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A Practical Approach to Anti-Terrorism for Law Enforcement

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**By
G. Houston Johnson**

**Harker Heights Police Department
Harker Heights, Texas
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research paper was to ask the question: Is there an effective and efficient process whereby local law enforcement agencies of varying sizes can use their finite resources to accurately identify, prevent, detect, deter, disrupt or minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack or activity within their jurisdictions? This paper hypothesizes several issues. There is a way for law enforcement agencies to proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or activities occurring in their areas, prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place. There is a simple system to identify potential terrorist targets and that proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be made using the existing resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional investigative training and cost. The research done for this project supported the hypothesis.

Anti-terrorism is a defensive or proactive effort to try and prevent a terrorist attack. The *Terrorist Group Profiling* of a terrorist organization and *The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism* were the result of studying over 1000 documented cases of terrorist attacks worldwide. *The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism* organized and placed in chronological order, the 12 behaviors that most terrorist groups go through when planning a terrorist attack and an associated timeline for those behaviors. Understanding those behaviors and what motivates groups will help law enforcement to identify potential terrorist activity and address it appropriately. That effort can be enhanced by combining information gathered with open source intelligence, criminal and suspicious activities and networking with other agencies.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center and the ensuing anthrax mail attacks, there has been a community and societal concern for what government agencies are doing to address and combat terrorism locally. Fire departments and law enforcement agencies are applying for grant funds and re-writing budgets to funnel money into hazardous material response preparations and bomb detections devices. Government building managers, various organizations and corporate America are hiring security consultants at a record pace to fortify and strengthen facilities, block access to roads and install metal detectors. Airport security has evolved into an adventure that rivals most SWAT operations. Airline pilots are carrying guns. Ironically the use of those weapons requires them to open a secured bulkhead door to shoot in the direction of passengers, in an effort to protect the traveling public. In all this excitement, it seems that federal agencies are getting larger and reorganized while local agencies are getting grant funds cut and pats on the back from state and federal agencies who say they will respond to assist with any terrorist incident that might occur in their city, as soon as the request is processed through proper channels. Narcotics task force budgets are being cut and every letter a person receives in the mail from one of those magazine clearing houses, has a white powder substance in it that must be anthrax. After all, they live in a trailer park and are two months behind on their rent. It isn't that they live in a trailer park. It's why would they be a target? Why isn't anyone promoting some way of preventing a terrorist attack rather than responding to it? It would seem that having your hazardous materials response team capable of responding to a

chemical/biological event in your city would be a great idea until you realize that all you're doing is moving the rescued from your contaminated zone into the government's contaminated zone because the Center for Disease Control (CDC) assisted, by federal, state and distant local agencies, has setup a no in or out perimeter 10 miles outside your city limits and is waiting and watching from the outside trying to determine what can best be done to help those outside the perimeter. Although this scenario is hypothetical, or is it, there has to be a better way. This research paper will look to answer the question; is there a proven method for law enforcement agencies of varying sizes to use existing investigative resources to prevent terrorism in their jurisdiction without having to apply for a grant to purchase a pancakeometer, whatever that is. Terrorism involves human behavior, and all behavior is purposeful and pleasure seeking. The advancements in the study of human behavior and the study of terrorist groups has to have crossed paths, even if in another country that has been dealing with terrorism as a way of life for some time. Most people are aware of the homicide/suicide bomber attacks the Israeli Government deals with. What most people aren't aware of is they have estimated they prevent 90% of the attacks planned by terrorist groups against Israeli interests. There has to be a system that will enhance community and societal concerns and provide local law enforcement agencies some form of investigative ability that is credible enough to consider a viable option to prevent terrorism.

The research for this paper began by outlining basic terrorism concerns and individuals who have expertise in those fields. Interviews were done, information gathered, analyses completed, comparisons made and conclusions

drawn that either proved or disprove the hypothesis which is: there is a way law enforcement agencies can proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or activities occurring in their areas, prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place, better identify potential terrorist targets located within their jurisdictions and that proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be done using the existing investigative resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional investigative training and cost. The intent of the research was to provide at least an outline that law enforcement agencies can use to consider as a method of addressing terrorism concerns.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

While preparing this report, it was important to find corroborating data to support the hypothesis. There were seven books from which information was gathered, and all seven supported issues identified in a study performed by Mr. Hart Brown and Mr. Doug Smith. Their conclusions were the *Terrorist Group Profiling* system and *The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism*.

