

STAYING ALIVE IN BESIEGED LENINGRAD: MOTIVATIONAL FACTORS FOR  
SURVIVAL

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by

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## ABSTRACT

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By analyzing personal diaries, memoirs, and recollections, this work aims to establish and classify motivational factors that triggered survival mechanisms and resistance to physical and psychological stress during the first year of Nazi Germany's blockade of Leningrad from June 22, 1941 to August 9, 1942. Survival in extreme settings—the psychological pressure of anticipated air raids, bombings, the five-month-long near-total absence of nutrition and semi-starvation that continued for the next 2 years coupled with unusually severe winter and the absence of basic living needs—greatly depended on the psycho-emotional endurance of each individual.

In a city of nearly 3- million inhabitants, mass starvation claimed over one million lives. One million of those who were starving managed to survive; only 557,760 of them lived through all 872 days of the siege.<sup>1</sup> Leningraders' survival tactics were the manifestation of individual and collective behavior. This thesis defines five major sources that motivated the behavior: patriotism (with the collective as its integral part), family, religion, an exclusive focus on the self, and culture. The thematic chapters are tentatively arranged in descending order from the most significant and widespread stimulus to the less common and less frequent stimuli.

KEY WORDS: Leningrad, Siege, Blockade, *blokadniki*, Hunger, Starvation, Diaries, *Distrofiia*, USSR, Soviet Union, Nazi, Germany, Great Patriotic War, World War II, Second World War, Operation Barbarossa.

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<sup>1</sup> TsGA SPb, f. 9156, op. 6, d. 35, l. 131.

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And although this work might lack in analysis and deeper conceptualization, its accomplishments are the fruit of the assistance and knowledge of many while all the shortcomings and failures are mine only. After all, it takes an academic village to raise a scholar.

## **NOTE**

Transliteration of the Russian-language words, phrases, names, and titles was done in accordance with the American Library Association (ALA) and the Library of Congress (LC) guidelines save for a few well-known names (i.e. Joseph [Stalin] instead of Iosif, Tchaikovsky instead of Chaikovskii).

All translations of the diary material cited are my own.

“Diarists” refers to people whose written records have been selected for this research.

Photographic material used is a courtesy of the State Archives of St. Petersburg, and the state on-line projects <http://blockade.spbarchives.ru/> and <https://spbarchives.ru/leningrad-victory>, copyright of St. Petersburg Archival Committee, <https://spbarchives.ru/home>.

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## INTRODUCTION

We triumphed over them, morally triumphed – we, besieged by them!  
Ol'ga Berggol'ts

Humanity has known wars, natural disasters, and epidemics. It has also known hunger. But as noted by David Glantz, “in terms of drama, symbolism and sheer human suffering, the Battle for Leningrad has no peer either in the Great Patriotic War or in any other modern war.”<sup>2</sup> The siege lasted for nearly 900 days and resulted in 1–1.2 million civilian and 980,000 military deaths. Roughly 600,000 people died in its first year alone. Death touched every family, with some families perishing altogether. Three pathogenic factors – prolonged starvation, bitter cold,<sup>3</sup> and the psychological trauma brought about by the bombings, darkness, and extreme privation – impacted residents’ physical and mental health. Starvation and severe hypothermia were the two main causes of death in the first year of the siege. Bread was the only food available on a regular basis. By the second half of November 1941, half of the bread was made of non-food additives (oilcake, malt, wallpaper dust, bran, boltings, cellulose, starch glue, etc.) rather than flour. In November and December 1941, rationing allowed the military 500 grams of

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<sup>2</sup> David Glantz, *The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944: 900 Days of Terror* (London: Cassel, 2004), p. 232. The war between Nazi Germany and the USSR (June 22, 1941—May 9, 1945) is termed the Great Patriotic War (*Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina*) in the Soviet/Russian historiography.

<sup>3</sup> The winter of 1941–42 was the coldest and longest winter in the history of St. Petersburg--Leningrad. Starting on October 11, 1941, the average daily temperature fell below 0°C. In the winter months of December, January, and February, the temperature fluctuated between 25--35°C below (-13--31°F) (some diarists wrote of days when it went down to -40°). Only after April 7, 1942, it began to steadily rise. Snow depth that winter was more than 50 cm. Thus, winter lasted 178 days or six months. But even in May, there were 4 days of frost. On May 7, 1942, the maximum daily temperature was +0.9°C (33.6°F). Source: Saint-Petersburg Agrarian State University, [http://spbgau.ru/about/museum/70\\_let\\_snatiya\\_blokady\\_leningrada/node/2245](http://spbgau.ru/about/museum/70_let_snatiya_blokady_leningrada/node/2245)

bread, workers – 250 grams, and civilians and dependents – 125 grams.<sup>4</sup> The caloric intake of workers was 707 calories, civilians and dependents – 405 calories per diem.<sup>5</sup>

Mass starvation resulted in *distrofiia* or acute starvation.<sup>6</sup> Despite the enormous death toll, one million of those who starved from two to five months<sup>7</sup> managed to survive, thus, illustrating the tremendous adaptive capacity of the human body. According to archival records, 557,760 people lived through all 872 days of the siege.<sup>8</sup> The survival greatly depended on the psychological resilience of each individual.

The Nazis showered the city with 150,000 artillery shells and 107,000 incendiaries, causing damage that in 1945 was estimated to be over 38 billion roubles (approximately \$110.8 billion in today's U.S. dollars).<sup>9</sup> Almost every building was damaged, and the six main districts had entire blocks reduced to rubble. Hundreds of plants, factories, schools, and hospitals were damaged or completely destroyed. The museums, galleries, cathedrals, and theaters were pilfered and the structures – vandalized.

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<sup>4</sup> TsVMA. F.13. D.12314. L.10. Glantz, *The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944*, p. 83. N.L. Volkovskii, ed., *Blokada Leningrada v dokumentakh rassekrechennykh arkhivov* (St.Petersburg: Poligon, 2005), p. 663.

<sup>5</sup> Vladimir Simonenko, Svetlana Magaeva, “Osnovy vyzhivaniia v blokadnom Leningrade s pozitsii sanogeneza” (*Klinicheskaia meditsina*, 2014, #2), p. 6.

<sup>6</sup> *Distrofiia* or the condition caused by starvation was termed “alimentary dystrophy” during the siege by the medical specialists of Leningrad. (It was also often referred to as “the Leningrad disease”). According to Professor Mashanskii, director of the city's health department, 85-90% of Leningraders suffered from it. *Mediki i blokada: Vzgliad skvoz' gody. Vospominaniia, fragmenty dnevnikov, svidetel'stva ochevidtsev, dokumental'nye materialy*. Kniga 2 (St.Petersburg: Mezhdunarodnaia assotsiatsiia blokadnikov goroda-geroia Leningrada, 1997), p. 22. Also in TsGA SPb, F. 2076, op. 4. D. 65, L. 32.

<sup>7</sup> The length of starvation varied depending on whether a person remained in the city or was evacuated.

<sup>8</sup> TsGA SPb, f. 9156, op. 6, d. 35, l. 131.

<sup>9</sup> The calculations of material losses were done by the Extraordinary State Commission (ESC) formed on November 2, 1942 and investigated war crimes against the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. Rouble-dollar exchange rate from 1937 to 1950 was approximately 5:1. Accordingly, the value of the damage in 1945 U.S. dollars was approximately \$7.6 billion.

One hundred eighty-seven historic buildings were severely damaged.<sup>10</sup> Human losses surpassed those of the Battle of Moscow and the Battle of Stalingrad, and their number is roughly close to “the total number of American military who died in all wars between 1776 and 1975.”<sup>11</sup>

The first siege winter, the “mortal time,” divided Leningraders’ lives into ‘before’ and ‘after.’ I would break down the Leningrad blockade into three periods. The first, from the start of the war on June 22, 1941 to the end of October 1941, can be characterized as the total mobilization of the population’s resources for the fight for survival. The second, from November 1941 to June 1942, saw the residents making sense of and adapting to their new reality of daily suffering and death, and redefining their conception of what was acceptable. The third – beginning in the summer of 1942 and lasting until the end of the siege in January 1944 – was a period of comparative “normalcy.” Measuring everything against the first winter of horrors, Leningraders resolved to lead relatively routine lives, despite the bombings, persistent hunger, and awareness that they were surrounded by the Nazis.

Drawing from personal (diaries, recollections, memoirs) and state records, this thesis will focus on the individuals’ motivations that incited their determination to cheat death during the first most brutal year of the siege, the “mortal time”<sup>12</sup> as Leningraders

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<sup>10</sup> *900 geroicheskikh dnei: sbornik dokumentov i materialov o geroicheskoi bor’be trudiashchikhsia Leningrada v 1941-1944 gg.* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), pp. 399-401.

<sup>11</sup> Alexis Peri, *The War Within: Diaries from the Siege of Leningrad* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017), p. 4. John Barber asserts that the city’s demographic calamity was the utmost “ever experienced by one city in the history of mankind.” John Barber and Andrei Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941-44* (Basingstoke-Hampshire-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 1.

<sup>12</sup> Vitalii Bianki, *Likholet’e 22.VI.41-21.V.42* (St. Petersburg: BLITS, 2005), p. 180.



themselves described it. What strategies did they use to resist the physical and mental deterioration? What was the role of state agencies in Leningraders' daily lives? How were personal narratives incorporated into the official one? To what extent did the residents internalize the tenets of Soviet ideology in their interpretations of reality? How did the new policies impact Leningraders and how the latter responded to them? Why was the city never relinquished? In defining the factors that ensured the survival of Leningrad and its population, the thesis will also trace how the residents' fight for their own lives and the city defense overlapped.

### **German Plans and the Encirclement of Leningrad**

Nazi Germany's war against the USSR was launched on June 22, 1941. German forces quickly advanced into Soviet territory. As a major port and industrial center, Leningrad was one of the three main objectives of Hitler's Operation Barbarossa (see *Figure 1*). Hitler anticipated that "with assistance from the Finns and Army Group Center, the capture of Leningrad would precede that of Moscow."<sup>13</sup> If a swift capture of the city failed, it was to be "razed to the ground."<sup>14</sup> On September 8, 1941, Army Group North and Finnish troops completed the land encirclement of Leningrad commencing the start of the Leningrad Blockade. While the Germans and their allies blockaded a number

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<sup>13</sup> Robert Kirchubel, *Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2): Army Group North* (Oxford: Osprey, 2005), p. 71.

<sup>14</sup> Martin Bormann's Minutes of a Meeting at Hitler's Headquarters (July 16, 1941). German text: *Aktenvermerk vom 16. Juli 1941, in Der Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichtshof. Nürnberg 14. November 1945 - 1. Oktober 1946*. Volume XXXVIII, Amtlicher Text – Deutsche Ausgabe, Urkunden und anderes Beweismaterial. Nuremberg 1949. Reprint: Munich, Delphin Verlag, 1989. Document 221-L, pp. 86-94. Source: [http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage\\_id=2345](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2345) (Accessed on September 21, 2016.)

of cities during the World War II, “compared to London and Berlin, both besieged by air, there was no regular contact or mobility between Leningrad and its environs.”<sup>15</sup>




Figure 1. Operation Barbarossa Plan<sup>16</sup>

With the encirclement came daily shelling and bombing, and historian Georgii Kniazev noted in his diary on September 8, 1941: “It looks like Leningrad will not sleep today. On the seventy-ninth day of the war, the bombardment of Leningrad began. Perhaps, there will be many more of such restless nights in the future. The cup of woe

<sup>15</sup> Peri, *The War Within*, p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Original source:  
<http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/articles/99spring/hooker.htm>

will have to be drunk to the very bottom.”<sup>17</sup> Although the Nazis continued their attacks, unlike besieged Odessa or Sevastopol’, Leningrad was never conquered. It was the first major strategic defeat of the Nazi Army in Operation Barbarossa.

In early September 1941, Professor Wilhelm Ziegelmeier, an expert from the Munich Institute of Nutrition, was summoned to *Wehrmacht* headquarters. The OKW (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*, High Command of the Army) asked him to calculate what would happen to the blockaded city without proper nutrition.<sup>18</sup> Based on the data provided to him regarding Leningrad’s population, available provisions, and rations, Ziegelmeier determined that for the residents of Leningrad “it was physically impossible to live on such a ration for any extended period of time,”<sup>19</sup> and concluded that it made no practical sense to “risk the lives of our troops. The Leningraders will die anyway.”<sup>20</sup> As dire as this prognosis was, in reality, the scientist of mass starvation miscalculated: due to the huge influx of refugees and the military, Leningrad was worse off than the German intelligence (and Ziegelmeier) presumed.

On September 22, 1941, Hitler declared: “Saint-Petersburg must be erased from the face of the Earth. [...] In this war – conducted for the right to live – we are not interested in having this large city’s population even partially saved.”<sup>21</sup> By September

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<sup>17</sup> Georgii Kniazev, entry for September 8, 1941. In Granin and Adamovich, *Blokadnaia kniga*, Chast’ 2 (Moskva: ID Komsomol’skaia Pravda, Direkt-Media, 2015), p. 86.

<sup>18</sup> Koval’chuk, *Leningrad i Bol’shaia Zemlia* (Leningrad: Nauka), 1975. p. 83. Götz Aly and Suzanne Heim, *Architects of Annihilation: Auschwitz and the Logic of Destruction* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 244-245. Michael Jones, *Leningrad: State of Siege* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 39.

<sup>19</sup> Aly and Heim, *Architects of Annihilation*, p. 245.

<sup>20</sup> Jones, *Leningrad*, p. 40.

<sup>21</sup> GA RF, F. 7445, Op. 2, D. 166, L. 312-314 (State Archive of the Russian Federation. Translation from German. This directive was a part of evidence presented by the USSR at the Nuremberg

26, 1941, the southern front line had been pushed to only 4 kilometers from the Kirov plant and only 16 kilometers from the Winter Palace (both shaded in red on *Figure 2*). In the north, the Finns stopped 30 kilometers from Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus.



*Figure 2.* Siege borderlines as of September 21, 1941<sup>22</sup>

### Authorities and Residents

When Leningrad was encircled, approximately 2.5 million civilians were trapped within the blockade ring, along with Soviet military units of the 42<sup>nd</sup>, 55<sup>th</sup>, and 23<sup>rd</sup> Armies, and the Baltic fleet corps.<sup>23</sup> The 8<sup>th</sup> Army and units of the Baltic fleet's coastal

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Trials and numbered USSR-113.) (*Nurnbergskii protsess nad glavnymi nemetskimi voennymi prestupnikami. Sbornik materialov (v semi tomakh)*. Moskva, 1961, vol. 7, p. 625.) Appendix V, Photo 1.

<sup>22</sup> Source:

[https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:Siege\\_of\\_Leningrad,\\_1941-09-21.svg](https://ru.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:Siege_of_Leningrad,_1941-09-21.svg)

<sup>23</sup> As reported by the City Registrar's Office, on January 1, 1941, the population of Leningrad was 2,992,000. (TsGA SPb. F.4965. Op.8. D.738. L.7) Together with two city's districts of Kolpino and Kronshtadt, over 3 million people resided in Leningrad, Kolpino, and Kronshtadt before the war. From that number - by October 1, 1941, -- up to 290,000 draftees left the city to serve at the front and 581,461 people (including 88,700 Finns and 6,700 Germans who lived near the front line (AUFBSB LO. F.21/12. Op.2.

guard defended the seaside base at Oranienbaum that had been cut off from Leningrad and surrounded on the landward side. The 54<sup>th</sup> Army was outside of the encirclement.

According to the last state-wide census of 1939,<sup>24</sup> the population of Leningrad's 15 urban districts was 3,015,188 and comprised 45.5% men (1,372,928) and 54.5% (1,642,260) women. Children and youth under 19 "accounted for 37.2% of Leningrad population (44.9% for the USSR), and people over 50 for 13.8% (13% for the USSR)."<sup>25</sup> Just like the rest of the USSR, Leningrad was multiethnic. Ethnic Russians constituted 86.99 % (2,775,979) of all residents. The four other main nationalities living in the city were Jewish (6.32% or 201,542), Ukrainian (1.71% or 54,660), Belorussian (1.01% or 32,353), and Tatar (0.99% or 29,850). The other 3.97% of the population consisted of over ninety other ethnicities and ranged in numbers from 0.65% (Poles) to 0.001% (Kurds, Chukchas, Japanese, Selkup, and others).<sup>26</sup> With the start of the war, the male population in the city declined, and, according to the records of the ration cards issued in

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P.n.18. D.11. L.3-8)) were ordered to evacuate (TsGA SPb. F.7179. Op.53. D.58. L.30-32). But the city also housed around 500,000 soldiers; and more than 300,000 refugees from Karelia, the Baltics, Ukraine, and Leningrad region entered the city. (The exact number of refugees varies in the state records. Authors of *Nepokorënniy Leningrad: Kratkiy ocherk istorii goroda v period Velikoï Otechestvennoï voïny* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1985), p. 125 estimate the number to be 100,000. But referring to the State Evacuation Committee report of 1942, Svetlana Magaeva asserts that by April 15, 1942, 324,382 refugees were evacuated from the city. If there were 324,382 refugees evacuating from the city, they must have gotten into the city somehow.) After basic calculations, we can deduce that no less than 2.9 million were trapped in the besieged city.

