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THE NEW ERA FOR POLICING

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A Research Proposal on the New Era of Policing

I. Introduction

Emerging from the programs, experiments, and wholesale constructions we see a new conception of how police departments must change to meet the new challenges of the contemporary world. This conception is by no means fully developed. The best executives and the best departments are groping toward a new vision of policing.

New approaches to policing that hold real hope not only for better crime control, but also for major improvements in the quality of urban life are urgently needed for the future of policing in America. The role of the police in the American society is very complex. The police are the security arm of the state. Hardly a day passes that we do not read or hear something about the police, or see evidence of police activity.

Fundamental changes are constantly occurring in the police profession. This is not more policing, but better policing; not tougher policing, but smarter policing. The development of policing through the reform era has provided police managers with some good defenses against attempts by outsiders to influence police practice. Two promising avenues lie open: reconstructing the police's attitudes and mechanism for dealing with community and political influence to overcome institutional isolation; and recasting the roles of several important parts of typical police departments to organize for responsiveness. The first is the most basic and most important. For example, when shifting from a reactive to a preventive approach to crime, the police should regard citizens wishes for help with matters other than crime, thereby successfully managing their overwhelming volume of calls for service. If one shifts from reacting to crime to the prevention of crime, one inevitably ends up shifting to problem-solving or community mobilization methods. And, one cannot shift to these without some degree of decentralizing the organization and reducing reliance on patrol and rapid response.

Some of the most important innovations however, are institutional and managerial. They have to do with reordering the relationships between police departments and the communities they police, and between police executives and the officers they must direct, control, and inspire.

The exact answer to the question of how cities might best be policed remains unclear. What becomes important is the design of a method for finding ways to reconnect the police to their communities so that the police can learn what their problems are and ways to use the initiative and knowledge dormant within police departments, to devise the proper responses. These persistent anomalies are forcing a reconsideration of the police mission. With that consideration is coming a new appreciation of the contribution that dispute resolution, order maintenance, and emergency service can make not only to crime control but also to the general quality of life in a community.

II. Traditional Policing

Insofar as the control of crime, fear, and disorder are important to cities' well-being- that is, to a very considerable degree- urban conditions are police business. The police have tried to handle that business, in modern times, in clear and well-defined ways. Their end has been to control crime, especially murder, rape, and robbery. Their means have been to enforce the criminal law: by patrolling in cars, answering 911 calls, and investigating crimes after they occur. Most police, and most of the public, believe fervently in this end and these means. The idea of a police force that fights crime vigorously, answers calls promptly, and investigates cleverly draws nearly universal support. Most people cannot imagine anything else the police could possibly do.

The trouble is that traditional police goals and methods are often too narrow and ineffectual to help troubled cities win back the ground they have lost. Even in less dire circumstances, traditional policing often cannot lend cities and neighborhoods all the support it might. Crime fighting, rapid response, and the like offer neither police nor residents much of a handle when it comes to addressing- far less preventing -such diffuse problems as fear and community tension.

No surveyor of the landscape of American policing can fail to be struck by police departments' remarkable similarity of form and style. There are, of course, variations, sometimes significant ones, from force to force, reflecting local contexts, developments, and traditions. The essential sameness is so strong, and so accepted by both the police and the

public, that it might seem that the police sprang forth fully developed in all their modern particularities: aloof, highly mobile, and deeply dedicated to the pursuit and apprehension of criminals. It is also easy to imagine that this essential sameness is proof against change; that what is now has always been, and ever shall be.

The appearance of immutability is an illusion. American policing went through a major crisis in the first half of this century that changed its character enormously. The responsibilities, purposes, methods, and social support of policing have all changed. Policing as we know it today is the result of that reform and those changes, not a historical accident but certainly a historical artifact.

A. Early Philosophy

Throughout history, societies have established rules to govern the conduct of individuals and have devised punishments for those who broke the rules. The earliest record of an ancient society's need for rules to control human behavior dates back to approximately 2300 BC when the Sumerian rulers set forth standards for what was an offense against society.[1] For thousands of years such rules were modified and adapted.

The system of policing and maintaining order in the Unites States is modeled on the police system developed in England. For hundreds of years before the Norman invasion of England, the Anglo-Saxon kings required their subjects to "keep the peace." These kings found that maintaining the peace required constant vigilance by every member of the realm.

Following the Norman invasion, the responsibility of all free Englishmen to maintain the "public peace" continued. By the seventeenth century, law enforcement duties were divided into two separate units, a day watch and a night watch. The day watch consisted of constables who served as jailers and fulfilled other government duties. Citizens worked on the night watch. Each citizen was expected to take a turn watching for fires, approaching bad weather, and disorderly individuals.

If a watchman or any other citizen saw a crime in progress, they were expected to give the hue and cry, summoning all citizens within earshot to join in pursuing and capturing the wrongdoer. Preserving the peace was the duty of all citizens.

By the end of the eighteenth century, most people with sufficient means paid others to stand their assigned watch for them, marking the beginning of a paid force and, in effect, the original neighborhood watch.

The first "modern" police force, the London Metropolitan Police, was founded by Sir Robert Peel in 1829.[2] Peel envisioned a close relationship between the police and the citizens they served which helped the police maintain order in London.

At the time the Metropolitan Police Force was established in London, the United States was still operating under a day and night watch system similar to that which had been used in England. In the 1830s several large cities established separate paid day watches. In 1844 New York City took the first step toward organizing a big city police department similar to what exists today across the country when it consolidated its day and night watches under the control of a police chief. The police department was modeled on the London Metropolitan Police and Peel's principles.

At the beginning of this century, law enforcement was one of the only services sanctioned by government to help citizens. Welfare, parole, probation, and unemployment offices did not exist. Police in New York, for example, distributed coal to the poor, monitored the well-being of vulnerable children, and made efforts to improve their impoverished homes by connecting them with a private charity, served as probation and parole officers, played a role in establishing playgrounds in the city, and supported charitable organizations.

August Vollmer and O. W. Wilson are usually attributed with spearheading the reform movement that called for a drastic change in the way police departments were organized and functioned. One basic change during this era was to disassociate policing from politics. With the disassociation of policing from politics came a change in emphasis on the role of the police. Citizens began to equate policing with fighting crime. The police considered social service type functions less desirable and avoided them whenever possible.

The relationship between the police and public also changed during the reform era. Police leaders in the reform era redefined the nature of a proper relationship between police officers and both politicians and citizens. Police would be impartial law enforcers who related to citizens in professionally neutral and distant terms. The public viewed the police as professionals who were to remain detached from citizens they served.

During the reform era the concept of the **"thin blue line"** developed. This phrase refers to the line that separates law-abiding, peaceful citizens from the murderous villains who prey upon them. The phrase also suggests a distance between the police and the public they serve.

Adding to the distancing of police from the public during the reform era was the replacement of foot patrol with motorized patrol. O. W. Wilson's preventive patrol by squad car coupled with an emphasis on rapid response to calls for service became the dual focus of policing during this era. The police image became one of officers roaring through city streets in high-powered squad cars, lights flashing and sirens wailing.

Many police methods were challenged during the 1960s when social change exploded in the United States as the result of several significant events which occurred almost simultaneously. The civil rights movement began in the late fifties as a grassroots movement to change the blatantly unequal social, political, and economic systems in the United States. Confrontation between blacks and the police, who were also completely male and white, increased during this time. Representing the status quo and defending it, the manner in which police handled protest marches and civil disobedience often aggravated each situation.

Plagued by lack of training and confronted by a confusing array of social movements as well as an emerging drug culture, the police became the "enemy". Officers heard themselves referred to as "pigs" by everyone from students to well-known entertainers. They represented the status quo, the establishment, and everything standing in the way of peace, equality, and justice. Police in the sixties were at war with the society they served. Never had the relationship between the law enforcement community and the people it served been so strained.

Many businesses and individuals began to hire private security officers to assure their safety. The public assumed that the police alone were unable to "preserve the peace". While some called for greater cooperation between public and private policing, others argued that the public should collaborate with all policing efforts.

In the 1980s many departments began experimenting with more community involvement in the "war on crime". Also during this decade several cities tested Herman Goldstein's problem-oriented approach to policing.[3] The emphasis in many departments began to shift from crime fighting to crime prevention. Upon discovering that their traditional methods were nowhere as effective as previously assumed, the police realized the need to enlist the community

in preventing and controlling crime. It was clear that this would not be accomplished simply by renewing the old campaigns or even through ambitious efforts to organize neighborhoods into blockwatch programs. The police were going to have to cultivate an entirely different type of relationship with the citizens they served. With a goal that went well beyond reducing tensions and being liked, it was recognized that getting the police job done required the greater involvement of all citizens.

B. Public Perception of the Police

Our society has varied images of law enforcement professionals and that image is greatly affected by how the public perceives the criminal justice system within which the police function. Many Americans believe in an ideal justice system in which fairness and equality are guiding principals; truth and justice prevail, and the accused innocent until proven guilty. Law enforcement professionals are part of this idealized vision; many view police officers and sheriff's deputies as unselfish, fearless, compassionate protectors of the weak and defenseless, who can uncover the truth, bring the guilty to justice, and make things "right."

In contrast, others in our society see a criminal justice system that is neither fair nor just. Some individuals point out that the system employs officers who are overwhelmingly white, middle-class males. They also believe some officers abuse power and, in some cases, those with whom they contact in the line of duty.

An individual's opinion of the police is based on many factors, even a person's driving record. Someone who has received a traffic ticket, drives down the street and sees a squad car directly behind them will probably react differently than an individual who has never received a ticket.

Among the factors that contribute to the police image are television programs, movies, newspapers, magazines, books, the opinions of friends and family, your education, where you live, your economic status, whether you are handicapped, male or female, a member of a minority group, and, most importantly, your contact with the criminal justice system.[4]

The media has an enormous impact on public opinion. The police image is affected by the manner in which television and newspaper stories present crime and law enforcement activities.

The police image is also affected by the police uniform and equipment. The uniform most police officers wear is a very visible reminder of the authority and power bestowed upon police. In fact, officers know that the uniform plays a major part in their ability to gain cooperation and compliance from the public. Much of their authority comes simply from what they are wearing. People recognize and react to visible symbols of authority.

The manner in which police exercise their authority also has an impact on the police image. The attitude of law enforcement officers, their education, their personal image of policing, discipline, professionalism, and interaction with the community have enormous impact on the public's perception of the police.

Seemingly innocent and humorous police novelty items have caused, major confrontations between police and the communities they serve. Some police product companies produce calendars, posters, T-shirts, and mugs that support, encourage, and make light of police brutality. Almost always meant to be humorous, the public may not share the same sense of humor. Such items can be immensely destructive to police-community relations. Particularly offensive examples include slogans such as "Brutality, the fun part of police work" and takeoffs on the Dirty Harry line, "Go ahead, make my day."

Another factor that contributes to the police image and the difficulty in maintaining good community relations is what police commonly refer to as negative contacts. Negative contacts are unpleasant interactions between the police and the public. They may or may not relate to criminal activity.

While officers have many opportunities to assist citizens, most of what they must do causes people unhappiness. Many people have police contact only when something goes wrong in their lives. Citizens commonly interact with the police when they:

> Receive a traffic citation.
> Have an illegally parked vehicle towed.
> Have a loud party terminated.
> Have been victimized.
> Discuss a child who is in trouble with the law.
> Have a domestic "disagreement" broken up.

Are arrested for driving while intoxicated or some other offense.
Receive a death notification.

Many more possible scenarios in which citizens become angry or disillusioned occur daily because of the actions police officers must take to perform their duties.

For the most part, the police have no way to eliminate negative contacts and still perform their duties. A major challenge of law enforcement is to build good community relations despite the often adversarial nature of the job. The fact that many negative contacts take place between police and noncriminal individuals, the so-called "average citizen," makes the task especially difficult.