In the book *A Force upon the Plain: The American Militia Movement and the Politics of Hate*, Kenneth Stern discusses an historical account of the militia movement in America. The book was released after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City when the patriot and militia movements were escalating as a domestic terrorism concern. Stern reveals a growing feeling of mistrust of the Government among militia groups and discusses the most extreme of these anti-government groups "Patriots".

In the book *American Jihad: The Terrorist Living Among Us*, the author, Steven Emerson, discusses the Islamic movement within the United States and how those groups are tied to known terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hizaballah. Emerson discusses how terrorist networks are working across America to fund raise, recruit and hide terrorist activities in America. Emerson himself has been targeted by terrorist groups and has been offered enrollment into the witness protection program because his research has been so damaging to terrorist organizations.

Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror by Rohan Gunaratna is based on over five years of research and interviews dealing with the structure, ideology, motivations, and tactics of this very violent terrorist group. One thing identified in this book is Al Qaeda's ability to learn from mistakes made during their operations as well as the mistakes of other terrorist organizations thereby improving their tactics and strategies.

Inside Terrorism by Bruce Hoffman reviews the history of terrorism and provides a historical overview. Hoffman is the director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence. The book reviews the motivations of religious terrorist groups and supports several of the issues identified in this project's research into group profiles and motivations.

Target USA: The Inside Story of the New Terrorist War by Louis R. Mizell Jr. is another book that provides an overview of terrorism. A passage from the book states "An enemy with a thousand faces has declared war on the United States, and the fighting has already commenced. The battlefields are neither deserts nor tropical jungles, but office buildings, hotels, churches, airports, and

even quiet suburban streets. The enemy soldiers, rarely in uniform, are virtually invisible.” It discusses many terrorist events and activities that have been going on around the United States for years.

Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why by Rex A. Hudson and the staff of the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress, is probably the most complete reference material reviewed which supports the research for this project. It reviews many terrorist groups and provides profiles of terrorist activities using non-classified open sources of intelligence. This report was considered a landmark research study in the field of terrorism.

The Cobra Event by Richard Preston is the book read by President Clinton that was credited with focusing Clinton’s attention on America’s domestic preparedness against Terrorism. The book takes an Ebola type virus and builds a storyline around it as a possible bio-terrorist weapon. The story is fictional but uses agents and organisms that are actually available, discusses how the agent could be disseminated, who could be capable of such an attack, and who would investigate or be brought to bear.

The Government Accounting Office Report (GAO/NASAD 98-74) states in part, “Threat and risk assessments are widely recognized as valid decision support tool to establish and prioritize security program requirements. A threat analysis, the first step in determining risk, identifies and evaluates each threat on the basis of various factors, such as, it’s capability and intent to attack an asset, the likelihood of a successful attack, and its lethality. Generally, the risk assessment process is a deliberate, analytical approach to identify which threats can exploit which vulnerabilities in organizations specific assets”. This document

supports the need for threat and risk assessments, and the organization of intelligence to assist in decision making and threat management.

The Department of Homeland Security Information Bulletin 03-004 (Possible Indicators of Al-Qaeda Surveillance) dated March 20, 2003, outlines identified behaviors of Al Qaeda operatives who are conducting surveillance within the United States. The document is important because close review and consideration of the behaviors indicated are proof that if a law enforcement or government organization were going to focus their efforts on identifying terrorist surveillance or reconnaissance activities in their area, the agency would need to concentrate on the behavior exhibited not necessarily the race, religion or ethnicity of the individual. According to Smith, the surveillance indicators listed in this document are mirrored by class participants while conducting vulnerability surveys as part of their class security surveys section of training. This reinforces the hypothesis and focuses support on the behaviors theory identified in this paper.

