

A STUDY OF THE DIPLOMATIC POLICIES OF WILLIAM
H. SEWARD RELATIVE TO THE FRENCH
INTERVENTION IN MEXICO, 1861-1867

by

James R. Young

A THESIS

Approved:

C. E. Frazier, Chairman

O. M. Refsell

Approved:

M. B. Etheredge

Bascom Barry Hayes
Dean of the Graduate School

A STUDY OF THE DIPLOMATIC POLICIES OF WILLIAM
H. SEWARD RELATIVE TO THE FRENCH
INTERVENTION IN MEXICO, 1861-1867

A Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of History
Sam Houston State University

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
James R. Young
August, 1970

ABSTRACT

Young, James R., A Study of the Diplomatic Policies of William H. Seward Relative to the French Intervention in Mexico, 1861-1867. Master of Arts (History), August, 1970, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas.

Secretary of State William H. Seward was one of the truly great Secretaries of State. The beginning of his term was marked by an aggressive, reckless view regarding United States foreign policy. Once he viewed the foreign policy of the United States with more perspective, his alternative passive policy served extremely well.

Napoleon III's scheme from the beginning was to establish a Latin American empire and check the growth and influence of the United States. The suspension of debts owed to England, France, and Spain was merely an excuse used by France and Spain to justify intervention. Mexico had been troubled by internal strife and civil war, thereby leaving it impossible to pay its debts. France could not have hoped to secure the monetary debts owed to it in Mexico's economic condition. Regardless of French intentions this scheme points out the difficulty a nation might encounter in an effort to secure debts by military force.

The foreign policy of Mr. Seward at first was intended to prevent intervention but failed due to the internal problems of the United States, being itself involved in the Civil War. This war left the United States powerless to oppose the French scheme to establish a European monarchy in Mexico.

Once the intervention began, Mr. Seward pursued a course of moderation in dealing with the French occupation of Mexico, yet his

foreign policy had to prevent French recognition of the Confederacy, prevent a war with France, quieten domestic opposition to the French scheme, and leave the way open for a more opportune time in which to demand French withdrawal. Mr. Seward chartered a narrow course between remaining silent and giving protest to France. On the one hand silence might encourage France and protest might bring retaliation. Mr. Seward's policy was founded on prudence and dictated by common sense. Gently and politely Secretary Seward informed France its actions were disapproved by the United States but never to the point where he gained the active disfavor of France.

Mr. Seward's policy was determined by his expectation that Mexico would be eventually conquered by immigration and a war with Mexico would be senseless, in view of the depleted United States Treasury. Commercial expectations were also considerations in Mr. Seward's foreign policy. He believed the United States would need France as a friend with which to deal commercially, so the United States should not instigate a war with France.

The Civil War's end removed the greatest danger to the United States, but Secretary Seward's policy of neutrality remained unchanged. Mr. Seward convinced France the United States still remained neutral, but in a more decided tone, he let the French know their actions were becoming irritating to the United States people and Congress might direct by law the foreign policy of the United States.

Refusing to heed the passions of the United States people and Congress, Secretary Seward skillfully used public opinion as pressure to induce France to remove her troops from Mexico. France removed its troops in 1867 due to political conditions in Europe, the skill

of Mr. Seward's diplomacy, and the spirit of the Mexican people, and shortly afterwards, Ferdinand Maximilian was captured and executed.

Approved:

C. E. Frazier
Supervising Professor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| CHAPTER | PAGE |
|---|------|
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| II. BACKGROUND OF THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO | 3 |
| III. THE EARLY DIPLOMACY OF SECRETARY SEWARD. | 21 |
| IV. PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING NEUTRALITY | 41 |
| V. THE TRIUMPH OF MR. SEWARD'S DIPLOMACY | 59 |
| VI. CONCLUSION | 80 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY | 85 |
| VITA | |

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period of the Cold War in the 1960's brought confusion, misunderstanding, and dissention among citizens of the United States. While the people of the United States are more educated today than at any time in the past, it is likewise true that citizens and their representatives do not always have reliable information with which to base their opinions and grievances regarding the foreign policies of the United States. It is not suggested that people be unconcerned about policies of our leaders for this is but the democratic process. It is suggested that people in relevant positions have much broader knowledge with which to deal with diplomatic problems. Much may be learned by studying the past.

More than a century ago, three European nations intervened in the Republic of Mexico. Failure of the Secretary of State of the United States, William H. Seward, to promptly correct this situation brought much criticism and lack of confidence in the Secretary of State by the people. This criticism went so far on occasions that individuals attempted to boldly take action on their own. Far from having a complete understanding of the problem, these individual's acts might have brought disastrous results for the United States. An investigation of the diplomatic policies used by the Secretary of State may prove helpful in understanding the dilemmas and crises presented by these events and policies applied to solve the problems presented by the intervention.

The purpose of this paper is to make a comprehensive study of the diplomatic policies of Secretary of State William H. Seward in regard to the European intervention in Mexico in 1861. An attempt will be made to develop a thorough examination of the techniques, policies, and results of the diplomacy of Secretary Seward in dealing primarily with the French intervention and establishment of an empire in Mexico headed by the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF THE FRENCH INTERVENTION IN MEXICO

United States foreign ministers sounded warnings between the years 1850-1861 of European designs to intervene in the affairs of Mexico and establish a monarchical government designed for the interests of the European nations. One of the first of these warnings was that of Alfred Conkling, Minister to Mexico, who in November, 1852, reported what he considered reliable information that England and France had entered into a secret convention to extort from Mexico the management of its custom houses and collect debts due French and English subjects and of excluding United States influence and interference in Mexican affairs.¹ Another such warning was issued in 1853 by Consul John Black, who reported that Santa Anna was making alliances with England, France, and Spain in order to check the growth of the United States.²

European nations assumed a more aggressive attitude toward Mexico during 1856. England and Spain presented demands on Mexico. There was a belief by the United States Minister, James Gadsden, that France's ulterior purpose was to establish a puppet government in Mexico favorable to the French or to involve Spain and Mexico in a war which would eventually give France a plausible excuse to intervene.³

United States diplomats in Mexico continued to warn of possible European intervention. The United States Minister to Mexico, John Forsyth, made repeated warnings during 1857 about European designs to establish a protectorate over Mexico and exclude United States influence

in Latin America.⁴ The United States Minister to Mexico, Robert McLane also made repeated warnings in 1860, that European designs were to intervene in Mexico to curb the influence of the United States and eventually seize all the Central American States.⁵

Thomas Corwin, the United States Minister to Mexico beginning in 1861, also warned of European desires to exclude the influence of the United States in Mexico. Mr. Corwin believed that Mexico might be split into small political states, each weak and prone to ask for European help. He described England, France, and Spain as each having wishes to intervene for various reasons. England desired intervention for commercial interests of the Mexican Gulf States and the Western coast. Spain wanted to re-establish her lost American colonies. Mr. Corwin stated that he had seen in creditable journals and heard statements that England and France had under consideration the project of intervention.⁶

There were several attempts made on the part of the United States government to thwart these European designs of intervention. The United States first sought to strengthen the Mexican government by intervening and giving economic aid to Mexico. Later, the Washington government considered making Mexico a United States protectorate. During President James Buchanan's administration, many attempts were made to save Mexico from foreign intervention. John Forsyth, the United States Minister to Mexico, pursued a policy to prevent European interference in Mexico. In reporting the danger of war between Mexico and Spain, Mr. Forsyth wrote to Secretary of State Lewis Cass:

There are many eventualities to such a contest once begun which the United States cannot be indifferent spectators. The triumph of Spain here would be the triumph of principles,

opinions and purposes wholly at variance with the interests and settled policy of the United States. With that moral and financial support which she can get from the United States, there is room to hope that Mexico might emerge from a successful conflict, with her old oppressor, improved and strengthened by the ordeal.⁷

After several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate the purchase of territory and transit rights from Mexico, Mr. Forsyth urged that the obvious duty of the United States was to resort to the argument of compulsion to induce Mexico to meet her obligations to the United States, which would enable the United States to secure territory since Mexico was unable to pay cash and would have to cede territory. Mr. Forsyth wanted to make ultimate demands on Mexico and urged the Government should accept a protectorate for Mexico and should also select the head of the Mexican government.⁸ Accepting the recommendations of Mr. Forsyth, President Buchanan, in his annual message to Congress in 1858, proposed to take over parts of Mexico. Referring to the weak Mexican local governments and consequent disorders along the United States-Mexico boundary, and recognizing the futility of attempts to secure indemnity of claims, President Buchanan contemplated reprisal by occupation of portions of the unsettled territories. Mr. Buchanan proposed a temporary protectorate by military possession over the northern part of Chihuahua and Sonora.⁹ In President Buchanan's annual message of 1859, he once again asked for authority to send a military force into Mexico to aid in the establishment of a constitutional government, and obtain redress of grievances committed against the United States.¹⁰ Mr. Buchanan was relying on alarming reports sent to him by various ministers he had sent to Mexico during his administration. Most of these ministers were alarmed at the possibility of foreign intervention. Consul John Black wrote a letter in 1859 from Mexico advising the United

States government to seize the castle of San Juan de Ulua to prevent its capture by the French.¹¹

The new Minister to Mexico, Robert McLane negotiated a treaty known as the McLane-Ocampo Treaty in December, 1859, which would have given the United States transit and commercial rights in certain areas of Mexico with the power to intervene in protecting the property of the United States within these areas. This treaty was proposed by Mr. McLane to establish a constitutional government in Mexico and enforce the treaty stipulations and would have enabled the United States government to intervene and destroy anti-United States elements in Mexico, destroying anarchy and thwarting European excuses for intervention, while making Mexico a virtual protectorate of the United States.¹² The Senate rejected this treaty on May 31, 1860, nullifying McLane's attempt to prevent European intervention in Mexico. The Senate rejection of this treaty was in part due to the increased sectional strife in the United States during this period. Most Northerners unjustly feared this was a plot by slave interests to extend their territory.¹³

Several causes and excuses existed for the European intervention in Mexico in 1861. Mexican debts to the European governments, European intrigue to establish a monarchical government in Mexico, and the internal strife of the United States combined to bring about European intervention.

Europe as a whole was extremely jealous of the successful democracy established in the United States, an upstart nation which was viewed with alarm because of her rapid expansion. England wanted more trade with Latin America, and her loans to Mexico constituted a large measure of her means of commercial infiltration. The French were seeking to

establish a Latin American empire and wanted to restrict the trade prosperity and the areas of trade of the United States. Spain still cherished the hope of renewed relationship with what had once been her best province. Since the United States was now involved in a Civil War, the moment appeared right for intervention.¹⁴ With the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860, the Southern states seceded from the Union. It appeared that a disorder of major proportions was about to ensue, for how long, or how intense, no one knew. The fact was, it would render the United States in a weak position to stop the European powers from intervention in Mexico.¹⁵

Before President Benito Juárez suspended payment of Mexican debts to the European countries for a two year period, there were two Mexican exiles in Europe seeking to bring about the intervention. They were José Estrada and José Manuel Hidalgo. There had always been a strong monarchial faction in Mexico. The clerical faction thought a monarchy would be a bulwark for the church, if united together. It was General Juan Almonte who gained the ear of Napoleon III while Señors Estrada and Hidalgo impressed upon the French Empress Eugenie the idea of intervention. Strengthened by an alliance with Spain and England, Napoleon was more willing to go along with the intervention and desired to make the Mexican empire an ally or even a protectorate of his own for the benefit of French trade and political supremacy.¹⁶ It has been said that the French Empress told Señor Estrada and Señor Hidalgo in 1857 that she had often thought of how nice it would be to have a Mexican throne for France.¹⁷

The idea of a united intervention in Mexico was proposed to France by Alejandro Mon, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, in November, 1858,

for the purpose of establishing a firm government in Mexico. The Spanish Foreign Minister Calderón Collantes and Mr. Mon kept up correspondence during 1859 on the matter, agreeing that it was a necessary move but would require moral persuasion and diplomacy. Spain, after repeatedly sounding out England and France, found them ready in April, 1860, to effect a combination for establishing a firm, united government which all the members of the distracted Mexico should recognize and obey.¹⁸

England and France accepted in principle the Spanish idea of intervening in the disordered affair of Mexico. They believed it would give courage to honorable persons in Mexico and cause them to labor in favor of the establishment of a strong government.¹⁹ The Spaniards thought the mere announcement of the formation of such a government would cause all the Mexican conservatives to rally around it and cooperate in the plan. The constitution to be imposed upon Mexico was drawn up in Spain in May, 1860, and sent to England and France for approval. The Spanish scheme met with a cool reception in England. The English attitude was that no force should be used in imposing an outside government upon Mexico, who must willingly accept any new government. England desired the protestant form of worship guaranteed, which Spain did not. The French agreed to a friendly intervention.²⁰ Napoleon was reluctant to follow the Spanish plan without British approval, fearing he might be opposed by both England and the United States. Temporarily, the plan was set aside.²¹

Spain, not receiving help from England or France, took up the project alone by entering Mexican waters with a fleet in 1860, only to be met with hostility from the United States, which then had a naval

fleet off Vera Cruz. Responding to the Spanish action, on September 2, 1860, Secretary of State Cass notified the Spanish minister that the "United States will regret any unjust claim against Mexico, and will not permit any hostility against the legitimate government of the Republic of Mexico."²²

Spain, fearful of war with the United States without help from England and France, and due to other involvements in Europe, postponed the planned invasion. It was evident by August, 1861, that the United States Government was so implicated in internal problems of secession that she could no longer maintain this attitude toward foreign intervention. Spanish Minister Mon wrote to the Spanish Foreign Minister Calderón Collantes that he considered the time right for placing a Bourbon Prince on the throne of Mexico.²³

The failure of Mexico to repay debts owed to foreign nations was another cause of the European intervention in Mexico. Mexico had been in a state of Civil War for many years and its monetary resources were exhausted. Not only were the debts a cause of the intervention but actually gave Spain and France an excuse to intervene and carry out their schemes. England was principally interested in settling her claims, which grew out of outrages against British subjects, destruction of property, and seizure of British funds during the Miramón government. Both liberal and conservative factions had seized British funds. The British government offered to recognize the Juárez government if he could establish himself in Mexico City and assume responsibility for the seizures. President Juárez agreed and recognized British claims to the extent of \$69,994,542.²⁴

The Spanish claims were for outrages, unkept conventions, and the

expulsion of Spaniards from Mexico. Most of these arose from the Mont-Almonte treaty, which had obligated Mexico to assume responsibility for claims by Spanish subjects because of outrages and forced loans which had occurred under the Santa Anna government. President Juárez recognized Spanish claims to the extent of ten million pesos.²⁵

The French claims against Mexico for robberies, murders, and outrages against French citizens were dealt with in the conventions of 1851 and 1853, whereby several million dollars were recognized as just obligations. Another claim involved J. B. Jecker, a Swiss who had arranged in 1859 to lend fifteen million dollars on a bond issue, and Mexico was to pay back \$16,800,000. Mr. Jecker paid only \$1,470,000 to Mexico on the bond and went bankrupt before completing it. Mr. Jecker gained French citizenship through a relative of Napoleon III and passed the note to the French government to collect. President Juárez would recognize only obligations to the extent of the actual money received.²⁶

Mexico's Civil Wars had left the treasury bankrupt, therefore, on July 17, 1861, the Mexican ministry under President Juárez passed a law suspending payment on foreign debts for a period of two years. The act was protested by France and Spain immediately.²⁷ The suspension of payment on foreign debts was the excuse France and Spain needed to justify intervention in order to accomplish their intentions of establishing a monarchy in Mexico.

