⁰⁶

The British plan of action against Italy was to pledge support to Greece, but not to extend this guarantee for the time being to Rumania. This was to be withheld and used as a lever to force Poland and Turkey to commit themselves to take action in the defense of the status quo. The French, however, showed their determination to extend their own pledge to both Greece and Rumania. Thus, London was compelled to drop its plan.¹⁰⁷ The problem of guaranteeing Poland and Rumania against Germany, therefore, still remained. These guarantees could only be made effective if Turkey would admit British warships, and if necessary, British and French troops into the Black Sea.¹⁰⁸ Immediate support, if the British and French were to have any, had to come from the east. Thus, everything depended upon Ankara, particularly in the light of the conflict between Russia and Rumania over Bessarabia which preoccupied Moscow and threatened to develop into armed conflict.¹⁰⁹

On 11 April Halifax inquired of Ankara whether they would commit themselves to assist Greece in the case of further Italian aggression,¹¹⁰ since the existing Greco-Turkish Treaty only committed Ankara if Greece were attacked by another Balkan state. The British were responding to Turkish concern over apparent lack of action on the part of the Allies, but their primary purpose was to secure free passage through the Straits should the need arise.¹¹¹ In return for Turkish commitment to Rumania and Greece, Britain was prepared to come to the aid of Turkey in the event of any threat by Italy which was actually resisted by Turkey, provided Turkey was prepared to

come to the aid of Great Britain if she were involved in a war with Italy.¹¹² The following day, Bonnet made a similar proposal to Ankara.¹¹³ On 13 April Britain and France proceeded to make guarantees to both Greece and Rumania even before the Turkish reply was received.¹¹⁴

The Turkish reply to the British and French pledges and requests "gravely disappointed" the two Allies.¹¹⁵ Ankara refused to cooperate on the grounds that any public statement involved a constitutional question, and therefore, consent of the Chamber, and that Turkey did not want to place herself on one side without further definite guarantees as to her own security.¹¹⁶ In this regard, Turkey desired to know whether Germany was covered in the British guarantee,¹¹⁷ to which London replied in the affirmative but only if Turkey would help her against Germany.¹¹⁸

Britain continued to press Turkey to make some statement in support of the Allied position, and the British Ambassador to Ankara was instructed to draw up a draft of a mutual assistance treaty covering the event of an Italian attack upon either Turkey or Britain. Ankara was receptive to this initiative and on 15 April returned to London definite proposals for secret collaboration.¹¹⁹

German pressure was equally strong and not without effect. Although Berlin realized that any further action by Italy in the Balkans or in Syria would push Turkey over into the "encirclement" camp, nevertheless German influence particularly in the economic sphere, served to prevent Ankara from deviating

too quickly or too far from her policy of strict neutrality.¹²⁰ Therefore, it was of extreme importance to Ankara that initial conversations with London remain strictly confidential.

On 17 April Paris moved toward initiating arrangements to join in the proposed Anglo-Turkish talks,¹²¹ which were to be based upon the Turkish proposals of 15 April. Turkey would remain neutral except in the case of Axis aggression in the Mediterranean or in the Balkans. Britain and France would agree to defend the land defenses of the Straits. They would strive to obtain the collaboration of the Soviet Union. Turkey would be assisted in her efforts to settle the Bulgarian-Rumanian dispute. Allied plans for the eastern Mediterranean would be communicated to Ankara, and most important to Ankara, the negotiations would remain secret.¹²² The French were, however, hindered in their relations with the Turks over Hatay which had remained a continuing problem particularly with the stepped-up Italian intrigues in the East and the Albanian affair. Although France had pledged not to give in to any further attempts by the Turks totally to annex Hatay,¹²³ rumors concerning the imminence of war over Poland, drove René Massigli on 19 April to telegraph Paris and point out the extreme urgency of completing arrangements over Hatay and transporting whatever forces and materials necessary for cooperation with Turkey at the earliest date.¹²⁴

Whether or not these war clouds had any effect on Turkish policy is doubtful but France certainly was becoming more agreeable toward final settlement of the Sanjak dispute. In

any case, by 25 April the Turks had definitely agreed that a treaty of at least fifteen years duration should come from these talks, and be ratified and published.¹²⁵ It now became only a matter of arranging for a public announcement of Turkey's support of Allied Balkan policy and settling the details of mutual assistance. However, this proved to be no simple matter.

FOOTNOTES

¹ "Germany and Russia Bid on Dardanelles Forts," New York Times, 25 April 1936, p. 1, col. 2.

² German equipment was preferred. Thornberg, p. 123; the last major contribution by the Soviets was the financial and technical assistance lent in 1934 to set up textile mills, Tansky, p. 38. About a week following the Montreux Convention, the Russians approached the Turks with a treaty concerning the Straits, but the Turks with British support turned down the Russian proposal as unnecessary. Kilic, p. 122.

³ "Dardanelles Setting for New Crisis," Newsweek, 8 Nov. 1940, p. 25.

⁴ Ibid. Their engineers were sent home with the outbreak of war, and the Allies completed the work.

⁵ Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 533; Thornberg describes the plant as a "white elephant" which was originally designed in 1922-33 by Krupp but built by the British who were compelled by the Turks to follow the original plans or see the job go to the Germans. The plant was not completed until 1940 and was almost useless. Thornberg, p. 109; the British assistance consisted of a grant of 15,000,000. Newsweek, 20 June 1938, p. 16.

⁶ Schacht's credit and barter system involved making

Germany the major source of Turkish exports by making Turkish trade with other nations difficult and making the Turks take payment in manufactured goods and munitions. Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 533.

⁷ "Germany Wooing Turkey," New York Times, 18 Nov. 1936, p. 9, col. 2; £12 million was provisionally fixed for the second Five-Year Plan, £10 million provided by Britain. Ward, p. 319.

⁸ Thornberg, p. 165.

⁹ Germany was the first to explore extensively Turkey's mineral resources, and until the 1930's the only one with any complete source of knowledge on the Turkish resources. Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁰ When a project was under consideration, the German engineering firms were glad to draw up a plan for it without charge. This was not the case with the United States, Britain or France. German firms would, however, receive remuneration by the Reichbank out of the total of Turkish exports to Germany, payment for which was centralized in the bank. Ibid., p. 165.

¹¹ E.G. Veron, "Germany Attempts to Gain Turkish Sympathies," The Christian Century, 53 (1936), p. 970.

¹² German trade with Turkey began to grow rapidly and in 1925 the Ingenieursteentoor voor Scheepsbouw (IvS), the secret German U-boat firm founded in The Hague by Krupp,

built two submarines for Turkey which were also used by the Germans to train German U-boat crews. Both activities were forbidden by the Paris Peace Treaty, Article 191. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950), IX, 288.

¹³ Annex I, p. 126.

¹⁴ Ibid., Italy was second with 12 per cent imports and 18 per cent exports. France was third with 13 per cent and 10 per cent, and Britain was fourth with 12 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ "Commercial History of 1936," The Economist, 13 Feb. 1937, pp. 27-28; Annex II for Turkey's import or export balance with the other countries, p. 127.

¹⁷ Numan Menemencioglu, Turkish Economic Minister, complained that Germany paid too low a price for Turkish products while conversely Turkey had to pay 20, 30 or 40 per cent higher for goods from Germany than elsewhere. DGFP, V, No. 546, 5 July 1938, pp. 726-28.

¹⁸ The International Monetary Fund gives the 1937 figure as 37 per cent, Annex V, p.130; "Commercial History of 1937," The Economist, 12 Feb. 1938, p. 30; see especially export figures of Turkish antimony, chrome and lead ore for 1937 in Annex III, p. 128.

- 19 Ward, p. 324.
- 20 DGFP, V, No. 545, 29 June 1938, pp. 723-25.
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 "Commercial History of 1936," p. 30.
- 23 Annex I, p. 126.
- 24 Ibid.
- 25 Ward, p. 329.
- 26 "British Credit for Turks," New York Times, 19 May 1938, p. 2, col. 5.
- 27 Ward, p. 330.
- 28 Janeway, p. 625.
- 29 Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, 44.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Annex III and IV, p.128; DGFP, V, Nos. 538, p. 712, 545, p. 723, 546, p. 726, and 547, p. 728; Clodius was of the opinion that the increase in trade expected to result from the agreement would contribute toward impeding England's economic position there. DGFP, V, No. 549, 8 Aug. 1938, p. 734.
- 32 Toynbee, Survey, 1938, III, 445-46.
- 33 DGFP, V, No. 546, 5 July 1938, pp. 726-28.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., V, No. 549, 8 Aug. 1938, pp. 732-34.

36 Ibid., V, No. 552, 15 Sept. 1938, p. 739. There were fears that the French would be making a visit to Ankara with the intention of undermining Germany's economic position, thus the greatest speed was essential because of the importance attached to settlement with the Turks. Ibid.; Ibid., V, No. 553, 23 Sept. 1938, pp. 739-40.

37 Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, p. 50.

38 Ward, p. 330.

39 "Commercial History and Review of 1938," The Economist, 18 Feb. 1939, p. 32; German imports were 47 per cent, exports 43 per cent; British imports were 11 per cent, exports 3 per cent, Annex I, p. 126.

40 Joseph M. Levy, "Turkey Revealed as a British Ally," New York Times, 21 July 1938, p. 1, col. 3; Janeway, p. 625.

41 In 1938 the Nazis rebuilt, at their own expense, a Turkish Jewish Synagogue, one of twenty Synagogues destroyed during anti-semitic outbursts in Vienna. "Vienna Nazis to Rebuild Turkish Jew's Synagogue," New York Times, 15 Dec. 1938, p. 23, col. 3.

42 Germany was followed by the United States and Italy. "Commercial History and Review of 1939," The Economist, 17 Feb. 1940, p. 26.

⁴³ "Germans to Build Turkish Sea Base," New York Times, 31 April 1939, p. 5, col. 5. German shipyards were also turning out submarines for Turkey, Newsweek, 22 May 1939, p. 17. The previous December 1938, Turkey awarded Swan, Hunter, and Wighams Richardson of Newcastle, England a contract for eleven merchantmen of 900-1,000 tons each at a cost of £1,800,000, thus maintaining the economic equilibrium. "Turkey Orders British Ships," New York Times, 5 Dec. 1938, p. 14, col. 5.

⁴⁴ New York Times, 31 April 1939, p. 5, col. 5.

⁴⁵ Thornberg, p. 165.

⁴⁶ Thomas and Frye, p. 89.

⁴⁷ As early as 1839, Hungarian scholars used the word Tiran, an ancient Iranian name for the country to the north-east of Persia, to describe the Turkish lands of central and southwest Asia, and applied the word Turanian to a people and language group. Politically, the idea took root in the minds of Turkish exiles and immigrants from the Russian Empire. Panturanian hopes flared when the collapse of that Empire in 1917 offered hope for the dream of uniting all Turkic peoples. Lewis, Emergence, pp. 347-352. In the early 1930's, Paris was the center of this activity, but from about 1937, it came under the patronage of Germany. Beloff, II, 48; Rudolf Schlesinger, Federalism in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 382.

⁴⁸ Barbara Ward, Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 103; Howard, "Turkish Foreign Policy," p. 31; "Treaty of Nonaggression (Sa'dabad Pact) Afganistan, Iran, Iraq and Turkey," (8 July 1937). Hurewitz, pp. 214-16.

⁴⁹ DGFP, V, No. 540, 23 Feb. 1938, pp. 716-17; No. 541, 23 March 1938, p. 718, n. 4; "Turkey Acts to Recognize the Conquests of Ethiopia," New York Times, 17 Aug. 1938, p. 2, col. 2; Toynbee, Survey, 1938, III, 442.

⁵⁰ On 15 April 1937, Germany informed her minister to Ankara that she had no objection to Italy's accession to the Montreux Convention and was planning to negotiate one herself at a later date. When Baron Konstanin von Neurath, Foreign Minister of Germany, visited Ciano in Rome from 3-5 May 1937, he told the latter that Germany would recognize Montreux in a bilateral agreement with Turkey after the termination of the London Naval Agreement. DGFP, V, No. 535, 16 July 1937, p. 706; on 16 July, Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker told his minister in Ankara that Berlin was ready to negotiate. Ibid; but Turkey refused, Ibid., V, No. 541, 23 March 1938, p.718; Berlin then tried to get Italy to use her influence, Ibid; but then changed her mind in April 1938, Ibid., V, no. 556, 5 June 1938, pp. 741-42. Settlement was never concluded. Ibid., V, No. 558, 20 June 1938, p. 744.

⁵¹ Relations were so improved that Attatürk had acknowledged that four Turkish destroyers would be built in Italian shipyards. Ibid., V, No. 542, 5 April 1938, p. 719.

52 Ibid.

53 Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas, p. 216.

54 Germany supported Italy but following Italy's attack on Albania, which caused an uproar in the Arab states, Berlin found herself confronted with a basic dilemma in her own Arab policy. Now faced with a deep Arab dislike for their closest ally and with Italy's aversion to an independent German action in the Arab region which Italy regarded as her own sphere of influence, Germany was forced nevertheless to pursue her own policy while attempting to maintain the appearance of solidarity in Arab affairs. Herszowicz, p. 58. In July 1939, Hitler received Khalid Al Hud, Ibn Saud's emissary, in Berchtesgaden for talks following which the German paper, Deutsche Diplomatische Politische Korrespondenz, announced that the Axis would support the Arabs in ousting French and British influence. "Power Politics," Time, 31 July 1939, pp. 14-15.

55 Mussolini was given the "Sword of Islam" made especially for the occasion to represent this claim. Robert G. Woolbert, "Mussolini Flirts with Islam," Asia, Jan. 1938, p. 32.

