The Bill Blackwood
Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas

An Analysis of Crowd Management Strategy in the 21st Century

An Administrative Research Paper
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for Graduation from the
Leadership Command College

By
David Carter, Lieutenant

Austin Police Department
Austin, Texas
July 2002

ABSTRACT

At the conclusion of the 1999 meeting of the W.T.O., the city of Seattle had suffered 20 million dollars in losses due to unanticipated rioting. Apparent political fallout included the eventual resignation of Seattle's police chief. A Mardi Gras riot occurring in Austin, Texas on February 25, 2001 caused local authorities to defend police practices. In light of the increasing frequency of incidents involving large crowds, this paper seeks to identify critical crowd management concepts.

Law enforcement executives who develop police policy, as well as political leadership, will need to give greater consideration to crowd management in the future. Police are increasingly challenged to maintain law and order while at the same time defend constitutional protections, especially those of expression and assembly. Police agencies need to clearly differentiate between free speech activities and other types of gatherings or incidents.

Among the many critical keys to crowd management are insuring that officers operate with a paramilitary unit mindset, removing the tendency of officers to take independent action. Furthermore, empowered, decisive, and exceptional leadership in "the field" is mandatory during crowd management events. To some these concepts may *appear* counter to contemporary community policing philosophy, however not if one is looking to address the overriding fear that besieges communities during riotous incidents, or controversial events likely to draw crowds.

It is vitally important to understand and manage political ramifications prior to events by establishing coalitions, adjusting internal cultures and opening lines of communications with potential activist elements. Proactive planning, coalition development and internal culture adjustment should occur in well before the onset of either anticipated or unanticipated incidents.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

On November 30, 1999 the city of Seattle hosted the annual meeting of the World Trade

Organization (W.T.O.). Visiting delegates, and related business, were expected to inject millions

of dollars into the Seattle economy. However, at the conclusion of the W.T.O. meeting some days

later, it was estimated that Seattle had sustained as much as 20 million dollars in property damage

and related loss of business within the downtown Seattle area. Political finger pointing became

rampant, and citizens openly expressed a lack of confidence in their city leadership. A nationally

published news article about the W.T.O. aftermath emphasized the political fallout stating:

"Seattle's police chief announced his resignation Tuesday, becoming the first political casualty of

the violent protests that disrupted the World Trade Organization conference"(Klahn, 1999).

Shortly after the "Mardi Gras riot" in downtown Austin that occurred on February 25, 2001,

newspaper headlines read "Police defend riot control" (Osborne, 2001).

Prior to the meeting of the W.T.O. in Seattle, the nation had not seen similar levels of

civil disturbance in many years. However, many police departments and local governments had

recognized the potential for civil disruptions in general, and in some cases had been planning for

such incidents. For example many large departments re-examined their preparedness in

anticipation of possible Y2K disruptions. However, what many American police departments

did not fully appreciate, at least prior to the Seattle incident, was the level of commitment and

tenacity of certain developing protest elements. For example in October of 2000 the annual

meeting of the Fortune 500 occurred in Austin, although smaller in scale than the Seattle

demonstrations, protestors gathered. Some donned black bandanas and waved signs, others

screamed profanities at members of the Austin Police Department Crowd Management Team, as

well as Travis County Sheriff's deputies. The protestors were very vocal and noisy, but other

than traffic disruptions, the overall protest was uneventful.

Although clearly unrelated to political protest, police leadership must be concerned about the level of chaos and violence, which may develop during festivals or post-sporting event celebrations. For example in February of 2001, the Austin Police Department found itself dealing with another large raucous crowd. Some estimates of the crowd size exceeded 100,000. The night was anything but uneventful. The night ended in one of the worst riots Austin had experienced in decades, with people injured, police car windows smashed, and small fires set on the street. In light of the historical frequency of major crowd events, many of which have evolved into large-scale civil disturbances over the past few years, this project will examine overall crowd control strategy. The project will investigate and discuss the importance of developing both a departmental philosophy and an internal departmental culture with regard to crowd management.

