

ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT: REVOLUTION
IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1947

by

James C. Maroney

A THESIS

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ORIGINS OF CONTAINMENT: REVOLUTION
IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1947

A THESIS

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Sam Houston State Teachers College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree

MASTER OF ARTS

by

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Purpose

It was the purpose of this study to undertake an investigation of the events leading up to and culminating with the Truman Doctrine, and to determine, if possible, pertinent facts relating to the revolution in United States foreign policy which was initiated by the Truman Doctrine.

Methods

The methods used to obtain material for this study were: (1) examination of diaries and memoirs; (2) examination of the Congressional Record; and (3) examination of various secondary sources such as books, newspapers, and periodicals.

Findings

The evidence presented in this study suggests the following conclusions:

1. Traditional American isolationism did not prepare the United States for world leadership. American isolationism had a record of success largely because of world

conditions during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not because of any inherent qualities of isolationism itself.

2. The Western democracies did not fully comprehend the objectives of their war-time ally, the Soviet Union.

3. During the months following World War II, a few far-sighted individuals attempted to awaken the American people to the Soviet threat. Communist aggression in Iran, Greece, and Turkey made their task less difficult.


4. The British decision to terminate assistance to Greece and Turkey--stemming from Britain's post-war economic plight--forced the United States to assume world leadership or return to the traditional isolationism.

5. President Truman was confronted by a hostile Congress at a time when he wished to build support for the coming election. He disregarded these personal considerations, however, and boldly proposed that the United States abandon isolationism and take steps to combat Soviet aggression.

6. Congress, led by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a former isolationist, enacted legislation that extended the requested aid to Greece and Turkey. Those countries subsequently remained free.

7. The Truman Doctrine, as the President's plan came to be called, was the first application of the containment policy. It represented a complete break with the past. The United States was beginning to assume world leadership, with all its burdens and responsibilities.

Approved:



Supervising Professor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| Statement of the Problem | 2 |
| Purpose of the Study | 3 |
| Limitations of the Study | 3 |
| Methods of Investigation | 3 |
| II. BACKGROUND TO THE POST-WAR WORLD | 4 |
| Traditional Isolationism | 4 |
| The War-time Alliance | 9 |
| International Organization | 13 |
| Period of Attempted Cooperation | 15 |
| III. THE PERIOD OF DISILLUSIONMENT | 19 |
| Ominous Warnings | 19 |
| Iran | 31 |
| Greece | 42 |
| Turkey | 48 |
| IV. THE CONTAINMENT POLICY | 55 |
| George F. Kennan | 55 |
| The Dispatch From Moscow | 56 |
| "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" | 59 |
| Walter Lippmann's Criticism | 64 |
| Frederick L. Schuman's Criticism | 67 |

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|--|------|
| Criticism of the American Friends | |
| Service Committee | 69 |
| V. THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE | 70 |
| The British Decision | 70 |
| Implications of the British Decision | 73 |
| The Truman Doctrine | 76 |
| Public Reaction to the Truman Doctrine | 81 |
| Congressional Reaction | 85 |
| VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS | 96 |
| Summary | 96 |
| Conclusions | 97 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 100 |
| VITA | 105 |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On Friday, February 21, 1947, British representatives delivered two notes to the United States Department of State concerning the British decision to terminate aid to Greece and Turkey. The British government hoped that the United States, as of April 1, could begin furnishing Greece and Turkey with at least the minimum amount of necessary aid. Britain, because of her post-war economic plight, could no longer supply this aid after March 31.

The executive branch informed the Congress of its decision to act on March 12, 1947, when President Harry S. Truman addressed a joint session of that body. When Congress approved the bill resulting from the President's proposal, it brought about a major shift in the foreign policy of the United States. The challenge and responsibility of world leadership had been accepted.

It was only with great difficulty that the American people realized they would not be able to indulge themselves in an era of peace and low taxes which they thought they had earned by emerging victorious from the most costly and destructive war in history. It was naively believed that the newly formed United Nations Organization would somehow automatically ensure peace. In the first eighteen months following World War II, the American people slowly became aware

of a new and powerful antagonist--their war-time friend and ally, Soviet Russia. The attempted cooperation with the Soviets did not fare as well as had been expected. In early 1945 there was already some evidence that the Russians would not live up to the provisions of the Yalta agreements.

Soviet conduct at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco in April, 1945, at the pre-armistice negotiations in March and April of that same year, and in Poland and Germany began to open the eyes of the American people. Perhaps the most shocking act by the Soviets, however, was their refusal to accept the generous American offer concerning the atomic bomb. The United States offered to relinquish its monopoly of atomic weapons to the control of an international authority if this organization would be granted the right of continuous inspection. The Soviet Union refused to accept the offer under these conditions. Continued pressure was applied by the communists to eastern Europe, Iran, Greece, and Turkey. By early 1947 the United States was forced to make a decision.

Statement of the Problem

The British notes forced the makers of United States foreign policy to make a momentous decision. They had the choice of returning to the pre-war isolationism of 1919-1939, or of assuming the position of world leadership which they had rejected in 1919.

Purpose of the Study

It was the purpose of this study to undertake an investigation of the events leading up to and culminating with the Truman Doctrine, and to determine, if possible, pertinent facts relating to the revolution in United States foreign policy which was initiated by the Truman Doctrine.

Limitations of the Study

This paper was limited to a study of the origins of the containment policy. A rather intensive study of the background was made in order to show the need for such a policy. This was followed by a study of the events leading up to the Truman Doctrine which put the theory of containment into practice. The concentration, therefore, was on the revolution in United States foreign policy initiated by the Truman Doctrine. No attempt was made to deal with the results of the assistance to Greece and Turkey which would have necessitated a much longer study.

Methods of Investigation

The methods used to obtain material for this study were: (1) examination of diaries and memoirs; (2) examination of the Congressional Record; and (3) examination of various secondary sources such as books, newspapers and periodicals.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND TO THE POST-WAR WORLD

This chapter will briefly consider the following: the basic characteristics of traditional American foreign policy, with emphasis on the prevalent theme of isolationism; the war-time alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union and the emphasis placed by President Roosevelt and the State Department on the necessity for an international organization to preserve the peace in the post-war world; and the beginnings of a period of disillusionment on the part of the American public with Soviet behavior.

Traditional Isolationism

The United States found itself ill-prepared to face the realities of the post-war period. The history of American foreign relations was largely a record of isolationism. George Washington set the precedent in his "Farewell Address." The first President reminded his countrymen that the "great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little Political connection as possible." He realized, however, that we should continue with "perfect good faith" any relations we had already made, but that these should be all. He also warned that:

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation.--Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.--Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships and enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. . . .¹

In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson made his famous statement on the same subject: "peace, commerce, and honest friendship, with all nations--entangling alliances with none"²

Later came the Monroe Doctrine which, in effect, said that the United States would not interfere in European affairs if Europeans would not interfere in American affairs. This concept helped build American pride and nationalism, for this was talk among equals.³ The Monroe Doctrine was effective mainly because it was proclaimed in the period between the mercantilism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the neo-mercantilism of the nineteenth and early

¹George Washington, as quoted in Saul K. Padover, The Washington Papers, Basic Selections From the Public and Private Writings of George Washington, 321-322.

²Thomas Jefferson, as quoted in Philip S. Foner (ed.), The Basic Writings of Thomas Jefferson, 4.

³Alexander De Conde, Isolation and Security, 2.

twentieth centuries. During this era the European countries were occupied with their industrial revolutions at home, and there was nothing to upset the balance of power from Waterloo until the German aggression that marked the outbreak of the first World War.⁴

In the nineteenth century the United States had been engaged in the problems of Civil War and westward expansion. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, this "traditional purpose" of American foreign policy had been fulfilled. Pax Britannica, according to Walter Lippmann, was responsible for the conditions which made American expansion to the Pacific Ocean a reality.⁵

By the time of World War I the British could no longer maintain the balance of power in Europe, and the United States could no longer observe its traditional policy of isolationism. Woodrow Wilson believed in the wisdom of traditional American isolationism, and only the threat of German victory, combined with the provocation of unlimited submarine warfare, was responsible for American entry into the World War.⁶

⁴William G. Carleton, The Revolution in American Foreign Policy 1945-1954, 2.

⁵Walter Lippmann, "Isolation and Expansion," Readings In American Foreign Policy. Edited by Robert A. Goldwin with Ralph Lerner and Gerald Stourzh, 161-162.

⁶Ibid., 164.

This possibility of German victory threatened the future of American democracy, and a great moral crusade was necessary to recreate the desirable conditions. Wilsonian idealism did not envision a world in which there were other nations that the United States would have to deal with as rivals, allies, and partners, but a world where there were no spheres of influence, power struggles, or alliances. The only war in this world envisioned by Wilson would be organized war against "criminal governments" that rebel against the established world order. Therefore, "all wars are wars to end wars" and no war can be satisfactorily concluded "except by the unconditional surrender of the aggressor nation and by the overthrow and transformation of its political regime."⁷

Lippmann holds that intervention by the United States in World War I could not have attained the necessary public support without "the highly charged emotions of the Wilsonian ideology." He believes that the employment of Wilsonian ideology

. . . has been the easiest and the quickest way to force through Congress measures which call for the use of American troops and the appropriation of American money for grants abroad. But this method of dealing with our people has, as many are now coming to see, established no political and moral foundation for a settled and steadfast policy. . . . In my view it is

⁷Ibid.

becoming increasingly plain that Wilsonian ideology is an impossible foundation for the foreign policy of a nation. . . .⁸

The League of Nations was created in order to preserve the status quo of war-time Allied collaboration. The United States, however, rejected this opportunity to assume leadership and attempted to return to the isolationism of the past.⁹

In the period between the two World Wars, the Western democracies had allowed to arise in Europe two totalitarian powers, Germany and Russia. George F. Kennan, prominent State Department official and author, believes they were so powerful that together they could not be defeated. Separately, the Western democracies could defeat one only with the aid of the other. The one assisting the democracies would, by way of military operations, take over much of eastern Europe.¹⁰

The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of August, 1939, destroyed the balance of power in Europe, making possible the attack on Poland.¹¹ When this pact was broken by Hitler's

⁸ Ibid., 165-166.

⁹ De Conde, op. cit., 9.

¹⁰ George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950, 66-67.

¹¹ John L. Snell and others, The Meaning of Yalta, Big Three Diplomacy and the New Balance of Power, 5.

invasion of Russia, the immediate pressure was lifted from Britain, and the United States was given a chance to re-establish the balance of power.¹²

The War-time Alliance

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, in accordance with Wilsonian ideology, put the defeat of Hitler before all else. This meant aiding any country that would help to bring about the defeat of Germany.¹³ As applied to the Soviet Union, two basic characteristics of this policy by the West were displayed at the various war-time conferences: a willingness to postpone territorial settlements until after Hitler was defeated, and the continuance of aid to Russia after the Germans were driven from Russian soil, thereby directly aiding Russian takeover of eastern European countries which, in turn, caused serious post-war political problems.¹⁴

Another significant explanation for American concessions at Yalta, the most important of the war-time conferences, was the assumption by President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull that an effective post-war world order could be constructed only with the aid and

¹² Ibid., 8.

¹³ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴ Kennan, op. cit., 75.

cooperation of the Russians.¹⁵ The President believed that it was necessary to secure from the Russians and British an agreement to establish a world organization before the end of the war. He gave this belief such a priority that it may have well been responsible for his willingness to grant concessions on regional matters at Yalta. Like Wilson in 1918, Roosevelt hoped that any unsatisfactory details could be ironed out later in the international organization.¹⁶

It must be pointed out that the bargaining position of the West at the Yalta Conference was far from ideal. The situation was as follows:

1. With the effectiveness of the atomic bomb unknown, General MacArthur and other military leaders believed that it was imperative to secure Soviet aid for the invasion of Japan.¹⁷

2. Stalin was demanding a "second front" in order to remove some of the pressure from the Red Army.¹⁸

3. The Germans had launched a gigantic counter-offensive which resulted in the so-called "Battle of the Bulge."¹⁹

In summary, the decisions of the Yalta Conference can be rightly understood only if viewed with the following

¹⁵Snell, op. cit., 14.

¹⁶Ibid., 167.

¹⁸Ibid., 25.

¹⁷Ibid., 32.