<sup>24</sup> The demography and structure of the city have barely changed in 1941 from the one in 1939. Nadezhda Cherepenina, "Demographic Situation and Healthcare on the Eve of War," in Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds. *Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44*, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> *Id.*, p. 14.

<sup>26</sup> For more information/breakdown see [http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus\\_nac\\_39.php?reg=36](http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_39.php?reg=36)

July 1941, the percentage of dependents (children, youth, pensioners, and disabled) equaled 45.8%.<sup>27</sup>

Isolated from the rest of the country, the prospect of Leningrad's survival was dire: delivery of goods to the blockaded city by land was impossible. Responsible for regulating life in the besieged city, the Military Council of the Leningrad Front (MCLF)<sup>28</sup> – headed by Andrei Zhdanov, Aleksei Kuznetsov, Pëtr Popkov – resolved that communication must be re-established with the mainland at any cost and in the shortest time possible. However, there were only two ways to do so: via Lake Ladoga and by air (see *Figure 3*). On August 30, 1941, the State Defense Committee (GKO – *Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony*)<sup>29</sup> passed a decree “On cargo transportation for Leningrad,” which included a detailed list of objectives.<sup>30</sup>

The setting up of an “air bridge” began in the first half of September 1941. Flights to Leningrad on this route were dangerous, not only because of constant *Luftwaffe* assaults but also because of the extreme weather. The cargo transported by these flights

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<sup>27</sup> Nadezhda Cherepenina, “Demographic Situation and Healthcare on the Eve of War,” in Barber and Dzenishevich, eds. *Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44*, p. 26.

<sup>28</sup> The Military Council of the Leningrad Front (MC LF) had similar function to the GKO only on a regional level (evacuation, military organization, supply, training, defense installations, communications, utilities, information, crime control, industrial and food production, etc.) The military councils included the city's leaders (usually the party members), who were assigned military ranks. The decisions of the Military Council of the Leningrad Front that regulated life within the besieged city (e.g., food supply, deliveries, repairs) were signed by the Gorkom VKP(b)'s secretaries – Zhdanov and Kuznetsov.

<sup>29</sup> Established on June 30, 1941, in order to mobilize all material, military, and human resources to repel the Nazis, this Supreme state agency oversaw all state, party, military, economic, and industrial organizations by determining the timing and supplying of industries and military, providing adequate training for military, specialists, and personnel, population mobilization and evacuation, relocating industries, militarizing peace-time economy, rebuilding damaged areas, etc. GKO comprised of I.V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K.E. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov, N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesenskii, L.M. Kaganovich, and A.I. Mikoian. After the Great Patriotic War on September 4, 1945, GKO was terminated by the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR.

<sup>30</sup> Koval'chuk, *Leningrad i Bol'shaia Zemlia*, p. 59. Dzenishevich, Koval'chuk, Sobolev, Tsamutali, and Shishkin, *Nepokorënnii Leningrad*, p. 130.

included supplies, food, and military equipment. Flights out of Leningrad focused on evacuation. Selected civilians (mainly specialists, scientists, and artists), manufacturing equipment, science organizations, valuables, artifacts, and museum collections were ferried out. However, the authorities and the military knew that the aircraft carriers and pilots would, at best, play only a supporting role sustaining the city.




Figure 3. Ice roads, water routes, borders, and breaking of the siege<sup>31</sup>

The navigation of Lake Ladoga presented its own challenges and risks. Before the war, ship transport over the lake had utilized near-shore routes that were now controlled by Nazi troops. Its undeveloped southern coast had no port facilities or wharfs, and the

<sup>31</sup> Source: <http://feldgrau.info/other/12135-sinyavino-ili-butylochnoe-gorlyshko>

supply of boats that could navigate the lake was limited. Nevertheless, the dredging of the lake and construction of moorings on the western bank of the Shlissel'burg Bay commenced. By the end of September 1941, multiple warehouses, two berths in the Osinovets and Gol'sman harbours, a dam in the Bay of Mor'e, and a narrow-gauge railway connecting the wharves with the main railway had been constructed.<sup>32</sup>

Missions freighting cargo across Lake Ladoga began on September 12, 1941. Despite the weather and navigation conditions, the lack of barges or suitable ships, the length and complexity of the voyage, and the constant air raids, the *Doroga Zhizni* – the “Road of Life,” as it came to be known<sup>33</sup> – was the only reliable link between the besieged city and the mainland until March 1943.

In addition to all other issues, Leningrad required quick and well-planned evacuation. Besides a trove of defense industry plants and cultural treasures, the city was also a home to over 800,000 children.<sup>34</sup> The Evacuation Commission formed on June 27, 1941, made removal of the city's 311,387 children a priority.<sup>35</sup> The evacuation of equipment and defense specialists, scientists, research industries, museums, and art collections began on July 14, 1941. The city also planned the forced removal of criminals and residents of Finnish and German descent, based on the belief that they might

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<sup>32</sup> Koval'chuk, *Leningrad i Bol'shaia Zemlia*, p. 63.

<sup>33</sup> The term “Road of Life” came to be a common reference after the siege. During the siege, Leningraders called it the Ice Road or even the “Road of Death.”

<sup>34</sup> As of June 22, 1941, there were 848,067 children under the age of 17 in the city. Liudmila Gazieva, “Bor'ba za spasenie detei v blokadnom Leningrade v 1941-1943 gg.” (avtoreferat dissertatsii kandidata istoricheskikh nauk, Sankt-Peterburg. gos. un-t, 2011), p. 16. Nadezhda Cherepenina quotes that number to be 433,600 in September 1941. Cherepenina, “Assessing the Scale of Famine and Death in the Besieged City,” in Barber, Dzeniskevich, eds. *Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44*, p. 36.

<sup>35</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 151. D. 2. L. 12. TsGA SPb. F. 7384, Op. 13. D. 664. L. 3.



destabilize the situation in the city.<sup>36</sup> This was in addition to the 157,000 refugees from Estonia, Karelia, Latvia, and the Leningrad region who had been evacuated before the siege.<sup>37</sup>

During the initial mass departure, many Leningraders refused to leave. Their reasons were varied. Some did not believe that the situation would worsen. Some either did not want to leave their homes or were emotionally attached to the city. Some thought they would be useful to the city's defense if they stayed. The residents were asking themselves: "Should we leave? Where? How? Why? What are the prospects for the future? How will we manage in places unknown, separated from husbands and sons who remain behind?"<sup>38</sup> In an attempt to hasten flight from the city, the District Council held meetings for women, at which officials answered questions regarding evacuation. But these mostly proved unsuccessful. Indeed, even threats to take away food ration cards fell on deaf ears: "'Let them! We'll manage without the cards.' 'We'll take away your passports and apartments.' 'So what? We are still not going to go anywhere.'" <sup>39</sup> This refusal proved to be detrimental to the city and its residents.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> TsGA. SPb. F. 7179. Op. 53. D. 58. L. 30-32; TsGA SPb. F. 4793. Op. 2. D. 6. L. 13-14. The actual number of those evacuated was less than ordered. As far as I know, the topic of the forced evacuation of the Germans and Finns is not thoroughly researched. Nikita Lomagin mentions it in his *Neizvestnaia blokada* (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdatel'skiĭ Dom "Neva," 2002), p. 291. I.V. Cherkiz'ianova conducts research and regularly publishes articles on the Leningrad Germans in the war years. (I.e. "Leningradskie nemtsy v gody voiny: sobytiia 1941–42 gg." In *Nemtsy v Sankt-Peterburge. Biograficheskii aspekt. XVIII-XX vv.* Vypusk 7. Sankt-Peterburg: Kunstkamera, 2013.) As for the prison population in the besieged city, it was very limited. As of July 1, 1942, there were 2,996 convicts and 3,201 detained under investigation. Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 565.

<sup>37</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 330. Op. 1. D. 10. L. 3.

<sup>38</sup> Russian National Library (RNB), Manuscript Department (OR). F. 1015. D. 57. L. 48.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.* L. 45.

<sup>40</sup> Had there been fewer people, the provisioning issue would have been less pressing.

Besides the supply problems and the evacuation, city authorities faced many other challenges. German bombing and shelling destroyed the telecommunication infrastructure. To restore telephone and telegraph lines, underwater cables had to be laid through the Shlissel'burg Bay, and attempts to do so began in September 1941. Three unsuccessful endeavors were made before the connection with the rest of the USSR was re-established on October 29, 1941.

City administration also had to confront the disruption in fuel and electricity distribution, water outage, damage to the city's heating and sewage systems, while at the same time providing safety and first-aid training, organizing fire brigades, constructing air-raid shelters, and converting factories and plants to war production. In order to fortify the city, 500,000 Leningraders dug and built "pillboxes, dragon's teeth, and anti-tank ditches" in the first weeks of the war; women<sup>41</sup> and teenagers erected concentric defense rings.<sup>42</sup> After announcing the formation of *opolchenie*,<sup>43</sup> the authorities were able to form ten divisions (the number of those signed up for military duty varies from 160,000 to 290,000).<sup>44</sup> By July 5, the city's factories had converted to military production making

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<sup>41</sup> Alexis Peri asserted that even "expectant mothers" were among those preparing fortifications. (Peri, *The War Within*, p. 23.) Indeed, *Lengorispolkom* mandated "all *capable* residents of both genders (between the ages of 16 and 50 for men and 16 to 45 for women)" to labor duty. It also listed those who were released from such obligation, which included "women in the final 8 weeks of pregnancy or 8 weeks after childbirth, and breastfeeding mothers." Hours of duty varied depending on the full-time occupancy and employment, but could not exceed 7 consecutive days with a 4-day break after that. (TsaSPb. F. 7384. Op. 18. D. 1420. L. 128-130.)

<sup>42</sup> Alan Wykes, *The Siege of Leningrad* (New York: Ballantine Books Inc., 1968), pp. 54-56.

<sup>43</sup> People's Militia; national irregular troops formed from the population at the times of national emergencies.

<sup>44</sup> Harrison Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp.146-147; Anna Reid, *Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944* (New York: Walker & company, 2011), pp. 75-90; Wykes, *The Siege of Leningrad*, p. 57, Leon Goure, *The Siege of Leningrad* (Stanford University Press, 1981), p. 33.

mortars, tanks, armored cars, flame-throwers, grenades, and anti-tank mines.<sup>45</sup> The administration was responsible for job placement and training, propaganda (publications, posters, lectures, exhibitions), suppressing crime, setting objectives for scientific research in the fields of food production, medicine, engineering, and technology, as well as establishing and operating the *stolovye* (communal cafeterias that fed the city's residents), the hospitals, and the orphanages. The combined magnitude and importance of these responsibilities required an efficient approach.

### **Inside the Circle of the Siege**

Cut off from the rest of the country, Leningraders were anxious to receive any news on events at the front or outside the city. Information was scarce and fragmented.<sup>46</sup> One of the diarists joked that there were “only three sources of information available: *OZhS*<sup>47</sup> (“one woman said”), *OMS*<sup>48</sup> (“one man said”), and *OVS*<sup>49</sup> (“one soldier said”). Those are our newspapers.”<sup>50</sup> Lack of official news incited the spread of tales passed through the grapevine (“*sarafannoe radio*”). They ranged from optimistic (on ration increase) to utterly absurd (on Stalin firing Popkov or a separate peace treaty with Germany). Despite the uncertainty, panicky moods were not predominant. Those who

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<sup>45</sup> Salisbury, *The 900 Days*, p.146.

<sup>46</sup> See Glantz, *The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944*. Goure, *The Siege of Leningrad*. Reid, *Leningrad*.

<sup>47</sup> *Odna Zhenshchina Skazala*.

<sup>48</sup> *Odin Muzhchina Skazal*.

<sup>49</sup> *Odin Voennyi Skazal*.

<sup>50</sup> V.G. Kuliabko, entry for September 29, 1941, in Valerii David, ed., *Budni Podviga: blokadnaia zhizn' leningradtsev v dnevnikakh, risunkakh, dokumentakh, 8 sentiabria 1941 – 27 ianvaria 1944* (Sankt-Peterburg: LIK, 2006), p. 24. Also in RNB OR, F. 163, ed.hr. 31, l. 38, 39. (Sinakevich O.V. entry for November 6, 1941).

spread rumors were despised. Teacher Vasiutina expressed her resentment: “All these endless rumors make your head spin. They claim accuracy and reliability, and then in an hour prove to be belligerent lies. I think reaction to them should be harsh as it is certain that enemies are trying to cause panic.”<sup>51</sup> And factory planner Osipova stated with disgust:

Those snitchers whispering that we’ll be captured are revolting. They make me want to constantly repeat everywhere – we’ll prevail, we’ll take charge... You can hear people riding the tram talk about our troops’ retreat, living hardships, shortages, and they fear that Leningrad will be taken. I wanted to get up and throw them out of the tram for such talk and alarmism.<sup>52</sup>

In a diary entry dated September 13, 1941, Hermitage employee Maria Konoplëva wrote how in the new reality of the siege everyone “sorely wanted to hear an update on the situation at the front” but “the radio kept repeating the ‘standard’ phrases” that lacked any details.<sup>53</sup> After the war when the motives behind such “bland” information reports became clear, she remarked on her September 13<sup>th</sup> entry: “Then, in the beginning of the war, we did not realize that radio announcements were restrained for a reason and that it could not have been any different.”<sup>54</sup> Archival records reveal that on January 3, 1942 all Leningrad departments in charge of press releases and publications received orders to omit specific data (organization, location, relocation, quantity, photo records, tactical strategies, cases of defection, death toll, maps), information on the economy, industrial production, evacuation, food supplies, and statistical data on population (including

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<sup>51</sup> Evgeniia K. Vasiutina, entry for September 4, 1941. TsGALI SPb. F. 522. Op. 1. D. 39. L. 36.

<sup>52</sup> N.P. Osipova. Diary. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 89. L. 3, 5.

<sup>53</sup> Mariia Sergeevna Konoplëva, entry for September 13, 1941, in *V blokirovannom Leningrade: Dnevnik, 22 iunia – 19 ianvaria 1943*. RNB OR, F. 368, ed.hr. 1, l. 80.

<sup>54</sup> *Id.*, l. 79-80.

gender and age) with some exceptions.<sup>55</sup> These measures were taken in order to minimize German intelligence, prevent information leaks, and reduce defeatism.<sup>56</sup> Although this withholding of information created tension and anxiety, it serves a good example of the lesser of two evils principle: if people found out about the disasters at the front and the numbers of the Red Army soldiers taken prisoner, the chance of panic would have been much higher.

On November 17, 1941, intelligence officers from the 18<sup>th</sup> Army (which had been monitoring the state of affairs in Leningrad) reported to the OKW that the “Food supply situation has worsened. [...] Supply of gas, water, and electricity has been cut off in the 14<sup>th</sup> district. There is no public transportation. Heating is problematic. There is no more coal. Distribution of firewood to the civil population has been discontinued in mid-October.”<sup>57</sup> Soon after, on December 10, 1941, *Einsatzgruppe A*<sup>58</sup> reported that food rationing portions were meager and noted the first deaths from starvation.<sup>59</sup> However, notwithstanding the city’s insufficient food and supplies, it continued to survive and resist: administrative organizations and some publishing houses, hospitals, daycares, theaters, museums, public library, scientific institutions, and factories remained operative.

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<sup>55</sup> TsGA SPb. F. R-359. Op. 1. D. 1 L. 1-5.

<sup>56</sup> “Given the city’s encirclement and the adversary’s immediate proximity, daily air raids and shelling, any detailed publication material could provide the enemy – directly or indirectly – with useful information and prove extremely detrimental to the army, city front, and its defense.” (From the report to the Secretary of Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b) A. I. Makhanov by Artamonov, Head of *LenOblGorLit* (Leningrad Regional Municipal Literature). TsGA SPb. F. R-359. Op. 1. D. 2. L.27)

<sup>57</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, pp. 618-620.

<sup>58</sup> The *Einsatzgruppen* were special SS mobile formations tasked with carrying out the mass murder of Jews, communist functionaries, and others deemed unfit to live by the Nazis. *Einsatzgruppe A* was one of the bloodiest Nazi mobile killing squads. It was active in the Baltic countries and the western region of Leningrad under the command of *Brigadeführer* Franz Walther Stahlecker.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.*, p. 650.