This project seeks to examine if there are differences between crowd control and crowd management. The focus of "crowd control" to date, has tended to be reactive. Modern "crowd control" may in fact use effective "mobile field force" tactics, however it is hypothesized that "crowd management" needs to be proactive as well. Departments must not only utilize effective Mobile Field Force tactics, but develop strategic concepts as well. Concepts such as building law enforcement coalitions, and developing other strategic partners, in addition to the fore mentioned departmental philosophy and culture. Additionally methods of strengthening lines of communications between involved parties will be examined. This is to include political leadership, community liaisons and even protest elements themselves.

Discovering differences in crowd control and crowd management will be accomplished by reviewing current and classic literature, and interviews with members of large metropolitan

area police departments from around the country. Additionally, this paper will include observations of this author, while serving as an Austin Police Department-Crowd Management Team Lieutenant (responsible for "operations") during the Fortune 500 protests in October of 2000, and the Mardi Gras riot of 2001.

It is anticipated that with a clear identification of key strategic crowd management concepts, law enforcement executives may be better able to respond to this highly critical public safety need. It is further hoped that political leaders will gain an increased confidence in their respective law enforcement agencies through an improved understanding of cause and effect as it relates to civil disturbance management, as well as the ethical responsibilities of law enforcement executives.

Review of Literature

Crowd control has been a topic of serious discussion within large law enforcement agencies for many decades. The very formation of "police forces," beginning in Boston in 1829 can in part, be attributed to the need to for a way to control "riotous behavior" (Begert, 1998). Yet in some ways the amount of available current and pertinent literature seems surprisingly limited. In light of many high profile incidents occurring over the past few years (e.g. Seattle) it is clear that more consideration is needed by, not only law enforcement executives who develop police policy, but also by political leadership who are ultimately accountable to citizens, and who control law enforcement purse strings.

Law enforcement agencies responsible for the control of civil disturbances, and reestablishment of order, have responded with "varying degrees of effectiveness" (Hubbs, 1997). Hubbs (1997) further notes that police agencies are often caught in, what are perceived to be "catch 22 situations." Such as, rapid and aggressive police action being perceived as police overreaction, while restrained or "limited" police action results in perceptions of police incompetence. These assessments are clearly as valid in 2002 as they were in 1997 or 1967 for that matter.

Recognizing that any large metropolitan area may suffer some form of civil disturbance, it is wise to review the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches adapted by agencies confronted by either anticipated or unanticipated civil disturbances. According to Schofield (2000) police agencies should learn from their own previous crowd control efforts, and develop innovative solutions and tactics, which will hopefully result in increased effectiveness and safety for all. Schofield goes onto say that departments need to conduct internal "in-depth reviews" to ensure that historical mistakes are not repeated (2000).

According to De Jong (1994) the Miami Police Department lists the following as "critical elements" with regard to "diffusing" large civil disturbances:

- Time - indicating the need to immediately "gather resources" and to quickly "suppress" disturbances to prevent escalation.

- Resources – sufficient in number to deal with "multiple incidents" simultaneously.

- Goals - agencies must have an organizational philosophy as well as prioritized goals specific to quelling civil disturbances.

- Specialized Tactics – specific to disturbance management.

- Plan of Action – addressing resources, personnel and command requirements.

- Training – ongoing, reinforcing tactics and plans.

- Critique and Update – related to both planning and training.

There is further information suggesting that (pertaining to civil disturbance management) law enforcement agencies should develop mission statements specific to civil disturbance management, to include "rules of engagement" (Fourkiller & Holsapple, 2000).

The U.S. Park police are well known for their understanding of crowd control issues. They separate crowd events into one of two categories; Special Events such as sports celebrations or festivals, and "First amendment activities" relating to protests, marches and demonstrations (Cox, 1998). This vital distinction is critical to the overall effectiveness of a police department, especially as it relates to public perception.