Upon learning of the suspension of debts by Mexico, the new United States Minister to Mexico, Thomas Corwin, urged the United States government to assume the interest on the debts which amounted to about sixty-two million dollars. The interest would have been about two million dollars yearly for five years. Mr. Corwin proposed that if

Mexico could not repay at the end of this period, she would pledge territory to cover the loan. The anticipation of foreign intervention was suggested in this letter to Mr. Seward. Minister Corwin was attempting to prevent excuses for foreign intervention. England and France terminated diplomatic relations with the Juárez government and threatened retaliation by seizure of Mexican customhouses. Mr. Corwin believed it was the duty of the United States to prevent the European aims of intervention.²⁸

Secretary of State Seward responded by authorizing Mr. Corwin to negotiate with Mexico a treaty by which the United States government would assume interest on the debts of sixty-two million dollars plus three percent per annum for a period of five years. The Washington government would charge Mexico six percent interest with a lien upon public lands and mineral rights in Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinoala. If Mexico could not pay the loan after six years, the land would become United States property.²⁹ This proposal by Secretary Seward was designed to prevent European intervention and maintain the Republican government in Mexico. Mr. Seward's proposal was designed to prevent Mexico from falling under the influence of parties favorable to the Confederate States.

Mr. Seward's proposal to assume the interest on Mexican debts was not acceptable to the European nations. France, England, and Spain entered into a convention on October 31, 1861, to compel Mexico to fulfill its obligations. The London Convention preamble stated that the parties had been placed under a necessity for exacting a more effective protection for the persons and properties of their subjects due to the arbitrary and vexatious conduct of the authorities of the Republic of

Mexico. The first article of the convention arranged for the parties to send land and sea forces to seize fortresses and military positions on the Mexican Gulf Coast. The second article bound the parties not to seek for themselves by coercive measures and territory or peculiar advantage and not to exercise in the affairs of Mexico any influence or character to impair the right of the Mexican people to choose and freely to constitute the form of its own government. The third article provided for a commission to determine all questions arising from employment and distribution of the money, which was to be recovered from Mexico. The parties agreed by the fourth article to invite the United States to join in the convention and subsequent action.³⁰

The United States was asked to join in carrying out the objects of the convention, which was principally due to British insistence, since England feared the attitude the United States government might take. France and Spain merely agreed to pacify England. Both France and Spain had ulterior designs as the French Minister Billault said that the French and Spanish were waiting to attempt the organization of a government in Mexico suited to monarchical ideas.³¹ Mr. Seward declined the offer to join with the European powers in the intervention and once more asked the powers to refrain from action pending the United States treaty to assume the interest on the Mexican debts and avert the war. All Seward's efforts failed to avert the intervention.³²

News reached Vera Cruz in November, 1861, of Spanish preparations in Havana for the intervention. There was nothing left for Juárez, the President of Mexico, to do but prepare for defense. He first issued orders to strengthen Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulua but later decided to move the main defense inland to a more defensive site. Juárez

attempted to negotiate conventions to settle the debts, but he failed to gain the approval of the Mexican Congress.³³ The triparte invasion began December 14, 1861, when a Spanish fleet prematurely sailed into and occupied Vera Cruz without opposition. The Spanish contingent consisted of about six thousand men. They were followed by England and France in early January, 1862, with about seven hundred British marines and three thousand French troops. England furnished battleships and most of the naval division but fewer troops.³⁴

The invasion met with no hostility or with any representatives of the liberal government of Juárez. The plenipotentiaries appointed by the various participants were: Sir Charles Wyke and Commodore Hugh Dunlap, on the part of England; Dubois de Saligny and Rear Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, on the part of France; and General Juan Prim, conde de Reus and Marques de los Castillejos, represented Spain both as diplomats and commanders of her forces.³⁵

It became apparent that no debts could be collected without a march into the interior, but this was not a part of the convention plan. The commissioners of the three intervening powers decided to meet in Vera Cruz to determine a course of procedure. Nothing worthy of notice occurred at the conferences till the pecuniary claims were made the subject of consideration. At the third conference, January 13, 1862, Saligny, the French plenipotentiary, failed to appear and Admiral Jurien read the French ultimatum consisting of ten articles; some of which were incompatible with Mexican independence and sovereignty.³⁶ Mexico insisted that the first French claim of twelve million dollars be settled by a mixed commission of the four nations involved. The J. B. Jecker claim of fifteen million dollars was declared

inadmissible by the Spanish and British representatives. This refusal to support Mr. Saligny's Jecker claim suspended the transmission of the collective note and ultimatum. A new note had to be drawn up. Manuel Doblado, the Mexican negotiator, answered the note and invited the parties to go to Orizaba with an honor guard of two thousand troops where they would be treated honorably and could be inland from the malaria infested coastal region. Mr. Doblado asked the rest of the allied troops to re-embark, promising that all just claims would be recognized and legal validity would be given to the pending Orizaba conference.³⁷

The allied parties refused to re-embark and informed the Mexican government of their intention of marching toward Jalapa and Orizaba to secure a healthier locality for the troops.³⁸ It was agreed that Mr. Doblado would meet General Prim on February 18, 1862, and they signed a convention on February 19, at the town of Soledad as a preliminary to the negotiations to be conducted. By this convention, the allied forces were to occupy territory inland from the coast which would be healthier, with the condition that in the event of a rupture of relations, the allies were to retreat back to Vera Cruz. The convention was ratified by all parties concerned. In this way, Mr. Doblado secured the recognition of Juárez as the legal government and the independence and sovereignty of Mexico by this convention. Mexico's ability to manage her own internal affairs was admitted by the allies. Mr. Doblado's diplomacy was considered a masterpiece since the French would have to ignore every principle of honor and decency in order to carry out their scheme.³⁹

The situation changed drastically at the conference of Orizaba.

The triple alliance was dissolved and each of the allies announced a resolution to adopt separate action. France had sent a new detachment of forty-five hundred troops under the Comte de Lorencez with new instructions from Napoleon, who was bent upon establishing Maximilian of Austria on the throne of Mexico. The French had sent Mexican monarchist General Almonte to promote the downfall of the Juárez government so it might be easier to gain control of the government. Mr. Saligny, the French Plenipotentiary, completely ignored the London Convention and Preliminaries de la Soledad.⁴⁰

The rupture of relations at Orizaba was caused by the French protection extended to General Almonte and other leading Mexican monarchists who had been banished from the country. The Mexican government demanded that Almonte be removed from French protection since he was conspiring to promote rebellion against the Mexican government. The French ministers refused to recognize the London Convention and take part in the conferences arranged at Soledad. Mr. Saligny maintained that France now could be appeased only by a march on Mexico City. The British and Spanish representatives concurred with the Mexican demands of removal of the Mexican monarchist from French protection and notified Mr. Doblado that they had resolved to re-embark their forces. Mr. Doblado, upon receiving this announcement, commended the British and Spanish representatives and signified his readiness to conclude a treaty to settle all pending questions.⁴¹

France was now left to its own devices by the withdrawal of Great Britain and Spain. The French army refused to evacuate Orizaba according to Article V of the Preliminaries de la Soledad. General Almonte assumed the title of "Supreme Chief of the Nation" and began

to organize a government. Soon after, General Elie Frederic Forey assumed command under orders of Napoleon III to carry out the French schemes of establishing a monarchy in Mexico.⁴²

Napoleon's intentions and plans were clearly shown in his letter to General Forey, when he stated that the end to be attained was not the imposition of a form of government distasteful to the Mexicans but to help establish one in conformity to their wishes which would have some chance of stability. Napoleon iterated that if the people preferred a monarchy, aid them to the best interest of France. Napoleon further stated that it was to the best interests of France that the United States should not grasp or control the entire Gulf of Mexico, South America, and Caribbean Islands. He feared the United States could become the sole dispenser of New World products, which were vital to the French economy. By establishing French influence in North America, it would allow for immense outlets for French commerce and provide necessary materials for her industry. Napoleon believed the best policy was to establish monarchical government in Mexico if possible and at least a government which promised stability and favorable sentiment toward France.⁴³

The French troops gradually extended their military operations with the arrival of more French troops, thereby occupying more territory. General Forey organized a junta in June, 1863, which consisted of two hundred fifty notables. This assembly was to draw up plans for a permanent government. The French army occupied Mexico City by July 10, 1863. A decree was issued by the assembly on July 11, 1863, formally establishing the monarchical government Napoleon had schemed to establish.⁴⁴ This decree contained four main provisions: first, it

adopted a limited hereditary monarchy with a Catholic prince; second, the Sovereign would assume the title of "Emperor of Mexico"; third, the Crown was formally offered to Maximilian; fourth, it empowered Napoleon III to choose another emperor if Maximilian declined.⁴⁵

After considerable hesitation, Maximilian formally accepted the offer of the Mexican throne on April 10, 1864. Maximilian's acceptance came in the belief that a majority of the Mexican people wanted him. This belief was held by Maximilian after a plebiscite was held primarily within conservative areas of Mexico which supported a monarchy and were at that time under the military control of the French army. The French attempt to establish a monarchical government was successful in gaining the title. The question remained if Maximilian could maintain his title in view of the certain success of the Union army of the United States against the Confederacy and the increasing belligerent attitude of the United States against the Maximilian government coupled with the failure of the French and conservative forces to subdue the liberals of Juárez.

¹United States State Department, Despatches From the United States Ministers to Mexico, 1823-1906, Vol. 16 (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1950) Conkling to the Secretary of State, Nov. 22, 1852, hereafter referred to as Mex. Desp.

²United States State Department, Despatches From United States Consuls in Mexico City, Mexico, 1822-1906, Vol. 10 (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1961) No. 24, May 30, 1853.

³Mex. Desp., Vol. 19, No. 97, Gadsden to Marcy, Oct. 4, 1856; J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1931) p. 203 citing George M. Dallas, Letters From London, Vol. 1, p. 60.

⁴Mex. Desp., Vol. 19, No. 29, Forsyth to Cass, April 4, 1857.

⁵Ibid., Vol. 23, No. 12, McLane to Cass, May 7, 1859 and enclosure "C"; Vol. 25, No. 72, McLane to Cass, March 30, 1860.

⁶House Executive Document No. 100, 37th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 14, Corwin to Seward, June 29, 1861.

⁷Mex. Desp., Vol. 20, No. 43, Forsyth to Cass, July 2, 1857.

⁸Ibid., Vol. 21, No. 73, April 8, April 16, and (Private) April 15, 1858.

⁹James Buchanan, The Works of James Buchanan, ed. John B. Moore (New York: Antiquarian Press Ltd., 1960) pp. 253-7.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 353-7.

¹¹Mex. Desp., Vol. 23, No. 12, McLane to Cass, May 7, 1859 and enclosure "C".

¹²Ibid., Vol. 24, No. 57, McLane to Cass, Dec. 14, 1859.

¹³Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, p. 226.

¹⁴Herbert I. Priestly, The Mexican Nation: A History (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1924) pp. 343-4; Senate Executive Document No. 11, 38th Congress, 2nd Session, pp. 272-3, Napoleon to General Forey, July 3, 1863; Ralph Roeder, Juarez and His Mexico (New York: The Viking Press, 1947) Vol. I, p. 334.

¹⁵Hubert H. Bancroft, History of Mexico (Bancroft's Works, Vol. XIV, San Francisco: The History Co., 1888), Vol. VI, p. 12.

¹⁶Priestly, The Mexican Nation, p. 245; Roeder, Juarez, pp. 333-4.

¹⁷Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, p. 208.

¹⁸Priestly, The Mexican Nation, pp. 345-6.

¹⁹General G. Cluseret, Mexico and the Solidarity of Nations (New York: Blackwell Printer, 1886), p. 26.

²⁰Priestly, The Mexican Nation, p. 346.

²¹Charles E. Frazier, "The London Convention and the Preliminaries de la Soledad," Journal of the West, Vol. 6, (April 1967).

²²Priestly, The Mexican Nation, p. 346.

²³Ibid., pp. 346-7.

²⁴Ibid., p. 341.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 341-2.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, p. 18.

²⁸H. Ex. Doc., No. 100, 37-2, pp. 15-17, Corwin to Seward, July 29, 1861.

²⁹Ibid., p. 22, Seward to Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861.

³⁰H. Ex. Doc., No. 100, 37-2, pp. 186-7.

³¹Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, pp. 21-2; E. Lefevre (ed.), Documentos oficiales Recognidos en la Secretaria Privada de Maximiliano (Brussels and London: 1869), Vol. 1, pp. 87-93.

³²H. Ex. Doc., No. 100, 37-2, pp. 188-90. (Circular) December 4, 1861.

³³Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, pp. 24-25 citing Niceto de Zamacois, Historia de Mejuico desde sus tiempos mas remotos hasta nuestras dias (Mexico: 1877-1882), Vol. XV, pp. 824-5.

³⁴Priestly, The Mexican Nation, p. 347-8; Gustave Niox, Expedition du Mexique, 1861-1876 (Paris: 1874), p. 733.

³⁵Niox, Ex. du Mexico, p. 41.

³⁶Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, p. 36; Lefevre, Documentos Oficiales, pp. 147-50.

³⁷Niox, Ex. du Mexico, pp. 76-7; Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, pp. 37-9 citing Francisco de p. Arrangoiz, Mexico desde 1808 hasta 1867 (Madrid: 1871-1872), Vol. III, pp. 23-4.

³⁸Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, p. 39; Niox, Ex. du Mexico, p. 86.

³⁹Bancroft, History of Mexico, Vol. 6, pp. 39-40; Niox, Ex. du Mexico, p. 85.

⁴⁰H. Ex. Doc., No. 54, 37-3, p. 48, Romero to Seward, April 9, 1862; Mex. Desp., Vol. 28, No. 21, Corwin to Seward, April 16, 1862; Frazier, "London Convention," pp. 274-5 citing Arrangoiz, Mexico, p. 353.

⁴¹John H. Latane, The United States and Latin America (New York: Doubleday, Page, and Company, 1922) pp. 211-2; Lefevre, Documentos Oficiales, pp. 220-227.

⁴²Latane, U. S. and Latin America, p. 213.

⁴³Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 11, 38-2, pp. 272-3, Napoleon to General Forey, July 3, 1862.

⁴⁴Latane, U. S. and Latin America, pp. 214-5.

⁴⁵Sen. Ex. Doc., No. 1, 38-1, pp. 254-68.