56 In Palestine, the White Paper of 1930 had annoyed the Jews, and the counter efforts to mollify them angered the Arabs who were further enraged when the Peel Commission recommended partition in July 1937. The Arab revolt between

September 1937 and April 1938, was dealt with in July by mobile British forces from Egypt which were forced to return because of fears of a possible Italian attack in September 1937. W.N. Medlicott, Contemporary England, 1914-1964 (London: The Whitefriars Press Ltd., 1967), pp. 356-57; Britain sent General Sir Archibald Wavell as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces there to strengthen British garrisons against Italian invasion from Libya and internal disorders in the Arab countries. Hirsowicz, p. 63.

57 "Agreement on Mutual Interests in the Mediterranean: The United Kingdom and Italy," (16 April 1938), Hurewitz, Diplomacy, pp. 216-18.

58 Chief technical assistance was in the form of flight instructors. Hirsowicz, p. 14.

59 Ibid. Ciano told Göring in April 1939 that because direct supply of arms was too risky, Italy gave the Arabs money and they bought the weapons through Greek middleman who transferred them "by the roundabout route across Syria." DGFP, VI, No. 211, 16 April 1939, p. 262.

60 Hirsowicz, p. 14; Woolbert, p. 33.

61 "Turks Showing Alarm," New York Times, 11 April 1939, p. 1, col. 8.

62 H. Beeley, "Signature of Franco Syrian Treaty of 9 September 1936," Toynbee, Survey, 1936, pp. 748-767.

63 Ibid.

64 Howard, "Turkish Foreign Policy," p. 31; "Turkey and Syria, French Offer," Newsweek, 20 June 1938, p. 16. The French had conscientiously maintained the regime prescribed by the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement and the effect was contentment of the local Turkish community and other communities. Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 768.

65 Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 770.

66 René Massigli, Turqui Devant La Guerre (Paris: Plon, 1964), p. 46; on 26 September, Aras asked at the Council of the League of Nations that France discuss the matter with Turkey. Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 770.

67 Ibid., p. 772.

68 Avedis K. Sanjian, "The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Hatay)," The Middle East Journal, 10 No. 4 (Autumn 1956), 380.

69 Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 775.

70 Ibid., p. 778; "Report by M. Sandler and resolution of the League of Nations," League of Nations Official Journal, Jan.-June 1937, p. 119.

71 "Statute and Fundamental Law of the Sanjak of Alexandretta," League of Nations Official Journal, May-June 1937, pp. 574-589.

72 Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 778.

73 "Franco-Turkish Treaty," League of Nations Official Journal, July-December 1937, pp. 837-841. It was reported by newsmen on the scene as early as June 1938 that Axis attempts to gain Turkish friendship were in vain due to Allied success. Levy, "Armenians Doubt Turkish Pledges," New York Times, 20 June 1938, p. 7, col. 4.

74 Toynbee, Survey, 1936, p. 779; in November the new constitution of Hatay came into force. Ward, Hitler's Route, p. 342.

75 Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, 481.

76 Ibid., p. 484; the Commission finally left under protest in June 1938. Ibid., p. 485.

77 Rumors developed that secret meetings were being held between the French and Turks designed to secure Allied access through the Straits and Turkish neutrality in case of hostilities. The validity of the reports is questionable although they do show the importance of the Straits to both Turkey and the Allies. Levy, "Turks Held Ready," New York Times, 16 June 1938, p. 15, col. 1.

78 One article stated that as part of Turkey's consideration of the deal, England would induce France to let Turkey have Alexandretta. Janeway, p. 625.

79 Throughout this period, the Turks flagrantly violated the Statute and Fundamental Law as well as the other treaties

they had signed by their actions in the Sanjak which were taken to ensure Turkish success in the elections. Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, 485.

⁸⁰ Turkey's claim, which has some truth in it in view of her desire for security, was "Le gouvernement Turc á affirmé de son côté que la question du Sanjak n'est pas une question territoriale pour la Turquie." "Le Traité D'Amitié Entre La France Et La Turquie," Le Temps, 13 Juillet 1938, p. 2, col. 3. During the negotiations, Turkey was also involved with discussions between herself and Germany the latter extremely touchy following the British credit loan in May. Ribbentrop, meeting in Berlin with Numan Menemencioglu in July, pressed for tighter political relations. Numan told Ribbentrop that "Turkey wants German-Turkish relations to be like Anglo-Turkish, mutual neutrality taken for granted and no agreements regarding it." Whereupon Ribbentrop questioned the meaning and purpose of the Franco-Turkish Treaty. DGFP, V, No. 548, 7 July 1938, pp. 730-732.

⁸¹ Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, 487.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ "Statute and Fundamental Law of the Sanjak," pp. 575-589.

⁸⁴ Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, 488.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ The credit agreement was signed on 16 January for orders to be placed before 31 December 1941; credit was to be extended for 10 years at 5 per cent interest. The schedule was to include mining and power plant facilities, rolling stock, merchant vessels and war materials up to 60 million marks. On the shipping orders, Numan complained to Ribbentrop that the merchant and naval craft previously delivered had many deficiencies. DGFP, V, No. 556, 20 January 1939, pp. 742-43.

⁸⁸ İnönü replaced Attatürk as president after the latter's death in November 1938.

⁸⁹ Ciano, p. 19.

⁹⁰ This was taken from the London News Review, which had obtained it from Mitropress of Paris. It appeared to be no more than an unofficial conjecture but had far reaching effects. Toynbee, Survey, 1938, III, 447.

⁹¹ "Turks Fearful of Italy," New York Times, 16 Feb. 1939, p. 7, col.3.

⁹² Toynbee, Survey, 1938, III, 447.

⁹³ Ibid. These broadcasts were still threatening to the Turks who feared the vacuum which would result when the French left.

⁹⁴ DBFP, IV, No. 390, 17 March 1939, p. 361; No. 407, 17 March 1939, p. 374; No. 423, 19 March 1939, p. 386.

⁹⁵ Ibid., IV, No. 424, 19 March 1939, p. 387.

⁹⁶ The Germans softened their campaign somewhat toward Turkey in order to counter a new move by Russia to reopen relations with Turkey since İnönü was thought to be more pro-Soviet than Attatürk and thus the time was ripe for such a step. Although Saracoglu and Numan told Berlin that their fear was illusory, the Germans sensed the need for greater reserve to counter any new Soviet move. DGFP, V, No. 559, 1 Feb. 1939, p. 744.

⁹⁷ Ibid., VI, No. 32, 19 March 1939, pp. 32-33.

⁹⁸ Ibid. On 31 March, Ribbentrop told the Turks through the Embassy in Ankara that Germany was pleased with Turkey's readiness to cooperate actively in developing "German economic relations with the Balkan states. . . ." Ibid., VI, No. 133, 31 March 1939, p. 168.

⁹⁹ There was intense diplomatic activity that day in Berlin and Warsaw as well as in London where Chamberlain suggested to the French that they both join Poland and Russia in declaring that the four nations were taking steps to prevent further aggression. Three days before, Maxim Litvinoff, Russian Foreign Minister, had proposed to the Allies that a European conference of France, Britain, Rumania, Poland, Russia and Turkey be held, but Chamberlain,

who had great distrust of Russia, called the proposal premature." William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1970), pp. 618-19.

¹⁰⁰ DBFP, IV, No. 458, 21 March 1939, p. 425; Ibid., IV, No. 472, 21 March 1939, pp. 436-37.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ "British Mediterranean Fleet Sails on Decision to Guard Greece, Turkey, Balkan Entente to Defend Frontiers," New York Times, 11 April 1939, p. 1, col. 8; Solonica was considered of prime importance to the Allies in defense of the Dardanelles, Weygand, p. 10.

¹⁰⁴ "Bulgaria Dissolves Fascist Party," New York Times, 12 April 1939, p. 41, col. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Mario Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 239.

¹⁰⁶ Weygand, p. 13; the Turks were especially upset over the lack of coordinated action in response to the Albanian affair. Knatchbull-Hugessen asked Halifax for permission to tell the Turks that Britain would stand behind them in order to strengthen their morale and attitude toward London in view of the Axis pressure on Ankara. DBFP, V, No. 124, 10 April 1939, pp. 164-65; see also Nos. 119, 120, and 121 of 11 April 1939, pp. 162-63.

¹⁰⁷ F.S. Northedge, The Troubled Giant (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 582.

¹⁰⁸ Winston Churchill, Step By Step (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 321.

¹⁰⁹ According to the Montreux Convention, Article 19, Russia insisted that Turkey was obligated to permit passage through the Dardanelles of fleets which were to assist Rumania against aggression. Russia now began to press Turkey to close the Straits to all but Black Sea Powers. David Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy, 1932-1942 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1942), p. 108; "Convention (Montreux) on the Turkish Straits Regime," Article 19, Hurewitz, Diplomacy, p. 201.

¹¹⁰ DBFP, V, No. 128, 11 April 1939, p. 167.

¹¹¹ Halifax admitted that "one of our original objects in entering into the present negotiations with the Turkish government was to put us in as good a position as possible to implement our guarantee to Roumania, in as much as, owing to the Montrux Convention, it is only when Turkey is a belligerent that Great Britain can send armed assistance to Roumania by sea." Ibid., IV, No. 537, 17 March 1939, p. 575.

¹¹² Ibid., V, No. 138, 12 April 1939, p. 167.

¹¹³ Ibid., V, No. 134, 12 April 1939, p. 173; No. 142, 12 April 1939, p. 84.

114 The British sent out on 18 March a number of Demarches to various capitals including Ankara, telling of German pressures on Rumania and requesting the ambassadors of the respective states to inquire as to their government's feelings toward any action to counter the Axis move. The Germans considered this to be the opening of the Allied "encirclement" policy. DGFP, VI, No. 160, 5 April 1939, p. 195. see also DBFP, IV, pp. Nos. 390 and 407.

115 DGFP, VI, No. 226, 18 April 1939, p. 276.

116 DBFP, V, No. 149, 13 April 1939, p. 187.

117 Ibid., V, No. 155, 13 April 1939, p. 190.

118 Ibid., V, No. 152 and No. 155, 13 April 1939, p. 190.

119 Ibid., V, No. 199, 15 April 1939, pp. 226-27.

120 The Charge D'Affairs in Ankara stressed that "greater Germany's economic importance to Turkey . . . has been a decisive factor in determining the Turkish government to maintain reserve toward the British manoeuvres." DGFP, VI, No. 226, 18 April 1939, p. 276; however, the suggestion was made, and repeated often as the year progressed toward war, that Germany should persuade Italy that "A statement by Rome that Italian policy in the Balkans and Near East has no territorial ambitions would strengthen the Turkish government in their neutral attitude and render more difficult the intensive efforts from our opponents to draw

Turkey into their orbit." Ibid. Perhaps of importance in the Turkish decision were the reports as early as 15 March among diplomats in Ankara that the Reich had intimated to the Turks that they would support the alleged Italian aspirations regarding Syria if Turkey deviated from her present policy of strict neutrality toward the Great Powers. Ibid., No. 3, 15 March 1939, p. 5. Rumors were again circulating in April of Italian military activity in the Dodecanese and in Lybia, "British Mediterranean Fleet Sails," New York Times, 11 April 1939, p. 1, col. 8.

121 DBFP, V, No. 203, 18 April 1939, p. 231.

122 Ibid., V, No. 199, enclosure 2, 17 April 1939, pp. 226-27; British response in Ibid., No. 219, 19 April 1939, p. 240. Secrecy was of extreme importance particularly in view of the German pressure. However, the local (Ankara) News agency announced a report that the British Prime Minister would make a short statement on 18 April to the House of Commons, "announcing adherence of Turkey to the anti-aggression pact." Saracoglu became anxious and reminded Knatchbull-Hugessen of the conditions of secrecy in Document 199 and expressed his hope that the Prime Minister would limit his statement to a reference of sympathy and good relations between the two nations. Knatchbull-Hugessen received immediate instructions to assure Ankara that the report was false. Ibid., V, No. 200, 18 April 1939, p. 228.

123 Toynbee, Survey, 1938, I, 489.

¹²⁴ DBFP, V, No. 215, 19 April 1939, p. 238.

¹²⁵ Ibid., V, No. 271, 24 April 1939, p. 258.

ANNEX I


PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF TURKISH IMPORTS AND EXPORTS,

BY VALUE, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1928, 1935, 1938, 1940

COUNTRY	1928		1935		1938		1940	
	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports	imports	exports
Total Turkish Trade Amount (in thousands of liras)								
Percentage total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
United States	4.5	15.9	7.0	10.1	10.5	12.3	10.8	14.1
United Kingdom	12.3	10.1	9.8	5.4	11.2	3.4	14.0	10.4
Switzerland	1.0	0.1	1.7	0.8	0.7	1.1	2.3	4.5
Palestine	a	a	a	a	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.8
Sweden	1.3	0.4	1.7	1.6	1.5	1.2	0.9	1.7
Italy	11.8	18.2	6.4	9.9	4.8	10.0	16.3	16.1
Greece	0.4	6.7	0.7	2.2	0.5	2.0	1.5	4.0
Egypt	1.1	4.5	0.8	2.0	0.7	0.9	1.5	1.4
France	13.0	10.6	4.7	3.2	1.3	3.3	2.8	5.9
Belgium	5.9	2.2	1.0	3.2	1.6	1.8	0.7	1.2
Czechoslovakia	6.1	4.2	4.3	3.2	3.9	3.4	3.7	4.2
Germany	14.2	12.8	40.0	10.9	47.0	42.9	11.7	8.7
U.S.S.R.	5.4	3.7	4.9	4.3	3.9	3.5	1.4	0.7
All others	23.0	10.6	17.0	13.2	12.0	14.0	32.4	26.3

Max Weston Thornberg, Grahon Spry and George Soule, Turkey: An Economic Appraisal (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1949), p. 282.

