ANDREW JACKSON AND GAMAL ABDUL-NASSER: A BEHAVIORAL STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

by

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the present study is twofold: (1) to examine the essential components of leadership in general and charismatic leadership in particular, and (2) to deduce some predictive generalizations pertaining to the emergence, consolidation and termination of charismatic leadership. With these objectives in mind, an attempt has been made to apply the behavioral approach as well as the analytical approach to the leadership of both President Andrew Jackson of the United States of America (1828-1836) and President Gamal Abdul-Nasser of the United Arab Republic (1952-1970)--as case studies.

The initial hypotheses which underlie the investigation are the following:

1. Both Presidents were charismatic leaders.

2. Both Presidents acted in the best interests of their countries as they saw fit.

3. Both Presidents, as individuals, matched each other in their socio-psychological settings.

4. Both Presidents encountered separate socio-political situations which might be labelled similar.

5. In displaying their charismatic leadership, both Presidents shared many politico-behavioral uniformities under parallel situations.

6. Some generalizations about charismatic leadership might be deduced from the comparison between the two cases.

7. These generalizations might be of a predictive nature and as such would be helpful in future cross-cultural leadership studies.

In this dissertation, a study of the parallel situations brought into focus the following analogies:

1. The Jacksonian Democracy and the Nasserite Socialism.

2. Jackson's war against the Bank and Nasser's war against Feudalism.

3. Jackson's war against the Nullifiers and Nasser's war against the Syrian secessionists.

4. Jackson's Spoils System and Nasser's Militarized Bureaucracy.

This research produced two sets of results: One set supports the first five hypotheses listed above (which postulate possible similarities between the two leaders). This set was reached by a qualitative analysis of the parallel situations and was substantiated by two methods of quantitative analysis (a content analysis and a questionnaire). In light of this set of results, Jackson and Nasser are seen as sharing a considerable degree of similarity with regards to their charismatic leadership.

The other set yields the predictive generalizations anticipated by the last two hypotheses. Because these

generalizations presuppose the first set of results, they have been considered the main conclusions of this dissertation. These generalizations are the following:

1. Two independent variables perceived as extremely important in understanding charismatic leadership are personal traits and situational performance.

2. Charismatic potential develops in a leader by a certain merger of his personal traits and his performance style. This merger produces a state of dormant charisma. Dormant charisma flowers when it receives favorable popular support and becomes activated charisma; dormant charisma dies when such support is denied.

3. The effectiveness of charismatic leadership depends on the leader's ability to maintain the charismatization bond between himself and the masses.

4. Charismatic leaders who come from lower social classes tend to be aggressive, violent, and perhaps vindictive. They are inclined to deploy vociferous ideologies and try to uphold this deployment by repression.

In the process of formulating these generalizations, the concept of charisma first initiated by Max Weber has been given a new operational application; namely, the concept of charismatization as presented in this research.

The goal of this dissertation has been to make a modest contribution to the study of cross-cultural charismatic leadership. It is hoped that this inquiry will be

supplemented by other studies of analogous personalities and that the combined efforts invested in such studies will ultimately transpire in the establishment of an acceptable theory of charismatic leadership.

PART I

INTRODUCTION, METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

An unidentified philosopher once said that there are at least three subjects (and probably a dozen more) on which no wise man should ever attempt to write: love, genius, and leadership. Of the three, the last is the most mysterious, the most capricious, and the most unpredictable. No amount of training, no sedulous nurturing by the family or the social group, no long line of ancestry piously dedicated to the eventual flowering of a leader has ever proved a sure means of developing leaders.

History, which affords us a comfortable insight into the mistakes of others, may explain actions long after the event, but the decisions through which some men become leaders while others are crushed in defeat cannot, in most cases, be anticipated.

Wherever one turns today, the cry is for more and better leadership. The pervasiveness of this demand, however, is hardly indicative of its underlying causes. Nor does this pervasiveness explain just what it is that people expect of leaders. People face a general sense of a vital need for leadership.

Before the last echoes of the thunderous shouting, "Duce Duce," "Heil Hitler Heil Hitler," or "Nasser Nasser" have faded altogether from our memories, it is well to pause to inquire into the nature of man's quest for leadership. As long as man has lived in society, whether in primitive families or in complex twentieth-century national communities, he has sought and found leaders. Some of his leaders have been good--others, bad. Some have led to progress while others have disappointed their people and led them to ruin. But always, there have been leaders.

Recognizing its grave importance to him, man has struggled with the problem of leadership for centuries. He has studied the problem, speculated about it, and proposed many solutions to it which, however, have not proved to be universally applicable to all peoples at all times.

Throughout the centuries of civilization, leadership not only in the abstract but also in the concrete experiences of everyday living has been one of the most controversial subjects. Partially answered questions have been asked concerning the philosophical and the biological aspects of the phenomenon of leadership. Definitions have been formulated, but most of them have created undefinable feelings of uncompleteness. It is indeed a most puzzling question to try to explain objectively why some members of a group move definitely to the top, while others remain relatively stationary or move upward only short distances.

Nevertheless, students of political leadership have produced numerous reports which list the so-called "traits of leadership."[1] Such lists, of which there are a multitude, are either posed with complete generality or are presented for "good" and "bad" leadership. Recent research has produced such lists which distinguish "democratic," "autocratic," "bossist," "charismatic," etc., from each other.

Most of these lists may be discounted on the grounds that any experienced layman could sit down and make up equally good lists. Furthermore, the lists usually allow abundant exceptions: many leaders lack many characteristics; many non-leaders exhibit most of the traits; and the leader in one situation may not be the leader in another.

Leadership involves social interaction. To the extent that one identifies a pattern of leadership, it would be safe to assume that this pattern has a functional relationship to the structure of the group or the society within which the pattern has emerged. It follows that a change in the leadership pattern cannot easily take place

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[1]W. H. Cowley, "Three Distinctions in the Study of Leaders," Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, XXIII (June 1928), pp. 144-157. For a thorough critique of the trait approach, see Alvin W. Gouldner, Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 212-25. Too many of these older studies of leadership proceeded on the admirable, simple but debatable assumptions that a leader had qualities or traits that accounted for his gaining and maintaining leadership.

without simultaneously affecting the structure and also, that a change in the structure cannot but affect the prevailing pattern of leadership. In other words, even though revolutions may be "exportable," as some militant leaders proclaim today, leadership cannot--as a rule-- be "importable."

The structure of any given society at a certain time in its history is determined by its historical, social, cultural, economic, and geographic aspects, as well as by its unique character which is a mysterious blend of those factors. Therefore, leadership in different societies must be perceived, treated, and studied as separate entities. On this assumption, any attempt to study comparative leadership must be preceded by an extensive study of the above stated affecting factors.

Another way to study comparative leadership is to observe the behavior of the leaders of the societies involved. Leadership can then be seen as a relationship between an individual and a group built around some common interest and behaving in a manner directed or determined by the leader. Creative leadership emerges when an individual becomes identified with a value or complex of values. This type of leadership is different from the ordinary representative leadership because it attempts to bring in innovations--an undertaking which cannot be restricted to any one society or group of analogous societies. Endeavors to innovate may be traceable to indigenous sources as well

to social influences. Fantastic ambitions and irrational motivations as such are not incompatible with creative leadership. In all societies, including democracies, these two factors may even be a necessary ingredient for a leader to appeal to the society and its leadership demands. These factors have been most obvious in the figure of the charismatic leader.

The central theme of this dissertation is concerned with the idea of charismatic leadership. The current emphasis on behavioralism in the study of charismatic leadership stimulates students of political leadership to initiate cross-cultural projects without particularly focusing on the cultural heritage, the social structure or the economic aspects of the societies involved in such a project.

The main weapon of the charismatic leader is personal magnetism. His charm conveys not only his magical power but also his delicate need for support and reinforcement. The charismatic leader needs his followers as much as the actor needs his audience. In this interdependence the charismatic leader maintains the cohesion of the group or society largely by identifying himself with myth. The charismatic leader becomes able to communicate to his followers a sense of continuity between himself and his mission and their legendary heroes and their missions. And since a myth remains the same as long as it is felt as

such, he and his claims are legitimated by his ability to clothe himself with the mantle of myth.

In "developed" societies, charismatic leadership--at the present time--appears to be of a minor importance simply because the faith in a charismatic leader is not sufficiently strong or general to provide an adequate basis for legitimizing radical institutional changes. In "under-developed societies," or "developing societies," as they insist to be called, the political institutions do not seem to be so rigidly established as their counterparts in developed nations. Also, the socialization processes seem to be still in the process of expanding to include a larger number of institutions than in the past (before the family seemed to be the only effective institution). It has been argued that charismatic leadership in traditional societies is probably the most appreciated, the most welcomed, and the most effective type of leadership to effect social or political change.

This dissertation will have two major objectives: a general one which will be discussed in the first two parts of this study; and a specific one which will be analyzed in the next three parts of the work.

The first objective is to pursue carefully the literature on political leadership to determine how the phenomenon of leadership has been explained, analyzed, conceptualized, and categorized. This objective will be

attained through a three-stage process. First, the author will discuss some of the famous works of pre-twentieth century writers to determine their conceptions and approaches. Second, the author will analyze the works of some recent scholars who have been concerned with political leadership. Third, this writer will deal in depth with the idea of charismatic leadership and will attempt to generate his own concept of "charismatization" and also some generalizations which may be useful in the evaluation of charismatic leadership in a cross-cultural situation.

The second objective of this dissertation is to present, analyze, and study two selected, cross-cultural cases of charismatic leadership. The first is President Andrew Jackson (1767-1845) of the United States, and the second is President Gamal Abdul-Nasser (1918-1970) of the United Arab Republic (Egypt). The study will apply the suggested concept of charismatization to the leadership of those leaders in order to analyze and conceptualize the phenomena associated with the emergence, maintenance, and consolidation of charismatic leadership.

The study of the leadership style of Jackson and Nasser has been on the mind of this author for the last three years. The striking similarity between these two leaders in their social background, in their psychological nature, in their emotional stamina, and in their temperament seemed quite compelling. The closeness of their

physical appearance strongly surprised and motivated the author to embark on the research.

Jackson and Nasser symbolize a distinctive brand of charismatic leadership. Utilizing their charisma, they certainly succeeded in communicating to their peoples a great sense of identity, pride, and honor. The two leaders became legendary heroes among their followers. Their persons, attitudes, and ideologies were turned by their respective peoples into solid bodies of myth which remained (and will remain in the case of Nasser) for centuries in the United States and the United Arab Republic respectively. The espousal by Jackson and Nasser of the idea and practice of "aggressive presidency" and "massist politics" enhanced the reputation of their brand of leadership and indeed made it worthy of fresh objective studies by modern students of political leadership.

This study will seek to analyze four kinds of questions relative to the two selected cases of charismatic leadership. First, an attempt will be made to probe into the historical, social, and psychological factors which might have impinged upon the personality and behavior of both Jackson and Nasser before and during their periods of leadership. Secondly, the ideologies of Jacksonian Democracy and Nasserite Socialism will be analyzed to show how the behavior of these leaders influenced the current political thought of their times. This analysis will also include

an evaluation of the two leaders' role in improvising the socio-political institutions in their respective countries and their attempts to affect change. Thirdly, the author will analyze the "political strategy" by which these two leaders encountered and handled three similar situations. The study will make a comparison between Jackson's war against the Bank and Nasser's war against feudalism; between Jackson's war against the Nullifiers and Nasser's war against the Syrian secessionists in 1961; and also between Jackson's "spoil system" and Nasser's "militarized bureaucracy."

Finally, this author will attempt to show evidence that Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser shared "high" politico-behavioral similarities. In the course of presenting such evidence this writer will make a content analysis of thirty texts (fifteen books on each leader) chosen randomly from among the vast amount of available literature dealing with these two leaders. The content analysis will be made to determine how each group of scholars viewed their leader in terms of favorable sentiments, unfavorable sentiments, and neutral sentiments. This data will help to support the author's initial hypothesis. Also a questionnaire will be conducted in an attempt to determine the shared perceptions that scholars in the field today have of these leaders.

To conclude this chapter, the writer would like to emphasize that this dissertation is basically concerned with the study of leadership patterns. It highlights the leadership images that Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser sought to project to their followers. The study neither attempts to present a detailed bibliography of the two leaders nor claims to offer a complete picture of all the dimensions of their lives. Such associated questions pertaining to the economic, social, political, or educational aspects, while not ignored or by-passed, are not presented in minute detail as they would be in a historical coverage. Also, it should be noted that while the two leaders had significant differences, the emphasis of this study seeks to focus specifically on the similarities--in particular with regard to leadership styles in given situations.

With these questions as guidelines, let us proceed to designate and explain the methodology and the assumptions which will be used.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY AND ASSUMPTIONS

Today a concern for political leadership as a field of political sociology needs no justification. Most teachers of political leadership, like most students of the subject, probably disagree in some measure with the approaches found in present texts and could easily write a book based on their disagreements.

The disagreement of this writer with many of the past studies of leadership is also substantial. His experience as a student of political science and as an administrator of government have led him to develop the suggested approach in this research in an attempt to meet the major problem which is found in most available works. The problem results from what can fairly be termed "the underdeveloped state of political leadership as an academic field." It is clear that while progress has been made, there is much more to be done to create a set of generalizations (hopefully a theory) which would be applicable to explain (hopefully to predict) future leadership situations.

While this thesis will concentrate on Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser, it should not be seen as a dual

political biography. Neither has it been designed to present a comprehensive coverage of the history of either Andrew Jackson or Gamal Abdul-Nasser.[1] More specially, this thesis is directed toward developing general theoretical explanations of the occurrence of leadership phenomena. It focuses on the behavior of leaders in the context of socio-political circumstances such as political prosperity, political instability or political decay.

This research falls between the traditional approach, which emphasizes historical analysis of individual cases and situations, and the behavioral approach which emphasizes the careful development and manipulation of data in an effort to create and test theoretical propositions. The data of this research will be events, decisions, and behavior--probably a mixture of them all. The tools will be definitions, classifications, and analytical concepts. The method will encompass operations on the data undertaken to explain leadership phenomena. The objective of this research project is thus to develop a set of propositions and hypotheses which seek to explain political leadership phenomena with the intention to establish criteria for cross-cultural analysis.

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[1]Those who wish to pursue a more traditional study of the political histories of these two leaders may see the Bibliography, pp. 323-337, and Appendix I and II, pp. 339-344.

In order to compare in a satisfactory manner instances that differ from one another in complexity and quality, well-developed tools of analysis must be devised. The interest of this researcher will be to analyze and break down happenings into their component parts, and to move backward in time in an attempt to delineate those factors and variable which seem to have had an impact on the events being analyzed. In addition, the writer will attempt to examine leadership styles from various aspects such as the level of the populace, the level of the system, and the level of the leader himself. Political leadership may be studied in terms of the individual behavior of political actors, ideologies, partisan politics, quality and quantity of repression, popular response or in terms of the interplay among all of these factors.

Assumptions

This research presents seven hypotheses which will delineate the main body of the work. The rest of this project will be devoted to the evaluation of the validity of these assumptions. The assumptions are:

1. that Jackson and Nasser were charismatic leaders.
2. that unless it is proved otherwise, Jackson and Nasser acted in their countries' best interests as they saw them.

3. that Jackson and Nasser, as individuals, distinctively matched each other in the socio-psychological setting.
4. that Jackson and Nasser encountered separate socio-political situations which can be labelled "similar."
5. that in displaying their political leadership, Jackson and Nasser shared many politico-behavioral uniformities under the "similar" situations.
6. that some generalizations about the phenomena of charismatic leadership can be developed from the study.
7. that these generalizations will be applicable and helpful in better understanding the future actions of charismatic leaders.

This study highlights the assumption that Jackson and Nasser[2] distinctively matched each other in socio-psychological setting, in politico-behavioral style of leadership, in ideological views, and, perhaps, in physical measurements and facial resemblance.[3]

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[2]President Andrew Jackson will be usually referred to as "Jackson." President Gamal Abdul-Nasser will be usually referred to as "Nasser." Whenever the names of the two presidents appear together, Jackson will precede Nasser upon chronological and alphabetical basis.

[3]See the photographs on pages 345 and 346.

Both Jackson and Nasser came from impoverished lower-class families. Both were orphans or semi-orphans. Both had a severe indigent childhood but managed to gain their way into middle-class society. Both, in their youth, were frustrated by the existing establishment and found refuge in the military as a career. Both participated gallantly and courageously in military battles. Both turned to politics after gaining their military fame. However, both retained--consciously or subconsciously--a military mentality, and administered the government as a legion of troops. Both won a great, but superfluous, battle--the former at New Orleans and the latter at Port Said--against a common traditional enemy: the British. As presidents, both managed to build up a repressive base and suppress their adversaries. Both attempted to unify the factions of their nations and raise the standard of living of the underprivileged by undermining the privileged. Both represented the masses and claimed to have a mandate from their peoples. Both were allegedly charged with providence and both seemed to have accepted the charge. Healthwise, both had long ailments and both survived an assassination attempt. Both were described as controversial men, dubious, misleading, but they were also described as men who captured the admiration and reverence of their peoples.

A serious--and legitimate--warning, however, must be made at the outset: this work by no means attempts to

compare American political systems or institutions, economic systems or social structures in the United States to those in the United Arab Republic at any time in history. The major--and only--concern of this research is the style of leadership displayed by Jackson and Nasser, and not the systems of their respective countries.

It is hardly conceivable, however, to draw an arbitrary "yellow line" between leadership per-se and the environment that fosters it. The emphasis, nevertheless, will be focused upon the effective identification of systematic and consistent uniformities of politico-behavioral styles common to these two actors and discharged by them under certain situations.

Andrew Jackson lived and died in the nineteenth century, while Nasser lived and died in the twentieth century. The reader may, validly, resist the idea that the environmental nature of events and problems under Jackson are comparable to those faced by twentieth-century Nasser. This resistance might be plausible from a sociological point of view. From the problem-solving approach of political leaders, however, this is not necessarily the case. The problems of irrigation faced by the Assyrians and the Chinese in the fourth century B.C. and by the Yemenese and the Romans in the second century B.C. caused analogous problems to Franklin D. Roosevelt in the twentieth century in terms of his Tennessee Valley Authority and to Nasser in

terms of his Aswan Dam. This problem of irrigation still threatens the promotion of agricultural projects in Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico as well as in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Time seems to have produced limited corrections. This comparison appears vividly in light of the ninety-five years which separated the Jackson era from the Nasser era.

Jackson probably fought against the Aristocrats with the same ferocity with which Nasser fought against the Egyptian Feudalists and land-owners. Both claimed a mandate to restore the people's rights. Both were probably wrong and caused tremendous harm to their peoples. Jackson's war against the "nullifiers" was similarly replicated by Nasser against his so-called "Arab Separatists and Opportunists." Many of Nasser's enemies were imaginary; so were many of Jackson's enemies.

While it is argued that Jackson rode to power on the tide of a "popular revolt," which demanded the restoration of the true principle of representative government (within a constitutional framework), Nasser per contra mounted to power by overthrowing the incumbent political order. This, however, must not distort the flow of this comparison. The salient point of this research actually focuses upon the techniques by which these actors managed to retain power and keep their opponents out of it. Both were simultaneously the most beloved and the most hated, the most feared and most respected by their peoples.

Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser were the first presidents who represented what is termed "the masses," the first whose following vulgarized, so to speak, the national administration and the social life in their capitals. While "Old Hickory" and "al-Rayyis"[4] were probably honest and upright in their general endeavor to give their countrymen a high and a noble administration, both were constantly charged with responsibility for "corruption" and "debauchery" of their respective political systems. Under Jackson's guidance, the Democratic Party, utilizing the methods of spoil-system politics, became an "army of occupation entrenched in office."[5] Under Nasser, all government branches and independent agencies were penetrated and stuffed with incompetent representatives of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), who, in fact, served as the eyes and ears of the regime.

"Old Hickory" and "al-Rayyis" were broadly perceived by students of political leadership as being basically "rude" and "demagogue" and motivated in part by honor but mostly by jealousy and the desire for revenge. While Jackson was characterized in his use of presidential power as "the veriest autocrat who ever ruled in America,"[6]

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[4]The word is Arabic and means the "Boss."

[5]James Schouler, History of the United States Under the Constitution, Vol. III (New York, 1885), pp. 455-464.

[6]Ibid., pp. 266-273.

Nasser's "iron rule" ploughed long furrows in the back of the Egyptian society.

It has been historically charged that the dominant motivation behind charismatic rule is to gain power and retain it. A great disservice to nations occurs when issues are subordinated to personalities. Charismatic leadership demagogery is often seen as a threat to the basic institutions of nations. Furthermore, it is even seen as a degradation of a nation's political heritage. In America, the Civil War might have washed out Jackson's guilt. In Egypt, the emergence of such a feeling of guilt remains evident in the post-Nasser era. Egypt after Nasser might either pursue his policies and thus deny the emergence of a guilt complex, or revert back its path and see Nasser's era in the light of factual historical events. If the latter materializes, Egypt probably will arraign Nasser and his cohorts before the bar of history.

While Jackson was recorded by most historians as a "loose Christian," Nasser was known to be a devoted Moslem. Though Jackson was known to have enjoyed his life (particularly during his youth) in a happy and a loose manner, some historians contend that for the thirty-five years prior to his becoming President he was accustomed to reading at least three chapters of the Bible daily.[7] While President, he

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[7]John Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 748.

attended the Presbyterian church regularly. Nasser, to the contrary, while he was known to be a devoted Moslem, did not have a great familiarity with the Koran. Moreover, Miles Copeland states that Nasser secretly drank liquor when he felt jubilant after a political triumph.[8] Also, it can be argued that Nasser diminished his popularity among the traditionally-minded Moslem people by his constant feud with the Moslem Brotherhood;[9] he suppressed it, outlawed it, and in 1955 he executed six of its leaders.

Religion as a political instrument was excessively used by Nasser, though it was rarely evoked by Jackson. The reason is sociological rather than political. In the American society religion is separated from politics as a basic rule of freedom and equality. Egypt was, and still is, a Moslem state. Nevertheless, it can be easily argued that neither did Nasser gain politically by being a devoted Moslem nor did Jackson lose by being a loose Christian. In their power struggles, neither seemed religiously motivated. Both fought and killed their adversaries without religious discrimination. Their basic motive was to secure power and to retain it.

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[8]Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 159.

[9]A militant Moslem organization which strongly advocates the return of the State to the old "pure" Islamic system. The organization approves of the use of violence, murder, and sabotage as means of achieving its goals.

Jackson and Nasser unequivocally earned their titles as "public men" because they provided the mobs, impatient of all restraint, with champions who typified their own prejudices. One can easily discern in their popularity (Jackson's and Nasser's) an element of instinct and personal recognition. Mobs felt "he is one of us . . . he thinks as we do." Their adherents had a most delightful sense of their own power in supporting these two leaders in defiance of sober, cultivated people who disliked the mobs for their violence, ignorance, and lack of cultivation. A basic source of Jackson's and Nasser's political power was the hatred and jealousy of the poor for the rich, of the uneducated for the intellectuals, and of the rural community for the urban.

The Jackso-Nasserite conduct of presidency was unmistakably perceived by the intellectuals, the wealthy, and the open-minded individuals as subversive to the rule of law. It was argued that since Louis XIV, the maxim, "L'etat c'est moi," has scarcely found so ingenuous and complete an expression as in Andrew Jackson.[10] It is the opinion of this writer that this description applies as much to Nasser as it does to Jackson. The source of the Jackso-Nasserite "parentalistic despotism" was found in these actors' claim

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[10] Alfred A. Cave, Jacksonian Democracy and the Historians (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1964), p. 9.

to be the direct representatives of their peoples, elected by the peoples, and responsible only to them. Though neither the American constitution or the Egyptian constitution make mention of the President as a direct representative of the people, the style of the two political actors, bypassing the people's elected representatives, resulted in the creation of an "arbitrary state," to use Herman Von Holst's term describing Jackson's behavior.[11]

Jackson and Nasser--as controversial, dubious and misleading as they were--have puzzled their critics. Studies in political leadership have vacillated in their assessment and appreciation of the Jackso-Nasserite pattern of leadership. Some critics have argued that it was not all pernicious after all. They have rejected the dominant view of the Jacksonians and the Nasserites as corrupters of the republican system. Rather, this group emphasizes that the Jackso-Nasserite movements were sound political expressions of the demand of common peoples for social justice.[12]

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[11]Herman Edward Von Holst, Constitutional and Political History of the United States (Chicago: 1879), p. 158.

[12]Some of the best references on this dichotomy are: Cave, op. cit. In this monograph the author analyzes the approaches of approximately eighty writers, biographers, and authors who have dealt with the subject of the Jacksonian Democracy. The author focused his analysis on the points of difference rather than the points of similarity. The monograph is an excellent analytical work which indicates that literature on controversial leaders reflects three shortcomings of the authors: bias, lack or scarcity of consensus,

These same critics argue that Jackson and Nasser sought to introduce specific principles of government in the farmer-labor alliance formed under their administrations which would encourage a progressive force that had long been suppressed. Jeffersonian egalitarianism and Spencer's truths were not always the ideal types, especially among underdeveloped peoples of America's Southland or Egypt's Ṣaᶜīd.[13] Those ideals were probably dismissed as fantastic philosophies or preposterous dogmas. Perhaps the greatest danger in a democratic state is the possibility of the perversion of government into a system of favoring a new privileged class of the many and the poor. Jackson and Nasser were undoubtedly among the few presidents in the world who have confessed a belief in the simple faith that the government must deal as justly with the poor as with the rich. The struggle between Jackson and the anti-Jacksonian forces (as well as Nasser and the anti-Nasserite forces) was perhaps a class struggle. Jackson and Nasser, unlike President Jefferson and Prime Minister Zaghlūl,[14] appeared to be "social democrats." The

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and--which is most important--conflict of interests due to difficulties of perception and values. Also see Richard T. Ely, The Labor Movement in America (New York, 1886), pp. 42-43; Aḥmad Muḥamad al-Ḥūfī, al-Buṭūlah wa-al-Abṭāl (Heroism and Heroes) (Cairo: al-Majlis al-'zᶜla lil-Shuūn al-islāmīyah, 1967); Sulymān Maẓhar, ᶜImlāq-min Bani Murr (Giant from Bani Murr) (Cairo: al-Dār al-Qawmīyah lil-Tibāᶜh wa-al-Nashr, 1962).

[13]Arabic word for "upper Egypt."

[14]Prime Minister Saᶜad Zaghlūl was the most prominent national hero in Egypt between 1914-1927.

principal opposition to the Jackso-Nasserite ideology, in both the United States and the United Arab Republic, probably came from conservative classes, from men possessed of property in slaves, in land, or otherwise. They refused to accept either the Jackso-Nasserite brand of nationalism or its affiliate theory of democracy. The Jackso-Nasserite movement has been perceived by the privileged classes in the United States and the United Arab Republic as a banning together by the masses in order to use their political power to interfere with the "natural order." Jackson and Nasser were seen as constantly striving to advance the interests of the classes which had "the least money and the most votes." The Jackso-Nasserite movement was probably hailed by the masses as a triumph for the frontiersmen and the fellaheen. Perhaps their political behavior (Jackson's and Nasser's) can be perfectly described as that fierce Tennessee-Ṣa^{c}idi spirit which broke down the traditions of conservative rule, swept away the privacies and the privileges of officialdom, and like Gothic leaders, opened the temple of their nations to the populace.

There is probably too much information written about Jackson but unfortunately not enough about Nasser. Conclusive data on Nasser are still largely unavailable or unrevealed, and perhaps the case will remain so for a good many years to come. Neither Jackson nor Nasser wrote an autobiography. Probably neither of them imagined himself mortal to the point

of recording his times in terms of autobiographies. Biographies of Jackson are numerous but a number of them seem prejudiced. Objective and scholarly biographies of Nasser are nonexistent. Egyptian writers were probably timid to write about his history lest they make errors of description or of interpretation and thus incite his wrath against them. On the other hand, writing biographies of living figures in the Middle East has not been common. Foreign authors who have written about Nasser are few.[15] Most Western authors have often indicated evidence of disliking him, envying him, or simply not understanding him. This author, nevertheless, will try to compensate for the lack of scholarly data on Nasser by presenting his own observations which were accumulated during his career as a government official in the United Arab Republic.

In the next two parts of this research, this writer will first present a set of concepts which should be helpful in understanding the nature of charismatic leadership. Second, the writer will examine the seven assumptions and

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[15]Some of the famous sources on Nasser are: Robert St. John, The Boss (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960). (This book is considered by the author of this dissertation as the most objective source on President Nasser.) Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1967); Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959); Gordon Waterfield, Egypt (New York: Walker and Company, 1967); Mohammed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: Victor Gollancz, 1955).

analyze them in light of the data available and then seek to draw some conclusions concerning their usefulness in developing a set of generalizations about charismatic leadership styles operating in significantly different historical, political, economic, cultural, and social environments.

PART II

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP: PROBLEMS IN ANALYSIS AND CONCEPTUALIZATION

CHAPTER III

NATURE AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP CONCEPTS PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

Historically the concept of leadership has been most difficult to define. Inevitably one becomes bogged down in such interminable questions as to what constitutes leadership. Is leadership a function of personality, society, or fate? What is the degree of interdependence between the leader and his followers? Considering these questions from the point of view of empirical studies only, leadership is an omnibus term indiscriminately applied to such varied activities as playground leader, committee chairman, club president, business executive, state politician, or chief of state.

In this chapter, the writer will discuss the works, thoughts, and conceptualization of ancient philosophers. Such an understanding of leadership concepts of the past will be of great help in the appraisal of the utility of modern leadership approaches.

The word leadership itself can be traced at least as far back as early Greek and Latin, and it is derived from the verb <u>to act</u>.[1] Hannah Arendt shows that the two Greek

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[1]Hannah Arendt, <u>The Human Condition</u> (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 188ff. For more

verbs archein "to begin, to lead, and finally to act" and gerere "to pass through, to achieve, to finish" correspond to the two Latin verbs agere "to set into motion, to lead" and gerere (the original meaning of which was "to bear").[2] It was believed that each action is divided into two parts: the beginning, made by a single person, and the achievement, performed by others, who, by "bearing" and "finishing" the enterprise, see it through.

Thus the two words distinguishing the verb "to act" in both Greek and Latin are closely related. The beginner or leader depends upon others for help; the followers are dependent upon him for an occasion to act. In time, suggests Arendt, the original interdependence of action between the leader and the follower becomes split into two different functions--the function of giving commands, which becomes

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detailed information on leadership, see Helen Jennings, Leadership and Isolation (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950); Franklin Haiman, Group Leadership and Democratic Action (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1951); Paul Pigors, Leadership or Domination (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1953); Alexander Leighton, The Governing of Men (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945); Hickman Titus, The Process of Leadership (Dubuque, Iowa: C. Brown Company, 1950); A. E. Mander, Logic for the Millions (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947); George Halsey, How to be a Leader (New York: Harper, 1938); Ferenc Merie, "Group Leadership and Institutionalization," Human Relations, II (January 1949); Kenneth Benne, "Leaders Are Made, Not Born," Childhood Education, XXIV (January 1948); Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History (New York: Crowell, 1840).

[2] Ibid., p. 189.

the prerogative of the leader, and the function of executing them, which becomes the duty of his followers.

Contrary to what many social scientists believe, leadership as far back as early Greece and Rome did not necessarily mean that followers were completely dependent upon leaders. There was--as is the case today--a range of interdependence within which leaders and followers interacted. A successful leader may have claimed for himself what actually was the achievement of many, and perhaps through this claim the leader monopolized the strength of his followers without whose help he would not have achieved anything. It is probable that in this way the delusion of extraordinary strength arose and with it the phenomenon of the "great man" who is powerful because he is alone.[3]

Plato opened a gulf between the two modes of action, leading and executing, by his view of the leader as one who does not have to act at all, but who rules over those who are capable of execution. The essence of politics is viewed by Plato as knowledge of how to begin and how to rule in the gravest matters with regard to timeliness and untimeliness. But action itself is eliminated and becomes the execution of orders.

During the early Italian Renaissance, Niccola Machiavelli emerged to suggest his concept of the "Prince."

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[3]Perhaps the most famous exponent of this concept was Alexander Plutarchus in his Plutarch's Lives (Chicago: Great Books Foundation, 1947).

He argued that a powerful leader was needed in two major instances--at the birth of an organization and at the time of severe crisis. The prince was known by his talent and ability to shift quickly and gracefully from persuasion to cajolery, flattery to intrigue, diplomacy to violence, or to concoct just the formula required to retain power and escape disaster.[4] Among the notable leaders who have been charged with practicing this Machiavellian formula were Fredrick The Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, Benito Mussolini, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fidel Castro, Quami Nkrumah, and naturally, the main actors in this thesis--Andrew Jackson and Gamal Nasser.

It was Thomas Carlyle (probably a forerunner of Max Weber) who developed a keen awareness of the historical impact of the "great man." Carlyle wrote that among the undistinguished, antlike masses are men of light and magnetism, mortals superior in power, courage, and understanding. The history of mankind is a biography of its "great men." Carlyle noted that "although their moral character may be less than perfect, they have intuitive insight and great sincerity."[5] In these respects, Carlyle considered

[4]Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince and the Discourses (New York: Modern Library, 1950), p. xxxvii.

[5]Carlyle, op. cit., p. 10.

them superior. They are followed, admired, and obeyed to the point of worship. Carlyle has been regarded by many historians and social theorists as the defender of the thesis that of all factors in history, great men are the most important.

Whereas Machiavelli believed that leadership rested upon the power of cunning and force, Carlyle believed that leadership rested upon intuitive insight into reality, presented by his concept of "seeing-eye." Out of Carlyle's views developed the common image of the great leader who has an extraordinary insight and to whom people inevitably bow.

While Carlyle loved regimentation and organization and conceived of the ideal society as a kind of feudal community bound together in hero worship, duty, and service, John Stuart Mill abhorred such regimentation and looked upon the great man as one who should restore independence and originality to a high place in a society that was rapidly submitting to collective thinking. Mill saw his "great man" as an individual who would create as many centers of independent thought as possible. His powers of persuasion should be used to enlighten the people and give them a robust aptitude for critical and independent thought.[6]

In Mill's analysis of leadership, it is found that the ingredients of domination which were amplified by

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[6]Edwin A. Burnett, The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill (London: Modern Library, 1939), p. 99.

Machiavelli and which were brought to a climax by Carlyle are no longer crucial. Mill rebelled at the dethronement of leadership in favor of executive behavior. This, he suggested when he noted that "the greatness of England is now collective, individually small; we only appear capable of anything great by our habit of combining."[7] Mill believed that too much organization and reliance upon executive know-how was reducing the greatness of England and appealed to a return to respect of leadership and originality. Mill later indicated that the best way to find the great leader was through the use of democratic institutions such as the electoral process. In this way, if heroes turn out to be shams, they can easily be dethroned without causing disorder or war.

On the American scene, one of the most eminent believers in leadership was William James. Apparently upset by Herbert Spencer's idea of the inevitability of history, he argued that nature was not so tightly organized that there were no possibilities for real change and innovation. He emphasized that people should place greater faith in their ability to mold their environment in terms of their needs and requirements. It was William James, among others, who voiced the essential belief that through vigorous

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[7]Eugene E. Jennings, An Anatomy of Leadership (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. 6.

action one can greatly determine his future.[8]

The preceding arguments later led to the American "no-man" theory of history advocated by Brooks Adams, Edward Cheney, and Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., who supported the so-called "scientific approach to history." This theory contends that the actions of men are but shadow-symbols of greater struggles going on somewhere behind the screen, significant chiefly as indications of mightier forces. This theory belittled historians who are still personalizing human events: providence, fate, destiny, law, and morality controlled the affairs of men as they controlled all things in natural sciences. In short, according to this impersonal theory, "men are merely ventriloquist's dummies of inscrutable forces."[9]

Friedrich Hegel was sadly disappointed by Napoleon who set out to free the Germans from bad rulers but ended up ruling them badly. Hegel thought it was ironical that whatever man did (thesis), he never did it successfully enough; he always produced an opposite condition (antithesis), which in turn produced a synthesis of the two previous conditions. He thought that human actions always

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[8]William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1956). Also see, Herbert Spencer, A Study of Sociology (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896).

[9]Jerome Frank, If Men Were Angels (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942), p. 124.

failed to produce intended results because intentions are generally too particularized. For that reason, Hegel argued that man can never assert himself without also creating the conditions of his own demise.[10]

With this thesis in mind Hegel and Fichte proceeded to develop the "fashion concept" or the "time-spirit" (zeitgeist) theory. Hegel propounded the idea that Germany was destined to become a great nation and to find a great military leader who would fulfill its destiny. The leader, then, in Hegel's thesis, is the instrument of historic forces. A leader is great in the sense that he understands the invincible logic of events and cooperates with history. In short, it is Hegel's conviction that occasion makes the "great man," rather than the opposite.

Another attempt to reconcile personality with history was made by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels who were students of Hegel. They introduced the thesis that the force which propels the individual into social relationships is his need to work.[11] They discredited Hegel's spirit of the nation thesis and endorsed the notion that the driving

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[10]See the works of George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of Hegel, edited with an introducted by Carl Friedrick (New York: Modern Library, 1953); Lectures on the Philosophy of History (London: G. Bell and Sons, 1890); Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965).

[11]Karl Marx and Friedrick Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International Publishers, 1947).

force which gives character and direction to society is simply the productive forces that are embodied in the basic patterns of economic production and distribution. Rather than accept Hegel's argument that European history would culminate in the rise of the German nation to the position of "spiritual leadership," Marx believed that social history would culminate in the rise of the laboring class to the peak of what he called the "socio-economic leadership" overthrow of the capitalist systems. Marx rejected Hegel's appeal to national patriotism and made an appeal directly to the class loyalty of workers. Both Hegel and Marx, however, believed that organization is based on class. Both appealed to the individual's need to submerge himself in a great "spirit" and take his place in the inevitable march of history. In both cases, the "inevitablism" was assumed to invite enlightened mass cooperation and vigorous participation. Men are necessary, but yet insignificant, in terms of changing the course of history.

To give President Nasser (the co-star of this thesis) a fair share of this philosophical discussion of leadership, it is necessary to turn to leadership as seen in traditional Moslem societies. The Moslem philosophy of leadership is based upon the belief that rulership is a gift bestowed and predestined by God, and the ruler will be accountable for it before God on the Day of Judgment. This implies that the ruler theoretically does not own his power

and accordingly is not accountable for it to his fellowmen. Various verses from the Koran, as well as sayings from the Hadīth, were interpreted as confirming that theory. The ruler, according to this theory (be he a Caliph, a Sultān, or a Wāli,[12] or one appointed by them), is "God's shadow on earth"; and the "divine shadow is here assimilated to the divine effulgence."[13] Other men must therefore love and obey the ruler who, for his part, must rule them justly. The ruler's accountability to God for his conduct is stated on the authority of a saying ascribed to the Prophet Mohamad that "unjust rule does not last long."[14]

In practice, however, the situation was different. Pure Islamic principles after the death of Mohamad were difficult to implement. Among other dilemmas that developed was the problem of succession.

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[12]The three terms Caliph, Sultān, and Wāli are Arabic titles meaning respectively: "successor of the Prophet charged with sacred as well as secular leadership," "possessor of power," usually appointed by a Caliph, and "governor of a province," usually representing the Sultān. For more information on the Caliphate and the Islamic political thought, see Thomas Walker Arnold, The Legacy of Islam (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931); Erich W. Bethmann, Bridge to Islam (London: Allen and Unwin, 1953); Kenneth Cragg, The House of Islam (Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1969); Caesar E. Farah, Islam: Beliefs and Observances (New York: Barron's Educational Series, 1968); Louis Gardet, Mohammedanism (New York: Hawthorne Books, 1961); Kenneth W. Morgan, Islam: The Straight Path (New York: Ronald Press Co., 1958).

[13]Abū-Ḥāmid al-Ghazāli, Naṣihat al-Mulūk (Council for Kings), trans. from Persian by F. R. C. Bagley (London: Oxford University Press, 1915), pp. xl, xli.

[14]E. I. J. Rosenthal, Political Thought in Medieval Islam (Cambridge: University Press, 1958), Part I, pp. 113-223.

After Mohamad's death, the early Moslems had hastened to select a leader (Abu-Bakr) even before they had buried the Prophet; and ever since then the consensus of opinion (ijmāᶜ), which is one of the roots of Sunnite jurisprudence, had been that the legality of governmental and judicial processes must derive from a single ruler acknowledged by all and responsible to the Moslem Community ('umma) as a whole.

The practice of succession evolved in an unstable manner during the first three centuries of Islam. It later tended to stabilize. Among the most knowledgeable philosophers who, in the ninth and tenth centuries, presented scholarly theses on the subject of succession and leadership in Islam were Abu-Hāmid al Ghazāli and Abu-Yūsuf al Mawardi.

In al-Ghazāli's views on the Caliphate, the public interest requires obedience to rulers who dispose of military power, however unjust they may be, because resistance would cause civil war and even greater injury to the Moslem Community. In Nasihat al-Mulūk, al-Ghazāli advises the Sultān to consult and frequent pious ᶜulama[15] constantly. Such consultations would provide stability in government.

Al-Mawardi designated three possible ways for succession. Among them, a prospective Caliph will normally be designated by the preceding Caliph, but his legal title will depend on his possession of the necessary qualifications (of

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[15]The word is Arabic and means the council of elders.

leadership) and upon the homage (bay^{c}ah) paid to him after his precedessor's death. This homage is given to him by the electors who represent the Moslem community and are called "possessors of loosening and binding" (ahl al-ḥall wa-al-c^{c}aqd). By accepting the homage of the electors, the Caliph assumed a contractual obligation toward the community to fulfill certain functions, whereupon all Moslems become religiously and politically bound to obey him.[16]

Al-Mawardi enumerates seven Caliphal qualifications and ten Caliphal functions. The qualifications are: (1) justice (^{c}adālah), (2) knowledge (^{c}ilm), (3) sound sight, hearing, and speech, (4) sound limbs, (5) administrative competence (kifāyah), (6) courage and energy in war, and (7) descent from Moḥamad's tribe, Quraysh. The functions of the Caliph are: (1) to uphold religious orthodoxy, (2) to enforce judicial verdicts, (3) to maintain security, (4) to apply the Qur'anic penalties for offenses, (5) to garrison the frontiers, (6) to wage holy war against the infidels, (7) to collect legally authorized tributes (fay'), and alms-taxes (zakāt), (8) to pay salaries and expenses, (9) to appoint trustworthy officials, and (10) to personally supervise governmental and religious business.[17]

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[16] Abu-Yūsuf al-Mawardi, al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyah (Governmental Rules), trans. to French by E. Fagnan (Algiers, 1915), Chapter I, "On the Contract of the Imamate), pp. 5-42; also see Rosenthal, op. cit., Part II, pp. 113-223; Nadav Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961).

[17] Al-Mawardi, op. cit., Chapter I.

Al-Mawardi, in his chapter on the contract of the Imamate, does not give any right to the people to overthrow the Caliph as long as he fulfills the above-mentioned functions. The Imamate is an endowment from God, and people's allegiance is a form of worshipping God. However, al-Mawardi admits in the same chapter that a Caliph may lose his title if he forfeits the qualifications of justice through immoral or unorthodox conduct. Probably upon al-Mawardi's reservation as well as similar reservations made by other philosophers, Moslem groups frequently found legitimate reasons to rise against their rulers and often put them to the sword.