CHAPTER III

THE EARLY DIPLOMACY OF SECRETARY SEWARD

William H. Seward became Secretary of State of the United States in 1861. Mr. Seward's political career had been characterized by an ardent desire for the expansion of the national boundaries of the United States. The danger of European intervention in American affairs was probably the biggest problem encountered by Secretary Seward during the eight years of his service. Mr. Seward not only faced the possibility of European intervention in American affairs but also a disrupted union brought about by the United States Civil War. His career as Secretary of State began with an aggressive policy in dealing with foreign relations, which was first seen in his famous "Thoughts", proposed to President Lincoln in 1861.

I would demand explanations from Spain and France categorically, at once.

I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America, to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.¹

Mr. Seward proposed to reunite the Union by substituting the Monroe Doctrine for the slavery question and to prevent foreign intervention by organizing a continental crusade on the American continents against European powers threatening intervention.

Another aspect of this aggressive policy was shown in his

anxiety over the possibility of Spanish intervention in Santo Domingo. In a note to the Spanish minister at Washington, [~]Señor Gabriel Tassara, Mr. Seward strongly protested Spain's action regarding Santo Domingo: "This reported attempt cannot fail to be taken as a first step in a policy of armed intervention by the Spanish government in the American countries which once constituted Spanish America, but have since achieved their independence."² Secretary Seward reminded Mr. Tassara that the United States had respected the Spanish title to Cuba largely because it had expected the Catholic Kingdom not to become an aggressive neighbor. Mr. Seward concluded:

I am directed to inform you and also the government of His Majesty in a direct manner, that if they should be found to have received at any time the sanction of that government, the President will be obliged to regard them as manifesting an unfriendly spirit toward the United States, and to meet the further prosecution of enterprises of that kind in regard to either the Dominican Republic or any other part of the American Continent or islands with a prompt, persistent and if possible, effective resistance.³

Mr. Seward immediately communicated with the ministers of Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and New Granada and enclosed a copy of his note to Mr. Tassara. In the note he sent to Matias Romero, the Mexican Minister to Washington, he wrote:

I am . . . instructed by the President to suggest for your consideration the propriety of bringing the subject to the notice of the government of Mexico to the end that it may adopt such measures in this exigency as the safety and welfare of the respective States existing on the American continent, and its islands, including perhaps Mexico, shall seem to require.⁴

This note to Mr. Tassara clearly displayed an aggressive policy adopted by Seward. It was virtually an ultimatum to Spain to stay out of Santo Domingo and was a clear warning to abstain from intervention in any of the American countries.

Another manifestation of Seward's aggressive policy was his instructions to Thomas Corwin, the new Minister to Mexico. Secretary Seward directed him not to press for a settlement of claims against Mexico but to call attention to the aggressive designs of the Confederacy and Europe; to give assurance of the desire of the United States government for Mexico to retain its complete integrity and sovereignty; to oppose recognition of the Confederacy; and to impress upon Mexican statesmen that the United States Civil War was a great concern to all republican nations, since Mexico was concerned with the same. Mr. Seward remarked that the American states held a common attitude and relation toward all other nations. It would be in the interest of all of them to be friends since they were neighbors, and they should mutually maintain and support each other as far as would be consistent with each's individual sovereignty against all disintegrating agencies within and foreign influences without.⁵ In this letter Seward's aggressive policy may be traced back to his "Thoughts" proposed to President Lincoln. Mr. Seward was once again proposing an American alliance against foreign intervention and domestic insurrection. Secretary Seward believed that the American states had a common interest in maintaining and supporting each other against domestic and foreign influences.

Secretary Seward's aggressiveness was also obvious in his instructions to Thomas Corwin regarding Confederate designs upon Lower California, Sonora, and Chihuahua. Mr. Seward notified Mr. Corwin that the commanders of the land and naval forces of the United States on the Pacific were to be authorized to prevent Confederate violations of Mexican territory and sovereignty and directed him to encourage the government of Mexico to an energetic effort in defense of its sovereignty

and to ask consent for the intervention of the United States forces if they should be needed. Mr. Corwin was to assure Mexico that the United States government did not desire the acquisition of any Mexican soil, but would be willing to purchase Lower California, or part of it rather than seeing it inevitably fall into the hands of the Confederacy.⁶

Secretary Seward's early foreign policy was clearly aggressive and defiant toward Europe. Along with many others, he did not realize how long and difficult the Civil War in the United States would last. Most of his colleagues believed it would be of short duration. After the first battle of Bull Run, in which the Union army was routed and severely demoralized, the most critical stage of the Civil War ensued. Mr. Seward was forced to change this defiant policy to meet the crisis. Foreign relations were in a critical state, and Mr. Seward began to adopt a different policy from his earlier aggressive approach and gradually assumed a policy of moderation, which concerning Mexican affairs was first seen in a circular letter pertaining to an aggressive policy as proposed by H. R. La Reintrie on December 29, 1860. Mr. La Reintrie had been sent by the United States Minister to Mexico, Robert McLane, to deny a report that the United States government desired the continuance of the Civil War in Mexico and to make clear the United States policy in regard to the Civil War in Mexico. Mr. La Reintrie sent a circular letter to the leading representatives of the European powers in Mexico in which he declared:

The United States has determined to resist any forcible attempt to impose a particular adjustment of the existing conflict against the will and sanction of the people of Mexico, and also, any forcible intervention by any power which looks to the control of any political destiny thereof. . . . The

government of the United States does not deny to the European powers the right to wage honorable warfare for a sufficient cause, anywhere, or against any nation; nor does it deny their right to demand redress for injuries inflicted on their respective subjects . . . but it does deny them the right to interfere directly, or indirectly with the political independence of the Republic of Mexico, and it will to the extent of its powers, defend the nationality and independence of said republic.⁷

This policy, Minister McLane hoped would become the official policy followed by Secretary Seward, and it did resemble Mr. Seward's early aggressive policies. With the complications of the Civil War in the United States, Mr. Seward refused to commit his government to the opinions of Mr. La Reintrie, by direction of Mr. McLane, expressed in this circular letter.

Mr. Seward's refusal to acknowledge this policy was displayed in a letter to Thomas Corwin which indicated the change from his early defiant policy to one of moderation. With reference to the La Reintrie manifesto, Mr. Seward wrote:

I am very sure this government cherishes the actual independence of Mexico as a cardinal object to the exclusion of all foreign political intervention . . . yet the present moment does not seem to me an opportune one for formal re-assurance of the policy of the government to foreign nations. Prudence requires that in order to surmount the evils of faction at home we should not unnecessarily provoke debates with foreign countries, but rather repair as speedily as possible the prestige which those evils have impaired.⁸

This letter was among the first of several indications of change in Secretary Seward's policy toward Mexico. Mr. Seward affirmed the United States government's desire for Mexican independence and freedom from foreign political interference but refused to commit his government to the policies set forth in the La Reintrie circular. Secretary Seward's letter to Mr. Corwin also showed an increased concern for domestic problems which his government had encountered in the early

stages of the Civil War in the United States. Circumstances demanded that Mr. Seward avoid international issues and domestic problems at the same time in order to meet the immediate crisis at home.

On Thomas Corwin's arrival in Mexico as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, he promptly reported that Mexico was in great need of money to meet the demands of England, France, and Spain for payment of debts and to establish a permanent government which could prevent disruption of the country. Mr. Corwin suggested to Secretary Seward that the United States purchase Lower California to save Mexico from partition and subjugation by Europe. Mr. Corwin's first concern was to prevent European intervention which he foresaw; he believed the Mexican states would be broken up and used against the interest of the United States.⁹ England, France, and Spain terminated diplomatic relations with Mexico due to President Juárez's suspension of the payment of debts to them. The three European nations were preparing to resort to seizure of the ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz. Mr. Corwin urged that it was the duty of the United States government to prevent the European powers from intervening in American affairs. Mr. Corwin recommended that the United States government, with proper pledge of territory as a guarantee, arrange to negotiate a loan to pay the interest on the Mexican debt for a period of five years. Mr. Corwin believed the United States, as the only safe guardian of independence and true civilization of the continent, would be benefited in all time to come by helping Mexico.¹⁰

With the purpose of preventing foreign intervention and probable disruption of Mexico, Secretary Seward authorized Minister Corwin to negotiate the proposed treaty for assuming the payment of the interest

on the Mexican debt at three percent interest on the funded debt for a period of five years from the date the debts were suspended, provided the Mexican government pledged to repay six percent interest with a lien upon all the public lands and mineral rights of Lower California, Chihuahua, Sonora, and Sinaloa. This property would have become absolute property of the United States after six years, if such reimbursement was not made before that time. The treaty was conditional upon consent of England and France to forbear to a resort to action on account of Mexican failure to pay the interest until after the treaty had been submitted to the United States Senate for ratification.¹¹ In proposing this treaty, the Lincoln administration was doubtless influenced to some extent to circumvent the plans of the Southern Confederacy to secure recognition from Mexico and to induce the Mexican government to refuse to grant permission for the transit of United States troops from Guaymas to Arizona.¹²

One of the important motives behind the proposed treaty was the desire to remove what was thought to be a strong provocation for European intervention in Mexico resulting from President Juárez's suspension of the payment of debts to the European nations. However, Mr. Corwin pointed out some interesting sidelights of the treaty which would have been advantageous to the United States and, in reference to the lien upon the public lands, remarked: "This would probably end in the cession of sovereignty to us. It would be certain to end thus if the money were not promptly paid as agreed on."¹³ Mr. Corwin believed Lower California would be essential to the protection of Pacific possessions, and would extinguish all Southern hopes of extending their dominions into Mexico and Central America.¹⁴ Mr. Corwin revealed

another aspect of the mortgage on the Mexico public lands by maintaining that it would justify the United States in meeting the Confederates on these lands and helping Mexico to expel them, since the United States would have a mortgage on the public domain and the right to intervene and protect its interests.¹⁵ Regarding the Board of Commissioners which would take charge of the pledged lands, Mr. Corwin remarked on another occasion that because some of the commissioners would be United States citizens, this would attract purchases from the United States and, being dispersed among the Mexican people, would teach them lessons in morals, religion, and politics. Mr. Corwin believed the United States had done more to weaken Mexico than all the other nations combined and that the United States should extend a helping hand, as the results of Mexican trade showed the United States had gotten very little commercial benefit from Mexico due to past policies of aggression toward Mexico. Mr. Corwin remarked: "Let it be remembered that Mexico is our neighbor, and enlightened self interest requires that we should not be indifferent to the welfare of such."¹⁶ Mr. Corwin also pointed out to Secretary Seward the possibility of disposing of some of these public lands by colonizing the free Negroes in connection with President Lincoln's plans. Mr. Corwin believed the Negroes would not be subjected to racial or political discrimination in Mexico.¹⁷

Secretary Seward, hoping to satisfy foreign creditors through his loan policy, heard of rumors of the proposed tripartite expedition to make demands on Mexico and wrote William Dayton, United States Minister to France, that the United States looked with deep concern on the threatened expedition and that he was not unwilling to use his offices to prevent it. Secretary Seward was anxious to prevent any further

complications, even though France disclaimed all ideas of territorial acquisition.¹⁸ Secretary Seward, before negotiating the proposed treaty, sought to obtain an agreement from the English and French governments to refrain from operations concerning the expedition until President Lincoln could submit the treaty to the United States Senate for ratification. Objections to Seward's plan for paying the interest on the Mexican debt were sounded both in Paris and London. The French Minister of State, M. Thouvenel, said: "It might not be possible to prevent the United States offering money to Mexico or to prevent Mexico receiving money from the United States, but neither England nor France ought in any way recognize the transaction."¹⁹ In response to Seward's proposed treaty, Lord Earl Lyons declared:

That her majesty's government were as apprehensive as Mr. Seward himself could be, of an attempt to build upon a foundation of debts due, and injuries inflicted, by Mexico, a pretension to establish a new government in that country. Her majesty's government thought, however that the most effectual mode of guarding against this danger would be for Great Britain, the United States, and France to join Spain in a course of action, the objects and limits of which should be distinctly defined beforehand. This certainly appeared more prudent than to allow Spain to act alone now, and afterwards to oppose the results of her operations, if she should go too far.²⁰

Lord Lyons suggested that the dangers of intervention could best be avoided by joint co-operation on the part of the United States, England, France, and Spain in some policy.

Even Charles F. Adams, United States Minister to England, did not approve Secretary Seward's plan to assume the Mexican debt as he explained:

The view customarily taken in Europe is that their government is disposed to resist all foreign intervention in Mexico, not upon any principle, but simply because it is self expecting, in due course of time, to absorb the whole country for its own

benefit. Hence any proposal like that which I had the honor to receive, based upon the mortgage of portions of Mexican territory as security for engagements entered into by the United States, naturally becomes the ground of any outcry that this is but the preliminary to any entry for inevitable foreclosure. And then follows the argument that if this process be legitimate in one case, why not equally in all. . . .²¹

Secretary Seward's proposed loan treaty was doomed to failure in spite of his efforts to secure approval. While Mr. Corwin was still in negotiation with the Mexican government, the United States Senate in reply to two successive messages of the President, passed a resolution, February 25, 1862, expressing the opinion: "that it is not advisable to negotiate a treaty that will require the United States to assume any portion of the principle or interest of the debt of Mexico, or that will require the concurrence of European powers."²² This put an end to Mr. Seward's proposed treaty. It is doubtful the European parties would have accepted the proposed plan of Mr. Seward, since England, France, and Spain had already entered an agreement, the London Convention, on October 31, 1861, for the purpose of securing their rights.