Historically, the roles of police, even though not carefully or accurately articulated, were nonetheless generally understood and accepted. Quite obviously, this is most definitely not the case in contemporary America. Youth, ethnic groups, academicians, political leaders, businessmen, and lay citizens all have divergent, disparate views of those historic police roles. This lack of consensus has created an atmosphere in which sharp conflict over the rationale for police action flourishes, and consequently bitter debate rages throughout a community or even the nation. These debates are sometimes so testy that the only result is a tearing of the social fabric that holds a community or nation together.[5]

History has left us a bewildering hodgepodge of contradictory roles that the police are expected to perform. The public may well ask, for example, are the police to be concerned with peacekeeping or crime fighting? The blind enforcers of the law or the discretionary agents of a benevolent government? Social workers with guns or gunmen in social work? Facilitators of social change or defenders of the "faith"? The enforcers of the criminal law or society's legal trash bin?

Actually, the police are expected to do all those things and become all things to all people, at once the confessor and the inquisitor, the friend of all yet the armed nemesis of some.

In sum, the public had developed such high expectations of its police that those expectations moved beyond reality to something that could be better described as faith. As the public came to have faith in the police to do all things, the police came to have faith that they could do all things. When disillusionment set in, the singers lost faith in the song, in each other, and in themselves.

Common wisdom among police officers holds that, ninety-five percent of the community is good and law-abiding.[6] These are the people with whom they must work. However, one of the untested assumptions of community policing is that residents want closer contact with the police and, further, want to work actively with the police to reduce the incidence of crime in their neighborhoods. According to a large number of community residents, a major reason why residents do not get involved with community policing projects is the historically poor relationship between the police and the residents of poor communities. Such poor relationships, most common in those areas of the city usually chosen as the target sites for community policing demonstration projects, will not be easily changed.

Klockars suggests: Sociologically, the concept of community implies a group of people with a common history, common beliefs and understandings, a sense of themselves as 'us' and outsiders as 'them' and often, but not always, a shared territory."[7] Unfortunately, many communities lack this "we-ness." In such areas, the police and public served have a "them v. us" relationship. As noted by Goldstein: "Areas of cities requiring the most police attention are usually those with few shared values and little sense of community."[8] In such communities crime may flourish. When considering the police-community relationship, it is imperative to determine if a sense of "we-ness" and ownership exists in the community. Developing effective police-community relations is a challenge.

The public often demands that the police crackdown on crime, on drunk drivers, and even on traffic violations. For many police departments, the majority of their complaints involve traffic problems. Citizens often demand that police enforce speed laws near their homes. Inevitably, when the police respond by issuing citations to violators, some of those who want the laws to be strictly enforced are ticketed; they often feel betrayed and angry. Somehow, they see their own violation of the speed law as different from that of "teenagers" or "outsiders," and they feel they deserve "a break.". Most police officers have been asked, "Why don't you spend your time catching real criminals instead of picking on citizens?"

Citizens become incensed when crime flourishes. They hold the police responsible for combating crime. As noted by Wadman and Olson there is a "dichotomy of the police being held responsible for crime but having little or no authority over its causes."[9] In addition, when

citizens have a problem, they expect the police to help resolve it whether its their own problem or when someone else is causing a problem.

The public asks a number of things of the police. First, it asks that the police be effective at carrying out their function. This question requires us to determine what the police function is. Some of the discussions of community policing, and all of the discussions of problem-oriented policing, are concerned primarily with the effectiveness of police services. The next question asked is that these services be equitably distributed. That is, that the police act in a fair and responsive manner while carrying out their functions. Equity issues are at the core of many forms of community policing, especially those advocated in response to serious crises resulting from police abuses of force. The final question the public asks is that effectiveness be achieved at minimal cost or that the resources provided the police be used in the most productive manner possible. Efficiency concerns are about the means of policing: hiring, training, performance measurement, organizational structure, technology, integrity, morale, policies, and procedures.

Public expectations and the expectations of those in law enforcement are often at odds. Even within agencies, police disagree about what their primary focus should be. The police face a continuous struggle with "the dilemmas of governing counties that are in fact, complex, ambiguous, diverse, and highly stratified."[10]

If we are to restore any semblance of faith in the police by the public- and the police themselves- we must begin first by defining the police role very carefully so that it does not distort reality. The historical definition of the police role eventually achieved this regrettable result by fostering the belief that police, because they were present and visible twenty-four hours a day, could function as a gigantic surrogate agency to the community handling all the needs of the people all of the time.

To establish credibility or faith in the police service requires that the police role be outlined so that there are reasonable expectations about what the police should do and can do. Once we know what the police are to do, then we can address the three critical problems of police recruitment, training, and leadership. As matters stand now, we do not know what we are recruiting officers for, what kind of training and education they ought to have, or what kind

of leadership we ought to be developing- because we don't know where we want to lead them in the first place.

C. Police Perception of the Public

Though the community calls mostly for community service and peacekeeping, policemen nevertheless consider the fundamental job, the "real guts" of policing, to be the apprehension of felons. Police are occupied with peacekeeping- but preoccupied with crime fighting. Most policemen on entering the force either positively want to fill the peacekeeping and community-service roles, or are at least willing to tolerate them as a major aspect of their work. Once on the job, however, tendencies in this direction are frustrated by a number of factors, beginning with the realization that there are no built-in rewards for good performance as a peacekeeper. Pats on the back, compliments about doing a good job, and other verbal and nonverbal rewards from the peer, supervisory, or command levels rarely follow the successful completion of a peacekeeping or community-service activity.[11]

Furthermore, police officers believe that citizens have little regard for their performance in the area of peacekeeping and community service. It is all too obvious that there is often considerable hostility from the community when peacekeeping and community-service functions are being carried out- and this negative response hardly encourages superior community-service performance.

Equally frustrating to the police in their roles as peacekeepers and community service agents is the insecurity which community service calls generate. Policemen are untrained to intervene effectively in family fights; they have no medical background; they have few links with the medical, welfare, and social-service resources in the community; and they have no real power to act (short of arrest) in many citizen disputes. Therefore, when asked to perform a community service (often at night or on weekends when other resources are not available), they feel unable to do it properly.[12]

Police leave community-service and peacekeeping calls with no sense of having solved, ended, or "closed out" a problem. This commonly happens when they are called into a citizen dispute- family fights, tenant-landlord squabbles, even fare disputes between taxi drivers and

passengers. The police have no real power to settle any of these except by arrest, which is almost always inappropriate. After many such calls, the police are left with the feeling that they have accomplished little or nothing, and that they have wasted their time. Frustration with the peacekeeping and community-service roles leads the policeman to be angry with the community he/she serves. The officer's peers who have been through the same frustrations, support his tendency to stereotype the citizenry as the "bad guys" and tend to acculturate the young policeman in simplistic thinking about the complexities of the urban scene.

The police can perhaps be forgiven for some of their uneasiness about opening up to public and political influence. Policing has long been an easy mark for politicians eager to make their careers. It has sometimes, usually in periods of national unrest over social policy, become highly charged politically; this was true in the United States during the civil rights movements and is true today in Britain, where policing has emerged as a key issue in the battle between left and right.[13] Whatever the merits- and they are often great- of the critiques that emerge at such times, they are very difficult for the police, and many in the police have come to view their relations with the rest of the world in terms of long periods of political calm, whey they are left alone to do as they see fit, interspersed with painful periods of politically inspired harassment. They have come to equate politics with trouble, tension, and interference. Inviting public review and consultation- that is, inviting politics- thus seems sheer lunacy.

What the police have failed to realize is that they do a great deal to set themselves up for being hammered in such debates. By keeping their distance from the public and its representatives, they often allow themselves to drift away from doing the things the public would like them to do. By not being honest about what they can and cannot accomplish, by keeping alive the myth of solitary and heroic crime fighting, they create unreasonable expectations that haunt them in times of trouble. By not being open about what they do and how they do it, they make credible the vilest accusations of official misconduct.[14]

The dominant form of policing today continues to view police officers as automatons. Despite an awareness that they exercise broad discretion, they are held to strict account in their daily work- for what they do and how they do it. Officers constantly complain that they are treated like children; they want desperately to be recognized as mature adults.[15] Especially in procedural matters, they are required to adhere to detailed regulations. In large police agencies,

rank-and-file police offers are often treated impersonally and kept in the dark regarding policy matters. Officers quickly learn, under these conditions, that the rewards go to those who conform to expectations- that nonthinking compliance is valued.[16]

The police field can be the beneficiary of a flood of new ideas, new energy, enthusiasm, and commitment by modifying some of the constraints under which rank-and-file police officers now function. This means, quite simply, making it legitimate for rank-and-file officers to think and be creative in their daily work; and making it legitimate for them to develop better ways for their agency to deal with community problems. It means giving officers much more freedom, within appropriate restraints, in carrying out their job. The potential benefits are of two kinds. The most important is the improvement that this could produce in the quality of the responses that the police make to oft-recurring community problems. In addition, such a change would be directly responsive to some critical needs in the police organization- the need to treat rank-and-file police officers as mature men and women; to demonstrate more trust and confidence in them; to give them more responsibility and a stake in the outcome of their efforts; and to give them a greater sense of fulfillment and job satisfaction.

Police-community exchange means that the police must genuinely communicate a feeling, that the public they are serving has something to contribute to the enterprise of policing. The old professional was not especially interested in hearing from the lay public, including businessmen, to say nothing of representatives of minority groups. The old professional sees himself as someone who had received advanced training in the complexity of the penal code, search-and-seizure law, use of firearms, interrogation tactics, and the fine points of when and how to apply the baton. His training did not, he thought require additional input from members of the community.[17]

If the old professional leaned toward, perhaps exemplified, a "legalistic" style of policing, the new professional inclines toward and exemplifies a more service-oriented style. The new professionalism suggest more than the service style uncovered by James Q. Wilson in an affluent Long Island Suburb.[18] The new professionalism implies that police serve, learn from, and are accountable to the community. Behind the new professionalism is a governing notion: that the police and the public are co-producers of crime prevention.

We have seen how the police came, during the later part of the reform period, to embrace an image of themselves as impartial, professional crime fighters. This image lies at the heart of the police value system; indeed, it is its foundation stone. This image is what police chiefs talk of at award dinners and budget time; it is what police officers talk of with their "civilian" friends. It is the face policing wishes to present to the public. It is real, or at least honest, as far as it goes; the police really do believe it.

It is not all the police believe, however. Behind it lie, usually secret and hidden, several other very powerful beliefs, often expressed in conversation between officers, embodied in departmental stories and legends, personified in police heroes.[19] These beliefs bear little resemblance to what's laid down in the force instruction manual or prescribed through formal management structures and all too often have little to do with the chief executive's stated values. Together, they are the building blocks of current police culture; they are the truths that officers feel in their bones, the touchstones that- unless changed- will continue to govern their behavior and attitudes. The strongest of them being:

1. We are the only real crime fighters. Crime fighting is what the public wants from us. Other agencies, public or private, only play at it.

2. No one else understands the real nature of police work. That is, no one outside the police service- academics, politicians, and lawyers in particular- can comprehend what we have to do. The public is generally naive about police work.

3. Loyalty to colleagues counts above everything else. We have to stick together. Everyone else- including the public, politicians, and especially senior officers- seems to be out to make our job difficult.

4. It is impossible to win the war against crime without bending the rules. We are hopelessly shackled by unrealistic constraints foisted on us by civil liberties groups, thanks to the fickleness of politicians.

5. Members of the public are basically unsupportive and unreasonably demanding. They all seem to think they know our job better than we do. They only want us when they need something done.

6. Patrol work is the pits. The detective branch and other specialties are relatively glorious, because they tackle serious crime. Patrol work is only for those who aren't smart enough to get out it.[20]

These are the beliefs that, for better or worse, now play a large part in fashioning police conduct. They reflect the values that are drummed into new recruits informally as soon as they have left the academy; they reflect the values that are perpetually reinforced among peers in locker rooms and cafeterias.