Al-Ghazāli referred to the qualifications of the Moslem leader and listed them as six physical and four moral. The physical are: (1) adulthood, (2) sanity, (3) liberty (non-slave), (4) male sex, (5) Qurayshite descent, and (6) sound, sight, and hearing. The moral are: (1) military prowess (najdah), (2) administrative competence (kifāyah), (3) piety (wara^{c}), and (4) knowledge (^{c}ilm).[18]

Obviously, the qualifications of the "Moslem-leader type" are broadly similar to those pertinent to the Western-leader type; they are, basically, courage, justice, competence, good health, and knowledge. The process of reaching leadership, however, is different. In the former, the

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[18] Al-Ghazāli, op. cit., p. iv.

leader was mainly selected by a third party (God), while the followers--by obeying--showed gratitude to God Almighty. Popular election, as a concept of representation, was by far more curtailed in the Moslem community than it was in the West. The nominator of the leader in Islam was virtually God; the electoral college was the *ᶜulama*, and the leader was a prophet who must please God by conscientiously guiding and directing His people. The religious factor in Moslem communities was strikingly dominant; the passivity of the followers tended to equalize the lack of positiveness on behalf of the God-selected leader. The political process in the Moslem community seemed to be the responsibility of the *Caliph* alone since he had received the divine message and had to keep it from the corruption of secularism. Therefore it can be argued that the political system in the Moslem community was by far less pervasive in terms of democratic theory and application than in Western societies. The rulers' duties were seen primarily as religious; rulers had to avoid personally religious eccentricity and punish or banish recalcitrant heretics. They supervised the subjects of all ranks, rewarded good-doers, and punished evil-doers. They had always to strive to set a good example because the character of the subjects depended on the character of the rulers whom they imitated.

Finally, it is important to indicate that the principles discussed by al-Ghazāli, al-Mawardi, and other Moslem philosophers were not stated in the Qūran. Neither the

Holy Book nor the Prophet referred to such doctrines. The more Islam changed from a "pure religion" to a "governing religion," the more Moslem philosophers had to apply al-Ijtihād (the application of reason to explain religious texts). The farther the Moslem Empire extended, the more exposed to foreign cultures, the more was there need to innovate in political thought. This writer believes that the great distinction between the Moslem practice of government (as indicated by those philosophers) and the original theories in Islam, vividly represents the impact of the new cultures, which Islam encountered, on the basic Islamic ideology. The strongest among these impacts came from the Persian culture and Byzantine political thought.

From the preceding analyses of leadership, it becomes evident that earlier philosophers perceived leadership in terms of mysterious, unidentified, and rather religious obligations. The role of followers was to a great extent ignored and neglected. Operational approaches to the study of leadership seem to have been non-existent.

CHAPTER IV

DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO LEADERSHIP CATEGORIZATIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The history of the study of leadership in the twentieth century is somewhat less chaotic than the study itself. Most students have identified two main approaches used in studying leadership. The earlier one is commonly known as the "trait" approach, and the later one is usually called the "situational-interactional" approach.

The old trait approach originally considered the "leader" as a personality type that tended to assume a position of dominance in almost every social situation, and its early followers tried to discover the particular personal factors common to all such persons. With the acknowledgment that the same people do not always "lead" in every social situation, the focus of the trait approach was shifted to discover the different personality traits demanded of a leader by each situation, but students following this approach were still concerned with identifying and examining the personalities of individuals considered to be leaders.[1]

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[1]See Ralph M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated with Leadership: A Survey of the Literature," Journal of Psychology, XXV (January 1948), pp. 35-71. The article is an early classic which sought to establish the basis for the shift of the study of leadership from the former approach to the latter.

The obvious limitations of this method of study caused some students to divert their attention from cataloging personality traits and led them to study leadership in terms of "situational-interactional" factors. By focusing upon the interaction among individuals in their activities as group members, this approach removed personality traits of the leader from their determinant status and relegated them to the position of a contributing factor to be examined in conjunction with three other factors: (1) the social and physical nature of the environment within which the group must operate, (2) the nature of the group task, and (3) the personality characteristics of the other group members.

Whereas the student of the trait approach sought to account for the leadership phenomenon solely by studying the personality factors of the leader himself, situational-interactionists argued that there were other relevant variables that had to be taken into account. The explanatory superiority of the situational-interactional approach demonstrated itself to the extent that current research on leadership is conducted almost exclusively within this framework.[2]

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[2]Bernard Bass, Leadership, Psychology, and Organizational Behavior (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Edgar Borgatta and Arthur Couch, "Some Findings Relevant to the Great Man Theory of Leadership," in Paul Hare, Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1955); Raymond Cattell, "New Concepts for Measuring Leadership in Terms of Group Syntality," Human Relations, IV

Although many students following the situational-interactional approach also operated within dictionary definitions of leadership, some students succeeded in formulating more precise concepts of leadership. R. B. Cattell presented (in 1952) a conception of leadership which "involved a group member's effect upon group syntality."[3] Ralph Stogdill defined leadership as "the process of influencing the activities of an organized group in its efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement."[4] While, for example, it is clear that each of these conceptions has a fairly explicit meaning, both bear different implications for research and theory.

From the preceding discussion, it becomes evident that leadership means "different things to different people." Nevertheless, Carroll Shartle and Richard Morris offered similar listings of five criteria frequently used to

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(December 1952); A. W. Gouldner, Studies in Leadership (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950); Robert Kahn and Daniel Katz, "Leadership Practices in Relation to Productivity and Morale," in Dorwin Cartwright, Group Dynamics (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1953); William Hawthorne, "The Influence of Individual Members on the Characteristics of Small Groups," in A. Paul Hare, Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955); Fritz Redl, "Group Emotions and Leadership," in A. Paul Hare, op. cit.; John Thibaut, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959); Ralph White, "Leader Behavior and Member Reaction," in Dorwin Cartwright, op. cit.; Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957).

[3]Cattell, op. cit., p. 573.

[4]Stogdill, op. cit., pp. 35-71.

identify leaders. According to this list, a leader has been identified as:[5]

1. An individual who exercises positive influence upon others.

2. An individual who exercises the most influence in the goal-setting or goal-achievement of the group or the organization.

3. An individual who exercises more important positive acts than any individual group member.

4. An individual who is elected by the group as leader.

5. An individual who is in a given office or position of apparently high influence potential.

Cecil Gibb's listing of leadership criteria includes the previous five postulates listed under fewer headings and also adds two others:[6]

1. The leader has a focus on the group.

2. The leader is one who engages in leadership behavior.

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[5]See Carroll Shartle, "Studies in Naval Leadership," in Harold Geutzkow, Groups, Leadership and Men (Pittsburgh: Carnegie Press, 1951), pp. 119-133, and Richard Morris, "The Problem of Leadership: An Interdisciplinary Approach," American Journal of Sociology, LVIX (September 1950).

[6]Cecil Gibb, "Leadership," in Gardner Lindzey, Handbook of Social Psychology (Cambridge: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 877-920.

As to what is involved in leadership behavior, Richard Morris would include:[7]

1. Behavior involved in the execution of a given position.

2. All the behavior of an individual selected as leader.

3. Any positive influence act.

4. Behavior of any individual that makes a difference in the behavior or the characteristics of the group.

5. Behavior of an individual when he is directing the activities of a group.

From the extensive investigation by this writer, it can be suggested that the literature on leadership has, at one time or another, utilized all these criteria to identify leaders. Dwight Dean, in an attempt to explain this dilemma of the study of leadership, produced four useful "indictments of the literature on leadership":[8]

1. Little comparability exists among leadership studies in the aggregate, for those studies, guided by widely different notions of the phenomenon called leadership, have not concerned themselves with common phenomena.

2. Much of the research on leadership has been influenced by a conception which, upon inspection, blurs

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[7] Morris, op. cit., pp. 149-155.

[8] Dwight Dean, Dynamic Social Psychology (New York: Random House, 1969), pp. 458-461.

into another more fundamental concept employed in the study of group processes.

3. The study of leadership has suffered under a dubious distinction between "leadership" and "headship" which has adversely conditioned much of the conceptualization of leadership.

4. The study of leadership has emerged as a separate field in the study of group processes and has been conducted as if leadership were a totally unique phenomenon, although virtually all the existing conceptions of leadership can be explicated in terms of more basic concepts of social psychology.

Notwithstanding these reservations made by Dean and other leading authors in the field of leadership with regard to the difficulties of distinction between different approaches, this writer will present, discuss, and analyze in the next part some of the common notions of conceptualizing leadership as used by post-twentieth century authors. These approaches will include the following:

1. The genetic approach.
2. The personality approach.
3. The sociological approach.
4. The situational approach.
5. The charismatic approach.

The Genetic Approach

Not long ago many persons considered that ancestors determine everything. "Blood will tell." Francis Galton, applying the biological knowledge of his day to human life, declared that genius is inborn and bound to assert itself despite adverse circumstances.[9] He held that the absence of superior inherited traits is fatal to superior achievement. Geneticists also talk of superior genes, normal genes, and genes for defective traits. When persons mate "integration" takes place and a product occurs. The rules which govern such an integration are not definitely known. A child may be superior to either parent or inferior to either.[10] One parent may be intellectually low-grade and the other naturally without energy, or lazy, but the offspring may rank well in both intelligence and energy and be headed for leadership.

The question that can be raised then is: Can combinations and interactions of genes be understood and hence controlled so as to produce more superior individuals? Many biologists acknowledge the influence of environment,

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[9]See Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1892). For more detailed information on the genetical approach, see Will Durant, Adventures in Genius (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1931); Havelock Ellis, A Study of British Genius (London: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd., 1904); and Herbert E. Walter, Genetics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930).

[10]H. S. Jennings, The Biological Basis of Human Nature (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1930), pp. xviii and 384.

but in a novel way. They talk about the environment of the gene. The genetic result, in terms of a personality trait, depends on the surroundings of the germ itself, on the cells in contact with the germ cell, and on the hormones that bathe this cell;[11] nature, they argue, works in Gestaltic terms. The biologists' theory of the effect of environment on the genes, however, has been supported by several hereditary studies. In a study of monozygotic twins, biologists discovered that those twins differed according to what happened to their genes in the process of their development.[12] In other words, heredity is a term that covers a multitude of processes. Sometimes superior parents beget superior children and sometimes mediocre parents have superior children, which can be illustrated by a study of the hereditary background of Shakespeare, Napoleon, Jackson, Truman, and Nasser who apparently came from mediocre families. Whatever geneticists might say about their biological calculations, it seems that, in the end, they admit the role of environmental nature in the making of leaders.

Another question to be raised is what constitutes the magical formula of interaction between the genes and the environment? The answer may be that personalities and leadership traits--though they are not one--are "products

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[11] Ibid., Chapter V.

[12] Ibid., p. 145.

of development, and development is always through the interaction of the materials of inheritance (the genes) and other things (environmental effects)."[13]

The genetic theory, although it does not solve this equation, presents severe warnings to the common man and to the overzealous augenist to exercise caution in their generalizations about who may become leaders and about who may possess genius; prediction becomes dangerous and most unwise.

In discussing the biology of leadership, H. S. Jennings emphasizes that there are certain common mistakes to be avoided. It is necessary to state them briefly:[14]

1. It is fallacious "to sum up heredity in the maxim that like produces like." Geniuses do not always produce geniuses. Perhaps they do, rarely. However, inferior parents may produce superior offspring.

2. It is fallacious to assume that, although all human "characteristics" are inherited, heredity is all-important in human affairs. Heredity has to be taken into consideration, but it need not be worshipped.

3. It is fallacious to claim that "characteristics" are not alterable by environment. If the process of adaptation is often obscure, it need not therefore be denied.

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[13] Ibid., p. 209.

[14] Ibid., p. 211.

4. It is also fallacious to assert that biological dogma, widely proclaimed and believed by many in social, economic and political circles, requires an aristocratic constitution of society. If genes, special ability, and hence, leadership, may come from apparently inferior patterns, a democratic organization of society is wise. The offspring of the inferior must not be condemned to inferior social roles by autocratic overlords.

Finally, it becomes evident that the influence of genetic theory, which had a great impact between the seventeenth century and the second half of the twentieth century, has diminished rapidly. Its validity has become highly questionable.

The Personality Approach

By far the largest body of material on leadership is based on the theory that leadership is a result of the personal traits and characteristics of the leader.

Leadership, in this perspective, bears a vital relationship to individuality. By virtue of his individuality, a person is able to perform in ways different from and superior to his fellows and thus he qualifies for leadership.[15] Of course, a great deal of individuality may not produce superiority and thus may not result in

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[15]Emory S. Bogardus, Leaders and Leadership (New York: Appleton-Century, Inc., 1934), p. 4.

leadership. Selfishness is probably the most common satelite-sin that haunts every leader who attempts to demonstrate superior individualism. Moreover, superior individuality must be expressed in directions that are appreciated by the social group or its possessor will not be a leader.

The personality approach overemphasizes the role of personality. The leader who pushes his way up does so through the combination of a strong personality with a vigorous assertive ego and a steady determination to accomplish certain results he sees as important. Historically, the leader who has possessed a strong personality and steady determination has been labelled a "born leader." Students of the personality approach, however, tend to make a distinction between the egoistic model and the genetic model. The examples of Napoleon, Jackson, Hitler, Mussolini, De Gaulle, Nasser, and Sukarno are probably self-evident. None of these was born to superior parents; however, they apparently were dominant egoists who showed early characteristics of leadership.

Ordway Tead in his analysis of this personality type described the egoistic leader by saying:

> They impose themselves; their will to power is inordinate and insatiable. They thrive on the passion for authority and the thirst for obedience. . . . They are forces to reckon with, for people come to be convinced that in submission to them they are caught up into a larger whole

> and come to desire, somewhat hypnotically, desparingly or mistakenly, what the leader desires.[16]

James Martin, in his book Tolerant Personality, divided the structure of personality into three major components: habits, attitudes, and traits.[17] Martin analyzed these three components in two different approaches--the static and the dynamic. These three elements of personality --habits, traits, and attitudes--combine to form a pattern of characteristics peculiar to the individual and serve to identify him as a unique person. A person may share many of these characteristics with other members of the cultural group; but he still represents a unique combination. These common characteristics will also vary somewhat with respect to intensity and degree. Although no one personality is perfectly integrated, psychologists expect that there will be a certain functional interrelationship among the personality characteristics of any individual. It is equally reasonable to expect that some persons will have a sufficient number of similar characteristics to justify a cautious usage of the term "personality type." The effect of culture on personality may be such that certain personality "types" are more or less identifiable.[18]

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[16] Ordway Tead, The Art of Leadership (New York: Whittlesey House, 1935), p. 26.

[17] James Martin, The Tolerant Personality (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1964), p. 35.

[18] Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 90.

A valid conclusion to be reached about the way in which egoistic individuals become leaders is, therefore, a realization that their personality "type" must be so challenging and stimulating as to prod their leadership capabilities into existence. It is important to grasp the implication of this truth that it is the person who creates the situation rather than the contrary.

The personality model is mainly seen in terms of three common sub-models: the autocratic, the paternalistic, and the bossist.

Autocratic leadership assumes rule persons without consulting them. It wields an iron club. It leads in terms of its own wishes, wants, desires; it molds the actions of others to suit its own plans. Autocratic leadership usually justifies its domination on the grounds of its superiority. The autocratic leader is objective, overt, and positive. He proceeds aggressively and obtrusively. He commands and organizes; he captivates and paralyzes. On occasion he moves with precision; again, he blusters and storms. He exercises great freedom and acts as a law unto himself. He risks his life. He is proud, boastful, cocksure, or seemingly so.[19] If in doubt, he never discloses his doubts. In the extreme, autocratic leadership is ruthless.

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[19]See Tead, op. cit., p. 20.

Paternalistic leadership is perhaps the most common. It is Washingtonian in nature; fatherlike and considerate of the welfare of the group members. It may overrule the wishes of the group if these seem-ill-advised. If mistakes are made by the group, the paternalistic leader must assume responsibility. Hence, he does his best to safeguard his group from error by making the final choices himself.[20]

A common weakness of both the autocratic leadership and the paternalistic leadership is that the group is left helpless when it loses its leader. It has been so accustomed to its dependence on him that its members have not acquired the necessary experience to stand alone when their leader is gone. Paternalistic and autocratic leaderships are faulty in that they do not provide sufficiently for the development of individual initiative and leadership in the groups they lead.[21]

The bossist sub-model was engineered by W. B. Munro in the mid-twenties.[22] It is a type of political leadership which is found between autocracy and paternalism and is more common in local government than it is in state or national government.

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[20] Ibid., p. 22.

[21] Ibid., p. 23.

[22] William Bennett Munro, Personality in Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 67.

The boss is an extroverted person, a "dubious individual," a shrewd master who plays upon human feelings. He ranges from the coarse, crude autocrat in a factory, to the suave politician. He is direct, partisan, and autocratic.

The boss calls himself "realist" and all writers of books on government or politics are to his mind "theorists." The boss who knows his business well will take whatever he can get, keep for himself as much as he dares, and divide the rest with his associate. His principles are just seven: five loaves and two fishes. The boss always has to demonstrate superior individuality; however, he climbs to leadership by a combination of skill, industry, good judgment, perseverance, brute force, and good fortune. And he usually has nobody to thank for it but himself.[23]

The boss is not a man of military training, but it is astonishing how well he applies, in his own sphere, the axioms of military science. His intelligence officers, scouts, and spies are everywhere even in the enemy's camp. They bring him information which is in most cases accurate.

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[23]Munro, op. cit., p. 69. For information on the bossist model, see Harold Zink, City Bosses in the United States (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1930). The author presents an interesting analysis of some city bosses such as Tweed, Croker, Humphery, Vare, Flim, Cox, and others. Also see, Clay Felker, The Power Game (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968).

The major source of the boss' power comes, aside from his devilishness, from the spoils system which he creates. A spoils system first brought the boss into leadership, and it is his spoils system that contributes more than anything else to keeping him in power.[24]

The Sociological Approach

According to the sociological approach, leadership is an aspect of social movements. Sociologists see leadership as the activity of influencing people to cooperate toward some goal which they come to find desirable. Leadership thus perceived is interested in how people can be brought to work together efficiently, effectively, and happily for a common end. It implies the use and creation of power with the people. Leadership in this model is absolutely a product of group life. It is mainly a social process. It involves a number of persons in mental contact; one person (or more) assumes dominance over others by their consent and promotion. This naturally means that leadership is the process by which the attitudes and values of the many are changed by a delegated leader, a representative of the people. Furthermore, this also implies that representation is not lasting; a dialogue of give-and-take between leaders and followers must exist and continue; otherwise, the leader loses his representative status.

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[24] Ibid., pp. 69-70.

The role of the leader in this model as a representative of the people is often self-evident; the function of the followers may be obscured. Yet the follower is vital because without him there could be no leader. The role of the follower is also important because he may refuse to obey or he may take punishment rather than follow. The leader must consider continually the various possible reactions of his followers.

In contemporary studies of leadership, sociologists emphasize the role of followers to the extent that they equate its significance to the role of leadership itself. The dividing line between these two roles, suggests Emory Bogardus, is neither clear-cut nor stationary. It is this writer's impression that Bogardus sought to draw a distinction between "individuality," which refers to those distinguishing traits that set one person off from another, and "sociality," which is composed of those traits that identify one person with another. Bogardus' notion indicates that the individuality of a person interacts with the sociability of the group and produces tailored patterns of leadership.[25] Styles of democratic leadership, consequently, depend upon the specific combination of ingredients offered by both the leader and the followers.

The stable composition of the group and the lack of social assurance on the part of its members often

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[25]Bogardus, op. cit., p. 356.

contributes toward producing a very high rate of social interaction within the group. The group structure is a product of these interactions. Out of such interactions arises a system of mutual obligations which is fundamental to group cohesion. William Whyte, in his Street-Corner Society, pointed out that:

> . . . the code of the street-corner boy requires him to help his friends when he can and to refrain from doing anything to harm him. . . . The leader is the focal point for the organization of his group. In his absence the members of the gang are divided into a number of small groups; there is no common activity or general conversation. When the leader appears, the situation changes strikingly. The smaller units form into one large group. The conversation becomes general and unified action frequently follows. The leader becomes the central point in the discussion. When the leader leaves the group, unity gives way to division which existed before his appearance.[26]

The leader is the man who acts when the group demands action. He is more resourceful than his fellowmen. Past events have shown them that his ideas were right and most probably will be right in the future. In this sense it is assumed that "right" simply means satisfactory to the members. While the leader is independent in his judgment, his followers are generally undecided on the course of action or upon the character of the move to be taken. The leader stimulates them to make a decision.

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[26] William Foote Whyte, "Leader-Follower Relations in Street-Corner Society," published in Harold Proshansky and Bernard Seidenberg, Basic Studies in Social Psychology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 519.

The sociological model of leadership probably encompasses most logically the democratic leader; he grows out of the needs of the group; he seeks to define these needs and to stimulate the members to secure adequate satisfaction. The democratic leader draws people up to their best level and does not push them in line with his own purposes. He trains his followers to become leaders, to take his place and as a result they may even surpass him. He ministers to others rather than allowing them to minister to him. He suggests rather than orders.

Democratic leadership depends on personal contact rather than objective decrees. It is humble rather than pompous. Ironically, this model of leadership is often sneered at by autocratic leaders and despised by "the high and the mighty."

The Situational Approach

The situational approach suggests that leaders must have situations or moments that will bring their genius to the fore, and without these situations, many great men remain unknown.[27] William James suggested that great events often occur by a proper marriage between the personality of the leader and the nature of the situation, and that leadership is not simply a personal quality, although the line between the personality and the situation has not yet been

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[27] William James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," from his The Will to Believe (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), p. 26.

well-determined. James' argument reconciles an older analysis presented by Hegel and Fichte. They introduced the "time-spirit" (Zeitgeist) theory which emphasized that situations call upon personalities to play required roles in fulfillment of destiny.[28] Hegel thought he saw in Germany, which at that time was divided into many small states, a German spirit or culture which would serve as the basis for unity if a German hero appeared and accepted the role of leadership. In this sense, the great man becomes the instrument of historic forces. He is great in the sense that he understands the invincible logic of events and cooperates with history. The situational approach emphasizes that occasion makes the great man rather than vice versa. There are probably, according to this approach, very limited choices for man, and even fewer opportunities to reach self-chosen ends.

The situationalists might not view Hitler as personally powerful, although he may have had an exceptionally strong personality. Hitler, they assume, generated his power through the skillful exploitation of a "ripe situation." Nasser's famous statement concerning the situation in Egypt before the 1952 revolution illustrates this point very vividly: "A role in search of an actor."[29] Nasser often

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[28] Jennings, op. cit., p. 9.

[29] Gamal Abdul-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Maṣlahit al-Istiʿlāmāt, 1966), p. 52.

used his role as an illustration of a human instrument of the "revolution which was the only way out."[30] British rulers, corrupt monarchs, feudal overlords, a non-Egyptian ruling class, among others, constituted the climactical situation which triggered popular dissatisfaction and thus set the stage for the "actor."

Another example always presented by the "situationalists" is that of Theodore Roosevelt. The situation of the United States then was (as Roosevelt described it) that of a nation which held in its hands the fate of other nations for the coming years. He saw that the people enjoyed exceptional advantages, but were menaced by exceptional dangers. With the picture of the job he faced, he concluded, "here is the task, and I have got to do it."[31]

Situationalists conclude that the situation is primary in their approach and while the individual is necessary, he is not the determining factor.

The Charismatic Approach

The charismatic leader is distinguished from other leaders by his capacity to inspire loyalty toward himself as the source of authority, apart from an established status.

The term "charismatic leader" has recently attained widespread and almost debased currency. In the past, it

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[30] Ibid., p. 53.

[31] Jennings, op. cit., p. 93.

was occasionally applied to Gandhi, Lenin, Hitler and Roosevelt. Now nearly every leader with marked popular appeal, especially those of new states, is indiscriminately tagged as charismatic. In the absence of clear-cut specifications of traits of personality or behavior shared by the many and apparently diverse[32] men to whom charisma has been attributed and of any inventory of the common characteristics of the publics who have been susceptible to charismatic appeal, it is not surprising that scholars should question the meaning and utility of the concept of charisma.

Max Weber adapted the term "charisma" from the vocabulary of early Christianity to denote one of three types of authority in his now classic typology of authority on the basis of claims to legitimacy.[33] He distinguished among (1) traditional authority whose claim is based on "an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions," (2) rational or legal authority, grounded on the belief in the legality of rules and in the right of those holding authoritative positions by virtue of those rules to issue commands, and (3) charismatic or personal authority, resting on "devotion to the specific sanctity, heroism, or

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[32] Peron, Nehru, Ben Gurion, Nkruma, Churchill, De Gaulle, Sukarno, Castro, Nasser, Toure, Lummumba, Kennedy, Khrushchev are just a few of the political leaders who have lately been called charismatic.

[33] See K. H. Ratnam, "Charisma and Political Leadership," Political Studies, XII (September 1964), pp. 341-354 for one of the more cogent critiques of contemporary uses of the concept.

exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative pattern or order revealed by him.:[34] It must be emphasized that these types are "ideal types" or abstractions; charismatic authority, according to Weber, differs from the other two in being unstable, even if recurrent, and tends to be transformed into one of the other two types.[35]

While elements of charismatic leadership may be present in all forms of leadership, the pre-eminently charismatic leader is distinguished from other leaders by his capacity to inspire and sustain loyalty and devotion to him personally, apart from his office or status. He is regarded as having supernatural or extraordinary powers which are given to few. Whether in his military prowess, religious zeal, heroism or in some other dimension he looms "larger than life," he is imbued with a sense of mission, or is divinely inspired, which he communicates to his followers. He lives not as other men, nor does he lead in expected ways by recognized rules. He breaks precedents and creates new

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[34] Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 328.

[35] This notion of transformation or "routinization" has led to criticism that Weber used the concept of charisma ambigously, that is, on the one hand as a characteristic of certain classes of people in certain situations, on the other as a more general quality that can be transmitted to and identified with institutions.

ones and so is revolutionary. He seems to flourish in times of disturbance and distress.[36]

The somewhat misleading search for the source of charisma in the personalities of leaders may have resulted from misreading of Weber's frequently quoted definition of charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities."[37] For, as the statement here suggests and Weber repeatedly emphasized, it is not so much what the leader is but how he is regarded by those subject to his authority that is decisive for the validity of charisma. Charisma is a state of mind which resides in the perceptions of the people.

There are many who deny that the term can be properly applied to leaders whose "call" neither comes from God nor can be considered divinely inspired in the specifically religious sense. On the grounds that the works of a "Luther" and a "Hitler" should not be classified together, they deplore Weber's extension of an originally Christian concept to include leaders who are seized with and

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[36] Max Weber, op. cit., p. 358.

[37] H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 245-250.

communicate a darkly secular ferver.[38] However, most social scientists refute this notion on the basis of its lack of realism. They recognize that the empirical or earthly manifestation of inspired and inspiring leadership is one and the same whether in the service of good or evil.

Charisma is therefore redefined, without departing from Weber's intrinsic intention, as a leader's capacity to elicit from a following deference, devotion, and awe toward himself as the source of authority. A leader who can have this effect is charismatic for this group.

It may be that systematic comparison of political leaders who have been regarded by their peoples as superhumanly inspired and inspiring would reveal certain traits common to all of them. Further systematic comparison of the societies and the conditions under which such leaders have come to the fore might eventually promote the concept of charismatic leadership out of the realm of speculation into that of empirically based social science. This of course is the ultimate objective of this thesis.

The "charismatic process" is one of interaction between the leader and his followers. In the course of this interaction the leader transmits, and the followers accept, his presentation of himself as their predestined

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[38] See Carl J. Friedrick, "Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power," The Journal of Politics, XXIII (February 1961), p. 13, for a striking example of this point of view.

leader, his definitions of their world as it is and as it ought to be, and his conviction of his mission and their duty to reshape it. In actuality, the process is more complicated because it involves several groups of followers and several stages of validation. There is the small group of the "elect" or "disciples," the initial group whom the leader first inspires as a beach-head into the society. There is, also, the public at large which, in turn, can be divided into those of predominantly traditional orientation and those of modern orientation toward order. In the societies with which this research is concerned, further divisions may exist along ethnic, tribal, religious, regional, and national lines. This writer contends that the nationally significant charismatic leader must command the loyalty of all or most of these sectors.

To understand how a charismatic leader functions, it seems advisable to distinguish two levels on which his appeal is communicated and responded to: The first level is that of grievances and special interests of each group; significance of these grievances and interests is probably greatest during the stage in which the charismatic leader mobilizes the population in opposition to a prevailing order and in assertion of the possibility of a new order. In developing nations or areas in transition from colonial rule to independence, this stage is naturally that of opposition to the rule of a colonial power. In developed nations, this

stage is seen in terms of determining the reforms of the adverse party (such as the situation in the United States or the United Kingdom) or attacking previous cult-worshipping systems (as it happened in Russia under Krushchev).

While the attraction exercised by the charismatic leader can, in part, be attributed to his ability to focus and channel diverse grievances and interests in a common appeal, this explanation is insufficient to account for the acceptance of a given leader. Nor does charismatic attraction show how a leader maintains charisma in the conditions of uncertainty and fractionalization which follow the attainment of the common goals. Ironically enough, this attraction exercised by charismatic leaders could not explain why the followers maintain their support (or augment it) to these leaders when they were defeated or humiliated by foreign or internal forces.

Ann Ruth Willner, a promising anthropologist, suggests that the charisma of a leader is bound up with, and may even depend upon, his assimilation in the thoughts and feelings of a populace, and his assimilation in the people's sacred figures, divine beings, or heroes.[39] Their actions, states Willner, and the context of these actions encountered

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[39] Ann Ruth Willner, Charismatic Political Leadership, Research Monograph No. 32 (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, 1968), pp. 84-85.

in myths, express the fundamental values of a culture, including its basic categories for organizing experience and trying to resolve basic cultural and human dilemmas.

Of the overlapping and conflicting theories of myth to be found in the recent anthropological literature, all seem to regard myths as tales referring to events that took place in the past, usually a legendary past. Levi-Strauss points out that "what gives the myth an operational value is that the specific pattern is timeless; it explains the present and the past as well as the future."[40] A prime example of Strauss' explanation was recently given by the cry of hundreds of thousands of Egyptians mourning President Nasser and chanting "Nasser did not die, Nasser cannot die."[41] President Pompidou of France reiterated this example when he expressed to the French people, after the death of President De Gaulle, that "his spirit will always lead France and the French people . . . France is now a widow."[42] Strauss contends that recent events in a people's politics, particularly those marking a major transition or extraordinary occurrence in public life, can become endowed with the quality of myth if they fit it or can be fitted into the pattern of a traditional myth or a body of myths. In

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[40] Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth," The Journal of American Folklore, LXVIII (September, 1955), p. 430.

[41] See Al-Ahrām, September 29 and 30, 1970, pp, 1, 2, 3.

[42] The Salt Lake Tribune, November 11, 1970, p. 1.

these terms, the Aswan Dam, the Port Sa^{c}id battle (in Egypt) and the battle of New Orleans (in America) all have been included in the Egyptian and the American bodies of myths.

The charismatic leader, Willner suggests, often communicates to his followers a sense of continuity between himself and his mission and their legendary heroes and their missions.[43] How a particular leader does this was described by Willner as a "cultural management." In a similar way, Miles Copeland, in his Game of Nations, called the same phenomena a "strategy" which is played by charismatic leaders in part consciously and in part unconsciously and intuitively.[44]

The particular "strategy" of individual charismatic leaders could be subjected to investigation. Elements of such strategies might be broken down into categories: rhetoric employed in speeches, similie, metaphor, and allusions used in myths and history; gestures and movements used in actions; and modes used in handling crises. While this list can be refined and extended, it suggests some of the categories in terms of which the charismatic appeal of leadership can be analyzed.[45]

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[43]Willner, op. cit., p. 83.

[44]Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), passim.

[45]This writer has deliberately refrained from giving specific details of "leadership strategies" here. To give a meaningful illustration of even a single leader would

It should also be stressed that the elements of the behavioral patterns of each leader vary from culture to culture and from society to society. However, specific to the charismatic leader in all cultures is the role of the myth in the validation of his authority. His appeal can best be understood and accepted by reference to the body of myth prevalent in his culture.[46] The charismatic leader is charismatic because, in the breakdown of other means of legitimizing authority, he is able to evoke and associate with himself the sacred symbols of the culture. It follows that the charismatic appeal of a leader is, by definition, limited to those who share the traditions of a given culture; that is, to those who understand and respond to the symbols expressed in the myths a charismatic leader evokes. As an example, although Zaghlūl was charismatic to the Egyptian people in the mid-twenties, he was not so considered by the rest of the Arab peoples. To the contrary, Nasser in the mid-sixties was as charismatic to the Egyptian people as he was to the Syrians, Libyans, and Sudanese. The change here is definitely related to the change in the Arab myths and traditions (in addition to other factors,

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require an elaboration of the myths and values of his culture and lack of space--at this stage of the research--prohibits this illustration.

[46] Bronislau Malinowski, "Myth in Primitive Psychology," in his Magic Science and Religion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), pp. 96-108.

i.e., communication systems and propaganda techniques) which Nasser evoked in the Arab peoples as one nation.

This argument should not suggest that charismatic leaders achieve power or retain it by charisma alone. Charismatic appeal provides the source and legitimization of authority in a certain society for a certain period of time. Other supports may be needed (sometimes required) to maintain power, especially when charismatic appeal begins to decline.[47]

The basic mission of a charismatic leader in any society can be broadly stated as: (1) to destroy the older order, completely or partially (political, social, economic or all of them together); and (2) to build a new and a more adequate (often termed better) order.[48] A valid question which is often raised with regard to the second point, adequate to whom? To the members of the society or to the leaders of the new regime? Or to both? Another question, of course, is what happens when the interests of the people conflict with the interests of the regime? The answers to these questions probably can be obtained only if new concepts of "political integration" and "political participation" are applied, as presented by David Easton, Gabriel

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[47] David Apter, Ghana in Transition (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1963), pp. 328-329. Apter argues that charisma can decline in favor of secular authority or, as he found in Ghana, as a result of conflict with traditional authority.

[48] Willner, op. cit., p. 86.

Almond, Sidney Verba, David Apter, and others.[49] Naturally, the new order (system) cannot be initiated against the proclaimed or implied wishes of the populace unless it is imposed by force. Also it becomes strategically hazardous to the new system if it fails to capture the public appeal (especially in the early stages of its emergenc). It, therefore, becomes imperative for political leaders to structure a socio-economic and a political system which attracts maximum popular appeal and, at the same time, minimizes the leadership risks the regime has to encounter.

In developing nations, as well as in rich nations, political, economic, social and ecological problems often spring to the fore when development projects are introduced to the populace. The end products of these dilemmas are often seen in terms of national unity or disunity (with regard to major development issues). Disunity might develop in a grave manner so as to threaten the cohesion, sovereignty or independence of the nation. The Civil War in the United States was a prime example; the situation in the Congo in 1961 or in Jordan in 1970 are also excellent examples. In

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[49]For detailed information on the theories of political integration and political participation, see the following references: Gabriel Almond, Study of Comparative Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966); Karl Deutsch, Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press, 1963); Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality and Nation-Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970); David Easton, A Framework of Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

these situations, the charismatic leader (Lincoln, Mubutu, and King Husein, respectively) may be the single symbol of unity surmounting the diversity and the primary means of creating consensus on objectives. Jackson and Nasser faced several situations of disunity in their histories. However, they floated high above the complexities of the issues and became the only visible embodiments of their nations as a whole.

The charismatic leader can be seen as a double-visaged Janus projecting himself, on the one hand, as the omniscient repository of ancient wisdom, and, on the other hand, as the new man of the people, who leads them and shares with them the trials of revolutionary renewal. The charismatic leader in developing nations often seeks to conserve his charisma and subdue factionalism under the umbrella of the single-party regimes serves a double function.[50] Joint participation in regime-sponsored organizational activities, even if partially or originally coerced, many times creates a sense of solidarity among the people, a sense of identification with the regime's goals, and a sense of accomplishment that gives some meaning to nationalism.

Of major significance to the charismatic leader is the creation of a national identity on the international

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[50]Willner, op. cit., p. 87.

scene. His speeches, remarks, and gestures become ideological indications which must be contended with in the international community. The presence and prominence of charismatic leaders in distant capitals and their exertion of obvious influence on international conferences give their peoples a sense of national identity and pride. Great examples in contemporary history are Churchill, Kennedy, Nehru, Nasser, and Khrushchev.

While charismatic leadership may contribute in many ways to the consolidation of the state, its exercise has often indicated the delay of institutionalism and political continuity needed for concrete tasks of development. A charismatic leader may become trapped by his own symbols and substitute symbolic action as ends instead of means. Viewing himself as the indispensable father of the country and the only one who holds its destiny, he may convert it--consciously, subconsciously or unconsciously--to an arbitrary state, to a police state or bluntly to a dictatorship. Charismatic leadership, as a rule, does not provide for orderly succession, though in several cases it did under uncommon conditions--Franco and Nasser are seen among the exceptions.[51]

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[51]President Nasser, some months before he died on September 28, 1970, hastily made provisions for Mr. Anwar al-Sadāt's (one of his associates) succession to the rulership of the United Arab Republic in case he (Nasser) became unable to preside. The reason for this hasty and arbitrary decision was explained by Al-Ahrām (October 17, 1970) as a response by Nasser when he discovered about an assassination attempt plotted against his life in a forthcoming trip.

Finally, it is noteworthy to indicate that there appears to be no correlation between charismatic leadership and recognized systems. It exists--and might exist--in democracies, theocracies or autocracies. It existed--and might exist--under capitalist systems, as well as under communist systems. It was common--and is common--in traditional societies and in developed societies. The charismatic leader might be a Christian, a Jew or a Moslem, as well as a pagan or an atheist. The charismatic approach focuses on the leader's ability and performance rather than on the constitutional technicalities of legitimacy and political philosophies. Charismatic leadership is hard to define, but "it is there, go and use it," to quote Thomas Edison when he described electricity. Charismatic leadership, in this respect, might either turn a nation on, or it might keep the populace, as well as the leader, in political darkness. Charismatic leaders are hard to find and are harder to depose; it is the people who help charismatic leadership emerge, and ironically it is these same people who stimulate its fall.

PART III

CHARISMATIZATION: CONCEPT AND APPLICATION

CHAPTER V

THE CONCEPT OF CHARISMATIZATION

It may be argued that individuals either have charismatic potential (the capability to develop into a charismatic image if other factors materialized) or they do not have it.

The one possessed of such potential can be seen as having a form of "dormant charisma." The one who does not have it cannot develop a different image other than what he already has.

Dormant charisma, so to speak, is the potential of an individual to shine under certain societal conditions. When these conditions appear, dormant charisma is activated into a "charismatic image." Dormant charisma is a personality trait which tends to be partial, locally observed, and is limited to face-to-face relationships. Activated charisma, on the other hand, is a personality stage which tends to be dynamic, nationally or internationally observed, and is capable of affecting people without the need for a face-to-face relationship.

The term "charisma" has not been used as a verb before.[1] However, in order to give the concept of charisma

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[1]Chapter IV of this dissertation explains how the term "charisma" has been used by different authors.

its operational use, this writer will use it in this capacity. The verb will denote, in this respect, a two-way process. First, the charismatization of followers by their leader (i.e., placing them under the influence of the charismatic image of the leader, and as a result they become receptive to and appreciative of the leader's attempts to change their lives). Second, the charismatization of the leader (i.e., making him aware of his new charismatic image by the great emotion and enthusiasm he receives from his charismatized followers). The former relationship refers to the role of the leader in the transmission of a dazzling ideology to his followers to fill an existing value-belief vacuum (or changing such beliefs) in a society. The latter relationship alludes to the creation (or reinforcement) within the leader of a charismatic image, thus he becomes capable of the diffusion of (or intensifying) an effective influence over the lives and welfare of his followers.

Jackson and Nasser, like many other charismatic leaders, were not born charismatic. However, from their youth, they seemed to have had "dormant charisma." This was manifested--in Jackson's life history--by his heroic performance at New Orleans, his election to the Senate by the people of Tennessee, and later by his nomination for the presidency in 1824. Nasser's dormant charisma can be seen in his military fame during the war in Palestine (at least within the Egyptian Army), his organization and

leadership of the Free Officers, and his coup against the monarchy in 1952.

Overcoming problems or meeting challenges of the times by emerging leaders will have a charismatizing impact on the masses; they generate compassion, great enthusiasm, and an identification with the emerging leaders. The apparent determination of a leader to overcome crushing odds creates a popular environment of sympathy among the masses. The feedback of these emotions transforms the leader; it activates his dormant charisma and generates his charismatic image. The leader can then turn his attention to more important issues since the masses, at this stage, have become receptive to and appreciative of his suggestions concerning changes in policies, institutions, and social values.

Jackson's defeat in the elections of 1824 by "corrupt bargaining" (though he received a majority of the popular vote) established the necessary environment of mass sympathy that enabled him to win the elections in 1828. Nasser's struggle with Naguib, which induced the Moslem Brothers' (allegedly affiliated with Naguib) assassination attempt on Nasser's life in 1954, brought about a similar environment for Nasser's emergence as the charismatic image of the revolutionary group.

The charismatic leader begins, in the next stage, to transmit to the masses his goals and aspirations, generally not clearly enunciated in the beginning stages

of his leadership. This is often done by his delivering speeches, giving audience to interviewers, appearing before the masses, and entertaining military parades and national processions. This, in turn, brings about mass absorption of the leader's commitments, great admiration for his endeavors, enthusiasm, and national pride. This popular expression of jubilance, accompanied by unquestionable acceptance of the leader--on behalf of the masses--has a reinforcing impact on the growth of the leader's charisma. Thus a charismatization process is set into motion.

This two-way process of charismatization develops through the occurrence of certain charismatic situations. The masses in a social, economic or political crisis freely commit themselves to an impressive and dazzling ideology presented by the "savior-leader." The outcome of each charismatic situation is two-fold: (1) the build-up of the mystical image of the leader among the masses, and (2) the transformation (or siltation[2]) of the leader's personality into a distinctive charismatic image. By recurrence, layers of charismatic sediments settle upon the masses through the leader's repeated psychological embodiment. With time these sediments solidify and become habitual; the real personality

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[2]The term is seldom used in a political context. It refers in this dissertation to the accumulation of layers of charisma in the leader's psyche.

of the leader disappears and his new image emerges and dominates the masses.

Charismatization processes have a psychologically multiplying effect. Each successive charismatic situation reinforces the receptivity of the masses to the leader's prescriptions and ideological slogans which will relieve their hardships. At the same time, the multiplying effect increases the leader's commitment to execute his mission in a more aggressive manner and perpetuate his charismatic authority.

Such charismatization processes terminate only by a social or a political shock: the death of the charismatic leader (as happened in the UAR after the death of Nasser), the disintegration of the political system by external or internal intervention (as happened in Germany in 1945 when the Allies occupied Germany, thus ending Hitler's charismatic state), or, as in the Western democratic states, by the legitimate removal of a charismatic leader through electoral processes (Sir Winston Churchill's defeat in the 1946 elections in England or Charles DeGaulle's defeat in the 1969 elections in France).

However, charismatic love for power has often motivated charismatized leaders and/or followers even in stable democratic countries to attempt to amend their constitutional systems in order to allow the continuation of the charismatization processes. While, for example, Marshall Tito and his Yugoslav followers managed to

introduce such an amendment successfully to enable Tito to remain as president for life, Kamil Sham^{c}uun, President of Lebanon in 1958, and his followers failed drastically in this respect and introduced civil war and foreign intervention into their country.

The charismatization process, as suggested by this writer, depends basically upon the interaction of three variables:

(1) Certain preconditions of stress such as serious economic, social or political instability which render the society in a state of helplessness awaiting a "savior" to solve its problems.

(2) A charismatic personage who is capable of presenting himself to the masses with personal magnetism, remedy prescriptions, and hopes for glory. The leader's tools are his personal qualities and his exceptional performance. It is imperative, however, that these tools be acceptable to the normative patterns of the society at the time.