The fourth article of the London Convention provided "that immediately after the signing of the present convention, a copy of it shall be communicated to the government of the United States, that that government shall be invited to accede to it. . . ."²³ Mr. Seward declined to cooperate in the expedition stating that he did not question the right of the parties to decide for themselves the fact whether they had sustained grievances, and the resorting to war against Mexico for the redress thereof. Mr. Seward also stated that the United States and the parties themselves had a deep interest that neither of the parties should seek or obtain any acquisition of territory or any

advantage peculiar to itself. Also, neither of the parties, or as a whole, should exercise in the affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair the Mexican people to choose freely and constitute the form of their own government. Mr. Seward went on to say that it was true the United States had claims to urge on Mexico but was of the opinion it would be inexpedient to seek satisfaction of these claims at that time. Mr. Seward stated that the United States preferred to adhere to its traditional policy of avoiding alliances with foreign nations. Mexico, being a member nation of the North American Continent with a system of government similar to the government of the United States in many features, the United States cherished a good will toward that Republic and a lively interest in its security, prosperity, and welfare. Due to these sentiments Mr. Seward believed a resort to forcible remedies for its claims at a time when Mexico was deeply disturbed by internal troubles and exposed to war with foreign nations was not justifiable. In the last part of the declination, Seward referred to the fact that the United States government was then seeking to enter a treaty with Mexico to concede some material aid which he hoped would enable Mexico to satisfy claims of the European nations to avert war, which they had agreed upon to levy against Mexico.²⁴

In pursuance of the London Convention, Vera Cruz was occupied in the early part of 1862 by first the Spanish, and later English and French. Until this time, the three European parties had disclaimed any political designs against Mexico, claiming that they sought only a redress of grievances. Mr. Seward, in his official communication with his foreign ministers had accepted all disclaims of political designs on the part of the allies. However, the first intimation of the real

purposes of Napoleon III was given in the letter of instructions of Mr. Thouvenel to Admiral Graverie, commander of the French expedition to Mexico. Mr. Thouvenel said that in case of a withdrawal of the Mexican forces from the coast into the interior of the country, an advance upon the capital might become necessary. He went on to relate:

It might happen that the pressure of the allied forces upon the soil of Mexico might induce the sane portion of the people, tired of anarchy, anxious for order and repose, to attempt an effort to constitute in the country a government presenting the guarantees of strength stability which have been wanting to all those which have succeeded each other since the emancipation.²⁵

Admiral Graverie was told expressly that he was not to refuse the encouragement. The British government immediately showed concern and alarm at the French order and instructed Sir Charles Wyke that he was to decline to take part in any advance into the interior of Mexico.²⁶ Observing the actions of France with deep concern over the plans to follow up the Spanish forces with a strong French force, Mr. Charles F. Adams wrote to Mr. Seward:

It is no longer concealed that the intention is to advance to the capital, and to establish a firm government, with the consent of the people, at that place. But who are meant by that term does not appear. This issue is by no means palatable to the government here, though it is difficult to imagine that they could have been blind to it. . . . The expedition to the city of Mexico may not stop until it shows itself in the heart of the Louisiana purchase.²⁷

This letter to Mr. Seward clearly showed Mr. Adam's alarm as to the real intentions of France regarding Mexico. His letter also appeared to absolve England of any ulterior designs in Mexico except to secure the redress of their grievances as they had already professed. However, England's position still was not clearly understood by the United States government. The British policy was better understood by a

letter written to Sir Charles Wyke stating: "If the Mexican people, by a spontaneous movement, place the Austrian Archduke on the throne of Mexico, there is nothing in the convention to prevent it. On the other hand, we could be no parties to a forcible intervention for this purpose. The Mexicans must consult their own interests."²⁸ There had been rumors circulating that Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian of Austria would be invited by a group of Mexicans to place himself on the throne of Mexico. The British government, by this letter to Mr. Wyke, clearly showed their honest intentions and sincerity, although their policy was still misunderstood by the United States government as shown in a letter from Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward: "Great Britain occupies the post of holding the door, whilst her two associates, with her knowledge, go in, fully prepared, if they can, to perpetrate the act which she, at the outset, made them denounce, at the same time that she disavowed every idea of being made to participate in it."²⁹

In reply to Mr. Adams in London, Mr. Seward issued a strong statement about European designs:

We have acted and shall continue to act, with frankness and justice towards the three powers who are invading Mexico, as well as with liberality to the government of Mexico itself. We do this distinctly relying on the assurances we have received from these powers that they will seek no political objectives in their invasion. If they should forfeit these pledges their broken faith would be rewarded with only serious complications, ending in results disastrous to themselves.³⁰

The plenipotentiaries of England, France, Spain, and Mexico met February 19, 1862, at La Soledad to discuss negotiations for the settlement of all claims to be settled at a conference at Orizaba. This conference proved of short duration. The representatives of the allies announced they had resolved to adopt separate and independent lines of

action, and British and Spanish forces were immediately withdrawn.³¹

In spite of appearances to the contrary, the French government still disavowed all designs upon the independence of Mexico. After the stormy conference at Orizaba, Mr. Thouvenel assured Mr. Dayton that all France desired was a stable government in Mexico and not an anarchy.

That if the people of that country chose to establish a republic it was all well; France made no objection. If they chose to establish a monarchy, as that was the form of government here, it would be charming, but they did not mean to do anything to induce such a course of action. That all rumors that France intended to establish the Archduke Maximilian on the throne of Mexico were utterly without foundation.³²

In this letter Mr. Thouvenel once again disclaimed all designs of interfering in Mexican politics and of establishing Maximilian as emperor of Mexico, thereby committing France to an official policy of non-interference in Mexican internal affairs. France might carry out a policy to the contrary of its announced intentions, but to avoid a confrontation with the United States, it would have to act openly within the realm of its official policy of non-intervention.

The first seven months of 1862 were domestically the most critical period of the Civil War in the United States and internationally concerning European interference to help the Confederacy. The United States Senate had refused to accept the proposed loan treaty in any form; therefore, it was necessary for Seward to formulate a new policy to replace his early aggressive policy.³³ In response to rumors Mr. Seward was hearing that France was trying to establish a monarchy in Mexico, he wrote a circular letter which outlined his new policy. Mr. Seward wrote:

The President has relied upon the assurance given to this government by the allies that they were seeking no political

objects, and only a redress of grievances. He does not doubt the sincerity of the allies. . . . The President, however deems it his duty to express to the allies, in all candor and frankness, the opinion that no monarchical government which could be founded in Mexico, in the presence of foreign navies and armies in the waters and upon the soil of Mexico, would have any prospect of security or permanence. Secondly, that the instability of such a monarchy there would be enhanced if the throne should be assigned to any person not of Mexican nativity. That under such circumstances the new government must speedily fall, unless it could draw into its support European alliances which, . . . would, in fact, make it the beginning of a permanent policy of armed European monarchical intervention, injurious and practically hostile to the most general system of government prevailing on the continent of America, and this would be the beginning rather than the ending of revolution in Mexico. . . . It is not to be doubted that the permanent interests and sympathies of this country would be with the other American republics. It is sufficient to say that in the President's opinion, the emancipation of this continent from European control has been the principal feature in its history during the last century. It is not probable that a revolution in a contrary direction would be successful in an immediate succeeding century. . . .³⁴

The second of the documents which set forth Secretary Seward's new policy was his instructions to William Dayton in Paris. These were sent to Mr. Dayton after evidence was building up that the French intervention was for the purpose of establishing a monarchy in Mexico. In his instructions, Mr. Seward wrote:

You will intimate to Mr. Thouvenel that rumors of this kind have reached the President and awakened some anxiety on his part.

It will hardly be necessary to do more . . . than to say that we have more than once . . . informed all the parties to the alliance that we cannot look with indifference upon any armed European intervention for political ends in a country situated so near and connected with us so closely as Mexico.³⁵

Such was Mr. Seward's Mexican policy in 1862. Mr. Seward informed the French government its intervention was disapproved, but in such a manner to avoid its active disfavor, while keeping the way clear for the adaption of a different policy in the future. Gently, politely,

and tactfully he informed the French that the sympathies of the United States citizens were opposed to monarchy and its interference in American hemispheric affairs. Mr. Seward left the impression, officially at least, that he accepted the French disavowals of political designs in Mexico as honest and trustworthy, pointing out that they would be impossible of realization even if they did exist. Mr. Seward's Mexican policy was founded upon expedience and dictated by common sense. His policy was confronted with a victorious Southern army at home and a friendly disposition toward the Confederacy from Europe. With evidence of French plans for establishing a monarchy in Mexico before him, he could afford neither to remain silent, nor to utter a sharp protest. Mr. Seward continually professed traditional friendship toward France but did subject France to frequent interrogation, thereby committing France to a non-interference policy in Mexico. Mr. Seward, suggesting that the French actions were inconsistent at times repeatedly asked for reassurance of French motives in Mexico. Secretary Seward's policy was designed to avoid a direct confrontation with France, at least until domestic trouble in the United States was solved. His policy suggested he purposely left the way open for France to deny its designs, so that in the final confrontation, Mr. Seward could use this basis upon which to insist upon French withdrawal. At no time did Mr. Seward mention the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward appeared to have thought it not expedient to bring it up, for fear of provoking French recognition of the Confederacy. Between vigorous protest and maintaining silence, which might have encouraged Napoleon more, there lay a very narrow path to follow in Seward's policy. Not only did Mr. Seward have the European diplomats to outwit, but he constantly had to expose himself to

criticism and opposition domestically over his failure to prevent what was termed in the United States as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.³⁶

In spite of France proceeding to take over Mexico under the command of General Forey after the Spanish and British withdrawal, Secretary Seward still held to his expedient policy. In a letter to Mr. Dayton on June 21, 1862, he wrote:

France has a right to make war against Mexico, and to determine for herself the cause. We have a right and interest to insist that France shall not improve the war she makes to raise up in Mexico an anti-republican or anti-American government, or to maintain such a government there. France has disclaimed such designs, and we, besides reposing faith in the assurances given in a frank, honorable manner, would, in any case, be bound to wait for, and not anticipate a violation of them. Circumstances tend to excite misapprehensions and jealousies between this government and that of France, in spite of all the prudence we can practice. On our part, we studiously endeavor to avoid them. . . .³⁷

Once again Mr. Seward reasserted his policy of accepting French assurances that they had no political designs in Mexico, and confirmed that France had the right to make war, while maintaining a friendly and cordial understanding that France was not trying to improve the war. Secretary Seward appeared to purposely disregard rumors that France had ulterior purposes in order to continue his policy until the time was much better for a firmer policy. Even after the declaration establishing the Mexican assembly by General Forey, Secretary Seward expressed officially the satisfaction of his government of the explanations given by France. In a letter to John Lothrop Motley, on September 11, 1863, Mr. Seward wrote:

When France made war against Mexico, we asked France explanations of her objects and purposes. She answered, that it was a war for the redress of grievances; that she did not intend to permanently occupy or dominate in Mexico, and that she would leave to the people of Mexico a free choice of institutions of government. Under these circumstances the United States adapted . . . entire neutrality

between the belligerents, in harmony with the traditional policy in regard to foreign wars. The war has continued longer than was anticipated. At different stages of it France has, . . . renewed the explanations before mentioned. . . . That provisional government has neither made nor sought to make any communication to the government of the United States, nor has it been in any way recognized by this government. France has made no communication to the United States concerning the provisional government which has been established in Mexico, nor has she announced any actual or intended departure from the policy in regard to that country which her before-mentioned explanations have authorized us to expect her to pursue.³⁸

Along the same line of general policy Secretary Seward had outlined in his previous instructions, he continued to accept the French assurances of non-interference in Mexican political affairs. Mr. Seward, realizing the powerless position the United States suffered and unwilling to provoke debates with France, chartered a moderate course designed to maintain neutrality, prevent recognition of the Confederacy, and at the same time leave the way open for a future course of action. This Mr. Seward had done with brilliance. Secretary Seward's success in maintaining this policy undoubtedly affected the outcome of the Civil War in the United States and the French expedition to Mexico. To these ends Mr. Seward gave him utmost attention to make sure his policy succeeded even though he found it extremely difficult at times.

¹John Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, A History, Vol. 3, (New York: The Century Co., 1890) "Some Thoughts For the President's Consideration," April 1, 1861, pp. 445-7.

²Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, p. 253 citing J. M. Callahan, Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy, pp. 19-20.

³Ibid.

⁴United States State Department, Notes to Foreign Legations in the United States, Vol. 17, (Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1950) Seward to Romero, April 2, 1861.

⁵H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37-2, Seward to Corwin, April 6, 1861.

⁶Ibid., Seward to Corwin, June 31, 1861.

⁷Ibid., pp. 17-18, (Circular) December 20, 1860.

⁸Ibid., p. 19, Seward to Corwin, Aug. 24, 1861.

⁹Ibid., pp. 12-14, Corwin to Seward, June 29, 1861.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 15-17, 23-24, Corwin to Seward, July 29, 1861.

¹¹Ibid., p. 22, Seward to Corwin, Sept. 2, 1861.

¹²James M. Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1901) p. 76.

¹³H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37-2, pp. 15-16, Corwin to Seward, July 29, 1861.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 31-32, October 29, and May 20, 1862.

¹⁶Mex. Desp., Vol. 29, No. 21, Corwin to Seward, April 16, 1862.

¹⁷Ibid., Vol. 29, No. 24, Corwin to Seward, May 20, 1862.

¹⁸Callahan, Am. For. Pol. in Mex. Rel., p. 284 citing France Instructions, Vol. 16, No. 60, September 24, 1861 and France Inst., Vol. 50, No. 79 (in reply to Dayton's No. 62 of October 16, 1861).

¹⁹Latane, U. S. and Lat. America, p. 201 citing British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 52, p. 329, Earl Cowley to Earl Russell, Sept. 24, 1861.

²⁰Latane, U. S. and Lat. America, p. 201 citing Bri. For. Papers, Vol. 52, p. 375, Earl Lyons to Earl Russell, Oct. 14, 1861.

²¹H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37-2, p. 201, Adams to Seward, Nov. 1, 1861.

- ²²Ibid., p. 49, Seward to Corwin, Feb. 25, 1862.
- ²³H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37-2, pp. 186-7.
- ²⁴Ibid., pp. 188-90, (Circular) Dec. 4, 1861.
- ²⁵Ibid., p. 174, Napoleon to Thouvenel, Nov. 11, 1861.
- ²⁶Latane, U. S. and Lat. America, pp. 207-8 citing Bri. For. Papers, Vol. 52, p. 381.
- ²⁷H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37-2, p. 206, Adams to Seward, Jan. 24, 1862.
- ²⁸Latane, U. S. and Lat. America, p. 209 citing Bri. For. Papers, Vol. 52, p. 418.
- ²⁹H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, p. 209, Adams to Seward, Feb. 19, 1862.
- ³⁰Ibid., p. 207, Seward to Adams, Feb. 19, 1862.
- ³¹H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, 37-3, pp. 46, 48, April 9, 1862.
- ³²Ibid., pp. 58-9, Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1862.
- ³³Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, p. 258 citing Callahan, Seward's Policy, p. 33.
- ³⁴H. Ex. Doc. No. 100, 37-2, pp. 216-7, Seward to Adams, March 3, 1862.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 218, Seward to Dayton, March 31, 1862.
- ³⁶Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, pp. 259-60.
- ³⁷H. Ex. Doc. No. 54, 37-3, pp. 530-1, Seward to Dayton, June 21, 1862.
- ³⁸Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 11, 38-1, p. 479, Seward to Motley, Sept. 11, 1863.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEMS OF MAINTAINING NEUTRALITY

The years 1863 to 1865 marked a very difficult period in our foreign relations with France for Secretary of State William Seward. The problem was how to maintain a neutral policy in face of an aggressive foreign power determined on establishing a monarchical government in Mexico and to quiet the ardent domestic desire for enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, at least until a more favorable time could be found to deal with the problem. Mr. Seward's policy was further complicated by the problem of maintaining neutrality while leaving his policy open for change when the situation would warrant. Secretary Seward's policy was also affected by the domestic desire to defend the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward used this spirit to put pressure upon France to get out of Mexico because of the strong sentiments of the United States citizens against French designs to establish a monarchy in Mexico.

Secretary Seward's apprehensions about challenging France over Mexico were found in a private letter to John Bigelow, Consul-General at Paris, on September 9, 1863, in which he stated:

We are too intent on putting down our own insurrection, and avoiding complications which might embarrass us, to seek for occasion of dispute with any foreign power. I do not know, but I think it reasonable to presume, that the emperor finds the difficulty of his administration sufficient to employ him, without inviting any unnecessary difficulty with the United States. I may be wrong in the latter view. But, if I am, there is likely to be time enough for us to change our course after discovering the error.¹

This letter gave Mr. Seward's personal view about the situation

concerning United States-French relations and the Civil War. It showed that he was concerned more with the domestic Civil War and sought to avoid complications with France which might interfere with the primary concern of the Lincoln administration, which was the Civil War. It also showed that Secretary Seward was thinking in terms of a long term policy in regard to France if the need for one arose.