These beliefs are, in a very real sense, true. The general public really does have little idea of the nature of police work, and in expecting the police to control crime with their existing resources and tactics is making unreasonable demands. The police, having willingly adopted the role of professional crime fighter, finding themselves hampered- however justifiably- by restrictions on their investigative and interrogation techniques, and burdened by vast numbers of seemingly unimportant calls, often feel obliged to cheat to get results, and to justify that cheating by the importance of the crime-control mission they are charged with.

Collectively these six beliefs preserve the myths that are central to the reform image of the police as a dedicated crime-fighting force. At worst they encourage and legitimize insensitive, unproductive and even illegal behavior; at best they promote organizational insularity, introspection, and detachment. Replacing them with a more honorable, more realistic, and more productive set of beliefs must be one of the core tasks of any new policing. They are not immune to change, but they are extremely strong, and their influence should not be underestimated.

III. Changing Role of the Police Department

The fundamental question about community policing in the 1990's is not "should it be implemented?"- the concept is already extremely popular with policymakers- but rather "How should it be implemented?" With any sizable programmatic or organizational change there is always the risk of serious setbacks or delays in achieving the optimum level of implementation due to poor planning, employee or community resistance, or other factors. In theory, community policing represents a fundamental change in the basic role of the police officer, including changes in his or her skills, motivation, and opportunity to engage in problem-solving activities and to develop new partnerships with key elements of the community. Therefore, the primary responsibility for achieving these basic changes in police attitudes and behaviors rests

with the officer's employer. Police departments, led by a growing number of talented and progressive chiefs, must face this task head-on if they want to go beyond the labels and buzz words of the 1980s to see an impact on community problems.

Determining what changes in the police organization are needed to achieve real changes in policing on the street is a matter of opinion, but some consensus exists on the larger issues. Allowing officers the freedom to be creative problem solvers and resource facilitators will require a less rigid, less hierarchical organization with a new set of performance standards and rewards. In addition, giving officers the necessary skills and motivation to excel in their new role will require radically different training programs at all levels of the organization, including new approaches to supervision.

It is not hard to understand the attraction of the new ideas about policing. They seem to recognize and respond to what have come to be seen as the limitations of the "reform model" of policing: its predominantly reactive stance toward crime control; its nearly exclusive reliance on arrests as a means of reducing crime and controlling disorder, its inability to develop and sustain close working relationships with the community in controlling crime, and its stifling and ultimately unsuccessful methods of bureaucratic control.[21]

In contrast, the new ideas point to a new set of possibilities: the potential for crime prevention as well as crime control; creative problem solving as an alternative to arrest; the importance of customer service and community responsiveness as devices for building stronger relations with local communities; and "commissioning" street-level officers to initiate community problem-solving efforts. To many, these ideas seem more likely to rectify the wide variety of crime and disorder problems that are now tearing the heart out of America's communities.

Beneath the enthusiasm for this wave of reform is an undercurrent of doubt and concern. Those influential in shaping decisions about how to police cities- the "Big Five" alluded to by Robert Trojanowicz (the police, the community, political leaders, social agencies, and the media)- still hesitate to commit to the new forms of policing.[22]

They worry that the new ideas sacrifice important aspects of policing's traditions (including its predominant focus on crime control and the achievement of high levels of performance in traditional police functions such as patrol, rapid response, and criminal investigation), and do so for quite uncertain gains in other less important and less substantial

dimensions (such as fear reduction or improved community relations). They worry that policing is heading "back to the future" and that some of the important gains that the police have made in becoming less corrupt and more professional in their key law enforcement roles will be lost.

The reason for hesitation of course, is that we do not know whether community policing "works." Nor do we know whether it is possible to implement community policing in the form in which it works. It remains at least somewhat uncertain what community policing is and what a proper test of its performance would be.

Although much attention in the literature on community policing has concentrated on police-public contact and cooperation and the need for an improved focus in service delivery, the organizational medium through which this "new wave" policing is to take shape is essentially under-studied. That is to say, for community policing to become a central feature of American law enforcement, the institutional framework and organization apparatus of police organizations must be altered if they are to accommodate the sweeping changes implied by community policing proponents. The success or failure of community policing, then, is in large measure affected by the organizational structures and processes that characterize modern-day policing. Moreover, the internal culture of these organizations, together with structural and technological considerations, is also expected to greatly shape the success or failure of community policing implementation efforts. This is true for several reasons.

First, by all accounts, police organizations have been some of the most inflexible of public bureaucracies, capable of resisting and ultimately thwarting change efforts. The rise and fall of "team policing" in the early 1970s is illustrative of the capacity of police organizations to deny change.

Second, the history of police organizational change has generally favored the police organization over other institutions bent on changing it. Organizational adaptation in police bureaucracies has tended to be one way: the change efforts adapt to the organization, rather than the organization adapting to the intended change. Confirmation of this proposition rests in the observation that American policing is more or less organized and implemented as it was at the turn of the century. Police organizations are rank and power centered, they maintain an emphasis on control, and they remain rooted in the call-response-call technology developed with the introduction of the motor car and police radio in the early 1900s. Culturally, police

organizations remain inward looking; they are often distant from their clients and they shun most civic oversight attempts.

Third, although many have suggested the importance that police organizations play in shaping police responses, there are only a few studies that have examined police organizations empirically. Detailed understanding of organizational change dynamics within police organizations, particularly as they relate to organizational culture considerations, is at best incomplete.

The police are the most visible component of the criminal justice system and have the most direct contact with the public. The day-to-day contacts of line officers are the most critical factors in police-community relations. What occurs within courts and corrections facilities can greatly affect police-community relations. It is vital that the three components of the system collaborate and develop programs to serve the needs of the public.[23]

According to Wadman and Olson, the lowest hurdle toward change to a "community wellness" or community-oriented philosophy of policing is selling the approach to the public. The next lowest hurdle is convincing the rest of city government. They state that the "highest hurdle of all will be the organizational resistance of the police agency itself."[24]

Police organizations have considerable momentum. Having a strong personal commitment to the values with which they have "grown up," police officers will find any hint of proposed change in the police culture extremely threatening. Moreover, those values are reflected in many apparently technical aspects of their jobs- system for dispatching patrols, patrol officers constantly striving to be available for the next call, incident-logging criteria, etc. The chief executive who simply announces that community policing is now the order of the day, without a carefully designed plan for bringing about that change, stands in danger both of "losing traction" and of throwing his entire force into confusion.[25]

Change is occurring as law enforcement agencies move toward community-oriented, problem-solving policing. One of the largest changes is the "customer orientation" described by Couper and Lobitz:

> A customer orientation means listening to your customers.
> Customers may be citizens, elected officials, employees, or
> interest groups...Listening to and being responsive to citizens
> should be a goal. There are, of course, a number of para-
> meters in being responsive- the law, ethics, and budgetary

constraints. In this new era of community policing, listening
to the customer is a vital part of the job. It is a change.
Professionals today no longer have the exclusive market
on knowing what is best for their patients, clients, or
customers. Today, people want to be heard and participate.[26]

Another basic way the police role varies because of community-oriented policing is the
manner in which the police interact with the public. Snelson and Oettmeier describe a number of
objectives of the Houston Police Department's policing style, designed to facilitate interactive
relationships between neighborhood residents and beat officers:

1. Establish trust and harmony between and among neighbor-
   hood residents and the beat officer by establishing a positive
   cooperative, and productive relationship between both parties;

2. Exchange information between neighborhood residents and
   beat officers which will strengthen rapport and enhance
   neighborhood safety;

3. Respond to the problem of crime and criminal activity by
   maximizing the efficient utilization of available department
   and community resources in enforcing the law;

4. Identify and resolve neighborhood problems which will reduce
   the fear of crime and enhance the quality of life within the
   neighborhoods;

5. Establish and improve communication linkages and working
   relationships between and among divisional and departmental
   personnel;

6. Establish an effective management structure which utilizes
   divisional and community input to define service needs, direct
   operational commitments, and clarify responsibilities on
   behalf of division personnel and the public in order to more
   efficiently respond to the concerns of neighborhood residents;

7. Facilitate the acquisition, analysis, and utilization of information
   in order to identify neighborhood crime and non-crime problems
   capable of being resolved through mutual participation on
   behalf of police personnel and community residents;

8. Develop and implement programs, strategies, and/or activities
   ' to efficiently use beat officers' uncommitted patrol time;

9. Provide safe and orderly traffic flow through neighborhoods by enforcing violations and reducing the number of traffic accidents; and;

10. Identify and utilize employee incentives conducive to improving employee morale.[27]

The objectives balance concern for the officers with concern for the community while balancing the officers' crime-fighting and service roles.

Policing is beginning its struggle to emerge from the limitations imposed by the reform model. The significance and the appeal of ideas like community partnerships and mobilization, problem solving, fear reduction, decentralization for responsiveness, and the like are not so much that they work well- although they may- but that they show that policing is not, as it has so long thought, bound to a narrow set of ends and means. Just what policing can be nobody knows. What we know now is only that policing can be more than it is, and that the direction of change must be toward a broader base of support and guidance, less rigid and more professional management, and smarter, less mechanical, and more proactive methods.

Nothing will be as important to this movement than that the police adopt new and very different values. It has been argued that if the police are to escape the impossible position in which they now find themselves, if they are to move beyond the limits of the reform model, they need a new belief about their role in society. It has also been argued that such a fundamental change cannot occur without the leadership and support of a new breed of police chief. Their primary job will not be to redeploy their people, institute problem solving, organize neighborhood meetings, or carry out any of the other technical tasks of a new policing. Important though those things will be, the main task facing these chiefs will be to change the expectations that citizens and communities have of police departments, and that the police have of themselves. In short, it will be to change the fundamental culture of policing.

Police departments are typically rigid bureaucracies, fiercely defensive of the status quo. Their considerable institutional momentum stands as a major barrier to change or development. Police officers who believe and behave as the reform model has led them to do will at first not be comfortable with the new conceptions, may not even be capable of pursuing them. Police chiefs who suddenly commit their organizations to a new strategy will throw them into confusion and

resistance.[28]   To move successfully from the reform model to a new style of policing, chiefs must change the basic nature of their departments.

A new attention to values is important to policing for two distinct, if closely related, reasons. First, attention to values can help executives change the culture and behavior of their organizations. By articulating the values that are to guide the organization's conduct, an executive can garner outside support, establish the terms by which the organization will be held accountable, and challenge and guide employees. The specification and promulgation of values is a key managerial tool in changing an organization's culture.

Second, the values that currently reside in policing, both those explicitly articulated and those implicitly held, are in many ways pathological. They prevent the police from discovering their full potential to contribute to the communities they serve and sometimes lead them to scandal and disgrace. They must be replaced with higher values that reveal the opportunities and obligations of policing and keep the police in the public's high esteem. This is a towering- but attainable- goal.

Despite compelling notions such as "problem-solving policing" and community policing," there is as yet no mature successor to the reform model.[29]

Fear reduction and order maintenance represent important additions to the police's mission. Community crime prevention and problem solving represent important shifts from random patrol as a primary method. These are clear, dramatic, and promising developments, and, insofar as any recent changes in policing have commanded widespread attention, it is understandable that these have.

One of the ways policing has gone astray in the past is by investing too much in trying to find particular answers to particular substantive problems- burglary or homicide or drums- and neglecting the larger question of how departments should be constituted and how they should relate to the public they serve. As policing sheds the reform model and its reliance on a few methods, it will inevitably enter a time of experiment, of trial and error. Some things will work; some, inevitably, will not. Having the right idea about how to work with the public, and how to organize and use the police, will probably be more important than debating the effectiveness and merit of particular programs.

The environmental pressures on police departments are numerous, powerful, and shifting. Police executives are beginning to face a barrage of questions, previously unasked or unacknowledged, about the effectiveness of their current strategies. Change is coming, and promoting and managing it is going to be one of the main jobs facing police chiefs and departments.