The *L.E.A.R.N. Practical Anti-Terrorism Training for Regulators of the Food and Agriculture Industry - A Common sense Approach* is a training manual developed and furnished to class participants, in the USDA's Anti-terrorism training program. It outlines terrorist group behaviors, profiles, motivations, chemical and biological weapons, threat and vulnerability surveys, security objectives, open source intelligence gathering, protective intelligence, information management, social engineering, multidisciplinary teams, S.C.A.N. and threat management. These topics all support the hypothesis and even outline the process for which law enforcement agencies can identify and implement training

that would allow existing investigative and enforcement resources to be used in a proactive manner against possible terrorist activities in their jurisdictions. There is also a facilitators training manual that addresses train the trainer courses complete with objectives, teaching aids, handouts and lesson plans.

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this research paper was to answer the question: Is there a proven effective and efficient process whereby local law enforcement agencies of varying sizes can use their finite resources to accurately, identify, prevent, detect, deter, disrupt or minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack or activity within their jurisdictions? The intent of this research paper was to develop information to support the hypothesis that there is a way and means for law enforcement agencies to proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or activities occurring in their areas, prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place, a way to identify potential terrorist targets located within their jurisdictions and that proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be done using the existing investigative resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional investigative training and cost. The method of inquiry for the research in this project was to identify information available regarding the hypothesized program and to develop research data to defend, support or disprove the hypothesis. This was accomplished through personal interviews with subject matter experts. The data gathered was then reviewed and compared with data from other subject matter experts, published materials and open sources of intelligence. The individuals who participated in this project had expertise in differing fields including anti-

terrorism, counter-terrorism, special operations medicine, military and civilian special operations such as S.W.A.T., hostage rescue and dignitary protection. They also had experience with the development of multidisciplinary teams, computer crime investigations, public and private sector training, radiological health engineering, systems safety engineering, safety engineering with focus on hazardous materials, explosions and their application to emergency responses. There was also expertise in industrial firefighting, oil spill cleanup, hazardous waste site management, emergency responses to terrorism, industrial rescue, threat management and emergency responses to chemical/biological terrorist incidents, incident command and white collar crime. The experts all had experience in course and curriculum design, instructor certifications and peace officer certifications. Some had developed programs and models for addressing terrorism that have been used and trained worldwide. The research would hopefully identify what law enforcement agencies can do to take a proactive role in their jurisdictions to address terrorism concerns without a tremendous increase in spending.

FINDINGS

For this project, it was necessary to conduct research on terrorism by identifying and analyzing terrorist group motivations and profiles, and to review that information to develop an understanding of the methods terrorists use to successfully plan and carry out terrorist acts. It was also important to recognize that a terrorist attack could be either an act of domestic terrorism, as in the case of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma City or an

act of international terrorism as was the case with the two attacks on the World Trade Center. When researching the modern day approach to dealing with terrorism, it is important to identify that the term counter-terrorism is generally an offensive or reactive approach to dealing with terrorism after an attack has occurred. An example of this would be our ongoing efforts in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda. Anti-terrorism is a defensive or proactive effort to try and prevent a terrorist attack. Counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism can both have the same final outcome which is to identify, locate and neutralize the threat. The identifiable difference for this project is that anti-terrorism, the focus of this paper, is a more practical and realistic approach for the majority of law enforcement agencies.

The first subject matter expert interviewed was Doug H. Smith a 27 year veteran of law enforcement with past military and special operations experience. Smith earned a B.S. in Criminal Justice and has been involved in basic and advanced level training for both public and private agencies for over 20 years. Interviews with Smith revealed the first indicators that the hypothesis could be supported. In 1988 Smith was approached by the Travis County Adult Probation Office in Austin, Texas. The agency's concern was that they were dealing with a more violent cliental and had concerns for their safety. They requested the development of a defensive tactics training program to better prepare probation officers to deal with or react to violent confrontations with probationers. Smith and his multidisciplinary project team identified that rather than teach the officers what to do when attacked it was a better approach to identify how to prevent the attack. The team believed that a *Safety and Security Needs Assessment* would