In setting forth his neutrality policy regarding Mexico, Mr. Seward declared the United States: "have neither a right nor any disposition to intervene by force in the internal affairs of Mexico, whether to establish or to maintain a republican or even a domestic government there, or to overthrow an imperial or a foreign one if Mexico shall choose to establish or accept it."² Secretary Seward continued by writing that the United States had no right to intervene on either side, and it practiced non-intervention, which they required all foreign nations to observe in regard to the United States. Mr. Seward also expressed grave doubts that the Mexican people favored the monarchical form of government imposed from abroad.³

Mr. Seward pointed out his belief that France was doomed to failure in trying to establish a monarchical government in Mexico. In a warning to France, Secretary Seward wrote:

Nor do we practice reserve upon the point that if France should, upon due consideration, determine to adopt a policy in Mexico adverse to the American opinions and sentiments which I have described, that policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies that might ultimately ripen into collisions between France and the United States and other American republics.⁴

Secretary Seward pointed out that the Mexican people should be the ones to decide their form of government and no other nation had a right to impose one upon the Mexican people, thereby disclaiming any

desire on the part of the United States to control any part of Mexico. Mr. Seward suggested that the United States government would not neglect to make provision for its own safety. Mr. Seward's statements were doubtless intended to convey the impression that the United States would not invoke the Monroe Doctrine. All Mr. Seward did at this time was to warn France of a collision course with the United States if France should adopt one adverse to United States opinions and sentiments which would result if France tried to impose a monarchical government on the Mexican people. This policy in effect left France a way to carry out its designs without clashing with the statements of Secretary Seward. France could claim she was only helping the Mexican people with what they wanted. In this manner France was allowed, officially at least, to help the Mexicans establish a monarchy under Maximilian. Without protest from the United States, there was left no excuse for Napoleon III to declare war on the United States or recognize the Confederate states.⁵

Secretary Seward was especially careful about our diplomats practicing neutrality. When John Motley, United States Minister to Austria, reported that Austria was recruiting troops to accompany Maximilian to Mexico and suggested the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine to prevent it, Secretary Seward was quick to reply that since Austria had not shown any interest in the Mexican affair, he did not deem it necessary for a United States representative to engage in political debates which the Mexican situation elicited.⁶ When John Bigelow wrote from France urging Mr. Seward to be more outspoken in regard to Mexico, Secretary Seward replied: "I think, with deference to your opinion, which I always hold in great respect, that, with our land and naval

forces in Louisiana retreating before the rebels instead of marching toward Mexico, this is not the most suitable time we could choose for offering idle menaces to the Emperor of France."⁷

The importance of Secretary Seward's neutrality policy was illustrated in a conversation between Drouyn de Lhuys, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and William Dayton, United States Minister to France. Mr. Dayton reported that in his conversation with Mr. Lhuys reference was made to the rumor that the United States government only awaited the end of its Civil War to drive the French out of Mexico. Mr. Dayton said the French concluded that if they were to have trouble with the United States, it would be safest to choose their own time. Mr. Lhuys said the Emperor had asked him if these rumors were true. Mr. Lhuys said he told him the United States had made no formal protest against the French actions. Mr. Dayton assured Mr. Lhuys he had received no orders to make such a protest and he had relied on French assurances they did not intend to colonize Mexico or impose a foreign government in Mexico. Mr. Dayton also assured Mr. Lhuys the United States government had no intentions of interference in the war between France and Mexico.⁸

Upon hearing rumors that France intended to seize Texas and form an alliance with the Confederates, Secretary Seward requested that the Emperor Napoleon make a reliable guarantee that he did not intend permanent occupation of Mexico.⁹ William Dayton reported the French Minister Lhuys said a vote of the entire country would be taken, and if a majority of the people desired a monarchy, he supposed that would be sufficient. Minister Lhuys went on to say that the dangers of the government of Maximilian would come principally from the United States, and the sooner the United States entered into peaceful relations with

that government, the sooner the French would be ready to leave Mexico and the new government to itself.¹⁰

Secretary Seward declined to accept the proposal of Minister Lhuys on the premise that the United States were determined to err on the side of strict neutrality. Action lending support to either side would violate that neutrality. In reply to the proposal, Mr. Seward wrote:

In the opinion of the United States, the permanent establishment of a foreign and monarchical government in Mexico will be found neither easy nor desirable. . . . On the other hand, the United States cannot anticipate the action of the people of Mexico, nor have they the least purpose or desire to interfere with their proceedings, or control or interfere with their free choice, or disturb them in the enjoyment of whatever institution of government they may, in the exercise of an absolute freedom establish. . . . The United States continue to regard Mexico as the theatre of a war which has not yet ended in the subversion of the government long existing there, with which the United States remain in the relation of peace and sincere friendship. . . . The United States, consistently with their principles, can do no otherwise than leave the destinies of Mexico in the keeping of her own people. . . .¹¹

There was a growing popular demand for a more aggressive policy against the French in Mexico by 1864. There was considerable contempt for Secretary Seward's passive policy toward the French. Senator James A. McDougall of California introduced a resolution in the United States Senate in January, 1864, declaring the occupation of Mexico by French forces was an act unfriendly to the United States and it was the duty of the United States government to demand withdrawal.¹² This resolution was never reported from the committee but did bring embarrassment to Secretary Seward. Again in April, 1864, the House of Representatives, by a vote of 109 to 0, declared it would not accord with the policy of the United States to acknowledge a monarchical government erected under the auspices of any European power. When the resolution

reached the Senate it died in the committee, thereby saving Secretary Seward political problems which might have developed over the resolution.¹³ The seriousness of the resolution was realized especially when Minister Dayton called on Mr. Lhuys in Paris shortly after a copy of the resolution reached him. Mr. Lhuys' immediate question was, "Do you bring us peace, or bring us war?" Mr. Dayton's reply was that the resolutions embodied nothing more than what had been constantly held out to the French from the beginning. This being that there should be no interference by the French government as to the form of government in Mexico.¹⁴ In response to a request for an explanation of the resolutions, Mr. Seward instructed Minister Dayton to inform the French government that although the resolution was a true interpretation of the unanimous sentiment of the people of the United States, it was another and distinct question, whether the United States would think it necessary or proper to express themselves in the form of the resolutions adopted by the House of Representatives. Mr. Seward went on to say that this was a practical and pure executive question, and the decision belongs to the President of the United States. The President, Mr. Seward related, respected the expression of the sentiments of the House upon this subject, but he does not contemplate any departure from the policy which had been pursued in regard to the war which existed between France and Mexico. Secretary Seward also said that any change in policy would be quickly notified by the French government.¹⁵

Secretary Seward received severe criticism from the House of Representatives for his explanations to France. After citing a long history of precedent and incidents in which Congress exercised a controlling influence in foreign affairs, a resolution was adopted stating

Congress had a constitutional right to an authoritative voice in declaring and prescribing the foreign policy of the United States, and it was the constitutional duty of the President to respect that policy and that the propriety of any declaration of foreign policy by Congress was sufficiently proved by the vote which pronounces it.¹⁶

Mr. Seward wrote a confidential letter to John Bigelow in which he stated:

the nation can act with all the circumspection and deliberation which a regard to its condition of distraction, civil war, and social revolution requires, I might say to you confidentially . . . that those who are most impatient for the defeat of European and monarchical designs in Mexico might well be content to abide the effects which must result from the ever increasing expansion of the American people westward and southward. Five years, ten years, twenty years hence, Mexico will be opening herself as cheerfully to American immigration as Montana and Idaho are now. What European power can then maintain an army in Mexico capable of resisting the martial and moral influence of immigration?¹⁷

Several clubs were formed to urge the government to a more active policy in the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine. One such organization was called the Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine. The French chargé, Marc-Antoine Geofroy, protested the organization's activities and purposes in a letter to Secretary Seward and asked for an investigation.¹⁸ Mr. Seward's reply was an explanation that there was an organization known as the Defenders of the Monroe Doctrine, and its presiding officer was a Colonel F. N. D. S. Borden, a citizen of Mexico. Mr. Seward continued by explaining that only a few young citizens of New Orleans, of little influence, belonged to the club. He explained that the object of the club was to influence the government in favor of a maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine but not in violation of the law or neutrality policy of the United States government.¹⁹ Secretary

Seward undoubtedly wished to maintain friendly relations with France and maintain his neutral policy by assuring the French that the organization was of little influence. Mr. Seward did admit its existence, perhaps for political effects and to let the French know that the United States citizens objected to any violation of a long established policy regarding foreign interference in political affairs on this continent.

Further apprehension was felt by United States diplomats when Maximilian formally accepted the crown offered by the Mexican deputies on April 10, 1864, at Miramar, near Trieste. In reporting to Secretary Seward the acceptance of Maximilian, William Dayton wrote, "Nothing has happened since I came here which so much foreshadows the future differences with France. . . . France has not kept faith with us, but it is needless to complain now-not till we are able to enforce reparation."²⁰ William Dayton, like Mr. Seward, realized the United States could not afford a war with France at that time. Mr. Dayton had written in a previous despatch, "We cannot afford a war with France for the Quixotic purpose of helping Mexico. . . ."²¹ Realizing the seriousness of the relations between the United States and France, Secretary Seward was determined to maintain a neutral policy towards the French-Mexico war and avert a crisis with France. Mr. Seward was determined to prevent a confrontation with France, at least until the United States had settled its chief domestic problem, the Civil War. Considering the possibility of aggression against the United States by France, Mr. Seward declared the United States would rise to the new duties devolved upon it, Secretary Seward again reiterated his opinion that "the destinies of the American continent are not to be permanently controlled

by political arrangements that can be made in the political capitals of Europe."²² Mr. Seward knew that intervention against France in Mexico at that time might be dangerous to the safety of the United States.²³ Mr. Seward's policy was well explained in a letter to Charles F. Adams, declaring, "I know no way but to contemplate the situation calmly, do our duty faithfully, and meet every emergency as it rises. . . ."²⁴

Secretary Seward's policy encountered difficulty again when the Radical Republican Convention at Cleveland, Ohio, on May 31, 1864, declared in an erroneous interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, "the national policy known as the Monroe Doctrine has become a recognized principle and that the establishment of any anti-republican government on this continent by any foreign power can not be tolerated." The Republican national convention then declared in June, 1864, that:

the people of the United States can never regard with indifference the attempt of any European power to overthrow by force or to supplant by fraud the institutions of any republican government of the Western Continent, and they will view with extreme jealousy, as menacing to the peace and independence of their own country, the efforts of any such power to obtain new footholds for monarchical governments, sustained by foreign military force in near proximity to the United States.²⁵

Secretary Seward, still maintaining his neutral policy and hoping the situation would resolve itself according to his expressed views, wrote to John Motley, "All that can be done in regard to them is to practice prudence and good faith in our foreign relations, and at the same time make preparations for self defense, if notwithstanding our best efforts, we find ourselves involved in new complications."²⁶ Secretary Seward believed his neutrality policy would prevent a war with France, allow the Civil War to be concluded without outside interference,

and maintain friendly relations with France and the European nations without having to engage in a senseless war to uphold the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward undoubtedly believed the United States would need friends rather than enemies after the conclusion of the Civil War. Mr. Seward held firm in his belief that diplomatic skill and time would alleviate the trouble in Mexico when he expressed himself to John Bigelow:

I remain, however, of the opinion I have often expressed, that even this vexatious Mexican question in the end will find its solution without producing a conflict between the United States and France. The future of Mexico is neither an immediate nor even a vital question for either the United States or France. For both of them it is a foreign affair, and therefore time and reason may be allowed their full influence in its settlement.²⁷

Rumors circulated that Maximilian was about to cede Sonora and part of Lower California to France for a military colony in the latter part of 1864. When John Bigelow inquired of the French Minister about rumors to this plan, the reply was that it had been proposed to give the French government a lien upon the mineral products of Sonora as security for the Mexican debt to France.²⁸ To maintain his established policy of neutrality, Mr. Seward answered the Mexican Minister Romero that the protest he had filed over the rumored French plans would be filed in the archives for future uses and purposes that events might demand.²⁹ He instructed John Bigelow that such a cession, or even the creation of a lien upon the mineral revenues of Sonora, would not be regarded with favor by the people of the United States.³⁰

Toward the close of the Civil War, apprehension was being felt in France that once the North and South were reunited, a combined effort would be made to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. Secretary Seward was careful to keep these rumors from becoming the basis for French

policy, and possibly for France to extend aid to the Confederacy in order to propagate the split in the Union. Mr. Seward made clear his policy toward France in a private note to John Bigelow:

the policy of this government toward Mexico as hitherto made known by the President remains unchanged. It rests with France to decide whether this is satisfactory. If we have war with her, it must be a war of her own making either against our ships or upon our territory. We shall defend ourselves if assailed on our own ground. We shall attack nobody elsewhere. All subordinate and collateral questions ensuing out of the war are left by us to the arbitration of reason under the instructions of time. Forbearance and liberality toward the United States in Europe will relieve the situation.³¹

Mr. Seward's explanation to France in explaining rumors and projects to reunite the North and South in a combined war against France to drive her from Mexico was that "this government prefers to fight this civil war out on the present line, if no foreign state intervenes in behalf of the insurgents."³² Secretary Seward was thoroughly convinced the United States must avoid a war with France if at all possible and his diplomacy was centered around this objective. His insistence that we would only declare war if warred upon our land or ships indicated his desire to settle the Mexican question with diplomatic skill and not by force of arms.