A. Management Philosophy

Organizations transforming from one set of dominant norms to another will retain members tied to the status quo. A persistent adherence to older norms and values may be especially true of the internal organization of police departments. "Old guards" can retain much influence, and police executives often seek to keep their support. In doing so, executives who would like to institute change sometimes undermine their own chances for success. They talk and act from, as it were, both sides of the mouth. They affirm conflicting norms, depending upon audience. As a result nobody in the department knows what they really stand for- sometimes they themselves do not know -and virtually all are confused.

The police chief must bring the troops along. Preferably, he should be the sort of executive who succeeds by persuading that the new values are superior. That is not always easy, especially in police departments with strong unions. Self-interest in higher wages and shorter hours sometimes stand in the way of introducing innovative ideas and strategies.

It is significant that many police chiefs took office following a scandal or dramatic failure to perform. John Avery became commissioner in New South Wales following the discovery that detectives had been manufacturing evidence. Kevin Tucker became commissioner in Philadelphia shortly after the notorious MOVE incident and just as a corruption scandal was breaking. Sir Kenneth Newman became head of the London Met following the Brixton riots. Lee Brown became chief in Houston after a police killing and an election that had discredited many of the department's old policies. Such scandals are the public sector's equivalent of bankruptcy.[30] Citizens, who have been asked to give up their money- and to some degree their freedom -to allow the police to operate, have become disenchanted with the police and have

withdrawn their credit. The chiefs are removed, and new teams are invited in to see whether or not they can do better.

Such events are managerially significant because they give the incoming executives a broader scope to make changes than would be available if the scandal had not erupted or the bankruptcy not been revealed. Old commitments to particular people, units, and ways of doing things come unglued. People who were confident and powerful become uncertain and unable to command the same degree of loyalty. Resources frozen into particular users suddenly become available for reallocation. The attention of the organization comes to be focused on the new executive, who has been chosen to lead it out of disgrace. Crisis empowers leaders.[31] The values they articulate have strength because they light the path forward.

Sir Kenneth Newman, Lee Brown, and, to a somewhat lesser degree, John Avery, all used value statements to exploit these opportunities. Darryl Gates in Los Angeles used his departmental policies to serve a similar function in less turbulent circumstances. It is Kevin Tucker's story, however, that is most instructive.[32]

When Tucker was appointed commissioner in Philadelphia, it was clear that he needed to do something to restore the public credibility and improve the performance of a by then notorious department. As part of that process, Tucker decided to commission a survey on what Philadelphia thought of its police. The results were a surprise. Tucker was leading a department that had just burned down an entire city block in a bungled effort to control a radical political organization and that was suffering a corruption scandal reaching high into the ranks. The good citizens of Philadelphia rated it fairly high- 70 percent as good or excellent overall. Only 5 percent said it was doing a poor job.[33]

Tucker's interpretation of these results was devastating. It seemed that the citizens of Philadelphia were quite content with a police department that was falling far short of embodying the values of the reform model, much less any newer style of policing. The deal between the citizens and the police appeared to be that if the police did a good job of fighting crime and responding to calls for service, they could be indulged a little in other ways.

To prevent all this from happening again in Philadelphia, Tucker sought a new compact between the police and the city's residents. This deal emphasized a working partnership between the community and the police, but it also committed the police to live up to the values

that Tucker believed a professional department should adhere to. Tucker's value statement began by quoting Plato to the effect that "good government is wise, brave, temperate, and just"; it referred to officers as "citizens who earn their police badges voluntarily" and established an absolute injunction against private gain and the violation of the Constitution or other law. It called on officers to "appreciate and care for the needs of the people they serve" and "exercise common sense in a manner that conveys common decency." It admitted that police work is demanding and disappointing but emphasized that it "provides officers the opportunity to contribute in an immeasurable way to the common good."[34]

Besides being of skeptical effectiveness, management through rules and close supervision is very costly. The direct cost is paying all those people to develop the rules, supervise the officers, and investigate those who supervise the officers. The indirect costs may be even greater. Management by rules and supervision gives little room for creativity or initiative, because it is designed to give little room for anything at all. It is based on the premise that giving officers latitude spells trouble. These regimes provide little opportunity for learning and development because they focus on adherence to prescribed practices rather than on examination of problems or formulation of new strategies. They encourage officers to devote themselves to avoidance of mistakes, and the surest way to avoid mistakes is to keep out of the way.

The disciplinary management style turns out to be phenomenally destructive of human resources. It creates a punishing environment that seems even more demanding than the street. According to the English officers who participated in a study of the sources of police stress, the aspects of poor management that have the strongest adverse effect on the performance and health of all officers were:

> Unjust criticism or scapegoating
> Lack of counseling skills
> Unrealistic expectations
> Contemptuous attitudes toward constables (patrol officers)
> Lack of concern for the individual
> Lack of communication
> Excessive autocracy and lack of consultation[35]

Given that controlling the conduct of officers through rules, supervision, and discipline is likely ineffective and expensive, is there an alternative? The public interest in controlling the officers' conduct cannot be denied. The question is what better form that control might take.

One alternative would be a shift to a style of management that is more characteristic of fully developed professional organizations, such as hospitals, architectural firms, or law offices. In these organizations the assumption is that those who do the work- the doctors, nurses, architects, and lawyers- are principals of the enterprise, not mere employees. They can be counted on not only to have appropriate skills, but to reflect appropriate values in the decisions they make and the work they do. The structures of such organizations are relatively flat, with wide spans of control to reflect the sense that workers can generally be counted on to do the right thing and that they are ultimately accountable for their own behavior. Workers in these organizations cannot fob the responsibility for mistakes onto wrong instructions by supervisors.

Many things conspire to make this style the dominant mode of administration in police departments. The paramilitary aspects- embodied in ranks, uniforms, and a unified chain of command -suggest a highly centralized organization. Officers themselves may feel comfortable in a world of rules because it fills a need for order and certainty in a disorderly, uncertain business, and because if they go by the book they cannot be blamed for failure or misbehavior. The public demands highly centralized authority because it wants someone prominent to blame if something goes wrong. That usually means chiefs, who in self-protection naturally try to make sure that everyone, from deputy chiefs to crossing guards, is doing exactly what is expected of them.

In response to the limitations and the shortcomings of the centralized administrative style, some police executives are trying to make a virtue of necessity by decentralizing responsibility. In some cases this means putting the principal operational commanders, rather than chiefs alone, out in the public eye.

At other times it means thinning out the ranks of supervisors and encouraging officers to make decisions themselves. Such actions also require the department to set up mechanisms for effective after-the-fact evaluations of officer conduct- with increased weight given to the public's reactions and complaints -as an alternative to before-the-fact supervisory control. Performance and results come to count for more than simple adherence to procedure.

Still other times, it means reducing the number of specific rules and increasing the role of well-articulated general values: as guides to behavior and as the basis for establishing officer accountability in specific instances. Commissioners Avery, Tucker, Newman, and Brown have all emphasized the development of broad value statements as operational guides for their departments. [36]

Such changes are very difficult. It is extremely uncomfortable for police executives to sit on top of organizations composed of hundreds or thousands of people carrying guns and the authority of the state and rely on their officers' professional training and values to keep misbehavior in check. They are much more inclined to reach for detailed control over what the officers do by hiring staffs to write rules, supervisors to ensure that the officers abide by the rules, and then more staffs and supervisors to ensure that the supervisors supervise appropriately. The cruel facts- that this elaborate super-structure cannot effectively reach street operations, that chiefs are ultimately reliant on officers' training and values anyway, and that the supervisory structure ironically tends to insulate officers from accountability for their conduct by creating an atmosphere of winks and nods -are all easily ignored in the effort to control the organization's operations and protect against charges of managerial negligence or incompetence.[37]

Whatever the chief executive of a department says, or means, or intends, professional life should be like for the patrol officer, it is the sergeant, the lieutenant, and occasionally the captain who shape the patrol officer's professional environment. We have said much about the debilitating effects of rigid command control, the prevalent style of these middle managers, but what aspects of their role need to change in an adaptive and innovative department?

First, middle managers separate knowledge from power in the department. Knowledge of the harsh realities of community problems has normally resided at the street level, and power over resources has been carefully preserved at the top. Middle managers must stop being a barrier between the two and start bringing them together. In particular they must encourage street-level officers to identify substantial community (or client) problems, help street officers win organizational acknowledgment of the importance of such problems, and bring appropriate organizational expertise and energy to bear.

Second, middle managers largely control the nature of a department's professional environment. They must understand the importance of coping constructively with failure, valuing ideas, and encouraging free and open communication, both positive and negative. It is only they who can break the link between failure and recrimination on an organizationwide scale. They must protect their officers from the political effects of legitimate failure.

Third, middle managers are the ones who can change the image of the procedure manual. Instead of an instrument of the disciplinary process, brought into play against wayward officers, it needs to become a river of knowledge, guidance, and inspiration for patrol officers: a tool rather than a master. It is middle managers who invariably feel most threatened by any hint of diminished emphasis on manuals. Darrel Stephens notes that "when you actually look at manuals' content you find it's not so much guidance for the street level as it is a focus on all the internal stuff- you know, where your collar brass has to be located, how you wear your hat, what you put in which box on what form. What it says most about is the internal management style."[38]

Fourth, it is principally middle managers who have routinely squashed new ideas; it is they who must embody the new organizational value "never kill an idea."

Fifth, midlevel managers must have a new role in defining work: to encourage their officers to tackle harder, broader problems and empower them by letting them know that the organization values their knowledge and expertise. They must identify deficiencies in capacity that their officers need help with and form the necessary partnerships to help solve problems. They must also change individual recognition of a problem into organizational acknowledgment and change individual recognition of a solution into organizational appreciation and education. In short, it falls to midlevel managers to tackle their officers' creative abilities and from them fashion organizational adaptiveness.

Finally, middle managers control the extent to which discretion can be built explicitly into the value system rather than being hidden and denied. Thus they must tie the broad discretion granted to street officers to political support- through being tight on values and loose on methods and techniques. Ultimately, middle managers have power to choose what they will do: tolerate yet another temporary change in the weather or lend their support to a change in the climate.

The reform model has left a deep imprint on the management style of modern police departments. Through their efforts to curtail arbitrary or inappropriate uses of police authority and resources, the reformers placed the notions of tight supervision and control- the reduction of officer's discretion -at the core of police management philosophy.[39]

Police departments typically boast weighty instruction manuals, often running to several volumes and thousands of pages. These books are designed to prescribe the action to be taken in any foreseeable circumstance, from the crash of a military aircraft to the report of a rabid dog. They also carefully designate who is to make which decisions and whose approval must be obtained before certain courses of action are followed. They are huge partly because the range of police activity is huge and partly because each error in the department's past has been met with another rule.

Many officers regard the manuals as useful reference books, which they are. Many officers also see them primarily as instruments of control. Some senior officers explicitly regard them as disciplinary tools. According to one British police superintendent, responsible as head of research and planning in a provincial force for maintaining and updating its manual, "The whole object of having the force instruction book is that when something goes wrong, you need to be able to turn to it and find out whose head goes on the block."[40]

The comment reflects the dominant philosophy of police management. Tight control, with explicit rules backed up by fearsome disciplinary systems, remains the most common style. That style has its origins in the early days of city police forces, when officers were lazy, often drunk, and frequently brutal. For those officers, and those times, the reformers were quite right to demand tighter control.

It is still generally true that the chief looks bad if anything goes wrong anywhere in the department. The implications of this simple fact cascade all the way down the chain of command. Precinct captains (and other department heads) know that the last thing they want to do is give the commissioner trouble. To keep the commissioner happy, they have to keep their commands from being the focus of any public criticism. They know that misconduct of any kind by any of their officers reflects poorly on them. They know that they will be judged at headquarters first on their ability to keep their commands free from problems and second on

their ability to bring swift and effective punishment down on any resistors. Tight control, backed up by strict discipline, becomes their aim.

