The Bill Blackwood Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas

Intelligence-Led Policing

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ABSTRACT

Over several decades, law enforcement has tried different methods and strategies to reduce crime and homeland security issues in a proactive manner, as opposed to reactive. Law enforcement agencies have been plagued with their own issues in inter-agency cooperation, as well as information sharing with external agencies. Some citizens in the various jurisdictions across the country still do not trust or have a positive relationship with law enforcement in their own communities. Because of these issues, I think law enforcement agencies should establish intelligence-led policing (ILP) in their organizations. There will be citizen concerns over data analysis and civil rights violations, but these concerns can be overcome by implementing agency policy for proper intelligence processes and adhering to current federal rules and regulations. Law enforcement agencies can evaluate their resources, change the agency culture with proper leadership, and work with their communities to make ILP work for their organization.

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INTRODUCTION

Law enforcement intelligence is a derivative of military and ancient times. References can be found in Chinese writings (Sun Tzu) and the Bible. After World War II, security intelligence was adapted for use in law enforcement operations. Military communication intelligence methods influences how modern law enforcement analyzes intelligence (USDOJ, 2005).

The first law enforcement intelligence units were established in the 1970s. These early intelligence units were not governed by policies that protected civil rights or abuse of intelligence. The public and court systems deemed these intelligence units as abusive and excessive. A strong statement about intelligence was made in 1973 by the the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The commission wanted every law enforcement agency and state to create the capability to gather, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence in a manner that protected civil rights. In response to the intelligence abuses during the mid-1970's, procedures were developed that required a criminal predicate for an individual to be entered in the criminal intelligence investigations. The Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (LEIU) *File Guidelines* were developed at this time (USDOJ, 2005).

In the 1980s, law enforcement changed their methods by using empirical data toward community policing. Initially law enforcement resisted the idea, but soon saw the benefits of it (BJA, n.d.). During the 1980s, Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) and the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts were developed. The Criminal Intelligence System Operating Policies (28 C.F.R. Part 23)

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was the primary basis for information sharing and was applied to the RISS (USDOJ, 2005).

Several federal centers were established in the 1990s to support intelligence and information sharing. The New York Police Department reevaluated the scientific policing of the 1980s and how they were going to approach crime fighting in the early 1990s. It was decided to use statistical data to map crime areas of the city for police to prevent crime by then Commissioner William Bratton and Deputy Commissioner Jack Maple. The method of using statistical data and mapping became known as Compstat (computer statistics or comparative statistics). Accurate and timely intelligence, effective tactics, rapid application of resources, and relentless follow-up and assessment were four key elements of Compstat. Officers were held accountable for crime in their precincts during the weekly Comstat meetings (BJA, 2013). Compstat was viewed as the era of smart policing (BJA, n.d.).

American law enforcement really focused on intelligence-led policing (ILP) after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The United Kingdom also used intelligenceled policing. An increase in property crimes caused the Kent Constabulary to develop the concept. They believed that a large percentage of the crimes were being committed by a small percentage of the population. By referring non-police calls to other agencies, the Kent Policing model re-emphasized their response to service calls. This allowed the agency to create intelligence units to focus on the property crimes and repeat offenders (USDOJ, 2005).

In October 2001, the Investigative Operations Committee of the International Chiefs of Police (IACP) recommended an Intelligence Sharing Summit be held in March 2002. Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement intelligence experts from the United States and Europe attended the summit. The United States obtained blueprints for ILP from the General Criminal Intelligence Plan and the United Kingdom's National Intelligence Model.

Law enforcement has used community-oriented policing (COP), problem-oriented policing (POP), and evidence based policing (EBP) models and operated in two fashions: reactive and proactive (Virginia DOCJ, 2013). To be proactive, ILP will have to focus on multi-jurisdictional crimes and inter/external information sharing, to get the proper intelligence to the line officer for recognition and intervention (USDOJ, 2005). According to Ratcliffe (2008), ILP is a business and managerial philosophy. This philosophy needs innovative management and effective enforcement to target repeat offenders. ILP gives personnel a renewed drive and direction that shows the community how police are using data, technology, and resources to fight crime; therefore, law enforcement agencies should implement ILP (James, 2017).

POSITION

ILP can be an integral part of law enforcement because it will aid in reducing local crimes and homeland security issues. ILP can also assist in bringing an agency together by having key personnel from the various divisions/units organize, plan, disseminate, and reevaluate the course of action. This type of cooperation can also extend to regional agencies to get them working with each other. ILP can also bring the community together. By getting law enforcement to work with the community, it can reduce the communities' fear of crime and get them comfortable in reporting suspicious and criminal activity. To make this possible, law enforcement must develop policy, standard operating procedures, and make it apart of the agencies culture for ILP to work.