ANNEX II

TURKEY'S IMPORT OR EXPORT BALANCE WITH OTHER
COUNTRIES, 1928 and 1938

Based on Annex I

ANNEX III

PRODUCTION AND EXPORT TO GERMANY OF CERTAIN METAL ORES

year	Antimony		Chrome Ore		Copper		Manganese Ore	
	production	to Germany	production	to Germany	production	to Germany	production	to Germany
1935	122	120	148,096	54,154	—	—	25,500	—
1936	562	748	161,292	70,567	—	—	5,100	—
1937	643	206	189,468	65,070	700	—	522	—
1938	580	50	210,256	68,463	2,200	—	3,000	—
1939	660	(est.)	210,000	104,156	5,900	—	600	—

T U R K E Y

Lead Ore	
year	production
1935	7,800
1936	9,400
1937	9,600
1938	9,800
1939	—

N. Montchiloff, Ten Years of Controlled Trade in South-Eastern Europe National Institute of Economic and Social Research Occasional Papers, (Cambridge University Press, 1944), VI, Appendix I.

ANNEX IV

PRODUCTION AND EXPORT TO GERMANY OF CEREALS, TOBACCO, COTTON AND HEMP

Turkey	year	WHEAT		BARLEY		MAIZE	
		pro- duction	to Germany	pro- duction	to Germany	pro- duction	to Germany
1930- 34	2,534,600			1,520,700		482,100	All cereals Turkey to Germany
1935	2,521,000	34,179		1,372,000	20,493	456,000	50,187
1936	3,853,300	6,000		2,153,600		684,700	93,884
1937	3,619,300	60,660		2,195,700	41,666	558,000	151,757
1938	4,248,300			2,408,500	61,130	603,500	155,000
1939	4,607,900			2,295,200		714,100	(est.)

		TOBACCO		COTTON		HEMP	
		pro- duction	to Germany	pro- duction	to Germany	pro- duction	to Germany
1930- 34	282,900			38,400	unknown	24,300	no export 7,100
1935	216,000			36,000	9,965	52,200	15,405
1936	448,000			74,100	10,581	51,100	16,167
1937	361,800	28,560		63,900	10,840	64,700	8,420
1938	448,500			53,200	10,500	66,300	3,600
1939	426,300						

Montchiloff. Appendix II.

ANNEX V
DISTRIBUTION OF VALUE OF TRADE

Country	1937	1938
	per cent of total exports	
Germany	37	43
United States	14	12
United Kingdom	7	3
Italy	5	10
	per cent of total imports	
Germany	42	47
United States	15	10
United Kingdom	6	11
Italy	5	5

Balance of Payments Yearbook, 1938, 1939, 1947 (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 1949), pp. 322-326.

ANNEX VI
GERMAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS
TO TURKEY

Year	Imports	Exports
		in millions of reichmarks
1932	40.1	31.0
1933	37.9	36.3
1934	67.5	50.9
1935	93.4	67.3
1936	118.5	79.4
1937	97.8	111.1

DGFP, V, No. 545, 29 June 1938, p. 723.

CHAPTER V

THE ANGLO-TURKISH DECLARATION OF 12 MAY 1939

Of critical importance to the Turkish government in arranging an agreement of mutual assistance with Britain was the Soviet Union. Saracoglu had taken pains to indicate to the British the need for Soviet participation in the final treaty¹ and refused to sign until agreement with the Russians was concluded.² In the first place, Turkey believed she was bound through her treaties with the Soviets to include them in the Anglo-Turkish negotiations. Of more importance was the simple fact that without Soviet involvement, Turkey feared a renewed Russian effort to control the Straits, and she was hesitant to stand too strongly in the Balkans without Russia behind her.³ The British were sympathetic to the Turkish request, since they were fully cognizant of what Halifax referred to as the "most delicate and difficult" problem, that of securing Soviet participation in continental security.⁴

The Soviets from 1917 to the mid 1920's had been persona non grata to most of Western Europe. They were, therefore, forced to seek their own form of security system. Thus in February, they proposed a Black Sea Pact with the Turks and Rumanians against the Axis, but the latter, near war with the Soviets over Bessarabia, refused to participate.⁵ It was perhaps characteristic of the zigzag Soviet foreign policy that the Russians began to pursue another approach to their

security problem. On 17 April 1939 Alexei Merekalov, who had been Soviet Ambassador to Berlin since June 1939, approached Baron Ernst von Weizsäcker, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, and presented a Soviet proposal for Soviet-Nazi collaboration. The meeting took place while the British were in Moscow seeking to fulfill their promise to the Turks to seek an accord with Russia.⁶ Nevertheless, the Soviet government requested a meeting with the Turks to be held at Batum on 1 May in order to discuss the mutual assistance arrangements among the British, French, Turks and themselves, which had the prospect of developing into a four-way agreement as the Turks had desired.⁷ The Turkish leaders were interested in an agreement with the Russians which would cover grounds of their common interest: the Balkans and the Black Sea, but not to be as extensive as the agreement desired with Great Britain.⁸ This plan was altered, however, and it was decided that Vladimar P. Potemkin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, would visit Ankara⁹ stopping briefly in Bulgaria on the way. Potemkin arrived in Ankara on 29 April, remaining until 5 May.¹⁰

Despite feigned approval of the Anglo-Turkish talks and Turkish actions with regard to the Balkans, and despite promises of Soviet support in settling the Bulgarian-Rumanian difficulty,¹¹ Saracoglu reported to Knatchbull-Hugessen that "Potemkin left the impression that the Soviets felt isolated and were suspicious that they were being intentionally kept at arm's length. This feeling led to a large degree of mistrust."¹² The conversations were totally fruitless, although

however, pass through the Straits except in execution of obligations under the Covenant of the League, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey."¹⁵ Therefore, if Turkey guaranteed Rumania, the British would be in a position to render aid. Halifax stated the British position that "One of our original objects in entering into the present negotiations with the Turkish government was to put us in as good a position as possible to implement our guarantee to Rumania, in as much as, owing to the Montreux convention, it is only when Turkey is a belligerent that Great Britain can send armed assistance to Rumania by sea."¹⁶ This, of course, affected Germany as well as Russia's dispute with Rumania.

This realization that the Montreux Convention could limit British and French aid to the Little Entente offered a strong motivation for Berlin to pressure Ankara to maintain her neutrality, and this became the key-note of Germany's policy toward Turkey. The representative of this policy was Franz von Papen, who through experience well understood Turkish thinking. His mission was to assure that the negotiations between Turkey and the Allies failed.

The Germans had spent a considerable amount of effort and time trying to obtain the Turk's acceptance of Papen who had served with the Turkish forces in Palestine during the First World War. His reputation, however, like those of many German officers, was not held in high esteem by the Turks who consistently refused his appointment.¹⁷ Not until 27 April

it was agreed that Saracoglu would visit Moscow in September to continue the talks. It later became evident that Potemkin's purpose was not to "harmonize Soviet-Turkish policy,"¹³ but to form a "block of neutral Balkan states," and to alienate them from the French,¹⁴ a policy favored by Germany with whom a growing friendship was rapidly developing.

The failure of the Potemkin-Saracoglu meeting to arrive at any conclusive agreement for their mutual security served to underscore the reality of the Turkish predicament in the ensuing power struggle taking place all about her. Throughout the Eastern Mediterranean Italy was active, and in the Balkans not only Italian but Bulgarian revisionist plans offered a serious threat to the Republic. German economic pressure was increasing throughout the Balkans and in Turkey. Russia certainly could not be ignored in these developments, although during the spring of 1939 she stood to lose as much as Turkey should Rumania and the Black Sea fall under Axis domination.

Turkey's geographic position, however, did afford her enormous strategic and political power through her control of the Straits, which was the key to Allied promises of aid to Poland and Rumania. But conversely, it also represented to the Third Reich the final and most important link in Allied "encirclement" and was thus a possible target for Nazi aggression. But of central concern to the Great Powers was Article 19 of the Treaty of Montreux which stated that "vessels of war belonging to belligerent powers shall not,

1939 was he accepted, and even then he was greeted with "scant enthusiam."¹⁸

Papen's task was enormous in any terms. He was to finalize Turkish neutrality and, thereby, do all in his power to prevent the final link in the "encirclement ring" which Ribbentrop had said would definitely be the causus belli for new world hostilities.¹⁹ Furthermore, because of the Reich's dependence upon Turkish chrome, economic relations had to be preserved. The task before Papen was greatly aggravated by Italian belligerence and the supreme effort by the Allies to block any improvement in Nazi-Turkish relations.

Papen's mission was confirmed by Hitler himself in a final meeting just prior to the Ambassador's departure from Germany. He was to assure the Turks that Germany only wanted to maintain the status quo and do her utmost to avoid a European war. But Papen realized a need for convincing proof from Germany that Rome offered no threat to Balkan or Turkish interests.²⁰ It was to this end that Papen began a lone and fruitless campaign for the next five months to elicit support from the German government.

The Italian threat and the issue of encirclement dominated all discussion between the German Ambassador and the Turkish leaders upon his arrival in Ankara on 27 April. On the issue of encirclement, Papen expressed his government's "irritation" and feeling that if it became a fait accompli through an agreement between Turkey, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, then the "ardent partisan of peace, Herr Hitler, would find

himself in an extraordinary state of exasperation."²¹ Then, in the spirit of his mission, he offered a bribe to Saracoglu in the form of increased military aid, which Turkey was desperately attempting to obtain from Britain,²² in exchange for Turkey's assurances of neutrality.²³

As to the Italian threat to Turkey, Sarcoglu admitted to Papen the key role Rome played in determining Turkey's future attitude.²⁴ The German Ambassador, in the hope of reassuring Turkey concerning the Axis' peaceful intentions, offered to exact a verbal declaration of friendship from Italy.²⁵ Despite Papen's claims that the Axis was solid but that Germany "called the tune," Saracoglu refused the offer on the grounds that the period for words was over.²⁶

Nevertheless, Papen immediately telegraphed to Berlin indicating the necessity of an unequivocal statement from Mussolini, and an official conversation between the Duce and Turkish Ambassador in Rome.²⁷ Weizsäcker, however, believed Turkey's distrust of Italy was too great for such a declaration to have any affect.²⁸ Papen agreed but suggested that since mobilization of the Turkish armed forces in 1926 and 1931, as a result of speeches by the Duce, and in 1935 before the Abyssinian campaign had cost more than £30 million, a cost Turkey could not continue to provide, some positive overtures on the part of the Axis powers might allay Turkish suspicions. He suggested that the Italians should reduce troop concentrations in Albania²⁹ and that Berlin should make a positive statement on the Balkan Pact.³⁰

On 1 May, the German Ambassador in Italy, Hans von Mackensen, explained to Ciano Turkey's attitude and asked for a declaration by Mussolini. Ciano, however, also felt that a declaration would be worthless. He further stated that this entire matter was "not of decisive importance. For . . . once he had made Albania the 'bastion'. . . then the complete dependence of the Balkan states on the Axis powers would be assured."³¹ Ciano did become increasingly concerned, however, as intelligence reported the near completion of Anglo-Turkish talks. On 3 May he altered his position somewhat and called the Turkish Ambassador to Italy, Hussain Ragip Baydur, for talks on the matter of the relationship between their two countries. The Italian Minister attempted personally to reassure the Ambassador that "relations between herself and Turkey were governed . . . by the existing treaties and could solemnly declare that Italy was pursuing no designs, either political, economic or even territorial, which could be taken as endangering Turkey."³²

It soon became obvious to Papen that after only a couple of weeks in Turkey all his efforts to satisfy the Turks on the Italian question by seeking a detente were useless.³³ His attempts to cajol the Turks to remain neutral or to accept responsibility for increasing the chances of war had had little effect.³⁴ He was simply unable to alter the fact that "Italian entry into Albania was the cause for Turkish policy with the West. . . ."³⁵ Thus, Papen, who had come to Ankara optimistically proclaiming that he believed he was not too late to

restore Turkey's strict neutrality,³⁶ was forced to concede to Berlin that "efforts to restore the situation have been unsuccessful."³⁷

The British and Turks were continuing their talks during late April and early May with the view to finalizing a joint declaration which was to be given publicly by both governments as soon as agreement could be reached. Most of the problems concerning this phase of the treaty discussions concerned phraseology and form rather than the content of the declaration.³⁸

The French, meanwhile, were pressing for their equal involvement in the discussions to which the Turks initially concurred.³⁹ However, the British feared a tripartite declaration would present a formidable impression of encirclement to the Axis which His Majesty's Government wished to avoid. Britain, therefore, favored bilateral treaties.⁴⁰ Furthermore, England was aware that negotiations regarding the Hatay were still prejudicing Franco-Turkish relations,⁴¹ and she was concerned over further delays wishing to complete negotiations with the utmost speed.⁴² The French, however, stressed the need to reflect the unified strength of the Allies which would be fostered through a tripartite arrangement.⁴³

Agreement was finally reached to make the Anglo-Turkish declaration on Wednesday, 10 May between two and four p.m. British Summertime.⁴⁴ But Halifax delayed the declaration, ostensibly on the grounds that a parliamentary problem existed.⁴⁵ He rescheduled it for Friday, 12 May at the latest.⁴⁶ The decision on the part of the British to change their original

thinking and include the French was based on two factors: first, the British conceded that a tripartite arrangement would serve to forstall any ideas the Axis might hold that the two governments were not in complete accord⁴⁷ and thus would prevent their exploiting Anglo-French disunity,⁴⁸ and second, the French assured England that they were trying to remove some of the causes of Turkish complaints over Hatay.⁴⁹

By this time, the Hatay not only figured in Franco-Turkish relations, and hence Anglo-Turkish relations, but in Ankara's relations with Berlin as well. The Turkish government had made settlement of the issue the prerequisite for the conclusion of a mutual declaration with France, but Paris considered a pact of mutual assistance a quid pro quo for settlement of the Hatay question because she was concerned about her relationship with Rumania and access to the Straits. Germany, on her side, was doing all in her power to prevent a settlement of the issue because they viewed it as the final step in Allied plans for encirclement. Berlin thus threatened economic and political measures and further intimated to Ankara that they would support Italian aspirations regarding Syria if Turkey deviated from her policy of strict neutrality.⁵⁰