be a more practical approach than defensive tactics training. Defensive tactics training would require an assault to take place before action could be taken; but preventing the attack all together seemed a more practical and reasonable approach. The team used a three step approach. They developed a customized questionnaire for all the employees and developed a customized check list then photographed and videotaped each facility to evaluate each facility's vulnerabilities. They also conducted individual and group interviews about specific security issues with over 165 employees in 7 facilities. The surveys and interviews were designed to identify what the employees perceptions were regarding the problem and, what they were willing to tolerate in order to make needed changes. Using that information, the team reviewed the findings and provided a report that cataloged and prioritized problems. The report addressed facility vulnerabilities, procedures, staff capabilities and administrative oversight. The report revealed that 85% of the problems identified had nothing to do with a need for defensive tactics training. What was needed was to modify the facilities and attached environment and to modify processes and procedures used by employees to match or manage the threat. The training program developed from that report was successfully implemented in other adult probation offices in San Antonio and Dallas. An interesting note was that none of the steps taken to resolve the problem were new. What was new was incorporating them together into a multidimensional *Safety and Security Needs Assessment*. What was also interesting was that by taking a proactive approach and managing the problem at an earlier stage, they had longer periods of time to recognize and deal with the threat. In a sense, the solution was simply organizing with common sense.

There is a correlation between that project and this research. A defensive or offensive approach could have been used as is the case with counter-terrorism vs. anti-terrorism. In that case, an offensive approach would have only addressed 15% of the problem identified, and it required an employee be vulnerable to an attack before the solution could be used. A defensive approach was the better choice because it prevented the attack rather than waiting for the attack to take place and then reacting to it. This is a part of the foundation for the hypothesis.

Ten years later, in 1998, Smith was the project manager at a state law enforcement training academy when he and his team were approached by the United States Department of Justice (DoJ) to design a *National Threat Assessment Program* to address domestic preparedness in America. It was interesting to discover that according to the book *Germs: Biological Weapons and Americas Secret War* by Judith Miller, around 1995, President Clinton read a book by Richard Preston called *The Cobra Event*. After reading that book, Clinton went to members of his National Security Council and asked how prepared the United States was to deal with a terrorist event like the one described in the book. The President was told that America wasn't very prepared, and Clinton began a shift of government attention and concentration on domestic preparedness for terrorism in America. He initiated that effort placing the Department of Defense (DoD) in charge of domestic preparedness. By 1998, the DoD was receiving much criticism as its' efforts were waning. The President tasked the Department of Justice with domestic preparedness. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report *GAO/NAS/AD 98-74* stated that

threat and vulnerability assessments were valuable problem solving tools but the conventional wisdom of other subject matter experts was that these assessments to preventing terrorism would be too complicated, would require a staff of experts and would cost too much money.

In June of 1998, Congress requested that the DoJ take the lead on the domestic preparedness project. Smith's team was asked to submit a proposal for the development of a National *Threat Assessment Program* to address the issues of preparedness for terrorism but it had to be cost effective and simple to operate. Remembering the success of the adult probation project and how they used a multidimensional approach to develop that strategy, Smith's team applied the same fundamentals to the new DoJ project. Smith asked one of his team members to provide developmental and detailed analytical support. Hart Brown had a B.S. in Radiological Health Engineering with a certification as a Systems Safety Engineering Specialist. Brown also had a M.S. in Safety Engineering with focus in the areas of hazardous materials, explosions and their pertinence to emergency responses.

The first thing the team needed was to create a questionnaire. Brown developed a 52 item questionnaire to be completed by DoJ class participants, prior to attending the class, to identify their level of experience and perceptions about terrorism. The team understood that if they were to change a person's perception, you must first understand what their perception was.

The second thing Smith's team did was to develop a site survey form used to help students evaluate and rate the level of security and vulnerability at a facility. Smith's team then trained students to use a multidisciplinary team

approach to complete those surveys and identify ways to manage threats. It was discovered that by using these survey forms and the multidisciplinary team approach, the class was more effective at identifying security and vulnerability concerns than was the trained security team Smith had used to do surveys on the same sites prior to sending out the class. A deficiency identified was that the class participants didn't know how to use existing resources to address those concerns. That became one of the training issues concentrated on by the team.