The need for law enforcement to enhance their intelligence operations was revealed after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Efforts to reorganize intelligence operations have been made to enhance local, state, and federal capabilities. Enhancements at the local and state level make it possible for these law enforcement agencies to play a part in homeland security. Improvements to local law enforcement's intelligence operations helps these agencies respond to local crimes (USDOJ, 2005). James (2017) states the preferred method of combating organized crime (professional criminals) is ILP. Effective intelligence operations can be equally applied to both local crimes and homeland security (USDOJ, 2005).

In today's world, the United States has to combat local crimes, domestic terrorism (far right and organized crime), and international/foreign terrorism (religious extremist and drug cartels). ILP can be used to focus on streets crimes, as well as respond to terrorism. ILP has the potential to identify terrorist groups and prevent acts before they occur. Countries such as Israel, are able to report such efforts, due to their long history in combating terrorism (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007).

The domestic far right is viewed as a significant threat to national security. Domestic terrorism outnumbers foreign terrorism and right-wing groups are extremely dangerous. Acts committed by the far-right extremist are increasing and those with religious ideologies are strong candidates to commit acts of violence with weapons of mass destruction (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). ILP can enhance an agencies inter cooperation by bringing units/divisions together and hold employees accountable for any reduction or increase in crime within their jurisdiction. The eyes and ears of every law enforcement agency is the patrol officer, who needs to be trained to think and act with intelligence sharing in mind. Information from observations, field interviews, and citizen contacts needs to be obtained and submitted through the agencies intelligence-led process of having a crime analyst analyze the information, develop a course of action, act on that course of action, then reevaluate. The practice of keeping intelligence information within a unit/division should no longer continue (USDOJ, 2005).

When it comes to ILP in the modern world, no one law enforcement agency can be effective alone. An agency can determine its level of success by the level of cooperation with partnering agencies. Agencies that work closely together, including state and federal agencies, have increased levels of success and satisfaction with ILP. Agencies working together is a force multiplication and the best way for agencies to obtain resources otherwise not available. Agencies must have policies in place to ensure the continuous flow of information sharing amongst themselves and partnering agencies. These policies and procedures must also protect the privacy of their citizens (BJA, n.d.).

The federal government is also improving its efforts in information sharing. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has shared its Law Enforcement Information Sharing (LEIS) strategies with state and local agencies. These strategies are to share DOJ information, provide new capabilities and services for accessing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information, and encourage agencies to share this

information with each other. The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) is also sharing information through Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These JTTFs have allowed state and local agencies to join the group and significantly increase the amount of information shared with the FBI (USDOJ, 2005). There has also been an increased demand for law enforcement to share information globally, as well as with other entities at home (public and private sector) (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007).

Intelligence-led policing (ILP) can also improve the community's partnership with law enforcement. Community-oriented policing (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) have been a law enforcement strategy for the past decade. COP and POP must be integrated into ILP to engage the community at all levels (USDOJ, 2005). Two-way communication with the public is important to get the message of suspicious activities for them to look out for and how to report those activities (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). According to Carter and Carter (2009), COP has developed skills in officers that are beneficial to ILP: problem solving, communication, fear reduction, and community mobilization. The benefits of a relationship with the community are directly related to the information and intelligence sharing (Carter & Carter, 2009). A positive relationship with the community promotes a continuous flow of information from one to the other. The idea is to get the private citizen to feel like they are included in the intelligence matrix to get them to report suspicious activities that may be related to terrorism or other criminal activities (USDOJ, 2005).

COUNTER ARGUMENTS

A concern for law enforcement agencies implementing ILP is proper data collection, analysis, and dissemination. Agencies have had a history of under-analyzing

collected data and not sharing information (Johnson, 2010). Intelligence efforts must be planned and focused if they are going to be effective (USDOJ, 2005). They must also be coordinated with guidelines in place to prohibit illegal methods of obtaining information (USDOJ, 2005). Illegally obtained information can flaw the results, regardless of who or how the information is analyzed (USDOJ, 2005). Street level officers are an excellent source of information on crime trends and persons of interest (USDOJ, 2005). However, a lack of agency policy, procedures, and training on how to collect and analyze the information has plagued law enforcement agencies (USDOJ, 2005).

To correct this problem, law enforcement agencies must change how they collect, analyze, distribute, and reevaluate their intelligence process (USDOJ, 2005). Intelligence involves the collection of information related to crime trends that targets known criminals based off of reasonable suspicion of the crimes being committed (BJA, n.d.). The traditional intelligence functions need to be reexamined and replaced with more organized methods of collecting information and moving the intelligence to the end users in a more fluid fashion (USDOJ, 2005). Collecting information is a constant process of verification and analysis (BJA, n.d.). In today's world of terrorism and conventional crimes, the intelligence process must continuously adapt (USDOJ, 2005).