Ziegmeyer, not seeing the results that he predicted, reviewed his calculations, looking for a reason that could explain the city's survival. But he had taken everything into account: rationing, bread quality, air temperature, and psychological stress. He remained convinced that 125, 150, or 200 grams of bread daily without any other nutrition was insufficient to physiologically sustain a human body in freezing cold weather. But the residents of Leningrad continued to live, move, and work in apparent defiance of the laws of science. After the war, while he was working as a senior nutrition specialist in the Soviet-occupied zone, Ziegmeyer met Aleksei Bezzubov, a Soviet food chemist who during the siege participated in a scientific research group that studied edible materials and implemented the technology of vitamin C production from pine needles.<sup>60</sup> According to Bezzubov, Ziegmeyer told him about his role in the siege and asked "How could you have survived? It is absolutely impossible! I am an experienced nutritionist, but it is a mystery to me how you managed to pull off such a miracle."<sup>61</sup>

On November 20, 1941, when the daily bread ration fell to a bare minimum (250 grams for specialists and blue-collar workers and 125 grams for dependents), Leningrad was struck by mass hunger. Physicians who survived the siege reported that emaciation was "characterized by rapidly progressing weight loss, increasing muscular debility, weakening cardiac activity, slowing of the heartbeat, fatigue, appreciable loss of working capacity, flaccidity, a slowing of speech and movement, and depression."<sup>62</sup> Witness

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<sup>60</sup> Aleksei Bezzubov, "Vitaminy dlia blokadnogo Leningrada" (*Khimiia i zhizn'*, 1985, #1). F. 7384. Op. 36. D. 68. L. 70. Avgustyniuk, in the entry for April 4, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb, F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 1. L.34.

<sup>61</sup> Granin and Adamovich. *Blokadnaia kniga*, p. 62. Aly and Heim, *Architects of Annihilation*, p. 245.

<sup>62</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941-44*, pp. 131-132.

accounts describe apathy, “sleepwalking,” indifference, and detachment from reality.

“We are no longer surprised or horrified, our nerves are numb.”<sup>63</sup> People had

empty, vacant eyes. The seal of hopelessness reflected on many faces. You no longer could either empathize or realize the entire depth of human sorrow. The never-ending sense of hunger that was gnawing on your innards inhibited your ability to be completely delicate, sensitive, and humane.<sup>64</sup>

Malnutrition weakens the immune system, increasing the chance of contracting infectious diseases. But the clinical picture was different in Leningrad. The scientists concluded that the adaptation to mental and emotional stress (that preceded the physical starvation) increased the residents’ biological defense mechanisms.<sup>65</sup> Leningrad is also the only example in all of histories of besieged cities that escaped epidemics of infectious diseases.<sup>66</sup> During the first winter, *distrofiia* (starvation) and hypothermia were the prevailing causes of death, and reported cases of common pre-war diseases like chicken pox, scarlet fever, measles, and rubella were rare.<sup>67</sup>

The use of innumerable food substitutes played a huge role in survival. Leningrad scientists conducted research and experiments on the possibility of extracting edible

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<sup>63</sup> From the siege diary of Stasia Antonevich. TsGALI SPb. F.97. Op.3. D.709. L.12.

<sup>64</sup> TsGALI SPb. F.97. Op.3. D.969. L.4. (M. Gol’zblat).

<sup>65</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 4965. Op. 3c. D. 45. *Life and death*, pp. 123-160.

<sup>66</sup> John Barber, who did comparative research on various famines (Ireland, India, China, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Holland, Greece, and Soviet Union) stated that unlike in Leningrad, in other famines “infectious diseases accounted for most deaths.” The explanation is two-fold: unfavorable winter conditions and preventative measures initiated by the city authorities. Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death*, pp. 3, 7-8. *Mediki i blokada: Vzgliad skvoz’ gody. Vospominaniia, fragment dnevnikov, svidetel’sтва ochevidtsev, dokumental’nye materialy*, Kniga 2, p. 50.

<sup>67</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and death*, p. 145. In 2016, Yoshinori Ohsumi received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine for his research of the autophagy mechanisms (“self-eating” of the damaged cells and recycling of non-essential parts of the cell during starvation). He discovered that autophagy is triggered in response to various types of stress (including starvation) and is a “key cellular process capable of clearing invading microorganisms and toxic protein aggregates, and therefore plays an important role during infection, in ageing and in the pathogenesis of many human diseases.” [https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/medicine/laureates/2016/advanced-medicineprize2016.pdf](https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/2016/advanced-medicineprize2016.pdf)

components from plants, industrial lubricants, organic matter, and even insects. The city's food industry implemented the use of surrogates in the production of bread, meat, milk, confections, and canning products.<sup>68</sup> Local publishers printed brochures compiled by the Botanical Institute of the Academy of Sciences with the list of edible items found in nature and households as well as recipes for making them.<sup>69</sup> Due to the extreme physical pain associated with starvation, people consumed everything that even remotely resembled food: various pharmaceutical remedies, window cleaning liquid, shoe polish, leather goods, commercial grease, tree bark, sawdust, albumin glue, petroleum jelly, stearin candles, cats, dogs, sparrows, various plants, and so on. On November 30, 1941, factory worker Evdokimov wrote: "Hunger. Hunger! How can we manage to live through this? Those who survive will never forget these days and will always value life and know its worth. Child mortality is very high. Almost the entire population is swollen from hunger. Horses, cats, and dogs are disappearing from the streets."<sup>70</sup>

The siege – like any catastrophe – imposed its own rules and pushed people into doing things they would never otherwise have done. Faced with ethical decision making on daily basis, people became accustomed to making tough, even cruel, choices. As the residents' emotions numbed, a degree of moral deterioration ensued. Realizing the adverse impact of hunger, diarists nevertheless often reproached themselves for certain actions. After unsuccessful attempts to control his temper, Aleksandr Avgustyniuk disappointedly wrote:

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<sup>68</sup> Anatolii Veselov, "Bor'ba s golodom v blokadnom Leningrade" (*Otechestvennaya istoriia*, 2002, # 3), pp. 157-158.

<sup>69</sup> Gellerbakh, Koriakina, Nikitin, Pankova, Rozhevitz, Smetannikova, Troitskaia, Fedchenko, and Yurashevskii, *Glavneishie dikorastushchie pischevye rasteniia Leningradskoi oblasti* (Leningrad, 1942).

<sup>70</sup> A.F. Evdokimov, entry for November 30, 1941, in *Budni podviga*, p. 106.



I scolded mom again. I realize that I am out of line but cannot help it, hunger is tormenting me. She has shriveled up and can barely move, and I am snapping at her... Why? It is upsetting that I cannot help her because I am helpless myself. That is why I nag, that is why I pick on her... I am responsible for my own actions.<sup>71</sup>

While everyone struggled with the new reality, and attempted to reason and make sense of it through self-searching, Leningraders regarded such traumatic experiences as social or collective precisely because such experiences were not unique.<sup>72</sup> But for the most part, moral norms were lowered or disregarded in relation to strangers.

During a winter in which the temperature plunged below -35° C (-31° F), Leningraders had no heat, no water, and no electricity.<sup>73</sup> Sewage was thrown out into the stairwells, streets, and into elevators. As the siege dragged on, people stopped caring about how they looked, and what they wore. Lev Khodorkov observed the change in the physical appearance of residents:

There is not a single normal face on the street. Hunger manifests itself in a variety of ways: legs, arms, and face swell up; eyes water; complexion is grayish-green; arms, legs, body, and face thin down; eyes sink in; arms get ghastly slim; nose becomes pointy; some people's faces darken and turn black. Those with a normal healthy complexion are looked back at.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Aleksandr Ivanovich Avgustyniuk, entry for November 26, 1941, TsGAIPD SPb, F. 1000. Op. 11. D. 1. L.9-10.

<sup>72</sup> Derek A. Summerfield argued that "war-affected populations" direct their attention "outward, to their devastated social world" and not inwards to the "mental processes." He later observed that one of the major determinants of the outcome is a sociocultural factor. ("The Impact of War and Atrocity on Civilian Populations: Basic Principles for NGO Interventions and a Critique of Psychosocial Trauma Projects" (Overseas Development Institute, London, 1996), p. 14. Online source: <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/97846/networkpaper014.pdf>; "Cross-cultural Perspectives on the Medicalization of Human Suffering" in Gerald M. Rosen, ed., *Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Issues and Controversies* (New York: JohnWiley & Sons, 2004), p. 242.)

<sup>73</sup> As a result of German air raids.

<sup>74</sup> Lev Khodorkov, entry for January 22, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 250.

Money depreciated, and jewelry, art, and other valuables could be exchanged for “cigarettes, hunks of ersatz bread, jars of sour cabbage, dirty bits of rye bread” on one of the city’s black markets.<sup>75</sup>

During the fall and winter of 1941–42, German aviation and artillery targeted apartment buildings, hospitals, schools, industrial facilities, and other crowded places in the attempt to intimidate and eradicate the city’s population.<sup>76</sup> The initial psychological impact was tremendous. A few diary entries speak of people dying from stress and fright during bombings. Poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts noted in her diary:

[They are] hurling explosive metal at unarmed, defenseless people. It whistles while in flight so that everyone thinks ‘this one is going to get me’ dying [from terror] inside before it hits the ground. You die even though it missed. But in a minute there is this whistling again and again, and a person dies once more. And anew he holds his breath and then resurrects only to die again and again. How much longer will this go on for? Come on, kill! But do not intimidate me, do not dare to scare me with this damned whistling, do not torment me. Kill quietly. Kill at once but not several times a day. Oh, my Lord!... I feel like something inside me is dying. And when it actually does, perhaps then I shall cease to be afraid.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Salisbury, *The 900 Days*, p. 440.

<sup>76</sup> See Appendix V, Photo 1 “OKW secret directive dated October 7, 1941 on the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad.” A secret directive on “The Future of the City of Petersburg,” numbered I-a 1601/41, dated 22 September 1941, stated that “The Fuehrer has decided to wipe the city of Petersburg from the face of the earth,” that it is planned to blockade the city securely, to subject it to artillery bombardment of all calibers, and by means of constant bombing from the air to raze Leningrad to the ground. It is also decreed in the order that should there be a request for capitulation, such request should be turned down by the Germans. Finally, it is stated in this document that this directive emanates not only from the naval staff, but also from the OKW.” The Avalon Project: Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Volume 8, p. 113. Source: <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/02-22-46.asp>. Also see, Martin Bormann’s Minutes of a Meeting at Hitler’s Headquarters (July 16, 1941). Nuremberg Document 221-L. Source: [http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage\\_id=2345](http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/docpage.cfm?docpage_id=2345) (Accessed on January 4, 2017.)

<sup>77</sup> Ol’ga Berggol’ts, diary entry for September 12, 1941, in *Leningradskii dnevnik* (Moskva: Eksmo, 2015), p.288.

But on January 12, 1942, *Einsatzgruppe A* reported that even constant air raids and shelling had little to no effect on the residents.<sup>78</sup> People had to get used to living in such conditions; sometimes at the expense of others. NKVD<sup>79</sup> reports describe instances of stealing, marauding, black marketing, an occasional murder, and even *trupovedstvo*, the eating of corpses.<sup>80</sup> With over 3,000 dying every day,<sup>81</sup> in the months between November 1941 and March 1942, death became a reality:

Placing bodies of the deceased relatives wrapped up and sewn into sheets on sleds or pieces of plywood, Leningraders dragged them along Ligovskii Prospect to the Volkovskoe cemetery. There were no planks or coffins. Having no strength to hack out graves, people delivered bodies to the tall metal fence and left them there.<sup>82</sup>

Unable to convey the scope of the human tragedy and emotional strain, diarists resorted to the repetition of certain words because using one word seemed insufficient: “Corpses are in the morgue, on the streets, in buildings, dormitories, and institutions. Anywhere and everywhere there are *corpses, corpses, corpses*. They clamor for revenge.”<sup>83</sup>

According to Svetlana Magaeva, a senior researcher at the Institute of Pathology and Pathophysiology of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, who endured the

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<sup>78</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 659.

<sup>79</sup> The NKVD *militsiia* units were entrusted with the tasks related to the city’s order and security: participation in the internal defense of the city, organization of anti-landing defense, building internal and external defense lines, ensuring the evacuation of the population, fighting crime, imposing the curfew, security checks of the incoming transport, arranging mass burials, and so forth. The *militsiia* also provided protection and ensured the security of the NKVD USSR Military Auto Road #101 (the official designation of the “Road of Life”). See Appendix IV for more details.

<sup>80</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, pp. 655, 750-797.

<sup>81</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21. Lur’e estimates 1,500 people daily in Lev Lur’e and Leonid Maliarov, *Leningradskii front* (St.Peterburg.: BKhV-Peterburg, 2012), p. 150.

<sup>82</sup> Recollections of Nina Moskalenko in Lur’e and Maliarov, *Leningradskii front*, p. 157.

<sup>83</sup> Izrail’ Nazimov, entry for January 11, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 249. Emphasis added.

siege as a child, the city's population should have been wiped out within a month as predicted by the Germans.<sup>84</sup> Specialists indicated that there were two main components to survival: physiological and psychological. Scientific research on the “physiological and pathological stress verifies that the outcome of the near-total starvation depended on the nature of psycho-emotional tension that the blockaders experienced prior to the onset of famine.”<sup>85</sup> While it is obvious that all residents experienced stress, its levels varied depending on the “individual predisposition of mental and emotional excitation, the activity of natural stress-limiting systems, and the ability of the organism to adapt to stress pressures.”<sup>86</sup> This adaptability to the two pathogenic factors (emotional trauma and starvation) played the main role in *blokadniki*'s durability under conditions incompatible with life. The initial stressor (emotional trauma) produced the long-term adaptation effect and preceded the starvation phase by three months. Since this adaptation is possible with the intensification of protein synthesis, it allowed increasing resistance to the ensuing extreme starvation. If the physiological stressor (starvation) began immediately after the siege was laid, remaining alive over any extended period of time would have been impossible under conditions of protein deficiency.<sup>87</sup> This conclusion drawn by medical specialists is verified historically: the survival of 557,760 Leningraders who lived through the entire siege is a compelling proof.

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<sup>84</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death*, p. 131.

<sup>85</sup> Simonenko and Magaeva, “Osnovy vyzhivaniia v blokadnom Leningrade s pozitsii sanogeneza” (*Klinicheskaia Meditsina*, 2014, #2), p. 10.

<sup>86</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death*, pp. 124-125.

<sup>87</sup> *Id.*, p. 126.

On the whole, individual personality traits determined the severity of the emotional and mental impact. The doctors and clinical specialists who worked in the city during the blockade did not always see a connection between emaciation level and death. Moreover, at times there seemed to be an inverse correlation: people without signs of severe dystrophy who lost the motivation to live passed away, and those whose vital statistics appeared incompatible with life, but were making a wilful effort, survived.<sup>88</sup> According to Professor Mikhail Chernorutskii's observations at the time of the siege,

[T]he weakening of the will to live, depression, and giving up the routine of ordinary living [...] led to a sharp deterioration in the general condition of the patients. Conversely, a firm will to live, cheerfulness, optimism, and invariable pattern of organization in daily life and work (that seemed to defy the evident) sustained the weak body and gave it new strength.<sup>89</sup>

Professor Aleksandr Miasnikov also noted that having been placed in the same environment people with highly sensitive personality traits – anxious, agitated, extremely emotional, and fearful – had an accelerated rate of developing *distrofiia* than those who were more pliable, calm, organized, and optimistic.<sup>90</sup> Clearly, the determination was an essential and integral part of the survival in Leningrad.

### **Historiography of the Leningrad Blockade**

As more archival records get declassified and new material (including diaries, memoirs, letters, and recollections) surfaces, it allows scholars to fill in the blind spots. The lack of accessible and reliable data in the past explains the limited scholarship on the siege of Leningrad in the west (as opposed to other significant events that took place on

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<sup>88</sup> Magaeva and Simonenko, "Osnovy vyzhivaniia v blokadnom Leningrade s pozitsii sanogeneza," p. 10. Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death*, p. 138.