Ankara had to confirm her talks to the Germans but attempted to appease them by promising they would not conclude a general treaty of assistance with any Great Power.⁵¹ Great Britain, in the meanwhile, began an active campaign to secure a Franco-Turk settlement over the Hatay in order to bring about a rapid conclusion of their own negotiations and thereby

open the Straits. This would, they believed, effectively present a united front to the Axis Powers. Little success, however, greeted the Allied talks prompting Knatchbull-Hugessen to wire Halifax on 8 May that a crise de confiance existed between the French and the Turks, who were claiming poor treatment from the French; while the latter said the Turks had "acted like children."⁵² The main difficulties were France's unwillingness to turn over certain villages in the Hatay until after termination of the mandate,⁵³ and the question of frontier guarantees. Saracoglu, extremely perturbed, expressed the Turkish feeling that the French were arguing over a few villages when Turkey was offering the whole of her manhood to cooperate with the West.⁵⁴

The problem involved more than simple arguments, however. It seems possible that part of the motivation behind Turkish recalcitrance was the desire to avoid a tripartite declaration at this time,⁵⁵ perhaps for the very reason the British had originally refused: to prevent any impression in Germany that Turkey was involved in an encirclement policy. Ankara, therefore, probably used the Hatay issue, as a delaying tactic, for despite British attempts to assure the Turks that they would use all their influence to arrive at some arrangement over Hatay,⁵⁶ and despite French assurances that they would give Turkey satisfaction on the point at issue to ensure agreement,⁵⁷ the Turkish proposal for settlement was too extreme for the French. The Turks demanded the cession of Hatay by 1 June⁵⁸ "with its present frontiers,"⁵⁹ and as a

result there was a temporary break-off of the negotiations. When, however, an agreement was reached on the basis of simply changing the date of cession to 20 June, Saracoglu suddenly informed Knatchbull-Hugessen that his government had changed its mind. Coming only one hour after the respective governments had been notified of the agreement, his excuse was based on lack of confidence in French assurances.⁶⁰

René Masigli, the French Ambassador to Ankara, was "furious" over the Turkish action and broke off all negotiations, which left no choice but to proceed with the plans for bilateral declarations. The first would be with the British and the second with the French when arrangements were concluded on the Hatay. Saracoglu's reaction was subdued as he told Knatchbull-Hugessen that Turkey would have no pride about taking the initiative in opening new discussions.⁶¹ Negotiations were reopened following the 12 May declarations which supported the contention that Turkey used the issue to prevent a tripartite arrangement. The delay, however, also served to weaken French resistance to Turkey's demand for complete cession of Hatay as Paris was becoming more and more anxious to formalize Turkish support for the Allied cause.

Friday, 12 May thus arrived without the hoped-for Franco-Turkish agreement. So at 3:45 P.M. British Summertime,⁶² Neville Chamberlain announced to the House of Commons that Great Britain and Turkey had signed a provisional agreement declaring their joint concern for security in the Mediterranean and Balkan areas and that in the event of an act of war in the

Mediterranean area, Great Britain and Turkey would be "prepared to cooperate effectively and lend each other all aid and assistance in their power."⁶³ In Ankara, the Turkish Prime Minister announced the provisional agreement to the National Assembly by saying that "Turkey considered that the best way to avert war was to associate with the countries united for peace," and for this reason he asked ratification of this agreement directed against none and nourishing no claims of encirclement but designed rather to ward off the catastrophe of war.⁶⁴

So far as the British were concerned, they believed that the largest obstacle had been successfully surmounted. The joint declaration would officially, though not yet securely, bind Turkey to the Allied cause. London was certain that Allied access to the Black Sea would avert German aggression in Poland, Rumania or Greece. The next stage of the negotiations would result in an interim understanding. The third stage would consist of meetings of experts in London to deal with all military and economic questions, and the fourth stage would be the signing of the formal treaty which would rapidly follow.⁶⁵

In reality, however, this was the beginning of a whole new series of problems which threatened to negate any feeling of security Ankara might have gained as a result of the agreement with the British. Of particular concern was the fear of a "merciless policy of reaction by Germany such as cutting off of material or of markets."⁶⁶ Fortunately, the Soviet Union greeted the pact with praise claiming it to be

". . . a valuable investment in the cause of world peace."⁶⁷
But Germany did do what was feared. She harshly assailed the pact⁶⁸ but seemed particularly upset with the Turkish parliament's simultaneous ratification of the credit of 150 million marks offered in January.⁶⁹

Papen wrote to the ministry in Berlin on 13 May that Germany still had a chance to negate the pact if they would act to remove the Italian threat to Turkey.⁷⁰ But the German High Command saw instead the need to muster as much pressure as they could to bear down on Turkey and force her to maintain her neutral status. The means at Germany's disposal were economic.

The obvious German pressure began as early as 3 May when it appeared certain that Turkey would sign with the Allies. On that day, Weizsäcker under instruction from Field Marshal Göring distributed a memorandum calling for the withholding of a shipment of 624 cm. guns for "reasons of Turkey's present political attitude." Hitler agreed with Göring but desired that some excuse be found to cover the real motive of the move.⁷¹ Turkey's fears of German economic retaliation thus became real and menacing for the number of contracts for war materials from firms in Germany and the protectorates amounted to over 124,592,000 marks as of 1 May 1939. Guarantees of payments to German firms stood at 16 million marks and to protectorate firms £1,123,000, while 14,500,000 marks was outstanding for material already delivered. The value of war material already in transit was 6,486,000 marks. Therefore,

although the immediate loss to Germany (guarantees and payments outstanding) was 70,468,000 marks.⁷² the Reich was in a much better position to suffer the loss, since in long-range terms, the damage to Turkey's military development was irreparable.

There were three steps which the Reich was preparing to take in their reaction against the Turkish-British declaration. These were drawn up in a memorandum on 4 May by Carl Clodius, Deputy Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry. First, there was the proposal to maintain current trade (aside from certain arms limitations) but to begin restrictions in September, a time when Turkey was most concerned with exporting commodities, particularly to Germany. Second, the Germans proposed to delay negotiations for the renewal of the German-Turkish Trade and Payments Treaty of 25 July 1938 which would expire on 21 August 1939 and would be due for renewal in June.⁷³ And finally, Germany would notify the Turks that she believed it inopportune to bring the credit agreement on 16 January 1939 into force.⁷⁴ These last two actions would not only remove greatly needed funds but would have the effect of keeping the Turkish government in suspense thereby hopefully bringing her around to the German viewpoint. The only restriction on these proposals was that a number of important contracts in the process of negotiation⁷⁵ should be carried through since their loss to Germany's economic position vis-a-vis Turkey would be damaging.

As the middle of May drew by, the effects of the Anglo-Turkish declaration were becoming painfully clear to Germany

and Italy, and both German and Italian diplomats were weighing the effects of the accord in terms of Germany's ability to meet the Allies in the Middle East. Otto von Henting, Chief of Division Pol. VII (Near and Middle Eastern Affairs), in a memorandum 22 May to Ribbentrop, concluded that there was no possibility for German activity in Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Syria. Germany could no longer use Turkish territory to attack British communications leading from India via Iraq and Palestine. King Ibn Saud was no longer dependent on outside funds because of his income from oil resources, and Italy had no chance for carrying on activity in Saudi Arabia.⁷⁶ In fact, the Italian invasion of Albania and Italian colonization in Libya had completely destroyed the symbolic role of protector of Islam which Mussolini had received when he was awarded the "sword of Islam" outside Tripoli on 18 March 1937. Thus any possibility of Arab support for Italian activity in the Middle East was destroyed.⁷⁷

The Italian Ambassador to Berlin, Bernardo Attolico, also interpreted Germany's position as having greatly altered to her disadvantage. Since despite German experts, professors, instructors and military missions which had played such a large role in Turkish civil and military affairs, Germany would now, he believed, have little success in pressuring Turkey as England now could replace Germany in the economic field and France in the military arena.⁷⁸ The Italian Ambassador, however, overestimated the resources of the two Allies and their ability to replace what had taken Germany decades to develop.

Nevertheless, Papen who perhaps had the deepest insight into the seriousness of the political and strategic loss to Germany coming from the declaration, believed it was not too late and expressed the need to "lead Turkey back to her previous attitude of strict neutrality if we are not to be faced, in a possible conflict, with a very unfavorable military-political situation from the outset. . . ." And, since Papen still viewed Turkey's attitude to be based upon the "fear of losing her European position," if Italy gave the assurance that this was not threatened, Turkey would then have "no reason for continuing her alliance policy with Britain."⁷⁹

It was perhaps because of Papen's frustration over the lack of response to his requests for an Italian pledge that he took it upon himself to see Ciano while in Berlin for the signing of the German-Italian Alliance of 22 May 1939.⁸⁰ Although Ciano listened to Papen he immediately complained to Ribbentrop who chastised the German Ambassador.⁸¹ Mussolini also resisted this suggestion, and on 30 May, he indicated the necessity of taking over the entire Balkan and Danubian area immediately after the first hours of war, noting: "By this lightening-like operation which is to be carried out decisively, not only the 'guaranteed states' like Greece, Rumania and Turkey would be out of the fight, but one would also protect one's back. . . ."⁸²

It appears though that the pressure of the Anglo-Turkish accord acted strongly upon the Italians to complete the German-Italian Treaty. Mario Toscano in The Origins of the Pact of

Steel, states that at the time, several Italian diplomats acknowledged that the Anglo-Turkish negotiations hastened Mussolini's decision to sign the pact.⁸³

It is apparent that the German moves were partially successful. They did have the effect of frightening the Turks, who depended almost totally on trade with Germany, and until final settlement with the British over the mutual assistance treaty and British pledges of aid, the Republic could not afford to lose German trade. The Turkish retaliatory threats to Germany were, therefore, only a matter of pride. On 5 June the Turkish Ambassador to Berlin called on Weizsäcker to complain about the refusal to deliver war consignments for which payment had already been made.⁸⁴ Concurrently in Ankara, Saracoglu argued with Papen over Turkey's pact with Great Britain. The German Ambassador, in lieu of any concrete statement from the Italians, reminded Saracoglu of Ciano's assurances of 3 May.⁸⁵ Whereupon the Turkish Minister threatened a reduction in chrome deliveries and the suspension of debt payments if war materials were not delivered.⁸⁶ Within two days, however, Numan met with Papen and softened his government's position somewhat by proclaiming that according to the Turkish interpretation of the Anglo-Turkish Pact, Turkey was bound solely in the Mediterranean, while any Polish-British-German conflict would not affect Turkey's neutrality as long as it was restricted to the north. Later, İnönü carried this another step by telling Papen that Turkey needed a strong independent Germany in the center of Europe and would never do anything to weaken Germany's position.⁸⁷

But in a veiled threat to Papen, İnönü said he would not permit the press to carry news of the German economic suspension. The British, he said, had made a similar move in 1914 by withholding two dreadnaughts when Turkey was still neutral contributing substantially to the decision to enter the war against Britain. The public still had not forgotten this and he, therefore, feared a similar response should they learn of the true situation.⁸⁸

Saracoglu was finally compelled, however, to take measures to counter the German policy if only to save face. He issued instructions not to renew contracts of Germans employed in Turkish public or semi-public undertakings.⁸⁹ This, of course, had no real political effect. Rather, representatives of the Turkish government continued to question various political and economic persons in the Reich as to when negotiations on the Turko-German Trade Treaty would begin and when war material might again be shipped.⁹⁰ Thus the Turkish threats served only to clarify the effects of the German policy upon the Republic. Papen was able to report on 12 June that the German policy of "in suspenso" was making Turkey very nervous and she was constantly trying to get a definition of future German-Turkish relations.⁹¹

While the German economic measures were developing, another problem arose which further complicated the Turkish position. It was centered around the Balkan nations, which, as a key to European security and particularly to Turkish security, had been one of the original causes for the Anglo-Turkish discussions.

Turkey from the beginning had refused to make a statement in support of London's guarantees to Greece and Rumania in spite of the leading role Turkey played in the Balkan Pact and the importance of Balkan security to her own welfare. Her reasoning, again, developed as a result of the expected effect such support would have on the status of the Straits and, therefore, on her relations with both Germany and the Soviet Union. The Turkish government did offer to improve, or neutralize the Bulgarian situation⁹² and offered their good offices to end the Dobrudja conflict between Rumania and Bulgaria with hopes of ultimately bringing the latter into the Balkan Pact. It was explained to Britain that such action "would strengthen the morale of the Balkan Pact nations and offer an element of resistance to German pressure creating a solid block south of the Danube."⁹³

This process of actually strengthening the solidarity of the Balkan Pact began when the Rumanian Foreign Minister, Gregoire Gafencu, visited Istanbul from 23-26 April and concluded a procès-verbal with the Turks containing seven points of agreement on Balkan policy. Both governments agreed to reinforce the Entente against the "growing menace," to pursue a friendly policy toward Bulgaria by inviting her to collaborate with the Entente in the economic and cultural spheres, and to pursue a prudent policy to maintain peace. Although if either were threatened by domination, they agreed to act together to organize the Balkans into a block. In an attempt to appease Britain, Turkey agreed that if Rumania were forced to take military action, she would remain neutral but permit

passage of ships coming to her aid through the Dardanelles.⁹⁴ An important step had, therefore, been taken toward satisfying the British demand for guarantees from Turkey and the development of a common Balkan front. This also pleased France who had alliances with Rumania and Yugoslavia and was working on the development of her own security system there.⁹⁵

The first sign that a serious problem was brewing in the Balkans, however, arose just prior to the May declaration when the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister told the Rumanian Minister in Belgrade that the Turkish decision to join Britain in a joint declaration was contrary to the Balkan Council's decision of 20 February 1939 at Bucharest not to join ideological groups. The Yugoslavian government threatened to make a "grave decision" if the present course were followed.⁹⁶

This opinion was again repeated by Yugoslavia following the declaration when Rumanian and Yugoslavian ministers met at Orsovo to discuss the event. Gafencu disagreed with the Yugoslavs that the declaration placed the Balkans in one of the two camps. He did agree that the reference to the Balkans in Paragraph 6 of the declaration, which announced the necessity of ensuring the establishment of security in the Balkans,⁹⁷ was unnecessary because the British assurances and the Balkan Entente were enough security.⁹⁸

England, meanwhile, renewed her pressure for some definite assurances by the Turks to Greece and Rumania making them the sine qua non for success of the staff talks which were scheduled to begin soon in London.⁹⁹ But with the new Yugoslav

and Rumanian expressions of opposition and the strengthening German pressures, Aras concluded it unwise to support so brazenly the Allied effort. An excuse was found in the Turkish Protocol of 17 December 1929 which prolonged the Turco-Soviet Treaty of 17 December 1925 and forbade a political agreement between Turkey and any other state in the neighborhood of Russia. Thus, Turkey could not make a unilateral declaration by supporting Great Britain's guarantees.¹⁰⁰

Gafencu returned to Ankara in June for further talks with Aras. Both paid particular attention to Paragraph 6. The Rumanian Minister did express his government's complete support of the Anglo-Turk Treaty except insofar as the treaty pertained to any further development of Paragraph 6. His government's reservations were based on the belief that the paragraph would draw Yugoslavia out of the Balkan Entente and into a Hungarian-Yugoslavian-Italian combination. Hungary was already pressing Yugoslavia to this end, which would be serious for Rumania. Gafencu thus begged that Turkey not make any open declaration arising out of Paragraph 6. His government wanted Turkish support for the British declarations to be secret.¹⁰¹ This, of course, suited the Turks in view of their own fears of making any public statement in support of the British declarations.