As Smith's team organized the project for DoJ, Brown continued his research on terrorist organizations and how they planned and carried out attacks. There were two very interesting research conclusions. The *Terrorist Group Profiling* of a terrorist organization and *The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism*. Brown studied over 1000 documented cases of terrorist attacks worldwide. While analyzing these events, a pattern of consistent behaviors emerged in the vast majority which allowed Brown to create an algorithm for pattern analysis. One of the patterns that developed from this analysis was *Terrorist Group Profiling*. Brown identified that a terrorist group can be profiled by considering four areas: Location, Motivation, Financial Backing and Education. The first two, location and motivation, helped determine potential targets. The last two, financial backing and level of education, helped determine potential capability.

Location considerations were simple. Where are the terrorists operating? Brown had identified 12 behaviors called *The 12 Evolutionary Steps of Terrorism*. He organized and placed in chronological order, 12 behaviors that most terrorist groups go through when planning a terrorist attack. His ability to attach a timeline

to those behaviors was enlightening. Brown identified that it took most terrorist groups 16 to 24 months to complete the first 9 behaviors which were:

- Create a Group and Recruit Group Members
- Fundraise
- Select a Weapon, took 12 to 18 months
- Select a Target
- Select a Date
- Conduct Surveillance or Reconnaissance, took 4 to 6 more months
- Move the Weapon to the Target
- Egress from the Target (if desired)
- Activate the Weapon took less than 1 hour.

What was even more enlightening, was that all of these behaviors occurred within 30, 60 or in limited cases 90 to 120 miles from the final target location. Brown discovered that after Weapon Activation, the next 3 behaviors were for the group to Gain Media Attention, Claim Responsibility and to try to Reduce Public Support of the Government which increased recruiting and support for their cause.

The next area of consideration in group profiling was group motivation. Understanding what motivates groups would help a team to identify potential targets if reviewing propaganda or to identify what type of group would be targeting a particular type of facility. Brown and Smith broke terrorists groups into 4 types of group motivations:

- *Religious*: Their ideology or religion is more important than anything else to include their own lives. Their motivation is to eliminate those who are non-believers or those who jeopardize the fundamentals of their religious beliefs. They select high casualty targets (more than 200 people), symbolic targets that have an economic impact and targets that demonstrate weakness of the enemy i.e. military or government targets. Examples would be Al-Qaeda and Aum Shinrikyo.
- *Political*: These groups want change in government. There are 2 types of political groups. Right wing: The Militia or Patriot groups who want a more conservative government. Left Wing: Communist, Marxist, Socialists groups who want a more liberal government. They both focus on government targets. Federal, State and Local government sites. IRS - FBI. Example groups would be the Mississippi Militia movement, the Basque Fatherland and Freedom (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna-ETA) and the Irish Republic Army (IRA).
- *Social*: These groups want to change the current society or create a new society. In change current society there is an aspect of the population they don't want in their society so they attack them wherever they find them within society. The KKK and National Alliance are two examples. The create a new society group want to establish borders and then drive out that part of the population and then create a new society within those borders. Predominately they protect or attack targets within their borders. These borders could be neighborhoods, cities or towns, states, counties or countries. An example would be Hamas whose members want a

Palestinian homeland. The Republic of Texas and street gangs would also be in this category. The Christian Identity Movement might also fall within this category but more research is needed to be sure.

- *Protectionist.* These groups want to protect things they think can't protect themselves. The other groups dehumanizes their targets while protectionist groups humanize what they are protecting. Examples would be the Animal Liberation Front, Environmental Protection Groups such as the Earth Liberations Front (ELF) and Anti-abortion Groups such as the Army of God.

The third area for consideration in group profiling is financial backing. Financial backing is one of the key areas of consideration when the group is selecting a weapon. That is one reason why groups select the weapon before they select a target. It is easier to match the target to the weapon since targets are many and weapons are few. Depending on the type of weapon desired, it may take some time to develop or acquire.