¹⁹Ibid., 26.

points in mind: the West agreed that Germany and Japan should be punished stringently, with any aggressive tendencies neutralized; the West realized that Russia had sustained terrible punishment and deserved compensation; President Roosevelt believed that the United States, Britain, and Russia must serve as "world policemen" until a world organization was operating successfully; the President was also under the impression that the Soviet Union would require a generation to recover and would, therefore, be willing to cooperate with the West; and it was clear that Russia would emerge from the war the dominant power in Europe. This meant to Roosevelt and the State Department that the United States must retain friendly relations with the Russians. The policy followed at Yalta by the West, therefore, was to agree to the minimum concessions and to anticipate Soviet collaboration.²⁰

There has been, in recent years, a great deal of criticism of the Yalta agreements, but as George F. Kennan says, "There was nothing the Western democracies could have done to prevent the Russians from entering these areas except to get there first, and this they were not in a position to do."²¹

There was, however, little immediate criticism of the Yalta agreements. Most of the Western world rejoiced at the

²⁰
Ibid., 205-207.

²¹
Kennan, op. cit., 76.

cooperation and good will displayed by the Big Three.²² President Roosevelt received "floods of messages" from home. The following are representative: from Herbert Hoover, "It will offer a great deal of hope to the world."; from William L. Shirer, ". . . a landmark in human history."; from Raymond Gram Swing, "No more appropriate news could be conceived to celebrate the birthday of Abraham Lincoln."; from Senator Alben Barkley, ". . . I regard it as one of the most important steps ever taken to promote peace and happiness in the world."; and Joseph C. Harsch wrote in the Christian Science Monitor:

The Crimea Conference stands out from previous such conferences because of its mood of decision. . . . The meeting at Yalta was plainly dominated by a desire, willingness and determination to reach solid decisions.²³

The feelings of President Roosevelt's special assistant, Harry Hopkins, were later expressed to Robert E. Sherwood, in his book, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History:

We really believed in our hearts that this was the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years. We were absolutely certain that we had won the first great victory of the peace--and, by "we," I mean

²²Snell, op. cit., 189.

²³Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History, 869-870.

all of us, the whole civilized human race. The Russians had proved that they could be reasonable and farseeing and there wasn't any doubt in the minds of the President or any of us that we could live with them and get along with them peacefully for as far into the future as any of us could imagine. But I have one amendment to that--I think we all had in our minds the reservation that we could not foretell what the results would be if anything should happen to Stalin. We felt sure that we could count on him to be reasonable and sensible and understanding--but we never could be sure who or what might be in back of him there in the Kremlin.²⁴

International Organization

As early as the Moscow Conference, held in October, 1943, the Big Three agreed to establish an international organization "based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security." After this conference, Cordell Hull said to a joint session of Congress that there was no longer a need

. . . for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests.²⁵

In April, 1944, Secretary Hull wrote that the cooperation of the four major powers "is the solid framework upon

²⁴Ibid., 870.

²⁵Snell, op. cit., 16.

which all future policy and international organization must be built."²⁶

The belief of Marshal Jan Smuts of South Africa in September, 1944, was "Should a World Organization be formed which does not include Russia she will become the power centre of another group. We shall then be heading towards a third World War."²⁷

At the time of the Declaration of the United Nations in January, 1945, Cordell Hull said:

This is a living proof that law-abiding and peace-loving nations can unite in using the sword when necessary to preserve liberty and justice and the fundamental values of mankind. Against this host we can be sure that the forces of barbaric savagery and organized wickedness cannot and will not prevail.²⁸

In a dinner given by Stalin at the Yalta Conference, the Soviet dictator, while proposing a toast, remarked that it would be immeasurably more difficult to retain unity after the war than it was while the joint aim was simply to defeat the enemy. He went on to state, however, that he believed the Big Three could meet the challenge and retain as cordial relations in the time of peace as they had in time of war.²⁹

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid., 22.

²⁸ Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II, 1125.

²⁹ Sherwood, op. cit., 869.

In August, 1945, while compiling his papers, Harry Hopkins said to his assistant, Sidney Hyman:

We know that we have been able to fight side by side with the Russians in the greatest war in all history. We know or believe that Russia's interests, so far as we can anticipate them, do not afford an opportunity for a major difference with us in foreign affairs. . . . We find the Russians as individuals easy to deal with. The Russians undoubtedly like the American people. They like the United States. . . . I believe they not only have no wish to fight with us, but are determined to take their place in world affairs in an international organization, and above all, they want to maintain friendly relations with us.³⁰

In January, 1946, Walter Lippmann suggested

. . . that the task of statesmanship is not to try necessarily to secure democracy for all the world, but to discover the means by which . . . democracy and Communism . . . can find a way of living together.³¹

Period of Attempted Cooperation

As World War II drew to an end, there was a great deal of optimism concerning the post-war world. The English-speaking peoples possessed a considerable amount of good-will for "Uncle Joe" and the Russian people. No politician or

³⁰ Ibid., 922.

³¹ James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries. Edited by Walter Millis with the collaboration of E. S. Duffield, 127.

official could afford to make any statement against Russia's intentions.³²

The emergence of the United States and Soviet Russia in the post-war period as the dominant powers created new problems. Even if its people did not relish the idea, the United States acquired Great Britain's role "as the pivot of the Western World" and was forced to become "the main defender of Anglo-American values."³³

Attempted cooperation did not fare as well as expected, for as early as the spring of 1945 there was already some evidence that the Russians would not live up to the provisions of the Yalta agreements. This first suspicion of distrust was heightened by Soviet conduct at the United Nations conference for World Organization at San Francisco in April, 1945, and at the pre-armistice negotiations in March and April of 1945. At this time, the Russians began to destroy the friendly relations of the war years.³⁴

Elections were not held in Poland until January, 1947, even though Stalin told Roosevelt at Yalta that elections would be held there within a month unless there was "some catastrophe" on the front. Furthermore, when the elections

³² J. Hampden Jackson, The World in the Postwar Decade 1945-1955, 5.

³³ De Conde, op. cit., 10.

³⁴ Snell, op. cit., 190.

were held, there was no doubt that they were dominated by the Communists.³⁵

The German sector under the control of the Russians was treated as a satellite, and Germany was not dealt with as one economic unit but separated from the remainder of the country. Much-needed foodstuffs grown in agricultural eastern Germany were withheld from the western portion of the country, thereby placing its people in a position of dependency to the West. Industrial equipment was withdrawn from the Soviet zone in lieu of reparations. In addition, political parties other than the Communist party were forbidden and freedom of speech, press, and radio were lost.³⁶

Perhaps the most shocking act by the Soviets, however, was their refusal to accept the generous American offer concerning the atomic bomb. In 1946, the United States, as the sole possessor of the atomic bomb, had a unique opportunity. It was in a position to force upon the world its program, but, instead, chose another route. The United States was willing to relinquish its monopoly of atomic weapons to the control of an international authority, provided that this organization would have the right of continuous inspection. When this system was in operation, all atomic bombs would be destroyed and their manufacture ceased. The Russians

³⁵ Jackson, op. cit., 21-22.

³⁶ Ibid., 21.

refused to accept this offer unless changes were made whereby there could be no effective inspection.³⁷

Even though the Soviets began as early as 1945 to become uncooperative, the United States, for a period of almost two years after the end of the war, still clung to the hope that, as serious as the problems were, they could be worked out in an acceptable manner.³⁸

³⁷Ibid., 26-27.

³⁸Carleton, op. cit., 53-54.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF DISILLUSIONMENT

In spite of the fact that the attempted cooperation did not fare as well as expected, the general optimism of the Western community concerning prospects for the future was not shaken severely before 1947. High ranking Washington officials shared this optimism with the American people. While the official policy remained optimistic, however, there were a few farsighted individuals who attempted to break through this feeling of security and to point out to the American people the true situation.

Ominous Warnings

In a letter of January 5, 1946, to Secretary of State Byrnes, President Truman said that he believed the United States should strongly protest the activities of the Russians in Iran. The Russian program in Iran was similar, he said, to their activities in Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. It was also reminiscent of the "high-handed and arbitrary manner" the Russians displayed in Poland. The President pointed out that Iran, as the war-time ally of both the United States and Russia, had allowed arms, ammunition, and other supplies from the United States to pass across Iran from the Persian Gulf to the Russians in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea. These supplies helped prevent the defeat of Russia. But in

spite of these circumstances, the Russians were now stirring up a rebellion and continuing to maintain troops on Iranian soil. The President ended the letter with strong words:

There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand--"How many divisions have you?"

I do not think we should compromise any longer. . . . We should let our position on Iran be known in no uncertain terms . . . I'm tired of babying the Soviets.¹

In Year of Decisions, the first volume of his Memoirs, President Truman describes a personal report of the Soviet Union given to him on April 20, 1945, by Averell Harriman. Mr. Harriman was at that time the United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union. He reported that it was his belief that the Soviets thought they could cooperate with the United

¹William Hillman, Mr. President, Personal Diary, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews of Harry S. Truman, Thirty-Second President of the United States of America, 27-28. A controversy developed over this letter. President Truman says on page 551 of Year of Decisions that he wrote the letter in longhand because he was in a hurry and wanted no publicity. When Mr. Byrnes came to the White House on January 5, Truman said, "I read it to him as he sat at my desk in the Oval Room . . ." On page 402 of All in One Lifetime, Byrnes claimed that "such a letter was never sent to me, nor read to me. . . . My first knowledge of the 'memorandum letter' came with its appearance in the Hillman book. The only explanation Mr. Hillman gives of this unusual action is that 'One day the President said that sometimes he wrote letters which he never sent but wished he had sent.'"

States and Great Britain and, at the same time, extend their sphere of influence over neighboring countries by means of unilateral action. According to Harriman, the Russians misunderstood our willingness to cooperate as a sign of weakness. This made them overconfident. He believed, however, that the Russians had no desire for a breach in our relations to develop since they needed American aid for their program of reconstruction. Ambassador Harriman believed that we were confronted with a "barbarian invasion of Europe." Russian control would dominate a country's foreign affairs, while internally, it would be subjected to secret police. He concluded the meeting by saying that, in his opinion, it would be possible to deal successfully with the Russians, but in order to do so we must realize that the Russians were not likely to operate according to principles that other countries recognize in international affairs.²

On April 4, 1945, Ambassador Harriman had cabled from the Moscow Embassy:

We now have ample proof that the Soviet government views all matters from the standpoint of their own selfish interests. . . . The Communist Party or its associates everywhere are using economic difficulties in areas under our responsibilities to promote Soviet concepts and policies and to undermine the influence of the Western Allies. . . . Unless we and

²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, I, Year of Decisions, 70-71.

the British now adopt an independent line the people under the areas of our responsibility will suffer and the chances of Soviet domination in Europe will be enhanced. . . . We must clearly realize that the Soviet program is the establishment of totalitarianism, ending personal liberty and democracy as we know and respect it.³

The night before Ambassador Harriman made his report to President Truman, he told Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal that unless our Russian policy became much more firm, he could not be very optimistic about our future relations with the Soviets. He said the Russians had not finished setting up satellites around their borders, and that we were faced by a threat as serious as Fascism or Nazism.⁴

The Cabinet meeting of January 11, 1946, considered the dangers of demobilization in light of the existing conditions. Forrestal suggested that the President should tell the heads of the more important newspapers and news services, at a conference, how really serious the international situation was, and that he should point out the need for making the country aware of the situation. President Truman, according to Forrestal, agreed to do so. The diary does not show what was finally done, "but certainly in early 1946," point out the editors of The Forrestal Diaries, "there was no such trumpet call as Forrestal clearly had in mind."⁵

³ James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, 39-40.

⁴ Ibid., 47.

⁵ Ibid., 129.

On February 9, 1946, Josef Stalin made an "election speech," in which he hinted that a peaceful world was not possible with the present economic development of the capitalist countries. He set forth a five-year plan for military and industrial expansion "to guarantee our country against any eventuality." This speech and program helped to convince Forrestal that democracy and communism could not live together as Lippmann had suggested.⁶ From this time on it seems clear that Forrestal began to believe more and more "that policy could not be founded on the assumption that a peaceful solution of the Russian problem would be possible."⁷

On March 5, 1946, through the arrangement of President Truman, Winston Churchill delivered a monumental speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri.

In his speech, Mr. Churchill suggested that our foremost task was to protect the "common people" from the horrors of another war. Since the United Nations was not yet well organized, he proposed the formation of an international air unit. It would be composed of squadrons from various countries which would be under the United Nations, except that they would not be required to act against their own country.

It would not be a wise policy, said Britain's war-time Prime Minister, to deliver the secret of atomic weapons

⁶ See statement by Lippmann above, 15.

⁷ Forrestal, op. cit., 134-135.

to international control in view of the present world situation.

Mr. Churchill, after the above preliminaries, announced that he had "come to the crux of what I have traveled here to say." And this was, he explained, "what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States." Otherwise, war cannot be prevented with certainty, nor can the United Nations develop into the kind of organization we wish it to. This association would require "growing friendship and mutual understanding" and necessitate a close association of our military advisers, which will lead to joint consideration of problems, weapons, and other items. The joint use of bases under this "fraternal association" would vastly increase the number for both systems and would lead to financial savings as the world "calms down."