When training officers, and command leadership in crowd control techniques it is imperative to review the constraints on government (i.e. police) as dictated by the U.S. Constitution. This is especially relevant as it relates to events surrounding first amendment activities. Rights granting all persons freedom of expression through speech, press, assembly,

and rights to petition the government for a redress of grievances. According to the Legal Information Institute (LII)"(t)he right to freedom of speech allows individuals to express themselves without interference or constraint by the government." The Legal Information Institute goes on to note that the Supreme Court requires "substantial justification" by the government in anything that would be perceived as "regulating" speech content. Police departments should be aware that this issue has recently come up across the nation as it directly relates to attempts by the police to control demonstrations or protests (e.g. attempting to restrict or designate protest areas). However, LII also states, (t)he Supreme Court recognizes that the government may prohibit speech that may cause a breach of the peace or violence. The term "content neutral" means…and is an important factor in determining whether attempts at regulation of speech (on the part of police) are constitutional.

According to Begert (1998) police leadership must always strive to balance "(t)he necessity of keeping the peace" with the rights of American citizens. That balance can be achieved by combining accurate assessment, effective training, tactics and equipment.

A comparison of historical riot control practices of police and military units in the 1960's and 1970's indicates that "regular army units" were more effective in riot control than police. A primary reason for this is that police officers have been trained to act alone using individual discretion, where as military training stresses operating as a unit, including discipline, and strong "command direction" with individual unit members lacking discretion (Johnson and Wolfe, 1996). Command Officers at the Las Vegas Police Department attempting to manage huge crowds on the Las Vegas "Strip" during New Year's Eve celebrations discovered that "officers, who are trained to act independent of supervisors on normal patrol, were acting independently to effect crowd-control arrests." The actions of individual officers at times caused entire teams of

officers to respond, "effectively misusing valuable personnel resources" (Schofield, 2000).

The importance of operating, as a disciplined unit is further supported by Fourkiller & Holsapple who stress the importance of the concept of team cohesiveness in riot training. They note that "officers are indoctrinated to thinking for themselves," and that the resultant individual behavior is clearly "detrimental" to riot control tactics. They conclude by making the following important statement: "Officers must abandon personalized conduct, opting for close team-work." Even the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) recognizes the validity of police operating as a disciplined unit in a report on their perspective of the Seattle disturbances. The ACLU (2000) cites the1968 National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which states, "the individual officer must stop acting independently and begin to perform as a member of a closely supervised, disciplined team." The Commission report also indicated that riot control "requires large numbers of disciplined personnel, comparable to soldiers in a military unit, organized and trained to work as a team under a highly unified command and control system" (2000).

Specific literature relating to strategic leadership for crowd management, including preparatory efforts, training and actual deployment was found to be limited. In some sense, it seems that police agencies may rely on either anecdotal or internal histories in developing crowd control tactics and strategies. There may be any variety of reasons that more is not available. Large-scale incidents occur rather infrequently, and when they do they usually occur in larger metropolitan population centers. Thereby having minimal impact on the vast majority of smaller law enforcement agencies. Issues of litigation may also tend to limit the amount of information any given agency may be able to provide about given incidents. Those two clearly legitimate issues not withstanding, both strategic and tactical discussions on crowd management are critical for police managers based upon the notion of low frequency, yet high risk or impact upon their

respective communities. We can consider the following unrelated but similar result example. Police managers clearly understand that an officer involved shooting in a minority neighborhood is certain to cause public concern. Such concern warrants quick but thoughtful response (i.e. tactics), as well as previously established relationships (i.e. strategic planning).