The fourth area for consideration in group profiling is education. This is where you identify what level of education or experience the terrorists operating in your area have acquired. Education can be broken down into two levels: formal (technical schools, universities) and informal (prison, training camps). Brown tried for 3.5 years to find an anomaly that would disprove his research. He researched terrorist events for an hour every day for that 3.5 years. During this time, he was unable to find a single case that significantly disproved his analysis.

The next step in this research project was to identify if anyone was teaching this information using a curriculum resembling the format outlined by

Smith and Brown. That curriculum also had to support the hypothesis. Gerald Kinard was chosen to address this section of the research project. Kinard is the President and CEO of the Law Enforcement Academic Research Network. L.E.A.R.N. Incorporated is a Texas based company that has been contracted to provide Anti-Terrorism training for the Food Safety Inspection Service Division of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). L.E.A.R.N. took information gathered from Smith, Brown and other members of their team then adapted and developed it to provide training to professionals whose daily responsibilities are to be veterinarians, compliance inspectors and other individuals whose daily focus is far removed from the investigative abilities of a law enforcement agency. The USDA's philosophy was that it would be easier to take veterinarians and train them what to be conscious of in their surrounding than it would be to take anti-terrorism specialists and teach them to be veterinarians. L.E.A.R.N. provides a 3.5 day training course addressing three areas: vulnerability assessments, protective intelligence and threat management. A document published by the Gilmore Commission dated December 15, 2002 wherein James S. Gilmore III, Chairman of the *Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction*, outlines the need for a proactive approach to address the threat of terrorism prior to an attack taking place. It is interesting to note that the USDA is responsible for one of the more vulnerable and largest targets in America, the food supply. It is a potential target for terrorist groups, such as the Animal Liberation Front as well as from Al Qaeda who have stated it is a viable target. Kinard, a veteran police investigator,

explains that not only can this training be provided to law enforcement agencies in a matter of just a few days; a train the trainer program already exists.

DISCUSSION/CONCLUSIONS

This research project was undertaken to determine if there was an effective and efficient process whereby local law enforcement agencies of varying sizes could use their finite resources to accurately prevent, detect, deter, disrupt or minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack or activity within their jurisdictions. Research was done that developed information and supported the hypothesis. There are ways for law enforcement agencies to proactively identify potential terrorist threats and/or activities occurring in their areas prior to a terrorist attack actually taking place, to identify potential terrorist targets located within their jurisdictions and that proactive anti-terrorism efforts can be done using the existing resources of law enforcement agencies with minimal additional training and cost.

The research has shown that by developing an understanding of the 12 evolutionary behaviors and the associated timeline, law enforcement agencies would have 16 to 24 months prior to the attack to address the threat, not less than 1 hour after the weapon has been moved to the target or after activation of the weapon. Since those first 9 behaviors would most likely take place within a 30 to 60 mile radius of any targets located within an agency's jurisdiction. What was needed was a way to identify how best to educate law enforcement officials on how to identify, locate and neutralize the threat and also to develop an

understanding of possible weapons that could be used. Incorporating that with the understanding that a group's location and motivation helps to identify potential target selection and that financial backing and education helps to determine a group's potential capability helps to bring the pieces of the puzzle together. Using this philosophy, an investigating law enforcement agency could look at a device and accurately determine a group's profile or look at group's profile and determine what type of weapon might be used or what type of target might be selected. By using intelligence gathered, recognizing what step of the 12 evolutionary behaviors a terrorist group is trying to accomplish, one could possibly identify where in the process the terrorists are and possibly how much time is left until the attack. An example would be: If you identify that 5,000 pounds of fertilizer, that could be used as a component for a bomb, has been stolen in your area and suspicion rises that it could be terrorist related, then identification of potentially valuable information has been gathered. You know that the terrorists are in the weapons selection stage. That would indicate that they have been operating in that area for 12 to 18 months already. This would leave only 4 to 6 months before the attack. Since the fertilizer was stolen, they probably aren't well funded which would be an indicator to look for thefts of other needed bomb components such as storage containers (55 gal drums), accelerant (diesel fuel), igniters and timers. This compiled information would indicate that the target, the location of the theft(s) and the group are most likely all within 30 to 60 miles of each other. What would also be a consideration is that the group would have to have a location large enough to mix and store 5,000 lbs. of fertilizer. Compare this information with reports of suspicious activity in that same