Police supervisors are therefore expected, quite universally and quite unreasonably, to exercise absolute control over their patrol officers, according to the theory that close supervision is always effective, provided it is close enough. This theory is reflected in the attitude of a significant proportion of internal affairs investigators, who frequently repeat the maxim "For every patrol officer who needs disciplining, there is a supervisor who needs disciplining."[41] The underlying assumption about any misconduct is that it must be routinely and directly attributable to a breakdown in supervision.

This dominant form of police management, like the dominant police values, represents a steep hurdle for any new policing. Nobody, from greenest recruit to most eminent chief, can expect a department to risk any new approach, however promising, when the entire structure is poised to attack at first sign of error or failure. Creativity, innovation, and experimentation-individual and departmental -are all stifled. If policing is to change and progress, police management, like police culture, must also change.

Making such changes in strategy, culture, and management- or at least setting such changes in motion -can only, in contemporary policing be the job of chiefs of police. The reform model's emphasis on centralization and the paramilitary style has put so much authority in chiefs' hands that no one else inside departments has the influence necessary, and the reform model has made policing so inward looking that no one outside departments has much influence at all. If policing is to progress, it must do so- at least initially -from within and from the top down. Chiefs must face the shortcomings of reform policing and craft at least the beginnings of a new way. They can no longer afford simply to keep things running smoothly. They must pioneer.

B. Increased Educational Requirements

According to surveys undertaken in Kansas City, Cleveland, Los Angeles, and several other cities in the middle and late 1920s, many policemen had less than impeccable credentials.[42] Only two out of three finished grade school, only one out of ten graduated from high school,

and by the reformers' own criteria, only one out of five scored high enough on intelligence tests to handle the duties. How many were physically and morally unfit is hard to tell. Some were in their sixties, seventies, and eighties; others were too infirm to patrol anywhere but in parks and cemeteries; a few had been arrested many times; and some had served time for bootlegging and homicide. All things considered, the reform crusade had not brought about much of an improvement in the caliber of the big-city police by 1930.

There were several reasons. To begin with, most police forces had trouble weeding out unqualified applicants. According to a report issued in the late 1920s, the official standard were quite low. Most cities required that candidates know how to read and write, but only a few insisted on a grade school education and only one a high school degree. Some barred applicants over twenty-eight; others took them up to fifty; and still others fixed no age limits. Although most cities demanded that candidates be healthy and virtuous, they only rejected them for flagrant physical and moral defects. Many applicants could usually get around even these requirements. Under pressure from the ward leaders, the civil service commissioners sometimes gave out advance copies of the tests and the precinct captains often ran cursory character checks. The civil service commissioners overlooked serious transgressions if they meant disqualifying a candidate with strong endorsements from influential politicians. Many officials were so lax that by the 1920s Bruce Smith, George F. Chandler, and many other reformers had lost much of their early enthusiasm for the civil service. Testifying before a national commission on public service employees in the mid-1930s, August Vollmer declared that unqualified applicants slipped through the civil service about as often as through the political machine.[43]

The reformers attempted to raise the caliber of the big-city police. To this end they urged the authorities to tighten the entrance, many of which were an outgrowth of the first wave of police reform. Their efforts were fairly successful. Charging that the departments were full of over aged officers who had come to policing after failing in some other line, the reformers convinced one city after another to lower the maximum age limits for applicants. By 1968 only Boston, Dallas, and a handful of other cities accepted recruits over thirty-five years old; Chicago, Detroit, and St. Louis turned them away at thirty-one; and Memphis, Minneapolis, and Oakland drew the line at twenty nine, the limit recommended by the IACP though considered too low by the President's Crime Commission. Contending that the departments were full of

officers who lacked the intelligence befitting their professional stature, the reformers persuaded one city after the next to raise the educational credentials too. By 1968 none of the big cities and very few of the medium-sized ones accepted applications without a high school degree. In the face of vigorous opposition from the rank-and-file, however, the authorities shelved the reform proposals to require two or more years of college everywhere except in Flint, Michigan, Ogden, Utah, and a few small California cities.[44]

A few reformers also doubted the wisdom of requiring a college degree of all recruits, a requirement that had been endorsed by the President's Crime Commission in the late 1960s. Jerry Wilson based his objections on several grounds other than the difficulty of persuading college graduates to go into policing. First, the police should be "reasonably representative" of the community, which was full of citizens who did not start, much less finish college. Second, the police should serve as "a ladder" to the middle class for blacks and other newcomers who would be hard pressed to meet this requirement. Third, the police do a good deal of tedious work which would probably bore many college graduates. Wilson did not object to higher education for police officers; on the contrary, he encouraged the rank-and-file to attend classes and supported plans to give them extra pay for college credits. He also strongly objected to the proposal to make the college degree an entrance requirement, a proposal that in his view reflected the law enforcement community's drive for professional status and its infatuation with formal credentials. Attacking the conventional wisdom of the reform movement, Wilson insisted that anyone with a solid education through the tenth grade should have no trouble assimilating police training and understanding departmental regulations.

The idea of higher education for police is hardly new. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1967 spelled out all the arguments, dealt with all the possible objections. For decades, the British, with possibly the most thoroughly thought policing system in the world, have recognized the undesirability of allowing their police forces to attract only the least-educated members of society. As the Royal Commission on the Police observed back in 1962, "The police play a vital role in our national life and well-being, and it is deplorable that they, to a far greater extent than any of the other public services, law, commerce, industry, or indeed any major branch of our national life, should for years have been failing to recruit anything like their proper share of able and well-educated young men. We do not

suggest that graduates are necessarily more likely than others to make effective chief constables; our concern is simply that the police today are not securing a sufficient share of the better educated section of the community."[45]

Rank-and-file organizations apparently feel so threatened by the idea of elevating their service that an astonishing variety of arguments against higher education, some of them positively ingenious, have accumulated over the years, like parasites on the bottom of a boat.

Taking them in some sort of logical order, which is not how they tended to be presented, one begins with an incredibly self-deprecating assertion about police work: "There are certainly numerous functions in the police service," writes former Washington Police Chief Jerry Wilson, "...which not only do not require a college education but would be deadly boring to an imaginative college graduate."[46] The answer here, of course, is not to shut policing off to college graduates by keeping police work boring, but to make major changes in the police business to render it more attractive to the college-educated and the non-college-educated alike. Too many police leaders fail to understand how stupidly policing is organized at present, and how urgently it needs to be reformed.

Many police officers seriously took up college studies once they were appointed to the department. The motivation to begin or resume college education was high. The law required any officer who had had no college exposure at all to take a minimum of two college courses after coming to the department. The department also provided some economic incentives to all officers to go to college. Often college courses attracted a policeman because they were likely to be helpful in preparing for a test for promotion within the department. Most important, the problems of police life motivated the officer to take college courses and repaid the extraordinary effort he made in attending college on a part-time basis. College courses opened new concepts and provided the verbal handles to grasp ideas. They also provided evaluation of a man's power to communicate.

The thoughtful Peel, reflecting on the importance of language to police work, remarked:

> Verbal and language skills are so important. A guy can go all
> the way through the academy without picking up a dictionary.
> I've seen it happen, and it shows. He needs the exposure to a
> college environment. You've got to know the right way to ex-
> press yourself before you can recognize the wrong way. And
> it enables him to bend from the right way to speak when it's

> appropriate. In arresting a guy, in letting the guy know what
> he's arrested for, you're very proficient as a policeman in the
> language of the text; you have to translate the language of
> the text to fit the content of the situation.[47]

His overall point was that a "college environment" was crucial to developing a good policeman's linguistic skills, but college experience could come after appointment to the police department. Peel even went so far as to argue that college experience without the necessary hunger to educate oneself was of much less value than college after the police experience had whetted the appetite for it.

> With college: you don't want to make them go to college.
> That's putting the cart before the horse. You want them
> to become so interested in their work that they want to
> understand more about the world, and then they go back
> to college because they want to.[48]

In addition to removing the rotten apples, various measures have been proposed to improve the behavior of the majority of men who are good officers but perhaps not sufficiently diplomatic: hiring "better men," recruiting college graduates, subjecting officers to sensitivity training or other forms of intensive personality reorientations, and organizing police-community relations programs, councils, or bureaus.

Consider the measures designed to get or produce better men. The central problem is that we have not known how to define or identify a "better man" or a "good cop," and until very recently, we have not even tried to learn how. One study done for the Chicago police department suggests that we may be able to devise psychological tests that will predict who will make good or bad patrolmen.[49] In the study 490 patrolmen were given four hours of tests and then had their performance evaluated by their supervisors, by the number of civilian complaints against them, and by other standards. This preliminary study has yet to be repeated in other cities and many questions still must be answered- chiefly, the reliability of the measures of patrol performance. Such tests may well be useful in weeding out the poorest risks, but it is unlikely they can guarantee the selection of officers who can handle any situation to the satisfaction of all concerned.

In the meantime, some have argued that college-trained men are more likely to have the desired qualities. A convincing case can be made for this view. Even if college teaches a man nothing of value in police work, it has two useful side effects; first, it selects from the general

population men and women who have certain qualities (motivation, self-discipline, general intelligence) that are probably quite useful in a police career and, second, it teaches certain characteristics (civility, urbanity, self-control) that might be especially desired in an officer. It is a measure of ignorance in these matters that an equally convincing case to the contrary can be made. Recruiting college men will no doubt reduce substantially (at least for the time being) the chances of adding more blacks and other minority groups to the police forces, for they are underrepresented in college classes. Second, college may make a man civil but it also gives him or reinforces for him, his sense of duty. This has led some college-trained officers to be excessively aggressive and arrest-prone when a gentler hand might be better. Third, college men and women may not be able as easily to identify with or understand problems of lower and working-class persons with whom they must deal. Finally, a police career is most unattractive for a college man- the work of a patrolman is routine, sometimes dull, frequently unpleasant, and occasionally dangerous. One study in New York City showed that patrolmen with a college education display a higher degree of cynicism and a greater sense of deprivation than those with less education.[50] In sum, the value of college training is still largely a matter of opinion.

C. Public Awareness Programs

Community policing is not a clear-cut concept, for it involves reforming decision-making processes and creating new cultures within police departments, rather than being a specific tactical plan. It is an organizational strategy that redefines the goals of policing. In general, community policing relies upon organizational decentralization and a reorientation of patrol in order to facilitate two-way communication between police and the public. It assumes a commitment to broadly focused, problem-oriented policing and requires that police are responsive to citizen demands when they decided what local problems are and set their priorities. It also implies a commitment to helping neighborhoods solve crime problems on their own, through community organizations and crime prevention programs.

These principles underlie a variety of policing programs. Under the rubric of community policing, American departments are opening small neighborhood substations, conducing surveys to identify local problems, organizing meetings and crime prevention seminars, publishing

newsletters, helping form Neighborhood Watch groups, establishing advisory panels to inform police commanders, organizing youth activities, conducting the drug education projects and media campaigns, patrolling on horses and bicycles, and working with municipal agencies to enforce health and safety regulations.

Can these programs live up to the expectations of their supporters? The answer to this is not clear, for there have been relatively few systematic evaluations of community policing programs. There is more exaggeration than solid evidence about the wisdom of community policing, and a great deal of hype behind many claims about new policing styles. Many researchers are professionally skeptical of claims about community policing, despite their general inclination toward it.

I am about to discuss several evaluations of community policing and summarize some of their results. Most of the evaluations contrasted the impact of community policing programs with the effects of intensive enforcement programs, as well as against what happened in control areas representing "normal" styles of policing. Since the mid-1980s, these enforcement programs have had a special focus on drugs. The community policing evaluations examined below point to some significant successes, however, that evidence that community policing can significantly reduce the crime rate remains elusive. They also point out many difficulties in actually implementing community policing.