This "special relationship," said Mr. Churchill, would not endanger the United Nations or be inconsistent with loyalties to the United Nations. He then pointed to several long standing alliances of Britain and the United States. It was his opinion that such a relationship, instead of hurting the United Nations, would strengthen it.

The ex-Prime Minister then warned that the Soviets had thrown a "shadow" over the recent Allied victory. Mr. Churchill stated that he had a "strong admiration" for the

Russian people and his war-time associate, Stalin. He acknowledged the need for Russia to have safety from future German aggression. We are glad, he said, for Russia to take its place among the world's foremost nations, and we would gladly exchange people and ideas. He then drew a grim picture of the existing situation:

It is my duty . . . to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe--I am sure I do not wish to, but it is my duty, I feel, to present them to you.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Triest [sic] in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow.

Communist parties, he continued, which were formerly small in these areas, now had power far beyond their size. In most cases police governments existed.

Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow government. . . . Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts--and facts they are--this is certainly not the liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace.

War was not inevitable, according to Mr. Churchill,

because he was sure that we controlled our own destiny.

Therefore, he felt that he must speak out:

I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. . . . Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be relieved by a policy of appeasement. . . .

From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness.

Mr. Churchill then pointed out that World War II was unnecessary. He had seen it on the way and said so, but no one listened. He warned we must not again be "sucked into the awful whirlpool." This could be prevented by achieving then, in 1946, "a good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations Organization . . ."

The speech was concluded with his belief that if the proposed "fraternal association" became a reality "there will be an overwhelming assurance of security," and "the high-roads of the future will be clear, not only for us but for all, not only for our time but for a century to come."⁸

According to the New York Times of March 6, 1946,

⁸Winston S. Churchill, "A Shadow Has Fallen On Europe and Asia," Vital Speeches of the Day, XII (March 15, 1946), 329-332.

the day after the Fulton speech, the proposal for close relations with the United States was well received in London, although there was some doubt as to how the American public would feel about it. There was some suspicion, however, of such strong criticism of the Soviets.⁹ The Times of March 6 also reported that the reactions of most American Congressmen who were willing to be quoted were unfavorable. Senator Pepper of Florida said that Churchill "had spoken 'in his best Marlborough manner for glorious imperialism . . .'"¹⁰

According to later reports, a few Congressmen believed the speech "realistic," but most were "cold" and some were "shocked." While the Wall Street Journal called it "brilliant" with a "hard core of indisputable fact," the consensus of other newspapers was that "such an alliance would only provoke Russian suspicion, already acute, and pull the props of trust and confidence right out from under UNO . . ."¹¹ Russian newspapers called the speech "aggressive," and the London Daily Worker said "Churchill . . . has returned to his anti-Communist vomit," but Time magazine said that "what

⁹"Churchill Speech Hailed in London," New York Times, March 6, 1946, 6.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹"Mr. Truman's Balloon," Time, XLVII (March 18, 1946), 19.

Churchill has returned to was his Munich-era assertion that appeasement will not buy peace."¹²

Churchill's message emphasized throughout the British Empire that Britain could not still protect her interests with her own military forces. "The pressures are many; the resources are too few," he said. President Truman said nothing, but Secretary of State Byrnes informed Russia that the United States "cannot remain indifferent" to the continued presence of Russia in Iran.¹³

An editorial in The Nation¹⁴ condemned the speech for its bad timing. Secretary of State Byrnes had promised that "we will gang up against no state," but Churchill's whole program "was a bold call for a military alliance. Byrnes, in short, talked like a man determined on peace, Churchill like a man committed to war." The editorial went on to point out that while a declining Britain might welcome such an alliance with the United States,

Churchill has adopted a strategy and a tone that will serve neither the good of Britain nor the cause of world peace. . . . He has added a sizable measure of poison to the already deteriorating relations between Russia and the Western powers. He has given the Soviets ground to intensify their unilateral pursuit of security . . . He has undermined faith in the UNO . . . ,

¹² Ibid., 25.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Churchill's 'Union Now,'" The Nation, CLXII (March 16, 1946), 303-304.

and, ironically, he has prejudiced the chances of the loan to Britain by arousing once again the suspicions of those who fear to be drawn into a defense of the British Empire.¹⁵

Ernest K. Lindley believed Churchill's proposal was useful as a reserve policy, partially because the American public was probably not ready to accept it, and partially because it was the hope that the Soviets would be concerned to the extent that they would attempt, by means of a more reasonable American policy, to prevent such an alliance from forming.¹⁶

Norman Cousins, editor of The Saturday Review of Literature, said the alliance proposed by Churchill might cause "fusion of all non-English speaking peoples, especially in Europe and Asia. Even worse than that: it would set the stage and point up the issues for World War III."¹⁷

Henry Wallace strongly condemned Churchill's proposal. He said that:

Few public addresses in the history of the world have been so loaded with dynamite as Churchill's Fulton iron-curtain, Anglo-American-alliance speech. The American people

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ernest K. Lindley, "What Mr. Churchill Meant," Newsweek, XXVII (March 18, 1946), 36.

¹⁷ Norman Cousins, "Blood, Sweat, Tears, and Iron Curtains," The Saturday Review of Literature, XXIX (March 30, 1946), 27.

were shocked and staggered by its content Some Americans, war-weary but tense, began to move dangerously toward the thought of an irrepressible conflict. . . .

Churchill's scheme is now clear. He assumes that our atom bombs and air power are at England's disposal. The first-line weapons are the foot soldiers and the industry of France and western Germany. France and Germany will guide Europe. England will guide France and Germany and, by the grace of God and Winston Churchill, the airplanes and the atom bombs of the United States will uphold her right arm.

Mr. Wallace points out that he does not believe the British people support the Fulton proposals. "They don't believe in atom bomb Christianity." He goes on to say that Mr. Churchill undoubtedly

believes that an Anglo-American dominated United Nations armed with the irresistible atom bomb should be used to hold Russia in check. He sincerely thinks, as do many Americans, that that is the only road to one world and peace. For my part, I am certain that the course Churchill advocates would make inevitable the very thing he seeks to avert--the destruction of civilization. Peace cannot be achieved by coercive threats backed by hideous weapons. In the name of one world and peace the Churchillians are making two worlds and war.¹⁸

Eight days after the Fulton proposal, Josef Stalin made a speech in which he bitterly attacked the West in general, and Churchill in particular. Stalin's intentions were

¹⁸ Henry Wallace, "Churchill's Crusade," The New Republic, CXVI (January 13, 1947), 22-23.

"to play on every nation's dread of war," and to emphasize the "threat of capitalistic encirclement."¹⁹ Stalin claimed Churchill's proposal was an ultimatum to all non-English speaking peoples to recognize the "lordship" of the United States and Britain or else "war is inevitable."²⁰

After Stalin's attack, Churchill announced, "I do not wish . . . to withdraw or modify a single word."²¹

Iran

During World War II the United States improved railroads, harbors, highways, and other transportation facilities in Iran so that a route for Lend-Lease items for Russia might be opened.²²

In addition to preventing the country's oil reserves from falling into the hands of the Allies, the Germans intended to use Iran as a link to the East. Britain needed Iran as a source of oil and as a link to India, while the country became important to Russia as a supply route for

¹⁹"Stalin Takes the Stump," Time, XLVII (March 25, 1946), 26.

²⁰"Backdrop for the UNO: The Great Debate," Newsweek, XXVII (March 25, 1946), 41.

²¹"Stalin Takes the Stump," Time, XLVII (March 25, 1946), 26.

²²Norman J. Padelford, "Soviet Pressure on Iran," Problems in International Relations, Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert Gibbs, editors, 13.

Lend-Lease goods from the United States. In 1941 the Shah refused the joint request of Britain and Russia to expel all German agents. Britain and Russia then decided to occupy Iran. Their intervention began on August 25, 1941, for the purpose of protecting the oil fields and the Trans-Iranian Railway. The British occupied the southern part of the country, while the Russians occupied the northern part. A Treaty of Alliance among Iran, Britain, and Russia was signed on January 29, 1942. According to the provisions, Britain and Russia agreed to respect "the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran"; Iran agreed to allow free passage of troops and their supplies, including the right to control transportation; and these troops were to be withdrawn not later than six months "after the cessation of hostilities against Germany and her associates."²³

It is now apparent, according to Norman J. Padelford, author of an article called "Soviet Pressure on Iran," that the Russians saw this as a wonderful opportunity. They isolated their zone to all outsiders and most Iranians. Their activities included economic controls, censorship of news, spying, anti-Western propaganda, and the employment of secret police and terrorist methods.²⁴

At the Teheran Conference of December, 1943, the Big Three issued a Three Power Declaration in which they

²³ Ibid., 12.

²⁴ Ibid., 14.

proclaimed that they were "at one with Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran."²⁵

On May 30, 1945, after the end of the war in Europe, Iran's foreign minister requested the withdrawal of Allied troops.²⁶ But Stalin claimed at the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945, that Allied troops were needed in Iran until Japan was defeated. President Truman said at this time that he did not believe American troops were needed in Iran, although there were supplies in the country which needed to be guarded for future use against Japan. Stalin had no objections to American and British troops in Iran, but he suggested that the Allies withdraw from Teheran. Churchill, since he had promised to secure the removal of troops from the country after the defeat of Germany, was anxious to remove the Allied forces from Iran. Stalin hedged. He pointed out that the treaty declared that the troops would be removed not later than six months after the defeat of Germany "and her associates." Churchill then suggested that the Russian proposal to withdraw troops from Teheran be accepted, leaving the other question for the foreign ministers to deal with later. President Truman announced that American troops were being withdrawn anyway, because they were needed in the Far East. He estimated that this withdrawal would be completed

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶Ibid., 14.

within sixty days. Stalin told the President that there was no need for the United States to be concerned about its supplies in Iran. The Soviet dictator said, "we promise you that no action will be taken by us against Iran." Stalin was thanked for this pledge.²⁷

The first news of seemingly undue Soviet interference in Iran's internal affairs was received by President Truman in September, 1945. The reports indicated that Russian army units were preventing Iranian police from moving into areas where the local communist party, the Tudeh Party, was active. Later in September, the State Department informed the President that Azerbaijan province in the northern part of Iran was "torn by unrest," and that the movement for autonomy was encouraged, and maybe initiated, by the Russians. The London Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers had agreed in September, 1945, that the deadline for the withdrawal of Allied troops would be March 2, 1946. In October of 1945, however, intelligence reports indicated that the Russians were actually building up their forces in Iran instead of preparing to withdraw them. The President said in his Mem-oirs that it appeared Russia was trying to get at least northern Iran.²⁸

Persian Azerbaijan is a fertile area covering some 35,000 square miles in northwestern Iran. If this province

²⁷Truman, op. cit., 379-380.

²⁸Ibid., 522-523.

fell into the hands of the Russians it would mean that Turkey would be completely flanked on the eastern side by the Soviets.²⁹ The separatist rebellion in this province broke out in November, 1945, and obviously had the support of the Russian troops that had been in the area since 1941. Russia and Britain were to "respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Persia" by the terms of the Treaty of Alliance of 1942, and the Allies were to remove their troops from Iran by March 2, 1946. Nevertheless, the northern provinces were "isolated as though by an iron screen" by early 1946.³⁰ The Russian occupation forces allowed the free movement of the rebel troops while preventing soldiers of the central government from entering the disputed area.³¹

On November 23, 1945, President Truman had Secretary of State Byrnes to bring the question of the Russian buildup in Iran before the Cabinet. At the meeting, Secretary Byrnes suggested that the United States withdraw her troops from Iran early and ask the Russians to do likewise. The target

²⁹ G. M. Coombs, "The Background of the Russo-Persian Dispute," The Contemporary Review, CLXIX (March, 1946), 154-155.

³⁰ Ibid., 152.

³¹ "Iran and Ivan," Newsweek, XXVI (November 5, 1945), 53.

date was to be January 1, 1936. On December 3, the Russians refused this request.³²

According to the Soviet newspaper Izvestia, the purpose of the autonomy movement in Azerbaijan Province was not to separate that province from the central government, but merely to seek "greater autonomy within the framework of the Iranian state."³³ Reports of Russian interference continued, and in mid-December, 1945, a proclamation announced an autonomous Azerbaijan Republic.³⁴

Time magazine reported on December 31, 1945, that Azerbaijan was quiet again after its declaration of autonomy. In its capital, Tabriz, a "middle-aged Communist stooge from Baku, Jafar Pishevari, boldly proclaimed himself Premier of the new Azerbaijan Provincial Government."³⁵

James F. Byrnes tells of his conversation with Stalin at the Moscow Conference of December, 1945, in his book, All in One Lifetime. When Secretary Byrnes reminded Stalin of the March 2 deadline, the Soviet dictator replied that the government of Iran was unfriendly to Russia, and he feared

³²Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, II Years of Trial and Hope, 93.