Relating to specific or actual tactical deployment in the field, the issue of span of control is addressed. Hubbs (1997) notes that skirmish lines are frequently too light on supervision, and that having a single supervisory officer attempt to lead 20, or more, officers in an actual conflict is very ill advised. The importance of empowering field commanders with both knowledge and all available resources, along with the authority to act quickly cannot be understated (Fourkiller & Holsapple, 2000). The lack of field command empowerment results in delays in tactical movement. A tactical delay not only minimizes the effectiveness of the tactic being considered, but results in two dangerous effects: mobs become empowered, and officers develop low morale. Low officer morale will cause independent and uncoordinated officer actions. Said actions will appear to mobs (and press) that the police are out of control.

Methodology

The first amendment of our nation's Constitution gives citizens some of the most vital freedoms expressed by any form of national government, some of those being the rights of freedom of expression, and assembly. Police are evermore challenged to maintain law and order while at the same time defend constitutional protections. This has never been truer than within the past few years, especially with regard to managing large groups of protestors exercising freedom of expression rights, or with any large group exercising the right of assembly. When those assemblies become unlawful, just how the police respond will receive as much, or more, scrutiny than those involved in illegal conduct in the midst of demonstrations, celebrations or riots.

This paper seeks to identify the critical components of professional crowd management strategy. It is hypothesized that those components include the importance of establishing a departmental philosophy specifically relating to crowd management. That philosophy should include the following:

- The importance of utilizing teamwork as opposed to independent action.
- Developing a departmental culture, which recognizes the importance of the first amendment.
- Insures that police actions are intentional, deliberate and occur only as a result of illegal conduct, not hateful or controversial speech.
- Clearly recognizes differences between illegal but non-violent conduct (e.g. "civil disobedience" and illegal conduct that is violent (e.g. active assaults or destruction of private property). Furthermore that the department has clearly distinctive tactical responses too each type of illegal conduct.

- Developing coalitions with not only other law enforcement agencies, but with political leaders (i.e. provide understanding), and activists.

- Empowering and trusting field commanders to take immediate and decisive action at first indication of "riotous" behavior.

In addition to the review of literature and previous coursework; other methods of inquiry that have been utilized for this project include interviews with members of large urban police departments specifically regarding crowd control practices, and observations of the author during the formation of the Austin Police Department Crowd Management Team. These observations were made while deployed during Fortune 500 protests, and the 2001 Mardi Gras celebration riot, which occurred within the city of Austin, Texas. Police departments around the country, which have been contacted include: Houston, Dallas, Phoenix, Denver, Atlanta, and San Francisco, among others. The cumulative population protected by the agencies contacted well exceeds 10,000,000 people.

The following questions and topics were covered during the interviews:

- Does the queried department use a Mobile Field Force (MFF), or similar, concept?

- How often does the department train in crowd control techniques?

- Does the department conduct MFF leadership training?

- Does the department have a dedicated crowd control team?

- Does the department have a specific crowd control policy?

- Does the department have any pre-established mutual aid agreements with other agencies?

- Does the department differentiate between "free speech" activities and other crowd control events?

- Does the department have an established relationship with known protest/activist groups?

The information collected will be summarized, and included and contrasted with the Author's observations relating to the development of the Austin Police Department Crowd Management Team and significant deployments.

Findings

A number of large police departments were contacted from around the country and telephone interviews were conducted inquiring about specific crowd control procedures utilized in response to large gatherings of people. Inquiries were also made as to the types of training provided to officers, as well as general crowd control philosophies subscribed to (if any). All of the agencies contacted responded that they subscribe to some form of the Mobile Field Force concept. Their training frequency varied, ranging from once a year to once a month depending on whether patrol or select units were given primary crowd control responsibilities. Of particular interest was that virtually none of the agencies contacted provided specific command leadership training beyond the basic crowd control training given to line units.

The issue of departments having specified crowd management teams was generally limited to either tactical teams with specialized weapons training, such as the Dallas P.D Tactical section, or as in the case of Phoenix the Neighborhood Response Units "NRU." In many of the cases it was expected that patrol would handle the majority of the responsibility, and that specified tactical units would provide support.