<sup>89</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death*, p. 138.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*

the Eastern front, i.e. the Battle of Stalingrad or the Battle of Kursk), while the scholarly literature on the subject is abundant in Russia. Approaches, perceptions, and assessments of the siege vary drastically within international scholarly circles and depend on national historical interpretations, political affiliations, and time period.<sup>91</sup>

Throughout the war and up until the end of the 1940s, the history of the siege in the USSR became known by means of various media publications as well as official (and trophy) records and materials presented at the Nuremberg Tribunal, when the Blockade of Leningrad received special attention. Documents produced at Nuremberg irrefutably established Nazi Germany's objectives to destroy the city and starve Leningraders to death, rejecting an option of capitulation and forcing residents who attempt to flee back into the city under fire.<sup>92</sup>

Up until the mid-1980s, the Soviet historiography of the Leningrad siege developed within the general frame of publications on the Great Patriotic War: the scope

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<sup>91</sup> Historiography of the war was greatly impacted by the Cold War and political clash between the capitalist West and the communist USSR. Thus in the Soviet era, the role of the “never-erring” cit/ state authorities was portrayed as a motivating force (i.e. A.P. Konstantinov, ed., *Zhenshchiny goroda Lenina* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1963) or Aleksandr Karasëv, *Leningradtsy v gody blokady, 1941-1943* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1959)), but with the break-down of the Soviet Union was revised and received objective criticism (i.e. Nikita Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*). And in the U.S., the Soviet authorities were – at the large degree are still – viewed as the intimidating and terrorizing force. (See Leon Gour's *The Siege of Leningrad* first published in 1962, where he asserted that government exerted control and almost total political conformism among civilians who “felt helpless to resist the controls imposed upon it” (*Id.*, pp. 63, 80, 304-308), and Anna Reid's *The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944* of 2011 with a similar assessment of the authorities as inept, and the Soviets as passive resisters submerged in the system-fostered “all-pervading culture of fear.” (*Id.*, p. 96))

<sup>92</sup> Franz Halder noted in his diary on July 8, 1941: “It is the Fuehrer's firm decision to level Moscow and Leningrad, and make them uninhabitable, so as to relieve us of the necessity of having to feed the populations through the winter. The cities will ‘be razed by Air Force. Tanks must not be used for the purpose. A national catastrophe which will deprive not only Bolshevism but also Muscovite nationalism of their centers.’” (The Private War Journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH), Vol. VI. Historical Division, SSUSA. 21 February, 1941 – 31 July, 1941 (Archives, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document No. N-16845-F, Copy 1), p. 212.) Online source: [http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder\\_eng6.pdf](http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf) See General Jodl's order on October 7, 1941 in Roderick Stackelberg and Sally Anne Winkle, *The Nazi Germany sourcebook: an anthology of texts* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 285.

of the tragedy in Leningrad was downplayed, issues of defeatism or state opposition were omitted, and the spread of individual memory about the blockade was curbed. The official state ideology endorsed and commemorated Leningraders' "epic struggle" in the battle for the city, leaving behind such aspects of the survival as privation and criminality.<sup>93</sup> (Although, such interpretation of the civilians' struggle was not characteristic only of the Soviet propaganda. In comparing the siege and the London Blitz, Lisa Kirschenbaum asserted that "in both cases, the media worked to persuade individuals that their personal sorrows [...] carried historic, if not epic, importance."<sup>94</sup> In both cases the stories of courage "transformed the everyday horrors of urban war into heroic legend."<sup>95</sup>) But what was lost in the official narrative was the fact that the war itself was just as much of an individual experience as it was national.

Collecting and preserving social memory began prior to the lifting of the siege. A number of state commissions oversaw collecting, sorting, publishing, and archiving of the documentation. Part of the commissions' findings was a compilation of research records pertaining to the psychological impact of the blockade conducted by scientists from Bekhterev Psycho-Neurological Institute during the siege. Those conclusions and evaluations were used in *Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad*.<sup>96</sup> The book examines historical-medical aspects relating to personality and behavior changes (including survival cannibalism) and the interrelation between alimentary dystrophy (*distrofiia*) and

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<sup>93</sup> I.e. Aleksandr Karasëv, *Leningradtsy v gody blokady: 1941-1943* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1959).

<sup>94</sup> Lisa A. Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941–1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments* (New-York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 317.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>96</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds. *Life and death in besieged Leningrad, 1941-44*.

psychiatric disorders. However, early post-war publications on the Leningrad Siege – especially personal memories of participants—were rare.<sup>97</sup>

As state control was liberalized, Soviet historians began to explore previously shunned topics. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, they published works that described the city's ordeal. And while they avoided focusing specifically on the more sensitive topics (scope of starvation, mortality rate, the rise of criminal activity, defeatism, a breakdown of norms, and so on) their research attempted to shed light on the extent of political control, living conditions, and overall public mood. Published in 1958, Dmitri Pavlov's book *Leningrad 1941: The Blockade* became a standard reference for domestic and foreign scholars.<sup>98</sup> When in the late 1980s the “party rhetoric” became a thing of the past, Soviet scholars began to explore many of the controversial issues in national history and experiment with different methodological approaches.

After the change of the political regime in the 1990s and the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russian historical school began to shift away from the Soviet methodology towards the “totalitarian view”<sup>99</sup> – largely influenced by the Western academia – of the Soviet period. According to Richard Bidlack, over 400 monographs and collective

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<sup>97</sup> “From the late 1920s to 1950s, the USSR had no social agencies and the information on the public opinion belonged to the classified category.” Elena Zubkova, “Poslevoennoe sovetskoe obshchestvo: politika i povsednevnost’, 1945-1953,” in *Rossiiskaia politicheskaia entsiklopediia* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1999), p. 5.

<sup>98</sup> As the Defense Council's chief of food supplies for the civilian and military population, Pavlov had access to information and statistics unknown to the general population.

<sup>99</sup> A totalitarian approach in the Western study and analysis of the Soviet society presupposed that power and initiative came from the top (Soviet leaders, Communist Party). While this approach has been used to conveniently interpret many (if not all) events in the Soviet history, it oversimplifies them and, more importantly, denies the possibility of “significant initiative from below,” or the society. George M. Enteen, “Recent Writings about Soviet Historiography” (*Slavic Review* 61, no. 2 (2002): 357-63), p. 363.



volumes on the siege were published in Russia by the mid-1990s.<sup>100</sup> Today, Russian historiography is represented by two main schools: revisionists and the school of resistance. The topic of the blockade remains central to many Russian historians (Gennadii Sobolev, Valentin Koval'chuk, Nikita Lomagin, Mikhail Shkarovskii, Sergei Iarov, and Vladimir Piankevich to name a few). The last two are prominent scholars who continuously use diary material in their historic research. Recently-deceased Iarov centered his studies on the moral aspects and ethics of the blockade. His publications describe daily life, the routine of those trapped in the city very carefully and with a lot of little details. Vladimir Piankevich's monographs focus on the rumors that circulated in the city and its black market. Leading researcher of the St. Petersburg Central State Archives Mikhail Shkarovskii's area of expertise belongs to one of the most sensitive and unexplored topics in all of the Soviet history – relations between the state power and the Russian Orthodox Church.

Issues of political control, public mood, and the possibility of civil revolt is one of the central themes in Nikita Lomagin's work.<sup>101</sup> While Lomagin acknowledges that in the entire system of agencies responsible for political control the NKVD was the most effective, his findings permitted him to assert that for the first year in besieged Leningrad the NKVD's work was less than satisfactory. At the onset of the war, the agency transferred half of its specialists to other departments in other cities. As a result of

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<sup>100</sup> Richard Bidlack, "Rabochie leningradskikh zavodov v pervyi god voyny," in *Leningradskaia epopeia: Organizatsiia oborony i naselenie goroda* (Sankt-Peterburg, 1995), p. 168.

<sup>101</sup> Nikita Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*. First published in 2004, its 2012 edition was supplemented with additional German documents in co-authorship with Richard Bidlack. Richard Bidlack, Nikita Lomagin, *The Leningrad Blockade, 1941-1944: A New Documentary History from the Soviet Archives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

personnel shortage and almost total isolation of the city, it faced serious problems.<sup>102</sup>

Noting that problems of political control are not thoroughly researched by Russian historiography, Lomagin emphasizes that the analysis of this topic by western historians is also inadequate:

The difference in methodological assessments of Stalinism and state institutions' role that exercised control as well as the lack of accessibility to a wide variety of sources result in rather one-sided studies based upon the fragmented or mainstream material. Prevalent to this day, control of the state security over the society is viewed as 'total' and is typical of those who adhere to the totalitarian model.<sup>103</sup>

German historiography on the siege of Leningrad is limited. As post-war Germany was "ideologically" split into two opposing camps, Western Germany (BRD) and Eastern Germany (DDR), it adhered to the principles of two different historical perspectives. Despite the availability of the rich and vast primary sources on the Nazi occupational policies in the Leningrad region as well as trophy documents of SD (*Sicherheitsdienst*, SS intelligent service) reports on the situation within the city (that came useful in the works by Leon Goure and Alexander Werth), there was hardly any research on the siege done in the BRD for almost fifty years after the war. With the onset of the Cold War, the U.S. initiated a full amnesty for Nazi war criminals in its attempt to legitimize West Germany.<sup>104</sup> This allowed the reversal of the denazification policy and initiation of another one, later called *Vergangenheitspolitik*,<sup>105</sup> which resulted in breaking

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<sup>102</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 219.

<sup>103</sup> *Id.*, p. 140.

<sup>104</sup> Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany and the Nazi Past: the Politics of Amnesty and Integration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p.13.

<sup>105</sup> Policy of the past.

from the past and “a triumph of silence” that lasted well into the 1990s.<sup>106</sup> Archival documents declassified and published during the 1960s and 1970s in the DDR indisputably established the criminal actions and intent of the Nazi government and army in Leningrad.<sup>107</sup> In the BRD, historical science preferred to take the route of denial and distortion. Popular in the 1950s “soldier stories” told of the war in the East and depicted the *Wehrmacht* as a brave and blameless victim that fought a “clean war,” the SS and SD as criminals acting and plotting behind the army’s back, and the Soviets as despicable barbarians.<sup>108</sup> One of the examples of Axis soldiers’ glorification who “fought with a firm belief that their cause was just” came forth in the memoirs of a former officer of Army Group North Werner Haupt.<sup>109</sup> Within such warped rhetoric, the Siege of Leningrad was regarded as “common means of warfare” and hardly ever mentioned.<sup>110</sup>

Nevertheless, Germany went through an enormous and very painful change in its historical assessment on how to write history about any aspect of the war, including the Holocaust. In 2002, the Hamburg Institute for Social Research published the volume *Crimes of the German Wehrmacht: Dimensions of a War of Annihilation, 1941-1944* and introduced documents that were six-dimensional in focus: the genocide committed against Soviet Jews, the mass deaths of the Soviet prisoners of war, starvation as a

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<sup>106</sup> Norbert Frei, *Adenauer's Germany*, p. xiv.

<sup>107</sup> Aleskandr Borozniak, *Zhestokaia pamiat'. Natsistskiĭ reĭkh v vospriiatii nemtsev vtoroi poloviny 20 veka i nachala 21 veka* (Moskva: Politicheskaiia entsiklopediia, 2014), p.278.

<sup>108</sup> Wolfram Wette, *The Wehrmacht: History, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 235.

<sup>109</sup> Verner Haupt, *Leningrad: 900-dnevnaia bitva: 1941-1944* (Moskva: Iauza, Eksmo, 2006), p. 7. (Original: Werner Haupt, Leningrad: *Die 900-Tage-Schlacht 1941-1944*, Friedberg: Podzun-Pallas-Verlag GmbH, 1980.)

<sup>110</sup> Jörg Ganzenmüller, “Nebenkriegsschauplatz der Erinnerung: die Blockade Leningrads im deutschen Gedächtnis (*Osteuropa*, 61. Jg., 8-9/2011), p. 7.

strategy of war, war against partisans, punishments, and execution of hostages. It contained orders and communication reports between the German command staff of various levels depicting how the annihilation of hundreds of thousands of Leningraders was planned and implemented. Additionally, the content of the documents shows that the military was not only an active participant in the mass murder of Soviet civilians but also was fully aware of the extent of sufferings to which the Soviets were subjected. Thus, the authors debunked the myth of the *Wehrmacht*'s "clean hands" that former Nazi officers attempted to create exculpating German soldiers from the atrocities committed in the East.

Three major works of American scholarship on the siege of Leningrad were written by people who had visited the city or had lived there at one point: Leon Goure, Alexander Werth, and Harrison Salisbury.<sup>111</sup> Despite criticism expressed by some scholars for using the limited source base, to this day these books remain the most comprehensive and fundamental western works published on the topic.<sup>112</sup>

With the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Anglo-American historiography marked the beginning of a new trend in its interpretation of Stalinism (and the events of that period): the concept of resistance.<sup>113</sup> This theory regards

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<sup>111</sup> Leon Goure, *The Siege of Leningrad*; Harrison Salisbury, *The 900 Days: The Siege of Leningrad*; Alexander Werth, *Russia at War: 1941-1945* (New York: Avon Books, 1964) and *Leningrad, 1943: Inside a City Under Siege* (London-New York: I.B. Taurus, 2015).

<sup>112</sup> Limited access to the state archives and private accounts greatly reduced the chance of accurate and comprehensive analysis, thus, making historians fill the knowledge gaps with mere hypothesizing, guessing, or unverified data (i.e. on the number of civil and military deaths, public moods, extent of state control, supply issues). But to this day, not all of the siege-time documentation has been mined. New information (previously inaccessible or unknown) emerges every year and some of it is used in writing of this thesis.

<sup>113</sup> Daniel Beer, "Review: Origins, Modernity and Resistance in the Historiography of Stalinism" (*Journal of Contemporary History*. Vol. 40, No. 2 (Apr., 2005), "Domestic Dreamworlds: Notions of Home in Post-1945 Europe"), pp. 363-379. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30036328>

Soviet citizens not as those who supported or those who opposed the regime, but as a force that continuously resisted the regime actively or passively. The opening of the Russian archives in the 1990s led to the research boom in the international academic community and branching out of macro-history: history of everyday life with a focus on individual strategies of daily resistance to the regime. The works of Michael Jones and Anna Reid follow this pattern.<sup>114</sup>

Naturally, certain issues within the Siege of Leningrad take precedence, spark more interest, and are viewed and interpreted differently.<sup>115</sup> However, comprehensive American scholarship on the blockade is still defined by the works of Goure, Salisbury, and Werth published decades ago, with Alexis Peri's *The War Within: Diaries from the Siege of Leningrad* as a recent major publication that offers a glimpse of the human suffering by examining diaries of the besieged Leningraders.

The practice of publishing war memoirs, biographies, and diaries was common in the USSR (although, some were "beautified" by censorship), and is still maintained in the Russian Federation. In the United States, there were limited publications and analyses of the siege diaries. Among the most well-known are Cynthia Simmons and Nina Perlina's

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<sup>114</sup> Michael Jones, *Leningrad: State of Siege*; Anna Reid, *Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944*. And while both used diaries as primary sources, the overall center of their analyses was the politics and not people (as stated in the theses).

<sup>115</sup> Such issues were explored not only in monographs but also in numerous articles and anthologies: perception of self (Alexis Peri, "Lichnost' v osade: samoanaliz v dnevnikh zhitelei blokadnogo Leningrada," *Chelovek i lichnost' v istorii Rossii konets XIX-XX vek: Materialy mezhdunarodnogo kollokviuma. Sankt-Peterburg, 7-10 Iunia 2010* (Sankt-Peterburg: «Nestor-Istoriia», 2013)), blue-collar workers' actions (Richard Bidlack, *Workers at War: Factory Workers and Labor Policy in the Siege of Leningrad* (Pittsburgh: The Carl Beck papers, University of Pittsburgh in Russian and East European studies, No. 902, 1991)), overlap of individual and collective memories (Kirschenbaum), shaping the system of meaning and normalcy (Jeffrey K. Hass, "The Experience of War and the Construction of Normality. Lessons from the Blockade of Leningrad," in *Bitva za Leningrad. Diskussionnye problemy*, edited by Nikita Lomagin, pp. 235-271. (Sankt-Peterburg: Evropeiskii Dom, 2009)).

*Writing the Siege of Leningrad: Women's Diaries, Memoirs, and Documentary Prose* published in 2002 and Anna Reid's *Leningrad: The Epic Siege of World War II, 1941-1944* of 2011. Currently, there are only two American scholars whose scholarly interests revolve around siege diaries – Jeffrey Hass and Alexis Peri. Hass's main interest is in "the human capacity for action."<sup>116</sup> Some of his articles are devoted to the human behavior and survival tactics in the blockade. His book *Fields of War and the Self: Meanings and Practices of Survival, Suffering, and the Self. The Story of the Blockade of Leningrad (1941-1944)* is waiting to be published by Oxford University Press.

Admittedly, the raw data and numerous researches available to German and Russian historians are abundant and easily accessible. Moreover, the Russian Academy of Sciences and other St. Petersburg institutions organize historical conferences devoted to the topic of the siege, which allows Russian specialists present their findings and engage in lengthy discussions.<sup>117</sup> While these conferences are frequented by scholars from various countries, the subject of the siege itself remains less popular among western historians than other events of the World War II and its main focus revolves around the Soviet political regime. Linguistic barrier and geographic location (in addition to the bureaucratic procedures involved in getting to the archives) are the main limitations the scholars face. In the case of handwritten diaries, letters, and other documents, there is also an issue with deciphering them (written in cursive, some are difficult to decipher

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<sup>116</sup> <http://socanth.richmond.edu/faculty/jhass/> "My interests ultimate relate to the human capacity for action, which means I study power, culture, and practice. Why do we do what we do, and do we act from compulsion or autonomous desire? How do social practices persist and change? This leads me to question just what "institutions" and "structures" are--social phenomena that too often are taken for granted."