³³"What is Happening in Iran," an editorial in The New Republic, CXIII (December 3, 1945), 731.

³⁴Padelford, op. cit., 15.

³⁵"Iran: Tabriz and Teheran," Time, XLVI (December 31, 1945), 30.

they might send saboteurs to the Baku oil fields, which are near the Soviet-Iranian border. For this reason, Stalin continued, Russia must keep troops in Iran until March, 1946, and "at that time the situation would be examined again." He was using what Byrnes implied was an obviously false threat against the Baku oil fields as an excuse for saying that Russia might not remove her troops by the deadline.³⁶

On January 15, 1946, the Iranian government announced that further negotiations with Russia were useless, and that the Iranians would put the case before the United Nations. The case was taken up by the Security Council on January 25. Iran charged that the Soviets had violated the 1942 agreement by retaining Russian troops in Iran, which violated the territorial integrity of the country; that Russia encouraged the revolt in Azerbaijan, which prevented the application of Iranian law; that the Soviets refused to allow the troops of the central government to reach the troubled area; and that they refused to negotiate on a bilateral basis. The Russians answered this charge by pointing out that negotiation had been started and therefore there was no need for the Security Council to take up this local matter which would not lead to "international friction." They then said that the revolt in

³⁶ James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 333.

Azerbaijan had nothing to do with the presence of Red troops in the area.³⁷

In January, 1946, Iran's ambassador to the United States, Hassein Ala, reviewed the existing situation in a speech and concluded that Russian interference in his country's internal affairs

is the reward we get for having been a loyal Ally during the war and for having placed all our communications and resources at the disposal of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States.³⁸

The situation in Iran was summed up by W. H. Hindle in a Harpers' article in February, 1946. He declared that the Russians wanted an ice-free port--one of Russia's ancient foreign policy goals--a buffer area for Russia's industrial area north of Iran, and Iran's oil fields. He also pointed out that a Soviet-held Iran would be useful as a flanking position to help "persuade" Turkey to allow them to get "virtual control over the Dardanelles."³⁹

When it became obvious that Russia had not observed the March 2 deadline, Iran protested to the Security Council.

³⁷Padelford, op. cit., 15-16.

³⁸Hassein Ala, "Iran's Dilemma." A speech delivered by the Iranian Ambassador to the United States in New Brunswick, New Jersey, on January 16, 1946. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, XII (March 1, 1946), 305.

³⁹W. H. Hindle, "The Trouble Isn't Over in Iran," Harpers Magazine, CXCIX (February, 1946), 136.

The Soviet delegate, Andrei Gromyko, opposed the motion for consideration of the question by the Security Council. He claimed that negotiations were already underway between Russia and Iran, and that Russia had agreed to remove Soviet troops within six weeks "unless unforeseen circumstances arise." The Soviet delegate also pointed out that, according to Articles thirty-four and thirty-five, the Security Council should consider only matters that endanger international peace and security. When he was unable to get the matter postponed, the Soviet delegation walked out.⁴⁰

The United States also took action after it became evident that the Russians did not observe the March 2 deadline. A note was sent to the Soviet Union that while "still being diplomatically polite, made it very plain that we did not like the way Russia was behaving in Iran . . ." The note had no apparent effect, for intelligence reports indicated Russian troops remained in the troubled area.⁴¹ Britain and Iran also sent notes of protest, but neither the United States nor Britain made a move to send troops back.⁴²

While the Russians maintained that the situation in Azerbaijan was too unsettled to remove their troops, they

⁴⁰Padelford, op. cit., 18.

⁴¹Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 94-95.

⁴²Padelford, op. cit., 17. Mr. Padelford says the Russians were encouraged not to remove their troops by the "soft" Western stand.

did begin to remove them from "quieter" sections of the country.⁴³

The bullying tactics of the Soviets was revealingly illustrated when the Iranian Premier, Ahmad Ghavam Saltaneh, went to Moscow in March, 1946. First, Foreign Minister Molotov demanded certain oil concessions originally offered by secret agreement by the former Iranian Premier, Morteza Gholy Bayat. Ghavam replied that this could not be done under the Majlis, or Parliament, law. He declared that such action would subject him to a possible jail sentence. Molotov demanded the law be changed, and on hearing that only the Parliament could do this, he roared "then change the Majlis." When the Iranian Premier subsequently inquired about the continued presence of Russian troops in Iran, he was informed by Stalin himself that Soviet troops must remain in Azerbaijan province and maintain its autonomy under the existing government in order to protect Azerbaijan. When Stalin was asked against whom was Azerbaijan to be protected, he replied, "Against you . . . We know that you have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union." Such action was explained to the Soviet people as protection against "capitalist encirclement."⁴⁴

⁴³"Iran: Test Case," Time, XLVII (March 11, 1946), 31.

⁴⁴"Russia: Inside Story of the Squeeze on Iran," Newsweek, XXVII (March 25, 1946), 42, 44.

On March 26, Soviet representative Gromyko announced to the Security Council that the Soviet Union and Iran had reached an agreement by negotiation regarding the withdrawal of the remaining Soviet troops. He claimed that this operation "will probably end within five or six weeks unless unforeseen circumstances arise."⁴⁵

The final Soviet-Iranian agreement was signed April 4, 1946. According to its provisions, all Soviet troops would be withdrawn within six weeks after March 24, a joint Iranian-Russian Oil company was to be established, and the Azerbaijan problem would be recognized as an internal one to be settled by the Iranian government. The terms of the oil concession were unique. During the first twenty-five years of the fifty-year operation, Russia was to control fifty-one per cent of the company's shares. After twenty-five years, Iran was to get an additional one per cent, making the company a fifty-fifty proposition. Then, after an additional fifty years, Iran was to have the option of either buying the Russian shares or extending the agreement. There were to be no other foreign concessions in north Iran. In spite of

⁴⁵ Andrei A. Gromyko, "Soviet-Iranian Negotiations." A speech delivered at the United Nations Security Council by the representative from the Soviet Union on March 26, 1946. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, XII (April 15, 1946), 406.

these terms, the central government in Teheran announced that it was satisfied and sent troops into north Iran.⁴⁶

In October, 1947, however, Iran's Parliament rejected the oil concession treaty "which had been the price for the withdrawal of the Red Army." Russia protested "bitterly," even though she had known in 1946 that the Parliament would have to ratify the treaty under the provisions of the country's constitution. The result was that while Iran reacquired Azerbaijan, Russia did not obtain the oil concession. Neither did she attempt to send her troops back to Iran.⁴⁷

Greece

Greece is a poor, mountainous, overpopulated country which is only twenty-five per cent arable. Before the war royalist and republican factions fought to a standstill. The government was made effective only by the dictatorship of General Metaxas under the reign of King George. During the Nazi occupation, republicans and leftists were temporarily united against the Germans. As time for liberation neared, a power struggle developed. The EAM, which was the largest resistance organization, and its guerrilla army, the ELAS, came to be dominated by communists.

The King and some of his followers fled to England and remained there throughout the war. Greeks who remained in

⁴⁶ Padelford, op. cit., 19.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Greece considered those who went to England cowards, while those who went to London believed the ones who remained in Greece were either communists or Nazi collaborators. So World War II "had only intensified the polarization of Greek politics, leaving little ground for the forces of moderation."⁴⁸

A British force under Lt. General Ronald Scobie landed in Greece in October, 1944, accompanying the Greek troops. They were well received. The EAM had control of most of the country after the Germans fled. They willingly gave control to the Papandreou coalition government which had come with the British. Within two months, however, EAM and royalist troops were fighting. The official reason given for this conflict was the question of disarmament of the EAM's guerilla army, but, according to Ernest O. Hauser, the real reason was that the left and right were too far apart "for even temporary cooperation."⁴⁹

David Sacker, a British correspondent, attributes much of the responsibility for the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in December, 1944, to the EAM, and especially to its communist wing. For some time before the outbreak of fighting, it

⁴⁸Howard Wriggins, "The Truman Doctrine," Problems in International Relations, Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert Gibbs, editors, 63-64.

⁴⁹Ernest O. Hauser, "Europe's Most Frightened Country," The Saturday Evening Post, CCXVIII (December 29, 1945), 10.

was obvious that the EAM wanted to use armed strength to overthrow the Papandreou government and establish a left-wing dictatorship. As for their tactics, the EAM not only made use of Bulgarians and other foreigners in their ranks, but according to Mr. Sacker, who was a first-hand witness, they committed "many barbarous atrocities." He said that any of the contemporary descriptions of EAM troops as "Greek democrats" or "gallant resistance fighters" were ridiculous.⁵⁰

Intelligence reports received by President Truman during the period indicated that many of the rebels were trained, equipped, and armed by the northern communist neighbors of Greece.⁵¹

The rebellion was crushed when the loyal Greek troops were joined by the British forces in Greece.⁵² The British believed that their decision to aid the Greeks in the defeat of the EAM saved the country from communist dictatorship.⁵³

Joseph M. Jones reported in his book, The Fifteen Weeks, that by February, 1945, fighting on a large scale had ended, but there was no real peace. Widespread lawlessness and the threat of communist neighbors to the north placed an

⁵⁰David Sacker, "Background of the Greek Crisis," The Contemporary Review, CLXIX (March, 1946), 156.

⁵¹Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 98.

⁵²Wriggins, op. cit., 64.

⁵³Hauser, op. cit., 11.

economic burden on the country by creating conditions which necessitated keeping a large army and police force. "People lived," according to Mr. Jones, "in a perpetual state of fear."⁵⁴

After the Civil War, the British supported the right-wing government under General Plastiras. The British supported this faction because of the general hostility toward the left. The EAM had become so totally identified with the communist party that many of its moderate supporters left. The Plastiras government, however, instead of trying to patch up the differences between the right and the left, apparently devoted most of its time to persecuting the left. These activities caused the public to turn against the rightist government.⁵⁵

A year after the Civil War had officially ended, the right-wing elements were still enjoying "a taste of power," but the fighting continued.⁵⁶ There was, however, a constant threat of a new flare-up in the Civil War because of hunger.⁵⁷

The economic plight of Greece by March, 1946, the date for a scheduled general election, necessitated further aid

⁵⁴ Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947), 74.

⁵⁵ Sacker, op. cit., 157.

⁵⁶ Hauser, op. cit., 9.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

from Britain. The British could not understand why more aid was necessary,⁵⁸ while the Greeks could not appreciate Britain's economic problems.⁵⁹

An article in The Contemporary Review by David Sacker attempted to evaluate the situation at the time of the March, 1946, elections. The left was resented because of the 1944 rebellion. Many moderates feared the return of the King. The monarchy was associated with the dictatorship of General Metaxas. It would help, according to Mr. Sacker, if the King would pledge to become a constitutional monarch if he should return. The communist party was allegedly hurt by its association with the Russian Communist Party.⁶⁰

Mr. Sacker's suggestions for British policy in Greece included the holding of free elections giving all parties an equal opportunity, and the granting of an amnesty to all political prisoners. Then Britain must accept the outcome of the elections and not interfere in internal politics after that time. If this policy were not followed, hostility to the British would be the inevitable result.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Sacker, op. cit., 155.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 159. Mr. Sacker accused the British Information Service of a poor job. He said the average Greek citizen believed that Britain possessed unlimited wealth. He also pointed out that little was done to dispel the widespread belief that Britain came to Greece for the purpose of organizing that country as a "base for a war with Russia." Ibid., 158.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 158.

⁶¹ Ibid., 159.

The Greek general election of March, 1946, returned a "large royalist majority," and another election in September, 1946, reinstated the King.⁶² This new government could not, however, control the guerrilla bands in north Greece. These groups were receiving aid from Greece's communist neighbors to the north--Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria--"in the form of arms and sanctuary within their territory."⁶³ By August, 1946, the guerrilla action was in full operation and was obviously well organized and supplied.⁶⁴

Time magazine reported in February, 1947, that by that time, Greece was "a strategic spot in democracy's worldwide, defensive struggle." As the only Balkan country not behind the Iron Curtain, Greece was the key to the eastern Mediterranean and the Dardanelles, which Russia wanted. A United Nations commission was currently in Greece to investigate that country's charge that her northern neighbors were attempting to push her frontier south.⁶⁵

In January, 1947, Congressman Jacob K. Javits of New York delivered a speech in the House of Representatives in which he assured that Greece was not suited for communism and that her people did not want it. He did warn, however, that

⁶²Wriggins, loc. cit.

⁶³Ibid., 65.