Most agencies indicated that they had some form of crowd control procedure, but that it was frequently a general order type policy relating to special events or other unusual circumstances. Few of the agencies contacted had a specific crowd control policy. Many indicated that "plans" are developed on a per incident basis.

Mutual Aid agreements between police agencies are generally thought of as necessary in the event of natural disasters or other law enforcement emergencies. Queried agencies were asked if they had established mutual aid agreements which addressed crowd control situations, be the agreement either formal or informal. It was found that generalized mutual aid agreements,

with at least one nearby agency, were found to exist among all the agencies contacted. However crowd control training and/or routine contact with mutual aid partners was limited and infrequent.

All agencies contacted differentiated between free speech activities and other types of gatherings or incidents. All contacted agencies indicated that they were committed to allowing free speech activities. However related training was not frequently addressed.

Activities relating to establishing relationships with activist groups seemed limited to cities that have been known to have frequent protests involving free speech activities such as San Francisco. Phoenix P.D. utilizes an interesting concept called the "Confrontation Mediation Unit." The unit specifically holds monthly meetings with area activists and concerned citizens with one of the goals to discuss possible protests or neighborhood concerns that have the possibility of developing into civil disturbances.

Relating specifically to the author's observations while developing the Austin Police Department Crowd Management Team (APD CMT) protocol leading up to the meeting of the Fortune 500, the APD sought to address both public safety and public apprehension (i.e. "fear of crime and civil disorder"). The Austin Police Department sought to determine whether the "Fortune 500 Forum" could draw protests having the potential to:

- Disrupt traffic, commerce and/or other individual citizen freedoms in the downtown area or elsewhere,

- Result in violence to persons or property,

- Disrupt the "Forum" itself.

Once potentialities for any of the above three criteria were identified, the Austin Police Department focussed on developing an appropriate response, which would be professional,

ethical, justifiable and effective. Specific objectives to be carried out by the APD CMT (and support units) during the Fortune 500 Forum were:

- Allow for meetings of the Fortune 500 Forum to occur without unlawful interruption,

- Maintain uninterrupted traffic flow,

- Allow for peaceful and lawful protest,

- Immediately intervene in cases of violence to persons or property.

Additionally the Austin Police Department further sought to understand the general nature of politically motivated civil disturbances. Various law enforcement intelligence groups observed that the same collective of protest groups which created disruptions in both Seattle and Washington D.C. continued to utilize disruptive tactics at both the Republican and Democratic National conventions in 2000. The common theme of disruptive tactics utilized were referred to as "direct action."

"Direct action" refers to organized protest tactics designed to disrupt both private and public entities (e.g. WTO, IMF, political conventions et. al.). Regardless of which protest group is involved, direct action frequently includes illegal activities. Depending on which particular group is involved, or present, illegal activity may be in the form of "non-violent civil disobedience" or overt violence. The range of "direct action" activities over the past few years include actions such as laying down in the street to block traffic, to "trashing" corporate targets such as a Starbucks coffee shops, or the Bank of America. Violence stemming from either an originally politically organized demonstration, or a semi organized non-political celebratory event may result in assaults or property damage.

Direct action tactics, in general, vary depending on which particular group is involved. For example the "Anarchist" groups, e.g. "the black block", have used violence toward persons

(especially police) and property. Anarchists frequently use "hit and run" tactics whereby unrelated protestors, at times unknowingly, create a larger disturbance/diversion (even) unintentionally providing cover for anarchists which cause significant property damage/arson at one location then rapidly leave. This tactic is designed to draw police to many different locations both to overwhelm and to cause fatigue. In contrast "Ruckus Society" trained groups tend to use so called "hard" civil disobedience tactics, which are designed to be confrontational but generally not intended to assault police. Examples are activities such as blocking traffic or pedestrian access by protestors linking themselves together, or chaining themselves to immovable objects, including suspending themselves or banners from high rise buildings, cranes, etc. Groups following "Ruckus Society" tactics strongly believe in their causes. Said groups further believe that illegal actions, including actively resisting police, are justifiable in both a moral and legal sense. At times it is difficult to distinguish which protest group is present, other times it is not (e.g. many anarchists wear black clothing, or wear bandanas and hoods).