<sup>117</sup> I.e., Historical Research Conference for Students "War. Leningrad. Siege" (2017); International Scientific Conference "Imperative issues in the history of the siege" (2016); Conference "Leningrad and Leningraders during the Great Patriotic War" (2015); Scientific State Conference "The Great Patriotic War 1941-1945: Soviet nations in the struggle against aggression" (2015).

even for a native speaker), making the analysis extremely time-consuming. Despite vast research and material gathered by the Russian and Western scholars, there are no studies that aim at defining and singling out the main motivating factors that aided residents of the besieged city in reducing the enormous physiological and psychological stress caused by the bombings and instinctual need for food. Heavily relying on the primary sources, this thesis aims at making a valuable Russian-language scholarship accessible to the English-speaking world and attempts to bridge the two schools.

### **Diarists & Personal Records as a Historical Source**

Over the past fifteen years, there has been keen interest among Russian and American historians and sociologists in the publication of siege diaries. While official records provide a frame of reference, there are real people behind every figure and event. Although hardly objective, personal histories nevertheless serve as a rich source of new perspectives that allow tracing commonalities and a better understanding of the daily struggles, public moods, and the psychology of survival. When Daniil Granin and Ales' Adamovich published their *Blokadnaia kniga* in 1979, they used oral history (incorporating diary sources and interviews of the siege participants), thereby providing a new frame of reference. Their work presented the Leningrad epic through the experiences, actions, and struggles of those who lived it. This new material allowed a more balanced portrayal of both the city's bravery and tragedy and went against the commonly publicized stereotype ("anguish – heroism – victory as a reward for valor") that had left no place for complexities like honor, mercy, or overstepping moral norms. The authors summarized their research:

People worked and helped the front; they saved others and supplied those in need. Some provided Leningraders with fuel, some gathered children, organized

hospitals, infirmaries, and made sure factories and plants functioned. Essentially, each and every story was filled with recollections of hunger, cold, artillery fires, deaths, and as a result – emotional anguish that stemmed from sufferings. And yet, they also spoke of people’s undertakings and accomplishments, what they did and how they fought despite it all. These three sides of the besieged life were distinctly present in every single story.<sup>118</sup>

Of the diaries consulted for this study, the breakdown of the authors’ professions is as follows: engineers (7) and teachers (8), blue-collar (12) and white-collar workers (9), scientists (6) and artists (17), students (36) and soldiers (6), writers (5) and journalists (2), NKVD and administration officials (11), professors (10) and doctors (10), housewives (2) and peasants (4). Varying in length, presentation, perception, and emotional expression, diaries were written by atheists and believers, ideologically “new” citizens and tsarist *intelligentsiia*, Communists and non-party members, men and women, elderly people and children. Belonging to all levels of society, these diarists (in a country of nearly total literacy) can be presumed to be fairly representative of the population that by the mid-30s comprised of two social classes (workers and peasants) and a stratum (*intelligentsiia*).

There are a number of major benefits of diary sources. The first one is the minimization of ex-post facto event recall because they were written at the time of occurrence. Given that aside from consulting the photographic material available, witnessing the phenomenon under study is not possible, diaries allow an individual glimpse on things that official records would otherwise neglect as insignificant. Being subjective, individual writers evaluated the events through the prism of their own perception and reality, limited by personal experiences, education, values, intellectual abilities, social settings, habits, and skills, and therefore may contain a degree of

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<sup>118</sup> Granin and Adamovich, *Blokadnaia kniga*, Chast’ 1, p. 27.



distortion, duplicity, or slyness. Some diaries present a dry statement of events, while others detail personal interpretations and emotional reactions. Although in the past emotions have been viewed as antipodean to rational action, recent studies argue that emotion and reason are interconnected with social, political, historical, religious, and cultural spheres.<sup>119</sup> And while feelings, ideas, or emotions do not always equal real action, at times remaining hypothetical on paper, deep engagement and analysis of the personal writings can lead to revelations about the complex processes, norms, and values of a particular community within a specific time period.<sup>120</sup>

A second benefit of private records pertains to daily local routines. They contain a wealth of information about households and communal practices, events, and conditions:

The urban economy is deteriorating unbelievably fast: the electricity went out on December 2; water system failed in January; the radio fell silent on January 17; yesterday we boarded up the latrines because the sewage pipes froze. We get water from the tap in the yard of the building #2 and pour the dirty water out in the backyard. The newspapers have not been delivered for a while. We are living without knowing what is happening at the front.<sup>121</sup>

Most scholars know that the city utilities and communications did not fail in all fifteen districts at the same time. Records like that of Polzikova-Rubets quoted above help in reconstructing the timeline and the full picture of such collapse.

Keeping diaries presented a challenge to their writers. As engineer Khodorkov emphasized, behind “every short little entry” hides “much profound grief and deep

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<sup>119</sup> Mark D. Steinberg and Valeria Sobol, “Introduction,” in *Interpreting Emotions in Russian and Eastern Europe* (DeKalb, IL: Northern University Press, 2011), p. 4.

<sup>120</sup> Carolyn Strange and Robert Cribb, “Historical perspective on honour, violence, and emotion,” in *Honour, Violence, and Emotions in History* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), p. 14.

<sup>121</sup> Kseniia Vladimirovna Polzikova-Rubets, entry for January 24, 1941. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000 Op. 11 D. 93.

meaning.”<sup>122</sup> Indeed, with all the activities throughout the day, people had to allocate time and find motivation to write, exhibiting strong organization and discipline skills. They had to sacrifice precious resources as it was too dark to write in the evenings, particularly in the fall and winter months (without electricity, kerosene and firewood were hard to come by and were needed for boiling water and heating). Additionally, a person had to have enough strength to write (some reported such weakness that they could not hold a pencil) in the freezing cold: water and ink froze inside the apartments where the temperature was often below zero, in which case records were often continued in pencil.<sup>123</sup>

A number of diaries contain newspaper clippings, quotations from novels, poems, sketches, and drawings. Most are structured by date, with some having a number of entries during the day and recordings of the time. The majority of the diaries were kept by women, who constituted two-thirds of the city population and whose narratives tend to be more detailed and express deeper emotions. Fifty-nine of the 158 records examined were produced by male subjects, and ninety-nine by female subjects. Thirty-six were written by children (9-year-old and up) and teens. A number of records did not contain the full name of an individual, only initials.

While all of the diaries are written in the Russian language, judging from the last names as well as data on the prominent diarists, their ethnic roots stem from Russian, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Swiss, and German origin (although none explicitly states

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<sup>122</sup> Khodorkov. entry for April 8, 1942, *Budni podviga*, p. 270.

<sup>123</sup> “It is so cold inside that water left in the room overnight freezes.” Izrail’ Nazimov, entry for January 29, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 135. Librarian Afanas’eva noted in March 1942 that “ink froze and library records were made with pencil.” A.L. Afanas’eva, “O blockade,” in *Bibliotekari osazhdennogo Leningrada: Sbornik vospomonanii, dnevnikov, pisem, dokumentov* (Sankt-Peterburg, 2002), p. 41.

his/her ethnicity). While nationality was an identity marker along with class, political history, and religious belief, it was a “neutral attribute.”<sup>124</sup> Beginning in the 1930s, the idea of building socialism in “one single country” promoted Soviet patriotism, which emphasized that Russians (constituting the majority of the population and inhabiting the majority of the territory) were the backbone of the country.<sup>125</sup> Although national languages were retained by the republics, the Russian language was reserved as the *lingua franca* and was taught at schools along with the indigenous ones.<sup>126</sup> Thus, the Russian language and Russia “as the central area of human history” became *primus inter pares*.<sup>127</sup> During the war, the notions of Soviet patriotism and Russian nationalism fused, giving rise to national patriotism which united all people in their ‘fight against fascism.’<sup>128</sup> Amending the official ideology, the state authorities generated and enabled such fusion in response to changing political and military conditions. It also provided an opportunity to address geocultural issues all Russian rulers grappled with: essential

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<sup>124</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick, *Tear off Masks!: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth Century Russia* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 92. Geoffrey Hosking, “The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness,” *Past & Present*, no. 175 (May, 2002), pp. 164–165.

<sup>125</sup> In 1937, Pravda stated: “Russian culture enriches the culture of other people. The Russian language has become the language of world revolution. [...] Russian culture has become international.” As referenced in Astrid S. Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism since 1856: Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p. 177.

<sup>126</sup> Lenore A. Grenoble, *Language Policy in the Soviet Union* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), p. 204. See also Marc Leprêtre, “Language Policies in the Soviet Successor States: a Brief Assessment on Language, Linguistic Right, and National Identity” (*Papeles del Este*, No. 3, 2002).

<sup>127</sup> Erik Van Ree, “Stalin as Marxist: the Western roots of Stalin’s russification of Marxism,” in Sarah Davies, James Harris, eds. *Stalin: A New History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 160.

<sup>128</sup> Tuminez, *Russian Nationalism since 1856*, p. 179. Although, Tuminez opines that the nationalist strand that was more prominent under Stalin was statism. Alfred Rieber adds “Panslavism” to patriotism and nationalism. “Stalin as foreign policy-maker: avoiding war, 1927–1953,” in Sarah Davies, James Harris, eds. *Stalin: A New History*, p. 148.

stability of the multicultural state, security of the “permeable frontiers,” and termination of ethnic marginality.<sup>129</sup>

The motives for and purposes of keeping diaries or personal records varied. While the majority of the writers did not divulge their intentions, the memorial and informational-mnemonic functions are apparent. Some people kept accounts for themselves and/or their children: “[T]he purpose of chronicling is to keep records about myself and current events.”<sup>130</sup> Some felt the urgency of the moment and the need to rationalize or excuse certain actions. Some did it for the therapeutic effect diary writing produced (as a way to distract oneself, ease emotional burden and anguish, compensate for the lack of communication with loved ones): “Talking to the self like this has a consoling, calming effect on the nerves.”<sup>131</sup> Some attempted to compile information that could become a subject of analysis in the future (in other words, they wrote for history):

My records are first-hand documents, perhaps, of less significance at times... Should I write about myself? If I am writing about others, about a dozen of subordinates whom I oversee, or about the war that I witness, then why should I exclude myself? In the circumstances, my status changes from being a subject to being an object. My future reader will have no extra sources of information about many details of our lives and our daily activities. I cannot observe other people’s private domestic settings in all of their intimate details. Here, in these notes, I shall mention my own experiences which are no longer my own and might be of interest. I am not writing recollections about the wartime. I am recording day by day, sometimes hour by hour, how we (I and people around me) endure this war. And even if these notes will not always be heroic, courageous, or utterly optimistic (as we have been accustomed to lately), they are authenticating life as it is within this small radius [area]. That is all.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Alfred J. Rieber, “Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay,” in Hugh Ragsdale, *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.323.

<sup>130</sup> Semën Fëdorovich Putiakov, in S. Bernev and S. Chervov, eds. *Blokadnye dnevniki i dokumenty* (Evropeiskii Dom, 2007), p. 311.

<sup>131</sup> Vladimir Kuliabko, “Blokadnyi dnevnik,” entry for December 22, 1941 (*Neva*, 2004, # 2).

<sup>132</sup> Georgii Alekseevich Kniazev, entry for February 26, 1942, *Dni velikikh ispytanii, dnevniki 1941-1945* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nauka, 2009).

Some kept diaries prior to the war and continued doing so during the siege. Many diarists practiced self-imposed censorship (i.e. scratching out words, phrases, or sentences; using foreign terms). Thus, two of the diarists used languages other than Russian in their comments (which indicates that they were more comfortable saying some things in a foreign language).<sup>133</sup>

Keeping records of daily life was also solicited by the city authorities for their future use as historical sources.<sup>134</sup> However, out of 158 records examined in the writing of this thesis, there are only two that remark on this solicitation directly.<sup>135</sup> Questioning whether she was writing what she “should,” school inspector Lidiia Zabolotskaia stated: “I am keeping the diary because I was asked to do so by the *Raikom* (District Committee), so that in the future I could help reconstruct the history of Leningrad’s

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<sup>133</sup> Aleksandr Boldyrëv occasionally used English, Persian, German, Tadzhik, and French words or phrases. I.e., he made a comment on December 31, 1941, about reading the “stupidest story by Shewchik ‘Two travels to the Big House.’” The author’s name and title of the story are written in English. By employing this Aesopian language, he seems to hint at his trips to the NKVD. Aleksandr Boldyrëv, *Osadnaia zapis’ (blokadnyi dnevnik)* (Sankt-Peterburg: “Evropeiskii Dom”, 1998), p. 38.

<sup>134</sup> This curiously parallels with Mass Observation project in Great Britain. Sandra Koa Wing ed., *Our Longest Days: A People’s History of the Second World War* (London: Profile Books, 2008).

<sup>135</sup> This scarcity is confirmed by Elena Viktorovna Mashnina and Gennadii Sobolev, who amassed siege diaries and analyzed them. Mashnina E.V. “Vedenie dnevnikovykh zapisei kak element povsednevnoi kul’tury blokadnogo Leningrada,” in *Dukh i kul’tura Leningrada v tylu Sovetskogo Soiuzu v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg.* (Sankt-Peterburg, 2010), pp. 165-170. Alexis Peri asserts that many “supporters and members of the party kept diaries at the bidding of local party officials.” Her findings had three subjects that kept solicited records (only one in addition to the two sources used in both Peri’s and this research). Peri, *The War Within*, p. 10. After their analysis, she concluded that they were “just as critical of local leaders and policies as journals from other collections.” *Id.*, p. 14. This conclusion verifies the fact that “political correctness” was one of the least concerns on Leningraders’ list of priorities. The previously-held notions among Western scholars of the Soviet state’s pervasive control of personal writings, their uncommonness, and repression of individualism in the Soviet society of the 1930–40s were toppled by Jochen Hellbeck. In fact, diary keeping became particularly widespread during the Stalin era. Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind: Writing a Diary under Stalin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 2-5.

defense.”<sup>136</sup> This diarist tried to be more rational about what she penned but was often saddened by the fact that her records contained “more feelings than facts.” Although, she finally concluded that the author’s sincerity was imperative and that “the feelings of an ordinary Leningrader (and my feelings and thoughts are shared by the majority) are also interesting for history.”<sup>137</sup> Indeed, retrospective journaling was hardly possible. To fill this void, the Kirov district party members advocated the creation of “collective” diaries of districts that would contain photographs and newspaper articles, being the places where “every *Raikom* member can enter anything he deems necessary and interesting.”<sup>138</sup> In the case of “collective” journals, it is possible to speak of self-imposed control and recording of a “cleaner” story (although such works were not analyzed for this thesis).

When reading diaries penned in what may seem like the pompous language during the era of change, it is important to factor in that communist “ideology was a living tissue of meaning that was seriously reflected upon,” making a diary “a medium of self-reflection and transformation.”<sup>139</sup> By assuming that Soviet subjects had absorbed propaganda and politics from around them and did not think much of this, we deny them the capacity for “self-understanding as well as self-interpretation of people who act and believe they know what they are doing.”<sup>140</sup> If we imagine that “we know better and can tell them what their real ‘motives’ are or which real ‘trends’ they objectively represent –

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<sup>136</sup> Lidiia Karlovna Zabolotskaia, entry for January 22, 1943. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 30. L. 29-30.

<sup>137</sup> *Id.* This wavering and hesitation indicate that the diarist did not receive any official instructions on how to chart her records besides the plea to record personal experiences and common daily life.

<sup>138</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 10. D. 776. L. 1-18.

<sup>139</sup> Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind*, pp. 8, 11.

<sup>140</sup> Hannah Arendt, *Essays in Understanding, 1930-1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994), p. 338.

no matter what they themselves think – we have robbed them of the very faculty of speech, insofar as speech makes sense.” The Bolsheviks’ vision – which sought the development of political consciousness, active participation in building socialism, and identification with the revolution – called people who subscribed to these ideals for taking personal responsibility for every action, thus, transforming themselves into exemplary human beings and becoming “architects of their own future” through “understanding and personal conviction.”<sup>141</sup> Unified by this idea, people saw themselves as subjects of history who were in charge of their own lives. Therefore, it is crucial to remember that personal narratives filled with Soviet values and propagandistic slogans or clichés did not necessarily intend to mislead: their authors perceived themselves as active participants and creators of history and often may not have distinguished between a public and a private sphere.<sup>142</sup> After all, any social structure with its cultural and political dominion serves as a foundation for individual interpretations, judgment, and self-identity. The diaries of youth and blue-collar workers, in particular, share common “forms of self-expression and ideals of self-realization, which point beyond the individual cases and suggest a wider cultural significance.”<sup>143</sup>

A significant part of the siege diaries (published and unpublished) selected for this research are archived in the State Archives of Saint-Petersburg, the Museum of the Defense and Siege of Leningrad, and the Manuscript Department of the National Library of Russia, and can be easily accessed by non-Russian researchers. All of their material

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<sup>141</sup> Jochen Hellbeck, *Revolution on My Mind*, p. 6.