⁶⁴Ibid., 68.

⁶⁵"O Aghelastos," Time, XLIX (February 24, 1947), 35.

the internal problem was made critical because of the shortage of food.⁶⁶

The British let the United States government know as early as the fall of 1945 that they could use some assistance in Greece, "especially financial help to the Greek government." After looking over the situation, the United States urged Greece to initiate a program of economic stabilization.⁶⁷ Although the United States began to give some assistance, the primary responsibility was still borne by the British in early 1947.⁶⁸

Turkey

Turkey had been spared Nazi occupation, and its government was not split by internal dissensions like the Greek regime. In fact, Turkey still had the one party dictatorship began by Kemal Ataturk. Turkey's problem consisted of pressure from Russia which was applied because of its geographic position. Russia had for centuries desired the Dardanelles and the Straits of the Bosphorus, which link the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Britain had traditionally assumed the

⁶⁶ Jacob K. Javits, "Facts and Impressions That Stand Out Markedly." A speech delivered by the U. S. Congressman from New York to the House of Representatives on January 20, 1947. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, XIII (February 15, 1947), 272.

⁶⁷ Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 99.

⁶⁸ Jones, op. cit., 75.

role of preserving the status quo in this area, thereby preventing Russia from realizing her objectives.⁶⁹ The British had assumed this role because of their widespread commercial interests in the Near East.⁷⁰

At the Russo-Turkish negotiations in Moscow in September, 1939, the Soviets were believed to have requested bases in the Straits area.⁷¹ It is known that Russia asked for bases in the Straits and Aegean areas during the Nazi-Soviet talks in the autumn of 1940. These requests were refused by Hitler. When the Nazis took Greece and the Aegean Islands during the spring of 1941, it was called "a symptom of the deterioration of relations between Germany and Russia which soon developed into war."⁷²

Although they hated Nazism, the Turks thought that Germany was the only European power capable of preventing Europe from falling to communism, according to E. W. F. Tomlin, author of an article entitled "Russo-Turkish Tension." Another reason for their reluctance to join the Allies was their lack of enthusiasm about fighting along with Russia.⁷³

⁶⁹Wriggins, op. cit., 65.

⁷⁰Cyril E. Black, "The Turkish Straits and the Great Powers," Foreign Policy Reports, XXIII (October 1, 1947), 177.

⁷¹Ibid., 179.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³E. W. F. Tomlin, "Russo-Turkish Tension," The Contemporary Review, CLXIX (February, 1946), 81.

On March 19, 1945, Russia announced that she was abandoning the twenty-year-old Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality with Turkey. Under its provisions, neither country could "participate in alliances, coalitions, or hostile actions of any kind directed at the other."⁷⁴

On January 7, 1945, Foreign Minister Molotov told Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper that a new treaty could be negotiated if Russia would be granted naval and land bases in the Straits area for the purpose of "joint defense." They also demanded that changes be made in the Montreux Convention of 1936 so that the Black Sea Powers would be granted the authority to administer the Straits, and that Turkey would turn over to Russia the Turkish provinces of Kars, Ardahan, and Artvin. These were near the Russian border and had been possessed by Russia from 1878 until after World War I. In addition, the Russians wanted Turkey to break her ties with Britain. This proposal was naturally declined. The Russians then began a "violent press and radio campaign" against Turkey, centering in neighboring satellite countries. This was followed by the massing of Soviet troops along Turkey's northern border. The Turks responded by strengthening their forces. The Russian moves had contributed to a feeling of national solidarity.⁷⁵

At several of the wartime conferences, it had been

⁷⁴ Jones, op. cit., 60.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 60-61.

agreed that the Montreux Convention, which set up rules for passage through the Straits, should be revised. But such bilateral negotiations as the above Russian proposal were not acceptable to the United States and Britain. In November, 1945, the United States made a proposal which provided for Turkish sovereignty in the Straits area and would allow free transit for merchant ships of all countries. Non-Black Sea naval ships, however, would not be allowed through the Straits without the permission of the Black Sea powers. Britain and Turkey accepted this proposal "as a basis for negotiations," but the Russians did not. They still insisted on bases in the vicinity of the Straits. Because of this Russian pressure, Turkey was forced to maintain a large and fully mobilized army which was a great financial drain. Over half of the national budget was spent on defense, which meant that no modernization could be undertaken without outside aid.⁷⁶

The question of revising the Montreux Convention again came up at the Potsdam Conference in July, 1945. The Big Three Foreign Ministers agreed that revisions should be made, but it was soon evident they did not agree as to the revisions.⁷⁷ Stalin said that since Turkey was not strong enough

⁷⁶ Wriggins, op. cit., 67.

⁷⁷ Black, op. cit., 174.

to guarantee free passage through the Straits, Russia ought to have bases there.⁷⁸

The Russian demands at Potsdam for bases were stopped by the United States and Britain, but, after the conference, they continued to apply pressure on Turkey for bases and the provinces of Kars and Ardahan.⁷⁹ The Russians claimed that Kars province "is a British dagger pointed at Russia's heart--Baku . . . but Kars can also be a Russian dagger pointed through Turkey at the British oil arteries." An article in Time magazine declared that if Kars fell to the Russians "the rest of Turkey might soon follow into the Russian orbit."⁸⁰

An article in Newsweek magazine pointed out that the Turks could not bring their problem before the newly organized United Nations because the interim commission could only deal with administrative affairs "until the organization is actually established, possibly six months from now . . ."⁸¹

On August 7, 1946, the second Russian proposal was made to Turkey. Copies were also sent to the United States and Britain. This proposal "would have meant the establishment of Soviet naval and air bases in Turkey, physical

⁷⁸Byrnes, op. cit., 295.

⁷⁹Ibid., 384.

⁸⁰"Turkey: Two-Edged Dagger," Time, XLVI (July 23, 1945), 48.

⁸¹"Turkey: The Blow," Newsweek, XXVI (July 9, 1945), 58.

control of the vital waterways, and the end of Turkey's independence."⁸²

One of the first actions of the United States on hearing of the proposal was to send a naval task force to the Mediterranean. Dean Acheson believed that we must then be willing to back the Turks up, regardless of the consequences. If we did this, then we would be able to answer the Russian note "gently but firmly. But we must be prepared to follow it up." The members of the administration were in general agreement with this view. On August 15, the State Department officials and the Chiefs of Staff met with the President. It was suggested that we should be firm with the Russians, insist that the problem of the Straits was an international matter, and turn down their proposals. This was done with the full knowledge that such a policy could lead to war. The President, after listening to the proposals said

that it was perfectly clear in his own mind that we should take a firm position, that we might as well find out now as in five or ten years whether the Russians were bent on world conquest. He authorized and directed the State Department and the Services to carry out the recommended program.⁸³

On August 19, 1946, Mr. Acheson gave to the Charge d' Affaires in Washington "a short and polite" note that accepted the Soviet proposal to revise the Montreux Convention,

⁸² Jones, op. cit., 59.

⁸³ Ibid., 62-63.

but rejected the proposal to give complete control to Turkey and other Black Sea powers. To the proposal that Russia and Turkey should jointly organize the defenses of the Straits, the U. S. note said:

It is the firm opinion of this government that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and could clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.⁸⁴

Similar notes were sent by Britain on August 21 and by Turkey on August 22. About a month later, the Russians sent another series of notes with similar demands. The West, in return, sent still another round of notes in opposition. Joseph M. Jones, author of The Fifteen Weeks, said that the Turkish people seemed to be completely unified in the face of the Russian menace and were prepared to fight to the last man.⁸⁵

⁸⁴Ibid., 64.

⁸⁵Ibid., 65.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTAINMENT POLICY

In February, 1946, the basis for a bold and revolutionary policy arrived in Washington. It was an 8000-word cable from George F. Kennan, the American charge'd' affaires in Moscow. In the cable, and in a subsequent article that appeared in the July, 1947, issue of Foreign Affairs,¹ Kennan outlined a program that came to be known as the containment policy. This chapter will survey the Kennan evaluation and the criticism it received.

George F. Kennan

George Frost Kennan, a nephew of George Kennan, a recognized authority on Czarist Russia, entered the United States consular service after graduation from Princeton in 1925. After more than twenty years in the foreign service, Kennan was made director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in 1947.² He served as the American Ambassador to the U. S. S. R. in 1952-1953. After his retirement in

¹George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), 566-582. The author was identified only as "X." It later became common knowledge, however, that the author was Mr. Kennan.

²Anna Rothe, editor and Constance Ellis, assistant editor, Current Biography, Who's News and Why, 1947 edition, 346-348.

1953, Kennan became a member of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. At the present time he is the United States Ambassador to Yugoslavia. For his literary efforts, he has received the Pulitzer and Bancroft Prizes for history and the National Book Award.³

The Dispatch From Moscow

The Kennan dispatch from Moscow of February, 1946, has been summarized by Walter Millis and E. S. Duffield, the editors of The Forrestal Diaries. The summary reveals that after studying Soviet propaganda, Kennan concluded that the Red party line did not stem from an unbiased analysis of the true conditions in the outside world. The Soviet party line actually had very little relation to events outside Russia, according to Kennan, but "arises mainly from basic inner Russian necessities which existed before the recent war and exist today."

Mr. Kennan believed that "the Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs" stems from the inherent Russian sense of suspicion. This traditional fear is a result of living for centuries on a vast, defenseless plain, surrounded by hostile neighbors. When contact was made with the West, there was the added fear of "the more competent, more powerful, more

³George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin. This information came from the book jacket of this book.

highly organized societies" that were encountered. Kennan pointed out that this sense of insecurity was felt not by the Russian people, but by their rulers,

for Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between the Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned the truth about the world without or if foreigners learned the truth about the world within. And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for the total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.

Such a setting, Mr. Kennan continued, was ideal for Marxism, which "had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe." In Marxism, the Bolsheviks found

the justification for their instinctive fear of the outside world, for the dictatorship without which they did not know how to rule, for the cruelties they did not dare not to inflict, for the sacrifices they felt bound to demand. In the name of Marxism they sacrificed every single ethical value in their methods and tactics. Today they cannot dispense with it. It is the fig leaf of their moral and intellectual respectability.

Kennan doubted that in the "atmosphere of Oriental secretiveness and conspiracy which pervades this government," that even Stalin himself received "anything like an objective picture of the outside world."

From the above assumptions, Kennan was able to

accurately predict future Russian actions. He said they would make use of any international organizations that might provide "an opportunity of extending Soviet power or of inhibiting or diluting the power of others." Moscow saw the United Nations not as a "mechanism for a permanent and stable world society, founded on the mutual interest and aims of all nations, but an area in which the aims just mentioned can be favorably pursued." If this analysis were accepted, it would render normal international relations with the Russians impossible. As Kennan summarized the situation:

We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U. S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over the energies of one of the world's greatest peoples and the resources of the world's richest national territory. . . . In addition, it has an elaborate and far-flung apparatus for the exertion of its influence in other countries. . . . Finally, it is seemingly inaccessible to considerations of reality in its basic relations. For it, the vast fund of objective fact about human society is not, as with us, the measure against which outlook is constantly being tested and reformed, but a great grab bag from which individual items are selected arbitrarily and tendentiously to bolster an outlook already preconceived. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. The problem of how to cope with this force is undoubtedly the greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably the greatest it will ever have to face.

Kennan believed that the Russians were still much weaker than the West in early 1946. Thus, he said, the

success of the Soviets depended on the Western defense. The West must first recognize the Russians for what they were. Then the public would have to be "educated to the realities of the Russian situation." Such action, according to Kennan, would eliminate a great deal of "hysterical anti-Sovietism," because "there is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown."⁴

"The Sources of Soviet Conduct"

An expanded version of the Kennan analysis, entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," appeared in the July, 1947, issue of the quarterly Foreign Affairs. The author was identified only as "X." Observers soon determined, however, that the author was George F. Kennan. Journalist Brooks Atkinson pointed out in "America's Global Planner," an article in The New York Times Magazine, that Kennan and other State Department officials prefer to work largely anonymously. "The trained foreign service officer," according to Mr. Atkinson, "regards personal publicity as something that limits the range and independence of his work."⁵

In the Foreign Affairs article, which was reprinted in Mr. Kennan's book, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, the

⁴James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, 136-140.