The Maximilian government took steps to secure recognition from the United States in March, 1865. Secretary Seward, not wanting to provoke unnecessary hostility from France over recognizing the Maximilian government, stated that the United States still recognized the Republican government in Mexico and had not given recognition to Maximilian; therefore, it did not receive unauthorized agents. Mr. Seward continued by stating that the United States were engaged in suppressing a dangerous rebellion and not unwilling to be unnecessarily diverted

from that duty over a controversy in Mexico with any party in Mexico or elsewhere concerning affairs in that country.³³ Secretary Seward earlier had instructed William Dayton that if Maximilian appeared in Paris with the assumption of political title in Mexico, he was to refrain from intercourse with him. If questioned about his actions, Mr. Dayton was to say he had not been recognized by the United States, and his instructions were to hold no formal or informal communications with political agents of revolutionary movements in countries with which the United States maintained diplomatic intercourse.³⁴

The future diplomatic course of the United States toward France was becoming one of anxiety to the French, and they continually sought assurances that the end of the Civil War would not bring a change of policy on the part of the United States in regard to the French presence in Mexico. In reply to a question to the future policy of the United States, Mr. Seward replied:

We want our national rights. We are not looking for ulterior, national advantages, or aggrandizement, much less for occasions for retaliating in other forms of hostility against foreign states. We are not propagandist, although we are consistent in our political convictions.³⁵

Mr. Seward's policy toward France was again asserted after a remark of John Bigelow had been misinterpreted by the French. On June 9, 1865, M. Rouher, in the French Assembly, asserted that Mr. Bigelow had said to the French Minister Lhuys, "We understand that Mexico, which has long been governed by the monarchial form, may desire to return to that state of things, and we are not going to make war upon a question of form of government." Mr. Bigelow reported to Secretary Seward that his misinterpreted remarks were in brief, that since the experiment had begun, the people of the United States wished it to be fully tried to

determine finally and forever whether European systems of government suited the Mexican people best. If it did suit them best, and public tranquility was restored, no nation was more interested in such a result than the United States. Whatever government was acceptable to the Mexican people was acceptable to the United States. Mr. Bigelow asserted that he had never said the Mexican people desired a monarchical government.³⁶

When Secretary Seward replied to Mr. Bigelow, he again asserted his policy of strict neutrality. Mr. Seward explained that Mr. Bigelow's remarks were not warranted by the instructions of his department. Secretary Seward declared:

So far as our relations are carried, what we hold in regard to Mexico is that France is a belligerent there in war with the Republic of Mexico. We do not enter into the merits of the belligerents, but we practice in regard to the contest the principles of neutrality as we have insisted on the practice of neutrality by all nations in regard to our civil war. Our friendship toward the republic of Mexico and our sympathies with the republican system on this continent, as well as our faith and confidence in it, have been continually declared. We do not intervene in foreign wars or foreign politics. Political intervention in the affairs of foreign states is a principle thus far avoided by our government. It is right and proper nevertheless that the French government should not misunderstand the case and be suffered to fall into a belief that we have entertained any views favorable to it as an invader of Mexico, or that we at all distrust the ultimate success of republican systems throughout this continent.³⁷

Secretary Seward was still careful in emphasizing our neutrality toward the Mexican question as we had insisted upon neutrality toward the Civil War. Mr. Seward did not deny the sympathies of the United States toward the republican form of government as existed in Mexico. He had continually stressed in previous correspondence to the French minister these sympathies. While Secretary Seward emphatically stressed to France the neutrality policy of this government, he was also quick to show

disapproval of the French actions if they consisted of imposing a monarchical form of government on the Mexican people. Possibly he had in mind to use this point as a basis for demanding French withdrawal from Mexico.

Mr. Seward was still careful not to give Napoleon a reason to believe the United States had changed its policy in regard to Mexico. In a despatch to Secretary Seward, John Bigelow cautioned Mr. Seward about giving any pretext which might rally French public opinion against the United States. Mr. Bigelow was especially aware of European disgust for the Monroe Doctrine and feared its use would only rally Europeans to oppose it. Mr. Bigelow believed it important that the United States not permit anything to happen to relieve the situation at our expense.³⁸ Mr. Seward replied that France knew the United States would not recognize a monarchical government engaged in a war with a domestic republican government. The United States could not ally itself with a nation at war with its friend. The United States desired peace and friendly relations with France. If France did adopt a measure of hostility toward the United States, this government would meet the shock according to its ability.³⁹

Secretary Seward was still anxious to give France no reason to believe the United States had changed its policy with the close of the Civil War. Mr. Seward had consistently expressed his policy of neutrality toward the Mexican question as he wanted the European nations to observe neutrality toward the United States Civil War. Mr. Seward consistently expressed the sympathies of this country with the republican government in Mexico and expressed its attitude that French imposition of a monarchical government would be looked upon with disfavor by

this country as the Civil War in the United States drew to a close.

Mr. Seward undoubtedly believed that the best policy to pursue was one of peace and time with a series of diplomatic negotiations. Secretary Seward wanted to secure by peaceful diplomacy what others were anxious to obtain by military means. Through these diplomatic negotiations, Mr. Seward first emphasized and later insisted boldly the necessity of the withdrawal of the French from Mexico.⁴⁰

The conclusion of the Civil War removed the greatest danger for the United States. Secretary Seward could have changed his policy immediately following the conclusion of the Civil War if it had been merely a policy of prudence, but for four years he had been practicing the art of diplomacy with France. Secretary Seward, through diplomatic skill, had kept France from openly intervening in the Civil War and kept France and Great Britain from forming an alliance possibly against the United States. To get the French out of Mexico peaceably through diplomatic skill would be a very difficult task, but one Mr. Seward would pursue now that the Civil War was closed and his attention could be directed toward that purpose.⁴¹

¹Frederic Bancroft, The Life of William H. Seward, Vol. 2 (New York: Harper Bro's, 1900) pp. 426-7 citing an unpublished letter Mr. Seward wrote to John Bigelow, September 9, 1863.

²United States State Department, Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the President, or commonly called Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Vol. 3, pp. 936-8, No. 45, Seward to Motley, October 9, 1863.

³Ibid.

⁴Dip. Corr., 1863, Vol. 2, pp. 709-12, No. 406, Seward to Dayton, Sept. 26, 1863.

⁵Ibid., and Bancroft, Life of Seward, p. 428.

⁶Ibid., p. 927, No. 31, Motley to Seward, August 17, 1863, and for Seward's reply, Dip. Corr., 1863, Vol. 2, pp. 929-30, No. 41, Seward to Motley, Sept. 11, 1863.

⁷Bancroft, Life of Seward, p. 430 citing an unpublished letter written to John Bigelow.

⁸Dip. Corr., 1863, Vol. 2, pp. 698-9, No. 345, Dayton to Seward, Sept. 14, 1863.

⁹Ibid., p. 703, No. 400, Seward to Dayton, Sept. 21, 1863.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 717-8, No. 361, Dayton to Seward, Oct. 9, 1863.

¹¹Ibid., p. 726, No. 417, Seward to Dayton, Oct. 23, 1863.

¹²Edward McPherson, Political History of the United States During the Great Rebellion (New York: Appleton and Co., 1864) p. 348-9.

¹³Ibid., p. 349.

¹⁴Dip. Corr., 1864, Vol. 3, p. 76, No. 454, Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1864.

¹⁵Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 3, 356-7, No. 525, Seward to Dayton, April 7, 1864.

¹⁶McPherson, History of the Great Rebellion, pp. 350-4.

¹⁷Bancroft, Life of Seward, p. 429 citing an unpublished confidential letter of May 5, 1864 from Seward to Bigelow.

¹⁸Dip. Corr., 1864, Vol. 3, pp. 216-7, (Legation) Geofroy to Seward, April 26, 1864.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 220, Seward to Geofroy, May 28, 1864.

²⁰H. Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39-1, p. 378, Dayton to Seward, April 22, 1864.

²¹Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, 39-1, p. 4, Dayton to Seward, March 25, 1864.

²²Dip. Corr., 1864, Vol. 3, p. 80, No. 538, Seward to Dayton, April 30, 1864.

²³Callahan, Am. For. Pol., p. 296.

²⁴H. Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39-1, p. 354, Seward to Adams, May 3, 1864.

²⁵Callahan, Am. For. Pol., p. 297-8.

²⁶H. Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39-1, p. 502, Seward to Motley, July 14, 1864.

²⁷Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, 39-1, p. 35, Seward to Bigelow, March 17, 1865.

²⁸Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 2, pp. 361-2, No. 8, Bigelow to Seward, January 20, 1865.

²⁹H. Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39-1, p. 97 (Legation) Romero to Seward, Feb. 25, 1865.

³⁰Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 3, p. 363, No. 33, Seward to Bigelow, Feb. 7, 1865.

³¹Callahan, Am. For. Pol., p. 301, citing France Instructions, pp. 277-99, March 6, 1865.

³²Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 3, p. 363, No. 33, Seward to Bigelow, Feb. 7, 1865.

³³Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, 39-1, p. 26, Seward to Bigelow, March 13, 1865.

³⁴Dip. Corr., 1864, Vol. 3, p. 45, Seward to Dayton, Feb. 27, 1864.

³⁵Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 6, 39-1, p. 37, Seward to Bigelow, March 28, 1865.

³⁶Ibid., p. 43, Bigelow to Seward, June 13, 1865.

³⁷Ibid., p. 47, Seward to Bigelow, June 30, 1865.

³⁸Ibid., p. 40, Bigelow to Seward, May 26, 1865.

³⁹Ibid., p. 42, Seward to Bigelow, June 12, 1865.

⁴⁰Callahan, Am. For. Pol., pp. 304-5.

⁴¹Bancroft, Life of Seward, p. 432.

CHAPTER V

THE TRIUMPH OF MR. SEWARD'S DIPLOMACY

The approaching end of the Civil War brought no substantial modification in the foreign policy of Secretary Seward, who became more convinced as the war's end drew near that the wisest course he could take was one of moderation and through a pacific policy, prevail upon the French to remove their troops from Mexico without a resort to hostilities. Having determined to persist in this course of moderation, it became ever more evident to Mr. Seward that it would require his talents of diplomacy to hold in restraint the rising demand for action to defend the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward knew that the violent threats from radicals in the United States, and at times even projects to launch an invasion of Mexico, would only serve to make the possibility of removing the French troops from Mexico impossible short of war. Many people even expected the mass army used during the Civil War to be used to vindicate the French intervention in Mexico. Secretary Seward was concerned that these indiscreet projects would serve only to help Napoleon cover up his mistakes by making him a popular figure in Europe in a patriotic war against the much hated Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Seward sought to prevent these projects in order to carry out his policy of moderation.¹

The high officials of the Northern army became more insistent on using their army to expel the French with the close of the Civil War. Many ex-soldiers sought to enlist in the services of the Juárez forces at the close of the war. Mr. Romero concluded that a prominent general

was needed to direct these emigrants and organize them into an army. When Mr. Romero conferred with General Ulysses S. Grant, he was found to be very favorable to the plan. After some discussion, they decided that Mr. Grant would be of more use diplomatically in the United States. They soon found an able man for the enterprise in General J. M. Schofield. Mr. Grant and Mr. Romero soon convinced the President and most of the Cabinet of the wisdom of the plan. Secretary Seward opposed the plan, fearing it would only lead to a needless war with France.² General Grant got permission from President Johnson to give General Schofield a leave of absence. General Sheridan was sent to observe along the Rio Grande and place ordinance stores along the river for the use of General Schofield and the troops he would have under his command. General Sheridan was to aid Juárez if at all possible and deliberately stir up trouble.³ Mr. Sheridan appeared to hold a great deal of contempt for Secretary Seward's neutrality policy and actually advocated war. General Sheridan complained of the slow and poky methods of the state department and even severely criticized Secretary Seward for lack of aggressiveness. He once remarked that a golden opportunity was lost since the United States had an ample excuse for crossing the border, but Secretary Seward opposed any act likely to involve the United States in war.⁴

Before carrying out his plan, Secretary Seward convinced General Schofield of the need for his talents in Paris as a diplomat in persuading Napoleon to remove his troops from Mexico. General Schofield's expedition to Mexico could have had serious consequences relative to the strategy of Secretary Seward. The whole undertaking by Schofield and Grant was practically disorganized when Mr. Seward flattered General

Schofield into thinking his talent were needed in Paris. General Schofield's role was to seek out the best measures to be taken to induce Napoleon to withdraw his forces from Mexico. Mr. Seward knew that the aggressive attitude of General Schofield would quieten once he stood face to face with the Emperor Napoleon. An illustration of Seward's confidence in his policy was when he told Schofield: "I want you to get your legs under Napoleon's mahogany and tell him he must get out of Mexico."⁵ General Schofield's report upon returning was there was no need for his services in such a scheme proposed. As Secretary Seward later said, he gave General Schofield something to do and converted him to his own policy by convincing him the French were going as fast as they could. This even pacified General Grant.⁶

Secretary Seward also opposed any attempts to help the Juárez forces by raising of money. The plan of Schofield and Grant was to raise money through the sale of bonds to Juárezist sympathizers. Secretary Seward knew monetary aid would be a breach of neutrality and sought to avoid giving any offense to the Emperor when he was probably then facing the decision of removing his troops. Mr. Seward's opposition and the large national debt were instrumental factors in defeating the measure in Congress.⁷

Another private project which evinced considerable correspondence and anxiety from Mr. Seward to the French was that of Dr. William M. Gwin, a former United States Senator from California, to colonize several states in Northern Mexico with ex-Confederates. Several very prominent Confederates were to be involved in this scheme. Secretary Seward related to the French that patience of the United States people over the French intervention was getting smaller. Any favor shown to

Dr. Gwin by the Emperor would only tend to increase that impatience and would be regarded as a menace to the United States. Mr. Seward reminded the Emperor that France had pledged a neutral policy in Mexican politics and now the Emperor was taking a different course from that previously assured to Mr. Seward. Secretary Seward asked for assurances that Dr. Gwin's scheme was not being sanctioned by the Emperor. A stern warning was given that the United States could not look with favor upon the insurgents across the border after having expelled them from the United States.⁸ After denying any knowledge of the scheme, the French Foreign Minister Lhuys declared: "we have nothing to offer as a pledge of our intentions but our word, but we deem the word of France a guarantee which will satisfy any foreign power. . . ."⁹ Although the charge was denied by the French government, undoubtedly there was considerable evidence to support the accusations of the plans of Dr. Gwin. Mr. Seward used this occasion to present a growing impatience on the part of the United States people for the withdrawal of French forces from Mexico. This was the first time Mr. Seward confronted the French with the fact of their complete violation of their neutrality policy, pointing out that the United States had formulated its neutrality policy and maintained it accordingly.

The reference to the growing impatience of the United States people by Mr. Seward was the beginning of a new policy in his effort to remove the French from Mexico. This policy was contrived with the purpose of using the attitude of the United States people as a weapon against the French at the opportune time. Mr. Seward represented the United States people as straining at the leash. Congress was portrayed, quite accurately, irritated and demanding action. The army

was pictured as spoiling for a fight as many of its professionals were. Mr. Seward had left his policy of 1862 open for just such an opportune time. French violation of the neutrality policy it had promised appeared fit for just such an opportunity. In view of the reported growing domestic opposition in France to the Emperor's enterprise, it was thought possible to hasten the Emperor's withdrawal from Mexico.¹⁰ Secretary Seward foresaw that France should not long delay her withdrawal from Mexico in the interest of future peace. He viewed with alarm the growing impatience of Congress, the anger of the United States people, and the danger of the two armies facing one another across the border. Mr. Seward's alarm was expressed in a private note to Mr. Bigelow on August 7, in which he claimed that the presence of French troops might quicken the impatience of the United States to a point which would be incompatible with peace. Mr. Seward again expressed through Mr. Bigelow to Mr. Lhuys the growing impatience of the United States people and requested Mr. Bigelow to make certain Lhuys understood this so he might hasten the French withdrawal.¹¹

Secretary Seward was gradually becoming more pre-emptory with France. The Instructions immediately prior to September were to set the stage for his final diplomatic moves to remove the French troops from Mexico without erupting a war. The French Foreign Minister disclosed in August the desire on their part to withdraw their forces if the United States could display a better attitude on their part toward the Maximilian government and observe neutrality once the French left.¹² Mr. Seward, in a long despatch on September 6, 1865, started a series of correspondence which resulted in a virtual ultimatum to France. Mr. Seward discussed in his correspondence of September 6 the previous

policies of the United States government in regard to Mexico and the traditional friendship between these two governments saying, however, that it appears now France was lending her influences to destroy the republican government in Mexico. Mr. Seward pointed out that past administrations in the United States had found it necessary to adapt their policies to the demand of the national will. He stated that the expression of that will could usually be relied upon as pointing out a line of action, and that since the Civil War had ended in the United States, Congress and the people would now give their attention to the relations with the French. He stated that since both countries had armies facing each other over the Mexican border, the time had come when both nations must consider whether the permanent interests of international peace and friendship did not require thoughtful and serious attention to the political question in Mexico.¹³ This was not exactly an ultimatum to France but a form of suggestion as to what the United States people might insist upon doing if the French failed to withdraw from Mexico. Mr. Seward was undoubtedly using the popular feeling in the United States as a weapon to point out a collision course with France if she did not withdraw from Mexico soon.