30 to 60 mile area. This analysis might assist with target identification or suspect location and quite possibly the location of previous or future component thefts. Not to mention that since the group is not well funded, their level of experience may be low as well. This might indicate the level of sophistication of the device which would help to analyze the type of components that might be used and the target which might be selected. After identifying potential targets, threat management steps can be taken to prevent a vehicle that could carry a 5,000 lbs. bomb from being able to get close enough to be effective. Understanding that this stage of the investigation is only 4 to 6 months before the attack, an organization might want to have already implemented a public awareness program that would help to identify these suspicious activities. L.E.A.R.N. teaches a technique taken from the Minneapolis/ St.Paul Airport called S.C.A.N. It stands for See, Contact, Ask and Notify. It's a simple philosophy that is already used by police officers but could be adapted for the public and is currently being taught in the USDA program.

A law enforcement agency could teach citizens groups the S.C.A.N. technique then monitor and track the feedback on suspicious activity and persons. During Smith and Brown's research, they administered, to government employees in 15 states, 759 questionnaires containing 52 items. An analysis of the questionnaire revealed that the largest majority of the group only had an overview level understanding of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. When the question was asked, what is the level of terrorist threat in the community? 44% stated that it was improbable and or unlikely to occur. This indicated that the participants who represented six professional categories did

not have the type of information needed. It was also discovered that the majority of participants saw the role of primary responsibility for threat recognition and identification to fall on local law enforcement with federal law enforcement second and state third. Another statistic the questionnaires revealed was that the group felt that Federal Buildings and Airports were the most common targets of terrorist attacks. Using data compiled from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) from 1991 to 1995, and after removing any event(s) that were not directly related to terrorist motivations, Brown discovered that mailboxes, residences, vehicles, commercial centers or businesses and open public areas were the top five most commonly targeted places. Federal government buildings were 13th and airports/aircraft were 17th. There is an interesting correlation to these findings that were compiled by Brown in 1998. The September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center, although using an aircraft as a weapon, were executed on a commercial/business center (4th on the list) and the ensuing anthrax attacks were done by mail (1st). Smith recently studied other data that reviewed terrorist attacks over a 20 year period that showed that although the numbers of attacks have decreased, the efficiency, effectiveness and the number of casualties has increased. Smith identified that claims “we are winning the war against terrorists because the number of terrorist incidents is down” is not completely accurate. The data revealed that the efficiency of the terrorists is getting better. This information does identify the need for public education at some level. This is definitely an area that deserves additional research and supports another part of the hypothesis. If law enforcement and emergency preparedness agencies have to react to a terrorist event, the terrorists have won.

All the doctors, police and firefighters in the world can't bring back those who've lost their lives as a result of a terrorist attack. One of the subject matter experts interviewed for this paper was one of the first doctors in the Murrah Building after the explosion. He tells that as he stood inside the building trying to walk without stepping on heads, hands and other limbs victims had lost during the explosion, there was excrement running down the walls and a young police officer digging through the rubble with one hand holding the upper torso of a small child in his other arm. He went to the officer and asked what he was doing. The officer said "I'm trying to put it back". It was then, he said, that he realized that all the years of medical school, S.W.A.T. schools and training would never bring those victims back to life and preparing to react to these types of events was the incorrect approach. It was then he decided to dedicate his life to trying to prevent terrorism and not reacting to it.

By preventing terrorism or by making it as difficult as possible for terrorists to facilitate activities in your area, you increase the likelihood of not having to respond to a terrorist incident. By using the techniques identified in this research paper, agencies could develop strategies that would give them the tools to proactively fight terrorism on their home front without having to apply for a grant to purchase a pancakeometer. The law enforcement community not only benefits but so does the public community.

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