⁵Brooks Atkinson, "America's Global Planner," The New York Times Magazine, July 13, 1947, 9.

author first summarized the Marxism of the era of the Bolshevik Revolution. It was pointed out that in the period immediately following the Revolution, the existence of civil war, the Allied intervention, and the fact that the communists were only a small minority of the Russian people, made it imperative that the Soviet leaders set up a dictatorship. This dictatorship could be justified as long as any traces of capitalism remained in Russia. Was the dictatorship eliminated after the last vestiges of capitalism were eradicated from the Soviet Union? No. The dictatorship was then justified by the existence of the menace of capitalist encirclement. Therefore, "all internal opposition forces in Russia have consistently been portrayed as the agents of foreign forces of reaction antagonistic to Soviet power." The Soviet leaders emphasized the original communist doctrine

of a basic antagonism between the capitalist and Socialist worlds. . . . But there is ample evidence that the stress laid in Moscow on the menace confronting Soviet society from the world outside its borders is founded not in the realities of foreign antagonism but in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.

After some thirty years of Bolshevik rule, the Soviet hierarchy could not begin to dispense "with the fiction by which the maintenance of dictatorial power has been defended."

The original communist ideology had not been

discarded, Kennan declared, but emphasis had been shifted to certain concepts. One of these concepts was "that of the innate antagonism between capitalism and Socialism." This meant that the Russians always had to assume

that the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to the Soviet regime. . . . If the Soviet government occasionally sets its signature to documents which would indicate the contrary, this is to be regarded as a tactical maneuver permissible in dealing with the enemy . . . And from it flow many of the phenomena which we find disturbing in the Kremlin's conduct of foreign policy: the secretiveness, the lack of frankness, the duplicity, the war suspiciousness, and the basic unfriendliness of purpose. . . . When there is something the Russians want from us, one or the other of these features of their policy may be thrust temporarily into the background . . . But we should not be misled by tactical maneuvers. These characteristics of Soviet policy, like the postulate from which they flow, are basic to the internal nature of Soviet power, and will be with us, whether in the foreground or the background, until the internal nature of Soviet power is changed.

This means that we are going to continue for a long time to find the Russians difficult to deal with. It does not mean that they should be considered as embarked upon a do-or-die program to overthrow our society by a given date. The theory of the inevitability of the eventual fall of capitalism has the fortunate connotation that there is no hurry about it.

The second concept was that of the infallibility of the Kremlin. The iron rule of the Communist Party relied on this principle. This meant that the Russian rulers could advocate any particular point they believed might benefit

them at the time, and, of course, require absolute obedience from those beneath them.

This means that truth is not a constant but is actually created, for all intents and purposes, by the Soviet leaders themselves. It may vary from week to week, from month to month. . . . Once a given party line has been laid down on a given issue of current policy, the whole Soviet governmental machine, including the mechanism of diplomacy, moves inexorably along the prescribed path, like a persistent toy automobile wound up and headed in a given direction, stopping only when it meets with some unanswerable force. The individuals who are the components of this machine are unamenable to argument or reason which comes to them from outside sources. Their whole training has taught them to mistrust and discount the glib persuasiveness of the outside world. Like the white dog before the phonograph, they hear only the "master's voice." And if they are to be called off from the purposes last dictated to them, it is the master who must call them off. Thus the foreign representative cannot hope that his words will make any impression on them. The most he can hope is that they will be transmitted to those at the top, who are capable of changing the party line.

The Russians have been in no particular hurry, because they have not been under the compulsion of a timetable. Therefore, the Soviets have not hesitated to retreat when confronted by a superior force. This means that the Russians have not been "easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory" by their opponents.

In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.

According to Kennan, this should be accomplished

by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of existence.

Kennan maintained that in 1946, the Russians were "still by far the weaker party," and that this fact alone would "warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment . . ." He pointed out that the Marxist thesis

not only implies complete lack of control by the West over its own economic destiny, it likewise assumes Russian unity, discipline and patience over an infinite period. Let us bring this apocalyptic vision down to earth, and suppose that the Western world finds the strength and resourcefulness to contain Soviet power over a period of ten to fifteen years. What does that spell for Russia itself?

This demonstrates, Kennan declared, that

in actuality the possibilities for American policy are by no means limited to holding the line and hoping for the best. It is entirely possible for the United States to influence by its actions the internal developments, both within Russia and throughout the international Communist movement, by which Russian policy is largely determined.⁶

Not all experts agreed with Kennan. According to

⁶ Kennan, American Diplomacy, 93-105.

Marshall Knappen of the University of Michigan and author of An Introduction to American Foreign Policy, Kennan "underestimated the strength and recuperative powers of the Soviet system," and the Foreign Affairs article omitted all reference to the use of American "economic power to strengthen the free world . . ."⁷

Walter Lippmann's Criticism

Among the foremost critics of the containment policy was columnist Walter Lippmann. Mr. Lippmann's criticism appeared in his book, The Cold War, which was a collection of articles which originally appeared in the New York Herald-Tribune.

The policy put forth by "Mr. X," Lippmann declared, would require the United States to apply counterforce "where the Russians encroach and when they encroach." "Mr. X" also said that the Russians "cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the part of its opponents." These statements were inconsistent, according to Lippmann, who contended that there was no reason to believe that the United States could sufficiently contain the Reds to the extent that "either the breakup or the gradual mellowing

⁷Marshall Knappen, An Introduction to American Foreign Policy, 292-293.

of . . . Soviet power" would become a reality.⁸ Such a policy would require infantry reserves much larger than could be raised by the United States. It would call for recruitment of forces from the areas that were threatened by the Soviets.⁹ This would mean recruiting troops from the peoples of Asia and eastern Europe, which would ignore "the natural allies of the United States . . . the nations of the Atlantic community . . ."¹⁰

Mr. Lippmann had serious doubts as to the constitutionality of the containment proposal. His argument follows:

How, for example, under the Constitution of the United States is Mr. X going to work out an arrangement by which the Department of State has the money and the military power always available in sufficient amounts to apply "counter-force" at constantly shifting points all over the world? Is he going to ask Congress for a blank check on the Treasury and for a blank authorization to use the armed forces? Not if the American constitutional system is to be maintained. Or is he going to ask for an appropriation and for authority each time the Russians "show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world"? If that is his plan for dealing with the maneuvers of a dictatorship, he is going to arrive at the points of encroachment with too little and he is going to arrive too late. The Russians, if they intend to encroach, will have encroached while Congress is getting ready to hold hearings.

A policy of shifts and maneuvers may be suited to the Soviet system of government, which, as Mr.

⁸Walter Lippmann, The Cold War: A Study in U. S. Foreign Policy, 18.

⁹Ibid., 21.

¹⁰Ibid., 24.

X tell us, is animated by patient persistence. It is not suited to the American system of government.¹¹

The policy of "Mr. X" was chided by Lippmann for ignoring the United Nations. He said the policy did

not have as its objective a settlement of the conflict with Russia. It is therefore implicit in the policy that the U. N. has no future as a universal society, and that either the U. N. will be cast aside like the League of Nations, or it will be transformed into an anti-Soviet coalition. In either event the U. N. will have been destroyed.¹²

Mr. Lippmann suggested that instead of containment, efforts should have been directed toward completion of the peace treaties, which would have allowed the removal of the armies of Russia, Britain, and the United States from central Europe.¹³ This would have resulted in a neutralized Germany and Austria, which would have been the only possibility, declared Lippmann, for a lasting and satisfactory peace.¹⁴ American air superiority would have prevented any reoccupation of the central European area by the Russians.¹⁵ Once the Russian army "had been withdrawn behind the frontiers of the Soviet Union, it could not re-enter Europe without committing an obvious act of military aggression, which would

¹¹Ibid., 15-16.

¹³Ibid., 46.

¹⁵Knappen, op. cit., 298.

¹²Ibid., 59.

¹⁴Ibid., 35.

precipitate a general war." These suggestions would bring about a "strategic change," said Lippmann, "in the balance of power."¹⁶

Although sarcastic, Mr. Lippmann's criticism of the containment policy, according to Marshall Knappen, was nevertheless, "a searching and prophetic criticism," and Lippmann "put his finger on most of its weaknesses." Knappen said that, in his estimation, "Mr. Lippmann's only important failure was in not satisfying his readers that he had something better to offer."¹⁷

Frederick L. Schuman's Criticism

Frederick L. Schuman is a professor of political science at Williams College and author of International Politics, described as "a widely used textbook in the field of international relations." Although his writings showed that his earlier pro-Red influence had mellowed somewhat, Mr. Schuman still opposed "what he considered the militarism of the Truman administration." In 1948 he actively supported Henry Wallace for President.¹⁸

Schuman criticized the Kennan proposal in a letter which appeared in the New York Times on October 5, 1947. He disagreed with the idea of "X" that Soviet leaders "are

¹⁶Lippmann, The Cold War, 43.

¹⁷Knappen, loc. cit.

¹⁸Ibid., 299.

obsessed at home with the cult of tyranny and dedicated abroad to aggrandizement . . ." He also contended that the policy of containment would not lead to the "mellowing" or break-up of Soviet power. Schuman said that Walter Lippmann's argument with the proposal of "X" was only "over the appropriate means by which America is to bring about these results." Coming events, predicted Mr. Schuman, will prove the thesis proposed by "X" to be "almost entirely in error."¹⁹

Schuman obviously did not accept the theory, that was rapidly being accepted by the American public,

that the Soviet regime was another European dictatorship and that the lessons learned from the experience of dealing with Hitler should be applied in the conduct of our relations with Stalin.²⁰

As an alternative to the containment proposal, Schuman, like Henry Wallace, "desired a continuation of the war-time system of trying to understand the Russians, learning to recognize their needs, and then negotiating with them in good faith." The basis of the Wallace platform in the 1948 election was criticism of Truman for abandoning this principle. Mr. Wallace's beliefs were rejected by the 1948 voters. He

¹⁹Frederick L. Schuman, Letter to the Editor of the New York Times, October 5, 1947, Section E, 8.

²⁰Knappen, op. cit., 300.

received less than 2.5 per cent of the votes cast. According to Knappen, the 1950 invasion of South Korea, denounced by Mr. Wallace, "put an end, for all practical purposes, to the theory that the Soviet Union is not an imperialistic, expansionist power."²¹

Criticism of the American Friends Service Committee

The Quaker group, the American Friends Service Committee, criticized the containment proposal, although they did not refer directly to it, in their 1949 report, The United States and the Soviet Union.²²

The report agreed with some of Kennan's beliefs, but it pointed out "that the Communists had no fixed timetable for their program and were therefore capable of putting up with delays of indefinite duration. In these circumstances, it seemed advisable to the Quakers "to consider the possibility of arranging for peaceful coexistence on a long term basis."²³

Marshall Knappen points out that whether or not the Friends had a case, the American people "were not greatly impressed" by it. The Korean situation seemed to eliminate any remaining support for such proposals.²⁴

²¹ Ibid., 301.

²³ Ibid., 302-303.

²² Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., 305.

CHAPTER V

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman delivered a speech to a joint session of Congress which embodied the principles that came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. It was the first application of the containment policy, and it began a new era in the foreign policy of the United States.

This chapter considers the events that led to the President's decision, the reactions--both on the part of the public and the Congress--to his proposals, and the action taken by Congress.

The British Decision

It has been seen that in early 1947 Greece was a divided country whose government was threatened by the existence of organized guerrillas sponsored by the country's communist neighbors. The people of Turkey were united, but they were subjected to severe external pressure from the Soviet Union which was a threat to their sovereignty.

British aid was responsible for the fact that Greece had not already fallen to the communists. But as early as the fall of 1945, the British suggested that the United States might help bear the burden of aiding Greece. President Truman authorized the State Department to enter

negotiations with the British on the subject of economic aid. He also sent a note to Greece in January, 1946, informing them that it would be necessary for them to take measures to stabilize their economy if the United States were to embark on such a program. The Greek situation, however, worsened, and little progress was made. On February 3, 1947, Ambassador MacVeagh reported from Athens that rumors were circulating there to the effect that the British were about to withdraw their troops, or at least a large number of them. By February 12, MacVeagh was urging American consideration of aid to Greece. The rumors from Athens seemed to be validated when a report from the American embassy in London arrived on February 20. The report stated that the British treasury was against any further aid to Greece because of Britain's own financial condition.¹

On Friday, February 21, 1947, the private secretary to Lord Inverchapel, the British Ambassador to the United States, called to arrange an immediate appointment with Secretary of State Marshall. The Secretary was out of town. Under Secretary of State Acheson, upon inquiring, found that two notes concerning the British decision to terminate their aid to Greece and Turkey were to be delivered to Secretary Marshall. It was decided that the First Secretary of the British Embassy, H. M. Sichel, should deliver copies of the

¹Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 99.

notes and discuss them with Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, and John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs. Any necessary staff work could begin, and the notes could be formally delivered to Secretary Marshall on Monday morning. Since Hickerson could not attend the meeting, Henderson met Sichel alone.²

The note on Greece began by recalling the fact that previous agreements between the United States and Great Britain had determined that Greece and Turkey should not be permitted to fall to the Soviets. Greece's total needs in 1947 were an estimated \$240 to \$280 million. The country would also need considerable aid for several more years. The financial aid of Great Britain would, however, have to be terminated after March 31, 1947. The British government, the note continued, hoped that the United States, as of April 1, could begin supplying Greece with at least the minimum amount of aid necessary.