<sup>142</sup> This entanglement of individual and social histories is addressed in Lisa A. Kirschenbaum’s *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad*.

<sup>143</sup> Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad*, p. 9.

was either donated by the diarists themselves,<sup>144</sup> or, in a case of the authors' death, by their family members and friends. Some were well-hidden and were found decades after the war when later residents renovated the apartments. Two were confiscated serving as evidence and until recently were a part of the Archive of the Administration of the Federal Security Service for St. Petersburg and Leningrad Region. A number of diaries and records still remain parts of family memorabilia. Diaries left by well-known people, that are extensive in presentation, emotional, articulate, and at times controversial, have mostly been published.<sup>145</sup> Being aware that some of the personal writings published during the Soviet period were edited prior to their publications, the use of such sources was avoided here.

Some memoirs, recollections, and autobiographies were also used in this research. Although they can verify certain events and add specifics to the knowledge of this historical period, depending on the time elapsed since the occurrence, accuracy can be compromised. Details might have been forgotten, distorted, or reinterpreted in accordance with newly held opinions. Granted, reaction to post-traumatic stress – which the siege undoubtedly inflicted – varies greatly from person to person: some may block traumatic memories, for some those details only sharpen with time.<sup>146</sup> Witnesses'

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<sup>144</sup> In 1943, the commission established for gathering materials and preparing a history of Leningrad's defense urged those who kept journals to donate them.

<sup>145</sup> I am referring to such authors as Kniazev, Ostroumova-Lebedeva, Vyshinskii, Simonovich, Berggol'ts, Kapitsa, Bianki, Kostrovitskaia, Inber, Ginzburg, Shaporina, Ostrovskaia, and others.

<sup>146</sup> Esther Farbstein wrote a comparative study where she analyzed a diary and memoir written by Holocaust survivor Rabbi Yehoshua Moshe Aharonson. She noted that the accounts of daily life, sufferings, chronology, and mortality are similar and, at times, identical. Memoir tends to be lengthier and more emotionally charged. It also adds a theme of resistance, whereas the diary had no mention of such endeavors. "We should give the memoir literature the place it deserves – a loftier place than what was given it thus far – and rid ourselves of excessive suspicion, especially when additional tools may confirm a reasonable degree of reliability." ("Diaries and Memoirs as a Historical Source. The Diary and Memoir of a



accounts, like any historical narrative, “shed light on certain parts ... [and] discuss certain aspects... None of these reports is complete or perfect, but all contribute to the advancement of knowledge.”<sup>147</sup> All of these “human” documents with “their intimate details” (as noted by Kniazev) allow us to see the past and its people from the perspective of their own values as they were at the time rather than those of today. While personal sources allow tracing attitudes of the majority, assumptions and generalizations about the public’s moods based on the diary material alone should be avoided and have to be corroborated by other available data.

Stories of the siege have many similarities, but they all differ in their description of a common tragedy. Unlike the official Soviet historical perspective, the diaries tell a story of human suffering, not heroism. It is not that their accounts lack heroic examples; rather, the system of values, norms, and morals to which civilized societies adhere simply became meaningless to those nearly 3 million people who were subjected to a sadistic social experiment in the attempt to destroy them “by an almost scientific method”<sup>148</sup> in the city that was turned into an enormous starvation ghetto.<sup>149</sup>

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Rabbi at the ‘Konin House of Bondage’” Source: *Yad Vashem Studies* Vol. XXVI, Jerusalem 1998, pp. 87-128. Online: [http://www.yadvashem.org/odot\\_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203134.pdf](http://www.yadvashem.org/odot_pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%203134.pdf) )

<sup>147</sup> *Id.*, p. 37.

<sup>148</sup> From the diary entry made by Joseph Goebbels on September 10, 1941. (*Atrocities, Massacres, and War Crimes: An Encyclopedia*. (Vol. 2), p. 409.). Jones, *Leningrad*, p. 40.

<sup>149</sup> The difference between Leningrad and other ghettos on the Nazi-occupied territories is the physical presence of the Nazi auxiliary police units and/or the *Einsatzgruppen* inside the city of Leningrad enabling them to perform mass executions. The extermination here was achieved by other means, mainly starvation. This method was also used in the Nazi treatment of the Jewish and Slavic civilians and prisoners of war in concentration camps. These crimes were committed under the administration of the *Wehrmacht*. “Recent historic studies have made it clear that Hitler had decided to starve all of Leningrad’s 3.5 million inhabitants to death (instead of having the *Wehrmacht* accept a capitulation of the city)...The siege of Leningrad is a stunning example of the unlimitedness of Nazi Germany’s drive to annihilate ‘the inferior races in the East’ in general.” Andreas Mink, *Challenging “Wiedergutmachung”: The Slave Labour Negotiations of 1998-2001* (Prague: Institute of International Relations, 2012), pp. 35-36. In 2008 (following the Jewish Claims Conference’s legal demands to find Leningrad siege victims eligible for one-

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time compensation payment), Germany has admitted for the first time a deliberate persecution of Jews who lived through the 900-day blockade, which allows to speak of the blockade operations in terms of genocide. Claims Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany: 2008/2009 Annual Report, p. 20. Online: [http://forms.claimscon.org/ar/CC\\_2008\\_AR.pdf](http://forms.claimscon.org/ar/CC_2008_AR.pdf) Also see *Obshchaia tragediia. Blokada. Kholokost*, Aleksandr Diukov ed. (Moskva: Fond Istoricheskaiia pamiat'; Tsentr i Fond Kholokost, 2009).

## CHAPTER I

### Patriotism, Duty, and Collaboration

Soul belongs to God, heart – to a woman, duty – to *Otechestvo*,<sup>150</sup> honor – to no one.<sup>151</sup>

...The true patriotism, the only rational patriotism, is *loyalty to the Nation ALL the time, loyalty to the Government when it deserves it*.<sup>152</sup>

Serving as a form of collective self-identification, the notion of patriotism is complex and varies from country to country and person to person. It can be deeply rooted or transform over time, taking “various forms in different contexts.”<sup>153</sup> As an integral part of ethical and cultural education, patriotism is closely associated with the process of shaping opinions, beliefs, and world outlook, reinforcing such individual traits as duty, responsibility, and rejection of injustice.<sup>154</sup> While genuine moral worth is typically attributed to actions from duty,<sup>155</sup> the ideal Soviet person was to amalgamate all motivations of the act: combining socially necessitated action *and* personal desire to do what is right (with an understanding that his/her actions would benefit both society and build character). The Great Patriotic War and the siege of Leningrad in particular served

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<sup>150</sup> *Otechestvo* – homeland, Fatherland.

<sup>151</sup> From the 1804 Russian officers’ code of honour.

<sup>152</sup> Mark Twain, “The Czar’s Soliloquy” (*The North American Review*, March 1905), p. 324. [emphasis in the original]

<sup>153</sup> Roger R. Reese, *Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2011), p. 15.

<sup>154</sup> Vadim Kozhinov, *Grekh i sviatost’ russkoi istorii* (Moskva: Iauza, Eksmo, 2006). Although patriotism can mobilize a person to work and act in the name of a nation or homeland, a degree of personal meaning has to be attached to the notion because, when choosing to fight or sacrifice oneself for the country, political motivation may not always be enough.

<sup>155</sup> The difference between acting from duty and in accordance with duty has been defined by Immanuel Kant in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Conducting oneself in accordance with duty instigates action that is motivated by personal desire, pleasure, or interest whereas, acting from duty occurs when one does what the duty commands irrespective of personal inclinations.

as a litmus test for the Soviet system, with its belief in the priority of public interests above individual ones and a strong state authority capable of rousing patriotism and mobilizing all members of society to rise above personal interests.

In the years preceding the war, Soviet people had a very broad take on patriotism that ranged from the imperial (*rossiyskii*) and the ethnic (*russkii*) versions to the Soviet (*neo-rossiiskii*) one – statist and supranational – that amalgamated both the imperial and ethnic forms, where the USSR as a motherland was the home for all ethnic groups and nationalities.<sup>156</sup> In this “embryonic compound nation,” Russianness remained “markedly internationalist in flavor.”<sup>157</sup> War, as a crisis, reinforced or polarized convictions and loyalties. The siege diaries reveal that, in addition to the state-sponsored and often internalized pride in the country, the meaning of ‘patriotic’ also had a distinctly “private” aspect: dedication to work, love for the city, community, and family.<sup>158</sup> Moreover, the diaries speak of the struggles and sacrifices that people made despite personal likes or dislikes of the authorities. In fact, political slogans of patriotism found in personal records during the first few months of the siege almost disappear in the “mortal time,” and spirited entries with a more pronounced appreciation for people, culture, or home appear. The radical nature of the blockade experience allows a closer look at the political culture at work, the dynamic between the authorities and the people, as well as the

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<sup>156</sup> “In much wartime rhetoric, images from the Russian past blended with those of the Soviet past and present... A supranational but Russified patriotism was grafted onto Leninist internationalism, replacing the class element with a new primacy placed on Russia’s past.” Ronald Grigor Suny, “The contradictions of identity: Being Soviet and National in the USSR and after,” in Mark Bassin and Catriona Kelly, eds., *Soviet and Post-Soviet Identities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 27.

<sup>157</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, “The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness” (*Past and Present* 175 (May 2002)): 163-166.

<sup>158</sup> On the sources of local patriotism and pride see Lisa Kirschenbaum’s “Our City, Our Hearths, Our Families”: Local Loyalties and Private Life in Soviet World War II Propaganda” (*Slavic Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Winter, 2000)): 825-847.

internalization of Soviet core perspectives, attitudes, and values. Extreme conditions coupled with the authorities' initial shortsightedness could not ensure a smooth fulfillment of all tasks. Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand that all of the objectives required the active participation of the work force, and it was up to the state to coordinate, consolidate, and direct them. While it is true that the authorities made brutal decisions – some were punitive and some compensatory<sup>159</sup> – that stirred people up and pushed them into action,<sup>160</sup> but so is true that the government relied on people's understanding of their patriotic duty *en masse*. What ultimately mattered was action, and historical documents supported by actual events show that in overcoming adversities Leningraders collaborated successfully.<sup>161</sup>

The magnitude of the threat to society became apparent only in late August 1941, and while the majority of Leningraders remained hopeful, the scarcity of the news adversely impacted some residents, and the initial boost of state-instilled patriotism gave way to confusion, anxiety, and pessimism. Demoralized, teacher V.M. Ivleva wrote on October 16, 1941:

Anguish weighs heavy on the heart when I listen to the morning radio. We are relinquishing one city after another. Now Moscow is in danger. We won't be able to endure. People are losing their lives, and everything is in vain: it seems that we are powerless to halt the aggression. Where is our might we so boasted about? Where are our guns and our ammunition? We have nothing. We are asking for

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<sup>159</sup> In addition to legal recourse, both punitive and compensatory measures were implemented through ration cards. The failure to comply with administrative orders could result in the withdrawal of a ration card. The ration card of category I was given as a compensation for additional effort and initiative (see Appendix III for ration Categories breakdown). Some deeds (blood donation, collecting dead bodies, burials, etc.) were encouraged and became a source of additional food and monetary awards.

<sup>160</sup> The logic of prioritizing collective objective over personal needs in the extremes of the war time is hardly the Soviet system's invention.

<sup>161</sup> Gennadii Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor'be za vyzhivanie v blockade. Kniga pervaya: iun' 1941 – mai 1942* (Sankt-Peterburg.: Izd-vo St.Peterburg. Universiteta, 2013), p. 285.

help from England and America. But these are not good allies – their help is more words than action. A bitter fate awaits us, indeed. Leningrad will not withstand, and we, like ants, shall all perish underfoot of a victor.<sup>162</sup>

Ivleva's words here are but one of the examples of hopelessness and bewilderment felt after almost four months of war.

Considering the tough situations on the Soviet-German front, near the capital, and within Leningrad, the need for a traditional authority able to bring people together that symbolized the people's will and ideas about firm actions during times of crises was more crucial than ever. Joseph Stalin's speech on November 7, 1941 satisfied that need. His address gave an extraordinary boost to the people's determination and spirit.<sup>163</sup> Historian Georgii Kniazev wrote in his diary that day: "It has been a while since Stalin spoke publicly and suddenly there were two of his speeches. There is some kind of change in the military situation. Germans are using all their might and all their reserves but we are no longer retreating. There is nowhere to retreat! The choice is either to die or to defend Moscow and Leningrad. There are no other options!"<sup>164</sup>

Additionally, Stalin's common address to "comrades and citizens" was enhanced by more personal "brothers and sisters," thereby inducing the feeling of belonging to a large family.<sup>165</sup> It was a "meticulously calculated and successful propaganda move. Even

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<sup>162</sup> David, ed., *Budni podviga*, p. 31.

<sup>163</sup> "Stalin's speech made a great impression on everyone and inspired new victories." A.P. Zagorskaia, entry for November 7, 1941. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 33. L. 7. "The overall glum mood somewhat dissipated under the influence of Stalin's upbeat speech and announcements made by Beaverbrook and Harriman." Konoplëva, entry for November 12, 1941. RNB OR, F. 368, ed. hr. 1, l. 163.

<sup>164</sup> Georgii Alekseevich Kniazev, entry for November 7, 1941, in *Dni velikikh ispytanií. Dnevnik 1941-1945* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nauka, 2009), p. 279.

<sup>165</sup> The view of the Soviet society as a "fraternal family of nations" (with the state authorities in the role of a "father" to the people, obedient children of the state) stemmed from the "traditional Russian concept of paternalism" rather than the communist world view. The notion of "big family" was particularly characteristic during Stalin's period. Ilya Zemtsov, *Encyclopedia of Soviet Life* (New Brunswick, NJ:

those Leningraders who harbored anti-Stalin attitudes felt it.”<sup>166</sup> Intensified further by propaganda and state media, the pronounced emotional emphasis on the “homeland-immortal-danger” idea (as opposed to the “larger-than-life-socialist-achievements” party ideology) narrowed the gap between the fears experienced by people and government, overlapping them. Whatever the reasons may have been for such a shift, it resulted in a heightened sense of community, striking the right chord with people. Now, Soviet patriotism’s essential elements were tied to family, home, and native place (*rodina*).<sup>167</sup>

Leningrad’s reputation as a city of intellectuals, culture, and the Russian aristocracy contributed to the people’s determination to persevere. Remembering all the wartime hardships, Daniil Granin, who fought at Leningrad’s front line in Shushary, said that if the Red Army soldiers had defended some other newly built city or another urban area, they would not have withstood: “The awareness of fighting for, perhaps, the most European city of Russia, erected by Peter the Great, for the city that embodied the Russian culture had a colossal effect on us.”<sup>168</sup>

For those who could not imagine their lives outside of their beloved Leningrad – “flesh of [their] flesh, blood of [their] blood”<sup>169</sup> – this emotional attachment made the

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Transaction, 1991), pp. 124-125. Hosking, “The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness,” pp. 165-166.

<sup>166</sup> Sobolev. *Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, p. 210. The NKVD reported that Stalin’s speech had a positive impact on public moods: the number of defeatist perspectives expressed by residents decreased by half and the number of pro-Nazi propaganda cases fell. Lomagin. *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 271.

<sup>167</sup> Lisa Kirschenbaum, *The Legacy of the Siege of Leningrad, 1941-1995: Myth, Memories, and Monuments* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 46.

<sup>168</sup> *Blokada*. 7-part documentary.

<sup>169</sup> Vladilen Tomigas, “Prostye zapiski i obyknovennye mechtaniia” (S. Glezerov, ed., *Blokada glazami ochevidtsev*, Vol. 3, St.Peterburg: Ostrov, 2016), p. 298.

choice of whether to leave or stay more agonizing. Some panicked to the point of considering leaving and some were full of determination to stay. For many, the decision depended on the course of action taken by relatives, friends, and loved ones. N. Bulgakova recalled: “Confidence in our victory was unwavering. Relatives refused to evacuate. Father said that he was here during the revolution and would not leave Leningrad now.”<sup>170</sup> In either case, nobody believed that the war would last long.