C1. Baltimore, Maryland

Two versions of community policing were tested in Baltimore. Each was implemented in two areas of the city, in white and black neighborhoods of comparable income level and housing quality. **Foot patrols** were assigned to walk through the areas approximately 25 hours each week. They choose their own routes, concentrating on busy commercial areas and recognized trouble spots. They talked frequently with residents, business owners, and people on the street. In one area the officers put more stress on law enforcement and order maintenance. The officer who conducted most of the foot patrols in the other area focused more on talking with residents and merchants. Surveys conducted after one year indicated that about 15% of residents of each area recalled seeing an officer walking on foot within the past week.

In two other areas, **ombudsman police officers** were assigned to work with neighborhood residents to solve local problems. They walked foot patrol, attended community meetings, and spent a great deal of time talking to merchants and residents about local problems. They developed a questionnaire that measured what residents thought were the most serious problems in the area, what caused them, and what could be done to solve them. Officers were to record how they had reacted to each problem, and their handling of them was reviewed by their supervisors. The officer serving one area was aggressive in his approach to possible drug dealers, broke up groups loitering on the street, and gave many traffic tickets. He spent most of his time in busy commercial areas of the neighborhood. The officer in the other target area spent more time meeting with area residents, working to solve juvenile problems, conducting a neighborhood clean-up campaign, and organizing a block watch program. He also involved other municipal agencies in these efforts. He arranged for abandoned cars to be towed away, trees to be trimmed, and empty buildings to be sealed. He also worked closely with the department's traffic, vice, and narcotics units when out of public view. Surveys at the end of the evaluation period found that 64% of the residents of one area, and 75% in the other, recalled officers coming to their home; the officer who emphasized local service had been seen by 33% within the past week.[51]

C2. Oakland, California

Two policing programs were evaluated in Oakland, Both aimed at reducing levels of drug trafficking and related crime and fear. Each program was implemented in its own target area, and both were implemented together in a third area. A special **drug enforcement unit** conducted traditional police operations in its target neighborhoods. They went undercover to make buy-bust arrests, and they used informants to buy drugs and identify distributors. They also mounted an aggressive, high-visibility program of stopping and searching motor vehicles and conducting field interrogations of groups of men whenever they gathered in public places. The team was extremely active, made a large number of arrests, and apprehended a number of major drug traffickers in the target area.

This traditional policing program was contrasted to a program of **home visits**. Officers in the experimental community policing area and in the combined target areas went door to door, introducing themselves to residents. Their job was to inform people in the target neighborhoods of the department's new emphasis on drug enforcement, to give them pamphlets on crime and drug programs, and conduct brief interviews asking about neighborhood problems. Their goal was to make contacts that might lead to useful information, alert the community to the drug problem, and perhaps deter potential offenders due to their presence and visibility in the community. These door-step interviews were conducted in about 60% of the households in the target areas, a high percentage. About 50% of those interviewed indicated that drugs were a major problem in their community. Unlike the enforcement program, however, it provided difficult to sustain the interest of Oakland officers in these home visits. It had little support from the district commander, who did not believe it could work. An energetic officer saw to it that many interviews were conducted, but there was no follow-up problem solving. None of the intended problem-solving policing was ever accomplished, and nothing was done with the information gathered in the door-step interviews.[52]

C3. Birmingham, Alabama

Three programs were evaluated in Birmingham. As in Oakland, a special **drug enforcement unit** was formed to crack down on open drug dealing in dilaudid and cocaine. The team concentrated on undercover operations. They made a series of videotaped purchases from street dealers and then returned to the target area to make warrant arrests. Officers also posed as dealers and made videotaped drug sales to outsiders who were driving into the target area to make drug purchases. Ten officers were involved in this program for a 6-month period, but although they made a number of arrests, it was unlikely that their efforts would be very visible in the community surveys.

In another area, officers were to make **home visits** in order to pass out crime and drug prevention pamphlets and conduct interviews with area residents. They developed a questionnaire that asked residents about neighborhood crime problems and the whereabouts of drug trafficking. · They eventually completed interviews at 60% of the occupied housing units in

their target area. Although they completed a large number of interviews, no effort was made to follow up on the information that was gathered. It was envisioned that they would do team-oriented problem solving with the information that they gathered, but events conspired to undermine the program. A rise in calls for service in their area of the city came at the same time that the Christmas holiday season left the district understaffed. Under pressure to respond to the resulting deterioration in police response to 911 calls, officers who were to conduct the community policing program were assigned to traditional patrol.

The third Birmingham program was instituted in the evaluation's control area after 11 people were shot there in a short period, just after the beginning of the research project. In response to community demonstrations, a **police substation** was opened, staffed 24 hours per day by eight police officers. They greatly increased the visibility of police in the community. The substation unit assisted in a cleanup of the public housing project that dominated the area. In follow-up interviews, 72% of residents thought the substation was effective in reducing drug-related crime.[53]

C4. Houston, Texas

Three programs were evaluated in Houston. The first was a neighborhood **police substation.** The program team located space in a small commercial building with good parking. The office provided a place for people to meet with police. Officers took crime reports and gave and received information from the public, and some community meetings were held there. The staff quickly developed programs that extended into the immediate neighborhood, including a series of large community meetings in a nearby church. Station officers organized special patrols in area trouble spots, and they met regularly with local school administrators. Area churches and civic clubs were invited to select members to ride with officers patrolling in the neighborhood. Finally, on five occasions during the evaluation period the station staff distributed approximately 550 newsletters throughout the neighborhood. The newsletters advertised the station's programs and other community events, and printed articles about crime prevention. The station provided a direct test of several aspects of community policing. They responded by developing community-oriented programs that were virtually unheard of in

Houston's police department, and they invented a variety of new ways in which police and citizens could meet and exchange information and discuss their priorities.

The **Community Organizing Response Team** (CORT) attempted to create a local crime prevention organization in a neighborhood where none existed. The team's immediate goal was to identify a group of residents who would work regularly with them to define and help solve neighborhood problems. Its long term goal was to create a permanent organization in the community, one that would remain active after CORT left the area. To test the CORT concept, the task force first tried to become familiar with the area's problems. To do this they conducted their own door-to-door survey of the neighborhood. CORT members questioned approximately 300 residents about problems that they felt merited police attention, and whether they might be willing to host meetings in their homes. Thirteen neighborhood meetings were held, each attended by 20-60 people. The CORT program tested the ability of police departments to assist in the development of community self-help organizations.

Houston's **Home Visit** program was to help patrol officers to become more familiar with the residents of their areas and to learn about neighborhood problems. Officers in one target area were freed from routine patrol assignments for part of each daily shift. During this time they visited households in the area. Typically, officers in the program would visit an apartment building or a group of homes, introduce themselves to whomever answered, explain the purpose of the visit, and inquire about neighborhood problems. A record of these visits was kept at the district police station to guide further contacts. During the 10 months of the program, team officers talked to approximately 14% of the adult residents of the area. Visits were also made to commercial establishments in the area, and after 10 months about 45% of the merchants had been contacted. About 60% of the people who were interviewed had something to complain about. The officers took numerous actions in response to problems they identified during these visits.[54]

C5. Summary

The most common components of community policing experiments have been foot patrol, newsletters, and community organizing.

Other studies have reviewed the effectiveness of community crime prevention efforts. The Seattle Citywide Crime Prevention Program, using property identification, home security checks, and neighborhood block watches, significantly reduced the residential burglary rate as well as the number of burglary-in-progress calls. The Portland antiburglary program succeeded in reducing the burglary rate for the participants. The Hartford Experiment restructured the physical environment, changed how patrol officers were assigned, and organized the neighborhood in an effort to reduce crime and the fear of crime.

The effectiveness of the media in assisting crime prevention efforts is another evaluation focus. The public has favorably received the "McGruff" format and content. The "McGruff" campaign has had a sizable impact on what the public knows and does about crime prevention. Studies of three police-community anticrime newsletters found them to be highly effective, especially if they included crime statistics.

Some general conclusions can be drawn from the preceding studies, including the finding that successful crime prevention efforts require joint activities by the residents and police and the presumed improvement of relationships between these groups.

Eighteen model programs identified by the National Symposium on Community Institutions and Inner-City Crime project shared the following characteristics. The programs (1) were focused on causes of crime; (2) built on community strengths; (3) incorporated natural support systems; (4) had an identifiable group of clients; (5) targeted those who were less affluent; (6) had clearly stated goals and well-defined procedures; (7) had sufficient resources; and (8) had a strong leader.[55]

The implementation of community-oriented policing must be weighed against several impediments including the powerful pull of tradition; substantial segments of the public do not want the police to change; unions are skeptical of innovation; innovation may be costly; lack of vision on the part of police executives; and the incapacity of police departments to evaluate their own effectiveness.

IV. Advantages of the New Era for Policing

From the loneliness of the solitary beat officer, to the collectivity of the larger police department, the changes we are now seeing are almost all for the better. The recruitment of

more minorities and women could make neighborhood policing less difficult because of their ethnic background and gender. A much higher percentage of civilian employees, including professionals- lawyers, planners, analysts, computer specialists, personnel administrators, and so forth -should enable a police department to cope with the increasing complexity of crime because of their close association with the community.

As policing is improved- with better-educated, more articulate personnel, especially in management, where the problem is greatest- the improved status should strengthen policing's hand in the effort to eliminate biased interference and corruption. In the improvement of quality of policing, as opposed to quantity of police, the work of police departments should be more finely in tune with that of other branches of the criminal justice system. Heads of different branches now do not understand the total effect of their work because they do not know what is occurring in other parts of the system, and therefore cannot tell whether they are working at cross purposes or in a team fashion.

The police in some localities produce more arrests than the system can reasonably handle; by the same token, the courts often produce rulings which mystify, in the sense of confusing and demoralizing. Better data systems should be able to orchestrate the system to minimize frustration and maximize crime control. As the data produced by these systems become more usable, the police should become much more productive and direct their activities in a way that will make more sense not only to themselves but to those who must work with them.

Up until now, the police have tended to take satisfaction in the mere completion of arrests, and then feel they can walk away, having done the job. All too often the offender who returns to the street and the community to become a backslider is cited by the police as evidence of the failure of the courts or the correction system. Why haven't the police devoted enough time to the offender who after being arrested returns literally to the scene of the crime; i.e., the community? Because they have not been working closely with probation and parole officers, the police have undercut their own effectiveness. In the future the system will work better if every part of it works together systematically.

The principal work that has been done so far on the questions of implementation concerns the potential for decentralization of operational initiative in the police department to

street-level officers. That is thought to be important in the creation of an organization that is capable of undertaking community problem-solving initiatives. It is also thought to be important for enhancing the morale of officers generally and engaging their commitment to the changed strategy of policing.

What the evidence shows on these matters is that it is both important and possible to decentralize initiative in a police department and that the effects of doing so on officer morale are largely positive.

Police officers must integrate themselves into the community. The presence of outsiders with weapons, policing a community they neither know nor understand, perpetuates the notion of police officers as an occupying army. Roots in the community, or at least a commitment to developing roots, must be seen as an important hiring criterion.

We recognize that changing the conception of the police as an occupying force in the community will not happen easily or quickly. There is no single program that can be instituted or policy that can be adopted that in and of itself can transform the nature of police-community relations. The commitment to change must be made at all levels in the police department and in local and national government. It must be demonstrated concretely throughout police department policies, practices, and programs. Efforts to improve police-community relations must receive both financial and moral support from elected government officials. Similarly, it will take an ongoing, active effort to participate in finding solutions to collective problems, whether as part of the police force or as residents of the community.

Community-oriented policing has the potential to change the relationship between the police and the community, and to have some impact on the layered antagonism that generated the Rodney King incident and the many other examples of violence and degradation. Community policing means to defuse the insider/outsider vision of the police, to overcome police resistance to change, to chip away at police culture.