The note on Turkey recalled that Secretary Byrnes had told the British Minister of Defense on October 15, 1946, that the United States would do all it could to extend economic aid to Turkey and hoped that the British would extend military aid. Joseph M. Jones relates in his book, The Fifteen Weeks, that after studying the Turkish situation

²Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, 4.

the British government was of the opinion that it was of the utmost importance for Turkey to maintain its independence, but that in their present state the armed forces could not resist effectively aggression by a first class power. . . .

Turkey needed to carry on a program of economic development, which would improve the military situation, and needed at the same time to re-equip its army. Turkey could do one or the other with its own resources, but not both. Great Britain was unable to offer further financial assistance. The obligation therefore devolved upon the United States or the International Bank.³

Implications of the British Decision

These notes acknowledged Britain's post-war economic plight: this proud and powerful nation had emerged from World War II to occupy a position that was clearly inferior to that occupied by the United States and the Soviet Union. British dependence on the United States for economic aid was illustrated by post-war appropriations and loans by the American Congress.⁴

The results of studies by State Department experts made as a result of the British notes were delivered to the President by Marshall and Acheson. Their conclusions, explained Truman in his Memoirs, were in greater detail, but

³Ibid., 5-6.

⁴Howard Wriggins, "The Truman Doctrine," Problems in International Relations, Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert Gibbs, editors, 67-68.

essentially the same as he himself had developed. As the President described the situation:

Greece needed aid, and needed it quickly and in substantial amounts. The alternative was the loss of Greece and the extension of the iron curtain across the eastern Mediterranean. If Greece was lost, Turkey would become an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism. Similarly, if Turkey yielded to Soviet demands, the position of Greece would be extremely endangered.

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America could not, and should not, let these free countries stand unaided. . . . The ideals and the traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom wherever it was threatened.

The risks which such a course might entail were risks which a great nation had to take if it cherished freedom at all. . . .

But the President indicated that he believed any proposal to extend aid to Greece and Turkey would cause the isolationists to begin dragging out Washington's Farewell Address:

I had a very good picture of what a revival of American isolationism would mean for the world. After World War II it was clear that without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal. If we were to turn our back on the world, areas such as Greece, weakened and divided as a result of the war, would fall into the Soviet orbit without much effort on the part of the Russians. The success of Russia in such areas and our avowed lack of interest would lead to the growth of domestic Communist parties in such European countries as France

and Italy, where they were already significant threats. Inaction, withdrawal, "Fortress America" notions could only result in handing to the Russians vast areas of the globe now denied to them.

This was the time to align the United States of America clearly on the side, and the head, of the free world. I knew that George Washington's spirit would be invoked against me, and Henry Clay's, and all the other patron saints of the isolationists. But I was convinced that the policy I was about to proclaim was indeed as much required by the conditions of my day as was Washington's by the situation in his era and Monroe's doctrine by the circumstances which he then faced.

It takes many men, Truman stated, to formulate such a program, "but their work ends where the President's work begins, for then he has to make the decision."

Truman's task was made more difficult by the fact that he was confronted by a Republican Congress. He said it therefore seemed wise "to advise the congressional leadership as soon as possible of the gravity of the situation . . .". On February 27, the President explained the situation to Senators Bridges, Vandenberg, Barkley, and Connally, Speaker Martin, and Representatives Eaton, Bloom, and Rayburn. He discussed the British notes which had not been made public at that time. He informed them of his decision to extend aid to Greece and Turkey and expressed the desire that Congress would give his proposal their support. The details of the situation were then turned over to General Marshall, who made it clear that the United States had the choice to either act

or lose by default. The Congressmen "appeared deeply impressed," according to Truman, and none objected to his proposed program at that time.⁵

Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., compiler of his father's papers, reveals that the Senator was deeply impressed by Marshall's statement, "The choice is between acting with energy or losing by default . . ." Senator Vandenberg had no knowledge of the crisis before being called to the White House.⁶ Although he ultimately supported the Truman proposal, Vandenberg objected to the practice he termed "crisis diplomacy," which he thought was

typified by a summons to the White House, alarming diplomatic reports, and an urgent plea by the President for action. Vandenberg always believed that a continuing policy developed through continuing consultation with the Congress would largely obviate the necessity for what he termed the "crisis method."⁷

The Truman Doctrine

The State Department began studying the problem after the meeting of February 27. The President, in the meantime, made a state visit to Mexico. When he returned on March 6,

⁵Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 100-104.

⁶Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., editor, with the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, 339.

⁷Ibid., 340.

he was briefed on developments. Greece had officially requested aid from the United States.⁸

The President called a Cabinet meeting for March 7 to inform the members of his decision to extend aid to Greece and Turkey. Under Secretary Acheson explained to the Cabinet the role of the British in these areas and the implications of their withdrawal. Truman told those present that he intended to ask Congress for \$250 million for Greece and \$150 million for Turkey. He pointed out that this amount alone would not solve the problem, but "would be only the beginning."⁹

Secretary of the Navy Forrestal declared before the Cabinet that

what was occurring was simply the manifestation of what had been in process of development in the last four years; that if we were going to have a chance of winning, we should have to recognize it as a fundamental struggle between our kind of society and the Russians' and that the Russians would not respond to anything except power.¹⁰

During the first days of March, 1947, the State Department began drafting the message to be read by President

⁸ Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 104.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ James V. Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, 251.

Truman to Congress. Of the first draft, the President wrote in his Memoirs:

The first version was not at all to my liking. The writers had filled the speech with all sorts of background data and statistical figures about Greece and made the whole thing sound like an investment prospectus. I returned this draft to Acheson with a note asking for more emphasis on a declaration of general policy. The department's draftsmen then rewrote the speech to include a general policy statement, but it seemed to me half-hearted. The key sentence, for instance, read, "I believe that it should be the policy of the United States . . ." I took my pencil, scratched out "should" and wrote in "must." In several other places I did the same thing. I wanted no hedging in this speech. This was America's answer to the surge of expansion of Communist tyranny. It had to be clear and free of hesitation or double talk.¹¹

On March 12, 1947, Truman addressed a joint session of Congress. He stated that Greece had requested economic aid from the United States and that reports showed this aid was necessary if Greece was to remain free. He then explained the internal situation in Greece and pointed out that the British government had been extending aid to the country, but they

can give no further financial or economic aid after March 31. Great Britain finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece.

¹¹ Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 105.

The President realized that many would wonder why the United Nations was not to handle the situation. He said:

We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis. But the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action, and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.

The President also said that the British found it necessary to withdraw aid from Turkey as well as Greece and that Turkey also needed American aid. The integrity of both these countries, he declared, "is essential to the preservation of order in the Middle East."

As to what the granting of aid to these countries would mean to the United States, the President said, "I am fully aware of the broad implications involved if the United States extends assistance to Greece and Turkey . . ." He then boldly proceeded far beyond the request for specific amounts of aid to Greece and Turkey, declaring that:

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one.

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom from political oppression.

The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the

majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections and the suppression of personal freedoms.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way.

I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.

The President then requested that \$400 million be appropriated for the purpose of aiding Greece and Turkey. This amount would cover "the period ending June 30, 1948." He also asked for authorization to send American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey "to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished."

Finally, he said:

If further funds, or further authority, should be needed for the purposes indicated in this message, I shall not hesitate to bring the situation before the Congress. . . .

This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is much more serious.¹²

Public Reaction to the Truman Doctrine

The press immediately realized the importance of the President's speech. The editorial in the New York Times on March 13 said:

This was a speech comparable with President Roosevelt's famous "Quarantine" speech made under analogous circumstances in 1937. But President Truman was more blunt, and he called unmistakably for action which will launch the United States on a new and positive foreign policy of world-wide responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order.¹³

The same issue of the New York Times carried "Extracts from American Editorial Comment on President Truman's Message." Representative comments from these excerpts follow in part:

President Truman was asking for dollars; he was also asking for the enthusiasm, the willingness to venture, the belief in our own values, which can prove to the shattered peoples of the world that the American system offers a working alternative to the totalitarian order which is otherwise their only refuge. (New York Herald Tribune.)

¹²Richard B. Morris, Great Presidential Decisions, State Papers that Changed the Course of History, 430-435.

¹³"Warning to Russia," an editorial in the New York Times, March 13, 1947, 4.

If Congress heeds Mr. Truman's statesman-like advice, there may be no World War III . . . (The Buffalo Courier Express.)

Relentless logic will not let us escape the fact that drawing back and doing nothing was the Western world's answer when it first encountered Hitler. Thus to relax in comfort hoping for the best, is attractive. But in the past it has led us into two world wars . . . (The Hartford Courant.)

Mr. Truman has given the Politburo in Moscow what plainly is an ultimatum--that the United States will not willingly permit the taking over of Greece and Turkey by Russia. Mr. Truman has talked strongly and well. Let the Congress back him to the limit. (The Portland Press Herald, Portland, Maine.)

Mr. Truman made as cold a war speech against Russia as any President has ever made except on the occasion of going before Congress to ask for a declaration of war. . . . The outcome will inevitably be war. It probably will not come this year or next year, but the issue is already drawn. (The Chicago Tribune.)

There can hardly be any serious doubt in Congress over the answer that must be given to President Truman's request. (The St. Paul Pioneer Press.)

Make no mistake about its importance. It means a historical change in our foreign policy . . . (The Atlanta Constitution.)¹⁴

An article in Newsweek magazine, "America's Date With

¹⁴"Extracts from American Editorial Comment on President Truman's Message," New York Times, March 13, 1947, 4.

Destiny," commented on European reaction to the Truman Doctrine:

Europe's capitals, unprepared for the scope of the message, termed it a "New Monroe Doctrine" that girdled the globe. London and Paris all but gasped, then gradually relaxed into voicing approval as the firmness of the President's words assured them that this was no idle American gesture, but a commitment that might well stand for generations to come.¹⁵

The same article quoted comments made by certain congressional isolationists who opposed the Truman proposal. Representative Harold Knutson of Minnesota said, "I guess the do-gooders won't feel right until they have us all broke. . . ." The chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, Senator Styles Bridges, "described the prospects in five words: 'It knocks budget plans askew'"¹⁶

The fact that the Truman proposal by-passed the United Nations drew much criticism from some quarters. Andrei A. Gromyko, the Russian representative to the Security Council, delivered a speech to that body on April 7, 1947, in which he said:

The measures taken by the government of the United States in respect to Greece and Turkey seriously undermine the authority of the United

¹⁵"America's Date with Destiny," Newsweek, XXIX (March 24, 1947), 23.

¹⁶Ibid.

Nations Organization and inevitably produce distrust in relations among the states members of the United Nations.¹⁷

Henry Wallace, at that time editor of the New Republic, wrote an editorial in that magazine entitled "The Constructive Alternative." Writing of the Truman Doctrine, Wallace said:

the timetable of the program, if there ever was one, is certainly upset. All this was bound to happen. Nothing so ill conceived, so undefined, so negative and so fear-ridden as the Truman Doctrine could have won the all out support of Americans who still believe in world coöperation and recognize that doctrine for what it is [sic] --a move away from the United Nations and peace. . . . We who say that the Truman Doctrine leads to imperialism and an armaments race, and that isolationism leads to chaos, must develop a constructive alternative.

That alternative is a world reconstruction program, underwritten by American resources and administered by the U. N.¹⁸

Wallace later toured Europe attacking the program. He was condemned by many, including Senator Vandenberg,

¹⁷ Andrei A. Gromyko, "Authority of United Nations Organization Undermined." A speech delivered before the United Nations Security Council at Lake Success, New York, by the representative from the Soviet Union on April 7, 1947. Reprinted in Vital Speeches of the Day, XIII (April 15, 1947), 391.

¹⁸ Henry Wallace, "The Constructive Alternative," New Republic, CXVI (May 19, 1947), 11.

who described him on the Senate floor as an "itinerant saboteur."¹⁹

Congressional Reaction

The President's proposal produced mixed feelings in Congress. Many members of that body seemed favorable to the general idea, but a great deal of skepticism resulted from the failure to outline the program in detail. The average congressman was concerned about how far the program would go, how long it would last, and, above all, how much it would cost.

In the congressional debates, no one played a more important role than the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. The support of Vandenberg, the most influential Republican in Congress, was invaluable. Immediately after Truman's speech, Vandenberg stated:

The President's message faces facts and so must Congress. The independence of Greece and Turkey must be preserved, not only for their own sakes but also in defense of peace and security for all of us.²⁰

The Truman Doctrine seemed to imply that aid would not be limited to Greece and Turkey. When Under Secretary Acheson hedged on the wider implications of the proposal at

¹⁹ Vandenberg, op. cit., 351.