The behind-the-scenes intrigues surrounding Gafencu's visit bore witness to the Rumanian Minister's fears. Involved were the Bulgarian and Hungarian Ministers in Ankara¹⁰² as well as the Germans. The latter were attempting to force

the Greek government to press for modifications of Paragraph 6 in the Franco-Turkish declaration which was expected at any time. Behind the German threat was the intimation that Yugoslavia would leave the Balkan Entente should there be no modification.¹⁰³ But the German pressure had already affected the Rumanian delegation since unbeknown to the Allies was the fact that Gafencu, though an unwilling agent, was speaking in part because of German pressure. In a telegram dated 13 June, Papen told the Foreign Ministry that "in any case, I have the impression that Gafencu has conducted his conversations here in accordance with our expectations especially as otherwise the solidarity of the Balkan Pact would be endangered."¹⁰⁴ On that same day, Papen saw Numan and told him in succinct terms that Ankara's willingness to forgo inclusion of the Balkan Pact in the Anglo-Turkish mutual agreement would be used as a test of the sincerity of the Turkish desire to maintain friendly relations with Germany.¹⁰⁵ Weizsäcker, however, told Papen three days later to be much more forceful in dealing with the Turks, commenting, "you are . . . requested to make it perfectly clear in Ankara that in any case we expect Paragraph 6 of the Declaration of 12 May to be deleted from the Franco-Turkish Declaration."¹⁰⁶ It is obvious with what gravity Berlin viewed the inclusion of Balkan security in the Anglo-Turk and Franco-Turk discussions and with what compulsion they sought to have Paragraph 6 removed.

German success was rapidly achieved since the British found themselves hindered on every side, including the Turkish

from building as extensive a security system as they had envisioned. They had originally viewed the paragraph as a means to avoid any impression that the Anglo-Turkish Declaration was limited to the Mediterranean area. But frustration over the delay and the ill effect the entire issue was having over other aspects of their negotiations with the Turkish government finally resulted in Halifax's decision on 5 July to notify the Yugoslav, Greek and Rumanian governments that there would be no repetition of the paragraph in any further agreements with Turkey.¹⁰⁷ It was believed by British government circles that if Turkey were at least committed to the idea of Balkan security then the purpose of the paragraph was achieved.¹⁰⁸

Of great delight to almost everyone concerned was the completion of negotiations on 23 June 1939 and the subsequent settlement of the Franco-Turkish dispute over Hatay. The treaty involved a compromise which enabled Turkey to play the three Great Powers against each other and reap the rewards by annexing Hatay.¹⁰⁹ On 29 June the Assembly of the Republic of Hatay met for the last time. On 13 July the Ankara Agreement was ratified, and on 23 July the French flag was removed and Hatay ceased formally to exist becoming the 63 Vilayet of the Turkish Republic.

The French did move to lessen the effect of the loss on the Syrian population. Articles 3 and 4 of the Treaty gave all citizens of the Hatay above the age of 18 the right to opt for Syrian or Lebanese nationality. Article 7 contained Turkish recognition of the new frontier,¹¹⁰ but after the

years of anger and dissention, criticism did not end with formal annexation by Turkey. In France and Syria many opposed the move. Dr. Abdur-Rahaan Shahbandar issued a manifesto declaring 23 June as a national day of mourning until the Sanjak was recovered.¹¹¹ But the most vocal of the protests came from Italy which sent a note to the French government on 10 July which stated: "Italy, in her quality as a power which participated in the assignment of mandates has the honour to make all and fullest reservations regarding the contents of the said agreement which was negotiated and concluded without her knowledge or consent and appears in evident contrast to the objectives of the mandate and the will of the interested populations. . . ."¹¹² Once more, dreams of empire and desire for an equal footing with the Great Powers, particularly in Mediterranean affairs, remained illusive to the Italians.

FOOTNOTES

¹ DBFP, V, No. 199, enclosure 2, 17 April 1939, pp. 226-27; No. 239, 21 April 1939, p. 259; No. 286, 26 April 1939, pp. 335-36.

² Ibid., V, No. 287, 26 April 1939, p. 336.

³ New York Times, 25 April 1939, p. 11, col. 3.

⁴ William R. Rock, Appeasement on Trial (n.p.: Archon, 1966), p. 262;. İnönü who is considered to have been more pro-Soviet than his predecessor, still had a great respect for the realities of Russian power and historical goals. He told General Maxime Weygand, who visited with him in May 1939 that Russian participation in hostilities was absolutely imperative on the ground that it would be disastrous if the Russian army alone were left intact at the end of a European war. DBFP, V, No. 400, 6 May 1939, p. 452.

⁵ Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During WW II," U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin, 19 No. 472 (1948), 63; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939-1941 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954), p. 16;. Rome strongly protested Moscow's attempt to create a Balkan block because she regarded herself as the dominant power in the Balkans and was determined to prevent Russian influence in the area. Dallin, p. 173.

⁶ Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, ed., Raymond Sontag

and James Beddie (Washington: U.S. Dept. of State, 1948), 17 April 1939, p. 1; hereafter referred to as NSR.

⁷ DBFP, V, No. 239, 21 April 1939, p. 259.

⁸ Ibid., V, No. 287, 26 April 1939, p. 336.

⁹ Ibid. No. 262, 23 April 1939, p. 287.

¹⁰ Beloff, II, 240.

¹¹ DBFP, V, No. 318, 5 May 1939, pp. 433-34; Potemkin told Massigli during their meeting on 30 April that during his stop in Bulgaria the Prime Minister had told him that subject to the return of southern Dobrudja, Bulgaria would be ready to join the Balkan Entente. The Turks met this with skepticism. Ibid., V, No. 322, 30 April 1939, p. 380.

¹² Ibid., V, No. 379, 5 May 1939, pp. 434-35.

¹³ Ibid., V, No. 322, 30 April 1939, p. 380.

¹⁴ Dallin, p. 108; Frederick Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, found out on 5 June that Potemkin was sent to Ankara in a great hurry to prevent Turkey from signing with the English and thus his delaying tactics while in Ankara. Schulenberg reported the Soviets were not opposed in principle to an English-Turkish agreement but considered it important that Turkey should not "dash ahead, but should act at the same time and in the same manner as the Soviet Union." NSR, 5 June 1939, p. 20.

¹⁵ "The Montreux Convention," Article 19, Hurewitz, p. 201.

¹⁶ Halifax further stated that this was the sine qua non for success of the staff talks soon to begin with Turkey as part of their negotiations for the mutual assistance treaty. DBFP, V, No. 537, 17 May 1939, p. 575.

¹⁷ Kemal was the first to refuse Papen as early as March 1939, Newsweek, 20 June 1939, p. 16. The news of Hitler's appointment hit the newspapers with the front-page headline: "Von Papen Will Be Envoy, Drang Nach Osten Feared with Von Papen's Appointment," New York Times, 28 March 1938, p. 1, col.4.

¹⁸ Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen reports that Papen served to promote some of the ill-feeling which developed between Germany and Turkey, but this appears to be a rather simplistic view. Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, Diplomat in Peace and War (London: John Murray, 1949), pp. 144-146; DBFP, V, No. 125, 13 April 1939, p. 354. Papen's account is that he consistently refused to accept the post until following the invasion of Albania when Ribbentrop would no longer accept his refusals. Papen said that he decided he could serve his country better by saving "Germany and the outside world from the threatening catastrophe" than by "putting on my old uniform and fighting a hopeless war on the Siegfried line." Franz von Papen, Memoirs, trans. Brian Connell (New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 443-45.

¹⁹ Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 63.

²⁰ Papen, p. 446.

²¹ DBFP, V, No. 302, 28 April 1939, pp. 354-55.

²² Contains the first German admission that Turkey is in the Allied camp. DBFP, VI, No. 359, 25 April 1939, p. 323.

²³ Ibid., VI, No. 212, 28 April 1939, p. 361.

²⁴ Ibid., VI, No. 286, 28 April 1939, p. 361.

²⁵ DBFP, V, No. 302, 28 April 1939, pp. 354-55.

²⁶ Turkey, who admitted no love for Albania, doubted any Italian assurances because of the enormous amounts of troops and supplies used for occupation. Beginning with 20,000 men, Rome had increased her forces to 72,000 including the heaviest artillery, certainly unnecessary against the Albanians. DBFP, VI, No. 286, 28 April 1939, p. 361;. The Italian Press, furthermore, continued to describe the Balkan Pact as dead. Ibid., VI, No. 315, 3 May 1939, pp. 408-09; Papen, pp. 446-47.

²⁷ Ibid., VI, No. 135, 27 April 1939, p. 262.

²⁸ Ibid., VI, No. 286, 28 April 1939, p. 361.

²⁹ In his memoirs, Papen also states that he suggested the return of two of the small Dodecanese islands lying within Turkey's territorial waters although no record of this exists in the German documents. Papen, pp. 446-47.

³⁰ DGFP, VI, No. 315, 3 May 1939, pp. 408-9. Papen correctly felt that only a complete reorientation of Italy toward the Balkan Pact could render it possible to detach Ankara from her ties with Britain. He suggested that Ribbentrop discuss this during his trip to Rome early in May. However, Weizsäcker ordered this telegram withheld from Ribbentrop who was already in Milan. Ibid., VI, No. 333, 5 May 1939, p. 430.

³¹ Ibid., VI, No. 303, 1 May 1939, p. 395.

³² Ibid., VI, No. 317, 3 May 1939, p. 411; DBFP, V, No. 387, 5 May 1939, p. 339; Galeazzo Ciano, The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943, ed. Hugh Gibson (Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1946), pp. 76-7.

³³ DGFP, VI, No. 336, 6 May 1939, pp. 436-37.

³⁴ Papen suggested that if Turkey delayed signing with Britain, then Berlin would propose Italian entry into the Balkan Pact followed by a guarantee of Balkan boundaries by Germany. DBFP, V, No. 414, 8 May 1939, pp. 463-64.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ DGFP, VI, No. 288, 29 April 1939, p. 364.

³⁷ Ibid., VI, No. 336, 6 May 1939, pp. 436-37.

³⁸ DBFP, V, No. 393, 6 May 1939, p. 446.

³⁹ Ibid., V, No. 396, 6 May 1939, p. 448.

⁴⁰ Ibid., V, No. 405, 7 May 1939, p. 459.

⁴¹ Ibid., V, Telegram 198 (not printed) 7 May 1939, p. 465.

⁴² On 6 May Knatchbull-Hugessen reported to Halifax following the meeting of the Popular Party on 5 May that rumors were spreading that Turkey had concluded a close alliance with Britain; thus there was a need for haste in the declaration. Ibid., V, No. 395, 6 May 1939, p. 447.

⁴³ Ibid., V, No. 446, 10 May 1939, p. 494.

⁴⁴ Ibid., V, No. 444, 10 May 1939, p. 493; Text of Declaration in No. 451, 10 May 1939, p. 497.

⁴⁵ Ibid., V, No. 447, 10 May 1939, p. 494.

⁴⁶ Ibid., V, No. 463, 10 May 1939, p. 504.

⁴⁷ Ibid., V, No. 447, 10 May 1939, p. 494.

⁴⁸ Ibid., V, No. 460, 10 May 1939, p. 502.

⁴⁹ Ibid., V, No. 464, 10 May 1939, p. 504.

⁵⁰ DGFP, VI, No. 3, 15 March 1939, p. 5; Germany informed Ankara that Franco-Turkish negotiations over Hatay were "displeasing" to Berlin as they contradicted the assurances of strict neutrality given by the Turks. Ibid., VI, No. 59, 21 March 1939, p. 68.

⁵¹ Ibid., VI, No. 72, 23 March 1939, p. 84.

52 DBFP, V, No. 415, 8 May 1939, p. 465.

53 The French felt bound by Article 4 of the Syrian Mandate which held France responsible for seeing that no part of the territory be ceded to any foreign power. However, the Permanent Mandate Commission had at its meeting in October 1938 dropped any examination of the events in the Sanjak regarding this article because of passage of the Statute on 29 November 1937. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1938, I, p. 489.