There are six steps to the intelligence process, according to The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). These steps are planning and direction, collection, processing/collation, analysis, dissemination, and reevaluation. Planning and direction on how information will be collected is an important aspect of the intelligence process. Planning should include assessing existing data and ensuring the new data fills the gaps with information already on file. Planning and collection requires a close working relationship between analysts and intelligence officers. Analysts understand how to manage, compile, and analyze the information, while intelligence officers know how to obtain the information. Planning requires the agency to determine the outcomes it desires with collecting data, therefore directing street officers and intelligence officers in their investigations. Law enforcement agencies collect a large amount of information on a daily basis. This information will need to be filtered through by intelligence analysts to convert it to data, then to eventual intelligence. Information technology has improved with software/programs to aid agencies in collecting information. Filtering through the information and determining what is accurate, relevant, and useful is very time consuming. The use of databases with text-mining capabilities is very beneficial to the collation process. There are several software companies that offer a wide range of product capabilities from expensive to low cost. Information placed into a file is evaluated on its content and source. This filed information must meet the standard of reasonable suspicion to criminal activity before it can be entered into an intelligence database. Information is converted into intelligence through analysis. Analysis determines the meaning and usefulness of data. Data is analyzed to further leads and predict future crimes. Recommended courses of action will be made based off of the result of the developed intelligence. The intelligence needs to be disseminated to those that have a right to know and need to know. Intelligence reports fail the mission if they are kept within the intelligence unit. Those that have a right to know and need to know are outside the intelligence unit; and, the rule should be to share often and exclude by exception. The decided courses of action based off the intelligence reports should be

reevaluated to determine their effectiveness. Feedback should come from the street officers, investigators, and their supervisors as to whether the decided courses of action are working. Feedback forms with specific questions can be useful in the reevaluation process (BJA, n.d.).

Fusion centers have been established in many states since 2003 (BJA, n.d.). Fusion centers exchange information across governmental entities (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). Fusion centers provide information on criminals, groups, and criminal activity in their specified region to street officers, investigators, and management from various agencies. Fusion centers have access to many public and private databases. Fusion centers are funded through state and federal sources (BJA, n.d.). Fusion centers are operated by intelligence analysts. Ratcliffe (2016) feels there is a need for better trained analysts who also have a geography background to enhance their capabilities of ILP (Ratcliffe, 2016). James (2017) states intelligence analysts use ILP's empirical data to map crime hotspots and target persons of interest for law enforcement to focus their resources on.

Another concern for law enforcement agencies implementing ILP is civil rights violations. A vast majority of law enforcement agencies have had no training on the intelligence process – an intelligence unit was viewed as a resource for larger agencies. Early law enforcement intelligence activities were problematic and lead to civil rights violations. Early agencies kept files on citizens based off of intuition and suspicion of being a threat. Many of these early agencies were sued under federal civil rights violations for keeping files of information on citizens for behavior deemed unconventional or un-American (Carter & Carter, 2009).

Measures were taken by the federal government to protect the privacy of citizens. Executive Order 28 CFR Part 23 established policy and procedures for entering information into the intelligence data bases (Williams, 2017). ILP has to be lawful, accountable, and necessary if it is going to intrude into the lives of citizens (James, 2017).

RECOMMENDATION

Since the 70's and 80's, there has been a call for law enforcement to change its methods of crime prevention by implementing intelligence operations. It took a national incident, September 11, 2001, to confirm that intelligence is everyone's job. Law enforcement must be forward thinking in their efforts to combat present and future crimes (USDOJ, 2005).

ILP must encompass COP, POP, intelligence operations, and sharing of information, if it is going to be successful in an all-crimes approach (McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007). By properly following the intelligence process, ILP has the ability to use intelligence to map and target offenders, to therefore reduce local crimes and combat homeland security issues. Information sharing is an integral component of ILP by utilizing inter-agency cooperation and partnering with external agencies to share intelligence. By including the community in ILP, it can open up lines of communication to report suspicious activities, reduce the fear of crime, and promote a positive relationship between the citizens and law enforcement.

Due to past and present events, there will always be a community concern of police misconduct and how ILP information is collected, analyzed, and disseminated. This concern also includes any civil rights violations. Law enforcement must adopt a top down leadership approach from command staff to street officer. Agencies need to implement an ILP mission statement, policy and procedure, trained personnel, and a culture change. Agency personnel need to follow the six steps to the intelligence process as outlined by The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (NCISP). Agencies need to ensure safeguards protect the privacy rights of citizens and adhere to the mandated federal rules and regulations.

Agencies should implement ILP into their culture by having a top-down leadership approach, establish policy/standard operating procedures, a methodical intelligence process, and a working community relationship. Not all agencies have the same size budget and unlimited resources available to them, therefore they should evaluate their resources and capabilities. For ILP to work, an agency will need intercooperation, as well as share information with outside agencies.

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