²⁰ Ibid., 343.

the public hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 24, Vandenberg did not allow anyone to get the impression that the proposed policy was confined to Greece and Turkey.²¹ He told Acheson:

. . . I think what you are saying is that wherever we find free peoples having difficulty in the maintenance of free institutions, and difficulty in defending against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes, we do not necessarily react in the same way each time, but we propose to react.

Acheson agreed.²²

Vandenberg saw, however, one major flaw in the President's program. The bill said nothing about bringing the program under the United Nations Charter. It appeared that the United States was prepared to work outside the charter. The Senator later wrote, "The Administration made a colossal blunder in ignoring the U. N."²³

The question was first brought up by Vandenberg when Acheson and Forrestal appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee the day after President Truman's message. Senator Tom Connally answered:

The UN could not handle it if it had it. It hasn't the facilities and it hasn't the money. There is nothing in the charter that authorizes the UN to make loans or grants. Greek-Turkish

²¹ Jones, op. cit., 190.

²² Ibid., 193.

²³ Vandenberg, op. cit., 344-345.

aid contemplates a grant. There would be the biggest howl and hullabaloo in all the member countries, including ourselves, if the UN began handing out grants to individual nations.

The Senator also said:

Those who talk about turning it over to the UN don't want anything done at all in my opinion. There is nothing in the UN Charter that prohibits or limits action of this kind by a government on its own initiative. To turn this problem over to the UN, which isn't constituted to handle it, would be a buck-passing arrangement, just a dodging and trimming and flim-flamming around.²⁴

On March 28, the United States Ambassador to the Security Council, Warren R. Austin, sought to ease the fears of those who were concerned about operating outside the framework of the United Nations. He said:

The program of economic assistance contemplated by the United States is of an emergency and temporary character. The United States believes that the United Nations and its related agencies should assume the principal responsibility, within their capabilities, for the long-range tasks of assistance required for the reconstruction of Greece. . . . the United States is giving momentum to the United Nations by its present policy. . . .²⁵

According to Joseph M. Jones, Austin's statement was

²⁴ Thomas T. Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, My Name Is Tom Connally, 318-319.

²⁵ Vandenberg, op. cit., 345.

of immense help in quieting the fears of those concerned about by-passing the United Nations.²⁶

Vandenberg did not believe that Austin's statement went far enough. In accordance with his policy to bring the program "as far as possible within the United Nations," Vandenberg proposed a new preamble. The new preamble explained the necessity of the aid, which could not be provided by the United Nations at that time, and pointed out that the act of aiding Greece and Turkey "by the United States will contribute to the freedom and independence of all members of the United Nations in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter . . ."²⁷

As the editors of Senator Vandenberg's private papers observe, "one more step remained to be taken." In what the Senator described as "the greatest act of voluntary allegiance" to the United Nations, he was, with Senator Connally's help, successful in adding another amendment to the Greece-Turkey aid bill.²⁸ The amendment read as follows:

The President is directed to withdraw any and all aid authorized herein under any of the following circumstances:

(1) If requested by the governments of Greece or Turkey, respectively, representing a majority of the people of either such nation;

²⁶ Jones, op. cit., 184.

²⁷ Vandenberg, op. cit., 345-346.

²⁸ Ibid., 346.

(2) If the President is officially notified by the United Nations that the Security Council finds (with respect to which finding the United States waives the exercise of the veto) or that the General Assembly finds that such action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of such assistance un-necessary or undesirable;

(3) If the President finds that any purposes of the Act have been substantially accomplished by the action of other inter-governmental organizations or finds that the purposes of the Act are incapable of satisfactory accomplishment.²⁹

In the words of Joseph M. Jones, "the amendment took most of the remaining wind out of the sails of the United Nations issue."³⁰

The amendment brought the whole program under the scope of the charter, in addition to presenting the United Nations the authority to terminate the assistance on its own initiative.³¹ As Walter Lippmann wrote, "the amendment cured 'the most serious defects of the original Truman proposal . . . exactly, completely, and handsomely.'"³²

Vandenberg was now able to give the amended bill his wholehearted support. After receiving the unanimous vote of the Foreign Relations Committee, he took the Senate floor on April 8, urging adoption of the bill. He said in part:

²⁹ Jones, loc. cit.

³¹ Vandenberg, op. cit., 346.

³⁰ Ibid.

³² Ibid., 350.

I am not one of those, Mr. President, who conceive that we are launching what has been called . . . a new doctrine in any such unique sense as did James Monroe a century and a quarter ago. Rather, in my opinion, we are launching a plan that has numerous precedents--although we must frankly and honestly assess the fact that it has new and "broad implications," as President Truman himself declared in his message of March 12. . . .

But it is much more than a plan for relief of human suffering in Greece and Turkey. Let us be totally plain about it. It is a plan to forestall aggression which, once rolling, could snowball into global danger of vast design. It is a plan for peace. . . . We do not escape war by running away from it. No one ran away from war at Munich. We avoid war by facing facts. This plan faces facts. . . .

Mr. President, far from bypassing the United Nations, this amended bill is the greatest act of voluntary allegiance to it in the whole story of the United Nations. . . .

Congress does not enjoy original jurisdiction in foreign relations. That is the prerogative of the Chief Executive. We come in, usually, only at the eleventh hour, when our choice is the lesser of two evils--as in this instance, when we must decide which is the wiser "calculated risk" for us. . . . To repudiate the President of the United States at such an hour could display a divisive weakness which might involve far greater jeopardy than a sturdy display of united strength. We are not free to ignore the price of noncompliance.³³

Vandenberg's support insured the passage of the bill. There were, however, those who opposed the measure. The attack came mainly from the far Left and the far Right. The

³³Congressional Record, 80 Congress, 1 Session, 3195-3198 (April 5, 1947).

left-wing charged that if the United Nations did not handle the program, the post-war dream of peace and international cooperation would be shattered. The right-wing claimed that the program would lead to war, national bankruptcy, or both. Although the major attacks came in the Senate, representative speeches from both houses of Congress will be examined in part.

In the House, Representative Sabath of Illinois characterized the program as a plan designed to bail the British out of their financial difficulties.

. . . I fear that President Truman, whom I know to be a great and honorable American, a wonderful humanitarian who hates war and seeks only relief of starving people, not only in Greece but the world over, may have been imposed upon by that Wall Street lawyer, John Foster Dulles, and perhaps by the Under Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Acheson, too thoroughly indoctrinated by shrewd British diplomats determined that we shall shoulder their burdens of empire and take over their defaulted commitments.³⁴

Excerpts from three of the many speeches made by Representative Bender of Ohio follow:

Why, if the British feel as does our President, that Greece is the key to the world battle against communism . . . , are the British withdrawing from Greece and continuing to pour money and troops into Palestine?³⁵

³⁴Ibid., 2147 (March 17, 1947).

³⁵Ibid., 2342 (March 20, 1947).

When this Congress votes for the Truman doctrine let us be perfectly clear that by doing so we will be making the choice between one world and a world divided into two armed camps. Let us be perfectly clear that we will have turned our backs upon mankind in the effort to obtain collective security. Let us be clear that we will be establishing a policy which destroys the United Nations.

I for one will not be party to such a crime against mankind. . . . The Truman policy is nothing other than an undeclared declaration of war. That policy, if it is pursued, will lead to war.³⁶

. . . this Greek-Turkish military bill is in effect nothing but an outright military alliance with the present dictatorial Government of Turkey. . . . It is a dishonorable proposal, a hypocritical proposal, a disastrous proposal, because it in the end, if applied throughout the world, will mean the bankruptcy of America. . . .³⁷

Representative Dirksen of Illinois asked:

We are confronted with a new foreign policy. It is embodied in 28 words. It is the essence of the President's message. It states in brief that:

"I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

At once certain questions arise: What peoples? How many? What will it cost? What

³⁶Ibid., 2784-2785 (March 27, 1947).

³⁷Ibid., 3672 (April 17, 1947).

is included in the term "attempted subjugation"? What is meant by outside pressures? Where does this policy take us? Is it realistic? Will there be firm adherence to it if it is carried into action? How will other nations react? What about Russia?³⁸

In the Senate, Senator Pepper of Florida, speaking about the proposed aid, said:

In my opinion, that comes dangerously near to going violently outside the democratic traditions of our country. That is what I warn against. I am saying that since we took an obligation to act collectively in meeting the challenges of aggression in the world, we are under a duty to try to act through the United Nations organization. . . .³⁹

Senator Taylor of Idaho, who was later to run with Wallace on the Progressive ticket, was another who criticized the bill for by-passing the United Nations:

The questions of Greece and Turkey must be submitted to the United Nations so that the United Nations can itself decide what action should, or should not, be taken. If the problem is not submitted to the United Nations, no matter how much information we may choose to give that Organization, or how many preambles we may choose to write, the United Nations will have been weakened by our hands. . . .⁴⁰

³⁸ Ibid., 2544 (March 25, 1947).

³⁹ Ibid., 3592 (April 17, 1947).

⁴⁰ Ibid., 2872 (March 31, 1947).

The opposite viewpoint was expressed in the following comments. Senator Brooks of Illinois said:

. . . I believe that the steps proposed may provide the spark that will lead us into the war which the proponents wish to prevent. . . .

I firmly believe that the step now proposed is only the first step, and that it will start a chain reaction that will drag us into constant conflicts around the globe.⁴¹

Senator Malone of Nevada said:

It is both useless and childish to assume that by giving money to Greece alone we can stay the hand of Soviet aggression and power . . . if such a program is to be required, the \$400,000,000 we are being asked to give to Greece this year is not the end, but the beginning.⁴²

Senator Wherry of Nebraska stated that:

It would be suicidal for the United States in such a critical hour to undertake the impossible task of adding the unbearable weight of military establishments to the national economies which it seeks to revive. We would spread ourselves so thin across the world, even while we are bleeding ourselves of our finances and resources, that we would become vulnerable on every front. We would set up conditions where Pearl Harbors and Corregidors would be repeated simultaneously in a score of places.⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid., 3467 (April 16, 1947).

⁴² Ibid., 3730 (April 21, 1947).

⁴³ Ibid., 3743 (April 21, 1947).

Although President Truman had asked that the bill be passed before March 31, the date that British aid would end, Congress could not complete the debates by that time. The bill was passed, however, by the Senate (67 to 23) on April 22, and by the House (287 to 107) on May 9. On May 22, 1947, the bill was signed by the President.⁴⁴ He said that with this aid "America had served notice that the march of Communism would not be allowed to succeed by default."⁴⁵ Greece and Turkey remained free.

⁴⁴Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, 108.

⁴⁵Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

It was the purpose of this study to undertake an investigation of the events leading up to and culminating with the Truman Doctrine, and to determine, if possible, pertinent facts relating to the revolution in United States foreign policy which was initiated by the Truman Doctrine.

The British decision to terminate economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey forced the planners of United States foreign policy to make a momentous decision. They had the choice of returning to the pre-war isolationism of 1919-1939, or of assuming the position of world leadership which they had rejected in 1919.

In the months following World War II, the Soviet Union had demonstrated repeatedly that she possessed objectives which were different from those of the Western democracies. If the United States did not extend the necessary amounts of assistance to Greece and Turkey, it seemed extremely likely that communism would engulf those free states.

In response to President Truman's proposal, Congress passed a bill extending aid to Greece and Turkey. The

assistance that followed helped to prevent those countries from falling to communist aggression.

Conclusions

The evidence presented in this study suggests the following conclusions:

1. Traditional American isolationism did not prepare the United States for world leadership. American isolationism had a record of success largely because of world conditions during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, not because of any inherent qualities of isolationism itself.

2. The Western democracies did not fully comprehend the objectives of their war-time ally, the Soviet Union.

3. During the months following World War II, a few far-sighted individuals attempted to awaken the American people to the Soviet threat. Communist aggression in Iran, Greece, and Turkey made their task less difficult.

4. The British decision to terminate assistance to Greece and Turkey--stemming from Britain's post-war economic plight--forced the United States to assume world leadership or return to the traditional isolationism.

5. President Truman was confronted by a hostile Congress at a time when he wished to build support for the

coming election. He disregarded these personal considerations, however, and boldly proposed that the United States abandon isolationism and take steps to combat Soviet aggression.

6. Congress, led by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a former isolationist, enacted legislation that extended the requested aid to Greece and Turkey. Those countries subsequently remained free.

7. The Truman Doctrine, as the President's plan came to be called, was the first application of the containment policy. It represented a complete break with the past. The United States was beginning to assume world leadership, with all its burdens and responsibilities.

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