When the French minister proposed United States recognition as compensation for the French withdrawal of its troops, Mr. Seward gave a sharp reply. His response to such a bid for recognition was a virtual ultimatum to France to withdraw. Using the public anger as his tool of diplomacy, Mr. Seward asserted:

The presence and operations of a French army in Mexico, and its maintenance of an authority there, resting upon force and not the free will of the people of Mexico, is a cause of serious concern to the United States. Nevertheless, the objection of the United States is still broader, and includes the authority

itself which the French army is thus maintaining. That authority is in direct antagonism to the policy of this government and the principle upon which it is founded.

They still regard the effort to establish permanently a foreign and imperial government in Mexico as disallowable and impracticable. . . . They are not prepared to recognize, or to pledge themselves . . . to recognize any political institutions in Mexico which are in opposition to the republican government. . . .¹⁴

Mr. Seward clearly accused the French of forcing upon the Mexican people a foreign monarchical government. This being the case, the people of the United States would never recognize such a government held only by French arms. Secretary Seward had once more wielded the weapon of the will of the people of the United States. Mr. Lhuys' shock to this sudden frankness and directness was clearly indicated by his concern when he remarked that he derived neither pleasure nor satisfaction from its contents.¹⁵ Regardless of Mr. Lhuys' reaction to Mr. Bigelow, the French Foreign Minister knew that Secretary Seward did spell out the opinion of the United States people and he indeed might have to cope with it.

Mr. Seward again brought up the necessity for French withdrawal in his correspondence to Mr. Bigelow on December 16, 1865. Pointing out the likelihood that Congress would direct by law the action of the executive department on the matter if France did not hasten the removal of its troops, Mr. Seward stated:

It is not the executive department of this government alone which is interested and concerned in the question whether the present condition of things shall be continued in Mexico. The interest is a national one, and in every event Congress, . . . is authorized by the Constitution and is entitled to direct by law the action of the United States in regard to that important subject.¹⁶

Mr. Seward made two points in this correspondence to the French minister. First, the United States wanted continued friendship, and secondly,

this friendship was in jeopardy unless France ceased its policy of overthrowing the Mexican republican government. The proposal to withdraw by the French if the United States would recognize the Maximilian government was rejected.¹⁷

The situation was further aggravated when on October 3, the Maximilian government issued a decree ordering all Mexicans belonging to armed bands, not legally organized, to be tried by court martial and if found guilty would be sentenced to death within twenty-four hours. This decree was aimed directly at the Juárez forces.¹⁸ Secretary Seward expressed alarm at the decree and its actually being carried out. He declared the United States government could never recognize a government which issued the decree. Secretary Seward directed Mr. Bigelow to call this matter to the attention of the French Foreign Minister and inform him these reports had been received with deepest concern.¹⁹

In the conversation which ensued between Mr. Bigelow and Mr. Lhuys, the former referred to the execution of the Mexican prisoners taken in war. Mr. Lhuys replied when asked to prevent these barbaric acts:

Why do you not go to President Juárez? We are not the government of Mexico, and you do us too much honor to treat us as such. We had to go to Mexico with an army to secure certain interests, but we are not responsible for Maximilian or his government. He is accountable to you, as to any other government if he violated its rights, and you have the same remedies there that we had.²⁰

One point Mr. Bigelow pointed out to Mr. Seward which may have made him more confident of his policy was that his impression from the conversation was that if the United States insisted upon their withdrawal, that would be the end of their Mexican experiment. Mr. Bigelow

believed no attempt would be made to defend Mexico if war broke out between the United States and Mexico.²¹

France had tried to use as a weapon the promise of withdrawal if the United States would recognize the Maximilian government. Mr. Lhuys proposed that if the United States would recognize Maximilian's government as a de facto government and open relations with Maximilian there would be no difficulty in arranging the recall of the French troops.²²

Secretary Seward replied to the French proposal on December 6, when he declared the proposal impractical. He declared that foreign armies in Mexico are dangerous. He confirmed the right of a nation to make war but not to menace the safety of the United States. Mr. Seward claimed France had subverted a domestic government established by the people. He promised the United States would not carry on a war of propagandism over the republican cause but insisted that every state had the right to choose a republican form if it so desired without foreign interference. He reiterated that the United States did not subvert European governments nor should they subvert American governments.²³

In his annual message of 1865, President Johnson gave his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in somewhat of an obscure threat. After reviewing the history of this foreign intervention, he declared the United States desired to act in the future as it had in the past. He stated the United States relied on the wisdom of non-interference on the part of the European governments as the United States practiced in regard to them. He declared the United States policy of leaving the European nations to form their own systems of government. He stated

that it would be a great calamity if the European powers challenge the American people to the defense of republicanism.²⁴

The United States Congress, which was soon to be in session, was sure to be aggressive and demanding for action. Secretary Seward hastened to use this occasion to use his weapon, public opinion in the United States, stating that Congress might by law direct the action of this country. The United States' traditional policy of friendship would be in eminent jeopardy unless France could stop the intervention in Mexico.²⁵ Mr. Bigelow reported on December 21, 1865, that he was convinced that France was determined to get out of Mexico without delay. He believed this to be the will of the French people. Mr. Bigelow saw that Congress should not spoil the negotiations by rash acts. He recommended that Congress hold itself in reserve, and concentrate on domestic issues, and wait until the Mexican question asserted itself. Mr. Bigelow said: "the quieter we are, the quicker they will go . . . the more patient Congress is, the better."²⁶

The official reply to Mr. Seward's Instructions of November 29, were written by Foreign Minister Lhuys, which was a lengthy letter first tracing the long history of events surrounding the Mexican question. Mr. Lhuys claimed the United States held friendly relations with the Brazilian monarchy and with Mexico in 1822. If the United States was not against monarchy, or the form of government, there was no point of antagonism between the United States and France. However, Mr. Lhuys said that as soon as arrangements had been made regarding the French debts, French forces would be withdrawn. He went on to say that when the United States promised strict neutrality after the French had left, the French soldiers would be returned to France.²⁷

Mr. Bigelow proposed to Mr. Seward on January 11, 1866, to test the sincerity of the Emperor's offer, to withdraw his forces. Mr. Lhuys suggested that if an assurance of non-intervention in Mexico after the French left could be given, France was prepared to disclose negotiations which were going on with the Maximilian government at that time for the purpose of French withdrawal.²⁸ Mr. Bigelow wrote again on January 25 that as soon as he could receive instructions giving assurances of non-intervention by the United States, he expected to receive the report of negotiations between Napoleon and Maximilian over French withdrawal. One reason Napoleon wanted the United States' promise of neutrality was because the Emperor desired his retirement from Mexico to appear entirely voluntary.²⁹ Mr. Bigelow, after giving some objections to giving a formal assurance to France that the status quo would not be disturbed, closed by reviewing the long history of the United States in not interfering in the affairs of other nations. The French Foreign Minister replied that he would see if he could not find this assurance in previous correspondence.³⁰

Secretary Seward replied to this note of January 29 in a letter to Mr. Lhuys, stating that regardless of the intentions, purposes, and objects of France, the proceedings of Mexicans for subverting the republican government there and for using the French intervention to establish an imperial monarchy are regarded by the United States as being without the authority and against the will of the people. He declared the United States could not accept the idea that the Mexican people had spoken for an imperial monarchy. He iterated that it would be necessary for a French withdrawal to allow such a voice to be heard. Mr. Seward stated that the United States still recognized the Juárez

government as the only legal government of Mexico. Mr. Seward went on to state that the United States did not seek to overthrow by force any imperial government in this hemisphere that had been established by the will of the people. He declared that France need not for a moment delay her proposed withdrawal. Trying to commit France to a withdrawal date, he asked for definite information when French military operations might be expected to cease in Mexico.³¹

Napoleon III decided at this time that he must act in view of France's troubles with Prussia, the growing impatience of the French people, and likewise of the people of the United States. Napoleon decided that he could not afford a war with the United States in view of the European situation. Mr. Lhuys' reply to Secretary Seward's note of February 12 was written on April 5, 1866. Refusing to discuss again the assertions on points of doctrine, Mr. Lhuys said that the United States government had conformed to the rule of practicing non-intervention throughout its history, as Secretary Seward claimed. He went on to declare that nothing justified the apprehension that it would now show itself unfaithful. Considering this as an assurance of non-intervention, he expressed the intended purpose of France to withdraw from Mexico in three detachments beginning in November, 1866, and ending in November, 1867.³² The "Moniteur," considered the official organ for Napoleon, announced the Emperor's decision to evacuate the French troops in Mexico in three detachments. The first detachment was to be in November, 1866, the second detachment in March, 1867, and the final detachment in November, 1867.³³

Secretary Seward expressed his satisfaction of the agreement reached in his reply and expressed concern that France adhere to the

time limit. He declared that the continued intervention during even the limited time would be regarded with concern and apprehension by the people and perhaps even Congress. He also stated that as long as the intervention continued, the United States army of observation along the southern bank of the Rio Grande River must continue.³⁴

Secretary Seward learned of another affair in March which threatened to upset the plans for evacuation of Mexico of all foreign troops. He learned of a plan to send ten thousand Austrian troops to Mexico.³⁵ Later, he reported he then had information that four thousand Austrians would be sent to Mexico. Mr. Seward told John Motley to notify the Austrian government that the United States government and the people would not be pleased with seeing Austria try and subvert the republican government and establish an empire in Mexico.³⁶ Mr. Seward again made a protest to Austria through Mr. Motley on April 6, 1866, when he stated:

in the event of hostilities being carried on hereafter in Mexico by Austrian subjects, under the command or with the sanction of the government of Vienna, the United States will feel themselves at liberty to regard those hostilities as constituting a state of war by Austria against the republic of Mexico; and . . . the United States could not engage to remain as silent or neutral spectators.³⁷

Mr. Motley's reply to Secretary Seward's despatch of March 19, was that there were no unordinary forces leaving for Mexico. There was a group, but only of the replacements sent regularly to replenish Austrian forces in Mexico which was expected by their Treaty of Miramar.³⁸

When Mr. Motley hesitated to present the strong protest Mr. Seward instructed him, because of the contrast in this policy to those of the past, Secretary Seward informed him that the contrast in policy was not a question to be discussed at that particular moment. Mr. Seward

also pointed out that Austria's authorizing the organization of any volunteers to engage in a war against Mexico was inconsistent with the principle of neutrality. Mr. Seward instructed Mr. Motley to secure a pledge on Austria's part not to send the troops to Mexico. Should the Austrian government persist in sending the troops, Mr. Motley was instructed to retire from Vienna.³⁹ Mr. Seward had already spelled out his policy in his Instructions of April 16, 1866. He said the United States maintained that the domestic republican government in Mexico was the only legitimate government existing there. A war had been waged there for several years for the purpose of erecting an imperial monarchy by force. The United States, by its geographical position and relations with Mexico, could not consent to the accomplishment of that purpose. The United States desired Austria to practice neutrality like the United States had asked France.⁴⁰ The Austrian government promptly replied to the protest by stating it had taken measures to prevent the departure of the troops to Mexico, owing largely to its approaching war with Prussia.⁴¹ Secretary Seward clearly had initiated a more aggressive attitude toward Austria. He knew Austria would be unwilling to risk war with the United States in light of its increasing difficulties with Prussia. Mr. Seward was able to avert any help to the Maximilian government by making a strong protest and leaving the impression that war was imminent if Austrian troops were allowed to leave.

Another complication was added to the Mexican question when General Santa Anna attempted to launch a new military scheme with monetary backing from private sources in the United States buying bonds with which to finance the adventure. When Santa Anna tried to gain the

official sanction of the United States government in his project, Secretary Seward replied that a reception would be incompatible with our practices since Santa Anna's remarks and opinions were contrary to our relations with the republican government in Mexico.⁴²

The great question in the United States and Europe was whether Maximilian would withdraw with the French or attempt to maintain himself without foreign support. Napoleon, being in a difficult position himself, refused to support the Prince. He sent one of his aides to Mexico to deliver the Emperor's plans to Maximilian. In a letter given to Mr. Seward by Mr. Montholon, on October 15, 1866, the new Foreign Minister, Marquis de Moustier told the Maximilian government that the limit of French sacrifices had been reached and there would be no future aid from France. If Maximilian preferred to abdicate, that course of action would be approved by the French government.⁴³

Matters were further complicated when the time came for the withdrawal of French troops and no action was taken to that end by the French government. John Bigelow sought explanations from the Emperor himself. Expressing his concern in regard to the early assemblage of the United States Congress, Mr. Bigelow tried to impress on the Emperor the need for quick withdrawal. The Emperor said the delay was purely for military considerations since troops were needed there to insure the safety of those already there. Mr. Bigelow gave Napoleon his opinion that he believed he was acting in good faith but this change of plans would not be warmly received in Congress. This might awaken suspicions in the United States and strain United States-French relations even more.⁴⁴ Secretary Seward's Instructions to Mr. Bigelow were to act surprised and deeply concerned by the postponement of the

the French withdrawal. Mr. Seward also denied allegations the delay was caused by United States re-enforcements sent to help President Juárez. He declared the postponement inconvenient and exceptionable and asserted: "we cannot acquiesce," because the time was too vague and indefinite and he could not tell an impatient Congress and people they had a better guarantee of French withdrawal than they could beforehand. Secretary Seward told Mr. Bigelow:

You will . . . state to the Emperor's government that the President sincerely hopes and expects that the evacuation of Mexico will be carried into effect with such conformity to the existing agreement as the inopportune complication which calls for this dispatch shall allow.⁴⁵

It became obvious the Emperor was only stalling for time, probably more to relieve his own embarrassment than for any other reason. Napoleon wanted it to appear France was leaving voluntarily and not under pressure. In another attempt to delay the departure of French troops, the Emperor made the proposition to form a new government which would exclude both Maximilian and Juárez. Secretary Seward knew by this time the Emperor could hardly reverse his course of action regarding the French withdrawal. Declining the proposition and not wishing to be drawn into further discussion and debate upon the withdrawal or enticed into the same action he had accused France of pursuing, Mr. Seward replied that the United States continued to recognize and respect the authority of President Juárez and his republican government. The United States practiced non-interference in Mexico's internal affairs.⁴⁶

Secretary Seward had initiated a plan, partly to satisfy critics in the United States, to put on a demonstration of unity with the Juárezist factions and display the armed forces of the United States to the French who were delaying their departure so that they might see the

need for a hasty departure. Mr. Seward sent Lewis D. Campbell as the succeeding minister to Mr. Corwin, along with General Sherman. Their purpose was to find President Juárez and see if the need of the United States land and naval forces might be needed to restore law and order in that country.⁴⁷ This was clearly a violation of the very neutrality Mr. Seward was assuring the French of violating, but a worthy weapon to put his message across to the French to not long delay the removal of their troops from Mexico in face of such an armed exposition. The United States government had already sent aid to Juárez by way of General Sheridan. Mr. Sheridan admitted that he had sent as many as thirty thousand muskets and a large quantity of ammunition to the Juárez forces, enough to equip a pretty good sized army.⁴⁸

Napoleon withdrew his army more quickly than he had promised. The departure of troops began in December and continued until March 12, 1867. Owing largely to Mr. Seward's diplomacy and United States hostility, the opposition in France itself, the menacing attitude of Prussia, and the resistance of the Juárez forces, Napoleon realized he could not afford a continued war in Mexico.⁴⁹

The Maximilian government virtually collapsed in two months after the French withdrawal. Secretary Seward, seeing the early collapse, telegraphed Mr. Campbell to ask Juárez for humane treatment for all captured prisoners. He also asked President Juárez for clemency for Maximilian if captured, believing a universal feeling of sentiment toward Mexico might follow such an exercise of good will.⁵⁰

Maximilian was captured on May 15, 1867, and tried by a court martial. He was found guilty for the harsh decrees against the Juárezist forces he had issued and sentenced to be shot along with two other of

his leaders. In spite of requests for clemency by several nations, Maximilian was executed by a firing squad on June 19, 1867, in view of future security for the country and to satisfy passions of the liberal forces for the bitter war they had fought. Thus ended another of Napoleon's dreams for a French empire in the Americas.