54 DBFP, V, No. 415, 8 May 1939, p. 465.

55 Ibid., V, No. 473, 11 May 1939, p. 516.

56 Ibid., V, No. 494, 12 May 1939, p. 534; Ibid., V, No. 500, 12 May 1939, p. 534.

57 Ibid., V, No. 490, 11 May 1939, p. 526.

58 Ibid., V, No. 505, 12 May 1939, p. 535.

59 Ibid., V, Nos. 478, 479, 482, 11 May 1939, pp. 518-522.

60 Ibid., V, No. 497, 12 May 1939, pp. 632-33.

61 Ibid.; Ibid., V, No. 514, 13 May 1939, p. 534.

62 Ibid., V, No. 500, 12 May 1939, p. 534.

63 For complete text see Great Britain, Parliament. House of Commons, vol. 347, 12 May 1939, pp. 952-953.

- ⁶⁴ DBFP, V, No. 506, 12 May 1939, p. 537.
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., V, No. 456, 10 May 1939, p. 499.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., No. 512, 13 May 1939, p. 548.
- ⁶⁷ Izvestiya, 15 May 1939 in Dallin, p. 106.
- ⁶⁸ "British Turkish Accord, Nazi Policy Guarded by a New Caution," New York Times, 13 May 1939, p. 2, col. 4.
- ⁶⁹ See above Ch. IV, p.89, n. 36.
- ⁷⁰ DGFP, VI, No. 374, 13 May 1939, p. 484.
- ⁷¹ Ibid., VI, No. 321, 3 May 1939, p. 416.
- ⁷² Ibid., VI, No. 435, 24 May 1939, pp. 581-83.
- ⁷³ See above Ch. IV, p. 88.
- ⁷⁴ DGFP, VI, No. 545, 30 May 1939, pp. 610-12.
- ⁷⁵ Ibid.
- ⁷⁶ Ibid., V, No. 422, 22 May 1939, pp. 555-56.
- ⁷⁷ Ibid., VI, No. 211, 18 April 1939, p. 262; Herszowicz, p. 14.
- ⁷⁸ Herszowicz, p. 55.
- ⁷⁹ DGFP, VI, No. 413, 20 May 1939, pp. 544-46. This document includes a detailed analysis of Germany's strength in Turkey and economic assistance.

⁸⁰ Papen, P, 488; Ciano mentioned how Ribbentrop was "influenced by the suggestions of the superficial von Papen and so he believes that the Turkish attitude has been determined by fear of Italy." Thus it appears Papen had reached Ribbentrop's ear if only briefly. Ciano, 21 May 1939, p. 85.

⁸¹ Papen, p. 488.

⁸² Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 63.

⁸³ Mario Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 340.

⁸⁴ DGFP, VI, No. 472, 5 June 1939, p. 633.

⁸⁵ See above p. 138.

⁸⁶ DGFP, VI, No. 475, 5 June 1939, pp. 658-59.

⁸⁷ Papen, p. 450; DGFP, VI, No. 499, 7 June 1939, pp. 658-59.

⁸⁸ DGFP, VI, No. 489, 7 June 1939, pp. 658-59.

⁸⁹ Ibid., VI, No. 512, 12 June 1939, p. 709.

⁹⁰ Ibid., VI, No. 565, 21 June 1939, p. 784.

⁹¹ Ibid., VI, No. 512, 12 June 1939, p. 709.

⁹² DBFP, VI, No. 138, 12 April 1939, pp. 179-80.

⁹³ Ibid., V, No. 163, 14 April 1939, p. 110.

⁹⁴ Ibid., V, No. 278, 26 April 1939, pp. 296-97.

- 95 Weygand, pp. 5-16.
- 96 DBFP, V, No. 440, 10 May 1939, p. 491.
- 97 Parliamentary Debates, 12 May 1939, pp. 953.
- 98 DBFP, V, No. 633, 26 May 1939, pp. 686-687.
- 99 Ibid., V, No. 537, 17 May 1939, p. 575.
- 100 Ibid., VI, No. 64, 15 June 1939, pp. 82-3.
- 101 Gafencu further feared problems with the Soviet Union should Paragraph 6 be pursued. Ibid., VI, No. 39, 13 June 1939, p. 51; The British disagreed with M. Gafencu's analysis of the Yugoslav position feeling she would remain neutral or at least lean toward the peace powers. Ibid., VI, No. 41, 13 June 1939, p. 54. For a complete summary of discussions between Knatchbull-Hugessen and Gafencu, Ibid., VI, No. 53, 14 June 1939, pp. 67-71.
- 102 Ibid., VI, No. 40, 13 June 1939, p. 53.
- 103 Ibid., VI, No. 87, 19 June 1939, p. 101.
- 104 DGFP, VI, No. 513, 13 June 1939, p. 710.
- 105 Ibid., VI, No. 518, 13 June 1939, pp. 714-15.
- 106 Ibid., VI, No. 533, 16 June 1939, pp. 732-33.
- 107 DBFP, VI, No. 238, 5 July 1939, pp. 260-61.

108 Ibid., VI, No. 87, 19 June 1939, p. 101.

109 For complete details of the final Franco-Turkish Treaty and the Hatay Settlement, Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1938, I, 490-92.

110 Ibid.

111 This feeling was further embittered when Armenians, fearing Turkish injustices, fled into Syria. Ibid.

112 DBFP, VI, No. 313, 13 July 1939, p. 346.

CHAPTER VI

THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY OF MUTUAL ASSISTANCE

Following the agreement between France and Turkey over Hatay, Great Britain believed she could pursue with all haste the original negotiations for a treaty of mutual assistance. There were three aspects of the renewed negotiations. The political agreement would include the actual provisions of the treaty. The economic arrangements would deal with financial assistance, specifically military supplies. This phase of the talks was critical from the Republic's standpoint because German aid would have to be replaced by massive assistance from the Allies. The third aspect involved staff conversations which were concerned with basic military plans. It was clear from the start that the success of the political aspects of the negotiations was contingent upon Allied satisfaction of Turkish economic demands.

The French wasted little time in renewing requests that they participate in a tripartite Alliance,¹ and almost immediately after conclusion of the Hatay problem they were again deeply involved in the negotiations. The Turks still maintained their desire for separate but concurrent conversations² but agreed on 12 July, when ratification of their treaty was assured, to proceed with Tripartite discussions although the staff talks were to remain separate.³

The withdrawal or delay of German economic assistance in May was the primary factor behind the economic aspects of the tripartite negotiations, which were important not only to the Turkish government but to the everyday life of many Turks. The Turkish exporters, because of their location along the heavily populated coastal area of Smyrna, stirred considerable public discontent over the loss of German trade,⁴ and this discontent was important in Turkey's decision to refuse further interim discussions until British war material began to arrive. Ankara claimed that morale in Turkey, Greece and Rumania was low because of the heavy shipments of German war materials to Bulgaria and the cessation of German war materials to Turkey, but the Turkish government officials believed that morale would receive an enormous boost should Britain begin immediate shipments.⁵

The British, unfortunately, were in no position to offer much immediate aid.⁶ Aware of the delay this could cause, they were forced to press for rapid conclusion of the staff talks by removing them from political or economic negotiations⁷ in hopes that at least this aspect of the negotiations might be concluded.

The British, however, notified the Turks on 29 June that they were able to grant Turkey credits for defense purposes amounting to £10 million, of which £6 million would be actual military items determined by the Turkish list of priorities. The remaining £4 million depended upon Turkish strategical needs and would be undertaken with the French who, the British believed, were in a better position to supply the Turks. The

loan, however, was made contingent upon a satisfactory agreement in the political negotiations. Thus Turkey could have almost immediate aid, as she requested, if she were willing to reach an immediate political settlement. Furthermore, Knatchbull-Hugessen was told that these credits might be increased to £15 million, but this was to remain confidential until it became definite. London, because of her own financial difficulties, was unable to make any cash loan to support the troubled Turkish currency, and furthermore, such a loan was being considered for the Poles.⁸

Ankara did not accept the British proposal outright. Instead, on 14 July they proposed a long-range eight-point program: (1) £35 million was to be given to Turkey for the military; (2) a £15 million bullion loan was asked for to strengthen the national currency; (3) a credit of £10 million to cover early expenses of point 1 was asked; (4) the £35 million and £10 million were to be long-term loans; (5) Turkey was to have the option of meeting the service charges on the £15 million loan by delivery of tobacco; (6) service on the £10 million and £35 million loans would be made, as had been done with Germany, from the surplus of Turkish exports to Great Britain; (7) if the loans did not divert Turkish trade from Germany to free currency countries, the Allies would adopt counter-measures; (8) Turkey suggested Britain and France come to an agreement as to how both could best meet the requirements.⁹

It appeared that Ankara, frustrated from her failure to obtain any firm promises of enough aid, had finally acted positively to corner the British by enlightening them on the extent of the Republic's needs about which the British government had apparently been somewhat ignorant. Knatchbull-Hugessen wired Halifax that the Turkish problem was so complicated that a Turkish mission would need to be sent to London. He also came to realize, as did the Home Office, the impossibility of divorcing the political from the economic aspects of the Anglo-Turkish discussions.¹⁰

Halifax took some time considering the Turkish proposal, but on 4 August he telegraphed his minister in Paris requesting that France agree to the Turkish proposal because of its vital importance to the negotiations.¹¹ The French reply was immediate and affirmative: they were ready to assist economically because Turkey was the "hub of the entire Balkan operation," and thus her needs should be met first.¹²

Ankara, however, was aware of the time it would take for the two governments to agree on an aid program, but in the meanwhile, the entire Turkish economic structure was being threatened by a rapid increase of imports from Germany which under most favored nation status, was flooding the market. The leaders in Ankara were forced to act fast to counter the move by switching to a free currency system of trade.¹³ To do this, they decided that their foreign trade with the United Kingdom, France and the United States would be conducted on a compensation basis as of 20 August 1939. The United States

agreed, but Great Britain refused thus adding further frustrations to the Ankara government and another block to the faltering negotiations.¹⁴

The British inability to supply the promised assistance was well known by both the Italian ambassador Ottavio de Peppo and Papen who reported it to their respective governments. Both were increasingly skeptical regarding the Anglo-Turkish alliance because of this inability, but also because of uncertainty over the outcome of the Moscow negotiations¹⁵ between the Allies and the Soviets which had begun on 11 August but had been greeted with little fanfare by the Soviets.¹⁶ The Russians by this time actually had written off any chance for an agreement with the Allies and had contacted Berlin on Saturday, 12 August on "the matter of the old German-Soviet political agreements."¹⁷ Papen now believed that if war came and the Germans won an early victory, Turkey could revise her policy since she was not yet bound by written agreement to the Allies. He, therefore, asked some latitude in shipments of war materials in order to prevent total Turkish-German estrangement.¹⁸

By the middle of August, Soviet-German negotiations were but a few days from completion, and Berlin was determined to increase economic pressure on the Turks in a final move to prevent her signing with the British. On 16 August Weizsäcker drafted a memorandum to Kroll on the manner in which the negotiations were to be handled with the Turks on the Trade and Payments Agreement due to expire on 31 August. According

to the instructions, the agreement could be extended provided that satisfactory arrangements could be reached regarding the contracts for war material which Germany wished to cancel. Furthermore, the credit agreement of 16 January 1939 could not be ratified with the 60 million marks of military supplies it contained, and granting Turkey supplies of industrial products in the amount of 90 million marks also was considered undesirable. However, in order to attain the cancellation of war material contracts and continuation of the Trade and Payments negotiations, the Turks could be promised delivery of industrial products in the form of separate credit transactions which could include the Krupp contract for harbor construction at Gulcuk.¹⁹

Kroll met with Numan on 20 August and presented his proposed demands which the latter received with considerable gravity. Although Numan did threaten to cut off chrome shipments, Kroll responded by declaring his government would then have no interest in an extension of the Trade and Payments Agreement. He did offer to extend the agreement for one year on condition his demands were met.²⁰ Further German action was taken on 22 August when Emil Wiehl, Director of the Economic Policy Department of the German Foreign Ministry, instructed the economic ministry that "in order to increase pressure on Turkey, import licenses for Turkish seasonal produce will be quietly withheld. . . ."²¹

In the meantime, Papen had gone to Berlin where he met with Adolf Hitler on 21 August receiving the Führer's permission

to grant Turkey new contracts for delivery of war materials so long as the arms could not be used against Germany.²² Papen thus acted in the belief that he could prevent total estrangement between his government and Ankara, and perhaps actually improve relations by delivering military supplies which the Allies had been unable to do. While Papen was in Berlin, the Nazi-Soviet Pact was initialed.

The news of the conclusion of the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact caused a sensation in Ankara where the Turkish press underlined the importance of the story with dramatic headlines. Information was scarce because most were caught unaware. Only two papers, the Republic and the Vakit, carried any detail on the subject.²³ Many, however, viewed the announcement with reserve because of the manner in which the Soviets had greeted the Declaration of 12 May.²⁴ One of the basic conditions upon which negotiations between Britain and Turkey depended was Russia's inclusion in the agreement. Ankara's foreign policy was thus shaken to the very core by this sudden and awesome turn of events. Turkey could no longer remain both pro-Soviet and pro-Ally. Hitler took the occasion to write Mussolini with great bravado that "Turkey will have to envisage a revision of her previous position."²⁵ The Duce replied that "A new attitude on the part of Turkey would upset all the strategic plans of the French and English in the Eastern Mediterranean."²⁶

England was amazed by the negotiations which had been proceeding in Moscow. She had depended too heavily on the Turks to bridge any gaps which might have existed between

London and Moscow.²⁷ But this turn of events greatly concerned the British who watched as the Turks appeared suddenly to slip away from the Allied side and begin to teeter on the verge of giving in to the German economic demands of 20 August.²⁸

Halifax went so far as to send Knatchbull-Hugessen "arguments" to be used as a means of allaying Turkish fears over the seriousness of the new threat to her security. He further stressed to his Minister the extreme importance of concluding the political agreement with Turkey without further delay explaining that he was seeking arrangements with the French in meeting Turkish financial and economic requirements.²⁹ In addition, he pointed out that London was now ready to make a great sacrifice to retain Turkey in the peace front,³⁰ because "the Anglo-Turkish Alliance is the basis on which the whole of our Mediterranean policy rests."³¹ He asked Knatchbull-Hugessen whether it would be worth-while to send political, naval, and military personages of highest rank to Turkey to help treaty proceedings³² to which the Ambassador responded by pointing out again that it was the economic aspects which were causing delay.³³

Russia's relationship with Great Britain and Turkey revolved around the historical question of the Straits. There still existed a real rivalry and fear on the Soviet's side that Britain would one day come to dominate the Dardanelles. This concern was reinforced in August when the Soviets learned of Britain's intention to establish a naval base for their fleet at Cesme (near Izmir) for the defense of the Straits.