(3) A political formula that determines the ~~limits~~ magnitude of the sacrifices the masses ~~are ready to~~ can make, and the amounts of relief, compensation, and progress which the leader can procure. The effectiveness of the charismatization process depends on the balanced blend between such sacrifices and their anticipated relief.

These three variables interact and produce two most significant results:

(1) A charismatization bond which resembles an "engagement contract" between the followers and their leader. This bond is a short-run pledge of loyalty and devotion between the two parties; it depends mainly on the ~~attraction~~ fascination of the personage. If no bond materializes, the whole charismatization process ~~disintegrates~~ fails to materialize.

(2) A conscious effort by the leader to routinize the process by his transforming the temporary contract (the bond) into a system. Routinization is a permanent situation in which political institutions emerge and hold the power in the society.

Charismatic leaders, stimulated by the concept of power, constantly struggle to remain in the position of leadership. In order to insure legitimacy, political stability, and continuity, newly organized procedures must be institutionalized and adopted as the natural order ~~of~~ in the state; this means that the charismatization process must be stabilized and transcended in a political system. The transformation of the process into a system serves the interests of the leader by providing him with a degree of stability & security. New aspirants for leadership can then be treated as rebels attempting to disrupt a political system rather than as legitimate forces trying to upset a junta rule.

The ultimate objective of a charismatic leader is the maintenance of power. He will initiate and develop

charismatization processes in order to manifest and aggrandize the discontent of the masses. This action helps the leader to project his "savior image," and rally popular support for his ideology (a new set of economic, social, and political relations). Such a state--as a rule--justifies and legitimizes the leader's ultra-virus powers. This takes place when the exhausted masses move from the stage of popular excitement (over their interests) to the stage of complete dependence (on the charismatic leader) and heightened expectations for a "glorious age".

Charismatic leaders, in their charismatization dialogue, attempt to draw a curtain of emotional sentiments between their followers and the current value system of the society. They try to de-activate undesired conventional roles (termed the "old order") and to replace them with a new set of roles based on direct, interpersonal leader-mass associations in compliance with the charismatization contract.

To sustain a charismatic state, charismatic leaders must operate a constant and invigorative charismatization campaign. Their control over propaganda agencies and mass media is of crucial significance to the success of the charismatization process. The intervening variables in this process are the socio-political awareness of the masses, personal magnetism of the leader, and the nature of hardships and stresses facing the nation at the time. The outcome of this interaction determines the level of

charismatization found in a nation at any particular time in its history.

By way of a sequential order, it is important to note that dormant charisma must precede the activated one. The latter, in turn, must precede the charismatization process.

Dormant charisma can be conscious or unconscious. Activated charisma must be conscious. The manager of this charismatization process must not only be aware of what he is deploying, but he must also be planning for the process, supervising its implementation, and appreciating its results.

CHAPTER VI

JACKSON AND NASSER: MANAGERS OF CHARISMATIZATION PROCESSES

Presidents Jackson and Nasser not only typified their times, but they also shaped them. By gauging the aspirations of their followers and translating them into programs that would win their overwhelming support, these leaders would be able to increase their power and the power of their followers over the government. Jackson and Nasser were the first presidents to provide the majority with effective leadership. The "Reign of King Jackson" and the leadership of "Al Rayyis" are seen by this writer as prime examples of charismatization processes. These two leaders' distinctive power was in their ability to identify their policies with the interests of the majority and to create the impression that they (the people) were masters rather than victims of the age in which they lived. Through this, Jackson introduced his version of "American democracy" and reshaped the American values to conform with his "Jacksonian democracy." Nasser successfully brought Egypt "independence" and his ideology of "Arab Socialism" became widely adopted in the Middle East. The Jackso-Nasserite strategy shifted the emphasis from the weakness of the state to the strength

of the people so that during their administrations "democracy" and "socialism" became as exciting as they were effective means by which individuals and groups coalesced behind their bold and forceful leaders. Jefferson and Zaghlul thought that powerful executives might destroy democracy. Jackson and Nasser later demonstrated that a strong President was an essential feature of democratic societies. Jackson and Nasser's ability, however, to provide a type of leadership that strengthened rather than vitiated democracy, can be attributed to their great skills in political strategy. They ascertained and exemplified the will of the majority, the people's views of interest; the extent of their thoughts and policies was reflected by the acquisitive spirit of their times. Jackson and Nasser, evidently, were seen by their peoples as symbols of their ages.

Eulogies probably tend to exaggerate, but in many cases they accurately illustrate the deep emotions which individuals, groups, and nations feel toward their dead, especially if the deceased have become mythical figures among their followers.

At 6 p.m. on June 8, 1845, Andrew Jackson died peacefully at the "Hermitage," and two days later he was buried by the side of his wife at the garden of the Hermitage.[1] At 6:15 p.m. on September 28, 1970, Gamal Abdul-

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[1]Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1966), p. 188.

Nasser died peacefully at "Manshiet Al-Bakry Home," and three days later, he was buried at a humble grave in the "Manshiet Al-Bakry Mosque"--a short walking distance from his home--where his wife will be his sole joiner when she dies.[2]

The eulogies written of Jackson and Nasser, in many terms, are similar; they have basically portrayed the two leaders as symbols of their ages.

Washington McCartney's eulogy of Jackson offers a clear illustration of this charismatization process:

> . . . Run the eye across the history of the world. You observe that there are certain cycles, or ages, or periods of time, which have their peculiar spirit, their ruling passion, their great, characterizing, distinctive movements. He, who embodies in its greatest fullness, the spirit of such an age, and enters with most earnestness into its movements, received the admiration of his contemporaries. . . . And why? Because they see in him their own image. Because in him is concentrated the spirit that has burned in their bosom. Because in him exists, in bodily form, in living flesh and blood, the spirit that gives them life and motion. The Spirit of God descended upon the Savior of the world in the form of a dove. The spirit of an age sometimes descends to future generations in the form of a man . . . in proportion as an individual concentrates within himself the spirit which works through masses of men and which moves, and should move them through the greatest cycles of time, in that proportion, he becomes entitled to their admiration and praise. Because his countrymen saw their image and spirit in Andrew Jackson, they bestowed their honor and admiration upon him.[3]

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[2] Al-Ahrām, September 29, 1970, p. 1.

[3] John William Ward, Andrew Jackson, Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 1.

The Daily Star, at the death of President Nasser, described the Arab World as "grief stricken, . . . stunned." A porter, the newspaper said, pushed his way out of the crowd screaming, "Let me go . . . I have become an orphan." A newspaper-seller wept and said, "I would rather hear the death of my three children, but not him." The crowds were marching hysterically in the streets of Cairo crying, "He was our father . . . He was our leader . . . He was our all."[4] According to Al-Ahrām, millions of Egyptians, hysterical with grief over the death of their President, turned his state funeral into riot and broke up the solemn procession of official mourners soon after it started.[5]

Mohammed Hasanein Haykal eulogized Nasser by emphasizing the notion of his being a symbol of his age:

> The roles of heroes are a cyclic phenomenon in history. . . . They emerge from the masses [of their nations]. The hero [Nasser] was a man whose determinations have hosted all the nation's dreams. . . . He absorbed his nation's secrets . . . and assimilated all his nation's capacities. He [Nasser] was a spearhead of his nation [into history]. . . and pushed it forward from anxiety to maturity, and from bewilderment to progress. His life was larger than life, and his death is larger than death.[6]

Anwar Al-Sadat, the then Vice President of Egypt, described Nasser as the " . . . hero, the leader, and the

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[4] The Daily Star (Beirut), September 29, 1970, p. 1.

[5] Al-Ahrām, October 2, 1970, p. 1.

[6] Ibid., p. 3.

prophet of Egypt and the Arab nation. . . . His memory will remain immortal in the hearts of the Arab nations and all man-kind. He looms larger than all speeches, and will remain outlasting all words."[7]

The Sheikh of Islam, at Cairo eulogized Nasser, "the eternal hero":

> . . . though Nasser selected to be beside God, he will remain alive in our midst, by virtue of his highest principles; . . . they are faith, justice, glory, and honor. [He] will lead us in our daily life as an illuminating light, a beam to direct [us] and as a high-flown flag which will encompass our endeavors on the path of faith, nationhood, glory, and existence.[8]

The usage of the term "selected" by the Sheikh of Islam a grand and knowledgeable scholar, is significant. This usage obviously carries the connotation that Nasser could have remained alive if he so desired. Consequently, it conveys the subtle meaning that Nasser had, in one way or another, power over his life vis-a-vis death.

This perception of power over death was not alien to the American society which mourned Jackson in 1845. Jackson was considered to be capable of putting death aside until his objectives were achieved. An anecdote to this effect describes a conversation which was supposed to have occurred in a New York omnibus between a merchant and

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[7] Ibid., p. 1.

[8] Ibid., p. 3.

a broker--the broker's speculative occupation makes him an appropriate adversary of Jackson.

Merchant: (with a sigh) "Well, the old General is dead."

Broker: (with a shrug) "Yes, he's gone at last."

Merchant: (not appreciating the shrug) "Well, sir, he was a good man."

Broker: (with a shrug more pronounced) "I don't know about that."

Merchant: (energetically) "He was a good man, sir. If any man has gone to heaven, General Jackson has gone to heaven."

Broker: (doggedly) "I don't know about that."

Merchant: "Well, sir, I tell you that if Andrew Jackson has made up his mind to go to heaven, you may depend upon it, he is there."[9]

The charismatization processes instigated by Jackson and Nasser can be analyzed in terms of four components:

1. Providence
2. Nature and self-made life
3. Iron will
4. Courage

Providence: Jackson and Nasser, The Agents of God

Before Jackson and Nasser became presidents, they were able to draw upon themselves a partial mantle of myth. Furthermore, insofar as any myth can be regarded as a charter for action which validates ritual and moral acts,

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[9]Ward, op. cit., p. 165.

or, indeed, any culturally prescribed behavior, the assimilation of Jackson and Nasser in the thoughts and feelings of their people validated almost all of Jackson's programs of reform and Nasser's policies in the Arab World.

Jackson, the myth, was established before his victory at New Orleans in the winter of 1814. Nasser's myth began before his victory at Port Said in the winter of 1956.

The American people in 1812 expected defeat at New Orleans. The New York Evening Post editorialized that " . . . if an attack has been made on New Orleans, the city has fallen . . . [since the British have] perfect command of the strategic situation."[10] The general American mood, at the time of New Orleans, was one of gloom and doubt. In a war replete with military reverses for the United States, the hardest blow dealt America was not a blow to the military, but a blow to the morale of the people. The war of 1812 threatened to destroy the young nation's pride. The buoyant optimism which had marked the opening of the war had given way at the end to gloom and despair.[11] At the

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[10]The New York Evening Post, quoted in Ward, op. cit., p. 4.

[11]The National Intelligencer, October 4, 1814 reported that money lenders in New Orleans would not advance funds or extend a loan for a period so long as sixty days for fear of a change in government within that time. The Salem Gazette, September 23, 1814 was arguing whether the Union was not "virtually dissolved." These quotations are from The National Intelligencer and The Salem Gazette and are cited in Ward, op. cit., pp. 4-5.

beginning of 1815, Washington was in ashes, the Hartford Convention was in session holding out the threat of disunion, and rumors of a British armada had the cities along the East Coast in a panic. These conditions undoubtedly provided the preconditions for Jackson's charismatization campaign.

Into this atmosphere of gloom and doubt burst the news of Andrew Jackson's crushing victory over the British in New Orleans. The news of the victory " . . . came upon the country like a clap of thunder in the clear azure vault of the firmament, and traveled with electromagnetic velocity, throughout the confines of the land."[12] The newspaper headlines gave some measure of the nation's reaction: "Almost incredible victory. Glorious news. Glorious unparalleled victory. Splendid victory. Rising glory of the American Republic."[13]

Through Andrew Jackson's victory, the American people were vicariously purged of shame and frustration. At a moment of disillusionment, Andrew Jackson re-affirmed the young nation's self-belief; he restored its sense of national prowess and destiny. It means nothing, however, to say that Andrew Jackson re-invigorated American nationalism without exploring further the terms in which the United States celebrated its self-love. What needs

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[12] Ibid., p. 5.

[13] Ibid.

stressing at this point is that the various concepts which gave substance to the abstraction "nationalism," were articulated (by the American people) in terms of Andrew Jackson, so that Andrew Jackson easily became a symbol for the ideas themselves.

The charismatization process, as previously stated, indicates that it is a state of mind which leaders transmit and followers accept. The initial charismatization situation which generated Andrew Jackson's mystical images was undoubtedly the product of his victory at New Orleans. It reflected a charismatic personage capable of presenting himself as a savior of the American honor, and a symbol of American nationalism. At a celebration held in Louisiana on January 23, 1815 and organized by Abbe Guillaume Dubourg, administrator apostolic of the diocese of Louisiana, the charismatization bond--between Jackson and the American people--was set into motion. An arch was built in the middle square of the city in front of the church. Jackson rode to the church accompanied by young ladies all dressed in white and wearing a silver star on their foreheads. General Jackson was requested to proceed to the church under the arch of victory and receive the crowns of laurel from the ladies. At the church, the Abbe addressed the General as the "Ruler of all Events" and characterized him as "God's chosen instrument." The Abbe went on to say:

> Whilst grateful America is now re-echoing from shore to shore your splendid achievements . . . whilst thus raised by universal acclamation to the very pinnacle of fame and descending clouds of incense, how easy had it been for you, General, to forget the prime Mover of your wonderful successes, and to assume to yourself a praise which must essentially return to that exalted Source whence every source of merit is derived. But, better acquainted with the nature of true glory, and justly placing the summit of your ambitions in approving yourself the worthy instrument of Heaven's merciful designs, the first impulse of your religious heart was the acknowledgement of the single interposition of Providence. Your first step in a solemn display of your humble sense of His favors. To Him, therefore, our most fervent thanks are due . . . and it is Him, we chiefly intend to praise when considering you, General, as the man of His right hand.[14]

Another writer said that " . . . [reports of the battle] were transmitted to posterity by tradition, instead of authentic history, it would be ranked among the fabulous, or by those who believed, considered as one of the miracles of heaven."[15] Prior to this occasion, a correspondent of the Richmond Enquirer, who had noted the disparity of the forces engaged in the Battle of New Orleans, concluded that the "finger of heaven was in this thing."[16]

Jackson himself seems to have accepted his characterization as God's chosen instrument graciously. "Jackson

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[14] Boston Patriot, January 28, 1815; National Intelligencer, cited by James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, Vol. 2 (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861), p. 244.

[15] Ward, op. cit., p. 106.

[16] Ibid.

could well afford to be gracious," stated John Ward--a great admirer of Jackson--who described the General's graciousness thus: "It hardly depreciated his importance at New Orleans to be assigned a secondary role, as long as it was second only to God."[17] Later, when Jackson was attacked in Congress for his conduct in the Seminole affair, one of his defenders warned the detractors that this was not an ordinary man upon whom they were laying their "sacreligious hands."[18]

Jackson must have believed that he indeed was or had become God's instrument on earth. In his address to his troops after the battle at New Orleans, he referred to the slight American losses at the Battle as "that wonderful interposition of heaven."[19] As a student of Jackson's religious views, Epes Sargent says that during the War of 1812 "Providence must have appeared to him (Jackson) as a sort of an ally that constantly was concerned in his material well-being."[20]

Later in life, Jackson was accustomed to referring to his role in the victory at New Orleans as that of "the humble instrument of a super-intending Providence."[21]

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[17] Ibid., p. 105.

[18] Ibid., p. 108.

[19] National Intelligencer, February 21, 1815.

[20] Epes Sargent, The Life and Public Services of Henry Clay (New York 1848), p. 19.

[21] Ward, op. cit., p. 107.

Aside from the political and military preconditions for charismatization mentioned earlier, the current American socio-religious values served as a catalyst with Jackson's emerging leadership. Perhaps the most durable of the cultural and social values that prevailed in the United States before and during the age of Jackson was the belief that "God will see to it that America will succeed." This vigorous optimism came down to Americans in the secularized version that "everything will come out all right in the end." Americans of the nineteenth century, preoccupied with immediate tasks, argued that a self-conscious social philosophy against which all change must be measured was unnecessary because men in America would intuitively trod the path of justice. To this was added the belief that the future was inscrutably present in God's mind and was working itself out according to His mysterious and eternal decrees. Since man's intuition was finally God's word mediated through the book of nature, both attitudes implied an acceptance of a higher law which informed and governed each individual action. But this higher law was conveniently beyond the reach of man's conscious mind. The result was that the law of God was comforting rather than critical. Against the troublesom possibility that man's reason might prove unable to validate the promptings of his heart was posed the psychological assurances that all actions were

necessarily fragments of a divine mosaic, and therefore harmonious, whatever man might think from his limited perspective.[22] In such a climate of opinion, there arises little cause for doubt or wonder at his followers' assumption that since Jackson represented the will of God, he should also represent the will of the American people. Jackson's entire life, after New Orleans, was seen by the American masses as a fulfillment of that assumption; but to Jackson himself the victory may have initiated his awareness of his future potential. The victory given to Jackson at New Orleans marked the beginning of the "charismatization bond" between himself and his followers.

The fact that Jackson alone, of all his family, survived the Revolutionary War supported, in a way, the American perception of Jackson as the "agent of God." It convinced the American masses, at the time, that "the way of Providence is dark and inscrutable."[23] One eulogist celebrated the memory of Jackson's mother who, for the cause of the Revolution, offered up her whole family except for the last son (Andrew): " . . . like Abraham, she could

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[22]For a discussion of these views, see Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York: Macmillan Company, 1966); Frederick Jackson Turner, The United States 1830-1850 (Gloucester, Mass,: Peter Smith, 1958); J. Isaac Copeland, Democracy in the Old South (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1969); Jackson Turner Main, The Social Structure of Revolutionary America (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965).

[23]Ward, op. cit., p. 112.

have sacrificed him too, had not her hand been stayed by an invisible hand."[24]

Other charismatic situations confirm Jackson's protection by God. Jackson was the first American President upon whose life an attempt was made. In 1835, while the President was in the House of Representatives, a lunatic--who later described himself as heir to the British crown--fired two pistols at him, not more than six feet away. The caps exploded, but the charges failed to go off. An expert on small arms calculated the odds on two successive misfires of this nature to be about 125,000 to 1.[25] Why the guns misfired is unclear, but the situation was highly charismatizing to the common man. The most common explanation given, at the time, was in terms of Divine Providence which ". . . had ever guarded the life of the man destined to preserve and raise his country's glory and maintain the cause of the people."[26]

Even Jackson's momentary setbacks were used to demonstrate God's far-seeing wisdom. Jackson's failure on December 23, 1814 to defend his troops from a British attack (during the Battle of New Orleans) was used to demonstrate the interposition of Heaven that Jackson might gain a

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Freeman Cleaves, William Harrison and His Time (New York: Kennekat Press, 1939), p. 312.

[26] Ward, op. cit., p. 114.

a greater victory later. Appeals were made to the electorate in 1828 to elect Jackson because he was the instrument chosen by Providence "to bring back the republic to the purity and simplicity of the democratic days of the country."[27] Thus the Nullification threat was later also seen as a manifestation of God's intervention through Jackson (as God's agent) in quieting separatist tendencies.

In the final analysis, it is clear that the charismatization process was set into motion, the bond was established, and the hero of New Orleans was seen as the man for the times chosen by Providence to guide the American people to the exalted destiny which God in His wisdom had ordained for the United States.

Nasser's activated charisma seems to have emerged in the mid-1950's. To millions of Arabs from Morocco to the Persian Gulf he became the symbol of the lost dream of Arab greatness, the proud challenger to the Goliath of the West. Nasser's durability and political success, despite several military and political setbacks, frustrated and baffled policy-makers in various world capitals. He seemed to defy the political laws of gravity. The answer to this riddle lay in his personal magnetism and his connections with the nationalist yearnings of the Arab masses after World War II.

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[27] *Ibid.*

No leader of the masses in Egyptian history has possessed so masterful and colorful a personality as Gamal Abdul-Nasser. He became an authentic folk hero (the type of man the common people have always admired), an out-of-doors personality, a man of direct action, and a legendary myth. Arising from plebeian origins, he had the extroverted tastes of the village, the prejudices, the religion, and the sense of values of the common man which enabled him to understand their psychology, to transmit to them his mentality, and to receive from them an overwhelming support for his exciting, though hazardous, endeavors. The New York Times stated that " . . . everything in this country [Egypt] is in doubt except the people's devotion to Nasser. Egypt is like a hard-pressed family that has closed ranks behind its father."[28]

Nasser was a real Egyptian, a genuine son of the Nile, the first "true Egyptian" to rule Egypt in twenty-five hundred years. He ousted King Farouk and his Pashas, instituted a measure of land reform, and established real social and apparent political equality. He cleaned up--or seriously attempted to clean up--the corruption and squalor that had characterized the government of Egypt for centuries.[29]

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[28] The New York Times, September 29, 1970, p. 9.

[29] J. B. Mayfield, "The Institutions and Politics of Rural Egypt," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas, 1968), p. 131.

After his initial takeover, the Egyptian people came to revere Nasser as their champion against colonialism and poverty. The masses were dazzled by his success in uprooting the old monarchical system and in making himself and Egypt a power in the world community.

Nasser's first charismatization situation took place when he successfully initiated a complete withdrawal of British troops from Egypt, and won Egypt's independence in 1954 from the British who had dominated the country--with no apparent intention to evacuate--since 1882. Nasser's brilliant feat, the removal of the British base from the Suez Canal, was perceived as a miracle by the older generation of Egyptians; by the younger generation it was perceived as the beginning of a glorious restoration of the old Egyptian prowess and pride.

As early as 1953, Nasser effectively demonstrated what Professor Ann Ruth Willner calls "cultural management" or the leader's strategy to draw on himself the mantle of myth among his populace:

> The people who bargain about their freedom are, in fact, signing the document of their slavery. . . . It is time for Colonialism to carry his cane back and depart [from Egypt], otherwise he must fight to the death for his existence.[30]

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[30] Gamal Abdul-Nasser, Majmūᶜat Kutub wa-Taṣrihāt wa-Bianāt, Vol. I (Cairo: Maṣlaḥat al-Istiᶜlamāt, July 1952-1958), p. 3, henceforth referred to as Taṣrihāt.

The removal of the British forces from the Canal Zone could be attributed to Nasser's political skill in negotiating their withdrawal; but the withdrawal of the Anglo-French and the Israeli troops, two years later, was definitely perceived by the Egyptian masses as a stroke of Providence. "Allah is with him" was the common saying among the Egyptians of all social levels since the foreign occupation forces were by far much more powerful and better trained than the Egyptian forces at the battle of Port Said in 1956.

Like Jackson, Nasser survived the one and only concrete attempt on his life. In Nasser's case the situation was more effectively exploited, probably because of the less really violent atmosphere of the Egyptian society compared to the American society at Jackson's time. The propaganda machine under Nasser was also much more effective due to the more developed communication media in the twentieth century. In this situation, Nasser, in fact, took full advantage of his charismatization skills to score a political achievement of an exceptional caliber. On the evening of October 25, 1954, eight bullets were fired at him while he was addressing his people at al-Manshieh Square in Alexandria, Egypt. He was not wounded. Whether he thought he was is not clear. But the manner in which he managed to continue and complete his speech displayed a stroke of genius and exceptional courage. He remained

stable. He did not attempt to bend or take shelter. Not one fearful gesture was made by him. To the masses no evidence of Divine protection could have been more empirical than Nasser's own words which--assuming that he was critically wounded and dying--he directed to his people on the spur of the moment:

> Oh free men, remain in your places.
> Oh free men, stay in your places.
> This is Gamal Abdul-Nasser speaking to you.
> My blood is from Egypt and to Egypt always.
> I revolted for you, for your honor, and for your pride.
> Let them kill me; I have already instilled dignity in you.
> Let them kill me; I have already established honor for you.
> Let me be killed for you; for your children, and for your grand-children.
> Keep struggling, my fellow Egyptians, and lift up the flame.
> If Nasser dies, he will die with a peaceful heart because he is leaving you all as NASSERS.
> Do not fear death--life is immortal.
> March onward.[31]

Much of Nasser's foreign entanglements result from the fact that Egypt is at the cross-roads of the World. When he announced in 1956 his nationalization of the Suez Canal in order to use its revenues to build al-Sadd al-ᶜāli (the High Dam) and to raise the standard of living for the Egyptian fellaheen, he, in fact, instigated one of his boldest charismatization situations. Egyptian people were--and still are--thirsty for al-ᶜizzah wa-al-karāmah (dignity and self-respect) which Nasser had promised them

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[31] Ibid., p. 238.

earlier. By his defiance and humilation of the West (which had, for centuries, humiliated and frustrated the Moslems), Nasser gained more mythical reverence for himself. Nasser, consequently, was often compared to Saladin, the twelfth century Moslem leader who was famous for his humiliating Richard the Lion-Hearted and his Crusaders through his recapturing of the Holy Land. Nasser's government, because of this emotional, religious, and political similarity, put Saladin's symbol--the eagle--in its coat of arms.

Songs demonstrating the will of the Egyptian people to build the Dam as a symbol of their glorious destiny became the tone of Nasser's era. The song, "We said we'll build the High Dam and here we have built it" became extremely popular in the streets of Cairo. "Our Rayyis is our fellah and our Skipper" was another song which Egyptians kept chanting for years after Nasser's striking "almost single-handed" success in rebuffing the tripartite aggression against Egypt. Port Said itself became a symbol of Egyptian resistance, a Mecca of patriotism, and a symbol of Nasser's defiance of the West. The battle of Port Said was described as psychologically comparable to the Battle of Stalingrad.

The victory at Port Said created a strong and rapid rapport between Nasser and the Egyptian masses. The people in the streets, storekeepers, students, and particularly the fellaheen were impressed by Nasser's manner and handling of the politico-military situation. It undoubtedly

demonstrated, in addition to his providence, his personal courage, devotion to his country, and readiness to die for his followers. The situation also re-affirmed the reputation of Nasser as God's man. He became the barakah (blessing) of the masses. The eight bullets that were fired at him and which wounded two associates right next to him, did not even touch him. The masses expressed surprise. Nasser was imagined by the common man to be God's representative sent to restore the Egyptians' lost glory. The predominantly Moslem Egyptian masses adhere to the Moslem concept of theocratic rule, and Nasser, undoubtedly, provided them with all its ingredients.

After the June 1967 war, Nasser's role as a hero, a leader and a prophet fell into jeopardy. Such a crushing defeat would have ended a leader's career in almost any other country. Nasser submitted his resignation, but the Egyptian people demonstrated, and so did millions of Arabs outside Egypt, because in their bleak moment of defeat they felt they could not give up Nasser, their father, their hero, and their prophet. In his speech on November 9, 1967, most Egyptians felt that Nasser had marvelously demonstrated rare courage and self-sacrifice. In an attempt to play upon his charismatization, Nasser declared:

> The forces of imperialism imagine that Abdul-Nasser is their enemy. I want to make it clear that it is the entire Arab Nation and not Abdul-

> Nasser alone who is their enemy. Arab unity began before Abdul-Nasser, and will remain after Abdul-Nasser.[32]

This speech suggests that Nasser the myth had become Nasser the symbol (i.e., Nasser the myth, whom the Egyptians and the Arabs could not afford to live without). His mistakes became the people's mistakes. His defeats became the people's defeats. His existence in power symbolized the determination of the people to exist, to struggle, and to reject the defeat. The defeat itself, which was called a "setback," was seen as an experience to teach the people a lesson which would save them from more drastic sufferings and hardships in the future. Nasser became, more than ever, the symbol of existence, of the struggle for survival, the only hope for future recovery and victory. He became the embodiment of the people's history, its present, and its future destiny. In other words, the Arabs became Nasser and Nasser became the Arabs.

Nature: Jackson and Nasser, Self-made Men

The legendary descriptions of the popular love, admiration, and worshiplike passions, as expressed by the American people toward Jackson, and by the Egyptian people toward Nasser, are difficult to analyze. What kind of men were Jackson and Nasser? What made their followers love them so desperately?

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[32] Al-Ahrām, November 9, 1967, p. 1.

The dynamic concept of personality as propounded by Sigmund Freud, and enlarged or elucidated by other psychologists and analysts, although rarely exploited by political scientists, has to some degree affected the work of students of political leadership. It is true that most writers, faced with the problem of the relationship between political power and personality, continue to fall back in the main to the description of the manifest traits of the successful leader; but there are few among the more serious students of leadership who do not give at least a passing glance at childhood circumstances, family relationships, and striking evidences of personality disorders on a subject if the information is available.[33]

A brief and condensed analysis of Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser's socio-psychological background will be presented in the next part of this chapter. This discussion will attempt to show that as simple, yet proud men, who "carved their way from the plough to the presidency," they were most adequate managers of charismatization processes in the United States and the United Arab Republic.

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[33]For detailed information of the impact of childhood experience on later periods of life, see Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958) and Identity, Youth, and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968); H. Hartman, Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation (New York: International Universities Press, 1958); August Kubizek, The Young Hitler I Knew (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1955); Edward Bibring, "The Mechanism of Depression," in Affective Disorders, P. Greenacre, ed. (New York: International Universities Press, 1953).

The success of the Jackso-Nasserite charismatization process was due to their self-made lives. Their respective populaces appreciated and admired these characteristics in them. Jackson and Nasser can be described as independent persons from their childhood. Neither had experienced elitist behavior or even middle-class behavior. Neither had attained "good" education and high life and affluency were alien to them. The masses saw Jackson and Nasser as members of their alienated class, who were loyal to their class, and thus attempted persistently to represent, enhance, and support the interests of their class.

Francis Boylies of Massachusetts has portrayed the common American attitude at Jackson's time concerning the simplicity of their hero--a trait they apparently loved--by saying:

> Jackson had not the privilege of visiting the courts of Europe at public expense, and mingling with the kings and great men of the earth. . . . He grew up in the wilds of the West, but he was the noblest tree in the forest. He was not dandled into consequence by lying in the cradle of state, but inured from infancy to the storms and tempests of life, his mind was strengthened to fortitude and fashioned to wisdom.[34]

In Egypt, Nasser was always considered by the masses as the fellah-president, the first saᶜīdi. The people tended to see him as a conservative leader, a straightforward citizen, and an open-hearted human being. Above

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[34]Ward, op. cit., p. 69.

all they saw in him a man of vengeance (tha'r)[35] as it is the custom of most sa^{c}īdi's. Nasser's complexion was swarthy, his culture was crude, and his language was usually the vernacular. He represented the image of the brother, the father, or the offspring of the masses who, in turn, constitute about 95 percent of the Egyptian population.

Professor A. H. Maslow has ranked human needs in his "Theory of Human Motivation." In his reference to the need for safety, he contends that a child's need for safety is his preference for some kind of indisrupted routine or rhythm. A child needs an organized world rather than a disorganized or unstructured one.[36] If safety needs are not gratified, argues Professor Maslow, the child will grow with psychological dangers in a world he perceives to be hostile, overwhelming and threatening. Such a person behaves neurotically as if a great catastrophe were almost always pending. His safety need often finds specific expression in search for personal protection. Such persons may attempt to order

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[35]The tha'r custom is a genuine custom in Upper Egypt. Briefly, it means that when a member of a family is killed by a member of another, the former must kill a member of the latter who must be of the same status of the victim. The tha'r is seen by the people of Upper Egypt as a sacred obligation. Failure to keep such a custom by a family brings shame and dishonor on that family. The custom of tha'r, in that part of Egypt, symbolizes courage, bravery and honor.

[36]A. H. Maslow, "A Theory of the Human Motivation," Psychological Review, L (June 1943), p. 377. Also see Maslow's later work, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper, 1954).

and stabilize the world so that no unmanageable, unexpected, or unfamiliar dangers will ever appear. They might become Fuehrers.[37]

It can be easily established that as small children Jackson and Nasser did not enjoy an "organized" or "structured" family life. As young children they were raised in anxious and unsafe environments. Both were orphans or semi-orphans and were raised in poor, lower-class families. Their world seemed unreliable and unpredicatable. As young children their lives lacked a favorable family schedule or routine. At the age of eight, Nasser lost his mother; Jackson lost his mother at the age of fourteen. By the age of thirteen, both had engaged in a war or a riot and had been exposed to extreme violence. At that age, both were independent and on their own. These early confrontations of Jackson and Nasser with unfamiliar and strange and unmanageable stimuli naturally elicited terror reactions in their behavior. The loss of their mothers, in fact, caused them great panic and inflicted on theme severe emotional pain. Both had admired their mothers, and in the peak of their power they often recalled missing her love and guidance.

Professors Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner state, in their Inventory of Scientific Findings, that the weaker the integration of the family, the more likely the members

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[37] Ibid., p. 380.

are to join political or social movements of a deviant character.[38] As will be shown, both Jackson and Nasser in their adulthood joined some movement of a deviant character. Jackson, however, selected the social approach as an expression of his rebellion. Nasser, probably because of the political spirit of his time, adopted revolutionary political views. However, Nasser was an extreme introvert in contrast with Jackson who was an extreme extrovert.

In Al-Muṣawwar, Nasser was described in his childhood as "an introvert, a loner, silent, and quiet all the time; he avoided his clan and evaded any participation in their games."[39] Robert St. John refers to Nasser's youth with the words:

> By that time [at the age of eight] Gamal's character had begun to form. He had a passion for secrets and intrigues. Often he would not take Mahmūd [his closest friend] into his confidence. The simplest affairs became matters of plot and counterplot, cloaked in dark mystery.[40]

Early in 1952, Nasser, then a colonel in the Egyptian Army, laid a conspiratorial plan to assassinate General Sirry ᶜAmir whom the Free Officers' Organization alleged

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[38] Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964), pp. 316-317; also see Erik Erikson, op. cit.

[39] Al-Muṣawwar, August 1957, p. 23.

[40] Robert St. John, The Boss (New York: McGraw Hill, 1960), p. 19.

had sold munitions stolen from the Egyptian Army to the Army of Israel. Nasser decided upon the plan and personally participated in its execution. The General was not hurt as the bullets missed their mark. Nasser was remorseful over his deed and later revised the initial plan of the Free Officers to assassinate "the enemies of the people" one by one, and directed his effort toward the accomplishment of a coup d'etat.[41]

Jackson's frustration with his low family status, his deprivation of love, and his lack of proper education led him to compensate for his love need by striving to build up a residue of self-esteem. He joined the swinging clique of his time and became a leader among them. For several years he was involved with drinking, quarrelling, dueling and notorious adventures of the sort. His quarrels with Sevier, Dinsmore and his duel against Dickensen are landmarks of Jackson's violent behavior. "A worthless, drunken, blackguard scoundrel" were some descriptions given Jackson by his opponents during that era of his youth.[42]

When Jackson reached maturity, his reckless life made of him an efficient militia officer. After General Jackson won the victory of his life at New Orleans, his

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[41]Gamal Abdul-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Cairo: Government Printing Offices, 1954), pp. 34, 35.

[42]J. S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 62.

fame brought about his nomination for the presidency, which was as acceptable to the masses in the United States as it was repugnant to the political circles in Washington. Recklessness and extrovertness undoubtedly served Jackson as much as conspiracy and introvertness helped Nasser. In any event, both behaviors were an outgrowth of a deprived childhood.

Jackson and Nasser came from lower-class families who lived in obscure villages in the southern regions of their respective countries.[43] The Jacksons came from Waxhaws, South Carolina;[44] the Huseins came from Bani Murr in the Egyptian Ṣaᶜīd.[45] Jackson's father was a farmer; Nasser's father was a clerk at the village post office. Andrew was born at Waxhaws; Nasser was born in a poor district of the city of Alexandria where his father was

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[43]The South in American culture, as well as in Egyptian culture, was probably perceived in terms of underdevelopment, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and--in the case of Egypt--stupidity and stubbornness of its inhabitants.

[44]Andrew Jackson was accredited with eight birthplaces. The controversy over his birthplace began in 1815, a few weeks after the battle of New Orleans made him famous. Marquis James, a famous biographer of Jackson, dismisses without discussion the claims advanced in favor of Ireland, England, the high seas, York County, Pennsylvania, Virginia (Berkeley County), and West Virginia. James, as well as most reliable biographers, established the fact that Jackson was born in Waxhaws, South Carolina.

[45]Literally, the name Bani Murr means "the Tribe of Bitterness," a metaphorical name for toughness and strength.

transferred from Bani Murr.[46] Andrew's father died before he was born; his mother followed when the boy was fourteen. Gamal's mother died when he was eight, but his father died much later. Both children loved and adored their mothers and were emotionally affected at her loss.

In their youth, Jackson and Nasser were described as wild. Bassett described little Jackson in the following words: "Of all the wild youth of the neighborhood, he was the wildest. The boy had a sensitive, quick-tempered, persistent, independent, and rather violent disposition; and there was little in the life around him to soften these traits."[47] Jackson's mother probably could have helped soften his traits if she had lived longer. She was a pious woman and is said to have fixed in her heart that her youngest child (Andrew) should become a minister, which leads to the suggestion that he must, in early life, have shown some leaning toward a life of public activity.

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[46] Some observers reiterated that Gamal Abdul-Nasser was born and raised in a Jewish neighborhood in Alexandria, as the name of the street where he was born indicates: Hārit Khamīs al-ᶜAds (Khamīs-al-ᶜAds Lane). The name ᶜAds is a common Jewish name used in Egypt. St. John seems to confirm this assumption as he states in his book on Nasser, op. cit., p. 19, that little Nasser seemed to resent anyone being in a position to give him orders (including the Jews in the building, who asked him to turn on their lights on the sabbath). Some political psychologists may find in this one reason why Nasser later set himself against Israel with such determination.

[47] Bassett, op. cit., p. 8.

However, in his earliest habits, there was little to confirm her hopes.

St. John, in his book The Boss, picks up the point of wildness and relates it, probably in an identical manner, to Nasser:

> Already, at the age of eight, he was fiercely independent. He objected to having to submit to authority of any kind. He seemed to resent any one being in a position to give him orders or even to make requests: His father, his teachers, the policemen on the streets. He resented more than anything else someone trying to make a decision for him.[48]

In another situation, St. John described little Nasser as "a child of the street, who had never had a joyful or a happy childhood."[49] Gamal, according to St. John who makes it clear in his book that the information was derived from Nasser's immediate relatives and friends (participant observers), did not like his father, and the gap between them widened after the death of Gamal's mother. The boy, according to St. John's information, adored his mother and used to write to her regularly when she, along with his father, was separated from him. The father was working at Al-Khaṭaṭba village, while Gamal was studying at Alexandria and living with his uncle.

Young Jackson and young Nasser attained little in the way of scholarship mainly because of their lack of

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[48] St. John, op. cit., p. 19.

[49] Ibid., p. 21.

interest in education and their voluntary interruption of schooling to engage in nationalistic endeavors. However, Jackson and Nasser later proved they were mentally egoists; they relied on themselves. There was no time in their lives when they showed willingness to learn from others. Ideas came to them originally and in obedience to a strong, natural aptness for knowing what they wanted. It was not their nature to take ideas from others.

Jackson was described, in his youth, as "neither studious nor teachable."[50] His formal education was interrupted by the call for soldiers to resist the British. In 1780 a band of British soldiers attacked Waxhaws and ravaged the homes of the people. Jackson and his brother, Robert, engaged in battle against the British and both children were captured (Jackson was then thirteen). The commanding officer of the British forces ordered young Jackson to black his boots, but the boy remonstrated that he was a prisoner of war and not a servant. The reply was a saber blow aimed at the head of the young prisoner. The blow was warded off by the arm of the recipient who carried the mark and the grudge to his grave.[51]

Nasser's first experience with the British occurred when he was a little boy, much too young to understand its

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[50] Bassett, op. cit., pp. 10, 11.

[51] Ibid.

seriousness. One day his uncle Khalil vanished. When it finally came out that he had been arrested by the British secret police for organizing anti-British demonstrations, Gamal's father was greatly disturbed. Uncle Khalil went off to prison for several years.[52] This had two significant consequences: Gamal's father became determined that no other member of the family should get mixed up in politics; at the same time, it awakened young Nasser's intent to fight the British occupation in Egypt and made him determined to seek a Ṣaᶜidi-style revenge. In 1923 when Nasser was only eight, he led a demonstration by his school to protest the British occupation. There were British and Egyptian policemen waiting for them with swinging clubs. Young Nasser's "Children's Crusade" failed after he had received a strong club-blow on the head.

By 1935, Nasser had developed expertise in agitating and leading demonstrations. He led another demonstration which proved more successful and effective than the earlier one. The penalty he received as a result was greater as well. This time his planning seemed well-developed and his nationalistic movement was well-engineered. Nasser had formed a committee to organize the demonstrations under his leadership. Substantial damage to British property was among the objectives of the movement. Another objective

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[52]St. John, op. cit., p. 13.

included the proper mobilization of student forces in a coordinated effort to fight constantly against the British "colonialists."[53]

Nasser's mature political demonstrations were fierce. The first damage inflicted on British property by young Nasser was the destruction of a car owned by Mr. Woodly who was Gamal's English teacher. Nasser hated him. The reason for his hatred was founded not only in the fact that the teacher symbolized British colonialism, but was also due to the fact that he used to carry a pistol around his waist during school hours. Nasser could not tolerate Mr. Woodly's defiance of the school system and his humiliation of the students. Nasser's demonstration swept the streets chanting, "tahya Masr" (long live Egypt). British forces and Egyptian policemen (led by British superiors) finally put a violent end to Nasser's student demonstration. One student was martyred (killed for the cause) and several others were arrested. Gamal escaped with only a superficial wound from a bullet which passed through the skin of his forehead leaving a crescent mark. Like Jackson, Nasser carried his scar and his grudge to the grave.

Physically, both Jackson and Nasser were tall, gaunt, slender and very erect. Jackson's eyes were very blue; Nasser's were very brown. However, a great deal of

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[53] Al-Muṣawwar, August 1957, pp. 42, 43.

their magnetism was transmitted by their eyes; they were intense, shining, and penetrating. Hariet Martineau stressed the "fiery passion" in the eyes of Jackson.[54] St. John emphasized the "hypnotic power" of Nasser's eyes.[55] Both Jackson and Nasser bore themselves with the air of men who were their own masters. Nasser at the age of twenty was six feet tall and had exceptionally broad shoulders. His slightly hooked nose and gleaming array of teeth later were the delight of cartoonists around the world. Jackson was consistently described as tall, slender, and erect. His mouth was large and his lips emphatically expressed extreme anger.[56]

Jackson and Nasser probably had an intrinsic love for the military. Harold C. Syrett described Jackson as follows: "It is doubtful if any other American military hero ever possessed so many attributes of what is commonly called Prussianism as did Andrew Jackson, and he carried

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[54]Harriet Martineau, Retrospect of Western Travel, Vol. I (London: Conduit Street, Saunders and Otley, 1838) p. 255.

[55]St. John, op. cit., p. 143. The writer of this dissertation, who met with President Nasser on several occasions, recalls that, without exception, foreign visitors who had audience with the President expressed that though on occasion they failed to see exceptional merit in Nasser's discussions, his penetrating eyes virtually forced them to concede to his opinions.

[56]Bassett, op. cit., p. 22.

these attributes into civilian life."[57] There were five reasons for their commitment to the military: First, the military provided them with secure and guaranteed careers after they had been "lost" in their pre-military life. Second, they perhaps realized that the military establishment would give them a chance to reform their agitated youth. Third, both Jackson and Nasser felt that the way to satisfy their eagerness for power would be easily and rapidly achieved through the military ranks. Fourth, the military, naturally, provided them with ample chance for fair competition and excellence; traits which were intrinsic within their egos. Fifth, both had--or imagined that they had--real or imaginary enemies (in both cases they were the British) who threatened the stability and progress of their respective countries, and thus the military would probably present them with a chance to avenge their earlier frustrations and personal injuries.