"Tactical Innovation Theory" which was used by civil rights organizations during the "60's" is an important concept for Mobile Field Force Commanders and law enforcement executives to recognize and understand, as it directly relates to tactics used by political activist groups. It is important that police executives examine this issue not with an eye toward undermining a social cause, which may or may not have merit; but rather in understanding the processes used by activist groups that may directly impact the police mission. The theory states:

- *Challengers lack* institutionalized *power.*
- *New tactics offset powerlessness, providing temporary bargaining leverage for the group.*
- *Authority figures neutralize the tactic over time and reinstate the power disparity.*
- *Challengers must formulate a new tactical innovation, resort to coercion, or parish.*

Understanding "Tactical Innovation Theory" from a police command perspective may suggest the following (in relation, and of concern to Mobile Field Force Leaders): There are elements within protest groups who are strongly committed to their cause, that they believe that the "cause" is worthy, just, and moral. They believe that they are powerless to "correct" the issue of their concern. As a result they may deem the use of illegal action as "justifiable." They recognize that "authority figures," including the police (seen as agents against change) will at some point render their tactics ineffective. It is imperative to recognize that some individuals may seek arrest to bring attention to their cause. As a result police commanders must also expect new, possibly illegal, protest techniques to be developed; thereby demanding flexibility and innovation on the part of police tactical planners. Tactical Innovation Theory was discussed in oral communications with Dr. Michael Lauderdale of the University of Texas School of Social Work, and Dr. Ronnelle Paulsen of the Austin Police Department during the West Point Leadership Program held in the spring and summer of 2000.

In addition to fully grasping the nature of civil disturbances based upon political activism; it is imperative law enforcement leaders recognize previous law enforcement deficiencies relating to riot control in general. This includes both strategy and tactics. Project findings have revealed the following general deficiencies related to overall police crowd control tactics and strategies:

- Failure to act preemptively upon intelligence

- Failure to understand crowd motivation and tactics,

- Failure to take rapid and decisive action,

- Failure to the understand importance of "troop morale,"

- Failure to understand the value of leadership at all levels,

- Failure to recognize troop needs/limitations (fatigue, hydration, food, bathroom

breaks, i.e. not having a definitive relief plan),

- Communication breakdowns (between leadership, other support teams and outside
  agencies),

- Failure to develop and maintain partnerships with other law enforcement agencies,
  media, and government/community leaders.

Conclusion

As a result of the wave of street demonstrations and large-scale celebratory riots occurring nationally pre September 11, 2001 ("9-11"), police departments need to pre-determine who in the department will be charged with responding and dealing with crowd situations. Although there has been somewhat of a slow down in such riotous behavior since "9-11" there is no indication that such activities will not re-resume in the near future. What ever teams are designated to respond to such events be it Patrol, specialized units or a combination of both; it is imperative that teams receive both specialized training and equipment needed to control large-scale civil disturbances, including those involving extreme violence.

Officers must possess self-discipline, physical ability and the capability to work under hazardous and stressful conditions for extended periods of time. Training should be ongoing, and periodic to ensure continued departmental response capability. Effective professional tactics, as well as civil disturbance management strategies should be frequently reviewed, and evolve as needed.