Moscow indicated to Ankara on 20 August her desire to build a base on the Sea of Marmora.³⁴ But this would have served more as a measure to counter British influence than to act in defense of the Straits. It is difficult to ascertain the precise effect of the British plan on Russia's foreign policy, but its influence might have reinforced Moscow's plans to seek an agreement with Berlin, since only two days later they approached the Germans on the idea of political talks.

Russia, however, also held it to be against her interests for Germany to establish herself on the Black Sea, but Russia shared with Germany the immediate objective of excluding Allied influence there. This may be considered one of the chief reasons for the Soviet-German relationship. In addition, Germany saw in the Soviet Union a further means of stopping the Allied encirclement policy. However, like Great Britain, Germany believed Soviet influence over the Turks to be stronger than it really was. Nevertheless, Russian assistance in blocking the Tripartite Treaty became the final stroke in Germany's plan to maintain Turkey's neutrality.

Within a few days after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Massigli was able to report that Saracoglu was much more determined that the new pact would have no influence on Turkish policy and that further the Turkish government had no intention of sitting down under the German threat of 20 August.³⁵ Saracoglu probably believed that Britain would react to the pact by a renewed effort to fulfill Turkey's pleas for aid. The following day, 24 August, Papen and Kroll met with Saracoglu suggesting

a change in Turkish policy in view of the latest events. Kroll asked about the proposal of 20 August to which the Turkish Foreign Minister replied that Turkey would reject it though she were 100 times weaker than Germany. If Turkey could not buy from Germany, he said, she could no longer sell.³⁶ The two German Ministers were greatly taken aback by this retort, which they hardly expected. They, therefore, made compromise proposals. The Turkish government would accept the fact that war materials could not be delivered and would not meanwhile raise the question of indemnity guarantees if Germany agreed to a months extension of the Trade and Payments Agreement in hopes that at the end of this period the world situations would permit a fresh examination of the position in a calmer atmosphere.³⁷ Saracoglu declined on 12 September, however, on the grounds that Turkey adhered to the principal of the integral fulfillment of contracts.³⁸

Formal political discussions for the final phase of the treaty negotiations between Britain, France and Turkey were to begin on 28 August,³⁹ although the two Allied powers had not as yet come to any agreement on how to meet the Turkish request for aid. British Treasury officials had met with Halit Nazmi Kesmir, Under-Secretary of the Turkish Ministry of Commerce, who headed the Turkish Commercial Mission which had been sent to London to discuss the Turkish program of 14 July.⁴⁰ But he had again been put-off by British explanations that because of her own cut-backs on munitions purchases in Canada and in the United States, a bullion loan was exceedingly difficult.⁴¹

These delays finally caused Ankara to seek a change in the basic style of the accord from Governmental to Treaty form. Great Britain had supported the original arrangement because it required only the signature of the Secretaries of State, and thus prevented any constitutional problems which might arise with the Dominions should the agreement require the signature of the Heads of State.⁴² Turkey, however, wished to prevent a repetition of the events which followed the Abyssinian conflict when Britain unilaterally denounced the arrangements with Turkey.⁴³ Furthermore, the National Party was by this time probably not too confident about British assurances, and therefore, insisted that the agreement be in the form of a treaty of 15 years duration.⁴⁴ Halifax responded on 29 August that his government agreed in principle to the new form⁴⁵ but stressed that despite the fact that the Dominions were to be mentioned in the preamble, the treaty would not apply to them.⁴⁶

The dawning of the first day of September brought with it the German invasion of Poland. The long-suspected but most unwelcome event ushered in the Second World War. England had no recourse now but to do all in her power to end the stalemate and complete the agreement with Turkey in order to assure Allied access to the Straits.

Halifax immediately presented a proposal to satisfy the Turkish eight-point plan of 14 July. A £10 million credit for the purchases of war material in the United Kingdom was granted. British money might not be used to purchase in other

countries because of the gold drain in Britain. France would begin shipments of armaments worth approximately 1 million francs with an additional shipment of 465 million francs to follow by March 1940. Instead of the £15 million bullion loan, Britain offered £3 million sterling to strengthen the currency and £2 million for liquidation of Anglo-Turkish clearing arrears. The credits of £10 million were to be repaid in 20 years at 5 per cent interest, and tobacco shipments could be used to cover the service of the £15 million and £5 million sterling loans.⁴⁷ Two changes followed within hours of the first telegram. In the first, London offered to forgo all payments on the loan of £5 million for one year and thereafter to accept service in Turkish pounds which would be used to purchase Turkish tobacco. Further, the period for repayment was cut to 15 years.⁴⁸ Despite the British concessions, the Turks refused the offer, and it appeared unlikely that they would sign the final agreement until they received a better bargain,⁴⁹ which they believed would be forthcoming because of the present situation in Europe.

The German invasion of Poland also raised the question of the position of Italy in the Mediterranean, since it had been the fear of Italian expansion which caused Turkey to desire an alliance with Britain in the first place. Turkey and Britain thus turned their attention quickly toward the Italian peninsula, for should Italy remain neutral, the current wording of the proposed treaty would allow Turkey to do so as well. The question as to Rome's position in the hostilities was

answered almost immediatly. At 4:30 p.m. on 1 September, the Italian Council of Ministers announced Italy's intention to remain neutral.⁵⁰ But this action served only to open a rift between Britain and France. The latter believed Rome was simply waiting for the best opportunity to enter the war⁵¹ while London believed strongly that Italy meant what she said.⁵²

Papen, meanwhile, continued his personal program of assuring the Turks of Italian neutrality should Ankara change her policy. This, however, infuriated the Nazi High Command who, fearful of any appearance of weakness in the Axis, chastized Papen and told him to present the two Fascist powers as being in agreement on all details of their relations.⁵³ This clearly was not the way to insure Turkish neutrality. Soon the Germans saw another approach through their new friends in the Soviet Union. Ironically, it was Papen who suggested the idea.

The Soviet Union had been involved in continuous dealings with the Turks throughout the summer following Potemkin's visit to Ankara in April 1939. Two weeks before the Nazi-Soviet Pact, on 4 August, the Soviet Ambassador to Turkey extended an invitation to Saracoglu to visit Moscow. He informed the Turkish Minister that the USSR was ready to enter into private and secret talks to include either an agreement between Britain, France, Russia and Turkey, an agreement between Russia, Turkey and the Balkan Entente, or a direct Russo-Turkish accord.⁵⁴ It appeared that the Germans were not aware of these communications for it was not until 2

September that Frederich Schulenburg, German Ambassador to the Soviet Union, learned of them and wrote to his ministry that the Soviet officials had admitted that they were actually engaged in an "exchange of opinion" with Turkey. Upon learning of the talks, Papen suggested to Ribbentrop that the Soviets be encouraged to work to neutralize the Turks.⁵⁵ When questioned on this issue, Stalin informed Schulenburg that there was only a non-aggression pact under consideration but that the Soviet government was prepared to work for the "permanent neutrality of Turkey," as desired by Germany which position, of course, was shared by Moscow.⁵⁶ Schulenburg further stressed to Molotov the importance of Turkish neutrality following "rumors that England was pressuring Rumania to take an active part" and was holding out a prospect of aid from British and French troops. Since this aid might come by sea, it was to the interest of the Soviets to close the Dardanelles completely. Molotov replied that the Soviets "had considerable influence with Turkey and was exerting it to these ends."⁵⁷ Russia apparently also suffered from a misconception of their relationship with Turkey.

As Soviet troops rolled over the Polish border on 17 September, Saracoglu offered to discuss a mutual assistance pact with Russia applying to the Straits and Balkans but with the restriction that in rendering aid to the Soviets, Turkey would not be obligated to actions against Great Britain.⁵⁸ Stalin, observing how successfully the Germans were moving in Poland, and fearing a German push into the Balkans, decided

Saracoglu should visit Moscow to hasten conclusion of the mutual assistance pact.⁵⁹ He then wired Germany that such a pact would keep Turkey neutral and would be a "hook" by which Turkey could be pulled away from France.⁶⁰

The German's were not, however, all together in favor of such a mutual assistance pact between Turkey and Russia although they did concur in the basic idea so long as the Soviets would not be obligated to act against Germany, Italy or Bulgaria.⁶¹ Germany particularly feared that the pact could strengthen a Turkish front against Italy if she were covered in the east.⁶² Germany did concede that if they could not avoid a mutual assistance pact then the Soviets should at least include a clause preventing the necessity of their acting against the Axis.⁶³ If this were not done then Russia would be committing an outright breach of the Nonaggression Pact.⁶⁴

Saracoglu arrived in Moscow on 25 September but found that his hosts had considerably altered their position and his reception was far from warm. In fact, he was forced to wait three weeks, during which time he visited museums while Ribbentrop was in Moscow negotiating a new treaty with Russia on the delimitation of German-Soviet spheres in Eastern Europe.⁶⁵ But the fact that Saracoglu remained in Moscow and that the talks did begin was interpreted by the German paper Völkisher Beobachter to mean that "Russia will obligate Turkey to maintain absolute neutrality and to close the Dardanelles. Thus a great neutral bloc would be formed extending from Russia

to Italy through the entire Balkans which could nullify the plans for the encirclement of Germany."⁶⁶

The Soviets, however, found their influence to be less than they had imagined for Saracoglu apparently refused the Russian terms for a mutual assistance treaty. Therefore, on 9 October Molotov told Schulenburg that rather than concluding a pact, the Soviet government was pursuing the aim of inducing Turkey to adopt full neutrality and thus close the Dardanelles.⁶⁷ But despite Turkish willingness to revise the already completed draft of the treaty with Britain and France so that a military conflict between Russia and Turkey would be ruled out under any circumstances,⁶⁸ Molotov presented Saracoglu with two specific demands on 16 October which completely erased any chance for a compromise.

The Soviet proposal demanded that because of Russian claims on Rumania and in deference to Germany, the Turks were to deny to Allied ships the passage of the Straits. The Russians also asked that any pact with Turkey should be part of a process of forming the Balkan states into a neutral bloc.⁶⁹ Furthermore, Stalin demanded that Turkey remain neutral in the event the USSR seized Bessarabia or Bulgaria seized Dobrudja from Rumania.⁷⁰ Saracoglu rejected the Russian demands and prepared to leave. The Soviets, anxious to avoid creating the outward impression of a break, gave Saracoglu a friendly farewell as Molotov informed Schulenburg of the failure of the talks.⁷¹ The official Russian statement of 18 October 1939 on the visit of Saracoglu stated that the meetings were

being carried on "in a cordial atmosphere, again confirming the unchanging nature of the friendly relations between, and the community of efforts of both to preserve peace."⁷²

With the failure of the Russian talks, and with the threat of involvement in the war, Turkey finally realized the need for a rapid conclusion of the negotiations which for the past six months had placed her in one of the most trying times of her existence. Thus on the following day, 19 October, Premier Refik Saydam, René Massigli and Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, signed the Tripartite Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Ankara.⁷³ Attached to the treaty were several financial agreements which provided for an Anglo-French credit to Turkey of £25 million for the purchase of military equipment and further loans totaling £18.5 million. The two sets of obligations were to be amortized over a twenty-year period, the first at 4 per cent and the second at 3 per cent interest.⁷⁴ Thus, the major obstruction to the agreement had been crossed with the help of the pressure of the times. The military convention, which formed an integral and essential part in the arrangements was not published. Politically, the treaty required that the terms were "equally binding as bilateral obligations" between Turkey and each of the other signatories. But in spite of the addition of Protocol No. 2, which stated that Turkey "was under no circumstances obligated to go to war with Russia,"⁷⁵ the Soviets greeted the event with a bitter excoriation on 31 October 1939 at the fifth (extraordinary) session of the Supreme Soviet:

As you know, Turkey has preferred to tie up its destination with a definite group of European powers who are belligerents in the present war. It has concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Great Britain and France who for the past two months have been waging war on Germany. Turkey has thereby definitely discarded a cautious policy of neutrality, and has entered the orbit of the expanding European war. Whether Turkey will come to regret it we shall not try to guess. 76

FOOTNOTES

¹ DBFP, VI, No. 239, 4 July 1939, p. 261.

² Ibid., VI, No. 283, 10 July 1939, p. 313.

³ Ibid., VI, No. 308, 12 July 1939, p. 341.

⁴ Ibid., VI, No. 82, 18 June 1939, p. 97.

⁵ Ibid., VI, No. 98, 20 June 1939, p. 120.

⁶ See above Ch. , p.

⁷ DBFP, VI, No. 168, 29 June 1939, pp. 188-189.

⁸ The £5 million ostensibly would come from the £10 million industrial credits given under the agreement of 27 May 1939. Ibid., VI, No. 169, 29 June 1939, pp. 189-92.

⁹ Ibid., VI, No. 320, 14 July 1939, pp. 353-55.

¹⁰ Ibid., VI, No. 331, 15 July 1939, pp. 361-62.

¹¹ Halifax was concerned that France might not agree since he had received word that M. Ruell of the French Ministry of Finance felt France could not aid because of their loss of Hatay, but the British argued that since Hatay was not French it had no bearing on the matter. The French obviously agreed. Halifax further pointed out that since May 1939 Britain had given £16 million in economic aid. Ibid., VI, No. 555, 4 August 1939, pp. 604-06.

¹² Ibid., VI, No. 572, 5 August 1939, pp. 617-18.

¹³ Ibid., VI, No. 654, 14 August 1939, p. 686.

¹⁴ The numerous economic reasons for refusal are listed in DBFP, VII, No. 28, 16 August 1939, p. 26.

¹⁵ DGFP, VII, No. 45, 13 August 1939, p. 51.