Both Jackson and Nasser failed in the beginning to join the military. The armies of their countries were not interested in non-aristocratic cadets who lacked impressive family connections. However, even if these two applicants had attained the required prestigious qualities, neither army--at that time--was in a condition to expand and to recruit new officers. The United States was in a transitional condition, trying to seek political and peaceful

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[57]Harold C. Syrett, Andrew Jackson (New York: Bobbs Merrill Company, Inc., 1953), p. 23.

compromises with its ex-colonialists. Egypt, in 1939 before the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, was completely under British rule and domination.

Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser, frustrated by their previous failure to join the army, followed--strangely enough--the same social norm of many young men who wanted to rise above the social and economic status of their parents. Both entered law schools. Jackson moved to Salisbury and joined a class of students under Spure Macay, a lawyer of local note.[58] Nasser entered the law school of the Fouad University in Cairo.[59] Law was respectable and the yearnings for respectability and status among the middle class was so great that a majority of all university students in Egypt were studying law.

Historians state that Jackson did not appreciate the study of law. "It was not a very great deal of time that he gave to his law books," Bassett contends in his biography of Jackson.[60] Nasser, likewise, left law school after a few months. Many reasons for his departure were given. Among them was the reason that he decided he had no aptitude for law.[61] St. John indicates that the real reason why Nasser left law school is still unknown. Since there was unending

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[58]Bassett, op. cit., p. 12.

[59]St. John, op. cit., p. 33.

[60]Bassett, loc. cit.

[61]St. John, loc. cit.

friction between Gamal and his step-mother, and he and his father were not even speaking to each other, if he remained a student in law, St. John reports, he would have had to live at home, perhaps for a long time. In addition, so many lawyers were graduating every year that only a few ever found positions in law offices and Nasser expected an extensive period of law studies. In contrast, however, if he undertook a military career, St. John goes on, he would be sent to distant places; he would live away from home and thus he would escape his unhappy life at home.[62]

In 1802, Jackson fulfilled his dream and became the elected Major General of the Tennessee Militia. In 1938, Nasser fulfilled his dream and became a Second Lieutenant in the Egyptian Armed Forces.[63] The ten years following Jackson's election as Major General were years of expectancy.[64] They brought him three calls for active service from the Government: one in 1803 when it was feared that Spain would not give up Louisiana without force; one in 1806 in order to defeat Burr's alleged conspiracy; and one in 1809 when the Government planned a secret attack against West Florida. The War of 1812 culminated Jackson's military

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[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., pp. 33, 34.

[64] At that time, higher ranks in the army were by election.

career when there seemed no other excuse for the war than to wipe out the disgrace of a long, spiritless inactivity.

Nasser's first ten years in the Army called him to service on three assignments. First, he served at Gabal al-Awliya in the Sudān in 1939. Later he was called to work in collaboration with the British Forces at al-Alamain (the period and nature of the assignment are unknown).[65] The third and most crucial among Nasser's assignments was his participation in the Palestine War in 1948. Nasser's military career[66] was culminated by his political victory at Port Said in 1956. Nasser then was the Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces and President of Egypt.

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[65] St. John, op. cit., p. 44. St. John attributes Nasser's hostility to the British--in addition to his intrinsic feelings adopted earlier--to his personal contacts with British officers at al-Alamain, most of them with more education, more sophistication, and more culture than he had; somehow they seemed to make him feel it.

[66] P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), p. 50. Mr. Vatikiotis explains that only because of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 could Egyptian Army afford to expand and recruit Nasser and other non-bourgeios cadets. Vatikiotis contends that since it was the Wafd Government which concluded the treaty, Nasser gives credit to the Wafd for enabling him to join the Military Academy. Nasser was a serious sympathizer with the Wafd according to Vatikiotis. However, this writer believes that the fact that the Wafd agreed to form a government in 1942 under the tutelage of the British forces in Egypt totally changed Nasser's sentiments toward the Wafd party; he began to view that party as "opportunist," "British agent," or simply "traitors."

Iron Will: Jackson and Nasser, Unbendable Leaders

Jackson and Nasser's charismatization processes were largely based upon their overwhelmingly strong will.

From an examination of the literature on Jackson, it became obvious that the term "iron will" was a key phrase used by almost all of his biographers. Throughout his career, Jackson was lauded as a man of iron; his iron will was central to the innumerable descriptions of his character.

Fikry Abaza, a prominent Egyptian journalist and the editor-in-chief of Al-Musawwar, reiterated the same title of Jackson, applying it to Nasser: "Qalb min hadīd" (an iron heart). Abaza wrote:

> What I realized from my own observations, and knew from his knowledgeable associates, testifies that he possesses a heart of iron! When he anticipates danger, which occurs often, he virtually is transformed into a chunk of rock, or a block of iron. He never bothers with the results whatever they might be.[67]

During the later part of their lives, both Jackson and Nasser were physically ill, but through their strong wills they managed to perform their official duties in an amazingly efficient manner. Their spirits were firm in conquering their physical infirmities.

Andrew Jackson's constant ill health originated from a bullet wound inflicted during the famous Dickenson duel. This informity provided admirers of his own will

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[67] Al-Musawwar, August 1957, p. 17.

power with many opportunities to elaborate upon the superiority of his mind over matter. As one biographer wrote of Jackson during the Creek War: "His mind arise in majesty as his body was emaciated with toil."[68] Alexander Walker observed that at New Orleans " . . . his body was sustained only with the spirit within."[69]

In the same respect, Nasser's behavior was similar to Jackson's behavior. Nasser was plagued with a number of ailments. After 1967, he developed a severe leg inflammation and diabetes. He received treatments for both ailments in Egypt then in the Soviet Union. Hasanain Haykal states that Nasser constantly refused to rest his ailing body. "He went all the way trodding with severe pains," reports Haykal.[70] Nasser was quoted by Haykal as saying: "How can I rest myself when Egypt is in need of me; I cannot leave our boys to die and go to Russia for treatment; this sounds incredible!"[71]

In another part of the article, Haykal reports that Nasser, during his last month of life, was physically ill. His Russian medical team headed by Professor Shazove attempted to quarantine him in his bedroom in order to help

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[68] Ward, op. cit., p. 160.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Al-Ahrām, November 9, 1970, p. 3.

[71] Ibid.

relieve his heart ailments. Nasser refused persistently, justifying his refusal by saying: "As long as I am alive, I must perform [my leadership duties]; when I cease to perform, then I am dead."[72]

A contemporary history of the United States records that Jackson, undismayed by the difficulties which surrounded him at New Orleans, mingled with the soldiers and the citizens and infused into them the greater part of his own spirit and energy. Biographers of Jackson borrowed this sentiment from one another. With only minor variations, three separate books on Jackson carried the words, "Before him was an army proud of its name, and distinguished for its deeds of valor . . . . Opposed to this was his own unbending spirit, and an inferior, undisciplined, and half-armed force."[73]

Jackson's victory at New Orleans, in fact, was the unmistakable evidence of the presence of a chief who inspired confidence, courage, and determination in all under his command due to his iron will. The New York Evening Post stated that "if we had a Jackson everywhere, we should succeed everywhere."[74] To this effect, an account of the Battle of New Orleans states, "Nothing was ready except the

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[72] Al-Ahrām, November 9, 1970, p. 4.

[73] The entire quotation is taken from John Frost, Pictorial History of Mexico (Philadelphia: Thomas, Cowperthwait and Co., 1850).

[74] The New York Evening Post, February 14, 1815.

general. . . . He had already evinced that iron energy, indominable perseverance and ceaseless activity."[75]

The belief that Jackson was able to put down the Second Bank of the United States solely because he willed its destruction was so widespread that when James Parton assembled material for his first scholarly biography of Jackson, he concluded the description of the bank crisis with the observation that " . . . never was there exhibited so striking an illustration of the maxim that Will, not talent, governs the world. The will of one man, Andrew Jackson, . . . carried the day against the assembled talent and the interested capital of the country."[76]

In the struggle against the Second Bank of the United States (which will be discussed at length later) that occupied so much of Jackson's political life, the social and the economic complexity was naively reduced to a dramatic struggle between the Hero (Jackson) and the Monster (the Bank). George Lippard remembered that when the proponents of the Bank suggested that rebellion might follow if the Bank was crushed, Old Jackson lost his temper and "screamed in a voice of thunder, raising his clutched hand above his white hair":

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[75] E. D. Branch, The Sentimental Years (New York: Appleton-Century Company, 1934), p. 161.

[76] James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, Vol. III (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861), p. 397.

> Come with bayonets in your hands instead of petitions; surround the White House with your legions. I am ready for you all! With the people at my back, whom your gold can neither buy nor awe, I will swing you up around the capital, each rebel of you--on a gibbet--high as Haman's![77]

Lippard proceeded to say:

> When I think of that ONE MAN, standing there at Washington, battling with all the powers of the Bank and panic combined, betrayed, assailed . . . . When I think of that one man placing his back against the rock, and folding his arms for the blow, while he uttered his vow, "I will not swerve one inch from the course I have chosen!" I must confess that the records of Greece and Rome--nay, the proudest days of Napoleon, cannot furnish an instance of a Will like that of Andrew Jackson.[78]

Whether the nationalization of the Second Bank of the United States was a proper feat is controversial. Nevertheless, the situation was undoubtedly a charismatizing one. It was exploited by Jackson to enhance the process of charismatization. The people's support of Jackson, obvious from the previous quotations, undoubtedly enhanced Jackson's charisma.

One other very significant charismatization situation can be cited to the effect of Jackson's iron will. His famous duel with Charles Dickenson indicates his adventurous nature in addition to his incredibly strong will which made him--quietly, steadfastly, and deliberately--

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[77] The Rough and Ready, March 13, 1948, as cited in Ward, op. cit., p. 1.

[78] Ibid.

take Dickenson's bullet in his chest and then calmly and decidedly cock his pistol, aim at his adversary, and shoot him fatally through the groin.[79]

Nasser's iron will mobilized the disunited Egyptian masses, the disunited Arab nations, and the ever-disunited opinions of American and Russian foreign policy-makers in 1956 when he, single-handedly, nationalized the Suez Canal. Nasser was fully aware of his inability to defend the Canal militarily against foreign intervention. On September 29, 1956, Egyptian troops in Sinai were withdrawing westward in rags after their defeat by the Israelis. By then, Nasser's forces were seen by the British and the French military observers as "helpless." Nasser realized the essential need to infuse a tremendous amount of moral support to balance the deteriorating situation, which he did masterfully. He inflamed the Egyptian people as well as the masses in Arab countries. He addressed the Afro-Asian nations which consequently demanded a United Nations' action in Egypt's favor. Nasser also agitated the world public opinion against the Anglo-French invasion of Port Sa^{c}id. On November 2, Nasser delivered his famous Al-Azhar speech from Cairo's most sacred Moslem shrine. Through this speech Nasser penetrated the thoughts and feelings of "all Egyptians, Arabs, and unprejudiced people." He said:

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[79]Parton, op. cit., p. 301.

> We live only one life, and God alone gives it to us or takes it from us. I will fight with you to the last drop in my blood. We will never capitulate. We shall fight everywhere [in Egypt] and never surrender. Let our slogan be: "Never surrender." We shall certainly build our nation, our history, and our destiny.[80]

There are numerous examples which testify to Nasser's iron will. Two prime examples are Nasser's feud against the Moslem Brotherhood Organization and his resentment of Communist influence. The Moslem Brotherhood Organization claimed that they strongly supported Nasser in his bid for power in 1952. The organization expected to receive some privileges under the Nasser regime. Nasser refused their plea for power. When the organization attempted to resist Nasser's "dictatorship," he outlawed it, arrested its members, and executed six of its leaders.

In 1958 the Russians seemed to have a privileged position in Egypt in the wake of their generous aid to Egypt. Without Russian aid (when Nasser was at odds with Washington), Egypt could not survive. Premier Nikita Krushchev, in a public speech, criticized President Nasser arresting the "communist comrades" in the United Arab Republic and tried to agitate Arab public opinion. Nasser, though in a maze, delivered a severe rebuttal to Russia's strong Premier. Nasser stated the following in Damascus:

> The defense presented by Mr. Khrushchev on behalf of the Communists in our country is a

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[80] Nasser, Taṣrihāt, op. cit., p. 605.

> completely unacceptable matter. Mr. Khrushchev's attempt to protect Communism in our country is a challenge to the will of the Arab peoples. Communists have clearly unveiled their plans against the U.A.R., but the U.A.R.'s people will never accept any influence exerted upon them. We are determined to remain free.[81]

Nasser's ventures in Syria, in Lebanon, and in Iraq --in 1958 and after--and his extremely costly venture in Yemen after 1960--not only indicate his tremendous ambition to dominate the Arab World, but also reveal the technique which he manipulated to reach his goal. He attempted and apparently succeeded in charismatizing the "Arab Masses." Nasser urged the Arab populace to remove their "reactionary leaders" and open the way to democracy, socialism, and Arab unity. Nasser realized the significance of his charisma in the Arab World. No other Arab leader possessed it in such an impressive manner. He had to exploit it, as a means to reach his prescribed ends.

Nasser took extremely firm stands on national issues. On such issues, he naturally had to listen to affirmative views as well as to opposing ones. However, in a Jacksonian style, whenever Nasser had his mind made up on an important matter, he never backed down. He would back up his decisions with a domineering will that disregarded all consequences. In 1955 when Nasser accepted Russian arms, he was fully determined to uphold his decision on the issue against any

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[81] Ibid., p. 370.

American attempt to foil his plans. When Assistant Secretary of State George Allen was dispatched to Cairo to present an ultimatum to Nasser, Miles Copeland says that a "flap" occurred.[82] Nasser was determined to dismiss the Assistant Secretary of State from his (Nasser's) office if the latter presented any ultimatum.[83] Copeland, a personal friend of Nasser, reveals that Nasser was determined to support the threat even if it required the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States and even "to escort Miles Copeland, his [Nasser's] close friend, to the airport in the shabbiest guest car available."[84]

Courage: Jackson and Nasser, Courageous Heroes

Webster's Third International Dictionary defines courage as "firmness of the spirit," "fighting for the ideals," "making the best of what is here without whining for more," "an ingrained capacity for meeting strain without fear," and finally, "quality of temperament which implies an ability to hold one's own, fight for one's principles or keep up one's morale when opposed, interferred or checked."[85]

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[82] Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 165.

[83] Nasser, Tasrihāt, p. 552.

[84] Copeland, op. cit.

[85] A. M. Webster, Webster's Third International Dictionary (Springfield, Mass.: G & C Merriam Company, 1968).

The most common and historically widespread kind of courage is physical courage or "courage in war." The rest of Webster's definitions seem to imply a struggle for principles or "moral courage." In this section, the writer will deal with these two kinds of courage as expressed by Jackson and Nasser or implied by their actions.

An attempt will be made to limit the evidences, in these respects, to information derived from empirical observation by "participant observers," (i.e., individuals who actually watched or observed the behavior of these two political role players in personal contacts.

From this writer's investigation of the history of Jackson and Nasser, it is apparent that both were possessed of extreme physical courage as well as moral courage. Evidences of courage in war were numerously demonstrated by Jackson. However, Nasser demonstrated it only once during the Palestine War of 1948.

The Battle of New Orleans has been well-described in the writings of almost all the biographers of Jackson.[86] This writer will touch only the main features of the Battle, particularly upon those that account for Jackson's courage and his tactical abilities. Despite all precautions taken

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[86] Two of the best analytical accounts of the Battle of New Orleans are Henry Adams, History of the United States of America during the Second Administration of James Madison (New York, 1921), Vol. II; A. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoire of the War in West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815 (Philadelphia, 1816).

by General Jackson, the British were able to land a force from their transports and to penetrate within approximately six miles of New Orleans by December 23, 1814. Jackson's strategy was to take advantage of the common landing confusion and attack immediately. Many writers on the Battle pointed out that the Battle of New Orleans was probably won on that very night. The British Command, unused to American offensive action, assumed that Jackson had a large force in New Orleans or he would not have dared to risk that attack. Jackson, in fact, was at his weakest when he launched that softening offensive. He had less than five thousand troops at his disposal, and what was more important, no fortifications had yet been built to impede the march of the British toward New Orleans.[87] The British, because of Jackson's unexpected courage and successful timing, elected to await re-enforcements and when the wait was over, Jackson was well entrenched before the British had received the needed additions to their fighting force. The morale of Old Hickory (Jackson's nickname) and his men was at a high point and the Battle was won mainly because of Jackson's "ruthless" courage, his control over his men, and his confidence in his ability to win.

The victory at New Orleans in 1815 was probably the greatest American military victory over an alien power

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[87]Ward, op. cit., p. 18.

before the victory over Hitler in 1945. The victory is attributed to General Jackson's single-handed display of courage. Most probably Jackson's victory at New Orleans was the greatest achievement in his entire life.

In 1813 before the Battle of New Orleans, Jackson led his Tennessee Militia bound for New Orleans to fight with General Wilkinson against the British. However, Wilkinson, who wanted no part in his glory-hunting, British-hating subordinate, planned to keep Jackson away from the battlefront. He ordered him to halt at Natchez and disband his troops. Jackson immediately foresaw that because his troops were without food and shelter, and because they were so far from home, they would probably be ordered to join Wilkinson's army after they were dismissed. He saw a premeditated plan to get rid of him, take his army, and humiliate him by forcing him to return to Nashville alone. His famous letter to the Secretary of War stated that "instead of dismissing them, I will escort them back to Tennessee."[88] It was a simple matter: No Jackson, No army.

All biographers present Jackson's trip leading his army for five hundred miles through the wilderness as a rare stroke of courage. Jackson had over 150 men on his

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[88]Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1966), pp. 53, 54.

sick list and only a few vehicles to ferry them. He ordered his officers to turn their horses over to the sick. He himself surrendered his three prize horses to the needy and trudged along on foot the entire distance. When Jackson began his long, tiresome trip home, he screamed to his soldiers: "On your way h-o-m-e," as though sounding a call to battle, whereupon the soldiers cheered. There were repeated cheers for the proud commander who silently shared the misery and disappointment of his men. Not much later, his army started calling him "Old Hickory" for his toughness and strong will. This nickname undoubtedly served him admirably thereafter throughout his military and political wars.

It can be argued that President Nasser, as indicated earlier, had developed a military fame within the Army as a result of participating in the Palestine War in 1948. On May 15, 1948 Captain Nasser graduated from the Staff College and was assigned to the Sixth Battalion as a battalion staff officer, a post corresponding to that of Operations Officer in the American Army. The position involved his making out orders, keeping records, and preparing maps and plans. The Battalion was stationed at Rafah on the battlefront with Israel. The State of Israel had been proclaimed officially as a sovereign Jewish state on the same day that Nasser received his command. Nasser was terribly disturbed over the shabby conditions of his battalion; there were neither

plans, strategy, reconnaissance, intelligence, nor any possibility of victory.[89] A few days later, Nasser's Battalion was moved forward and stationed at the village of ᶜIrāq al-Manshīyah, which, along with two neighboring villages--al-Falūja and ᶜIrāq al-Suwaydān--formed what was called the Falūja Pocket. In this Pocket there were four thousand men. Nasser was responsible for one-third of them stationed at ᶜIrāq al-Manshīyah. The Israeli forces eventually surrounded the Pocket, isolated it, and allowed the withdrawal of all the Egyptian forces with their arms, ammunition, and their colors.

Two main battles took place at the Falūja Pocket, which illustrate Nasser's personal courage under fire. The first is the "Biat Guns." The second is the "Zakarīya Artillery." The former took place at 5:30 a.m. Six Israeli tanks attacked Nasser's positions in the village. They penetrated the perimeters and advanced deep until they reached a schoolhouse near his headquarters. Nasser had no tanks, nor did he have any anti-tank guns. His artillery had been knocked out. The situation seemed extremely hopeless. St. John states that Nasser had to run to another village nearby (the distance is unknown) to obtain two Biats (anti-tank guns) and only then was he able to return the fire of the Israeli tanks. Three of the Israeli tanks

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[89]St. John, op. cit., p. 63.

were knocked out and the other remaining tanks retired--the battle was won. That night, Nasser reflected in his diary: "I went to inspect our soldiers, self-confidence appeared very strong in their eyes, and an air of firm determination characterized all their movements. I WAS HAPPY AND PROUD."[90]

The "Zakarīya Artillery" battle took place sometime later. It was more violent than the battle of "Biat Guns." It took place on December 28, 1948, when the Israelis attempted a full-scale attack on ᶜIrāq al-Manshīyah. In a short time they captured half the village, then they advanced to take over the rest. The situation seemed grim. At this point, Major Nasser put through a telephone call to Major Zakarīya Muḥyī-al-Dīn,[91] in the neighboring village of Falūjah and requested him to shell his (Nasser's) defense positions at ᶜIrāq al-Manshīyah. Zakarīya hesitated and then refused to comply. Nasser urged again, insisting that this was a last resort to deter the advancing Israeli forces; otherwise Egyptian defeat would be inevitable. Zakarīya wrote that he hesitated upon the assumption that he might kill Egyptian forces as well as Israeli. According

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[90] Ibid., p. 72; also see Al-Musawwar, August 1957, p. 69.

[91] Major Zakarīya Muḥyī-al-Dīn later became a member of the Free Officers Organization, took part in the 1952 Coup, became Egypt's Minister of Interior in 1955, and finally became the Vice President of Egypt until 1968. In 1967, when Nasser submitted his resignation, he appointed Muḥyī-al-Dīn President.

to Al-Musawwar, Nasser screamed in persistence and ordered Zakarīya to start shelling, as the last alternative left short of defeat.[92]

The strategum was a great success. Nasser had ordered his forces to withdraw from their positions leaving the Israeli attackers to Zakarīya's guns. A few days later, Major Nasser received an Israeli Rabbi) to whom he was extremely respectful)[93] and to him he surrendered five Israeli prisoners and then Nasser ushered him to four graves in which the corpses of seventy-five other Israeli soldiers were buried. "Your men fought bravely, Rabbi," Nasser said. "We gave them a burial befitting soldiers," he concluded.[94] The "Zakarīya Artillery" battle led by Nasser probably was one of the few most courageous battles the Egyptian Army ever fought during its three wars with Israel. The case exhibits Nasser's courage, determination, and his readiness to sacrifice for the cause of his country. It also reveals clearly Nasser's cunning and faith in luck. In his famous Al-Azhar speech of 1956, in his attempt to mobilize the Egyptian morale and determination to set back the British and French landing forces in Port Said, he reiterated his Falujah Pocket experience:

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[92] St. John, op. cit., p. 80.

[93] Ibid., pp. 80, 81.

[94] Ibid.

> I was in the Falūja Pocket for five months. Air raids were continuous. I did not hide in a shelter, but remained outside [directing the battles]. Nevertheless, I did not die because we live only one life, and God alone knows when it should end.[95]

When Nasser returned to Cairo on March 6, 1949, he was given a hero's welcome. Several newspaper articles glorified the bravery and courage of the Staff Officer of the Sixth Battalion, Gamal Abdul-Nasser or "Jimmy" as his colleagues in the Military Academy used to call him.[96]

Nasser's military record became well-known among the ranks of the military. The Egyptian forces, humiliated by their defeat in the Palestine War, were conditioned for a charismatization situation and for a strike against the "Rotten Monarchy" which "caused the defeat." Nasser's conspiratorial nature helped to create and organize the Free Officers which unanimously acclaimed him the leader, the strategist, and the philosopher. Nasser's "Zakarīya Artillery spirit" gave the Free Officers an example of inspiring leadership, defiant determination, and an overwhelming enthusiasm to win the "Battle of Egypt," or die in it. These factors led to the development of a charismatization situation between a leader and his immediate followers. They resulted in a great movement which affected Egypt and the Arab World.

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[95] Nasser, Tasrihāt, p. 606.

[96] Al-Musawwar, August 1957, p. 56.

Jackson's and Nasser's Moral Sentiments

Jackson and Nasser left distinctive, personal prints on several of their political decisions. Among all other personal traits, Jackson and Nasser can be seen as possessed with an acute tendency toward violence accompanied by a surprisingly gentle sentiment. Their temperaments seemed dubious, inconsistent and capricious. Jackson's and Nasser's behavior appeared unpredictable; sometimes they were ruthlessly violent; other times they were as gentle as lambs.

The most significant feature of Jackson's and Nasser's temperaments was their tendency toward violence. They perceived simple matters (which happened against their will) as conspiratorial affairs that necessitated a quick, decisive response. It also appears to this writer that the two leaders later regretted the use of extreme violence and saw their actions more in terms of detriments to their careers rather than enhancements. The critics of Jackson and those of Nasser continually haunted these two leaders by exposing their ruthless character.

Jackson and Nasser, in both their military and political capacities, imposed capital punishment on many of their adversaries including citizens as well as aliens. The killing of enemies in war is a socially accepted fact especially if it is executed by army officers under the conditions of battle. However, executions not necessitated

by conditions of war reveal a cruel temperament on the part of the leader especially if the circumstances were not impelling and if pleas for mercy were numerous.

Ironically, the number eight was a common figure on the Jackso-Nasserite execution agenda. Each ruthlessly ordered the execution of six citizens and two foreigners on different occasions. The prosecution procedures, the tribunal measures, and the executions were very similar.

On February 21, 1815, Jackson executed his famous "six militia men" when he was the General of the Militia. The Militia had fought for him and thus made him the grand victor of New Orleans. Hundreds of pleas for mercy were presented on behalf of the condemned men. However, all were denied.

Nasser executed his famous "six Moslem Brothers" in 1954 at a time when he was the undisputed strong man of Egypt (a position he reached with the help and support of the Moslem Brothers organization since this group spread the rumor that Nasser was, in fact, a former member of the organization). Thousands of pleas for mercy were presented on behalf of the doomed persons. Special requests were presented to Nasser from Egyptian as well as from Arab and Moslem leaders around the world. Nasser refused them all and a black flag was suddenly raised on the Cairo main prison announcing the executions.

One man in Jackson's group of executees was a Presbyterian minister.[97] Ironically, one in Nasser's group was a sheikh[98] (Moslem religious elder). After the executions, one of the doomed Americans did not die immediately.[99] Similarly, one of the doomed Egyptians lived for a while after he was executed.[100]

This writer will not go into the details of these executions. Both bands of executees were killed because of their alleged participation in mutinies: the first, against the military establishment of Jackson; the second, against the military rule of Nasser. Both Jackson and Nasser were in the highest command of their establishments, and therefore they could afford to be merciful. Both had the authority to reconsider the sentences passed by their military tribunals over the doomed persons. Both were "riding high" and enjoying a fast "uphill mood." Both encountered strong opposition to the executions. Both received innumerable pleas for mercy and both denied them all. Eventually, both Jackson and Nasser had to suffer politically because of the implications of their ruthlessness.

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[97] Parton, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 300-377.

[98] Vatikiotis, op. cit., pp. 88-93.

[99] Parton, op. cit.

[100] The writer of this dissertation was present during the execution.

The two foreigners that Jackson executed were rbuthnot and Ambister--in 1812 during the Seminole War--ho were subjects of Great Britain accused of "practicing ntrigues and villanies in the country."[101] They were lleged to have furnished arms and other assistance to the ndian tribes inciting them to war against the United tates. After a brief court-martial procedure, Jackson elentlessly ordered their execution. Bassett in his iography of Andrew Jackson tells of the incident as one hich "shocked the American's sense of fair play. Jackson in a cruel temperament] had no leniency for either risoner."[102] A few hours after Jackson had given his pproval to the verdict, Arbuthnot was hanged and Ambister as shot.

Nasser's group of two consisted of two Jewish oreign nationals: Doctor Mūssa Marzūq, a French surgeon n the staff of the Jewish Hospital at Cairo, and Samuel zaar, a Jewish teacher. Nasser's prosecutors declared arzūq and Azaar as "agents provocateurs" (agitating agents) rained and dispatched by the State of Israel to sabotage gyptian installations. St. John reports that "protests ame from all over the non-Arab world, pleas for mercy and ppeals of consideration were submitted. On the fourth

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[101] J. S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 254.

[102] Ibid., p. 255.

day [of the military tribunal] while the messages were pouring in, a black flag was suddenly raised over the Cairo Prison. . . . The French surgeon and the Jewish teacher went to death."[103]

The manner in which Jackson and Nasser demonstrated their cruel temperaments and their violent sentiments, in addition to the obvious lack of judicial guarantees and hurried executions, may shed light on their frustrated personal idiom. Jackson and Nasser, however, were not often possessed of a cruel temperament. On more occasions than not they displayed a semi-schizophrenic temperament, and exhibited characteristics of extreme lenience, gentleness, and sympathy.

Although Jackson had no children of his own, his supporters took many opportunities to record his gentle sympathy for children. Thomas Hart Benton, a participant observer, tells how he arrived at Jackson's home "one wet, chilly evening in February and came upon him in the twilight, sitting alone before the fire, a lamb and a child between his knees." Benton further states:

> . . . Jackson explained to me how it was. The child had cried because the lamb was outside in the cold, and begged him to bring it in, which he had done to please the child--his adopted child, then not two years old. The ferocious men do not do that. Although Jackson had his passions

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[103]Robert St. John, The Boss (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 188.

> and his violence, they were for men and enemies --those who stood up against him--and not for women and children, or the weak and the helpless: for all of whom his feelings were those of protection and support.[104]

Other incidents concerning children occurred which provided superb opportunities to those who wish to display the man of sentiment beneath the man of iron. An Indian child, orphaned during one of Jackson's campaigns, was discovered by Jackson after the Battle of Tohopeka. Some Indian women were about to kill the infant whose parents had died in the Battle when Jackson took the boy under his own care in order to protect him from the forthright solution of his troubles intended by his own people. The Indian boy's name was Lincoyer and Jackson made him his ward. The story of Lincoyer was widely told to point out the obvious sentimentality of General Jackson. His action was described as "a garland of roses around the iron helmet of the warrior."[105]

Nicholas Trist expressed in his reminiscences of Jackson, published in the New York Evening Post, and described the General as being as gentle as a woman: "There was more of a woman in [Jackson's] nature than in that of any man I ever knew--more of a woman's tenderness."[106]

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[104] Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Year's View, Vol. I, as quoted by J. W. Ward, Andrew Jackson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 198.

[105] J. W. Ward, Andrew Jackson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 198.

[106] Parton, op. cit., p. 62.

Except for metaphorical purposes, it was not suitable to make a woman of Andrew Jackson. The more effective way to suggest that there was not so much iron in him, that he would not be softened by love, was to display Jackson in the melting presence of a child or a woman. Such a ritual served two purposes: it proved that Jackson was open to the impulses of his heart; and it also proved that virtue, personified by a woman or a child, was ultimately more powerful and good, therefore, transcendent in the universe.

At the outset of his career, Jackson was aligned on the side of womanhood by his protection of the "beauty" of New Orleans from the lust of a savage British soldiery. This incident was recorded in history by the song of "Beauty and Booty"--after the Battle of New Orleans--which says:

> Whose valor was it that protected our mothers,
> Our wives and daughters
> From the savage tomahawk, and a licentious soldiery?
> Whose, but Andrew Jackson?[107]

Jackson seems to have been directly connected with the springs of virtue through the women in his life--his mother and his wife. Despite his mother's early death, biographers insist on attributing to her the good counsel that was the source of Jackson's later greatness.[108]

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[107] Ward, op. cit., p. 194.

[108] Ibid., p. 195.

When Jackson's wife Rachel died in 1828, probably deeply hurt by the slanders against her during her husband's candidacy for the Presidency, he achieved a vicarious martyrdom, and became a fit object for the sentimental outpouring of the nation, a matter which unconsciously reinforced the charismatization bond between him and his people. General Sam Dale remembered visiting Jackson during the Nullification controversy and finding him alone. Jackson remarked on the loss of Rachel, and Dale reported that " . . . the iron man trembled with emotion and for some time covered his face with his hands and tears dropped on his knee."[109] Nicholas Trist went one night to Jackson's room in the White House. Trist reported, " . . . he was sitting at the little table with his wife's miniature before him propped up against some books; and between him and the picture lay an open book which bore the marks of long use. The open book, I afterward learned, was her prayer book."[110] Jackson's defense of his wife and his devotion to her after her death established another trait in Jackson's private character not unusual in nineteenth century gentlemanly behavior--respect and attachment to female life.

When Jackson was converted, after his retirement, newspapers told the nation that "to see this aged veteran whose head had stood erect in battle and through scenes of

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[109] Parton, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 462.

[110] Ibid., p. 602.

earful bearing, bending that head in humble and adoring everence at the table of the divine Master, while tears f penitence and joy trickled down his careworn cheeks, as indeed a spectacle and most intense moral interest."[111]

The interest in Jackson's conversion and Christian eath was not due solely to the public attention given the ovements of national figures. The universal stress was n the fact that the man of iron was also a man of morals; n the end he bowed to God whom he acknowledged as his aster. The man who possessed a will-power great enough to ut him beyond social restraint was also subject to God's nfinite wisdom and had his place in the divinely ordered evelopment of society. Jackson's final turn toward God isproved the belief of those who had little faith in him; e was great because he was good.

Stories and incidents pertinent to Nasser's personal haracter are not sufficiently revealed to the public, robably because of his recent death. Nasser's private life as mostly traditional. At home with his family he apparntly was conservative with regard to Islamic and oriental raditions. His wife Tahiyah remained completely concealed rom public life except on very few occasions when she met ith women's associations representatives. Nasser had

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[111] Ward, op. cit., p. 204.

great love for his children (he had five of them, two girls and three boys). However, his love reflected an oriental pattern. In a society in which the man rules, in which family structure is patriarchal, Nasser was seen as a firm but compassionate father. Nasser himself stated:

> I am not biased toward spoiling my children. I see it necessary to combine wisdom with tender love; leniency bereft of weakness, and firmness bereft of cruelty. . . . I know when I should be hard and when I should be tender. I try to understand my children's ego. I grant them freedom [on condition] they don't abuse it.[112]

Nasser's daughter Mona once went with her classmates to visit Mudirivat al-Tahrīr (Liberation Province, an area of agricultural reclamation). The manager offered her a collection of pictures showing the development and progress of work at his province. He attempted to persent her the collection as a gift while at the same time the rest of the girls had to pay for theirs. Mona, Al-Muṣawwar reports, refused to receive the gift unless she paid for it and reiterated that "my father forbids us from receiving any gifts. He taught us that nothing is priceless. . . . We should pay for everything we get."[113]

Nasser, recalled his father Abdul-Nasser Ḥusein, was a dutiful son. During Nasser's famous speech at al-Manshiyah Square--in which he was the object of the

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[112] Al-Muṣawwar, August 1957, p. 89.

[113] Ibid., p. 90.

assassination attempt--his father was sitting listening among the people. When the shooting began, his father passed out. After a long while, he regained his consciousness and found himself lying on a couch in a nearby building with the President standing by his side (leaving behind all Egypt talking about the incident), patting his shoulder and saying: "I'm fine, father, don't worry."[114]

Ḥajj Abdul-Nasser Ḥusein, Gamal's father, testified that the President had extreme faith in God (Western observers sometimes called it faith in luck). Gamal, his father recalled, was constantly mindful of God's teachings; he always prayed and consulted God before any serious decision. He (the President) was careful to carry on him verses from the Qur'ān.[115] On his departure to attend the Bandung Conference in 1955, his father saw him off at the airport and reminded him to take "the verse from the Qur'ān." Nasser replied, "I have already taken it father; the Sheikh of al-Azhar has written it for me."[116]

A part of Nasser's moral characteristics has been symbolized by his simplicity. This has been described by James Bell, editor of Life magazine. Bell reported that Nasser "is very strict with regard to the obligation of self-control. . . . However late he stays up, he gets up

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[114] Ibid., p. 89.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid.

at six a.m., washes for prayer, and then prays. His breakfast is simple and consists of beans, bread, cheese and tea. Then he goes to his office."[117]

Haykal, after Nasser's death, recalled how the President--throughout the years of his office--avoided extravagance in his diet and loved simple foods. Haykal wrote in Al-Ahrām:

> White cheese was his favorite meal. He never travelled [outside Egypt] without a large can of white cheese accompanying him on the plane. Extravagant tables were set for him wherever he travelled; he ate little of these foods, however. When he retired to his private quarters [after such parties], he always ordered white cheese and dry bread.[118]

Conclusions

Providence, Iron Will, Nature and Self-made Life, Physical Courage, and Moral Sentiments were the main pillars of the Jackso-Nasserite charismatization process. The masses in the United States and in Egypt were unconsciously charismatized by the numerous situations displayed by their leaders. Jackson and Nasser, probably subconsciously, reacted more charismatically in specific situations, which in turn added thicker layers of charisma on the people's ego.

Jackson and Nasser symbolized a distinctive brand of leadership. Utilizing their charisma, they certainly

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[117] This quotation was a part of the Arabic translation of Bell's article in Al-Muṣawwar, August 1957, p. 89; also see St. John, op. cit., p. 227.

[118] Al-Ahrām, October 9, 1970, p. 3.

succeeded in communicating to their peoples a great sense of identity, pride, and honor. They (Jackson and Nasser) became legendary heroes among their followers. Their images, attitudes, and ideologies were turned by their respective peoples into solid bodies of myth which remained (and will remain) for centuries in the United States and in the United Arab Republic. Jackson and Nasser in their respective countries are consistently counted by their peoples as being among the most effective Presidents their countries have ever had. It is doubtful that the people of Egypt and other countries of the Middle East will soon forget the era of Abdul-Nasser. Egyptians talk about the Nasser era with the same enthusiasm and pride by which they recall the eras of Mohamed the Prophet, Saladin the victorious, Mohamed Ali the reformer, and Sa^{c}d Zaghlūl the exponent of Egyptian independence. Prominent leaders in a people's history, particularly those marking a major transition or an extraordinary impact on public life, can become endowed with the quality of myth. Jackson and Nasser, in their respective histories, undeniably are regarded as charters of action who validated moral, social, and political acts in an historical sense.

PART IV

IDEOLOGICAL AND SITUATIONAL COMPARISONS

CHAPTER VII

INTRODUCTION TO IDEOLOGICAL AND SITUATIONAL COMPARISONS

The main objective of this research, as has been mentioned before, is to produce general statements that will help to explain the phenomenon of political leadership in an accurate and hopefully predictive manner. This objective, after the discussions presented in Chapter III, has been narrowed to explain the phenomenon of charismatic leadership as the central notion of this research. The empirical and historical evidences presented in the previous chapter have clearly typified Jackson and Nasser as charismatic leaders; in addition, the previous discussion has also provided a tentative verification of the research assumptions numbers 1, 2, and 3.[1]

As has also been mentioned in Chapter I, the method of this research involved collecting, describing, and analyzing "leadership situations" in order to suggest relationships between such situations and the behavior of the leaders involved. It can be argued that if Jackson and Nasser acted--or reacted--under similar situational

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[1]See Chapter II, pp. 12-27.

conditions in a similar "style of action," a statement about "charismatic behavior" may validly be developed and generalized.

Charismatic situations are evidently seen by different individuals in different perspectives. To the leader, they are a "continual outgrowth" of this initial charismatization process launched originally to legitimize and routinize his rule. To the followers, they are a confirmation of their charismatically effected "revolutionary achievements." To the observer, they are the "growth" or "decline" of the "charismatization bond" which blends and unifies the "conventional values" with the "revolutionary image" of the leader. The intensity and durability of the bond would indicate the level of charismatization in a state at a certain time in history. The examination of "similar" situations encountered by Jackson and Nasser, and the assessment of their conducts vis-a-vis the "similar" situations in Part III of this dissertation, will exhibit, or fail to exhibit, Jackson's and Nasser's shared behavioral uniformities under "similar" political stresses. Also the research assumptions numbers 4 and 5[2] will be pursued and hopefully will provide new insight and greater understanding of the objectives of the research.

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[2] See hypotheses 4 and 5, Chapter II, p. 15.

Numerous "situations" will be cited in this part of the research to portray Jackson's and Nasser's behavioral uniformities. Prime examples of these situations are the Jacksonian democracy and Nasser's socialism; Jackson's war on the Bank and Nasser's war on feudalism; Jackson's war against the Nullifiers and Nasser's struggle for Arab unity; Jackson's "spoil system" and Nasser's "militarized bureaucracy"; Jackson's foreign policies vis-a-vis France and Nasser's foreign policy vis-a-vis Britain; and finally, Jackson's and Nasser's expansion of the "presidential powers."

The usage of the term "similar" is admittedly ambiguous. It fails to determine the boundaries of "similar" situations. The term also is confusing because it equates sociological, religious, and economic origins of situations in different societies when they are evidently distinctive. Nevertheless, the concept of "similarity and dissimilarity" must, inevitably, imply subjective judgment by the researcher. While conditions might appear similar to one researcher, they might seem different to another. Behavioralist studies, though they strive toward scientific findings, allow--consciously or unconsciously--subjective judgment--at least with regard to the selection of the subjects under research and the techniques used for examining them.

This dissertation has focused only on the similarities between the two leaders. The similarities between the Egyptian situations and the American situations can be justifiable in terms of the similarities in preconditions, general trends, mass excitement and support, national necessity, and the sensitivity of the masses.

This writer has selected one major "similar" topic in which Jackson and Nasser took full advantage of their charismatization powers to inflict substantial change in the value systems of their followers--the ideologies of the Jacksonian democracy and the Nasserite socialism. Also three other situations have been chosen to illustrate the tactical behavioral uniformities between Jackson and Nasser. These are:

1. The Jacksonian War against the Bank and Nasser's war against feudalism.

2. Jackson's War against the Nullifiers and Nasser's struggle to preserve the United Arab Republic in 1961.

3. Jackson's "Spoils System" and Nasser's "Militarized Bureaucracy."

CHAPTER VIII

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE JACKSONIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE NASSERITE SOCIALISM

Ideology has many meanings and many usages. Webster defined ideology as "The integrated assertions, theories, and aims constituting a politico-social program, often with an implication of factitious propagandizing; as, Fascism was altered in Germany to fit the Nazi ideology."[1]

Henry Aiken, in his book The Age of Ideology, refers to ideology as a belief: "During the Napoleonic era . . . 'ideology' came to mean virtually any belief of a republican or revolutionary sort, that is to say, any belief hostile to Napoleon himself."[2]

Daniel Bell defined ideology as " . . . the conversion of ideas into social levers."[3] Milton Rokeach added to Bell's definition the notion that "ideology" must refer to a "more or less institutionalized set of beliefs."[4]

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[1]Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C. Merriam Company, 1948).

[2]Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York: Mentor, 1956), pp. 16-17.

[3]Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 370-371.

[4]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960), p. 35.

Belief-disbelief systems, explains Rokeach, cannot be considered as ideologies since they only contain "views someone picks up."[5]

Aiken later elaborated on the meaning of ideology by bestowing upon it some specific political, social, religious and emotional features. Aiken explained Marx's notion of ideology by saying:

> What [Marx and Engels] . . . call ideology includes not only the theory of knowledge and politics but also metaphysics, ethics, religion, and indeed any form of consciousness which expresses the basic attitudes or commitments of social class.[6]

Aiken's definition is probably seen as very broad, loose, and useless.

More beneficial is the definition used by Giovanni Sartori: " . . . ideology indicates only the political part of a belief system. . . ." and furthermore "a particular state, or structure, of political belief systems . . . not all political belief systems are ideological."[7] The opposite of an ideological belief system for Sartori is a pragmatic belief system. In a real sense, therefore, Sartori has refined the type of definition used by

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[5] Ibid.

[6] Aiken, op. cit., p. 17.

[7] Giovanni Sartori, "Politics, Ideology and Belief Systems," The American Political Science Review, LXIII (June, 1969), p. 400.