There are many critical keys of professional crowd management starting with the importance of training, thinking and operating with a unit mindset. Thereby removing the tendency of officers to take independent action. This may *appear* counter to some Community Policing viewpoints. However large urban departments have to now consider the possibility that there will be an ever-increasing number of controversial events likely to occur within their jurisdiction. With the improvements and rapidity of worldwide communication networks, as well as mobility, departments will find themselves dealing with a wide spectrum of persons of varied political beliefs, causes, cultures, values, and perceptions. Some, if not many, protest participants will not be from the affected community, thereby minimizing community-policing

efforts that might otherwise have been effective in the prevention of civil disturbances (e.g. civil disturbances in Seattle, Washington D.C., Philadelphia, Los Angeles, et. al.). While, it is important for police departments to establish communication and understanding with protest organizers; the reality is that protest organizers are not likely to have complete control over all aspects of a protest, e.g. "black block" anarchists.

How a department effectively deals with civil disturbance incidents will continue to be highly scrutinized by the entire range of "stakeholders." With that in mind, internal departmental cultures may need to be adjusted specifically relating to tactical civil disturbance units. For example the APD-CMT has a developed unit pin with the motto "defend the first" engraved upon it. The APD-CMT responds only to illegal action…not words, even when the APD-CMT responds it does so clearly recognizing the difference between "civil disobedience" and violence toward persons or property. In addition to unit, or teamwork, training for civil disturbances, it is important as previously noted to not only recognize constitutional protections, but to actually incorporate first amendment issues into crowd management team leadership training.

Law enforcement coalitions among various agencies are needed to establish effective civil disturbance management. In developing coalitions, police commanders must not neglect or minimize political coalitions including formal political leadership. Police leadership will also benefit from (at least informally) in establishing ongoing relationships and communications with the fore mentioned protest/activist organizations.

The necessarily restrictive role of the police (i.e. the need to maintain absolute impartiality) clearly suggests that the police not speak to the issues concerning the protestors. Protestors must be allowed to present their message, regardless of the popularity of said message. While at the same time insuring that our citizenry move about freely without fear of violence

and/or <u>unreasonable</u> disruption of their lives. Most, if not all, police commanders will strongly agree with this premise. However, police departments must also work to avoid perceptions of hindering free speech, from which much political hay can be made.

Some, but certainly not all, controversial elements are clearly violent; the collective protest of the present is vastly different from riotous "mobs" of the past. Traditional crowd control tactics are highly effective in managing disorganized violent mobs, and continue to remain such. However a variety of additional tactics are needed to control organized groups that are, not only knowledgeable in police tactics, but use their own strategy and counter-tactics. Protest actions may include "layering" direct action with civil disobedience. At times violence may be interspersed. Whether resultant violence was originally intended or not, police tactics must remain flexible.

The police use of force, has long been an area of concern to the public, not only relating to individual incidents, but to large scale incidents as well (e.g. civil rights demonstrations of the 1960's). While the police must be mindful of a negatively perceived police history, and perceptions in general relating to the use of force, the police must not hesitate to rapidly use appropriate force at the onset of widespread violence.

Crowd management commanders need to recognize that there are three general types of protest or crowd situations to which they are likely to respond:

- Those protests or demonstrations which are lawful in scope and intent, requiring no, or minimal, police action;

- Those protests or gatherings which are unlawful in action and intent, though are generally peaceful involving acts of civil disobedience requiring arrests, however using either no, or only minimal, force;

- Those protests or gatherings which are unlawful in action and intent, whereby there is great risk of injury to persons or damage to property, requiring arrests and/or crowd dispersal utilizing collective force.

It is clear that the line between police under reaction and over reaction is narrow and precarious at best. Even in spite of best efforts and intentions, the perception of police intervention, or lack thereof, can be equally devastating to a large law enforcement agency. Some negative perception, or "spin," related to the most professional police response is a virtual certainty. That fact must not hinder police leadership in its ethical obligation toward maintaining public safety. However, negative perceptions may be mitigated, or minimized.