A. Effective Cooperation from Citizens

More than anything else, the police are rediscovering that ordinary people and communities are the first line of defense in controlling crime and fear. The police cannot

succeed without an effective partnership with the community they serve. Without the eyes and ears of residents to extend the scope of police surveillance, the reason of police patrol is pathetically thin. Unless ordinary people are willing to call the police, rapid response is essentially useless. Unless ordinary people provide descriptions of offenders and accounts of events, detectives can neither solve crimes nor mount effective prosecutions. Citizens' vigilance and willingness to come forward are an integral part of police operations. If that piece of the machinery is not working well, the police, for all their sophistication and equipment, are rendered ineffective.

The American public needs to come to grips with its unconscious need to see policemen as parents. The police are neither all-powerful nor all-knowing and cannot make pain, fear and feeling helpless go away.

The policeman cannot make us feel totally secure from either accidents of fate or the antisocial predators among us. This need for police to be superhuman is both unrealistic and harmful to our ability to cope effectively with uncertainty and danger because it perpetuates our belief that we can create a world in which we can be happy children whose parents are taking care of us. Consequently, it is best that civilians begin to rethink their own responsibility for maintaining public safety. They cannot leave the job of preventing crime and apprehending criminals entirely to the police, our divine parents, while they do nothing.

Citizens must become more involved in assisting the police by forming block watchers' groups to monitor movement on their streets and taking appropriate security measures in their homes and in their travel to make themselves less vulnerable to crime. They must overcome feelings of isolation from each other so that they can be of mutual assistance in times of trouble.

The far more difficult tasks for civilians are to develop a greater understanding of themselves and to change their perceptions of the police as substitute parents whom they expect to make all their hurts and fears disappear. They need to accept and to cope as best they can with their very real vulnerability to harm from which the police cannot make them immune.

The police must do more than they have done in the past to engage the citizenry in the overall task of policing. In a field in which resources are so often strapped, the potential of this relatively untapped resource is enormous. The police have been mistaken in pretending for all these years that they could take upon themselves all of the responsibilities that are now theirs. A

relatively small group of individuals, however powerful and efficient, simply cannot meet those expectations. A community must police itself. The police can, at best, only assist in that task.

B. Police Awareness of Community Needs

The new thrust in American policing, which we loosely designate community-oriented policing, is not a single coherent program. Rather, police forces around the country are experimenting with a variety of new programs all resting on the rationale that police must involve the community in a practical way in the police mission.

Police forces have been prompted to that kind of innovation by their own recognition that what has been tried for so long is not working; streets are not safer, fear of crime is not declining, criminals are not being brought more surely to the bar of justice, and faith in the criminal justice system is dwindling. Though police officers are reluctant to admit this, in their guts they know it is true, and it gnaws at them as much as it does at the public. Their growing conviction that something new must be tried has been reinforced by careful and systematic research showing that standard operating procedures are not having the effects they were supposed to. Increasing the number of police officers, for example, does not reduce crime; random motorized patrolling does not enhance public safety; rapid emergency response neither produces more arrests of criminals nor reassures the public; and crimes are rarely solved by policemen acting on the basis of physical evidence but require victims and witnesses to identify perpetrators and give persuasive testimony.

Accessibility of the police to the community is essential if local community feedback is to be more accurately comprehended and acted upon. Communication processes are subtle and easily distorted even among people who know each other well to say nothing of strangers.

The officer will have to accept that just beneath the surface of hero worship expressed by a civilian is hate for him not being the all-giving, loving parent the civilian unconsciously wants him to be. The policeman must rein in his own pleasurable response to admiration because it is neither constant nor unconditional. There are clearly a number of emotional strings attached to the civilian's affection for him. Consequently, he must try to accept hero worship with more than a few grains of salt.

Conversely, the policeman must accept that the knee-jerk hostility shown by some civilians is based on their unconscious experience of him as a powerful, cruel parent. In these cases, the officer may avoid angry and potentially violent encounters with these cop haters by not confirming their expectations that he is aggressive and punitive. While this is easier said than done, I believe that if the officer can avoid falling for the cop hater's baiting him into taking a threatening stance, he can defuse some of the civilian's hostility by doing the unexpected.

The old saying "You catch more bees with honey than with vinegar" applies in this type of situation, especially when the civilian expects vinegar. By appearing nonthreatening without giving up his authority, the police officer can turn the cop hater into someone less dangerous and easier to control.

Ethical behavior by individual officers and by the department as a whole is indispensable to effective police-community partnerships. Police use of discretion and force will profoundly affect police-community relations. A police officer or police agency may be said to exercise discretion whenever effective limits on his, her, or its power leave the officer or agency free to make choices among possible courses of action or inaction. Community-oriented policing emphasizes wider use of officer discretion.

Although the list of impediments to change focuses on factors police can in some measure affect directly, we recognize that conditions outside their control also play a significant role in determining the chances for success of police innovation. Some of those factors are the strength and weakness of local and national economies, the proportion of immigrants in a city, racial discrimination and hatred, municipal power structures, and bureaucratic and political traditions. Police chiefs frequently cite such factors as reasons for not introducing new strategies into their departments. In some instances these excuses may be valid. In others they are a cop-out. They mask a critical lack of strategic vision on the part of the chief or the department. Some police administrators simply don't know or are overwhelmed by the idea of introducing reforms involving community feedback, cooperation, crime prevention, and command decentralization. Some administrators are afraid of change in any form.

In sum, to introduce and implement new police ideas is not easy, but it is possible. More than that, it is essential if we are to achieve elementary public safety in American cities and confidence in the police by those who are being policed.

C. Enrichment of a Safer Community

Many Americans, including the police, believe crime prevention is the responsibility of the police. When crime surges in a community, the usual public response is to demand that more officers be hired. Citizens often believe that a visible police presence will deter and reduce crime, although most studies indicate that this is not the case.

The broad nature of policing in the 1990s highlights the critical contributions citizens, community agencies, and organizations can make to combat crime. For communities to thrive, citizens need a sense of neighborhood and to work together as a team. The police and the citizens they serve must realize that their combined efforts are greater than the sum of their individual efforts on behalf of the community.

Some critics argue that crime is not prevented by programs like Neighborhood Watch but instead it is displaced to neighborhoods where the residents are not as likely to report suspicious activity to the police. Even if this is true, such programs do raise community awareness and have a chilling effect on criminals who are inhibited by those who watch and call the police.

At the opposite end of the spectrum from communities that want the police to do the wrong things are communities that need police help but seem unable to voice these needs and help in filling them. In cities' poorest and most vulnerable neighborhoods, many lack the courage and self-confidence even to call 911, much less to organize cooperative partnerships and projects with the police. Too often there seems to be no partner with whom the police can join to try to turn things around, or so the police often believe. They may be right, but it could also be that they do not know how to look.

Random patrol and emergency response make it difficult for the police to form an accurate idea of the strengths of the communities they serve. Personnel practices make it unlikely that many members of police departments will have come from the poor communities they police so intensively. Traditions of professional independence and autonomy make it hard for the police to acknowledge the potential usefulness of people who have long criticized and attacked them.

As a result the police may fail to see the community's capacity for self-defense because they see the community through undiscriminating eyes. They cannot see that the community seems so helpless because it feels abandoned, and would discover new strengths if only the police could make an effective alliance with important community elements. Overcoming these blinders is one of the principal justifications for seeking a closer, more thoughtful discriminating relationship with communities.

The community must give innovation breathing space. New strategies take time to implement, and demonstration of their success takes even longer. Public support for new strategies is difficult to develop because of the public's opposition about police. The public acknowledges the difficulties of policing as an occupation but sometimes fears the potential of enforcement, even harassment. Such feeling are usually most pronounced in inner-city communities composed of members of minority groups. The police experience that opposition keenly. Although they know a police presence is frequently requested and often appreciated, they nonetheless feel resented and misunderstood.

Proactive crime prevention activities project the police into a co-production posture, which incorporates citizens into the police world. The citizen who co-produces may experience some of the frustrations and limitations of trying to maintain public safety. That is positive since the citizen will be more likely to comprehend and identify with the problems of policing. Police could scarcely invent a more effective form of positive public relations, which can eventually translate into political support for police and their resource needs.

With sufficient community-group pressure, bureaucracies are roused from their sluggishness to effect a crackdown on a small, locally defined problem. The community group then celebrates its small successes, trying to increase the hope of those whose hopelessness kept them from being involved, enlisting their support for the next project. Each new success is supposed to generate more participation, until a critical mass is reached.

The nostalgic sense of community embedded in the language of community policing is largely absent in the neighborhoods beset by crime. Despite all the problems related to doing so, reversing an area's economic decline may be a necessary forerunner to restoring the sense of community.

Future research and programs need to leave the area of the hypothetical to wrestle with the real questions of what the community can do. One possible avenue is to shift community efforts away from symbolic interactions that are easy to do but have little overall impact, into long-term interactions with public and private agencies that have the power to rebuild the infrastructure vital to community.

Though crime and disorder must be resisted simultaneously, it is time to stop thinking in terms of crime as the only barrier to community well-being. An alternative subjective framework for community activities might regard crime prevention as a result of other activities rather than as an independent activity in its own right.

Success requires more than different target selection. Building community is not a matter of monthly or weekly meetings, but of day-to-day caring. It requires demonstrations of caring that have meaning in terms that are understood by the persons cared about more than in terms meaningful to those showing the caring spirit. That is a formidable task, difficult to conceptualize in the quantitative terms that dominate social science and one that places the direct burden on the shoulders of those with the fewest resources, financial or personal. It is in filling that void that the community-based organizations have the greatest chance for success, in mobilizing agencies with a positive rather than a punitive agenda. Keep the feet of the police to the fire, by all means, but recognize that enforcement is but a bandaid. The real community healing must be done by outreach, by pouring into a seemingly bottomless hole of need those things that are taken for granted in the nostalgic community we allude to: teaching everyone's children a sense of self-worth, seeing that they do not go hungry, or without medical care or an adequate education; insisting on economic opportunities for all members of the community, support services for those who need it, and most important, membership in "the community" which is granted, not earned by trial.

D. Less Stressful Working Environment for the Police

One of the most talked about issues in police working during the last 15 years is "police stress." The job came to be seen as a highly stressful one that exacted a high emotional toll on its officers.

Just what police stress really is and what the term really means remains a puzzle. If stress is such a vague concept and if its usefulness in describing its effects is restricted to the theory used to define it, why is the idea of police stress not only popular but seemingly well accepted as an important topic for research? The answer may be that if police stress is defined as an occupational health issue, then aspects of the job could be identified and isolated as high stressors.

The organizational viewpoint of police stress is readily observed in Job Stress and the Police Officer, a symposium sponsored by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health.[56] Many of the speakers lay the problem of police stress at the door of the police department's structure and management style. They indicate that making the department less punitive and less hierarchical with respect to decision making would make the job far less stressful.

The point is that any attempt to understand stress in police officers that does not take into account the intense feelings of hate and pleasure caused by the job cannot completely account for the phenomenon. It is true that the organization and management style is a source of stress for cops. It is also true that the criminal justice system, the public, racial hostility, and crises contribute to police stress. Ultimately stress is an emotional experience, and the policeman's emotional experience of the work will have a great deal to say about its stress-inducing qualities.

The cop consciously believes the job is without pleasure while he unconsciously derives considerable gratification from it. This is a compromise in which the superego gets something, namely, the conscious experience of not gaining bad pleasure, while the unconscious desire for pleasure also get its share. He can do his job, get pleasure from it, and feel that he is following his conscience. The price tag for this compromise is that he cannot allow himself to consciously derive pleasure from the work, so he sees the job as demoralizing and worthless. This is a very stressful state to be in for 20 years- feeling that the job "sucks" every tour of every week for the cop's career.