LaPalombara, encompassing all its political points in a way that approaches operational utility.[8]

The concept of ideology as myth deserves some emphasis. Marx and Mannheim are standard references on this aspect. The basic point they have made is that political ideologies are sets of illusions, distortions of reality, and ways of disguising the truth. Karl Mannheim expressed this point vividly by these words:

> . . . [ideology] includes all those utterances the "falsity" of which is due to an intentional or unintentional, conscious, semi-conscious, or unconscious, deluding of one's self or of others, taking place on a psychological level and structurally resembling lies.[9]

Thus, according to Mannheim, a mass public, accepting a given ideology, will view it as a reflection of reality; an elite perhaps responsible for the dissemination of the ideology will tend to see the fraud.[10]

From the above discussion it becomes clear that definitions of ideology have ranged from sweeping generalizations to narrow specifics.

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[8]See Joseph LaPalombara, "The Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," The American Political Science Review, LX (January, 1966).

[9]Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), pp. 238-239.

[10]For a review of the literature, see Joseph J. Spengler, "Theory, Ideology, Non-Economic Values and Politico-Economic Development," in R. Braibanti and J. J. Spengler, eds., Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic Development (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961), pp. 3-56.

Most ideologies, however, have these qualities:

1. They are group beliefs that individuals borrow; most people acquire an ideology by identifying (or dis-identifying) with a social group.

2. They have a body of sacred documents (constitutions, bills of rights, manifestoes, declarations) and heroes (founding fathers, seers and sages, originators, and great interpretors).

3. They imply an empirical theory of cause and effect in the world and a theory of the nature of man.[11]

This writer will limit his usage of the term "ideology" in this dissertation to socio-political considerations. The term will mean a body of concepts with these characteristics:[12]

1. They deal with the questions, "Who will be the rulers?" "How will the rulers be selected?" "By what principles will they govern?"

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[11]Robert E. Lane, "Democracy and Ideology" in Calvin Larson and Philco Washburn, Power Participation and Ideology (New York: David McKay Company, 1969), p. 321.

[12]For detailed information on ideologies, see: David Apter, Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Daniel Bell, op. cit.; R. H. Cox, Ideology, Politics and Political Theory (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1969); Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: The Free Press, 1962); Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940); Lyman Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1969); Paul Sigmund, The Ideology of the Developing Nations (New York: Praeger, 1963); Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1960).

2. They constitute an argument; that is, they are intended to persuade and to counter opposing views.

3. They integrally affect some of the major values of life.

4. They embrace a program for the defense or reform or abolition of important social institutions.

5. They are, in part, rationalizations of group interests.

6. They are normative, ethical, moral in tone and content.

7. They (inevitably) are torn from their context in a broader belief system and share the structural and stylistic properties of that system.

The Jacksonian ideology of democracy was in its day as much of a controversial issue as the Nasserite ideology of socialism is today. Both ideologies failed to introduce new philosophies; however, they highlighted new application. Democracy was well-known, taught, and practiced before Jackson preached it. Socialism, as well, was common in several systems in the world before Nasser championed it. Jackson and Nasser apparently were not, in this respect, theoreticians or original ideologists. In 1816, Jackson stated that he was "not fit to be president."[13] Twelve years later he became a devoted partisan president, an

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[13] Harold C. Syrett, Andrew Jackson (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1953), p. 23.

exponent of "American democracy" and a "reshaper of American values." In 1953 Nasser, during his dispute with Naguib, advocated the return of the "officers" to the barracks. However, eight years later Nasser launched his "Democratic Socialist and Cooperative State" and thus attempted to transform the Middle East into a "United Arab Socialist State."

Several interesting questions can be raised: Were Jackson and Nasser, in fact, ideologists all along or did they adopt such "programs of convenience" as final phases to institutionalize their charismatization processes? Both, it is observable, reached this "theorizing level" after a long period of apparent "political indifference." Why did Jackson and Nasser remain silent for several years about their ultimate destination? Or were they new "converts" to democracy and to socialism, who, after a period of hesitation, came at last to embrace their "new deals"?

Harold C. Syrett has remarked that "in all his long and illustrous military career, Jackson never showed any marked concern for the rights of individuals or the views of the majority."[14] The same author has also stated that "Jackson did not become identified with popular government until relatively late in life, and even then he aligned himself with the democratic movement in much the same

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[14] Ibid., p. 22.

fashion as a man who agrees to a marriage of convenience that has been arranged by prudent parents."[15] Despite Jackson's apparent lack of concern for either individual or majority rights, this writer is mindful that Jackson was not, and could not be, altogether immune to the democratic developments that were transforming America. As with most Westerners, and for that matter most Americans of his age, he mingled with all classes and was inclined to judge an individual on his merits rather than on his family background and rank in the social hierarchy. He had, moreover, filled a number of governmental posts which enabled him both to observe and to participate in the democratic process. Finally, it can be said that Jackson, despite all his glorious military achievements was a civilian, not a professional soldier. In fact, he took up arms only when his country was threatened, and he invariably returned to his "plough" after the enemy had been repulsed.

In a letter forwarded to Samuel Swarthout on February 23, 1825, Jackson tried to wipe out his alleged reputation as a "military chieftain." He wrote:

> It is true that early in life, even in the days of boyhood, I contributed my mite to shake off the yoke of tyrrany, and to build up the fabrick of free government; and when lately our country was involved in war, having the commission of Major General of Militia in Tennessee, I made an appeal

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[15] Ibid., p. 23.

> to the patriotism of Western citizens, when 3,000 of them went with me to the field to support her eagles. If this constitutes me a "military chieftain," I am one.[16]

When Jackson was nominated as a candidate for the presidency by the Tennessee legislature in July 1822, he wrote, "I have never been a candidate for any office. I never will . . . [but] when the people call, the Citizen is bound to render the service required." In another letter, Jackson stated, "My political career prompts me to leave the affair uninfluenced by an expression on my part: and to the free will of those who have alone the right to decide."[17]

It can be argued that Jackson's democratic views originated as a means of "political convenience" in 1824 when the Tennessee legislature nominated him for the presidency. Because Jackson had not taken a stand on any of the major issues of the day and because any stand was bound to alienate some voters, his campaign managers emphasized his military career and ignored the issues which were crucial at the time. They highlighted his role as a national hero. This might give the impression, therefore, that he had no choice but to run as the candidate of the people. In this fashion, Jackson's backers were able to convince large

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[16] Ibid., p. 85.

[17] Ibid., p. 78.

numbers of voters--many of whom had only recently been enfranchised--that "Old Hickory" was a man of the people and the ideal representative of the majority in "emergent America."

Whether Jackson was in fact a "democratic man"--which most authors appear to question--is difficult to determine. However, his sweeping victory over Adams in 1828 can be attributed to Jackson's success in playing the role of the "leader of masses" and the "symbol of democracy." Jackson appeared to be the non-favorite of any entrenched minority groups.

In the West, Jackson was described as a frontiersman; in the South, it was emphasized that he was a plantation owner and a slave holder; and in the Northeast, he was depicted as a friend of the common man. Throughout his administration he viewed himself as the agent of the majority and as a chief executive who derived as much power from the people as from the Constitution. Other presidents had been content to administer the laws enacted by Congress, but Jackson's strategy was not only to help make laws, but also to convince the majority that he was making them with its assistance and for its benefits. The result was that countless individuals who had previously thought of themselves as being ruled by government for the first time believed that they were ruling themselves. These sentiments, in fact, activated the "charismatic potential" of Andrew Jackson and

consciously or unconsciously gave the President the impression of capturing great popular support. Upon such assumption, Jackson became--or thought he became--an "absolute majority." This provided him with tremendous power to manufacture, produce, and propagate his distinctive brand of democracy.

A reconstruction of the probable course of the evolution of Nasser's socialism before 1961--based upon direct revelations made by him and on the known facts of his life--would probably challenge the common theories suggested by his admirers and detractors. For all these theories assume that, until his moves in the direction of socialism had become clear in 1961, Nasser must have been either a socialist or a non-socialist. Such an assumption oversimplifies a complex situation. It not only overlooks the fact that there may be various degrees of commitment to a social ideal, but it also fails to take into account the dynamics of the "process of actualization" through which an initial propensity toward a certain conviction may imperceptibly develop into actual faith in response to an untold number of possible stimuli.[18] This is relevant especially in the case of a pragmatic man of action such as Nasser whose interest in ideas was not purely theoretical but was

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[18]Fayez Sayegh, "The Theoretical Structure of Nasser's Socialism," published in Sami Hanna and George Gardner, Arab Socialism (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969), p. 100.

decisively affected by their bearing upon his preoccupation with the practical tasks immediately at hand.

According to Nasser himself, when the revolution broke out in 1952, he had no doctrine, no program, and no political organization (apart from the "Free Officers").[19] Nasser must have realized the potentially serious effects of the lack of political ideology and of a political organization. This situation was apparently tempered by Nasser's naive attempt to launch his "six principles" incorporated into the platform of the "liberation organization." This attempt took place six months after the Revolution. Nasser's "six principles" expressed in fairly precise terms his general vision of a "dual revolution."[20]

Nasser's concept of "two revolutions," social and political, was implicit in the earliest of his speeches. He was distinguished primarily by his constant emphasis upon the theme that the "social revolution" had yet to be launched and that it was the true object of the "political revolution." This idea was given a place of honor in his book, The Philosophy of the Revolution, first published in 1953. In it he wrote:

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[19]The Charter of National Action was laid down by President Gamal Abdul-Nasser in Cairo, The United Arab Republic, on May 21, 1962 (Cairo: Information Department, 1962); henceforth referred to as Charter.

[20]Nasser's "six principles" were (1) eradication of imperialism and its supporters; (2) extinction of feudalism and the control of capitalistic influences over the system

> Every nation on earth undergoes two revolutions: one is political in which it recovers its rights for self-government from an imposed despot, or an aggressive army occupying its territory without its consent. The second revolution is social in which the classes of society would struggle against each other until justice for all countrymen has been gained and conditions have become stable.[21]

Nasser's "six principles" were, in his descriptive words, no more than "signposts along a difficult road" or "banners" under which the revolution marched; they were "neither a method of revolutionary action nor a program for fundamental change."[22]

However, from the point of view of charismatization operators, these "six principles" can be seen as a means of soliciting popular support for his regime. The "six principles" were acceptable and attractive to most Egyptians. There was no rationale in resenting them or showing hostility to the regime. They involved no discomforting measures against any major sector of the society; they merely demonstrated the will and dedication of the regime to "reform the society."

It must be remembered that at that time--between 1952 and 1954--not only was Nasser obscure, but he was also

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of government; (3) extinction of monopolies; (4) establishment of sound social justice; (5) establishment of true democratic life; and (6) building up of a strong national army.

[21] Gamal Abdul-Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution, tr. by Dār al-Maᶜārif, Cairo (Buffalo, N.Y.: Economica Books, 1969), p. 36.

[22] Charter, Chapter IV.

unpopular. The common Egyptian envisioned him as "one of those officers" who had usurped the authority from the "father image"--Mohammed Naguib, who had gained enormous affection and popular support. Nasser, prior to the popular acceptance of his charisma, was neither handsome nor impressive. His young age (thirty-four at the time of the Revolution) was more of a detriment than an advantage. His "conspiratorial nature" raised doubts and discomfort among the people. His disputes with Naguib indicated, at least to the common man, that he was playing a selfish power game. In addition, he was not in full control of the conflicting factions within the Army. To many people, Nasser symbolized the role of "spoiler" rather than that of "reformer."

President Nasser, most probably aware of these shortcomings, could not afford to launch any "serious" reform programs at the time. More than anything else, he needed time to demonstrate his political potential. It seems, therefore, that Nasser felt committed to resort to a step-by-step improvisation. In this context, Nasser reminisces:

> We decided to proceed, nevertheless. . . . We would study in the meantime; we would diligently try to learn. . . . We had the courage to declare that we had no theory. . . . We proceeded by trial and error to construct a theory. We continued to say that we might make mistakes, . . . and we continued to admit that we had no theory. But after all, we were able to act, to do something, to bring

> about some application. . . . As a result, we are now heirs to an experiment and an application with the foundation of a theory.[23]

Jackson, on the other hand, had no reason to delay his reforms. He was possessed of "activated charisma" by the time he became President and his charismatization campaign had steadily gained momentum since then. Further delay would seem to deprive his followers and electors of the message "he had for them."

Jackson, contrary to Nasser, must also have realized that the American President was, so to speak, constitutionally immune to military coups, popular uprisings, and a-la-bastile revolutions. The American political system provided Andrew Jackson with far more stability than that with which the disjointed Egyptian environment provided Nasser.

Jackson must have realized that his leadership was limited to two terms only (at most). Nasser had, or thought he had, decades of relatively undisputable power; he could afford to wait, see, and determine his program. Jackson and Nasser probably could have easily ruled their countries, presided over their governments, and led their peoples without resorting to such controversial and painstaking

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[23] Proceedings of the Unity Talks (Cairo: Al-Ahrām Press, 1963), p. 142. This is a pamphlet published by Al-Ahrām and containing the formal text of the meetings between President Nasser and other Arab leaders discussing plans for Arab unity.

programs as the Jacksonian Democracy and the Nasserite Socialism. Their championship of these programs undoubtedly caused them personal agonies as well as political hardships. Nevertheless, had they selected not to undertake such programs, they probably would not have gone down in history as "insignificant presidents"; they were basically charismatic individuals, toughened by hard experiences, and possessed of great ambitions too strong to curtail or conceal.

The Jacksonian Democracy

To illustrate the controversiality of Jackson's democracy and to get a feel of its basic issues, one must read the works of "objective participant observers." A fairly precise record of these observations has been kept by historians of that era.[24]

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[24]Those who wish to know something about the life of Andrew Jackson should study two works: James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, 3 vols. (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861) and John S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson, 2 vols. (New York: Macmillan Company, 1928). If they wish to add some excitement, they should read Marquis James, Andrew Jackson (New York: Garden City Publisher, 1940). For the history of this period generally, especially to catch the color and splash of the times, there is no better book than Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1946). A scholarly and more recent study of the age is Glyndon Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), but this book is Whiggish in tone and a bit bland. In some ways, the most perceptive book about Jackson as President is Leonard White, The Jacksonians (New York: Macmillan Company, 1954).

Lately, historians have been having trouble deciding what Jacksonian Democracy is all about. One obvious reason for this is their neglect of the central figure of the period. In terms of biography, Jackson himself has not been the

Despite the severity of James Parton's final judgment upon the Jacksonian influence in American political life, there is a basic inconsistency in his interpretation of the Jacksonian movement. In many passages, Parton characterized the Jacksonians as the "corrupt manipulators of vicious rabble"; in others, however, he made them appear as the representatives of the "highest American ideals." Parton referred to Jackson as a man who, "autocrat as he was, he loved the people, the sons and daughters of toil,

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subject of serious scholarly study since Bassett first published his work in 1910. None of the biographies subsequently written approach Bassett's scholarship or critical handling of his subject. James' study is an immensely readable book, but despite impressive research, he produced a one-dimensional Jackson that is highly partisan. He does not begin to suggest the deep subtleties within Old Hickory. And, as long as the Hero himself remains elusive, Jacksonian Democracy will also be controversial. So disputes about the nature and significance of the Jacksonian movement continue and readers have a wide range of volumes from which to select interpretative ideas. Among the most interesting and provocative books are: Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957); John Ward, Andrew Jackson, Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955); Frederick Jackson Turner, Rise of the New West (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1906); Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); William MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907); Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, II (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1954); Algie M. Simons, Social Forces in American History (New York: Macmillan Company, 1925); Louis Hacker, The Triumph of American Capitalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940); Frederick A. Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919); Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); Claude Bowers, Party Battles of the Jackson Period (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1922).

as truly as they loved him."[25] While lauding the nobility of the "Old Hero's" ideals, he castigated Jackson's political opponents for their dismal conservation, for their slavish imitation of European ways, and for their lack of comprehension of the "great sentiments which breathed all the life into this great Republic."[26] Parton's treatment of the Bank controversy reflected both his rejection of the National Republican Economic Program and his distaste for the Jacksonian party. He was most suspicious of the motives behind the Jacksonian attack on the Bank of the United States. In his view, Jackson was basically moved by petty, personal hostility to Nicholas Biddle, not by proper rational conviction that the Bank's special privileges endangered liberty. Parton viewed Jackson's conduct during the recharter debate as another illustration of the violence of his temperament and the lack of his sound policies.[27]

W. G. Sumner found a special significance in the history of the Jacksonian era. "No period," the Yale professor declared, "equals in interest the administration of Andrew Jackson."[28] Much of Sumner's interpretation of the Jacksonian movement seems to have been derived from his

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[25]Parton, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 148-150.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Ibid.

[28]William G. Sumner, Andrew Jackson (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1895), pp. 119-135.

conviction that the masses cannot rule. Sumner viewed the coming to power of the masses associated with Andrew Jackson's electoral triumph in 1828 as an ever-present danger to the "natural order." Writing of the fondness for inflationary financial measures cherished by many of Jackson's supporters, Sumner assailed their use of government to "advance the interest of the classes which have the least money and the most value."[29] Analyzing the Jacksonian agitation against the Bank of the United States, Sumner found opposition to recharter (the Bank) grounded in "ignorance of the realities of money and credit," compounded with political opportunism and mob hatred of the wealthy and prosperous.[30]

Old Hickory, in Sumner's analysis, provided the mob, impatient of all restraint and jealous of all talent and wealth, with a "tailored government" which typified their own deplorable prejudices. Sumner disliked its agrarian radicalism and was horrified by the "barbarity of Western life." He therefore found little cause to rejoice that the "Western influence--under Jackson--had triumphed in national policies." The election of Jackson, he complained, "meant that the uneducated Indian fighter had been charged with the power of the presidency."[31] Despite

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[29] Ibid., pp. 119-135.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., pp. 77-82.

his extreme distaste for the Jacksonian version of democracy, Sumner declared that "it came in Andrew Jackson's way to do some good, to check some bad tendencies, and to strengthen some good ones."[32]

James Schouler's narrative of the Jacksonian years shed more light upon the questions concerning the origins of the Jacksonian Democracy raised by Sumner. Schouler, the Republican son of a Whig journalist, charged the Jacksonians with responsibility for that "corruption" and "debauchery" in American political life. "There was a vigorous vulgarity about Jackson's administration at every point," he contended. He went on to say:

> The painted Jezebel of party patronage seized upon the public trusts for her favorites. . . . Andrew Jackson was the first president from what we call the masses, the first whose following vulgarized, so to speak, the national administration and the social life at the capital.[33]

Though Schouler softened his harsh portrayal of Jackson's democracy by granting that Old Hickory "was honest and upright in the general endeavor to give his countrymen a high and noble administration," he found that Old Hickory was basically "a rude, if honest, demagogue, motivated in part by honor but more by jealousy and desire

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[32] Ibid., p. 279.

[33] James Schouler, History of the United States Under the Constitution, Vol. III (New York, 1894), pp. 455-464.

for revenge."[34] Schouler contends that the Jacksonian position on the Bank issue was "sound in principle." By Jackson's day, he argued, "the time had come for the United States . . . to break the web of corporate favoritism which was becoming a corded net upon its growing shoulders."[35]

The publication of the English translation of the second volume of Professor Hermann Von Holst's Constitutional and Political History of the United States offered further support to those American scholars who deplored the "Jacksonian degradation of democracy." Von Holst based his analysis of the Jacksonian movement upon the premise that "popular sovereignty" would be a dreadful condition of things. Stressing the "conservative sense" which a democratic government needs more than any other form of state, Von Holst charged the Jacksonians with the subversion of the "institutional restraints" he found embodied in the American Constitution. He protested that the cohorts of "Old Hickory" had "raised the caprice of the majority to the sole law of the land." Commenting upon the majority's insistence that Jackson, the popular favorite in the indecisive electoral vote of 1824, was morally entitled to the support of all truly democratic representatives in Congress, Von Holst branded their view of majority rule "not a

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[34] Ibid., pp. 134-147.

[35] Ibid., pp. 260-271.

postulate of democracy, but the overflow of the constitutional state." He argued that in "democratic constitutional states, the legally and morally binding rule is not the will of the majority of the people expressed in any way that suits their whims, but the will of the majority expressed in the way provided by the Constitution, and in no other." Denying that the Founding Fathers of the United States intended to create a popularly elected chief executive, Von Holst warned that acceptance of the Jacksonian interpretation of the democratic principles would lead to anarchy and mob rule.[36]

Several other writers reflected their scholarly repudiation of Jacksonian democracy. John T. Morse expressed the spirit if not the candor of many biographers when he exclaimed to Henry Cabot Lodge: "Let the Jeffersonians and Jacksonians beware! I will poison the popular mind."[37] Morse's biography of John Quincy Adams found Jackson "the representative hero of the ignorant masses."[38] Henry Cabot Lodge, in his Daniel Webster, concurred, finding Old

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[36]All the quotations from Von Holst are taken from his book, The Constitutional and Political History of the United States (Chicago: Callaghan and Company, 1881-1892), Vol. I, pp. 32, 158-160; Vol. II, pp. 8, 77-79; Vol. IV, pp. 74-75. Also see Cave, op. cit., pp. 14-16.

[37]John T. Morse, John Quincy Adams (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1882), pp. 163-218.

[38]Ibid., pp. 163-218.

Hickory's presidential policies the product of "crass ignorance."[39]

Henry Adams' Life of Albert Gallatin found in the Jacksonian democracy the beginning of that degeneration of the Republic which he later lamented at greater length in the classic, Education of Henry Adams.[40] Theodore Roosevelt, though celebrating many of the virtues of the hardy frontiersman in his Thomas Hart Benton deplored the "narrow mind and bitter prejudices" of the first Western president. "Jackson's election," he wrote, "is proof that the people are not always right."[41]

On the side of Jackson's supporters and admirers who appreciated and lauded his "Jacksonian system" are writers such as Richard Ely, Frederick Jackson Turner, Charles H. Peck, John W. Burgess, Ralph C. Catterall, and Carl Fish.

Richard T. Ely's The Labor Movement in America rejected the dominant view of the Jacksonians as corruptors of the Republic. He argued that the Jacksonian movement was a "political expression of the demand of common people

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[39]Henry Cabot Lodge, Daniel Webster (New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1896), pp. 116-123.

[40]Henry Adams, Life of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia, 1879); Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1961).

[41]Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas Hart Benson (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1886), pp. 19, 22, 33-38.

of America for social justice."[42] "The Democratic Party from 1829 to 1841," wrote Ely, "was more truly a workingmen's party than has been the case with any other great party in our history."[43] In the farmer-labor alliance forged by the Jacksonian democracy, Ely found "a progressive force later betrayed by both major parties."[44]

Frederick Jackson Turner hailed Jackson as the herald of "democracy as an effective force," and proclaimed the Jacksonian movement "the triumph of the frontier."[45] He described Jackson as the "very personification [of the frontier democracy] . . . free from the influence of European ideas and institutions" and lauded those "men of the Western world [who] with a grim energy and self-reliance began to build up a society free from the dominance of ancient forms."[46]

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[42] Richard T. Ely, The Labor Movement in America (New York: T. Y. Crowell & Company, 1886), pp. 42-43. The role of labor in the Jacksonian era has been especially attractive to historians. See Walter Huggins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), is a first-rate book. See also Joseph Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, II (New York: Viking Press, 1946); Philip S. Foner, History of the Labor Movement in the United States (New York: International Publishers, 1947); William A. Sullivan, The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, Pa.: Historical and Museum Commission, 1955); and Joseph G. Rayback, History of American Labor (New York: Macmillan Company, 1959).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Frederick Jackson Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), p. 15.

[46] Ibid.

Turner regarded the Jackson movement as a "dynamic," "invigorating," "nationalizing force" in American political life. He partially defended the Jacksonian use of "rotation in office" on the grounds that naional government in that period was no complex and well-adjusted machine."[47] Indeed, all aspects of Jackson's administration--the attack upon the Bank, the presidential disregard for the niceties of constitutional law, the repression of nullification, as well as the spoil system--appeared to Turner as a reflection of the rugged democracy of the frontier, with its intense and wholesome dislike for "ancient forms."

Charles H. Peck presented an interesting interpretation in his defense of the Jacksonian democracy. In his Jacksonian Epoch, Peck argued that the Jacksonians rode to power on the tide of a "popular revolt" which demanded the restoration of the true principle of Republican government, and the non-interference with popular rights.[48] Deeply influenced by the Social Darwinist philosophy which helped shape many earlier accounts of the Jacksonian era, Peck deplored the American system as a "departure from the law of natural selection." Unlike earlier scholars, he found in Jacksonian democracy no tendencies dangerous to the

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[47] George Rogers Taylor, ed., The Turner Thesis Concerning the Role of the Frontier in American History (Boston: Heath, 1949), p. 24.

[48] Charles H. Peck, Jacksonian Epoch (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1899), pp. 125, 180-235.

strictest laissez-faire orthodoxy. He lauded the followers of Old Hickory as faithful disciples of the "true theory" of democratic government and praised even the spoil system as a democratizing device designed to assure popular control over officehodlers. Peck's interpretation of the "true theory" of government, however, was grounded in principles no social Darwinist could question: laissez-faire, no government aid to special interests and free trade.

This reference to the "Socialistic Democracy" of Jackson was not, however, a mere artificial tendency. John W. Burgess, in his study of The Middle Period dealing with the origins of the Jacksonian democracy, wrote:

> The Western division [of the Jacksonian party] alone was a real democracy. . . . It was the settlement of the country west of the Alleghenies which first created social conditions in harmony with [the democratic] theory.[49]

Burgess, however, did not share the enthusiasm for Western democracy harbored by Turner. He followed Sumner in denouncing the "political and social radicalism" of the West and, without defining the term, hinted that Jackson's economic policies "smacked of socialism."[50]

The socialistic perspective of the Jacksonian democracy, in fact, has remained a mute issue until recently. A thorough investigation of this perspective was first

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[49] John W. Burgess, The Middle Period (New York, 1898), pp. 134-136.

[50] Ibid.

brought to light almost a century after Jackson's death. One reason for this delayed revision was probably the late universal unawareness of the concepts of socialism.

The publication in 1945 of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.'s Age of Jackson probably enhanced the revisionist trend. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of Schlesinger's volume was its emphasis upon the importance of a militantly class-conscious Eastern labor movement in shaping the more radical aspects of the Jacksonian program. Schlesinger described the threshold of Jackson's era as a "decade of discontent, born in depression, streaked with suffering and panic, shaken by bursts of violence and threats of rebellion."[51] During the first year of the Jacksonian era, Schlesinger states that "through the land an excitement for change had welled up from profound frustration."[52] This widespread conviction, which would by itself have caused trouble, was aggravated by local grievances. The new Western states felt their development hampered and thwarted by economic and political institutions too much under Eastern capital. The new industrial pattern of life in the Northern and Middle states raised painful problems of adjustment for a people habituated to farms, ships, and

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[51]Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), p. 31.

[52]Ibid., p. 45.

household manufactures. The establishment of the protective tariff exasperated the Southern planters who regarded it as a tribute levied upon them by Northern bankers. "The broadening of the suffrage throughout the nation" stated Schlesinger, "gave a sense of power to classes which believed themselves denied the benefits of government . . . resentment flared up into conflict, revealed how intensely the Western farmers and Eastern workingmen felt themselves balked by the existing order, and how far they were prepared to go in transforming it."[53]

Schlesinger, in effect, called attention to a "class war" among the Jacksonian society. He said: "This was the crisis, and it was to be distinguished by the fact that it was evidently openly and acknowledgely a WAR OF CLASS."[54]

Fanny Wright, who championed a socialist group at the time, raised with other socialist leaders the banner of socialism and called for socialistic solutions to the problems of the "proletariat." Wright stated: "It is now everywhere the oppressed millions who are making common cause against oppression; it is the ridden people of the

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[53] Ibid., p. 30.

[54] Ibid., p. 183. For more detailed information on the history of Labor Socialist Parties in the United States, the contributions of Joseph Wedemeyer and F. A. Sorge, who were in close contact with Marx and Engels before their migration to the United States, to the Socialist movement in the United States, see Harry W. Laidler, History of Socialism (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968), Chapter 37.

earth who are struggling to throw from their backs the 'booted and spurred' riders."

The crisis might terminate, Fanny Wright suggested, in three possible ways. First, it might end in total enslavement of the people by a "crafty priesthood and a monied aristocracy" (a theocratic-capitalist state), but she felt this destiny was unlikely for America. Second, the crisis might end in a violent revolution on the part of a people goaded too long by oppression (a revolution by the Proletariat). The third alternative was the "socialist transformation." She contended in her plea for a "socialist state" that "if the industrious classes and all honest men of all classes, UNITE for a gradual but radical reform, they could avoid these dreadful fates." Miss Wright's scheme for salvation was only through a "state-guardianship system." Her call of "Workers unite!" probably was a forerunner of the daily slogan broadcast by the Communists on Moscow radio since 1917.[55]

Fanny Wright's vivid sense of impending revolution infected much of the workingmen's movement during the Jacksonian era. However, it seems that not everyone favored "state guardianship." A competing panacea was a form of

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[55]All quotations from Miss Wright's writings are taken from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), pp. 180-192.

"agrarianism" expounded by Thomas Skidmore and Alexander Ming, Sr. This notion they thought would cure society by "redistributing the land." Skidmore set forth his plan in a verbose book, The Rights of Man to Property, published in New York in 1829 (one year after President Jackson took office) in an attempt to expose the President to the feverishly emerging workingmen's movement "socialistic transformation" plans.

In an article on "The Workingmen's Movement of the Jacksonian Era," Edward Pessen undertook an analysis of voting behavior in Boston during the first administration of Jackson. Pessen concluded that the social ideas of labor spokesmen, evidently and clearly, "preached class conflict, denounced the domination of society by the wealthy, and called for a sweeping transformation in social organization." However, Pessen added that the labor parties as a whole were "reformists, not revolutionary," and far from presenting a "militant proletariat," they were rather affected by "the mood of the American workingmen of that era, men who, while workers today, might become masters tomorrow."[56]

Another student of that period, Louis Arky of the University of Pennsylvania, in an article dealing with

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[56]All quotations from Edward Pessen's writings are taken from his article, "Did Labor Support Andrew Jackson?" Political Science Quarterly, LXIV (September, 1927), pp. 262-274.

"The Mechanics' Union of Trade Associations and the Formation of the Philadelphia Workingmen's Movement," found the spokesmen of labor in that area (in 1828-1829) "possessed of a monomania against Capitalists." Tracing their ideology to the Richardian Socialist's labor theory of value, Arky found in the workingmen's movement an expression of alienation from the emergent business order, not enthusiastic acceptance of middle-class values. Outlining the objectives of the movement, Arky wrote: "They sought to arrest the momentum of incipient capitalism, using a tool they were not adept in wielding: the apparatus of governments."[57]

Although there are several other authors who contradicted the theses of the "socialistic democracy" of Andrew Jackson, this writer feels inclined to highlight these socialistic tendencies which establish an articulate comparison between Jackson's pro-socialist democracy and Nasser's pro-democratic socialism. The key to understanding the Jacksonian democracy, argues Professor Joseph Dorman, lies not in regarding the party battles of the day as expressions of antagonism between social classes, but rather as seeing them as internecine fueds fought within the business community. "The so-called labor movement . . .

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[57]Louis Arky, "The Mechanics' Union of Trade Association and the Reformation of the Philadelphia Workingmen's Movement," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXXVI, as quoted by Cave, op. cit., p. 59.

was anti-Aristocratic rather than anti-Capitalistic. . . . The humanitarian element contributed a weak impress of reform, but it was decidedly thrown into the shade by the business drive." The very political measures which Schlesinger interpreted as evidence of a Jacksonian determination to restrain the business community, Dorfman saw as an expression of the "business drive."[58]

Further support for Dorfman's interpretation was offered by William A. Sullivan. He contended in his analysis of the voting behavior in Philadelphia during the Jacksonian years that no evidence was found to support the thesis that the working class tended to vote for Jackson or for candidates of the Jacksonian party. Comparing property valuations and voting returns by wards, Sullivan concluded that the workingmen of Philadelphia gave their votes far more consistently to the Whigs than to the Jacksonian Democrats. Moreover, adds Sullivan, it was prior to the Bank War and not during it that the working class revealed any inclination to follow the lead of Jackson and his party.[59]

The revisionist interpretation of the Jacksonian labor movement was later given further expression in the

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[58]All the quotations from Joseph Dorfman are taken from his book, The Economic Mind in American Civilization (New York: Viking Press, 1946), II, pp. 637-695.

[59]William A. Sullivan, The Industrial Worker in Pennsylvania, 1800-1840 (Harrisburg, Pa.: Historical and Museum Commission, 1955), Chapter V.

monographic study of the New York workingmen's movement conducted by Walter Huggins, Huggins followed Dorfman by arguing that the so-called labor groups were neither motivated by a proletarian sense of class injustice nor possessed with an expressive, anti-capitalist sentiment. Rather, in Huggins' judgment, "the movement reflected the determination of newly enfranchised commoners of all classes to obtain a share of the largess of capitalist society by destroying the last vestiges of special privilege which barred the way to economic advancement."[60]

It follows from the preceding analyses that the Jacksonian democracy apparently was not an original movement. It is hard to assume that General Jackson and/or his intimate friends had deliberated at length before the 1828 elections to determine how they would run the federal government if they won. At least no historical evidence to this effect has been presented. It also sound implausible that the "stubborn," "military chieftain," the "Gothic leader," the "tyrant," the "semi-illiterate"--as Jackson's opponents saw him--had the clear intellectual vision to read the philosophies of democracy, analyze them, criticize them, and then determine his own stand upon the system of government he had selected for his people.

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[60] Walter Huggins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class: A Study of the New York Workingmen's Movement (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 8, 80, 112-128.

More observers than not charge Jackson with being "intemperate, arbitrary, and ambitious for power." Jefferson was quoted to have said of him that he was a "dangerous man."[61] A group of politicians led by Martin Van Buren anticipated that Jackson would "storm Washington" in a revolutionary style. Van Buren, who later became Jackson's Secretary of State, wrote: "I scarcely ever went to bed without apprehension that I would wake up to hear of some coup d'etat by the General."[62]

It can be argued therefore that Jackson's frustration over the success of the "intriguers and politicians" in depriving him of the presidency in 1824 by "corrupt bargaining," probably had a tremendous impact upon his political thoughts after 1828. It is the opinion of this writer that had the aristocrats in 1824 allied themselves with Jackson and given him the moral, social, and political support which he expected--and probably deserved--it is likely that he would not have become any different as President from Jefferson or Monroe. Naturally, he would not have had to seek, and later champion, the cause of the masses being as he was a lawyer, an office-holder, a land speculator, and a merchant at different times. Jackson's political thought probably developed as a natural "compromise" between his

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[61] Avery Craven and Walter Johnson, The United States Experiment in Democracy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1947), p. 280.

[62] Ibid.

personality and the events that moulded the second quarter of the nineteenth century. On his way up to the presidency, it should be remembered, Jackson had gained a splendid military reputation but a loose distinction as the plain man's candidate against the hierarchies of the Republican party.

The broadening of the franchise, the shift to direct choice of presidential electors, the fading of old party lines all seem to have prepared the way for Jackson to break "Washington's chain of succession" and seize the first place in American political life. Jackson's popularity in 1824 and then the decisive majority he received in 1828 must be regarded as victories of the masses first and of Old Hickory secondly. The exemplary progress of Andrew Jackson from obscurity to fame had certainly awakened a new sort of mass enthusiasm among the American public.

Jackson, the popular hero who had been deeply disturbed about his loss of the presidency in 1824 by corrupt means conducted by the aristocrats was finally "appointed" President in 1828 "by the masses." Thereupon, the will of the masses, "the bone and sinew of the country,"[63] as Jackson used to call them, proved to be more powerful and useful than the combined forces of the Aristocrats.

Thus Jackson, consciously or unconsciously, had to champion the case of the masses against the "aristocratic

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[63]Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 15.

hand" which dominated the country. He apparently was under the spell of two diverse motives: to reward the masses who had brought him to national leadership, and to punish the "anti-Republican intriguers and politicians" who usurped his "right to power" in 1824. Jackson, in fact, crowned himself the guardian of "old republicanism" which demanded not only adjustment or re-evaluation of the political system, but also the right to take action upon a solid, mass consensus.

Jackson identified the masses--"the real people" as he often called them--as consisting of planters and farmers, mechanics and laborers. Thus a composite class of industrious folk was marked off within society.[64] Jackson's "real people" can then be seen as essentially the four specific occupational groups he named--the men whose "success depends upon their own industry and economy . . . who know that they must not expect to become suddenly rich by the fruits of their toil."[65]

Morals, habits, character, were key terms in Jackson's socio-political vocabulary. Major policies were warranted by their capacities to preserve the morals of the people" or "to revive and perpetuate those habits of economy and simplicity which are so congenial to the character of

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[64] Ibid., pp. 13-18.

[65] James D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the President, Vol. III (New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1917), pp. 305-306.

Republicans."[66] And so with the differentiation of classes according to worth: the American "laboring classes" were "so proudly distinguished" from foreign counterparts by their "independent spirit, their love of liberty, their intelligence, their high tone of moral character."[67] At a still higher level within the block of favored classes were those who work the land, "the first and most important occupation of man." Farmers, in Jackson's view, contributed to society "that enduring wealth which is composed of flocks and herds and cultivated farms;" they constituted "a hardy race of free citizens."[68]

Like the Nasserites, Jackson regularly identified the class enemy as "the money power" or the "moneyed aristocracy." This term implies undoubtedly some direct appeal against the rich. However, this writer surmises that this was a secondary meaning to both Jackson and Nasser. They disregarded the sheer idea that income can be, or should be, an index of differential economic or power interest. However, they fiercely attacked the role of wealth as manipulator of government.

As a national political phenomenon, the Jacksonian democracy drew heavily upon the Bank War issue which

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[66] Ibid., pp. 19.

[67] Ibid., pp. 19-166.

[68] Ibid.

amplified that democracy's distinctive character. The basic position Andrew Jackson established for the Democratic Party in relation to the "control of wealth on government" continued to operate as a source of political strength through the 1840's. So powerful, in fact, was the Jacksonian appeal with regard to the Bank War that large sections of the rival Whig Party finally capitulated on the issue explicitly for the purpose of saving the Party's life and escaping identification as the "Bank Party." The Bank War topic will be discussed at length in a later section.

Jackson's appeal for economic reform suggests a dismantling operation: an effort to pull down the menacing constructions of federal and corporate power and restore the wholesome rule of "public opinion and the interest of trade." This, at first glance, has the sound of laissez-faire, but upon deeper probe and in accordance with this writer's thesis, it has particular overtones which give the argument a socialist tint. Jackson's war against the Bank, which in fact gave the Jacksonian Democracy its shape, was the Jacksonian's platform which attempted to redistribute the nation's wealth, to curtail the dominating influence of the aristocracy, and to free the masses to handle money and increase their share in national power.

Jackson's economic ideology ushered and welcomed government intervention. Granted that competition free from government intervention constituted the ideal economy, one

may question the Jeffersonian commitment to free enterprise when that freedom resulted in the growth of monopolies which destroyed competition. The Jacksonian answer, it can be argued, was government intervention to restore the conditions of competition, to "heal the wounds of the constitution," and to "re-establish the principles of government in their original purity."[69]

Though Andrew Jackson could not act with the same measure of freedom that Nasser possessed, which he probably would have done if he had Nasser's free hand, Jackson apparently did all he could to promote his "socialistic policies" by stretching his presidential powers and softening the constitutional hedges on several occasions. Prime examples are the destruction of the United States Bank and the establishment of protective tariffs (both situations will be discussed at length later). Like Nasser, Jackson used a specific set of tools to achieve his goals. Beside the manipulation of his charisma, he applied repression and cultivated favorable public opinion. Differences between Jackson and Nasser may then be seen not as differences in ideology, but rather as differences in the degree of power which each enjoyed.

Jackson did not accept the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "dissolutions of classes"--to use the

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[69]Edwin C. Rozwenc, Democracy in the Age of Jackson (Boston: D. C. Heath & Company, 1965), p. 78.

modern political terms--as means to promote the interests of the underprivileged masses. However, his explicit intentions were to liberate the working classes and get them closer to the position of power in the country. The way to achieve that, Jackson thought, was by encouraging the workingmen movement, by reducing tariffs (if he so willed), and by undermining the influence of the elite and the control of capital over government.

While it is not difficult to argue that Jackson did not aspire to change totally the historical and generally appreciated capitalist system, it seems, nevertheless, that he was determined to apply the Jeffersonian concepts differently. Jackson's "practical democracy" was probably more pragmatic, more progressive, and more acceptable to the masses of the times than that of Jefferson. After all, Jackson's democracy proved workable for several decades after he died.

Nasser's Socialism

While it is apparently true that Jackson's democracy "smacked of socialism," it might be valid also to say that Nasser's socialism "smacked of democracy." Nasser's ideology did not reach its peak in Egypt and in the Arab World during his life. After his death, few people apparently had sufficient knowledge of what he had intended it to be. The

Nasserite socialism certainly was his own creation. Whether it will outlive him remains to be seen.

There are few objective studies on Nasser's socialism, mainly because few people fully understood his mind and realized what he imagined it to be.[70] Most Arab sources lauded Nasser's socialism because, under the circumstances of repression that existed then, most of them had to praise Nasser himself. They so acted either because they were under his charismatic spell or because they feared him. Non-Arab sources are divided: Socialists praised Nasser's socialism

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[70]For a more detailed information on Nasser's socialism, see the following references: ᶜAli Al-Barūdi, Fi al-Ishtirākīyah al-ᶜArabīyah (On the Arab Socialism) (Alexandria: Dar al-Maᶜarif, 1967); Jalāl Amīn, Muqaddimah lil-Ishtirākīyah (An Introduction to Socialism) (Cairo: Modern Press, 1966); Jalāl Yahya, Al-Takhalluf wa-al-Ishtirākīyah (Underdevelopment and Socialism) (Alexandria: Dar al-Maᶜarif, 1966); M. H. ᶜUways, Al-Ishtirākīyah (Socialism) (Cairo: Al-Risālah Press, 1969); ᶜIsmat Sayf al-Dīn, Al-Tarīq ila al-Ishtirākīyah (The Way to Socialism) (Cairo: al-Nahdah Press, 1968); Mukhtār Amīn, Hawl al-Ishtirākīyah al-ᶜArabīyah (On the Arab Socialism) (Cairo: Modern Press, 1966); Gamāl Saqr, Al-Ishtirākīyah wa-al-Tarbīyah (Socialism and Education) (Cairo: al-Kitāb al-ᶜArabi, 1963); Gordon Waterfield, Egypt (New York: Walker and Co., 1967); Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1960); Jean and S. Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958); Safran Nadav, Egypt in Search of Political Community (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961); Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1967); Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); Wynn Wilton, Nasser of Egypt (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959); W. F. Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1970); Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962); Kemal Karpat, Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East (New York: Praeger, 1968).

most Westerners either ignored it--to undermine Nasser's leadership--or simply had limited knowledge of the subject. This, in turn, resulted either from their lack of information, from their ignorance of the Arab psychology, or from the complexity of the subject and its rapid change.

In this analysis of Nasser's socialism, the writer will depend basically on Nasser's own assessments of the topic, on the few European sources available, and on his (the writer's) observation of the events as he experienced them.

Nasser shaped and reshaped his policies as many times as needed to manufacture a "tailored system" to serve his purposes. However, it seems to this writer that he was consistent about his inconsistencies. Although Nasser appeared as a genuine leader who abhorred imitations, it can be strongly argued that he was neither a theoretician nor a philosopher. It fitted him most to be designated as "a pragmatist contriver." He utilized known theories and applied them differently. Apparently he made special efforts to contrive his "isms" in order to make them appear original. His "isms" were tailored in a manner which provided his objectives with convenient tools.