Even with the initiation of a new wave of mass evacuation in the spring, there were those who wanted to remain in the city despite the hardships. Among them was artist Anna Petrovna Ostroumova-Lebedeva, who had numerous opportunities and offers to evacuate but always refused. In the summer of 1942 she wrote: “I think that leaving [Leningrad] would be the most unfortunate thing for me. My very skin has been fused with its walls!”<sup>171</sup> Were those who wanted to stay better off than the majority, having additional sources of food or extra rationing? Hardly so. The residents who made such a resolute decision in the winter-spring period of 1942 were for the most part single by then and had entirely different motivations – love and attachment to their native land. Reflecting on the events of winter 1941–42, Raia Podraiskaia also rejected the possibility of evacuation: “Having experienced all this, I do not want to leave Leningrad. On the contrary, despite frequent air raids, shelling, and hunger, there is a huge longing to be right here, to wait for victory and the enemy’s decisive destruction precisely here.”<sup>172</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Vladimir Piankevich, *Liudi zhili slukhami. Neformal'noe kommunikativnoe prostranstvo blokadnogo Leningrada* (Sankt-Peterburg: Vladimir Dal', 2014), p. 438.

<sup>171</sup> Ostroumova-Lebedeva, *Avtobiograficheskie zapiski*. (Moskva: Tsentrpoligraf, 2003), vol. 3, p. 294.

<sup>172</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. R-97 Op. 3 D. 709 L. 25 (from the diary of Raia Podraiskaia, 1942)



As the situation in Leningrad grew grimmer, people exchanged news, opinions, and gossips, counter-balancing extreme psychological stress. Public moods were not linear or consistent. Some residents did not notice “defeatist” talks, such as Arkadiy Lepkovich who wrote on December 12, 1941: “People bear it. I have not heard a single complaint or displeasure with the order or authorities.”<sup>173</sup> Those who lost hope blamed the city administration: “Someone made a sarcastic remark that soon all of Leningrad will die out save the superiors.”<sup>174</sup> And a small percentage expressed clearly pro-German sentiments. On the first day of the war, Olimpiada Poliakova, who later became a German collaborator and wrote under the name of Lidiia Osipova, declared: “I am not a foe to my nation, to my homeland. I am not a monster. But the truth is that we all, the entirety Russia, avidly wish our enemy to emerge victorious, whoever the enemy might be. This damned regime robbed us of everything, including the feeling of patriotism.”<sup>175</sup> As noted by Harrison Salisbury, not everybody was like Ol’ga Berggol’ts, ready to forgive the cruelty suffered at the hands of the state; “not all were able to feel in this fateful hour that patriotism and the Motherland came first.”<sup>176</sup> Fortunately, people like Poliakova were in the minority.

Although there were no surveys or opinion polls conducted at the time, military censorship records indicate that negative, anti-Soviet attitudes changed from 3-4% in the

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<sup>173</sup> Arkadii Lepkovich, entry for December 12, 1941. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 58. L. 6. Also in TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 28. L. 8 (A.P. Grishkevich, January 1942).

<sup>174</sup> Irina Zelenskaia, entry for January 11, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 36. L. 51.

<sup>175</sup> Lidiia Osipova, “Dnevnik kollaborantki” (*Grani*, No. 21, 1954): 92.

<sup>176</sup> Salisbury, *The 900 Days*, p. 122.

first third of December 1941<sup>177</sup> to 6% at the beginning of January 1942<sup>178</sup>, to 20% by the end of January 1942.<sup>179</sup> Evidently, the emotional resilience of people tried by hunger during the most difficult months decreased, escalating oppositional views. As fine art expert Mariia Konoplëva asserted, this “mob psychology” could be regulated by giving the disillusioned “half a kilo of bread a day,” and they would “easily put up with all other privations.”<sup>180</sup> Indeed, as the rations increased at the ends of February and March 1942, negative moods declined. How representative were these figures of the entire population, and not of just those who sent post cards and letters? It is hard to tell, and while unfavorable attitudes towards those in power are present in the diaries, there were no protests in Leningrad, and on February 18, 1942, German intelligence reports dismissed any possibility of “the organized revolt which might enable the change. The city is under the complete control of the Soviets.”<sup>181</sup>

Although political control was an important element in the maintenance of order, the residents’ understanding of the stakes was just as imperative. The accumulation of official news and hearsay painted a distinct picture of the “exterminatory” nature of the war, making the majority realize that survival was feasible only by resisting. This awareness reversed Leningraders’ initial regard of Germans as a “cultural nation”<sup>182</sup> and

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<sup>177</sup> AUFSB LO. F. 21.12 Op. 2.P.n. 19. D.12. L.91.

<sup>178</sup> *Id.* L.119.

<sup>179</sup> *Id.* L.170.

<sup>180</sup> Mariia Konoplëva, entry for December 7, 1941. RNB OR. F. 368. Ed. khr. 2. L. 1.

<sup>181</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 669.

<sup>182</sup> Many diarists indicated disbelief that German people whose culture bore many prominent composers, writers, and philosophers could be “so barbaric and vile, killing people in gas chambers by thousands, and torturing them in concentration camps.” S. Kuznetsov, “Glavy iz knigi vospominanii,” in T.

the war rhetoric, which was once internationalist and ideological, became national (*otechestvennaia*).<sup>183</sup> Now, the meaning of homeland acquired a new value, and Leningraders deemed the expression of protest of any kind when the enemy was at the gate as sacrilegious.<sup>184</sup> Sustaining and promoting this sense of patriotism was a priority for the city authorities.

Communicated through various channels and aimed at strengthening the morale and spirit of the people, the scope of patriotic propaganda was indeed colossal: all levels of society from the cultural elite to peasants actively participated in it.<sup>185</sup> Conducting informational meetings at work and home associations and speaking with people at the canteens, lines, and bomb shelters, Leningrad's party organizations used various forms and methods of political work to mobilize people.<sup>186</sup> Wartime posters, historical lectures and publications, stories from the front, music, and numerous addresses from party members and prominent residents promoted mutual cooperation, boosted morale, and urged action. With "home and hearth" validating the war, and vice versa, even free-thinking intellectuals welcomed collective work and structure.<sup>187</sup> Many young

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Zukovskaia, and I. Tikhonov, eds., *My znaem, chto znachit voina...* (Sankt-Peterburg, 2010), p. 73. Kulagin, *Dnevnik i pamiat'*, p. 34.

<sup>183</sup> Here *otechestvennaia*, that is often translated as "patriotic" (hence, the name of the war in the Soviet/Russian historiography as the Great *Patriotic* War), actually has a connotation of a "nationwide defense of homeland."

<sup>184</sup> Alexander Werth contended that any attempt to differentiate between Russian patriotism, revolutionary feistiness, and Soviet organization or to figure out which of the three factors played the key role in the city's defense is doomed for a failure, because all three have intertwined into a single and unique "Leningrad" way. Werth, *Russia at War. 1941-1945*, p. 358.

<sup>185</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. R-297. F. 10. D. 66.

<sup>186</sup> TsGA SPb. F. R-297. Op. 10. D. 66.

<sup>187</sup> Hosking, "The Second World War and Russian National Consciousness," p. 173.

Leningraders, members of the Komsomol, attempted to enlist and go to the front or serve in *opolchenie*. Some moved their date of birth backward because those born in “1924-1925 were not accepted.”<sup>188</sup> Brilliantly amalgamating Russian historical patriotism, Orthodox commandments, and political awareness, the Soviet government successfully utilized diverse means to instill devotion to the homeland and the righteousness of the fight. The Red Army officers received extraordinary privileges; “everyone was given epaulettes. The Communist revolutionary song, the famous *Internationale*,” was replaced in 1943 with the new Soviet anthem that started with the words “Great Rus’”. The imperial past was honored again. And the “Church was asked to pray for victory.”<sup>189</sup> Paul Linebarger asserted that these efforts “were not characterized by blind reliance on past experiences. They showed a very real inventiveness, and the political policies behind them were both far-sighted and far-reaching.”<sup>190</sup> The population viewed their fighting the enemy as righteous, regarded the mobilization of all forces as essential, and believed in ultimate victory, demonstrating the effectiveness of the party propaganda campaign.

While relying on the residents’ sense of patriotic duty, the authorities made attempts to provide them with at least a bare minimum necessary to sustain life and work. The magnitude of their decisions and endeavors – planning and realizing delivery routes, evacuation, food distribution, orders to research and manufacture food substitutes, medication, and vitamins, opening public and work cafeterias, hospitals, orphanages,

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<sup>188</sup> Boria Kapranov, entry for October 18, 1941, in *Detskaia kniga voiny. Dnevniky 1941-1945* (Moskva: “Argumenty i Fakty”, “AiF. Dobroe serdtse”, 2015), p. 159. Maia Bubnova, entry for November 1941. *Id.*, p. 213.

<sup>189</sup> Paul Linebarger, *Psychological Warfare* (Landisville, Pennsylvania: Coachwhip Publications, 2010), p. 144.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*

boiling water stations, paying wages, organizing spring cleaning of the city streets – speaks for itself. The administration’s motivation was an entirely different matter: decisions made by the power agencies were not based on empathy. After all, any wartime economy pursues very practical goals diverting resources to the war effort. Fostering feelings of solidarity and collective citizenship, the authorities demonstrated surprising flexibility in adjusting some of the rigid rules of social and economic regulations. Thus, by implicitly allowing *tolkuchka*’s (improvised public barter market) black marketing and public gardening that permitted Leningraders use municipal property for growing vegetables, the state partially forfeited its exclusive role to provision, delegating some of it to the residents. Lack of firm, yet adaptable actions would have advanced the city’s take over, its inevitable destruction, the execution of its residents, and a total (most likely, fatal) change in the theater of war.<sup>191</sup> As David Glantz pointed out, despite the authorities’ preoccupation with the “desperate situation at the front, they mobilized all of the city’s resources to save it and its population.”<sup>192</sup>

On November 20, 1941, the daily ration for residents fell to its lowest: 510 tons of flour was used daily – as opposed to 2,100 tons before the siege – to sustain the city’s population of 2.5 million, where only one-third of it received the blue-color worker ration.<sup>193</sup> However, this reduction needed further revision as the “Road of Life” was not going to satisfy Leningrad’s needs in its first days of work. Andreenko, Chief of

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<sup>191</sup> The fall of Leningrad would have resulted in the collapse of the frontline, destruction or surrender of the Baltic Fleet. Army Group Center would have been assisted by the forces of Army Group North in its drive on Moscow. In that case, the Nazi’s taking Moscow would have been just a matter of time.

<sup>192</sup> Glantz, *The Siege of Leningrad 1941-1944*, p. 82.

<sup>193</sup> Dmitrii Pavlov, *Leningrad 1941: The Blockade* (The University Chicago Press: Chicago & London, 1965), pp. 112, 15.

Leningrad trade, met with Aleksei Kuznetsov, the Party's First Secretary, trying to recalculate the rationing of the provisions available. They both knew that "additional reduction of the bread norm was not possible: people were already dying... After a long discussion, [they] finally decided to reduce the ration, although, not for residents but for the military, navy, and soldiers. Things were looking very grim in December..."<sup>194</sup> Thus, at the end of November, front line soldiers received 300 grams of bread, and 100 grams of soldier biscuits daily. Additionally, they received flour soup for breakfast, dinner, and thin porridge for lunch. Despite these small portions, soldiers of the 54<sup>th</sup> Army and sailors of the Baltic fleet decided to give part of their ration to the Leningraders. At the end of 1941, the Military Council ordered delivery of over 300 tons of foodstuffs stored in Kronstadt, forts, and islands to the city's residents.<sup>195</sup>

Leningraders' sense of patriotic duty was not restricted just to the male population, it extended to the women of Leningrad as well. The unexpected and notable consequence of the majority of men leaving for the front and *opolchenie* or evacuating with the industrial plants as specialists was the extreme shortage of workers and qualified personnel in the engineering and technological fields who had disproportionately been male. While trade schools and specialty colleges accelerated their preparation of new workers, the gap between supply and demand was too great. Women closed this gap.<sup>196</sup> They came to industrial organizations and facilities looking for jobs or asking to master new trades, replacing their husbands, fathers, and brothers on the home front. Not only

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<sup>194</sup> Dzeniskevich, Koval'chuk, Sobolev, Tsamutali, and Shishkin, eds., *Nepokorënniy Leningrad*, p. 149.

<sup>195</sup> *Id.*, p. 150.

<sup>196</sup> A. Nevskaya, "Vosstanovlenie zhil'ia"; B. Reznikov, "Sil'nee smerti," in *Pamiat'*, pp. 212, 230.

did women perform hard physical labor (clearing the streets of debris after the bombings, moving the dead, loading and unloading delivered materials and goods), but they also ended up becoming turners, milling machine operators, steelworkers, blacksmiths, smelters, rollers, and adjusters.<sup>197</sup> Compared to 47% of female industrial workers in 1940, the percentage of women who worked at the besieged Leningrad's plants rose to 75-80%.<sup>198</sup> L. Sisiukina shared her childhood memories of how her "mama became a carpenter, a woodworker. We often dropped by her workplace and saw what hard work it was. Exhausted and hungry women moved and sawed logs, made doors and window frames by hand."<sup>199</sup>

Mobilizing every possible resource for the war effort, the authorities encouraged women to shoulder industrial labor tasks or become nurses and caretakers. As the female population of Leningrad started taking over the traditionally male roles in the city, press accounts, public talks, and visual media stressed its contribution as a way to promote greater participation and spur an increased sense of patriotism, duty, and solidarity among residents as well as the soldiers fighting at the Leningrad front. But even if we trim down the 'heroic propaganda stories' of the females fighting for the 'future of the Soviet people,' this fighting remains one of the largest historic accounts of the women participating in combat. And willingly or not, this participation added to the level of collaboration and mutual assistance.

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<sup>197</sup> Just like "Rosie the Riveter" in the United States.

<sup>198</sup> N. Popova, *Zhenshchiny Strany sotsializma*, p. 97, in Andrei Varsobin, ed., *Pamiat': Pis'ma o voĭne i blockade. 1945-1985* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1985), p. 226.

<sup>199</sup> L. Sisiukina "Vse khoteli, chtoby my ostalis' zhit,'" in *Pamiat'*, p. 145.

### Collaboration and mutual assistance

As part of the Soviet upbringing that emphasized the necessity to behave in the interests of the group within which the individual lived and worked,<sup>200</sup> this collective spirit crystallized during the “mortal time,” when it became clear that surviving the siege was possible only by helping and holding on to each other: “Things have been re-evaluated, particularly the nature of team work. If it was not for our collaborative daily living and the moral support of friends, [we] would have most likely perished.”<sup>201</sup> At a time when life was at stake, personal interests and responsibility to others fused, ensuring survival. The head of a communal kitchen remembered: “In order to supply the kitchen with water, we had to drag up to 300 buckets on sleds from the Neva River daily. Most of our women did not leave for home at all because they needed to start collecting water at 5-6 a.m. so that they could cook soup for Leningraders.”<sup>202</sup> These cooks made thin soup that fed not only residents but also their relatives and themselves. In a city dying of hunger such solidarity was common: “Never before had I heard of or seen such keen unity as there was then! All of us – twelve-year-olds and old workers – were like one family... There was no bread but it seemed that there was some kind of energy exchange between us.”<sup>203</sup>

This figurative expression that may seem to be a propagandistic party line was a result of the successful efforts the state took to instill the new ideology. The revolution of

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<sup>200</sup> Vladimir Lenin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* (M.: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1957), Vol. 26, p. 107; Vol. 37, p. 190.

<sup>201</sup> Stasia Antonevich. Diary 1942. TsGALI SPb. F. 97. Op. 3. D. 709. L.19.

<sup>202</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 25. Op. 11. D. 347. L. 14.

<sup>203</sup> From the recollections of artillery range worker M.E. Siasina. Quoted in Sobolev. *Leningrad v bor'be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, p. 285.



1917, with its objective to forge a “new ‘improved edition’ of man,”<sup>204</sup> encouraged personal chronicling. By 1925, a state-wide educational campaign targeting illiteracy and emphasizing the relationship between cognition and language achieved a nearly 100 % literacy rate in some cases (compared to 28.4% in the Russian Empire).<sup>205</sup> And while self-observation, self-improvement, and analytical reasoning were typical of the Russian *intelligentsia*<sup>206</sup> journaling, now it was the “new Soviet man” (including peasants and workers) who began to formulate and define his understanding of how to live his extraordinary new life by mapping daily activities and thoughts in a new revolutionary language and practicing “correct and precise thinking.”<sup>207</sup> This patois was used in public speeches, lectures, and literary writings and professed love and devotion to the country and its common goal. Taking into consideration the time (people were very zealous about socialist ideas), instilled values (in particular, self-sacrificial notion of the benefit to others and the country), and circumstances (fighting to stay alive in the war of annihilation), it is reasonable to conclude that these kinds of comments were sincere<sup>208</sup> and in tune with the expectations of the authorities.

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<sup>204</sup> Leon Trotsky, *Problems of Everyday Life: Creating the Foundation for a New Society in a Revolutionary Russia* (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1973), p. 140.