The mental view of police stress does not lend itself to coming up with simple solutions to the problem. The occupational health and organizational management approaches can conduct scientific research, collect and analyze data, and formulate recommendations to alleviate

police stress. Studies can lead to straightforward changes such as eliminating rotating shifts, buying better radios, giving sergeants training in leadership, and other specific stress-reducing strategies. However, the mental picture says the problem is much more complex and less susceptible to simple solutions. The problem of police stress has to do with human nature rather than departmental procedures and organization and human nature is very resistant to change of any kind.

There is a growing recognition among police administrators that the officers under their command are not superhuman- that they are affected by their daily exposure to human indecency and pain; that dealing with a suspicious and sometimes hostile public does take its toll on them; and that the shift changes; the long periods of boredom, and the ever-present danger that are part of police work do cause serious job stress. Indeed, police work has been identified as one of the most stressful of all occupations.

Job stress is a serious threat to the well-being of both individual officers and police departments as a whole. Unrelieved stress can result in high blood pressure, cardiovascular disease, chronic headaches, and gastric ulcers. It can lead to severe depression, alcohol and drug abuse, brutality, and suicide. Stress affects officers' alertness, their physical stamina, and their ability to work effectively. These consequences of stress can plan an enormous financial burden on police departments. Excessive absenteeism, disability and premature retirement compensation, and high replacement costs for disabled officers all direct resources away from effective crime prevention and law enforcement activities. Police administrators have increasingly acknowledged that they cannot afford to ignore stress symptoms until officers break down, an infraction is committed, administrative action is required, or an officer can no longer function on the job.

Many sources of police stress arise from the nature of police work itself. The change from day to "swing" or graveyard" shifts not only requires biological adjustment, but also complicates an officers personal life. Role conflict is another stressor that often accompanies police work. Conflicts can easily arise between serving the public, enforcing the law, acting in accordance with one's own values and ethical standards, and serving as spouse, parent, and friend.

Lack of consideration by the courts in scheduling police officers for court appearances is an often-cited source of stress for officers. Court appearances often interfere with officers' work assignments, their personal time, and even their sleeping schedules. From the community at large, sources of stress include a lack of public support and negative attitudes toward police, distorted and unfavorable media accounts of incidents involving police, and the inaccessibility and perceived ineffectiveness of social services and rehabilitation agencies to which police must refer individuals.

Careful planning is needed to transform a general idea, such as the provision of counseling services to officers with stress-related problems, into an effective stress program tailored to the needs and characteristics of a particular police department.

Although program planners may feel that the need for a stress program is obvious, some needs assessment activities should be undertaken to reveal the specific needs and gaps in services that officers perceive as most important so that the program can be designed accordingly. This needs assessment should include questions about the primary causes of stress in officers' lives, the frequency of stress experiences, and the services that are needed most to help officers to cope with these stressors.

Once a department has implemented a stress program, administrators need information on how well that program is operating and whether it is accomplishing its goals and objectives. With such information in hand, they can identify flaws in program design or implementation and then develop plans for correcting those deficiencies.

Many administrators believe that they can accurately assess a stress program's effectiveness without formal procedures by relying on their experience, common sense, and intuition. Subjective judgment is no substitute for carefully gathered data or formal evaluation findings. Program administrators' impressions of what works and what needs modification are sometimes correct. Often, however, they are wrong. Therefore, some kind of monitoring and evaluation, involving formal procedures for collecting and analyzing information, should be an integral part of every police stress program.

A police department stress management program- whether labeled a stress program, a psychological/counseling service, a behavioral sciences unit, or an employee assistance program -typically contains both preventive and reactive program services. Preventive services are aimed

at the prevention and early identification of stress-related problems through education and training. These services may include providing information about the nature and causes of stress, training in the use of biofeedback techniques to help officers recognize and monitor signs of general health, and demonstrations of stress reduction techniques that can be used to reduce the chain effects of stress.

V. Conclusion

Something is clearly afoot in the field of policing. Throughout the country, police executives are committing their organizations to something called "community" or "problem-solving" policing. Predictably, rhetorical commitments to these ideas have outpaced the concrete achievements. Still, as one looks across the country, one finds many examples of departments that have introduced important new operational programs and administrative systems that are consistent with the spirit of the wider reforms and are often the important first steps in changing the operational philosophy of an entire department.

It is not hard to understand the attraction of the new ideas about policing. They seem to recognize and respond to what have come to be seen as the limitations of the "reform model" of policing; its predominantly reactive stance toward crime control; its nearly exclusive reliance on arrests as a means of reducing crime and controlling disorder; its inability to develop and sustain close working relationships with the community in controlling crime; and its stifling and ultimately unsuccessful methods of bureaucratic control.

Obviously, this situation presents a golden opportunity for police researchers. Society needs to know whether the new directions in which police agencies are now moving are valuable or not. In principle, police researchers are well positioned to provide the answers. Yet the situation holds a dangerous temptation for police researchers. The temptation is that the researchers will try too early to give a definitive answer to the key question of whether community policing works. Alternatively, researchers might try to 'rationalize' the untidy developments now occurring in the field, and bring them under some form of central control designed to ensure that the one best form of community policing is tested and implemented. In

doing so, there is a real risk that the search for better ways to police America's communities might be aborted or crippled.

Arguably, it is important both to society and to the police field that the current binge of innovation be allowed to go forward without too much regulation. Such an approach would ensure both the most intensive use of the field's own imagination and experience, and the widest possible search for interesting operational and administrative ideas. It would also ensure that the police field would continue to own and feel responsible for the developments that are now occurring.

As commentators, the police researchers would keep asking questions designed to clarify the concept of community policing and to unearth the particular assumptions that were being made in establishing the probable value of the new approach. They would report the results of experiments undertaken by the field. The findings from such studies would be accumulated as they became available, and used to influence judgments about the meaning, value, and feasibility of community policing. These reports would reflect the understanding that definitive results on the success of community policing would probably take a decade, perhaps a generation, to produce.

Through such work, society will ultimately learn what it needs to know about the developments now occurring in policing. The complex idea of community policing will gradually become clearer and the relationships among its constituent parts better understood, both theoretically and empirically. We will know better than we do now whether the complex ideas fit together into a coherent whole and whether the coherent whole works to achieve goals and objectives that society judges to be important and useful. We will also learn how hard it is to implement these ideas in the context of today's police organizations.

All this will happen at a pace that allows the important experimentation and innovation now occurring within the field to carry on at its current rapid pace. Most importantly, the professional field will continue to own the developments now taking place. Just as it took us a generation to develop and understand simultaneously the strengths and limitations of "professional policing" it may well take us a generation to develop and understand simultaneously the strengths and limitations of "community policing."

The police alone cannot solve the crime problem. Neither can the combined police and criminal justice system. The police could do far better if they understood their potential, as well as their limits, and spoke clearly and honestly to the public about both. They have failed to understand. They have failed to educate the public. They have contributed more to the problem than to its solution by defending the status quo when basic change is needed.

In defense of the American police officer, our society clearly gives him more to do than can be humanly accomplished. In the future, police performance will probably increase only as we decide on the priorities of those things we want accomplished by our policing. This will require sorting out among crimes and among criminal behavior.

The failure of management of police institutions has had a traumatic effect not only on the lives of our citizens but also on our police officers. It may hardly be the fault of dumb police administrators that the police have one of the highest rates of suicide of any occupation in the country. After all, the inherent conditions of the job and the streets- the physical dangers, psychological pressures, etc., have a lot to do with it. It is probably correct to say that dumb police management contributes generously to exceedingly high rates among police officers of alcoholism, nervous breakdowns, family breakups, heart disease, and other stresses that we see now as the almost inevitable concomitants of modern policing. While better management would hardly wipe out all the stresses, as if with a magic wand to erase reality, it would surely help alleviate some of the strains.

What the police chief must do, by all means, is to focus the entire institutional effort around one job: that of the police officer closest to the communities. Everything else should be secondary. It is a bosses' job only if we permit the boss to make it one, if we permit both the institutions of the police and the officers themselves to become alienated from their primarily role in society, which is to keep the peace and maintain order in a sophisticated, humane, and Constitutional way. Policing should not be a bosses' job but rather a cop's job, because it is my view that perhaps the American police officer in this last quarter of the twentieth century has the most important job around.[57]

A. Recommendations for Change

I offer the following ideas about what should be done with the powerful movement that is now occurring within the field of policing. I recommend that it be allowed to proceed expeditiously. There are enough theoretical arguments about the potential utility of the approach, and enough experimental evidence about the accuracy of the judgments that the widespread search for improved methods of policing along the lines suggested by community policing is warranted.

There are two principal problems with the way things are now developing. One is simply that the field as a whole is not yet accumulating enough experience. The rate of programmatic and administrative innovation should be higher than it now is if the movement is not to slacken and is to provide the basis for learning what works. The rhetorical commitment must be matched by the operational commitment. The second is that police researchers are not well positioned enough now to maximize the learning that can come from the experience.

One way to solve both problems simultaneously would be for the federal government to use its current commitment to increasing police presence on the street to encourage a change in the style of policing and to support efforts to learn as efficiently as we can from the field's accumulating experience. This should involve three things: (a) an ongoing survey of the field of policing to determine to what extend community policing is moving from rhetorical to operational levels throughout the country; (b) the establishment of a small number of police departments that could become the nation's laboratories and resource centers in which many of the operational and administrative problems associated with implementing community policing as an overall philosophy could be worked out for the benefit of the field as a whole; and (c) the creation of a national award process that would give a cash award to any police department that developed an important operational or administrative innovation consistent with the principles and spirit of community policing. Police researchers should be closely involved in these activities so that they can reliably fulfill the role of commentator. Through these devices, we can not only get on with the implementation of community policing, but discover what we ought to mean by the concept.[58]

ENDNOTES

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[3]Ibid,12.

[4] Herman Goldstein, **Problem-Oriented Policing,** (New York: McGraw-Hill PublishingCompany 1990, 20.

[5] Ibid, 22

[6] Dennis P. Rosenbaum, **The Challenge of Community Policing,** (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 1994), 45.

[7] Carl B. Klockars, **The Rhetoric of Community Policing,** (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1991), 247-248.

[8] Herman Goldstein, **Problem-Oriented Policing,** (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 25.

[9] Robert C. Wadman and Robert K. Olson, **Community Wellness: A New Theory of Policing,** (Washington: Police Executive Research Forum, 1990), 27.

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[12] Ibid, 27.

[13] Ibid, 30.

[14] Ibid, 30.

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[17] Jerome H. Skolnick and David H. Bayley, **The New Blue Line,** (New York: The Free Press,

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[20] Ibid, 51.

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[25] Malcolm K. Sparrow, **Perspectives on Policing: Implementing Community Policing**, (Washington: U.S. Department of Justice, 1988), 1

[26] David C. Couper and Sabine H. Lobitz, **Quality Policing: The Madison Experience**, (Washington: Police Executive Research Forum, 1991), 522-23.

[27] J. W. Snelson and T. N. Oettmeier, **Operational Plan for the Westside Command Station**, (Houston: Houston Police Department 1987), 5-6.

[28] Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, **Beyond 911, A New Era for Policing**, (U.S.: Basic Books, Inc., 1990), 131

[29] Mark H. Moore and Robert C. Trojanowicz, **Corporate Strategies for Policing, Perspective on Policing**, (Washington: National Institute of Justice and Harvard University, 1988)

[30] Malcolm K. Sparrow, Mark H. Moore, and David M. Kennedy, **Beyond 911, A New Era For Policing**, (U.S.: Basic Books, Inc., 1990), 132.

[31] Ibid, 132

[32] Story based on the experience of Mark H. Moore, who was a member of the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force along with Gerard Caplan, a consultant to Kevin Tucker.

[33] Survey of Community Attitudes toward Philadelphia Police: Final Report, prepared for the Philadelphia Police Study Task Force by National Analysts (1986), 13.

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[53] Ibid, 170-171.

[54] Ibid, 172-173.

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