Nasser, in the Charter, did not deny the notion of "importing ideas." However, he argued that such ideas must be harmonized with the socio-economic and political environments of a nation. He stated:

> To recognize the presence of national laws governing social actions does not mean to accept ready-made theories and take them as an adequate substitute for national experiences. The real solutions to the problems of one people cannot be imported from the experiences of another; but it [a nation] also needs to digest its food and mix it with the intellectual substance it can get produced by her living cells.[71]

The composite phenomenon which some have chosen to call "Nasserism" is comprised of several ingredients. Within the United Arab Republic, Nasserism is revolutionary change, republicanism, anti-feudalism, planned economic development, and socialism. In intra-Arab relations, Nasserism is a drive for integration and political unification. And in the country's relations with the rest of the world, "Nasserism" expresses itself negatively as opposition to colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign military bases, and great power's "spheres of influence," and positively, in Afro-Asian solidarity and "neutralism." Of the diverse components of "Nasserism," socialism is the most recent.[72]

A famous and knowledgeable Israeli author, Eleizer Be'eri (probably possessed of disjunctive sentiments against Nasser) in his book, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, made it clear that Nasser's socialism was an "affair of convenience." He stated that:

> His [Nasser's] principles are political, national greatness and Egypt's independence and hegemony in her spheres of influence, while

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[71] Charter, Chapter VII.

[72] Sayegh, op. cit., p. 99.

> social goals remain of secondary importance. Economic and social activity are designed to serve political ends; and so they are easily changed as the need arises or in the light of experience.[73]

This analysis by Be'eri, at first glance, seems plausible to most authors who are not familiar with the true Egyptian experience with poverty and feudalism. Be'eri's analysis sounds like a common oversimplified reaction to a nation's attainment of independence. The missing factor in Be'eri's analysis, this writer firmly believes, is a psychological one. The fellaheen in Egypt were always known to be apathetic, submissive, and fatalistic. Nasser realized from the beginning that without a social revolution which would "awaken the fellaheen," his revolution would not rise any higher than the previous ones by Ahmed Urābi or Sa^{c}d Zaghlūl. History has indicated that without a social awakening of the Egyptian fellaheen, political upheavals have always been doomed to failure.[74] Nasser undoubtedly wanted to secure a successful change in the lives of all Egyptians;

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[73]Eleizer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 398.

[74]For more information on this subject, see W. S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1922); P. G. Elgwood, The Transit of Egypt (New York: Russell and Russell, 1928); Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958); Sirdar Ali Shah, Fouad King of Egypt (London: Herbert Jankins, Ltd., 1936); Robert Tignor, Modernization and British Colonial Rule in Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).

consequently, he was careful to promote and gain support from the fellaheen first. Since he had originally been one of them, Nasser felt a personal obligation toward the farmers. Nasser's first public speeches in early 1953 were mainly directed to the fellah. Among Nasser's first coined slogans was "Raise your head, O brother." The main emphasis in Nasser's speeches was to awaken the masses, integrate them into the political system, and use them as a solid pressure group which would support his plea for social change.

In a speech delivered at Shibin al-Kōm, a rural town in lower Egypt, Nasser said:

> . . . the hunger and nakedness of [our] people, the treasures and wealth of our land, the reasons and needs of life, [all these] call upon us to awaken as other [nations] did and to establish our country on good bases. We are not only seeking a strong nation in terms of industrial or military capabilities, but also we strive toward a human revival. . . . I here proclaim that all [disasters] which occurred to the Egyptian society were a direct result of our people's ignorance of their rights. . . . All people were born free and entitled to equal rights without any discrimination except in terms of what each of us can do for his country.[75]

In another rural region, Nasser addressed the fellaheen of Egypt with these words:

> . . . our country entertained great pains and hardships. . . . Do not forget that. Do not overlook your rights. Let me assure you that I will never sleep on [overlook] any social oppression or tolerate any political despotism.[76]

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[75]Nasser, Tasrihat, Vol. I, p. 3.

[76]Ibid., p. 15.

Nasser considered the "revolution of the underdeveloped" as a fact. He emphasized the "absolute need for a period of political, economic, and social regimentation in order to achieve the necessary conditions for a true democracy."[77] This, in Nasser's view, consisted of social and economic equality, higher production, a higher standard of living, and would require above all some mass organizational device to mobilize the national forces. Therefore, to satisfy and charismatize the masses, an attractive ideology was launched--socialism. To implement it, a mass apparatus was created--the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). To alleviate the anxiety of abrupt change, the democratic framework was preserved. The whole treatment was given in convenient, slow doses.

Professor Fayez Sayegh, a distinguished Arab observer (an author probably possessed of conjunctive sentiments) emphasized that the pre-Nasser ideological void was a convenient catalyst of Nasser's charismatization process. This was rapidly offset by two elements of Nasser's revolutionary apparatus of 1952: the instinctive belief in the imperativeness of "two revolutions," and the "six principles." Both elements, remarks Sayegh, continued to occupy a central position in Nasser's social thought until his death.[78]

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[77] Ibid., 100-104.

[78] Sayegh, op. cit., p. 101.

While the Charter is the most important source of the study of Nasser's socialist ideas--at once the most comprehensive, systematic, and authoritative expression of those thoughts--it is by no means the sole source.[79] Other official statements are also numerous and helpful.[80]

When the Free Officers rose to power in 1952, their ideology contained no reference to socialism. In the declarations of Nasser at that time, no mention was made

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[79]The Charter was submitted by President Gamal Abdul-Nasser on May 21, 1962 to The National Congress of Popular Powers a (then) projected charter defining the direction, methods, and aims of national struggle for future years. The Congress was comprised of 1750 members representing all the working powers in the country, of whom 1500 had been elected and 250 appointed.

The Charter was composed of ten chapters entitled: (1) General View, (2) The Necessity of the Revolution, (3) The Roots of Egyptian Struggle, (4) The Moral of the Set-Back, (5) True Democracy, (6) The Inevitability of the Socialist Solution, (7) Production and Society, (8) The Socialist Application and Its Problems, (9) Arab Unity, and (10) Foreign Policy.

[80]Other official statements include the "explanatory memoranda" attached to many of the socialist laws enacted since July 1961; the proposals on "The Political Organization of the Arab Socialist Union," submitted by Nasser to the National Congress of popular powers on July 2, 1952; The Statute of Arab Socialist Union of December 7, 1962. Nasser's speeches are also very helpful as a supplementary source because of the special role he usually assigned to his public addresses as a vehicle of communication with, and mobilization of, the people and as an educational device. This writer would advise specialized students to read and study these original sources in order to be able to understand "Nasser's socialism."

to socialism--not because it had yet to be discovered, but because Nasser was opposed to it. In the beginning, the leaders of the Revolution rejected every variety of socialism both in the domestic and in the international sphere. Emphasizing his discontent with the Communists, Nasser stated in a conversation with a Western correspondent in September 1954 that "the Zionists are serving Communists since they are attempting to stir disorders and prevent an improvement in relations between Arabs and the West."[81]

Neither in the Philosophy of the Revolution[82] nor in the 1956 Constitution does "socialism" appear. Although they were not socialists, the Free Officers espoused the cause of "underprivileged masses" in Egypt. The officers, as stated earlier, needed the enthusiastic support of the masses to legitimize the regime at that stage. To acquire instant mass support and at the same time score a vigorous blow to the "feudalists," Nasser feverishly introduced his laws of "agrarian reform" which considerably crippled the elite.[83]

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[81] Nasser, Tasrihat, Vol. I, p. 220.

[82] Nasser's Philosophy of the Revolution was his first published work which contained his pre-ideological views. The book simply reflects Nasser's general views on the causes of underdevelopment in Egypt, his hopes for national positive action, and the need for a total Arab unity.

[83] Al-Ahrām, January 15, 1971, p. 10. When the Revolution took place in 1952, the arable land in Egypt was approximately 1,978,000 feddans; the area owned by more than two million farmers did not exceed 778,000 feddans,

Nasser's major socialistic theme was clearly perceived in his Philosophy of the Revolution although he never mentioned the term throughout the book. Nasser wrote:

> To be successful, the political revolution must unite all elements of the nation, build them solidly together, and instill in them the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole country. But one of the primary features of social revolution is that is shapes values and blossoms principles and sets the citizens, as individuals and classes, to fight each other.[84]

General Mohammad Naguib (President of Egypt before Nasser) wrote in his Egypt's Destiny that during his struggle for power with Nasser in 1954, the latter and the rest of the Free Officers threatened to resign their politico-military offices and form what was to have been the Socialist Republican Party.[85] Naguib's release of such information confirms the notion that though Nasser seemed to have been a sympathizer with socialism, he shrewdly concealed the fact until he gained the power to launch his socialistic offensive.

Toward the attainment of that objective, Nasser worked cautiously and gradually. Prior to December 1957,

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while 2,115 feudalists owned about 1,208,493 feddans. The laws of agrarian reform in 1952 mainly focused on the following principles: (1) establishing a maximum limit for land ownership, (2) distributing the surplus among small agricultural workers, (3) extending loans and help to the new land owners to enable them to exploit their newly acquired land.

[84]Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution, op. cit., pp. 25, 26.

[85]Mohammad Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1955), p. 233.

no hints of socialism were mentioned. Nasser at the time seemed to have been gravely concerned with his foreign entanglements (the evacuation of the British, the nationalization of the Canal, and the War of 1956). Whether he was too occupied with these issues to launch his socialist campaigns or whether he deliberately selected to defer launching them until he gained a charismatic image among the people remains unknown. However, previous to December 1957, the goals of the "social revolution" were limited to the creation of a "cooperative, democratic, socialist society," which means a society "free of economic, social, and political exploitation."[86]

Nasser's socialist ideology reached its peak in 1961. The government, applying this ideology, started to take over the means of production in the country and a "public sector" was established to control banks, heavy industry, foreign trade, insurance companies, and other essential private enterprises.

Chapter VI of the Charter bears the highly significant title "On the Inevitability of the Socialist Solution." It sheds sufficient light on the circumstances which led Nasser to adopt a "professional application" of socialism in order to solve the problems of economic and social development in Egypt. The chapter clearly stated

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[86] Al-Ahrām, December 6, 1957.

that the decision on such an application of socialism was not a question of free choice; "such a solution was a historical inevitability imposed by reality, the broad aspirations of the masses, and the changing nature of the world in the second half of the twentieth century."[87]

Nasser's emphasis upon the changing nature of the world in the second half of the twentieth century clarifies, in accordance with this writer's original hypothesis, some of Nasser's political contrivances. By 1962, Nasser was under pressure from his foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The latter was supporting Egypt economically, militarily, and politically. The Aswan Dam (Egypt's symbol of perseverance and defiance of the West) was still under construction by Russian technicians. The Soviet leaders expected, and probably demanded, either ideological allegiance to Moscow, Soviet military privileges in Egypt, or the full payment of Egypt's debts to the Soviet Union. Nasser was in no position to comply with any of these demands. However, in order to carry on his significant image in world politics, to enhance his leadership among the Arabs, to secure Egypt's bargaining force vis-a-vis the West (thus keep the inflow of Western foreign aid), to threaten Israel, and to raise the morale of the Arab masses--all without endangering Egypt's sovereignty--Nasser apparently favored

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[87] Charter, Chapter VI.

the adoption of socialism as a modus vivendi. Nasser's espousal of socialism seemed (to him) a panacea; it would feed the Egyptian increasing population, quiet the desperate orientations among the Arab peoples, calm the Soviets, check Israel, and, above all, leave him (Nasser) as the unquestioned leader of Egypt and the Arab World.

Thus, it can be argued that Nasser was driven to socialism by five impelling considerations; three relate to his personal character and two are concerned with the historical developments in the area. The first three are: (1) his immediate goal to effect an historical progress in the lives of the masses, (2) his hatred of capitalism which had impoverished Egypt and introduced long generations of colonialism, (3) his nationalist nature which discouraged him from adopting Marxism or other "imported socialist systems." The second two are: (1) the need for a subtle, symbolic, and moderate gesture of gratitude to the Soviets in return for their aid, and (2) the careful consideration of the developing climate of opinion among Egyptian intellectuals and religious leaders who resented Communism, and the working groups which resented capitalism.

Those who watched popular reactions to Nasser's public speeches--and no one paid more attention to it than Nasser himself--realized that Nasser received particularly strong ovations whenever he attacked feudal landlords and capitalists or talked about the rights and aspirations of

the laboring classes. Whether Nasser truly needed this public support for his political moves is debatable; however, he had to meet his people's cry for social justice, and the best method was to take the lead.

Nasser's Charter defined socialism as the pursuit of "sufficiency," "justice," and "freedom." By "sufficiency," Nasser meant the expansion of the nation's total wealth. "Justice" connoted freedom from exploitation and the enjoyment of an equal opportunity to develop one's ability and to receive a fair share of the national wealth according to one's efforts. "Freedom" signified mass participation in the nation's destiny.[88] The attainment of each of these ideals required certain readjustments in the existing system of social, economic, and political organization, and the creation of a "new system" of appropriate means and devices to reach these goals.

Emphasis on sufficiency as an integral element of socialism is inevitable in an underdeveloped society. However, attaining sufficiency is by far a difficult achievement. Sufficiency entails not only the increase of production, but the expansion of services as well.[89] The true object of production is to provide the greatest amount of services. According to the Charter, the principle

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[88] Charter, Chapter VII.

[89] Ibid.

services that socialism must provide include medical care, free education, full employment, and insurance against old age and sickness.[90]

Sufficiency (and prosperity, to which it is a prelude) is justified in its own right; but it is also justified by the fact that without it social justice and equality of opportunity (the second goal of socialism) cannot be attained. "In proportion to the expansion of the base of production . . . new scopes are opened, affording equal opportunities to all citizens."[91]

Only the vigorous, methodical pursuit of sufficiency then can make possible the establishment of social justice and a meaningful equality of opportunity. But these, in turn, are a prerequisite of sufficiency: they are necessary to invigorate the pursuit of sufficiency and to give it a chance to reach its destination. Professor Sayegh, in his brilliant analysis of Nasser's socialism, contends that:

> A happier, healthier, better educated or more skilled farmer or worker, liberated from the oppression of the feudal master or purged of the debilitating estrangement caused by the exploitation of the employer can apply himself with greater dedication and usefulness to the productive enterprise to which his enjoyment of social justice gives him a sense of belonging.[92]

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[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Sayegh, op. cit., p. 109.

The development of a "self-sufficient Egypt," however, was far from attainable by mere slogans. The paucity of natural resources, the dimensions of the population increase, "the revolution of rising expectations" among the masses, and the conflicting ambitions of the Egyptian leaders--all these added immediacy to the challenge of development. In the absence of the organized political parties which Nasser had abolished shortly after he came to power, he engineered the "new order" of the nation: the "alliance of all popular powers." This alliance became the ideal of Nasser's socialism. The new order was based on the harmony of the working classes, not on their fusion. Socialism, according to Nasser, rejected the colorless vision of classless uniformity just as forcefully as it rebelled against the actuality of the hierarchical structure of non-socialist societies.

Nasser's "alliance of popular powers" consisted of five groups: the farmers, the workers, the soldiers, the nationalist capital holders, and the intelligentsia. Minute distinctions among these five groups are still controversial in Egypt.[93] Unity among the alliance proved to be difficult. Farmers, workers, and soldiers (who form three-fifths of the alliance) were far below the level of effective contribution.

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[93]See J. B. Mayfield, "The Institutions and Politics of Rural Egypt," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas, 1968), Chapters V, VI.

The nationalist capital holders and the intelligentsia (who form the other two-fifths) were too indifferent to contribute effectively; they disliked sharing with the other three groups any protracted and unseen wealth.

Nasser realized that socialism could not be effected without socialists. The natural alternative to this was the adoption of a "central system" which could exercise a form of "state guardianship." This system became the "Arab Socialist Union" (ASU). The Union was perceived by Nasser and his ideologists to be capable of uniting and integrating the five branches of the "alliance of popular powers."

The Union was Nasser's third attempt to create the expected mass-based organization and, with minimum friction, was conceived to accelerate the pace of "social and political development" in Egypt. The evaluation of the effectiveness of the ASU at the present time is premature. However, most students of contemporary Egyptian politics express their doubts about the success of the ASU.[94] To implement the principle of "state guardianship" under the tutelage of the ASU, the path to socialism was hastily paved by enacting several laws of agrarian reform, laws of progressive

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[94] Ibid. Also see Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1967); Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958); Ivor Powell, Disillusion on the Nile (London: Solstice Productions, 1967).

taxation, laws of nationalization of private enterprises, and even laws of confiscation.

"Social justice," in Nasser's view, was the enjoyment of equal opportunities: an equal opportunity for a share of the national wealth proportionate to one's own work and ability, an equal opportunity for a share of the essential services for decent living, and an equal opportunity for self-realization and dignity.[95] Equality of opportunity and the eradication of hereditary and other circumstantial barriers obstructing the enjoyment of such equality meant that man--every man--had a chance under socialism to "determine his place in society by his own work and his own effort. Every individual should feel that his own exertion entitles him to progress and advancement."[96] In the final analysis, social justice meant the "dissolution of class distinctions." Nasser remarked:

> I want a society in which class distinctions are dissolved through equality of opportunities to all citizens. I want a society in which the individual can determine his own position by himself on the basis of his efficiency, capacity, and character.[97]

Just as equality of opportunity did not signify equality of abilities, so, too, "the dissolution of class distinctions" did not mean the dissolution of classes as such. Nasser's object of socialism, like Jackson's object

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[95] Sayegh, op. cit., p. 112.

[96] Nasser, Taṣrihat, Vol. III, p. 467.

[97] Ibid., p. 557.

of democracy, was not a classless society; it was the creation of conditions in which diverse classes, each performing a valid social function, and all free from domination and exploitation, could exist within a framework of national unity and harmony.

In conclusion, Nasser's "socialist freedom" smacked heavily of democracy mainly in terms of the right to vote and be elected to political positions. "Democracy is political freedom, while socialism is social freedom," reiterated the Charter in Chapter VII. It further states:

> The two cannot be separated since they are both indispensable to true freedom; they are, so to speak, its true wings without both of which it cannot soar to the horizons of the awaited morrow![98]

Nasser's socialist freedom emphasized the need to restore a sound electoral process which, without the freedom of luqmit al-ᶜaysh ("the piece of bread," i.e., earning a living), had lost its value and had misled the people. In this respect Nasser wrote, "The freedom of [access to] the loaf of bread is essential [to effect] the freedom of the election polls."[99]

Nasser realized that the conditions governing the polling system, mainly the conditions of an inordinate financial deposit, discouraged the working masses from

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[98] Charter, Chapter VII.

[99] Ibid., Chapter IV.

voting. The ASU was a mass organization and in order for it to survive and prosper the freedom of representation had to be restored. The freedom of speech, of association, and of political action were emphasized in the Charter. Also to relax the ASU members, Nasser recommended that the freedom of political criticism and self-criticism be adopted--only within the "constructive plan" of the Arab Socialist Union.

It becomes evident from the preceding analysis of Nasser's socialist thought that his intentions were to effect an aggressive "socialist transformation," to drop some "old"socio-economic and political values, and to substitute for them "new" revolutionary democratic and socialist values. Whether Nasser's charismatization offensive, embodied in his socialism, was effectively driven home to the minds and aspirations of the followers is difficult to determine. Whether the "socialist transformation" of values under Nasser paid off in terms of strengthening the bond between him and his followers is also debatable. In the northern region (Syria during the UAR period), it undoubtedly failed to keep the existing bond at its initial level. The revocation of that charismatization bond, along with other grievances, led to the Syrian "nullification movement" which doomed the United Arab Republic. In Egypt, the first beneficiaries of Nasser's socialism were the farmers and the workers (who

constitute approximately 75 percent of the populace and occupy 50 percent of the seats in the National Assembly) who consequently supported Nasser's leadership feverishly. The strength of the bond between these two classes on one side and Nasser on the other was clearly demonstrated on June 9 and 10, 1967 when Nasser's career was in great jeopardy. At that time his forces had been defeated by the Israelis, the canal had been blocked, and Cairo was being threatened. He apparently invested a great amount of his charismatic residue in delivering his famous "June Ninth" address of resignation. It contained self-criticism and his acceptance of all responsibility for the defeat. Nasser's tone during the speech was sad but penetrating. Although defeated, the masses perceived Nasser as "towering." The masses rationalized that they could not live without Nasser the leader, the father, and the single hope left for them. The stunned people marched to Nasser's house and virtually wept through the night and appealed to him to reconsider his resignation. The masses had already overlooked their leader's mistakes (the war and the defeat). "His" responsibility became "theirs." The next day Nasser reconsidered the situation and withdrew his resignation. He probably emerged as a stronger leader than he had been before. The masses danced in the streets; their leader was back. Nasser remained in office and his charismatic transmission was restored to normal.

An Evaluation of Jackson's and Nasser's Ideologies

It is the vertical stratification of classes, so to speak, in accordance with which some are subordinate and exploited while others are dominant, that both Jackson and Nasser vehemently resented. Both Jackson and Nasser perceived and advocated a unified socio-economic structure which contained all classes. Nasser called such a structure "popular powers," "working powers," or "powers of working people"; Jackson gave it no specific term; however, he often referred to it as "farmer-worker alliance" or "workingmen's movement." It is significant to state that in both cases "popular powers" did not hold together firmly. The two classes which were closest to each other in Jackson's democracy and Nasser's socialism were the farmers and the workers.

The industrialists under Jackson and the nationalist capital holders under Nasser resented the "holy alliance" between the farmers and workers in both countries. Effecting an alliance of the working class and farmers under both Jackson and Nasser was possible. Also, an alliance of the two exploitive classes--the feudalists, and the capitalists in each country--easily developed and grew. However, Jackson and Nasser, with all their charismatic powers, appear to have failed to answer the most crucial question in politics: How to unite the people on equal footing.

Nasser's socialism was not pure socialism; neither was Jackson's democracy a pure democracy. The former was not a "professional" socialist system which owned the means of production. The latter was not a true "Jeffersonian" system which espoused complete laissez-faire and abhorred government intervention. It is the contention of this writer that both ideologies consisted of a group of concepts and practices specifically "tailored" to serve the purposes of certain leaders at certain times in history. These "convenient" concepts and practices were partly economic, partly social, but mostly political. They contained neither an elaborate economic theory nor a distinct theory to organize society. Only through the application of the political dimension of these ideologies did Jackson's and Nasser's socio-economic programs reflect their speculated utility. Each "economic, social, and political dimension" had implications for, and produced ramifications in, all three fields. Consequently, strict compartmentalism seems impossible.

Jackson's and Nasser's ideologies can be seen as pragmatic socio-economic and political contrivance engineered, almost single-handedly, to meet the following needs:

1. The implementation of a protest against the concentration of economic power in the hands of the elite.

2. The realization of the desire to end class distinction and establish social justice.

3. The improvement of social and economic conditions of the lower classes.

4. The eradication or curtailment of the domination of capital over government.

5. The realization of modernization and industrialization within their countries.

Jackson's and Nasser's pragmatist nature slightly altered the ideologies of Jeffersonian democracy or Marxist socialism respectively, in order to gain popular acceptance and mobilize national support. By gaining such acceptance and support, Jackson and Nasser were availed a free hand to shape their people's destinies with minimum opposition. Their ultimate goals to form a set of new values for their nations were thus made possible.

Though Jackson's and Nasser's interpretations of the political concepts were actually insignificant, the application of those interpretations was impressive and effective. Nasser's socialism rejected the theory of economic determinism and the theory of class struggle. Likewise, the Jacksonians denied class struggle as a concept and stimulated integration and free mobility among classes. Although both Jackson and Nasser rejected and resisted the dictatorship of the proletariat, they certainly championed the interests of the "underprivileged classes" and through semi-dictatorial control over the bureaucracy, they basically worked to promote such interests.

Nasser's socialism left ownership of lands and other property in private hands, although substantial governmental control was initiated within the agricultural, financial, and industrial sectors of the economy. Jackson's democracy --an offspring of a relatively mature and developed laissez-faire system--could not effect change as radically and as aggressively as did Nasser's socialism. Nevertheless, government intervention, as will be seen later, was used widely to effect considerable changes in the economic community, industry, and trade.

Jackson's democracy and Nasser's socialism apparently began initially in the form of a struggle among "the parties." Each of these leaders, devoting himself to the cause of the masses, began to consolidate his power by organizing a "masses' party" in order to neutralize (in Jackson's case) and de-activate (in Nasser's case) the rival parties. Jackson created, strengthened, and expanded the Democratic Party; Nasser established and nurtured the ASU as the one and only party in Egypt.

Jackson and Nasser utilized some similar tools to promote their ideologies, to implement them, and to defend their application. In addition to the manipulation of their leadership charisma, they resorted to two traditional instruments--repression and the cultivation of public opinion.

Jackson's repressive nature was less violent than Nasser's, apparently because of the democratic character of

the United States in the 1830's. However, Jackson's repression ranged from blunt violations of the Constitution to threats of force and individual satire. Nasser's repression, in addition to Jackson's techniques, included the utilization of police measures (i.e., illegal arrests, detentions, purges, and "show trials"). Adequate description of the repressive nature of Jackson and Nasser will be discussed later with relation to specific situations.

In his cultivation of public opinion, it is impressive to examine the huge amount of correspondence Jackson left after his death, and the unprecedented large number of speeches which Nasser delivered during his political career. Jackson's correspondence and Nasser's speeches were published later in four volumes which contained about six hundred pages each. Ironically, both Jackson and Nasser utilized the services of a mouth-piece. Jackson in 1830 appointed Francis P. Blaire, chief editor of The Globe, to propagate his ideas. Nasser appointed Mohammad H. Haykal, chief editor of Al-Ahrām, to serve in the same capacity. Both the Globe and Al-Ahrām were widely read newspapers that effectively contributed to the enhancement and promotion of the charismatization processes of Jackson and Nasser.

To conclude this comparison, this writer would like to summarize and highlight the basic similarities between

Jackson's democracy and Nasser's socialism in accordance with the three levels suggested in the methodological section in Chapter II.

As indicated in the methodological part of this dissertation,[100] Jackson's and Nasser's ideologies could be seen and appraised from at least three levels: the level of the populace, the level of the system (regime), and the level of the leaders themselves.

The followers of Jackson and those of Nasser seem to have been immensely thrilled by the ideologies of their leaders. Both the Jacksonian democracy and the Nasserite socialism symbolized popular revolts, national unity, and both attempted to effect social justice. The followers of Jackson and those of Nasser also envisioned the ideologies of their leaders as checking the domination of "capital" over government, as suppressing the social influence of the aristocracy, and as advancing the interests of the farmer-labor coalition which was politically active at the time. The American masses under Jackson, as well as the Egyptian masses during the Nasser era, seem to have been appreciative of their leaders' ideologies which, to a considerable extent, softened the severe class distinctions prevalent in both societies, eased mobility among classes, and introduced "radical" institutional changes. Although the American populace during Jackson's administration and

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[100]See Part I, Chapter II, pp. 12-27.

the Egyptian populace during Nasser's rule hailed their leaders' endeavors to protect private ownership and encourage private enterprise, the two groups showed evidence of not appreciating a "rule by the masses." Nevertheless, it follows clearly that the masses in America at the time and the supporters of Nasser's ideology appreciated their leaders' tendencies to expand government intervention as a means to trim the encroaching influence of the aristocracy over the society. This appreciative sentiment can be easily gleaned from almost all sources that discuss the subject of ideology during the rules of Jackson and Nasser.

From the level of the system (regime), both Jacksonian democracy and Nasser's socialism seem to have reflected similar impressions. Both ideologies amalgamated democracy and socialism in different proportions, increased political instability, and augmented the stress on the system by stimulating frictions among the classes. It can also be argued that the ideologies of Jackson and Nasser led to a weakening of the political integration in their respective societies and an encouragement of "false political participation." Both ideologies are accused of breeding "spoils systems" and corrupt bureaucracies. Furthermore, both ideologies can be brought before the bar of history for "hindering economic development" and subsequently "ushering in economic depression."

Finally, from the level of the leaders, it can be easily seen that both Jackson and Nasser were engaged in prolonged charismatization processes. Both leaders conducted "massist platforms," coined motivating slogans, and attempted to pacify their followers by seeking the satisfaction of the people's dignity. Both leaders succeeded in the establishment of strong charismatization bonds between themselves and their populaces. Through such bonds Jackson and Nasser masterfully succeeded in their capture of the undying loyalty and devotion of their populaces throughout their rulerships. Without such loyalty and devotion, Jackson and Nasser would probably have never appeared in history as "great men."

The major differences, however, between Jackson's democracy and Nasser's socialism may be summed up in the following:

Jacksonian Democracy	Nasser's Socialism
1. Sudden change	Gradual change
2. Vague and undocumented ideology	Well-defined and documented ideology
3. Strong constitutional environment at its inception	Loose constitutional environment at its inception
4. Encountered much opposition	Encountered little opposition
5. Free from foreign impact	Subjected to foreign impact
6. Tolerant of criticism	Intolerant of criticism

of the stock would bring the public treasury a good profit on the transaction. A board of twenty-five directors, one-fifth appointed by the President of the United States, selected the Bank's administrative officers, created branches with local boards of directors, invested the bank's funds, and provided for its other business. According to the bank charter, foreign stockholders were not able to vote for directors and frequent reports had to be made by the Bank to the Secretary of the Treasury.[2]

Other important features of the charter were as follows:

(1) The Bank might issue notes without restrictions, but they must all be signed by the President of the institution and must be redeemed in species.

(2) its notes are receivable for Government dues, a privilege extended to notes of state banks only when they were redeemed in species.

(3) The public deposits are kept without interest, a valuable privilege in the prosperous years during which the charter ran.

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[2]The Bank War has been the subject of intensive debate; much of the material written by economic historians is anti-Jackson. Among the best works are Walter B. Smith, Economic Aspects of the Second Bank of the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953); Fritz Redlich, The Moulding of American Banking (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Chicago University Press, 1960); Ralph C. Caterall, The Second Bank of the United States (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1960).

(4) A bonus of one and one-half million dollars is to be paid and public funds are to be transferred without cost to the Government.

(5) The Secretary of the Treasury might remove the deposits from the Bank, but he should "immediately lay before Congress, if in session, and if not, immediately after the commencement of the next session, the reasons for such orders or directions."[3] The charter did not specify whether the Congress then was able to pass on the reasons submitted and whether the deposits were to be restored if the Congress did not approve of such a transaction; this point caused later controversy.[4]

The size and privileges of the Bank gave it power over other banks. It received large quantities of state bank notes and presented them for redemption which forced the banks of issue to maintain adequate specie reserves and to refrain from over issue. No single state bank or combination of them was able to exercise the same influence over the great Bank and it was able to appropriate to itself much of the volume of new bank notes which the business of the country demanded. This probably was its most pronounced monopolistic feature. The Bank was protected by the Supreme

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[3]Bassett, op. cit., p. 586.

[4]The Charter of the United States Bank. Statutes at Large, Vol. III (1815-1817).

Court (which Jackson accused of being a reactionary body). In two cases, McCulloch vs. Maryland (1819) and Osborn vs. The Bank (1824), the Supreme Court ruled that the state had no power over a bank incorporated by Congress.

The Bank inevitably had the opposition of the State banks, and since the latter were connected with local politics, it became an issue in state politics. Bad management and the panic of 1819 made it necessary for the Bank to take over large quantities of real estate, especially in the West, and later sell it at a great advantage. The former owners condemned the bank's opportunist attitude. Thomas Benton wrote in 1831, "I know towns, yea, cities where the Bank already appeared as an engrossing proprietor."[5] Woodrow Wilson in his Division and Reunion shared much of the people's aversion to the Bank and warned against the perils of leaving "so great, so dominating a financial power in the hands of a giant private corporation."[6]

Ralph Catterall of the University of Chicago in his The Second Bank of the United States wrote that "Biddle (the President of the Bank) in 1833 and 1834 sought to coerce the nation into supporting recharter by plunging the economy into a severe crisis through restriction of credit not justified by the Bank's actual economic condition."[7]

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[5]Bassett, op. cit., p. 586.

[6]Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898), pp. 24-25.

[7]Catterall, op. cit., pp. 132-358.

William McDonald, in his book Jacksonian Democracy, criticized the conservative and aristocratic nature of the Bank calling that institution "a gigantic monopoly."[8] William E. Dodd of the University of Chicago, in his book Expansion and Conflict, characterized the Bank War as a struggle to prevent "the subordination of the country to one of its interests."[9]

George Rogers Taylor in his study of The Transportation Revolution argued that "the lack of adequate public control over the policies of the Bank, combined with the ever-present danger of overissuance of the bank notes" gave ample justification to the Jacksonian opposition to recharter.[10]

The President of the Bank was Nicholas Biddle. He graduated from Princeton, became a lawyer, dabbled in literature, and at length was Secretary of Legation in London and Paris. In 1819, through political influence, he was appointed Government Director of the Bank. Bassett described Biddle as a "man of personal power . . . [who] dominated the Board of Directors. . . . He was bold and imaginative. . . .

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[8]William McDonald, Jacksonian Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1907), pp. 24-30.

[9]William E. Dodd, Expansion and Complex (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin Company, 1915), pp. 1, 4, 9, 12.

[10]George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution (New York: Rinehart, 1951), pp. 310-311.

He had much latent pride and loved his own power. . . . He became--as was inevitable with a strong man--the center of the Bank's policy as truly as Jackson was the dominant force in the national government."[11] William Sumner, however, subtly charged Biddle of incompetence by saying that he used to adhere to an unsound, obsolete theory of government finance.[12]

Little is known of Jackson's early attitude on the subject of the Bank. His behavior toward the Bank might become evident from an examination of his earlier experiences with it. In a memorandum which he gave to Nicholas Biddle in 1829, after a stormy meeting between them, Jackson said: "I don't dislike your bank any more than all banks. But ever since I read the history of the South Sea bubble, I have been afraid of all banks."[13]

An earlier experience with the Bank took place between Jackson (then about to assume the office of Governor of Florida) and the Bank's branch in New Orleans in 1821. Jackson asked that branch to cash a draft on the State Department for ten or fifteen thousand dollars, but the draft was refused apparently because the parent bank had ordered that drafts should not be cashed. Nevertheless,

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[11]Bassett, op. cit., p. 587.

[12]William Sumner, History of Banking in the United States (New York, 1896), pp. 192-218.

[13]Bassett, op. cit., p. 599.

during the six years in which Jackson was a presidential candidate, nothing happened to show Jackson's views on the question.

Biddle, who acted as a professional financier, could not have kept the Bank out of politics. The fact that its charter had to be renewed by Congress made the Bank question a political one. The general revival of state rights theory embodied in Jackson's "massist democracy" undoubtedly had its effect on the Bank question. Personnel in the Bank's management had an influence on the question; for men of dignity and wealth, as were the directors and officers of the Bank, naturally opposed Jackson's election. The Jacksonians charged, and they probably believed, that the Bank took an active part in politics in several states during the election of 1828.

Jeremiah Mason, President of the Portsmouth, New Hampshire branch, was charged with practicing loan discrimination against administration men. His manner was described as cold and he was unpopular to an extent that the Secretary of Treasury complained of him to Mr. Biddle. Mr. Biddle's answer seems to have upset Jackson because the former claimed to have had the right to defend the Bank and its personnel from the "imputation of partisanship."[14]

The Bank, however, was not seen as all evil by all observers. James Parton's treatment of the Bank controversy

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[14] Ibid., p. 593.

reflected both his rejection of the National Republican economic program and his distaste for the Jacksonian party. Parton was most suspicious of the motives behind the Jacksonian attack on the Bank. In his view, Jackson was moved by "petty, personal hostility to Nicholas Biddle, not by a proper rational conviction that the Bank's special privileges endangered liberty."[15] Jackson's conduct during the recharter debate, as seen by Parton, was but another illustration of the "violence" of Jackson's temperament. His supporters, Parton argued, were not really concerned with the dangers inherent in monopoly, but were concerned only with the hope of selfish gain.

Sumner, in his analysis of the Jacksonian policies against the Bank, argued that Jackson's "agitation" was grounded in "ignorance of the realities of money and credit," compounded by "political opportunism and mob hatred of the wealthy and prosperous."[16] Because of the triumph of mob prejudice embodied in the Jacksonian crusade, Sumner added, "The Jacksonian administration unjustly, passionately, ignorantly, and without regard to the truth assailed a great financial institution."[17]

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[15]James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861), Vol. III, pp. 397, 507, 590.

[16]Sumner, op. cit., pp. 119-135.

[17]For Sumner's interpretation of Jackson's banking policies, also see his History of Banking in the United States (New York, 1896), pp. 192-218. Sumner argued that

John Bach McMaster's treatment of the Jacksonian era in his massive History of the People of the United States reflected one of the severest castigations of Jacksonian economic policies ever written. Dismissing the charges against the Bank as the product of sheer ignorance and demagoguery, McMaster argued that the "misinformed financial blunder of Old Hickory and his cohorts had created inestimable sufferings for the common people of the land whose interests they professed to defend. "Through their folly," McMaster wrote, "The whole system of exchange was suddenly and unexpectedly thrown into confusion." McMaster also condemned the inflationary monetary schemes espoused by Jackson as both "vicious" and "absurd."[18]

Ralph Catterall, the first scholar to gain access to Nicholas Biddle's personal papers, concluded after his careful study of the Second Bank's activities that Biddle's institution by controlling and regulating state chartered banks and by providing sound banking facilities to the Federal Government, had performed an indispensable public service. Although, as mentioned earlier, Catterall criticized the Bank's restrictions of credit, he wrote that the

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the Bank of the United States was never subjected to adequate public regulation. Arguing for the necessity of establishing "the authority of the state over banks," Sumner complained that the bankers of that day "disregarded law so habitually that it became a commonplace that law could not bind them."

[18]All the quotations from John Bach McMaster are taken from his History of the People of the United States (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1883-1912, Vol. 5, pp. 518-522.

Bank's services to the Government were far superior to any other banking system known in this country. He deplored the destruction of the Bank by misinformed politicians who, "though generally sincere in their beliefs, lacked real understanding of financial matters."[19]

In a monograph written by Fritz Redlich entitled "The Moulding of American Banking: Men and Ideas," the contemporary scholar challenges the harsh treatment accorded Nicholas Biddle and the Second Bank of the United States in the writings of the Democratic School. Applying modern banking theory to his analysis of the Jacksonian War against the Bank, Redlich lauded Biddle as a notable and creative forerunner of the twentieth-century central banker and praised the Second Bank as a "useful, indeed, necessary stabilizer of the currency."[20]

Redlich's conclusions were also shared by Walter Smith in his Economic Aspects of the Second Bank of the United States. Smith found that both Biddle's supporters and opponents tended to exaggerate the economic power of the Bank. Nonetheless, he found the Bank's influence on the balance a "creative one." "Had the institution been allowed to develop, as it gave promise of doing," Smith wrote, "the United States would have had an effective banking system

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[19] Catterall, op. cit., pp. 132-358.

[20] Fritz Redlich, The Moulding of American Banking: Men and Ideas (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Edward & Brothers, 1947), p. 150ff.

long before it did. The benefits," he added, "would have been substantial."[21]

Although this study is not chiefly interested in determining whether Jackson's decision not to recharter the Bank was, so to speak, right or wrong, the preceding arguments undoubtedly clarify some behavioral perspectives involved in Jackson's historical decision. Three basic cosiderations affected Jackson's conduct during the Bank controversy: (a) the first was emotional, (b) the second was charismatical, and (c) the third was political.

Emotionally, Jackson hated the Bank--all banks. His deprived childhood and rough youth evidently created in him a considerable amount of animosity to the banks as "symbols" of wealth. This was a common view among the people of Tennessee. The refusal of the Bank's branch in New Orleans to cash Jackson's draft (at the time when he was becoming the most influential man in Florida) indeed hurt his pride and added to his frustration with the banks. Jackson's hostile sentiments toward the Bank were probably developed at that time. The fact that the Bank was administered by "autocrats" to serve the purposes of "aristocrats," gravely disturbed Jackson's revolutionary inclinations. The Bank was viewed by most "Westerners" (of whom Jackson was one) as an "octopus"; a great financial monopoly bent only

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[21]Smith, op. cit., pp. 1-17, 116-263.

on jeopardizing the "perpetuity of liberty" in the country. To add to the gravity of the situation, it seems Jackson believed that the officers of the Bank had used their influence against his election in 1824 and 1828. Biddle's heated defense of the branch at Portsmouth, New Hampshire seems to have aroused in Jackson a firmer determination to label the Bank as a "hostile institution." Biddle's friendship with several members of Jackson's Cabinet and a great number of congressmen seems to have infuriated the President who resented Biddle's "crooked" means of affecting his subordinates. The President apparently turned the struggle into a "personal challenge"; he used the technique of presenting the matter to the people and soliciting their support.

Jackson's technique of taking his personal challenges to the people was not unique; Nasser as well as many other charismatic leaders consistently acted likewise. By so doing, however, Jackson gained a great advantage while his opponents lost theirs. Before the masses it is charisma that counts, it is the man, "the leader," and not the issue that matters. Jackson's charismatical endeavors to affect a national consensus against the Bank seems to have effectively paid off. By writing messages to the Congress denouncing the Bank, by talking harshly to Mr. Biddle, by publicly threatening to "kill the bank," and by publicizing his discontent with the Bank's policies, Jackson succeeded

in establishing a coalition between his followers and himself. He skillfully manipulated the mob's hatred of the "wealthy and prosperous." Jackson's charisma aroused, dominated, and directed the will of the masses whom McMaster described as "never [having] seen one of its branches [the Bank] nor one of its notes, nor ever [having] had a cent on deposit in its vaults."[22] The alliance between Jackson and his followers was based primarily upon an interested concern by the people in the outcome of the situation and was thus personified by each participant in a primary action pattern consisting of conjunctive sentiments to destroy the Bank.

Jackson's Cabinet had divided opinions on the Bank issue. The majority of the members sided with the Bank. James Calhoun, Colonel Lewis, and others led the opposition party which was in favor of the Bank and agitated members of the Congress against the President. It appears that Calhoun's group was not in concert with the primary framework of claims and obligations laid down by the President. Thus, this group developed an interest in the establishment of a secondary framework of claims and obligations in which their interests and the Bank's interests would combine against the coalition of the President and the masses. The confrontation between the two coalitions

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[22]McMaster, op. cit., pp. 518-522.

created a "game of power" which aimed not so much to win, but to avoid loss. The situation required the deployment of additional force (charisma) by the party which possessed it. The President had it. He deployed it masterfully and won. Jackson's decision not to recharter the United States Bank, however, was severely attacked on the grounds that his action was unconstitutional. Jackson justified his decision by declaring himself the "representative of the people" who, by their mandate, was responsible for the defense of their interests. He declared to his followers "the confidence reposed by my country dedicated to my conscience that now was the proper time [to take action against the Bank]. . . . I dislike to act contrary to the opinion of so great a majority of my Cabinet, [however] I could not shrink from a duty so imperious to the safety and purity of our institution."[23]

Jackson's political skill clearly exploited the interest--but above it the loyalty--of the masses to justify his political desire to destroy the Bank. By rallying the "social masses" which had supported Jefferson in 1800, Jackson revitalized the Jeffersonian democratic tradition. The party battles of the Jackson era emanated from the popular determination to control government despite the opposition of "strong-willed aristocrats such as Nicholas

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[23]Bassett, op. cit., pp. 602.

Biddle who put little faith in popular elections."[24] In highly partisan terms, Jackson emphasized his role as the spokesman of the common man, the opposer to reactionary classes "which possessed of property, slaves, or otherwise refused to accept the people's nationalism or their theory of socialist democracy."[25]

Jackson's decision was not only to deny recharter of the Bank but also to remove the government deposits from that financial institution. This decision was considered a great victory for the masses. From the point of view of this writer, it was a spectacular charismatization situation which undoubtedly provided the leader, as well as the followers, with new charismatic potential which lasted throughout the Jacksonian era.