¹Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, pp. 264-5.

²Ibid., p. 268-9.

³Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles E. Webster and Co., 1886) p. 545-6.

⁴Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, Vol. 2 (New York: Charles E. Webster and Co., 1888) pp. 214-17.

⁵Bancroft, Life of Seward, p. 435 citing Schofield, 46 Years in the Army.

⁶John Bigelow, Retrospections of an Active Life, Vol. 4 (New York: Baker and Taylor Co., 1909) p. 42.

⁷Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, p. 270 citing Correspondencia de la Legacion Mexicana, Index to Volumes V, VII, and VIII.

⁸Dip. Corr., Vol. 3, 1865, p. 518, No. 195, Seward to Bigelow, July 13, 1865.

⁹Ibid., p. 519, No. 157, enclosure 2, Bigelow to Seward, August 7, 1865.

¹⁰Rippy, U. S. and Mexico, p. 270-1.

¹¹Bigelow, Retrospections, Vol. 2, p. 143, Seward to Bigelow, August 7, 1865.

¹²Ibid., p. 165-8, Bigelow to Seward, August 31, 1865.

¹³Dip. Corr., Vol. 3, 1865, p. 414, No. 259, Seward to Bigelow, September 6, 1865.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 422, No. 300, Seward to Bigelow, November 6, 1865.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 427, No. 209, Bigelow to Seward, November 30, 1865.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 490, No. 332, Seward to Bigelow, December 16, 1865.

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 5, 39-1, p. 3, December 13, 1865.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 19-20, Seward to Bigelow, November 28, 1865.

²⁰Ibid., p. 20, Bigelow to Seward, November 30, 1865.

²¹Ibid.

²²Dip. Corr., Vol. 3, 1865, p. 449, (Legation) Montholon to Seward, November 29, 1865.

²³Ibid., pp. 450-1, Seward to Montholon, December 6, 1865.

²⁴Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 1, p. 17, December 4, 1865.

²⁵Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 3, p. 490, No. 332, Seward to Bigelow, December 16, 1865.

²⁶Bigelow, Retrospections, Vol. 3, p. 287, Bigelow to Seward, December 21, 1865.

²⁷Dip. Corr., Vol. 3, 1865, p. 807, (Legation) Enclosure 2, Montholon to Seward, January 29, 1866.

²⁸Bigelow, Retrospections, Vol. 3, p. 311, Bigelow to Seward, January 11, 1866.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 323-4, Bigelow to Seward, January 25, 1866.

³⁰Ibid., pp. 324-5, Bigelow to Seward, January 25, 1866.

³¹H. Ex. Doc. No. 73, 39-1, pp. 549-51, Montholon to Seward, February 12, 1866.

³²Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 3, p. 828, Enclosure 1, Montholon to Seward, April 21, 1866.

³³H. Ex. Doc. No. 93, 39-1, p. 42, Bigelow to Seward, April 6, 1866.

³⁴Bigelow, Retrospections, Vol. 3, p. 414, Seward to Montholon, April 25, 1866.

³⁵Dip. Corr., 1865, Vol. 3, p. 831, No. 167, Seward to Motley, March 19, 1866.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 832-3, No. 173, Seward to Motley, April 6, 1866.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 833, No. 158, Motley to Seward, April 6, 1866.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 837-8, No. 181, Seward to Motley, April 30, 1865.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 836-7, No. 174, Seward to Motley, April 16, 1866.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 845, No. 177, Motley to Seward, May 21, 1866.

⁴²H. Ex. Doc. No. 17, 39-2, Seward to Santa Anna, August 15, 1866.

⁴³Dip. Corr., 1866, Vol. 1, (Legation) Montholon to Seward, October 15, 1866.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 364-5, No. 384, Bigelow to Seward, November 8, 1866.

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 366-7, No. 550, Seward to Bigelow, November 23, 1866.

⁴⁶Dip. Corr., 1867, Vol. 2, p. 218, No. 11, Seward to Dix, January 18, 1867.

⁴⁷Dip. Corr., 1866, Vol. 3, pp. 4-6, No. 3, Seward to Campbell, October 25, 1866.

⁴⁸Sheridan, Memoirs, p. 226.

⁴⁹C. A. Duniway, "Reasons for French Withdrawal From Mexico," Ameircan Historical Association, Annual Report, 1902, I, pp. 315-28.

⁵⁰Dip. Corr., 1867, Vol. 2, p. 560, Seward to Romero, June 15, 1867.

⁵¹Latane, U. S. and Lat. America, p. 237.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Secretary of State William H. Seward was undoubtedly one of the truly great Secretaries of State, yet his early diplomacy in 1861 did leave much to be desired. The proposal in his "Thoughts" was certainly an aggressive, dangerous approach to solving the problems of the United States by a continental war. Perhaps this proposal was the only solution he believed would stop the Civil War before it could destroy the Union he valued so much and settle the slavery question which he held in so much disgust. Once he settled down to view the problem in its entire perspective, his alternative policy served extremely well.

Napoleon's scheme from the beginning had in mind to establish a Latin American empire and check the influence of the United States, lest it become the sole dispenser of American commercial products. Spain's part was mainly religious. England's part in the intervention could be said to be honest in her intentions as to the collection of debts due her but misdirected by an expansive France. It can also be said that Juárez was hasty and untactful in his suspension of payment for Mexico's debts, but Mexico was in a poor state of economic condition. It could hardly do more. The fact was, France needed an excuse to justify its intervention before the world and this served the need.

The first efforts of Mr. Seward to forestall the intervention were a failure. He had reasoned they would quarrel among themselves and the whole affair would end in disarray, but this was not the case. Although they did quarrel, France proved to be determined to persist in an effort

to establish a European monarchy in Mexico. As evidenced by Napoleon's correspondence, this would not have been the case if the United States had not been tried by internal troubles.

Even the idea to assume the interest on the Mexican loan was somewhat characteristic of the earlier aggressiveness on Mr. Seward's part. Whether Mr. Corwin actually pointed out to Mr. Seward the other "considerations" of this proposal for acquiring the property because he was an expansionist and it was thought the property would become inevitably United States property, or as merely a way to get the United States involved in the Mexican affair, is a question for further study and consideration.

In his effort to forestall the European intervention, Mr. Seward was unsuccessful. Once the intervention took place, Mr. Seward's course of moderation was wisely pursued. After the battle of Bull Run, the United States could not afford a war with France, so Mr. Seward's course was one of neutrality and prudence in our relations with France. Mr. Seward spoke the language of the Monroe Doctrine without using it. He knew its use could only serve to inflame European opinions against it. From the very beginning of the invasion, Mr. Seward made it clear that any attempt to force upon the Mexican people a European monarchy would be a violation of the principles held by the inhabitants of the American continents. Secretary Seward conceded the right of the European nations to wage war against Mexico, a right which allowed France a method by which to carry out its scheme, officially at least, without conflicting with the policy as stated by Mr. Seward. Secretary Seward's diplomacy in this manner was a great factor in prevention French recognition of the Confederacy and allowing the United States to concentrate

upon the domestic issues. Mr. Seward accepted the French assurances of their honest intentions as long as this accomplished his purpose, but Mr. Seward left his policy open for future change, as France must have realized, conceding France the right to wage war but not to impose a monarchial government on Mexico. Mr. Seward let the French know its action was disapproved but not in strong enough language to gain France's active disfavor. Mr. Seward used skillful diplomatic techniques to inform the French of the United States disapproval.

Secretary Seward's policy of neutrality was certainly the wisest course he could have pursued. France would certainly have used the opportunity to strike at the United States if our policy had been otherwise. The seriousness of this neutrality was realized when Napoleon's concern was expressed to his Foreign Minister. When Maximilian tried to gain recognition from the United States, Mr. Seward still held to his neutrality policy, a wise course in view of the fact it further convinced France that the United States intended to remain neutral in the Mexican question.

Mr. Seward believed that eventually France would fail in its scheme without the help of the United States, and in years to come, Mexico would be conquered by immigration, so why fight a senseless war with France. The United States, he believed would need France as a friend in its commercial relations after the Mexican affair.

The Civil War's end removed the greatest danger to the United States. If Mr. Seward had been practicing only a policy of prudence, he could have changed this immediately after the war's end. Secretary Seward still maintained his neutrality policy and went to great lengths to convince the French of this. He could have assumed an antagonistic

policy but preferred one which would gently, politely, and step by step, remove the French from Mexico without making enemies of a much needed ally.

Mr. Seward wisely decided to not heed the passions of the country for a vindication of the Monroe Doctrine. Though there were numerous protests for action by the people and Congress, Secretary Seward refused to act by the uncontrolled and undisciplined passions of the people. He skillfully defeated private attempts to instigate action which might have upset his policy and refused to be swayed by popular indignation. Instead, Mr. Seward used the popular will of the people of the United States and the anxiety of Congress as a weapon to convince the French government of the necessity of its immediate withdrawal. He waited for the opportune time to confront the French with the violation of their own pledge of non-interference in the political affairs of Mexico. Mr. Seward, undoubtedly, knew at this time that the French people were against the continued intervention and Napoleon could not linger the Mexican adventure. Certainly he knew that in view of the possibility of war between Prussia and France, he could insist upon the French withdrawal from Mexico. There was even evidence France would not have helped Maximilian if the United States had declared war on Mexico, but Secretary Seward refused to sway from his passive policy.

Once France was committed to a withdrawal date, Mr. Seward could act more aggressive toward Austria when it threatened to interfere and replace the French troops in Mexico. The United States was in a position to be more aggressive and insisted Austria not interfere. A typical demonstration of summary diplomacy was employed.

There were many possibilities of danger in the Mexican question.

.

The United States policy could have alienated several European nations, but for the wise course of diplomacy followed by Secretary Seward. The whole affair was handled with restraint and a minimum of international friction, which was so important at that time. Secretary Seward's diplomacy had kept France from recognition of the Confederacy, prevented war with France, removed the French troops from Mexico, and established good relations with the Juárez government. There is no doubt there were other factors which helped remove France from Mexico, but the diplomacy of Mr. Seward's was certainly a major factor to that end.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Documents

House Executive Document No. 100, 37th Congress, 2nd Session

House Executive Document No. 54, 37th Congress, 3rd Session

House Executive Document No. 73, 39th Congress, 1st Session

House Executive Document No. 93, 39th Congress, 1st Session

House Executive Document No. 17, 39th Congress, 2nd Session

Senate Executive Document No. 1, 38th Congress, 1st Session

Senate Executive Document No. 11, 38th Congress, 1st Session

Senate Executive Document No. 11, 38th Congress, 2nd Session

Senate Executive Document No. 5, 39th Congress, 1st Session

Senate Executive Document No. 6, 39th Congress, 1st Session

United States State Department. Despatches From the United States Ministers to Mexico, 1823-1906. Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1950.

Despatches From United States Consuls in Mexico City, Mexico, 1822-1906. Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1961.

Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State: Mexico, 1833-1906. Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1946.

Notes to Foreign Legations in the United States From the Department of State, 1834, 1906: Mexico. Washington, D. C.: The National Archives, 1950.

Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the President. New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1965.

Books

- Bigelow, John. Retrospections of an Active Life. 5 Vols. New York: Baker and Taylor Co., 1909.
- Grant, Ulysses S. Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant. 2 Vols. New York: Charles L. Webster and Co., 1886.
- McPherson, Edward. The Political History of the United States During the Great Rebellion. New York: Appleton and Co., 1864.
- Moore, John (ed.). The Works of James Buchanan, 1856-1860. New York: Antiquarian Press Ltd., 1960.
- Nicolay, John, John Hay. Abraham Lincoln, A History. 10 Vols. New York: The Century Co., 1890.
- Sheridan, Phillip H. Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan. 2 Vols. New York: Charles L. Webster and Co., 1888.

Secondary Sources

Books

- Bancroft, Frederic. The Life of William H. Seward. 2 Vols. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1900.
- Bancroft, Hubert H. History of Mexico. 6 Vols. (The Works of H. H. Bancroft. Vol. 14. San Francisco: The History Co., 1888).
- Callahan, James M. American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1932.
- Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1901.
- Cluseret, General G. Mexico and the Solidarity of Nations. New York: Blackwell Printer, 1866.
- Latane, John. The United States and Latin America. New York: Double Day, Page, and Co., 1922.
- Lefevre, E. (ed.). Documentos Oficiales Recognidos en la Secretaria Privada de Maximiliano. Brussels and London: 1869.
- Niox, Gustave. Expedition du Mexique, 1861-1876. Paris 1874.
- Priestly, Herbert I. The Mexican Nation. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1930.

Rippy, J. Fred. The United States and Mexico. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1931.

Roeder, Ralph. Juarez and His Mexico. 2 Vols. New York: Viking Press, 1947.

Periodicals

Duniway, C. A. "REasons for French Withdrawal From Mexico," Annual Report, American Historical Association. Vol. 1, 1902.

Frazier, Charles E. "The London Convention and Preliminares de la Soledad," Journal of the West. Vol. 6, April, 1967.

Vita was removed during scanning