It is vitally important to understand and manage political ramifications. This means establishing solid lines of communication prior to an event. Based on recent events in other cities, the following broad categories are capable of causing public concern:

- Police Department readiness and preparation for anticipated civil disturbances,

- Timeliness or delay in initiating response to an "in progress" civil disturbance,

- Police use of force/tactics.

Recommendations for countering possible political ramifications include:

- Briefing City Staff on not only police tactics, but educating Staff that there will be situations which absolutely require rapid deployment, and the "use of force" to prevent worse consequences,

- Maintain good working relationship with media and community leaders,

- Maintain officer morale through training, support and leadership.

Departments should conduct ongoing assessment, occurring prior to, during or post incident. After an incident involving a disruptive protest or civil disturbance, police departments may wish

to consider the following criteria to gauge effectiveness, as well as public and political perception:

- Were citizen or stakeholders routines unreasonably interrupted for extended periods of time?

- Were any of the primary functions of the purported "controversial event" (such as a meeting of the Fortune 500 leaders) substantially disrupted?

- If so were the disruptions professionally managed or minimized?

- Were incidents involving large-scale violence rapidly interrupted?

- Did protestors feel as if their message was delivered?

- Were complaints of "police over-reaction" over-weighted or balanced by favorable public opinion toward police response?

- Do the citizenry have confidence in their police to handle similar events in the future?

The police, on a national level, are rapidly progressing toward "community policing" goals. However community leaders must recognize the true dichotomy of policing. On the one hand "community policing" properly prevails the majority of the time. Those times when the individual officer must work together with either individuals or groups, to solve or prevent problems leading to criminal activity and/or lowered quality of community life. On the other hand police executives must realize that there are times when police must act in concert, both strategically and tactically, to deal with large-scale public safety problems such as a riots.

Training and preparation for anticipated or unanticipated civil disturbances must continue, and in some cases be revamped due to a renewal of violence among some organized elements. Police leadership must have the discipline, understanding and courage to either employ, or refrain from deploying, force while at the same time maintaining complete impartiality toward

the original cause of the disturbance. The police must not hinder free expression, yet must act without delay in order to interrupt those bent on using violence with the intent to create fear, intimidation, and/or interrupt just political processes.

REFERENCES

ACLU-WA. (2000) <u>Out of control: Seattle's flawed response to protests against the</u> <u>World Trade Organization.</u> Seattle, WA: Author.

Begert, M. (1998) Crowd control measures. <u>Police Chief, 65,</u> (6), 42-51

Cox, J. R. (1998) Strategies for Effective crowd control. <u>Police Chief, 65</u> (6), 26-41.

De Jong, D. (1994) Civil Disorder: Preparing for the worst. <u>Sheriff, 46</u> (5), 13,44-47,56.

Fourkiller, L & Holsapple, M. (2000) Is your agency prepared for incidents? <u>Law and</u> <u>Order, 48</u> (5), 127-130.

Henderson, J. (2000) Seattle siege: learning from the chaos in a city's streets. <u>Police, 24</u> (4), 22-31.

Hubbs, K. (1997). Police practice: riot response: an innovative approach. <u>FBI Law</u> <u>Enforcement Bulletin, 66</u> (1), 8-11.

Johnson, H.A., & Wolfe, N.T. (1996) History<u> of Criminal Justice, Second Edition.</u> Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co.

Klahn, J. (1999, December 8) Seattle police chief quits after violence at WTO. <u>Austin American Statesman,</u> pp. A17, A24.

First amendment overview (2001) <u>Legal Information Institute</u> [On-line]. Available: http://www.law.cornell.edu/topics/firstamendment.html

Osborne, J. (2001, February 27) Police defend Sixth Street riot control. <u>Austin American Statesman,</u> pp. A1, A6.

Schofield, G. (2000) Controlling boisterous celebrations. <u>Police Chief, 67</u> (6), 51-62.

Seattle Police Department. (2000) After <u>action report Nov. 29 – Dec 3, 1999 World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference.</u> Seattle, WA: Author.