Nasser's War Against the Feudalists

Nasser's abolition of feudalism may also be seen in terms of the three factors which outlined Jackson's victory over the Bank: the emotional, the charismatic, and the political. Nasser's war against feudalism may also be considered as his first test of strength against the reactionary forces in Egypt. It can also be argued that Nasser's undertaking to destroy the feudalists was as harmful to the Egyptian economy as was Jackson's war against the Bank.

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[24] Dodd, op. cit., pp. 1-15.

[25] Ibid., p. 1-19.

The redistribution of land in Egypt only affected 10 percent of Egypt's cultivated area and at most benefited only about 8 percent of the fellaheen when it was completed.[26] The reduction of all agricultural rents benefited many more--perhaps four million of the farming population. From the view of agricultural reformists, the land reform laws may be seen as only a moderate measure. One marxist ridiculed the law because it failed to solve rural land hunger in Egypt.[27]

The agricultural reform decree of September 1952 provided that individual owners had to sell or take compensation for all holdings in excess of two hundred feddans (a little larger than an acre). A family could retain up to one hundred additional feddans by deeding fifty each to two children. Compensation was to be made to land holders by the government in the form of thirty-year government bonds bearing 3 percent interest. Other articles of the decree provided for drastic reductions in land rents; for the resale of surrendered lands by the Government in three to five feddan lots to peasants on easy terms; for the establishment of compulsory agricultural cooperatives to supply seed, tools, fertilizer, and loans to new land

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[26]Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1959), pp. 47-177.

[27]See Anwar Abdel-Malek, Egypte Societe Militaire (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1962). Also see Elizer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Societies (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1970), pp. 423-442.

holders and guide them in planting and marketing. Finally, the law attempted to set a new minimum wage for the fellaheen of eighteen piastres a day. Since a piastre is less than three cents, such a scale naturally would not make the peasants rich. However, even this scale was not enforceable.[28]

Agriculture in Egypt must be conducted on a scientific pattern. Centralized planning has always been necessary in order to make irrigation as efficient as possible. Because of the necessary crop-rotation system, it apparently has been uneconomical and impractical to split up large farms into separate five-feddan lots. Also, because of the rapid increase in population in the family, when the father dies, the five-feddan lot is too often fragmented among his heirs.

In 1961, a second decree carried the land reform much further and reduced individual holdings to one hundred feddans. Nasser said in this respect that the new limitations would affect only about 1,892 owners.[29]

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[28]For more detailed information (in English) on the Agricultural Reform in rural Egypt, see The Revolution in Twelve Years (Cairo, UAR: Information Dept., 1964); also see J. B. Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt: A Quest for Legitimacy (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971). This book is by far one of the most penetrating studies which analyzes the application of the land-reform laws in the Egyptian villages. The book suggests many socio-political ideas as to how the implementation of these laws would become more useful and effective to the people of rural Egypt.

[29]Georgiana G. Stevens, Egypt Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), pp. 140-142.

The fellaheen in Egypt hailed the new laws. Nasser became the savior of Egypt's "real people." In one stroke Nasser was able to create a class of land-owner fellaheen and at the same time he successfully crippled the class of feudal land-owners who had for a long period ruled and abused Egypt. The land reform was not so much "for" one group as it was "anti-" another. It certainly was not socialism, however. It can be compared with a system of anti-monopoly or a redistributive taxation in capitalist societies. Some Egyptian Marxists criticized the reform law as American-influenced.[30] The significance of the 1952 agrarian reform was that it sharply reduced, though it did not destroy, the political influence of the "aristocrats," the big land owners. In 1952 Nasser realized that his imminent test of power was to be from land owners, not because they owned much land, but because by virtue of such ownership they were apt to resent his attempts to change the social values of the society. The land owners enjoyed the "traditional society"; they resented change.

From the emotional perspective, Nasser and his family owned no land. Some questions which always annoyed Gamal as a boy were "Why do the peasants who raise cattle find themselves unable to eat meat?" "Why are the peasants wearing ragged clothes?" His father's answers were: "This

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[30] Abdel-Malek, op. cit., p. 67.

is how they wanted us to be, my son."[31] This answer did not satisfy young Nasser because at that time he could not figure out who "they" were.

Nasser's frustration with feudalism was further reenforced when he applied to the Military Academy in 1936. Nasser was rejected because he was "a peasant." The following is a translation of the original conversation that took place between young Nasser, the applicant, and the head of the interview board of the Academy:

Q: Where are you from?
A: From Bani Murr, sir.

Q: You are a fellah, then?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Does your family own land?
A: No, sir; we are peasants.

Q: Did anyone speak about you? [i.e., Did any landowner recommend you?]
A: No, sir. God is my recommender.

The interview ended and young Nasser was rejected. This experience apparently bitterly frustrated Nasser. " . . . he concealed his pain but his disgust with the rotten system and its values increased," remarked the editor of Al-Musawwar.[32]

After the Revolution, Nasser had to begin his charismatization offensive with a central issue which would please the greatest majority of people and at the same time

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[31] Al-Musawwar, August 1957, p. 22.

[32] Ibid., p. 51.

crush the smallest, but most influential, minority. For reasons of humanity, land reform was needed, but until the Army came to power, there was no channel through which the need could be expressed. No political party (mainly feudalists) and no group of intellectuals had ever actively advocated land reform although various individuals had argued for land reform in the late 1930's and early 1940's. There had never been a fellaheen movement in Egypt, though in the years since the Second World War there had been outbreaks of violence in some estates. Discontent was smouldering, but there was no ground-swell of popular feeling.

The motives behind the formation of land reform as a charismatizing situation may be surmised to have been three. One was a sincere desire to carry out reform for humanitarian reasons. The second was a revolutionary aim to break the power of the old ruling oligarchy, with its roots in the big estates. The third motive was that in 1951-1952 land reform was very much in the air internationally. America's advocacy of land reform was said to be a green light, and its State Department's influence probably played a part in the preparation of the decree in order to strengthen the revolutionary group.[33]

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[33]Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 13.

As mentioned earlier, the issue of land reform was emotionally the closest to his heart. Land owners, as a class, had caused him great personal humiliation and agony. Nasser followed the same technique previously used by Jackson and many other charismatic leaders. He wooed the masses in order to gain acceptance and support for his regime and to destroy the obstructors to his emerging power--the land owners.

In April 1954 at the peak of his charismatization process, Nasser, in plain vernacular Arabic, agitated the peasants against the owners of land by these words:

> Therefore I ask each of you to hold on to his land in order to live like a free man and to make his children after him exercise freedom. This land is not only to be owned or to raise one's standard of living, but above all to give one honor and pride.[34]

In another part, Nasser said:

> One of the greatest achievements [of the Revolution] is to liberate the farmer from the reigns of large ownerships which have obstructed his way to freedom and progress. This Revolution after two years of its birth, says to you [the peasants] that it is your Revolution, your voice, your arm, stand by its side . . . stand by yourselves. God will grant us an undecayable glory and everlasting honor.[35]

From the political perspective of the issue, Nasser clearly realized that his regime could not be established

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[34]Nasser, Tasrihāt, Vol. I, p. 122.

[35]Ibid., p. 179.

firmly without the destruction of feudalism. The majority of the Egyptians were peasants. Nasser needed their support and their votes. He attempted to create in them a political awareness and a sense of political participation. The land owners, the "aliens," the "born rich," the "society of the one-half of one percent," as Nasser used to refer to them, were the Revolution's imminent enemies. The land owners often boasted that "if they [the land owners] nominated a rock, the people would elect it."[36] Nasser was determined to crush the rock as well as those who nominated it.

Nasser, in the opinion of this writer, realized that land reform could not alone solve the problem of land scarcity in Egypt. The only effective remedy for this dilemma, the leaders of the Revolution often indicated, was to increase the cultivated land in Egypt.[37] However, although Nasser was unable to score effectively an economic achievement, he certainly was successful in handling an impressive deal.[38] He turned landless people into land

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[36] Nasser, Tasrihāt, Vol. I, p. 122.

[37] Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958), pp. 340-356.

[38] For more detailed information on the applications and problems of "land reform" in Egypt, see Gabriel S. Saᶜb, The Egyptian Agrarian Reform 1952-1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967); Saᶜd Gadalla, Land Reform in Relation to Social Development (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1962); Gabriel Baer, A History of Ownership in Modern Egypt (London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Hassan Riad, L'Egypte Nasserianne (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1864).

owners and turned the feudalists into landless enemies of the Revolution. The merits and weakness of the agrarian reform will not be discussed in this dissertation, but a few remarks are necessary at this stage. Nasser's agrarian reform was intended to have three prominent revolutionary virtues. The first was to destroy political feudalism in a popular manner. This would lead to the termination of the relation between capital and voters. This can be considered as having been achieved. The second was to restore the fellah's right to own property, and through it a certain dignity, initiative, and a sense of responsibility. This probably will take longer. The third was for the State to take over all the feudalist's properties, assets, and investments which cannot be distributed to the small farmer, and thus to bring about, from the top, a modernization of agriculture on model lines which was intended to spread gradually to those regions that had not immediately benefited from the agrarian reform program. This operation is still underway and is being carried out slowly, timidly, yet effectively. Many authors, nevertheless, argue against Nasser's agrarian reform. They assert that in the final analysis, Nasser's program has produced (or will produce) less crops, less personal initiative, and more government corruption.[39]

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[39]See Mayfield, op. cit., Chap. IX, pp. 290-314.

To conclude this chapter, Jackson's and Nasser's policies on this topic can also be seen and appraised from three levels: the populace, the system, and the leaders themselves.

The populace of Jackson and that of Nasser seem to have enjoyed watching the "power game" between their respective leaders and the "enemies of the people"--the American aristocrats and the Egyptian feudalists. The masses in both countries were pleased to be wooed by their governments for the first time in their country's respective histories. This generated great enthusiasm associated with a tremendous sense of pride. The masses in both countries identified themselves with political parties and enjoyed political action. The people in America under Jackson, as well as the Egyptians under Nasser, were finally able to discover their socio-political value and their effectiveness in the decision-making process.

From the point of view of the system, the eras of Jackson and Nasser provided their respective governments with crucial challenges. The aristocratic system in America and the monarchial system in Egypt had to give way to the strong winds of democracy and socialism. The firm control by the aristocrats in the United States and that of the feudalists in Egypt was greatly undermined. As a result, the structure of government in both countries was violently shaken.

The sudden disappearance of the strong capitalist class seemed to have created a state of "weightlessness." Jackson's and Nasser's socio-democratic ideologies were unable, for some time, to fill the vacuums which occurred in their respective systems. The system in both countries had to readjust itself to the ideological changes effected by the leader; this increased the stresses on the system, called for more government intervention, legitimized the use of repression, and necessitated the cultivation of public opinion.

From the leaders' points of view, Jackson's war against the Bank and Nasser's war against the feudalists enhanced their leadership immensely. These wars relieved, to a large extent, the leaders' frustrations with the elite, served the leaders' goal to communicate with their masses and gain the people's sympathy, helped transfer political issues into personal leadership skills, and signified the vulnerability of the populaces to charismatic leadership.

CHAPTER X

JACKSON'S WAR AGAINST THE NULLIFIERS AND NASSER'S WAR AGAINST THE SECESSIONISTS

Jackson's war against the nullifiers of South Carolina was a reaction to the objection of the South to the domination by the North. Nasser's war against the separatist movement in Syria was a reaction to the objection of the North to the domination by the South. Both movements initially developed as a result of the dissatisfaction of the people in South Carolina and in Syria with their economic conditions, and the imposition of excessive tariffs by the other side. In both cases the Union was not yet enough consolidated to make it possible to coerce a state (or a region in Nasser's case) to remain in the Union.

In both cases, ironically, the role of the President was of great significance in the dissatisfied regions. The Vice Presidents of the two countries were charged with aiding the deterioration of the situation. Both Presidents threatened to use their armed forces to restore the Union, however, neither of them did. Under Jackson the separatist movement failed to materialize. Under Nasser it did

materialize, mainly due to geographical reasons but Nasser was unable to avert the break off between Egypt and Syria.

The Nullifiers

In order to see the question of the nullifiers in its proper perspective, this writer will briefly describe the problem. The nullification issue of the 1830's was initially an economic one. Trouble in South Carolina had been brewing for a long time. The contrast between the slow and limited prosperity of the South and the swift, noisy progress of the North was striking. The North was rushing on like a Western high-pressure steamboat while the South was depressed and anxious. Cotton was down. Tobacco was down. Corn, wheat, and pork were down. For several years the chief products of the South had either been inclined downward or else had risen in price too slowly to make up for the (alleged) increased price of the commodities which the South was compelled to buy from the North. The major cause of this great disparity between the North and South argued most scholars of the time, was that the Southern system was one which did not attract immigrants while the northern systems did.[1]

The Southerners resented the tariff protection accorded Northern industries because in addition to other

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[1]James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, Vol. III (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861), p. 437.

issues it meant that they had to buy their manufactured goods on a closed market, while they sold their cotton abroad on an open market. Northerners, on the other hand, argued that they had to have government protection if they were to sustain themselves against competition from Europe, particularly Great Britain. The Southerners had accepted the last tariff raise of 1824 because they perceived it as a vehicle for Jackson's elections. But when he was safely ensconced in the White House, they expected him to haul the rates down again. The Southerners expedted "their President" to redress their economic grievances. They were emotionally excited about it. Calhoun, the Vice President, was not on good relations with Jackson at the time, and seems to have exploited the situation by advocating his "philosophy of nullification." Calhoun argued that the danger in the American system was that the Federal Government, which represented the interests of the whole, encroached on the rights of the states. "However, the power which really controls ultimately all the movements is not the agents (delegates of the states) but those who elect or appoint them," stated Calhoun in reference to the power of the states. Calhoun was also anxious to disqualify the Supreme Court in its arbitration of the disputes between states or between a state and the Federal Government. He said:

> The judges are, in fact, as truly the judicial representatives of the united majority . . . and to confide the power to the judiciary to determine . . . would be in reality to confide it to the majority, whose agents they are and by whom they can be controlled in various ways.[2]

The Union, Calhoun concluded, was a compact of states in which each state retained the right to examine the acts of Congress and when necessary nullify within its borders any it felt was a violation of its sovereignty and rights.

During the first years of his presidency, Jackson's own thinking about the issues and politics tended to be Jeffersonian and conservative. Jackson leaned toward "state's rights" and the economics of laissez-faire. However, fundamentally, with a little "twist" in the practices, Jackson's "pragmatic way" was suffused with a strong sense of popular need. Jackson's defense of "state's rights" was real. He made it plain during the Bank War as well as on the issue of the "removal of the Indians."[3]

Jackson, however, always seemed to be doing two things at once: he tried to maintain one foot in the "state's rights" camp, at the same time he jammed the other foot into the nationalist camp. This "contrival technique" was a common Jacksonian practice. Although Jackson primarily adopted and defended "states' rights," he feverishly

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[2] Ibid., p. 435.

[3] For a brief and helpful summary of the case in which Jackson induced the Cherokee tribe to emigrate west of the Mississippi, see Parton, op. cit., pp. 272, 278-280.

defended the Government of the Union as the supreme authority in the country--especially since he was its head.

Convinced of the soundness and feasibility of Calhoun's "Doctrine of Nullification" and confident of Jackson's adoption and defense of "states' rights," the majority of South Carolina's legislature resisted any raise in tariffs unless that tariff conformed to their own terms.

Jackson, in an attempt to play the charismatic role of "splendid arbitrator," proposed a "middle course." The middle course tariff law of 1832 fixed similar rates to that of 1824 which the Southerners had resented. Jackson's tariff was not a law proposed to please the nullifiers; on the contrary, it included several new items on the free list and imposed high duties on such political essentials as wool, woollens, iron, and hemp.[4]

The tariff reform proposed by Jackson was totally unacceptable to the South Carolina nullifiers. They threatened disunion and talked about civil war. On November 24, 1831, the legislature of South Carolina adopted the ordinance of nullification.

It can be argued that, at that stage, the nullification question was escalated from a dispute between two bodies of government to a charismatization situation. The decisive factor was certainly the President. He began

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[4]Robert Remini, Andrew Jackson (New York: Twayne Publishers, Inc., 1966), p. 132.

to handle the question as "the leader" rather than as the "President." His conventional role gave way to the "frontiersman spirit" which emerged to the surface. Jackson saw the bond between him and his followers threatened, if not already broken. The situation seemed impelling. "Leadership by charisma" had to overshadow rational judgment. President Jackson apparently gave way to the "charismatic image" which dominated the scene throughout the controversy. His faith in the system and his faith in the constitutional processes seem to have faded while the instruments of repression, vengeance and propaganda were sharpened for a "duel style battle" which would teach the "traitors" a lesson.

Jackson was deeply distressed by the situation in South Carolina. He was more determined than anyone else to crush the attempt of secession. In his letter to Martin Van Buren dated January 13, 1833, Jackson clearly expressed his intemperate character as well as his repressive nature:

> . . . was I to sit with my arms folded and permit our good citizens in South Carolina who are standing forth in aid of the laws to be imprisoned, fined, and perhaps hung. . . . The crisis must be now met with firmness . . . and the modern doctrine of nullification and secession put down forever. . . . I will meet all things with deliberate firmness and forbearance.[5]

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[5]James Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), pp. 2-4.

In another part of the same letter, Jackson fumed with a thundering threat: " . . . Woe to those nullifiers who shed the first blood. . . . I could march from that state 40,000 men in forty days."[6] In another part of the same letter, Jackson equates his struggle to preserve the Union with a military battle which he physically commands. He wrote:

> Lately I have been disimposed by cold and surrounded with the nullifiers of the South and the Indians in the South and West. I have and will act with all the forbearance to do my duty to extend the protection to our good citizens.[7]

The most glorious and charismatizing statement by Jackson, however, came on February 20, 1832 when he avowed to the Rev. Hardy M. Cryer, in a public letter, that "the Union shall be preserved or I perish with it."[8]

The President, doing two things at the same time, coordinated his threats with military preparation. In this respect he obtained no authorization of the Congress. He alerted Naval authorities at Norfolk, Virginia. He rushed Major-General Winfield Scott southward to take command of the Charleston Garrison whose commander had recently been changed. Jackson also stationed troops in North Carolina and the Western states.[9]

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[6] Ibid., pp. 2-4.

[7] Ibid., p. 19.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Remini, op. cit., pp. 132, 133.

Jackson's determination and iron will, in fact, preserved the Union. He cultivated a favorable public opinion to support his beliefs. He addressed the nation in a public proclamation in which he moved the masses emotionally, mobilized popular support, and threatened the nullifiers with extreme punishment: "The nation was supreme, not the states. . . . DISUNION IS TREASON."[10]

Jackson performed his proclamation masterfully. He indicated that nullification was a "humiliation to the country." Jackson's iron will, it can be argued, "made one a majority."[11] Jackson's "charismatic force" was the major power that threw the nullifiers off balance. The confrontation, therefore, soon subsided and a "compromise tariff" was presented to Congress. The bill provided for the reduction of rates over a ten-year period at the end of which no duty would be higher than 20 percent. The South voted to accept. At the same time, the President, majestically, accepted the "force bill" by which he acceeded to the withdrawal of all his military preparations. With great pride, and in an environment of sympathy and jubilation, the charismatic "father of the country" reasserted his supreme leader's image. The people's sentiments were high. They

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[10] Ibid., p. 134.

[11] This phrase was used by Parton but quoted from John Ward, Andrew Jackson, Symbol of an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 162.

appreciated Jackson's performance "which rescued the country from some dreadful danger."[12]

The Syrian Seccessionists

Nasser's failure to suppress the Syrian separatist movement was as much vital to his charismatic image as was the movement Jackson had bravely fought and avoided during the nullification dispute. Jackson won but Nasser did not. Jackson's timing was accurate; Nasser's was not. When Jackson announced his Proclamation of December 10, 1832, in which he brilliantly mobilized the nation for his support, he still had time to win the battle. But when Nasser, in the same manner, gave his Arab World-wide speech of September 28, 1961 in an attempt to mobilize the Arab peoples for his support and to kill the separatist movement in Syria, it apparently was too late.[13] By September 27, some troops of the Syrian Army had moved toward Damascus (the capital), took over the broadcasting station, and virtually broke the union of the United Arab Republic.

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[12]Remini, op. cit., p. 107.

[13]For more detailed information on the seccessionist movement in Syria during the UAR period, see Patrick Seale, "The Breakup of the United Arab Republic," The World Today (November 1961), pp. 471-479; W. F. Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970), pp. 160-162; P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), pp. 140-185; Gordon Waterfield, Egypt (New York: Walker and Company, 1967), pp. 177-189; Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1967), pp. 177-198.

The Union between Egypt and Syria began on February 21, 1958. Nasser was then at the peak of his power. The love which the Syrians gave to Nasser was genuine and astounding. Nasser reciprocated in kind and quantity. Mohammad Hasanāin Haykal tells in his editorial in Al-Ahrām of the charismatization bonds which developed between the Syrians and Nasser:

> It was in February 1958 in Damascus when Nasser fell in love at first sight [with Syria]. . . . The reception he was given was overwhelming . . . he stood in the balcony, and below it was a surging sea of people who had lost themselves in the enthusiasm of the welcome. . . . His name became the only word they shouted and it reverberated between the Square and Mount Qussium, which loomed at a distance. . . . He [Nasser] asked me, "What do you think?" I replied honestly: "If you were a different person from the person I know you to be, I would have said REMEMBER YOU ARE HUMAN." Nasser was surprised and told me that he had thought and said the same things to himself all the time.[14]

The United Arab Republic broke up in September 1961. Nasser was overwhelmingly grieved. He said: "Thursday [the day of the break-off of the Union] was probably one of the most difficult days in my life." He then added: "It was one of the most bitter moments. . . . I could not believe what I heard. . . . I could hardly believe my own ears," Nasser reiterated lamenting the frustrated goal of Arab unity. Nasser explained later by saying:

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[14] Al-Ahrām, November 6, 1970, p. 3.

> What happened today is more serious than what took place in 1956. . . . What happened in 1956 was foreign aggression. What we are facing today is something which affects our long struggle for the sake of Arabism and our Arab nation. . . . The sake of which our fathers and grandfathers fell as martyrs.[15]

The years of union were a period of serious economic crisis for Syria and this fact contributed greatly to the Syrians' disappointment in the dream of Arab unity as it materialized. Actually these economic causes of the crisis were not fully men made. From the winter of 1958-1959, Syria suffered five years of drought. The average wheat crop was 68 kg. per dunam (approximately an acre) in 1957 and 90 kg. in 1958, but was 35 kg. in 1959, 43 kg. in 1960, and 36 kg. in 1961.[16] The barley crops declined even more precipitously. Syria, more than any other Middle Eastern country, depends on the quantity of winter precipitation. She derives special benefits from the blessings of a rainy year and suffers much more from the curse of drought. Syria was not afflicted, however, with the protracted drought because of the Egyptians. It is the opinion of this writer that if the Union had succeeded in other matters, the drought would not have shaken it in the least. But since the Union's political and national foundations were weak, the economic crisis was the additional culminative factor against it.

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[15] Nasser, Taṣrihāt, Vol. III, pp. 521-556.

[16] Alfred Bonne, Economic Development in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), pp. 79-81, 160.

Small shopkeepers and businessmen are important to the Syrian economy, and it was in part their fear of Communism which hastened the Syrian union with Egypt in 1958. Egypt's introduction, significantly after 1956 and the growing Soviet influence, of more and more radically socialist measures was not agreeable to the Syrians. The small capitalists became more and more discontented as their activities were impeded by more and more "nationalizations and socialist measures."

Nasser courageously faced the Arab peoples with the charges which the Syrians raised against him. He denied the existence of "Egyptian economic imperialism" in Syria, and refuted Syrian charges one by one in these words:

> As regards nationalization, only 15 companies were nationalized in Syria while about 300 companies were nationalized in Egypt. . . . The ownership of monopoly companies has been transferred to the people in order to stop a small group of people [from] exploiting the overwhelming majority and obtaining the largest share in the national income.[17]

Nasser praised the success of the agrarian reform law which he had applied to Syria. He argued that it liberated the farmers and made them the masters of their lands.

Refuting the Syrian charge that the Egyptian technocrats had taken over the Syrian enterprises, Nasser announced to the Arab peoples:

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[17]Nasser, Tasrihāt, Vol. 3, pp. 521-56

> . . . there were engineers [Egyptian engineers] who rent to re-enforce the staff of Syrian engineers. There were doctors in the Syrian villages. . . . They lived to perform their duty toward the people of the Republic [UAR].[18]

Nasser's great political skill was his ability to turn failures into personal victories. He had tried this technique several times and it always worked out successfully. In this situation, Nasser blamed "imperialism," "reactionary elements," and "international Zionism: for the dissolution of the Union. Politically, the Union was a failure. Charismatically, Nasser tried to turn it into personal victory. Regardless of the sad situation, Nasser remained courageous, proud, and sure-footed. He appealed to the Arab peoples to stand fast and endure the crisis.

> We ought in such a crisis to set aside sentiments, bitterness, and reaction to ingratitude . . . stand high as men do . . . an enemy's stab hurts the body, but never the heart. [But] a friend's stab affects the heart more than it affects the cells of the living body.[19]

Nasser released several announcements on September 28 and 29 reassuring the Arab peoples of his "fatherly image" and calling upon them to keep the faith in Arab nationalism and never "lower the flags of Arab unity." Finally Nasser realized that the secession of Syria was inevitable. His rhetoric changed considerably. He mourned the loss of Syria in an emotional speech in these words:

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

> Fellow citizens, I pray that God may help beloved Syria, lead her to the right path, and bless her people. The United Arab Republic will continue to raise its colors, enchant its anthem, and march forward with all its strength to build itself up and become a shield for every Arab struggle, for every Arab right, and for every Arab aspiration. . . . It is not essential that Syria remain a part of the UAR. The essential thing is that Syria remains sound and safe.[20]

As with Jackson, Nasser also tried to do two things at once: while he was pleading with the Arab groups in Syria and in the Arab World to terminate the separatist movement, he was preparing for military action. Upon his orders, two thousand commandos flew from Egypt, landed in Laziqīyah, and joined the small Syrian pocket which resented the secession. When the force was airborne, it was learned that the pocket capitulated to the new Syrian regime. The Egyptian force was ordered back but only after troops had been parachuted on the site. The Egyptian troops were ordered by Nasser to refrain from shooting and to surrender to the Syrian forces.[21]

The role of Nasser's Vice President, Marshall Abdel-Hakim Amir (who was in Syria at the time), was shameful. In addition to his failure to take adequate precautions to secure Egyptian control in Syria, he failed even to defend himself. He was arrested and humiliated by the Syrian forces. Because of his weak personality and his poor

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

leadership he hastily capitulated and offered concessions to the junta. Nasser lived up to his principles. He was inflexible and refused to compromise. This, in fact, was what the junta had hoped for. Nasser thought that he had an ample residue of charisma among the Syrian soldiers. He gambled on it and lost. Although the Syrian people disliked many of Nasser's policies, they still loved him and honored him immensely. If Nasser had compromised with the junta leaders, it is doubtful that the separation would have succeeded. Mohammad H. Haykal surmised that had Nasser flown to Damascus (which he intended to do but was prevented from doing by pressure from his Cabinet members and colleagues), the separatist movement would have been doomed. It is noteworthy to mention that Nasser's efforts perhaps were not in vain. At the time of this writing, the Syrian leaders are negotiating the reunion of Syria with Egypt, Sudan, and Libya into a new, more extensive United Arab Republic.

The reasons why Jackson and Nasser performed in such a hypersensitive manner in their attempts to preserve the union of their countries can therefore be summed up in the following:

(1) The nullification question in South Carolina and the separatist movement in Syria were considered by Jackson and Nasser as imminent tests of their charismatic

capabilities. Both were at their peaks and the slightest defeat both envisioned would have detracted heavily from their leadership.

(2) The separatist movements represented a grave "insubordination" to both Jackson's and Nasser's absolute leadership, especially after both leaders had appealed to such groups to terminate their activities.

(3) The separatist movements endangered the bond between the followers and their leaders. Jackson and Nasser were treated by the separatist movements on the assumption that they were ordinary presidents--a fact which both Jackson and Nasser heartily denied.

(4) Separatist movements are contagious and both leaders feared it would extend to their present or anticipated unions.

(5) Both leaders took quick repressive actions--or threatened to take military action--without constitutional authorizations. Awaiting congressional approval and authorization--in times of crisis--apparently is viewed by some charismatic leaders as weakness, reluctance, and probably indicates retraction to their pre-charismatic image.

(6) Jackson and Nasser were probably geared toward continuous victories; they would not tolerate the expectation of defeat.

(7) Jackson and Nasser demonstrated their tactical skills in terms of performing two separate categories of compatible measures at the same time--charisma and repression.

From the preceding analyses, it becomes even clearer that leadership is truly an art of tactics. Although Jackson and Nasser used similar techniques against secessionists in similar situations, their calculations nevertheless varied significantly in terms of the delicate combination of their charismatic residue and their repressive potential. Both realized the seriousness of the situation in their countries, and both were strongly determined not to lose. However, when the deteriorating conditions became obvious, their readiness to compromise differed. Nasser, probably because of his overcharismatic perceptions reacted with force faster than did Jackson. Nasser flew his paratroopers in a rash attempt to satisfy his charismatic drive. When the troops failed to control the situation, it was too late for Nasser to compromise. Jackson, on the other hand, seems to have been quite aware of the limits of his charisma as well as of the damaging consequences of subduing South Carolina by force. He seemed flexible, rational, and certainly acted in a charismatically graceful manner. He undoubtedly handled the situation in a more astute way than his successors some twenty years later.

CHAPTER XI

JACKSON'S SPOILS SYSTEM AND NASSER'S MILITARIZED BUREAUCRACY

Today the study of comparative bureaucracies has become a well-recognized discipline. Such studies serve many purposes as they reflect the functional efficiency of political systems, the structural harmony among the branches of government, the level of stability in governmental agencies, and, above all, they reveal the ideological trends and political skills of leadership.

Both Jackson and Nasser radically changed the structural-functional nature of their bureaucracies. They utilized their bureaucratic systems to reach specific ends. In particular, they were successful in their manipulation of the bureaucracy to enhance their charismatic leadership, their regimes, and their parties' interests. As a result, Jackson was credited with the creation of the first "spoils system" in America and Nasser was given credit for the establishment of the first modern "militarized bureaucracy" in Egypt.

Jackson's Spoils System

Many writers have elaborated on Jackson's spoils system as the greatest wholesale proscription of the

century. George Tucker charged that the only purpose behind the Jacksonian movement was to gain power and spoils by keeping "General Jackson in office and keeping out his opponents."[1] Parton's severest strictures were reserved for the introduction of Jackson's "spoils system" into national politics. This innovation, Parton charged, "debauched the public service and corrupted the Republic." Parton added that "the government formerly served by the elite of the nation is now served by its refuse."[2] James Schouler wrote concerning Jackson's spoils system that certainly no list so lengthy, "with so many mean and even infamous characters had ever before been presented by an American executive." It is also most revealing that a disproportionate part of Schouler's narrative of the Jacksonian era was devoted to the manifold horrors of the spoils system.[3]

Professor Andrew McLaughlin, the biographer of Lewis Cass, described Jackson as the "conduit pipe through which followed into the field of national administration a tide of political proscription, intrigue, and legerdemain."[4]

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[1]George Tucker, The History of the United States from Their Colonization to the End of the Twenty-Sixth Congress in 1841 (Philadelphia: Carey, Lea and Blanchard, 1847), p.

[2]James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, Vol. III (New York: Mason Brothers, 1861), pp. 694-700.

[3]James Schouler, History of the United States Under the Constitution (New York, 1889), pp. 455-464.

[4]Alfred Cave, Jacksonian Democracy and the Historians (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1964), p. 17.

Most anti-Jacksonian writers imply that no sooner was Jackson in office than wholesale proscription began. They describe the situation as if an "ax fell in every department and bureau." Age and experience, they argue, counted against a man rather than in his favor, and rarely--they emphasize--was any reason given for removal other than someone else wanted the place. Anti-Jacksonian historians almost unanimously agreed that an estimated one thousands persons were ousted from office in the first year; and during the second year of Jackson's administration, the number is said to have reached two thousand.[5] The Post Office Department and the Customs Service, they believe, were purged with special severity. The sole requirement for new appointees, these authors argue, was loyalty to Jackson.

On the other hand, several authors have lauded Jackson's reform of the administration. Frederick Turner for one defended Jackson's bureaucratic reforms on the grounds that "national government in that period was not so complex and well-adjusted machine . . . the evils of the system were long in making themselves fully apparent."[6] In Jackson's generation, Turner argued, the spoils system "furnished the training in the actual conduct of political

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[5]Frederick Austin Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919), p. 126.

[6]Cave, op. cit., p. 22.

affairs which every American claims as his birthright."[7] Professor Charles Peck, in his Jacksonian Epoch, praised the spoils system as a "democratizing device designed to assume popular control over office holders."[8]

As far as this writer knows, the subject was not only controversial but it was also accompanied by a great deal of propaganda. Confirming this, Andrew Jackson wrote: "There has been a general noise made about removals."[9]

The term "spoils" which was used by the "frustrated" Whigs to describe the practice of removal and most probably indicated their bias and the hard feelings which follow any removal from a position of power. It is doubtful that any president would prefer to establish a corrupt bureaucracy or select to work with an inefficient staff. The title given Jackson's system of removal, by his enemies, apparently implies much exaggeration.

The conviction that the public service suffered from favoritism and inefficiency and the growth of democratic party organization were two reasons for the development of the spoils system. A third reason was the popular belief of "rotation in office." Long terms seemed to favor the creation of an official aristocracy and to produce an official class who were indifferent to popular approval.

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., p. 25.

[9] Ogg, op. cit., p. 126.

Jackson apparently championed "rotation in office" because he felt an impelling urge to clean the public service. The entrenchment of the aristocrats in the Federal offices aggravated him. The purification of the administration appeared to him as a patriotic achievement. There can be no doubt that he acted from what he believed to be in the best interests of the public. The clamor of the aristocrats and their propaganda machine did not deter him; on the contrary, it seems to have turned the issue into a personal challenge. Jackson wrote in his private journal sometime between May 18 and June 23, 1829, explaining the role of "rotation in office" saying:

> Now every man who has been in office a few years believes he has a life estate in it, a vested right in it, and if it has been held twenty years or upwards, not only a vested right but that it ought to descend to his children, and if no children, then to the next of kin. This is not the principle of our government. It is rotation in office that will PERPETUATE OUR LIBERTY.[10]

Jackson was not simply a spoils man. He wanted to remove inefficient officeholders and punish corrupt ones. The President held correctly that the idea of property right in office is un-American and that rotation in office gives the people a sense of sharing in their own government. It is also fair to add that the removals under Jackson were not so sweeping as his excited opponents implied.

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[10] James S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson (New York: Macmillan Company, 1916), p. 447.

According to Senate Documents of the Twenty-First Congress, only 919 officeholders out of 10,093 were removed during the first year and one-half of Jackson's presidency, which is approximately 9 percent of the total officeholders.[11] During his eight years in office, approximately 10 percent of all Federal officeholders were turned out. This was, in this writer's opinion, scarcely wholesale proscription under the circumstances of radical changes required. Reform at that time was probably seen as a serious matter which required more than the removal of a few clerks and customs inspectors in the interest of honesty and economy. The President regarded "rotation in office" as a "leading principle in the Republican creed,"[12] and during his administration it was established as a practice in the Federal government.

Jackson, however, was not the author of the spoils system. The device of awarding offices as a reward for political service had long been a familiar practice in state and local governments, notably in New York. When Jefferson became President, he found the majority of Federal offices were held by Federalists. He planned to appoint Republicans

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[11]These figures are taken from G. G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), p. 35.

[12]Erik Erikson, "The Federal Civil Service Under President Jackson," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIII (March 1927), pp. 527-529.

to office only until they were equal in number to their opponents, but when the Federalist Party disappeared, the Civil Service was filled with Republicans. In a statement designed to enhance his own support, James Monroe announced what he called an "amalgamation policy" to select office-holders from the two remaining parties. Jackson, it can be argued, was not the first president to carry over the spoils principle into the national government; partisanship was never quite absent from the choice of officials before 1829.[13]

Jackson's stand with regard to the spoils system was not, however, unassailable. Three serious charges may be cited here to show Jackson's repressive nature with regard to removals: (1) his determination to "turn the rascals out" seems to have gone further than removal for just cause; (2) his removals and appointments were being conditioned, at least in part, by loyalty or lack of it to him; and (3) it seems that Jackson did little to restrain his associates' use of patronage.

Nasser's Militarized Bureaucracy

Nasser's spoils system, on the other hand, was not publicized so extensively as Jackson's had been; many

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[13]Bassett, op. cit., p. 438.

people in Egypt did not feel its impact.[14] The Egyptian mass media tended to suppress the issue because of Nasser's censorship. In the same token, almost all Arabic sources have ignored the subject in an abrupt manner. The only information released on the subject of "Nasser's militarized bureaucracy" was given by Nasser's adversaries.

Ivor Powell, a British subject who lived in Egypt and worked for some time in the Ministry of National Guidance, recalls his experiences with the Egyptian bureaucracy in his book, Disillusion by the Nile. Although this book is not a scholarly one, since it is written in a flowery and emotional style, it does contain many statements which fairly describe the corruption in government. In his analysis of the bureaucratic inefficiency in Egypt, Powell stated:

> During this time, I saw more waste, duplicity and malfeasance than ever in my life before. Superior officials were kept in the dark, inferiors were bullied and, as the prophet's organizations vanished, the humble were forced to accept salary

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[14]For more detailed information on the Egyptian bureaucracy, see J. B. Mayfield, "The Institutions and Politics of Rural Egypt," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Texas, 1968), Chaps. V, IX; P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), Chap. VI; Ivor Powell, Disillusion on the Nile (London: Solstice Production, 1967); Mohamed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1955); Monroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

> cuts as "national duty." The Arab Socialist Union members [who were supposed to act as watch guards] were either made dupes or subourned.[15]

In his description of the Egyptian spoils system, Powell used his observations of corruption and inefficiency with regard to the Ministry of National Guidance as an example which was applicable to all departments and bureaus. In these terms he remarked:

> Starting as one of the Free Officers. . . Ḥātim [the Minister] preferred yes-men to idea-men, and surrounded himself by a bunch of opportunists devoid of any talent except that of feathering their own nests. . . . One of the senior colleagues [was] remarkable only for his collection of two hundred Sulka ties, and that when [the] boss visited Japan he [had] to send a special plane to collect the loads of purchases he had acquired there.[16]

Referring to the role of Nasser's militarized bureaucracy in its imposition of the socialist ideology on the people and its attempt to change the value system in the society, Powell described the accomplishments of Colonel Ḥātim (the Minister of National Guidance) in this respect:

> He openly sought for quantity rather than quality, but as his job was to improve general cultural standards, and heighten the perceptions of the vast ignorant multitude, the easier to impose the party line on them, he no doubt knew what he was doing. . . . All his efforts were subordinate to the propagation of Arab Socialism and Nasser's dangerously seductive ideology which,

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[15] Power, op. cit., p. 30.

[16] Ibid., p. 33.

> once accepted, lulled the mind into accepting any tyranny of the spirit, any lie, that the rulers cared to impose.[17]

In a later chapter Power, apparently realizing that he had not made the role of militarized bureaucracy quite clear, bluntly described the domination of the government by the "officers":

> Since 1952 the men at the top have always without exception been officers. They were men without much distinction, except for their skill in intrigue. Uniformed men at the top means usually that there will be uniformed men at every level of the administration; this is the case of post-1952 Egypt. In the Nasserite official attitude one finds too often the brashness born of ignorance, and an indifference to fine gradations of tone in discussion, perhaps typical of totalitarian states.[18]

Professor Be'eri in his book, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, produced a useful table (shown on the next page) which illustrates the extent of Nasser's militarized bureaucracy in terms of chief executives, executive assistants, and cabinet members.

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[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 41. A common joke widely circulated in Cairo during the 1960's depicts the people's astonishment at the large number of officers in government as well as in private enterprise. The joke claims that a man called a refrigerator dealer and asked the operator if he could talk to the general manager. The operator answered: "Sorry, sir, the General is not in yet." So the man asked if he could talk to the assistant manager. The operator answered: "Sorry, sir, the colonel is not in yet." The man asked in astonishment if he could talk to one of the salesmen. The operator answered: "Sorry, sir, none of the captains is in yet." The man, stunned by the information, apologized to the operator and said: "I am sorry. This seems to be a wrong number. I wasn't trying to reach the 'refrigerator corps.'"

TABLE 1

OFFICERS AND CIVILIANS IN EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENTS

	Sep. 7, 1952		Apr. 17, 1954		Sep. 26, 1956		Mar. 6, 1958		Aug. 17, 1961		Sep. 29, 1962		Mar. 25, 1964		Oct. 2, 1965		Sept. 10, 1966		June 19, 1967	
	First government under Naguib premiership		First government under Nasser's premiership		Egyptian government after the adoption of the constitution		First U.A.R. government after union		UAR government after abolition of the two regional executive councils		First Egyptian government under ʿAli Sabrī's premiership		Second government under ʿAli Sabrī's premiership		Government under Zakariyya Muhī al-Dīn premiership		Government under Muhammad Sidqī's Sulaymān's premiership		Government under Nasser as president and prime minister	
	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C	O	C
President			1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1	
First vice president													1		1		1			
Prime minister	1		1								1		1		1		1			
Vice presidents							2		5		5		3		3		3		3	1
Members of presidential council											3	2								
Deputy prime ministers		1											3	8	2	6	3	1		
Ministers of central government							4	4												
Ministers of Egyptian govt.		14	7	11	5	13	1	9	7	13	5	19	5	17	9	13	10	12	14	9
TOTAL	1	15	9	11	6	13	8	13	13	13	15	21	14	25	17	19	19	13	18	10
Percentage of officers	Above the government stood the Revolutionary Command Council, composed of officers only				32		38		50		42		36		47		59		65	

O = officers

C = civilians

In the governments during the period of union with Syria in 1958 and 1961 only Egyptians are enumerated. Whoever filled more than one governmental function is listed only once.

Source: Eliezer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1970), pp. 28-29.

It is evident from the foregoing table that the ratio of military to civilians in the executive branch increased rapidly between 1952 and 1967. The percentage of officers in the executive branch in 1952 was below 7 percent; the percentage jumped to 65 percent by 1967. The number of vice presidents and deputy prime ministers increased among officers during the same period from zero to seven. This certainly reflects Nasser's determination to "militarize" the government machinery.

In the diplomatic corps, of the 58 ambassadors and ministers who represented Egypt in the world's capitals in 1952, nearly half (25) were former officers. Of the 73 ambassadors and ministers in 1964, nearly two-thirds (48) were officers.[19] The ratio of officers to civilians in the position of province governor is strikingly indicative of the role of the military in Nasser's bureaucracy. The following table categorizes the governors of Egypt according to military-civilian ratio in 1967.

Almost as a rule, every Muhāfiz (Governor of Province)[20] who came from the military appointed a military officer to the post of Secretary General of the Province to administer the Muhāfza (province).[21] The number of military

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[19] Be'eri, op. cit., p. 427.

[20] This office was occupied by civilians and police officers until the 1960's, after which it was assigned to army officers almost exclusively.

[21] This writer personally witnessed this practice in all the provinces he visited during his government career in Egypt.