¹⁶ NSR, 14 August 1939, p. 47.

¹⁷ Ibid., 14 August 1939, p. 48.

¹⁸ DGFP, VII, No. 45, 13 August 1939, p. 51. In this regard, Papen asked that engines, designated originally for a Turkish submarine to be launched on 28 August, not be sent to Italy as had recently been planned, for fear of anti-German demonstrations which would cause enormous political damage. Ibid., VII, No. 52, 14 August 1939, p. 60. However, these engines had already been delivered to Italy on 9 August. Ibid., VII, No. 80, 16 August 1939, p. 91.

¹⁹ Ibid., VII, No. 80, 16 August 1939, p. 91. Details of the contracts to be cancelled are to be found in this document.

²⁰ Kroll's specific demands to Numan, Ibid., VII, No. 141, 21 August 1939, pp. 155-56.

²¹ Ibid., VII, No. 142, 23 August 1939, p. 156.

²² These could include powder and anti-aircraft weapons. Ibid., VII, No. 219, 23 August 1939, p. 233.

²³ Mario Toscano, Designs in Diplomacy, trans. and ed. George A. Carbone (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 119n.

²⁴ George Kirk, ed., "The Middle East in the War," Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), p. 443.

²⁵ NSR, 25 August 1939, p. 81.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 25 August 1939, p. 82.

²⁷ Halifax had requested Turkey's active assistance in July. *Ibid.*, VI, No. 366, 20 July 1939, p. 403.

²⁸ DBFP, VII, No. 161, 23 August 1939, p. 140. On 22 August Knatchubll-Hugessen reported Saracoglu was "distinctly upset" by the German approach of 20 August and by news of the Treaty. *Ibid.*, VII, No. 188, 23 August 1939, p. 155.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, VII, No. 217, 24 August 1939, pp. 183-84.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, VII, No. 300, 25 August 1939, p. 242.

³¹ *Ibid.*, VII, No. 338, 26 August 1939, p. 273.

³² *Ibid.*, VII, No. 301, 25 August 1939, p. 243.

³³ *Ibid.*, VII, No. 321, 26 August 1939, pp. 264-65.

³⁴ DGFP, VII, No. 137, 20 August 1939, p. 154.

³⁵ DBFP, VII, No. 188, 23 August 1939, p. 156.

³⁶ Saracoglu also told Papen they were withdrawing their staff and technical military missions from Germany as well. Ibid., VII, No. 260, 25 August 1939, pp. 214-15.

³⁷ DGFP, VII, No. 247, 24 August 1939, p. 260.

³⁸ Ibid., VII, No. 406, 28 August 1939, pp. 401-02, and VIII, No. 39, 12 September 1939, p. 55. Papen had used the interim to point out again that Germany would obtain an Italian assurance if Turkey proclaimed her neutrality. Ibid., VII, No. 393, 28 August 1939, pp. 389-91.

³⁹ DBFP, VII, No. 370, 27 August 1939, p. 300.

⁴⁰ Ibid., VII, No. 404, 28 August 1939, pp. 320-21.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid., VII, No. 217, 24 August 1939, pp. 183-84.

⁴³ Ibid., VII, No. 466, 29 August 1939, p. 360. Knatchbull-Hugessen was instructed to reply that Britain regarded these arrangements as having lapsed with the withdrawal of sanctions against Italy. Ibid., VII, No. 474, 29 August 1939, p. 366.

⁴⁴ Ibid., No. 466, 29 August 1939, p. 360; No. 615, 31 August 1939, p. 454; No. 667, 1 September 1939, p. 487.

⁴⁵ Ibid., VII, No. 485, 29 August 1939, p. 372.

⁴⁶ There was the fear that this issue would cause further delay. Ibid., VII, No. 535, 30 August 1939, p. 408.

⁴⁷ Ibid., VII, No. 635, 1 September 1939, pp. 471-73.

⁴⁸ Ibid., VII, No. 661, 1 September 1939, p. 484; No. 674, 31 August 1939, p. 490.

⁴⁹ Ibid., VII, No. 761, 3 September 1939, p. 536.

⁵⁰ DGFP, VII, ed. note, p. 487; Ciano's Diary. 1 September 1939, pp. 135-36.

⁵¹ Weygand, p. 11.

⁵² DBFP, No. 703, 2 September 1939, p. 503. The British acted to quiet the anti-Italian sentiment in the Turkish press. Ciano's Diary, 11 September 1939, p. 142. They also told the Italians that the Anglo-Turkish treaty would not be directed against them. DBFP, VII, No. 623, 31 August 1939, pp. 462-63.

⁵³ DGFP, VII, No. 16, 7 September 1939, p. 15; Ciano's Diary, 4 September 1939, p. 138.

⁵⁴ DBFP, VII, No. 579, 7 August 1939, p. 623.

⁵⁵ Papen, p. 455; DGFP, VIII, No. 6, 5 September 1939, p. 5.

⁵⁶ NSR, 2 September 1939, p. 85.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 5 September 1939, p. 87; DGFP, VIII, No. 6, 5 September 1939, p. 5.

⁵⁸ DGFP, VIII, No. 81, 17 September 1939, p. 80; Papen p. 455; NSR, 17 September 1939, p. 97.

59 Beloff, II, 298; Dallin, pp. 186-88.

60 DGFP, VIII, No. 81, 17 September 1939, p. 80.

61 NSR, 18 September 1939, p. 97.

62 DGFP, VIII, No. 116, 21 September 1939, pp. 114-16.

63 Berlin held that such a clause would have to be stated publically so that the German people would not lose confidence in the Russian-German Pact. NSR, 7 October 1939, pp. 117-18.

64 Ibid.

65 Howard, "Germany, The Soviet Union and Turkey," p. 63.

66 Dallin, p. 109.

67 NSR, 9 October 1939, p. 120; DGFP, VIII, No. 219, 9 October 1939, p. 244.

68 Dallin, p. 109. The British favored a Soviet-Turkish Pact, and Chamberlain later admitted he had hoped that Saracoglu had tied up the Soviets in a "parallel treaty to the Anglo-Turkish Pact." Newsweek, 30 October 1939, p. 20.

69 Beloff, II, p. 299-300.

70 The Turks did agree, with British approval, to stand aside if the Soviets seized Bessarabia since this did not involve inter-Balkan frontiers. Langer, p. 316.

71 DGFP, VIII, No. 268, 17 October 1939, p. 306.

72 Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1953), III, 385.

73 Newsweek, 30 October 1939, p. 19.

74 "Treaty of Mutual Assistance: Britain, France and
Turkey," (19 October 1939), Hurewitz, p. 226.

75 Ibid., p. 228.

76 Degras, III, p. 398.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Turkey's decision to align herself with the Allied Powers was a shrewdly calculated act of self-interest and diplomatic foresight which was part of a continuing policy directed toward one goal: protection of her sovereignty and independence. This goal was achieved through a highly successful series of diplomatic maneuvers which placed Turkey in a position of fluid neutrality, enabling her to play one power against another and thereby retain freedom of movement in any power shuffle which threatened her sovereignty. Turkey thus became a classic example of a small state's ability to determine her own affairs despite the overwhelming power of the large nations which wished to influence them.

Turkey's advantage lay in her highly strategic position athwart the Straits which made her an enticing partner for each of the Great Powers, all of which sought to insure control of shipping through the Dardanelles. In the nineteenth century any such attempt by one nation was usually countered by the other nations which desired to prevent any change in the balance of power in the Levant. This balance was radically destroyed, however, by the first World War which resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the division of some of its territory among the Allied Powers. The victors were unprepared, however, for the surprising rise of powerful nationalist

forces among the Turks which resulted in the expulsion of all alien elements from the Anatolian peninsula, and, following the diplomatic upset at Lausanne, the return of Turkish soil in Europe which again placed the Turks in complete control of the Straits.

The new Republic of Turkey was endowed with a leadership which was blessed with political acumen and the foresight to see that the fulfillment of the country's needs lay in rapid westernization. The actions taken toward this end threw off the last vestiges of Ottoman political control and also began the process of advancement and modernization. This movement paradoxically also served to destroy any remnant of European control as well as to move Turkey back into a close association with her former enemies, particularly Great Britain, through her need for financial and technical assistance.

Although the Soviet Union played an important role in the success achieved by the Turks during the nationalist campaign as well as in their programs of modernization, the traditional anxiety felt by the Turks toward Russia's historic attempts to control the Straits soon resulted in a cooling off in Soviet-Turkish relations. On the other hand, Turkey's former ally in World War I, Germany, immediately began to reclaim her pre-war role as the major contributor to Turkey's technical development. Turks began again to attend German schools, and German missions and money flowed in increased amounts into the Republic.

It took some time before Great Britain and Turkey began a rapprochement, but with the settlement of the Mosul dispute and the growing community of political and philosophic ideas, the two nations were soon sharing common interests. More importantly Turkey began to look more and more toward Britain for defense of the Mediterranean against the increasing bellicosity of Italy which, because of her position in the Dodecanese, her interests in the Middle East, the Balkans, and eventually in Africa, offered a direct threat to the security of the Republic. It was, therefore, Italy which played the crucial role in determining Ankara's policy of alignment with Great Britain, and it was primarily against Italy that the Declaration of 12 May 1939 was directed.

England, of course, was primarily concerned with the containment of German aggression and sought a means to support her guarantees to Rumania and Greece by maintaining free access through the Straits. The Italian menace was also recognized by Britain only too well because of Fascist threats to her position in Palestine and the Suez, but in any case, England's Mediterranean policy came to be based largely on her association with Turkey particularly following the Montreux Treaty of 1936 which successfully settled all remaining differences between the two countries. This treaty also marked the opening of increased British involvement in Turkey's internal development and, therefore, the deepening of mutual relations. It also brought England into direct

confrontation with Germany which by this time had the largest economic investments in Turkey. Thus, as the European situation worsened, London became more and more dependent upon Turkish friendship for containment of Germany.

Of extreme importance to the Republic and the Turkish Nationalists after World War I was the formation of a state which would be both militarily defensible and economically viable. The Mosul had been claimed by the new Republic, but Britain successfully obtained it as part of her mandate of Iraq. Of greater importance to Ankara, however, was control of the Sanjak of Alexandretta which was placed under the French mandate of Syria-Lebanon. The problem which surrounded Turkey's attempts to acquire this district greatly impaired Ankara's relations with Paris and greatly hindered Britain's attempts to complete the treaty of mutual assistance with Turkey. Furthermore, Germany wished to prevent a Franco-Turkish settlement of the issue in order to block allied encirclement. It was not until final settlement and subsequent annexation of Hatay by Turkey that the Allies were able to begin serious negotiations toward completion of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance which was the necessary ingredient in the defensive plans of all three nations in the Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean.

Part of these defense plans included the Soviet Union. Turkey had requested her inclusion in the treaty negotiations as a means to tie Moscow with Turkey through the common concern of defense. The Soviets presented a potential threat

to the Balkans and especially to Turkey. When Russia signed the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in August, the Turks found themselves in an even more serious position. It was now Russia, more than either Germany or Italy, which offered the greatest threat to Turkey. From the Soviet viewpoint, however, Turkey's control of the Straits and association with Britain which had long blocked Russian ambition in the Dardanelles, menaced Soviet expansionist plans in the Balkans, and suggested a threat to her southern coast. This situation led to the visit of Saracoglu to Moscow in September 1939 which caused a further delay in the finalization of the Treaty with Britain and France. Ankara sought an alliance with Moscow which would neutralize the Soviet threat to the Straits, and Moscow sought to maintain Turkish neutrality which, according to the Montreux Treaty, would close the Straits and prevent their use by the Allies in war time.

Germany also continued to work against the Anglo-Turkish treaty as well, primarily through economic pressure. Britain was unable to offer the military supplies which Turkey had been obtaining from Germany, and thus the Germans were almost successful in thwarting the Anglo-Turkish alliance. It was precisely this very problem, Allied inability to replace Germany in the economic field, which prevented the treaty from being truly effective. In reality, therefore, Turkey continued to act in accordance with her national policy of strict neutrality despite the signature of the treaty with Britain and France.

Knatchbull-Hugessen apparently missed this point, since he saw the alliance as "a permanent factor in Turkey's international life and not primarily, as with Great Britain, an element in international grouping necessitated by the immediate German menace."¹ This "grouping" was not so permanent a factor for it had been forced upon Turkey by Italy, and despite strong political ties, Turkey's association with Britain was merely temporarily useful in maintaining Turkish security and freedom of movement.

Papen had a clearer understanding of the Turkish position vis-a-vis the Great Powers realizing fully the Turkish fear of Italy but also recognizing Ankara's dependence upon Germany for military supplies and consumer goods. He knew full well that Turkey would not at this time renounce her far-reaching commitments to Great Britain and France, but he believed those commitments could be offset by Soviet-German-Italian assurances which might well preserve normal relations with Turkey or even Turkish neutrality.

The advent of war hastened allied attempts to finalize the treaty and Axis attempts to prevent it, but Papen's view seemed to be born out because even after the alliance of Turkey with France and Britain, Turkish relations with Germany, though strained, remained basically normal. Their economic ties remained strong. Germany required Turkish iron, copper and chrome, while Turkey needed German purchases of agricultural goods and deliveries of German military equipment, which the Allies could never equal. This fact is essential

to the understanding of both Nazi-Turkish relations and the zigzag policy often followed by the Turks who always realized the necessity of maintaining their trade with the Third Reich. This relationship prevailed even after the signature in October of the Mutual Assistance Treaty and after the entrance of Italy into the war.

In the end, Turkey was thus able to get what she needed from both the Axis and the Allies and retain her independence as well. She benefitted enormously from the treaty with Britain and France which offered her protection but required little in return. Instead, she used the Franco-British treaty as a means to counter Italian, Russian, and German pressures just as she continued to use her economic association with Germany to counteract British and French influence. She therefore remained out of the conflict until the very end of the war thereby successfully preserving her independence of action against enormous odds.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Knatchbull-Hugessen, p. 145.

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