TABLE 2

GOVERNORS OF EGYPT ACCORDING

TO MILITARY-CIVILIAN RADIO, 1967

Province	Name	Civilian	Officer
Cairo	Sa^{c}d Zāid		x
Alexandria	Hamdy ^{c}Ashūr		x
Port Sa^{c}id	Farīd Tūlān		x
Ismailīyah	Mubarik Rifa^{c}ī		x
Suez	Hamid Mahmud		x
Qalūbīyah	Kamāl Abu-al-Fitūh		x
Sharqīyah	Abd-al-Salām Khafagah		x
Dyqahlīyah			
Dimiāt	Mahmūd Tal^{c}at		x
Munufīyah	Ibrahīm Bugdādy	x	
Gharbīyah			
Kafr-al-Shiykh	Gamāl Hāmad		x
Bihira	Wagīh Abazah		x
Giza	Mohamed Biltāgī		x
Fayūm	Ali Yūnis		X
Bani-Swiyf	^{c}imad Rushdy		x
Miniā	Ali Al-Sharīf		x
Assūt	Ahmed Kamil		x
Suhāg	Abd-al-Hamīd Khyrat		x
Qinā	Abd-Allah Ghubārah		x
Aswān	Madkūr Abu-il-^{c}izz		x
Matrūh	Hassan Mihdāwi		x
Al-Wadi al-Gidid	Anwar al-Barudi		x
Red Sea	M· Siyf al-Yazal		x
Sinā	Abdul-Mon^{c}im Qaramāni		x
	Total number of Governors	25	
	Number of officers	22	
	Number of civilians	1	
	Vacancies	2	
	Percentage of officers	88	

Source: M. A. Biyūmī, My Diary (Cairo: Al-Shirkah al-Misrīyah lil-Nashr, 1967), p. 38.

ersonnel appointed by the Muhāfiz or by his "whiz kid" the Secretary General) has remained secret. However, by 967, ex-military employees in the government included, in ddition to officers, a large number of sergeants, corporals, nd, in some cases, privates.

The militarized bureaucracy of Nasser, however, annot be seen as all evil. Nasser showed great concern for he "ragged" bureaucracy which he had inherited from Farouk's egime. He stated several times in public addresses that he ad discovered deplorable corruption in the government, in onstruction programs, and within the administration boards f industrial sector. Nasser was dedicated to reforming he situation; however, it was difficult to effect encouraging results. In one of his speeches (date undetermined), he eclared that Egypt was successful in its nationalization of he Suez Canal but failed in its improvement of the conditions in the Qasr al-ᶜainī Hospital. In another speech, he xpressed profound concern for government corruption and ledges to attempt to purge it. He said:

> We found mistakes . . . briberies of five-, ten-, and twenty-thousand pounds. . . . The solution was to create a government prosecution agency. The Director who practices patronage or appoints his relatives [to public offices] must be prosecuted and considered a traitor. . . . People [however] are not angels, but every letter I will receive [about corruption in government] I will see . . . anyone [bureaucrat] who appoints his relatives--write to me about him. . . . Send me a letter immediately. The only solution [beside the first] is to nationalize the public

> sector to stop the corruption that was prevalent from the beginning. Also negligence will be made a crime. . . . We will change the laws and make the penalty of negligence imprisonment. . . . Negligence in government is the exposure of the whole nation to great danger.[22]

The problem with the post-Nasser bureaucracy was not actually a problem of laws and regulations--it was a built-in phenomenon of corruption. Egyptian bureaucrats were accustomed--as they probably still are today--to the traditional "service-for-service" practice, the bargaining custom which included appointment to jobs, salary raises, special privileges, and the exchange of benefits. Though it was easy for Nasser to change the laws, he failed to change the people who had been born and raised in a closed society which practiced the common proverb, "My brother and I against our cousin, and my cousin and I against the stranger."

Nasser, in a sincere attempt to improve government machinery and speed up its pace, had to replace many government officials with officers whom he thought were more efficient. Nasser declared in a speech, "I can import anything, but I cannot import Egyptians."[23]

Nasser's contrivance to militarize the bureaucracy led to the creation of a new fashion of corruption--this time by ex-military individuals rather than by civilians.

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[22]Nasser, Tasrihāt, pp. 446-463.

[23]Powell, op. cit., p. 56.

There is no evidence to support the notion that army officers in Egypt are more honest than their civilian counterparts. There is also no evidence that army officers in Egypt had forgotten their native social values or could become--by virtue of holding a civilian capacity--more honest than the people who held the office before them. Further examination of the problem has confirmed the common rumor which claimed that military officers were appointed in civilian positions because they had failed in their previous military capacities.

The manner in which Nasser handled the dilemma of the bureaucracy can be understood in simple terms. By appointing army officers to the bureaucracy he thought he was killing many birds with one stone; he would please the incompetent army officers (and there were many) as well as the efficient ones who were striving to improve the conditions in the army by purging the incompetents. Ex-military bureaucrats, Nasser also thought, would be more loyal to his regime than civilian officials. In addition, it also appeared that the ex-officers would be more vulnerable and thus more controllable than the civilian employees. A significant factor, however, must be pointed out: the civilian employees did not resent Nasser's militarized bureaucracy because the ex-army officers were, in fact, added to the bureaucracy rather than substituted for the civilians.

Conclusions

In the light of Jackson's and Nasser's persistent efforts to build a "cooperative bureaucracy" capable of executing the aggressive ideologies of these two leaders, of neutralizing the interests of the aristocrats and feudalists, and of propagating the national myths, Jackson's spoils system and Nasser's militarized bureaucracy seemed to this writer as useful and necessary means for the continuation of the charismatization processes launched by those leaders.

While behavioral scientists tend, by and large, to overlook the detailed study of motives, it must be stated that Jackson and Nasser evidently had several "noble" motives with regard to their attempts to reform the bureaucracy. These motives were basically oriented toward the "welfare of the under-privileged classes," the "neutralization of the influence and control of capital over the government," in addition to the simple reform of the bureaucracy. The motives of Jackson and Nasser in these respects may be summarized as:

1. To offer more jobs to the under-privileged classes.

2. To give the masses their share in the decision-making process.

3. To color the administration with a "massist tint."

4. To trim the "invisible fingers" of the aristocrats or feudalists who consistently attempted to serve their own interests.

5. To punish the corrupters who were many at the time.

6. To create a sympathetic environment for the leader's ideologies.

7. To satisfy the love for power through the practice of the power of appointment and removal.

8. To "reward the friends" and "humiliate the foes."

9. To increase loyalty for the leader in general.

The spoils systems in both countries were probably inevitable features of the "regimes of the people" In any event, it is evident from the literature investigated by this author that those systems were generally accepted by the majority of the people in both countries and were equally sanctioned by public sentiment for decades.

PART V

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER XII

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

An historical discussion of the personal traits and performance of Presidents Jackson and Nasser has been presented in the preceding chapters. These two leaders shared many similar traits and reacted to parallel situations in comparable ways. However, it might be appropriate to substantiate this similarity through quantitative evaluation. This chapter will attempt to display the extent of the similarity between these two leaders as determined by this writer after a review of the present scholarly literature on them.

Two approaches were used in this chapter: the first is a content analysis; the second is a carefully structured questionnaire. The objective of these two techniques was to determine the degree to which scholars and writers perceive a similarity (or dissimilarity) between the leadership behavior of these two leaders. The data obtained from these two approaches will supplement the findings of each. The analysis of the data may validly lead to the establishment of some "predictive generalizations" that might help clarify the behavioral aspects of charismatic leadership.

The Content Analysis[1]

The purpose of the content analysis technique is to establish a quantitative classification of a given body of information in terms of a system of categories devised to yield data relevant to a specific hypothesis concerning that content. Prominent scholars in the field of content analysis are Bernard Berelson, Irving Janis, Abraham Kaplan, Harold Lasswell, and Nathan Leites.

Each of these scholars has his definition of content analysis; however, all content analysis definitions presented have distinguishing characteristics:

1. It applies only to social science generalizations.
2. It applies primarily to the determination of the effects of communications.
3. It applies only to the syntactic and semantic dimensions of language.

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[1]The output of content analysis studies has sharply increased in every five-year interval over the past thirty years. The content analysis technique was first used by students of journalism (and later by sociologists) to study the content of American newspapers. This work centered in the School of Journalism at Columbia University in 1926. Modern content analysis studies are used in the fields of voting behavior, war propaganda, political attitudes, leaders' speeches, and personality analysis. For definitions, characteristics, and usage of content analysis, see B. Berelson, "The Effects of Prints upon Public Opinion," in D. Waples, ed., Print, Radio, and Film in a Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 41-65; I. L. Janis, "Meaning and the Study of Symbolic Behavior," Psychiatry, VI (June, 1943); A. Kaplan, "The Reliability of Content Analysis Categories," in H. D. Lasswell and N. Leites, eds., Language of Politics (New York: Stewart, 1940), pp. 83-112; H. Lasswell, Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics (New York: Stewart, 1949).

4. It must be objective.

5. It must be systematic.

6. It must be quantitative.

The leadership behavior of Jackson and Nasser was observed through the remarks made by thirty authors in their texts (fifteen books on each leader). These texts were selected randomly from among approximately 150 books pertaining to the two leaders. For purposes of objectivity, Arabic texts published in Egypt about Nasser were excluded. Also, for operational purposes, classical biographies (very long ones) of Jackson were excluded.

The unit employed to measure the behavior in this analysis is the "reference." A reference is a word, a phrase, or a sentence that described a personal quality, a performance, or a decision of the leader (good, bad, effective, efficient, intelligent, slow, active, right, erroneous, and so forth). A reference is not equatable, however, to every time Jackson's or Nasser's name is mentioned by an author. Instead of being coded in substantive categories, each reference is categorized in terms of whether the quality, the performance or the decision appeared to be cited by the author in favorable, unfavorable, or neutral terms.

References in which authors identify Jackson or Nasser in terms of what they were or should have been are classified in the personal qualities category, whereas

the references to what they did or should have done are treated as performance references. If an author has not identified Jackson or Nasser as possessing either an interacting set of personal qualities or an interacting set of performances, but as a symbol of some phenomenon or collectivity (the "Jackson approach" or the "Nasser style"), such identifications are also treated as references. However, since those symbols or collectivities were not numerous and could be identified easily with the personality style of the leader, they have been combined with the personal qualities category.

Listed below are the sample texts examined. In the tables of results, each of the books is referred to by the last name of the author.

The Sample on Jackson

Joseph L. Blau, Social Theories of Jacksonian Democracy (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1955).

Chauncey S. Boucher, The Nullification Controversy in South Carolina (New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968).

Alfred A. Cave, Jacksonian Democracy and the Historians (Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida, Monograph No. 22, 1964).

Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966).

Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Beliefs (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957).

S. G. Heiskell, Andrew Jackson (Nashville, Tenn.: Ambrose Printing Co., 1920).

Marquis James, Portrait of a President: Andrew Jackson (New York: Crossett and Dunlap, 1937).

Frederic Austin Ogg, The Reign of Andrew Jackson (New York: The Chronicles of America Series, 1919).

James Schouler, History of the United States Under the Constitution, Vol. III (New York, 1885).

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1953).

Harold Syrett, Andrew Jackson (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1953).

Edwin C. Rozwenc, Democracy in the Age of Jackson (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1965).

Glyndon G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1959).

John William Ward, Andrew Jackson: Symbol for an Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

The Sample on Nasser

Anwar Abdul-Malik, Egypte Societe Militaire (Paris: Editions du Seuel, 1962).

Elizer Be'eri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Societies (New York: Praeger, Inc., 1970).

Jean and Simonne Laccuture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958).

Tom Little, Modern Egypt (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 1967).

Peter Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965).

Ethel Mannin, Aspects of Egypt (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1964).

Mohammed Naguib, Egypt's Destiny (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1955).

Ivor Powell, Disillusion by the Nile (London: Solstice Productions, 1967).

John Marlowe, Four Aspects of Egypt (London: George Allen and Union, Ltd., 1966).

Robert St. John, The Boss (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1960).

Georgiana G. Stevens, Egypt Yesterday and Today (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1963).

P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961).

Gordon Waterfield, Egypt (New York: Walker and Co., 1967).

Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960).

Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt (Cambridge: Arlington Books, Inc., 1959).

Results of the Analysis

The tables on the following two pages contain the results of the content analysis of the thirty books (authors).

Analysis of the Data

As can be seen in Tables 3 and 4, the thirty authors engaged in two distinct forms of evaluation. Thirteen authors on Jackson and ten on Nasser made more conjunctive (favorable) than disjunctive (unfavorable) references to the subjects indicated in the tables. Conjunctive sentiments henceforth shall serve as this writer's definition of "cordial" behavior and as a distinguishing characteristic of cordial authors. Only one author on Jackson and five on Nasser engaged in "hostile" behavior (operationally defined as more unfavorable than favorable references to the subjects indicated in the tables). Disjunctive sentiments of some authors varied considerably in their intensity from the sentiments expressed by other authors with regard to each leader. It should be emphasized that the mere number of

QUANTITATIVE RESULTS OF THE SAMPLE ON JACKSON

Author	Total References	Proportion of References Recorded As			Proportion of favorable References Recorded As		
		Favorable	Unfavorable	Neutral	Personal Qualities	Performances	Other Aspects
Blau	356	180	86	90	56	104	20
Boucher	93	25	16	52	2	11	12
Cave	NOTHING WAS SEEN AS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT BY THE AUTHOR (CAVE)						
Eaton	438	278	129	31	129	120	29
Meyers	311	177	54	80	13	121	43
Heiskell	622	344	194	84	217	101	26
James	410	318	52	40	151	162	5
Ogg	227	156	52	19	91	52	13
Schouler	434	45	316	73	4	11	30
Schlesinger	456	281	118	57	118	122	41
Syrett	259	192	29	38	111	65	16
Remini	330	264	40	26	167	81	16
Rozwence	137	99	10	24	32	58	9
Van Deusen	195	138	50	7	29	105	4
Ward	187	121	32	34	121	--	--
Totals	4,455	2,618	1,178	659	1,241	1,113	264
Percentage Relative to Total Ref.		58.7	26.5	14.8			
Percentage Relative to Fav. Ref.					47.5	42.5	10.0

references indicated by an author does not lead to the conclusion that he is necessarily more hostile or more cordial than someone who makes less references.

Although the sample on Jackson was voluminous and contained approximately 4500 references, the percentages of favorable, unfavorable, and neutral references were fairly close to the corresponding percentages yielded by the relatively small sample on Nasser. Jackson's percentages were 58.7 favorable, 26.5 unfavorable, and 14.8 neutral, compared to Nasser's percentages which were 53.8 favorable, 30.5 unfavorable, and 15.7 neutral.

The data obtained by the content analysis and recorded in Tables 3 and 4 suggest a high degree of similarity in the various authors' perception of the two leaders.

Although cordial references made about Jackson were sponsored by thirteen authors, the percentage of favorable references to the total was 58.7 percent. On the other hand, although the cordial references made about Nasser came from only five authors, the corresponding percentage was 53.8 percent.

Although hostile references made about Jackson came mainly from one author, the percentage of unfavorable references made about Jackson was 26.5 percent of the total references. The hostile references made about Nasser, although they came from five authors, amounted only to 30.5 percent of the total references--four percent below that of Jackson.

Neutral references on Jackson and those on Nasser were amazingly close; 14.8 percent and 15.7 percent respectively. Equally amazing is the fact that favorable references recorded with regard to "other aspects" in the cases of both Jackson and Nasser resulted in very close percentages: 10 percent for Jackson and 12.7 percent for Nasser. Coupled with the fact that they are small, these close percentages for "other aspects" indicate that the main body of references focused upon the behavioral characteristics of the two leaders.

Close correspondence can be established by the study of the percentage of references recorded as favorable after they are broken down to personal qualities and performances. Although favorable references were expressed by thirteen cordial authors about Jackson, the percentage of references about his personal qualities were recorded as 47.5 percent and the corresponding percentage recorded for Nasser was 44.9 percent. This percentage reflects the fact that although authors appear to believe that excellence in personal qualities is an important ingredient of leadership, it is not the dominant factor. Of great interest is the apparent tendency of these authors to emphasize performance criteria which turned out to be almost as important as the personal traits.

Favorable references recorded about Jackson with regard to his performance were 42.5 percent of the total

favorable references. The corresponding percentage for Nasser was 42.4. Although there were thirteen cordial authors in the case of Jackson and only ten in the case of Nasser, the results were almost identical.

Although this author realizes that the results of the preceding content analysis does not, in fact, prove with complete objectivity that Presidents Jackson and Nasser were closely similar, the analysis, nevertheless, strongly supports the notion that scholars indeed did see these two leaders showing similar traits.

Thus, upon the previous substantive discussions presented by this author and upon the supporting views of the group of scholars shown by the content analysis tables, some findings may be inferred. Both Jackson and Nasser can be seen as having a similar degree of "controversiality" (Jackson received 58.7 percent favorability versus 26.5 percent unfavorability, while Nasser received 53.7 favorability versus 30.5 percent unfavorability). Both Jackson and Nasser were described as harboring less "performance ability" than "personal traits." (Jackson received 42.5 percent for performance versus 47.5 percent personal qualities while Nasser received 42.4 percent performance versus 44.9 percent personal qualities). Both Jackson and Nasser appear, however, to have supplemented their lack in "performance ability" by a relatively high "personal traits" potential. When personal qualities and performance potential

were combined, the two leaders ranked almost on the same level. Jackson's scores were 90 percent, while Nasser's were 87.3 percent. The difference is an insignificant 2.7 percent.

The results of this fairly rudimentary content analysis shows with some convincing evidence that scholars, in general, tend to describe and evaluate Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser in a very similar way.

The Questionnaire

The following questionnaire was conducted to supplement and support the findings obtained by the content analysis.

Determining the nature of a representative and an operational sample for this questionnaire presented a primary difficulty to this researcher. A sample selection of high school students was disregarded because of the handicap of "ignorance" which it produced. A sample selection of college students was also ignored because it chiefly produced the handicap of "unrepresentativeness." A sample selection of common citizens added to the handicap of ignorance, the handicap of "bias." A sample selection of college professors at large proved to be extremely difficult especially given the time limitation imposed upon this study. Given the problems of these earlier options, the researcher had to be satisfied with distribution of

the questionnaire to fifty professors and graduate students chosen randomly from the departments of Political Science, Social Science, and History at the University of Utah and Idaho State University.

Two groups, each consisting of twenty-five scholars, were requested to answer questions regarding only one of the two leaders. The researcher made sure that those who answered the questions on a given leader were thoroughly familiar with the literature on that leader. The members of each group were not informed of the identity of the other leader or of the identity of the members of the other group.

After the questionnaire was completed, the data was accumulated and analyzed. The results were used to supplement the findings of the content analysis in order to verify the initial hypothesis of this study.[2]

A copy of the questionnaire will be found in the following pages.

The Criteria Employed for the Classification of Answers

In order to classify the obtained data in a clear and operational manner, the following criteria were adopted (arbitrarily) by the researcher:

A or B	were considered favorable answers
C	was considered as neutral and was dropped
D or E	were considered as unfavorable answers

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[1]This researcher will produce upon request a list of names of the participants as well as their original answers.

QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS

The following is a study in comparative political leadership. The objective of the questionnaire is to measure the leadership of two political leaders and to discover to what degree they are similar or different. This part of the questionnaire is concerned with only one of the two. In answering this questionnaire, please notice the following:

1. Make your responses to each statement by placing a circle around the letter that best represents your opinion. The letters are defined as follows:

   A Strongly agree or favor

   B Agree or favor

   C Uncertain or undecided

   D Disagree or disfavor

   E Strongly disagree or disfavor

2. There is no right or wrong answer. The best answer is your own opinion.

3. Do not give more than one answer to each statement.

4. Do not sign your name on the questionnaire.

5. Return your answers, as soon as you can, to the address on the envelope.

Your cooperation is certainly appreciated.

QUESTIONNAIRE

On the Leadership of President

Andrew Jackson

Personal Aspects

1. The President was a "great man" in the history of his nation.	A	B	C	D	E
2. The President had a great degree of "personal magnetism."	A	B	C	D	E
3. The President was a "controversial figure"; most loved and most hated at the same time.	A	B	C	D	E
4. The President was seen by his followers as an "exceptionally inspiring" leader.	A	B	C	D	E
5. The President was seen by his followers as "inspired by Proficence."	A	B	C	D	E
6. The President had a great reputation of being "a self-made man."	A	B	C	D	E
7. The President was famous for his courage and his iron will.	A	B	C	D	E
8. The President was known for being proud, stubborn, and probably self-conceited.	A	B	C	D	E
9. The President was known for his inquiry after the opinions of others; however, he did what he believed was right in a bossist manner.	A	B	C	D	E
10. The President ran the government with a militaristic mind.	A	B	C	D	E
11. Colleagues and subordinates of the President probably feared him more than they respected his prudent judgment.	A	B	C	D	E

QUESTIONNAIRE

On the Leadership of President

Gamal Abdul-Nasser

Personal Aspects

1. The President was a "great man" in the history of his nation.	A	B	C	D	E
2. The President had a great degree of "personal magnetism."	A	B	C	D	E
3. The President was a "controversial figure"; most loved and most hated at the same time.	A	B	C	D	E
4. The President was seen by his followers as an "exceptionally inspiring" leader.	A	B	C	D	E
5. The President was seen by his followers as "inspired by Providence."	A	B	C	D	E
6. The President had a great reputation of being "a self-made man."	A	B	C	D	E
7. The President was famous for his courage and his iron will.	A	B	C	D	E
8. The President was known for being proud, stubborn, and probably self-conceited.	A	B	C	D	E
9. The President was known for his inquiry after the opinions of others; however, he did what he believed was right in a bossist manner.	A	B	C	D	E
10. The President ran the government with a militaristic mind.	A	B	C	D	E
11. Colleagues and subordinates of the President probably feared him more than they respected his prudent judgment.	A	B	C	D	E

Psychological Aspects

12. The President suffered from a "hard childhood" which probably caused him frustration and turned him against the social structure of the country. A B C D E

13. The President's loss of his mother at an early age was probably a reason for his psychological inclination towards violence, cruelty, and brutality A B C D E

14. The President's "low family status" and his "lack of adequate education" probably implanted within him a "hostile behavior" toward the privileged classes A B C D E

15. Because the President was personally humiliated by colonialist forces in battles, during his youth he probably became an exponent of "national independence" and espoused the "cause of freedom." A B C D E

16. As an individual, the President was honest, humble, and sentimental. These qualities enhanced his respectful image among his followers. A B C D E

Charismatical Aspects

17. The President was a charismatic leader, i.e., one who was charged with peculiar talents and who was devoted to the salvation and preservation of his nation. A B C D E

18. The President's charisma procured him a "special image" which induced his people to be more loyal to him than they were to preceding rulers. A B C D E

19. The President was careful to promote at all times his "special image," especially on crises situations. A B C D E

20. The President successfully deployed his charisma to rally popular support for himself, his party, and his principles--in this order.	A	B	C	D	E
21. The President was probably paranoic, with a love for power.	A	B	C	D	E
22. The President had a strong tendency to remain in power and to keep his enemies out of power.	A	B	C	D	E
23. The President tended to consolidate as much power for himself as he could.	A	B	C	D	E
24. The President had many true (or imagined) enemies whom he often tried to punish for their disloyalty to him.	A	B	C	D	E
25. The President was greatly concerned with cultivating public opinion in favor of his leadership.	A	B	C	D	E

Ideological Aspects

26. The President launched (or attempted to launch) a distinct ideology which carried his name into history.	A	B	C	D	E
27. The President changed (or attempted to change) the socio-political setup of the nation in accordance with his psychological and sociological interpretations of "justice and right."	A	B	C	D	E
28. The President appeared as a political pragmatist rather than a theoritician.	A	B	C	D	E
29. The President did not begin new theories but innovated novel applications for older ones.	A	B	C	D	E
30. The President's pragmatic applications of socio-political principles had as a primary goal to enhance his leadership and that of his party.	A	B	C	D	E
31. The President's ideology was based on espousing the cause of the "masses" and in undermining the influence of the elite.	A	B	C	D	E

32. The President was (or played the role of) the hero of the masses, a role which received great applause and jubilance on behalf of his followers. A B C D E

33. The President favored the "farmer-worker" class and espoused the cause of their welfare. A B C D E

34. The President rejected what would now be called the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the "class wars," and the "state ownership of the means of production." A B C D E

35. The President probably had "socialistic tendencies," i.e., inclinations to redistribute the wealth of the nation, to raise the standard of the working classes, and to trim the control of the aristocrats on the decision-making process of government. A B C D E

Functional Aspects

36. The President showed on several occasions his disregard to the constitution as well as to decisions of the Supreme Court. A B C D E

37. The President had the inclination to use repression in situations which could have been dealt with in compliance with "democratic principles."

38. The President apparently subordinated issues to personalities. A B C D E

39. The President apparently manipulated the bureaucracy to serve his own interests and the interests of his political party. A B C D E

40. The President stuffed the branches of the government with "friends" to secure loyalty and power for himself and his party. A B C D E

41. The President's social reforms probably led to the emergence of demagoguery, corruption, and a threat to the nation's basic institutions. A B C D E

42. The President's economic policies were seen by his enemies as unregulated economic practices which led to a serious recession in the economy. A B C D E

General Aspects

43. The President's leadership helped consolidate the factions of society and promote "political integration" in the country. A B C D E

44. The President's leadership contributed to the fragmentation of society and weakened the "political participation" in the nation. A B C D E

45. The President's leadership was, in general, more profitable than damaging to the country. A B C D E

46. The President's leadership, on the whole, merits more praise than criticism. A B C D E

47. There is more literature in favor of the President's leadership than antagonistic to it. A B C D E

Analysis of the Data

From the review of the preceding tabulated material, it becomes evident that the total average of similarity is 93.4.[3] The total average of dissimilarity is 6.6. The similarity-dissimilarity ratio is about 16:1.

Similarity percentages on question-to-question basis ranged between 100 and 84. Average percentage per category (aspect) ranged between 95.6 and 90.5. The highest average per category is seen in the personal aspects, followed by the functional aspect, then followed at the same level by the psychological aspect, the ideological aspect, the general aspect, and the charismatical aspect.

A similarity percentage of 100 never appeared as an average percentage on any one category. However, it appeared on a question-to-question basis throughout the questionnaire. On seven questions out of forty-seven, the similarity percentage was 100. The questions mainly dealt with personal aspects (four scores), ideological aspects (two scores), and functional aspects (one score).

A similarity percentage of 96 did not appear as an average percentage on any one category; however, it appeared on twelve questions throughout the questionnaire. The

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[3]This figure was reached by adding the total average of similarity on each category and dividing it by the number of categories. The average of each category is the total of scores on each question divided by the number of questions in the category.

TABLE 5

RESULTS OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Question	Jackson		Nasser		Percentage of dissimilarity	Percentage of Similarity
	Favorable	Percent of Favorable	Favorable	Percent of Favorable		
Personal Aspects						
1. Great men	25	100	25	100	--	100
2. Personal magnetism	25	100	25	100	--	100
3. Controversiality	25	100	25	100	--	100
4. Inspiration	25	100	25	100	--	100
5. Providence	19	76	20	80	4	96
6. Self-made	25	100	23	92	8	92
7. Courage	24	96	23	92	4	96
8. Proud	24	96	25	100	4	96
9. Bossism	21	84	23	92	8	92
10. Militarism	24	96	22	84	12	88
11. Fear by subordinates	18	72	20	80	8	92
Average					4.4	95.6
Psychological Aspects						
12. Hard childhood	22	88	21	84	4	96
13. Loss of mother	18	72	16	64	8	92
14. Low family status	21	84	20	80	4	96
15. Humiliation by colonialists	20	80	22	88	8	92
16. Honest and humble	21	84	24	96	8	92
Average					6.6	93.5
Charismatical Aspects						
17. Charismatic leaders	23	88	24	96	8	92
18. Special image	20	80	23	92	12	88
19. Promote image	19	76	22	88	8	92
20. Rally support	19	76	22	88	12	88
21. Paranoic	20	80	23	92	12	88
22. Remain in power	21	84	24	96	12	88
23. Consolidate power	23	92	24	96	4	96
24. Enemies	23	92	21	84	8	92
25. Public opinion	20	80	23	92	12	88
Average					9.5	90.5
Ideological Aspects						
26. Distinct ideology	24	96	23	92	4	96
27. Socio-political change	19	76	23	92	16	84
28. Pragmatist	23	92	24	96	4	96
29. Old theories	19	76	21	84	8	92
30. Enhance leadership	20	80	19	76	4	96
31. Espouse masses	25	100	25	100	--	100
32. Hero of masses	25	100	25	100	--	100
33. Farmer-worker	22	88	25	100	12	88
34. Dictatorship	25	100	23	92	8	92
35. Socialism	21	84	24	96	12	88
Average					6.5	93.5

TABLE 5 (continued)

Question	Jackson		Nasser		Percentage of dissimilarity	Percentage of Similarity
	Favorable	Percent of Favorable	Favorable	Percent of Favorable		
Functional Aspects						
36. Constitution	20	80	19	76	4	96
37. Repression	23	92	21	84	8	92
38. Issues and persons	23	92	21	84	8	92
39. Bureaucracy	24	96	25	100	4	96
40. Friends	25	100	25	100	--	100
41. Corruption	15	60	17	68	8	92
42. Economic policies	18	72	15	60	12	88
Average					6	94
General Aspects						
43. Consolidate factions	16	64	18	72	8	92
44. Fragment society	14	56	12	48	8	92
45. Profitable	17	68	16	64	4	96
46. More praise	22	88	23	92	4	96
47. More literature	18	72	16	64	8	92
Average					6.5	93.5
Total average					6.6	93.4

aspects which scored 96 percentage are seen in this order: personal aspects, psychological aspects, charismatical aspects, ideological aspects, functional aspects, and general aspects.

The content analysis and the data generated through the questionnaire show a strikingly similar set of conclusions concerning the way in which both early and contemporary scholars are willing to describe and evaluate these two leaders.

Since the purpose of this thesis has been to show the extent of similarity between Jackson and Nasser in terms of characteristics, styles, and approaches, it is interesting to note how a carefully structured questionnaire and the utilization of content analysis can lead to very similar conclusions.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps more is written and less is known about leadership than almost any other phenomenon. Perceptions concerning a leader are distorted by the admiration or hatred for that leader. The tremendous importance of the leader in strengthening or weakening the accepted values in a society through the prestige of his example makes it difficult for anyone with value-commitments of his own to examine the leader objectively.

During the course of this dissertation, the writer has attempted to evaluate various approaches of leadership, to show their strength and weakness, and to develop a new approach to the study of charismatic leadership.

The first approach evaluated was the psychological approach. As has been emphasized, this approach usually has been conducted, and perhaps must always be, through the study of personality traits. Leadership, according to this approach, is not a simple trait but rather a complex of many traits fashioned together as a unit. An adequate appraisal of leadership should naturally reduce this complex to its individual components, and any study of leadership to be of value should produce an authentic list of

of traits which could be applied to all leaders. Psychologists argue that if this is accomplished, man's understanding and control of human behavior would be indeed enhanced and promoted.

The psychological approach to leadership is perhaps strongly undermined by the realities of the sociological approach to leadership. Even with an authentic, objective and practical list of leadership traits at hand, would such a list be applicable to the leaders in all societies? The answer to this is, of sourse, in the negative because societies differ as much as the individuals who are included within the different societies. Societies reflect a collection of undetermined components which represent human needs, values, culture, economic facilities, future aspirations, and above all, historical experiences. In other words, leadership cannot be seen simply as the "man," but he must be seen rather as the "man in his society." Therefore, leadership must be conceptualized as an integration of the psychological composition and social reality.

A third approach in the discussion of leadership stems from the idea of the instability of social conditions in social structures. Sooner or later societies have to be exposed to the phenomenon of change in their histories. Instability followed by a need for change seldom occurs merely as a result of social, economic, or cultural considerations. Somehow leaders must emerge to interact with

these conditions. The twentieth century presented a somewhat unique set of situations. Among the characteristics of twentieth-century societies are the emergence of masses, the spread of collective wars, and the development of ideologies. These situations led to the emergence of the situational approach to leadership. The fundamental theme, according to this approach, is the argument that such acute situations motivate some potential leaders to emerge and take the reins of leadership in crises. The combination of personal leadership traits and the presence of an acute situational need for leadership, at a certain time, creates the leader. This combination has become the cornerstone of the charismatic approach to leadership.

Emphasizing the nature of the charismatic approach, the writer of this dissertation has discussed the notion of charisma as presented by several authors. Among them is Max Weber who introduced the oldest scholarly argument on charisma as a claim to legitimacy in his classic typology of authority. Carl Friedrick identified charisma as a capacity to elicit deference and devotion from a follower or group of followers. Ann Ruth Willner, along with Bronsilau Malinowski and Claude Levi-Strauss, stressed the fact that charisma is bound up with, and may even depend on, the leader's becoming a myth in his society rather than a regular person. Willner emphasized that the charismatic leader must be capable of communicating to his followers

a sense of continuity between himself and the sacred symbols of the society.

This author, while accepting the preceding arguments, realized during his research the presence of a common gap in the analyses made by these writers. They neglected, or seemed to ignore, the positive role of the followers in the emergence, maintenance, and continuance of charismatic leadership. The followers cannot be seen as absent voters since they are concerned with the situation and with its solution. It is their attitudes, sentiments, and motivations that urge the change in leadership; they participate in creating the adequate conditions for the "waiting leader" to emerge. After all, unless a leader is offered favorable and encouraging sentiments, he would fail to emerge as the leader. Also, without the continuous support of the followers, the charismatic leader would not be able to remain in power and effect any significant change. Charismatic leadership cannot stand still; it either progresses forward or slides backward. The followers' role is that of the principal agent. Therefore the charismatic leader needs and seeks to establish an accord with his followers. Without such an accord (bond) between the charismatic leader and his charismatized followers, charismatic leadership cannot last.

The idea of charisma as a two-way relationship process rather than a one-way endeavor on the part of the

leader is presented in this dissertation as the "concept of charismatization." The process in which both the charismatic leader and the followers interact is called by this author the "charismatization process."

The concept and the process were used extensively in this research to discuss, analyze, and evaluate the techniques utilized by Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser. This author, by his study of similar situations which occurred under Jackson and under Nasser, has deduced some generalizations which should be most useful to an understanding of the strategies and management of charismatic leadership.

Based on the study of the leadership patterns of Presidents Andrew Jackson and Gamal Abdul-Nasser, and until further comparative leadership studies are applied to other similar charismatic pairs (cross-culturally), the following findings may be suggested:

First, two independent variables perceived as extremely important in understanding charismatic leadership are <u>personal traits</u> and <u>situational performance</u>. The study of personal traits of charismatic leaders must include a careful analysis of their social background and their education; their values, attitudes, and beliefs; as well as their behavioral reactions to environmental stimuli. A combination of these attributes forms the leader's personal idiom which often leaves its prints on his strategy of

leadership. The study of situational performance of charismatic leaders must encompass a thorough examination of their past stands and decisions with regard to diversified situations (social, political, economic, military, or combinations of these) with comparison to the available options at the time; recurrent selection patterns on the part of the leader establish a performance style of leadership.

Secondly, charismatic potential develops in a leader, by the gradual merger of his personal idiom and his performance style, an incipient state of mind which this author called "dormant charisma." This state of dormant charisma either flowers or dies: it flowers when it receives favorable popular support; it dies when such support is denied. In the case of charismatic leaders, the dormant charisma of the leader becomes activated by the strong support of his followers. Such support helps the charismatic leader to bring his dormant charisma to the fore, expose it to popular enthusiasm, absorb his followers' endorsement, and project his image as a leader possessed of "activated charisma."

Thirdly, populaces constantly need leadership. The intensity of such need depends upon the extent of stability in a given society; the stronger the stresses and strains on the people in a society, the greater their need for leadership. Charismatic leaders usually tend to espouse the demands of the masses whose support they rely upon to remain in power. The effectiveness of charismatic

leadership depends on the leader's ability to maintain the charismatization bond between himself and his regime on the one side and the mass support of the majority on the other. The durability of charismatic leadership depends on the leader's ability to maintain and reinforce popular acceptance of his image as a national symbol and myth.

Fourthly, charismatic leaders who come from lower social classes tend to be aggressive, violent, and rather brutal in dealing with the elite. They tend to reaffirm publicly their disenchantment with the elite as a means to capture, retain, and to enhance their massist image. Charismatic leaders who have a limited share of higher education tend to compensate for that by deploying noisy, showy, and impressive ideologies which hopefully would enter their names into history. They tend to borrow from older theories and apply what they borrow differently. In the process of advocating their ideologies, charismatic leaders tend to cultivate and nourish a favorable public opinion by appointing ghost writers, designating mouthpieces, and controlling the mass media.

This writer hopes that the four guidelines which emerged from this research will prove helpful to students of political leadership in general and to students of charismatic leadership in particular. If this dissertation stimulates further contributions toward the development of a unified theory of charismatic leadership, the efforts invested in it will have been well rewarded.

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A P P E N D I X E S

I. CHRONOLOGY OF ANDREW JACKSON.

II. CHRONOLOGY OF GAMAL ABDUL-NASSER.

III. PHOTOGRAPH OF ANDREW JACKSON.

IV. PHOTOGRAPH OF GAMAL ABDUL-NASSER.

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY OF ANDREW JACKSON

1767 - Born in Waxhaw, South Carolina

1780-81 - Served in Revolutionary Army; captured by the British, then released.

1785-87 - Read law in Salisbury, North Carolina and admitted to bar.

1788 - Settled in Nashville in the Western District of North Carolina.

Appointed public prosecutor for the Western District of North Carolina.

1791 - Married Rachel Donelson Robards.

Appointed attorney general for the Territory South of the River Ohio.

1795 - Settled at "The Hermitage" as a cotton planter.

1796 - Served as delegate to Tennessee constitutional convention.

Elected to House of Representatives.

1797 - Elected to Senate; resigned in following year.

1798 - Appointed to Superior Court of Tennessee.

1802 - Elected Major-General of Tennessee militia.

1804 - Resigned from Superior Court of Tennessee.

1806 - Conferred with Aaron Burr on latter's plan for a Western expedition.

1806-12 - Devoted major attention to his plantation.

1812-15 - Led troops against Indians and British in War of 1812.

1814 - Troops under his command defeated Creeks at Horse-shoe Bend.

1815 - Troops under his command defeated British at New Orleans.

1818 - Headed Florida expedition.

1821 - Resigned military commission to become first governor of the Florida Territory.

1822 - Nominated for the Presidency by the Tennessee Legislature.

1823 - Elected to Senate.

1824-25 - Received plurality of electoral vote in Presidential election, but lost election to John Quincy Adams in the House of Representatives

1825 - Resigned from the Senate.

1825-28 - His supporters conducted campaign for his election to the Presidency in 1828.

1828 - Elected President.

1829 - Introduced spoils system.

1830 - Vetoed Maysville Road Bill.

1830 - Obtained British permission for direct United States trade to the British West Indies.

1831-36 - At his insistence, France agreed to pay United States claims arising from attacks on American commerce.

1831 - Reorganized Cabinet following Eaton affair and break with John C. Calhoun

1832 - Vetoed bill to recharter the Bank of the United States.

Issued proclamation on nullification in South Carolina.

1833 - On his orders, Secretary of the Treasury withdrew Federal deposits from the Bank of the United States and placed them in state banks.

1834 - Replied to Senate criticism of his policies with the Protest.

1836 - Issued Specie Circular.

1837 - Retired to "The Hermitage."

1845 - Died at "The Hermitage."

APPENDIX II

CHRONOLOGY OF GAMAL ABDUL-NASSER

1918 - Born in Alexandria, Egypt.

1926 - His mother died.

1930 - Led his first student demonstration against the British occupation of Egypt.

1936 - Completed high school education and received his Baccalaureate.

Denied acceptance to the Military Academy.

1937 - Entered the Military Academy.

1938 - Graduated with the rank of Second Lieutenant and was appointed at Maqabād, Province of Assūt.

1940 - Promoted to First Lieutenant.

1943 - Promoted to Captain and assigned to teach at the Military Academy.

1944 - Began to organize the Free Officers.

1946 - Studied at the Staff College

1948 - Graduated from Staff College and volunteered to fight against the Israeli forces in Palestine.

1949 - Won the battles of ᶜIraq al-Manshiyah and al-Falūja

Returned from Palestine and concentrated on coordinating the Free Officers' plan.

1952 - Executed a military coup against King Farouk.

Abolished all titles and ranks.

Promulgated the first Agrarian Reform Law.

Declared the dissolution of the 1923 Constitution.

1953 - Dissolved all political parties.

Agreed with the British on the Sudān Question.

Proclaimed the Republic in Egypt.

1954 - Signed the Evacuation Agreement ending British occupation of Egypt.

1955 - Took part in the Bandung Conference in Indonesia.

Concluded arms deal with Czechoslovakia and Russia.

1956. Raised Egyptian flag over the Suez zone announcing the completion of British evacuation.

Elected President of the Republic by a majority of 99.99%.

Nationalized the Suez Canal.

Announced victory in Port Sa^{c}id over British and French forces.

1957 - Abrogated the Evacuation Agreement with the British.

Rejected Eisenhower Doctrine.

Initiated Five-Year Plan for industrialization in Egypt.

1958 - Established the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria)

Declared his principles of Positive Neutrality and Non-Alignment.

Established the first atomic reactor in Egypt.

1959 - Hosted the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Cairo.

Started the building of the High Dam

1960 - Began a series of nationalization of means of Production.

Introduced Socialism and adopted it as a national ideology.

Issued the socialist laws of July.

1961 - The Breakdown of the United Arab Republic.

1962 - Declared that UAR entered space age by the launching of first Egyptian missiles.

Recognized the Yemen People's Revolution and sent troops to support it.

Proclaimed the Charter.

Announced the basic law of the Arab Socialist Union.

1964 - Hosted the first Arab Summit Conference.

Hosted African Summit Conference.

1966 - Elected President for a second term.

1967 - Egyptian forces were defeated by the Israeli forces in Sinai.

Announced his resignation from Presidency.

Reconsidered his resignation and remained President.

1970 - Accepted American peace initiative in the Middle East.

Died at "Manshiyat al-Bakry."

APPENDIX III

ANDREW JACKSON

APPENDIX IV

GAMAL ABDUL-NASSER

VITA

Safwat Sabit Souryal was born on June 14, 1930 in Cairo, Egypt (UAR). His early childhood was spent in Cairo where he received both his elementary and secondary education in the public schools of the city. In 1945, he entered the Royal Police Academy in Cairo and graduated in 1949 with a B.A. in Law and Police Science. He was commissioned with the rank of Second Lieutenant in the Egyptian Police Force.

In 1953, while in the police service in Cairo, he attended the American University, and in 1956, he obtained a B.A. in Education with a major in Sociology. In the same year, fighting broke out in Port Sa^{c}īd because of the Tripartite aggression on Egypt, and Captain Souryal was dispatched to participate in defending the city. On November 5, 1956, he was seriously wounded in action.

Returning to Cairo in 1957, he pursued his education by joining the United Nations Institute of Public Administration in Cairo, where he studied for a year. Upon graduation he was appointed to teach at the same institute (in addition to his police work) for the next three years.

In 1961, Major Souryal had to complete a tour of duty with the police forces in several rural regions of Egypt. He served in the capacity of Chief of Police in different

areas in Upper Egypt. His tour of duty encompassed serving in the provinces of Sohag, Minia, and Giza. In 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Souryal returned to Cairo and succeeded in obtaining a study-leave, without pay, in the United States of America.

In that same year, Mr. Souryal enrolled in the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the State University of New York at Albany. In 1968, he completed his Master's degree in Public Administration. He then taught for some time at Russell Sage College and Marylrose Academy, Albany, New York.

In January 1969, Mr. Souryal began his work toward the Doctorate in Political Science at the University of Utah. He held both a teaching assistantship and later a teaching associateship at the University's Middle East Center. He is a member of Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honorary Society.

Mr. Souryal is married to Maggie F. Meleka of Cairo, Egypt. They have two children: Tarek Omar, 14, and Lamya Safwat, 7.