<sup>205</sup> By 1925, 99% of railway workers and 100% of the Red Army soldiers were literate. Charles E. Clark, “Literacy and Labour: The Russian Literacy Campaign within the Trade Unions, 1923–27” (*Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 8 (Dec., 1995)), p. 1330; Lucy L. W. Wilson, *The New Schools of New Russia* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1928), pp. 131-132. By 1939, the overall urban population reached 93.8% literacy rate while rural was at 84%. Collins Dictionary of Sociology, 3rd ed. M. Kashin, “Literacy.” Retrieved January 25, 2017 from <http://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary.com/Total+literacy+rate>

<sup>206</sup> Cultural and intellectual elite.

<sup>207</sup> Trotsky, *Problems of Everyday Life*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>208</sup> After all, no one questions the religious devotion and faith. Soviet ideology was to replace religion in its fusion of the Russian imperial culture and Soviet patriotism/Marxism-Leninism.

Similar attitudes are evident from the diaries of the younger generation. Naturally, children's social conduct, norms, and values are "programmed" by adults. As the second most influential factor in this development (after the family), the state educational institutions had an immense impact on shaping children's points of view. While at the end of December 1941 only 39 schools maintained their full functions, most school buildings remained open and children received hot breakfast or lunch there.<sup>209</sup> Children and teens noted that an additional cup of soup, being with friends instead of staying at home alone, getting moral support, and having something to do saved many young lives. Actually, "a school became something akin to an orphanage. The teachers heated and cleaned classrooms, did laundry, and washed boys and girls who had lost their parents. [They] read them books and told stories about the valor of Red Army soldiers and marines."<sup>210</sup>

Naturally, youths spoke very fondly of their teachers, many of whom they witnessed dying of starvation.<sup>211</sup> A student of the 32<sup>nd</sup> school, M. Shagalova, remembered how her emaciated math teacher Vasilii Matveevich Osipov (who urged his students to think spatially by using tangents and cotangents) stopped going home but continued teaching until his last day. Her physics teacher Kul'chitskii, who also succumbed to *distrofiia*, often joked by saying that none of his pupils would become Ampères or Newtons because "unlike Newton, you would have eaten the apple before it had a chance

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<sup>209</sup> Usually it consisted of thin lentil soup without bread.

<sup>210</sup> Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor'be za vyzhivanie*, p. 456.

<sup>211</sup> Misha Tikhomirov, entry for December 24, 1941, in *Blokadnyi dnevnik Mishi Tikhomirova* (*Zvezda*, 2010, #2).

to fall.” But Shagalova’s warmest words were spoken about her favorite teacher Pëtr Aleksandrovich Raiskii, who was among the first to die:

Quiet and romantic, he was infinitely in love with Russian literature... During the blockade, he told us about things that were not part of our school curriculum. He spoke of literary protagonists who fought courageously and steadfastly. Teaching us kindness and sympathy, he enlightened us about Danko<sup>212</sup> and hoped that our burning hearts would light the path for others... We listened to him and forgot about the war, bread, and cold. We were strong and fearless.<sup>213</sup>

Students’ diaries are not purely descriptive in nature. They articulate and elaborate on ideas and concepts not typical of children but something they had learned from adults. Young diarists saw self-improvement and studying as their contribution to the collective effort.<sup>214</sup> Many schoolchildren were part of the fire brigades, delivered draft notices to volunteers, brought sand that was used to put out fires to the roof space,<sup>215</sup> and did other things that were commonly done by adults. “We did it all: at night we had to unload freight cars with logs for the factory, cleaned the snow off the Lanskaia station, were on duty at the school hospital, performed the messengers’ duty in the people’s *druzhina*, watched for blackouts, guarded buildings’ attics, put out incendiary bombs, checked on people, and located the dead,” recalled Nina Kostromina.<sup>216</sup> Fifteen-year-old Sof’ia Gutshabash wrote in her diary that it was hard work but they did the best they could because they knew that their help “was indispensable to Leningrad and the

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<sup>212</sup> Danko is a protagonist of the third part of Maksim Gor’kii’s novelette *Old Izergil’* who sacrificed his own life to save his community. By tearing out his heart that was burning with love he had for people and, using it as a torch, Danko guided them out of the dark woods.

<sup>213</sup> M. Shagalova, “Uchitel’ia,” in *Pamiat’*, pp. 353-354.

<sup>214</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 72.

<sup>215</sup> Every apartment building had attic space under the building’s roof.

<sup>216</sup> Nina Kostromina recollections, in Andrei Varsobin, ed., *Pamiat’*. *Pis’ma o voine i blockade. 1945-1987. Vypusk 2* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1987), p. 386.

Motherland.”<sup>217</sup> Such language, full of stereotypical formulations, naïve spirited slogans, and a degree of artificiality is characteristic of the diaries written by children and teens.<sup>218</sup> Given the commonness of this rhetorical style, there is no reason to presume its intentional use or premeditated calculation. It points to the fact that common notions (in the ways they were spoken about) were internalized by the diarists.

“Taking action” is a part of every single piece of Leningraders’ personal writing in addition to physical and emotional anguish. The *blokadniki* concurred that “being in a *kollektiv* made the toleration of misfortunes easier and silenced the inexorable thoughts about food.”<sup>219</sup> People not only responded to the authorities’ various calls and orders, they also came up with constructive public initiatives that pre-empted the actions of the Municipal Committee. Descriptions of voluntary donations and help to the military and the community disclose a consistent trend in collective decision-making and taking action that became increasingly autonomous *after* the onset of the “mortal time” at the end of November and through December 1941. Rather than being espoused by the city authorities, many of these initiatives emanated from the residents. And even though the city-wide implementation of such residential proposals depended on the administration, the symbiosis between the two was as apparent as it was essential, because without those who “appealed to us to stick together, who did not allow the last connections to break

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<sup>217</sup> Sofiia Iakovlevna Meerson (née Gutshabash), *Diary: June 1941 – January 1944*, entry for September-October 1941. RNB OR, Fond 1273, ed.hr. 4, l. 2.

<sup>218</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 72. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 93. RNB OR, Unpublished Fond 1273. Diary of Anna Keчек. TsGALI SPb, F. 97. Op. 3. D. 709.

<sup>219</sup> Sobolev. *Leningrad v bor'be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, p. 285. E. Pavlova, “Iz blokadnogo dnevnika,” in *Pamiat' Vypusk 2*, p. 179.

down, and who pushed us to work to survive,” it would have been impossible to “resist the apathy, hopelessness, and death.”<sup>220</sup>

An example of such independent initiative was the organization of Komsomol<sup>221</sup> and youth communal units in February 1942. Initially established in the Primorskii district by the members of its Komsomol bureau, these units very quickly became the source of a citywide renaissance.<sup>222</sup> Teenagers and young people – mainly women – took responsibility for the *blokadniki*’s daily needs, such as firewood or water delivery, helping with the sick and emaciated who were unable to move, seeking out orphaned children, removing the dead from empty apartments, washing floors, doing laundry, fetching rations, and more. These altruistic deeds gave the despairing a sense of hope and made them feel that someone cared, that they were not alone in their misery: “This brutal time will pass. But I shall never forget that it was *komsomol*’tsy<sup>223</sup> who came to my aid in the hardest moments of the siege.”<sup>224</sup>

On January 25, 1942, when the main hydraulic water pump was damaged, the city’s baking factories faced crisis: without reliable water supply, they could not make bread. The regional union committee ordered mobilization of Komsomol members and

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<sup>220</sup> Kulagin, *Dnevnik i pamiat*’, pp. 156-157.

<sup>221</sup> Abbreviation of Communist (*Kom-*) Union (*so-*) of Youth (*mol-*).

<sup>222</sup> Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, pp. 452-453. According to the records kept by each unit, it was calculated that Komsomol helped 78,000 Leningraders, and assigned 15,000 orphans to the childcare facilities. *Leningradskaia Pravda*. Issue of October 29, 1943.

<sup>223</sup> Members of Komsomol.

<sup>224</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 10. D. 1356. L. 6.

all available employees in the city organizations for manual water and firewood delivery.<sup>225</sup> The secretary of the Leningrad Komsomol organization recalled:

Late at night came a phone call: a bakery plant needs 4,000 pails<sup>226</sup> of water. If there were water, tomorrow there would be no bread. We need at least 2,000 Komsomol members because each one would have enough strength to bring no more than two pails. And they came and helped; moaned and groaned but helped.<sup>227</sup>

People formed a living conveyor, passing containers with water to each other or dragging sleds with full pails to the bakeries. Leningraders knew that by helping others they also helped themselves. Recognizing the significance of this initiative, the *Lengorsovet* vested the Komsomol and youth communal units with broad powers.<sup>228</sup> Volunteer members of the People's Guard (*druzhina*)<sup>229</sup> had the same impact on Leningraders' lives.<sup>230</sup>

In the winter of 1941–42, people who could walk checked on their neighbors making sure they were still alive. And despite the sharp increase of private property theft

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<sup>225</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 9023. Op. 1. D. 121. L. 53. Also in L. Reikher, "Mat' i dvoe nas," in *Pamiat'*. Vypusk 2, p. 416.

<sup>226</sup> The standard volume of a pail is 12.3 liters.

<sup>227</sup> Aleksandr Karashev, *Leningradtsy v gody blokady. 1941-1943* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo AN SSSR, 1959).

<sup>228</sup> They were allowed to request the evacuation of Leningraders, place homeless children into orphanages, and relocate people whose homes were destroyed by bombings to the new places of residence. There were two other important projects realized by the Komsomol members: the establishment of the Komsomol canteens that prepared food and delivered it to the starved Leningraders, and special stores where the sick could exchange their ration coupons for goods. Dzeniskevich, Koval'chuk, Sobolev, Tsamutali, and Shishkin, eds., *Nepokorënniy Leningrad*, p. 118.

<sup>229</sup> Voluntary People's Druzhina (also translated as Voluntary People's Guard, People's Volunteer Militia/Squad) were detachments for maintaining public order and helping those in need.

<sup>230</sup> During the most severe months, 3,000 members of the so-called "walking ambulance" patrolled the city after work looking for the sick or dead in the apartments and assisting weakened and hypothermic people get home, to the "warming stations," and sanitary posts. In 1941–42, the women of the People's Guard examined 281,727 apartments, discovered 69,000 sick residents, delivered 31,357 persons to the hospitals on stretchers, took care of 22,142 Leningraders in their homes, and put over 10,000 children into childcare facilities. See Dzeniskevich, Koval'chuk, Sobolev, Tsamutali, and Shishkin, eds., *Nepokorënniy Leningrad*; Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor'be za vyzhivanie v blockade*; A.P. Konstantinov ed., *Zhenshchiny goroda Lenina*. Also in TSGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 10. D. 270. L. 16, 19.

from abandoned apartments,<sup>231</sup> many of the communal flats and apartments were left open to enable unrestricted entry for someone who could possibly help.<sup>232</sup> People stated that “this habit of leaving the doors unlocked stuck around in Leningrad for a long while” after the war.<sup>233</sup> Leningraders gave their food (!) to others,<sup>234</sup> took care of orphaned children and neighbors, checked on the sick, and offered shelter and clothes. Those who were too weak to move had others – neighbors, relatives, sanitary units, even strangers – get their bread ration from the stores, bring water, or clean. Investigating cases of lost ration cards, inspector Berman found eight family members in one of the apartments on her list. Their cards were lost and the inhabitants were dying of hunger. She wrote:

I went to the canteen and managed to exchange my coupons for the second decade<sup>235</sup> for three bowls of soup and took it to them in a glass jar. I had no bread because it is not distributed in advance and I’ve already eaten my portion. Early in the morning I’ll bring them my 125 grams. But it is nothing for the family of eight.<sup>236</sup>

The charity of *blokadniki* who were in dire straits themselves but attempted to help others can be explained by a number of factors (all of which were necessitated by the desire to live): having experienced the horrors, they could easily commiserate; there

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<sup>231</sup> Apartment theft accounted for 57.4% of crime for the entire duration of the blockade with 1,216 people arrested in the first 6 months of 1942. It drastically declined in the next two years. Thus, there were 546 arrests in the second half of 1942, and 194 in the first half of 1943. TsGA SPb. F. 4380. Op. 7. D. 33. L. 3. As the supply situation in Leningrad improved, crime rates declined.

<sup>232</sup> Vera Berkhman, diary entry for June 6, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh* (Sankt-Peterburg: Lenizdat, Komanda A, 2014), p. 104.

<sup>233</sup> From the recollections of Galina Alekseevna Vladimirova, in *Leningradskie madonny*, p. 259. Galia Zimnitskaia, entry for January 19, 1942, in *Detskaia kniga voiny*, p. 103. Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia* (Sankt-Peterburg: Logos, 1995), p. 339.

<sup>234</sup> The sincerity of people’s feelings and intentions was measured by their willingness to share bread. In Leningrad there was no extra food, and when a person gave someone a piece of bread, this gesture was the epitome of humanity because he took that piece from own meagre portion.

<sup>235</sup> Food was allotted thrice monthly: every ten days or “decade.”

<sup>236</sup> A.G. Berman, entry for December 10, 1941, in *Budni podviga*, p. 111.

was hope to get some food (*e.g.*, when volunteering at the hospital or performing for the soldiers at the front); and they longed to avoid being alone. In any case, there was an understanding, a hope that by helping someone else a person could at least count on a reciprocal act of kindness. Vera Berkham described how, after the death of all the people in her communal apartment, Vera's neighbor Maria Aleksandrovna, who helped her on daily basis, described this "co-dependency" and cooperation: "There are no feelings!... Now there are only life and death. Both of us are struggling, and whoever is meant to be next will perish. I am helping you, and you are helping me. And there are no feelings."<sup>237</sup>

According to many, "the work, discipline, daily routine, and scheduling that [people] adhered to even during the harshest winter period of 1941–42 uplifted the spirits and saved those who were starving."<sup>238</sup> Although most of the scientific institutions in the field of defense had been evacuated, some personnel remained and continued to conduct research.<sup>239</sup> Terminally-ill professor of the Chemical-Technology Institute Maksimenko carried on his directorial duties even when he was no longer able to walk: he advised specialists from other defense plants and research facilities in his home.<sup>240</sup> Working in close cooperation with engineers, designers, and other specialists, the scientists implemented new technologies, developed new methods of alloy production, modernized factory equipment, sought fuel substitutes and new raw materials, and manufactured

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<sup>237</sup> Vera Berkham, diary entry for June 15, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivikh*, p. 102.

<sup>238</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 9631. Op.1. D. 4. L. 13 (Recollections "Archive during siege" Suslova O.A.)

<sup>239</sup> 92 institutes in addition to scientific research organizations have been evacuated before October 8, 1941. TsGA SPb. F. 330. Op. 1. D. 3. L. 24-38.

<sup>240</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 10. D. 358. L. 13.



vitamins and new medications.<sup>241</sup> Little by little, “people grew weaker and could barely walk... but their life still lingered,” and they continued their research and work.<sup>242</sup>

Russian historian Vasilii Leonidovich Komarovich, who was close to death from starvation by February 1942, kept working on his dissertation and “those who read it did not believe that it was written by a man dying of hunger who hardly had enough strength to hold a pencil!”<sup>243</sup> Still capable of contributing (either physically or intellectually) to the common good, people like Komarovich and Maksimenko made every effort possible to do all they could.

Public opinion regulated and established moral standards and played a huge role in the Leningraders’ behavior. Motivated by the pre-war slogans, participants of “socialist construction” now revised them through the prism of subjective experiences (consciously or not), shaped their sense of self, strove to save their minds and mores, and attempted to find some solace in the internalized civic values and duties. Fëdor Isaakovich Mashanskii, director of the Trauma Institute, articulated another, “reversed” motivational formula – “survive to work” – which he thought was a “vital tenet in besieged Leningrad.”<sup>244</sup>

This exact formula (survive to work) motivated a small group of the Vavilov Plant Industry Institute’s scientists when they guarded and preserved part of the world’s largest seed stock collection, which contained over 370,000 specimens including grains,

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<sup>241</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 4. D. 69. L. 183-200. *Id.* F. 8975. Op. 1. D. 73. L. 19. *Id.* F. 3278. Op. 2. D. 130. L. 37.

<sup>242</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 10. D. 358. L. 11. TsGA SPb. F. 9565. Op. 1. D. 17. L. 1.

<sup>243</sup> Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia*, p. 343.

<sup>244</sup> Quoted in Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, p. 53.

potato, rice, corn, and beans, thereby exhibiting exceptional willpower, dedication, and sense of duty. Protecting the live samples and seeds, scientists locked the stock in the vaults of the Experimental Station building on the St. Isaac Square and continued their research. And they starved to death doing it. In the course of the siege, not a single seed, grain, or tuber was touched out of the entire selective fund of several tons of rare cereal crops. Rice specialist Dmitrii Ivanov succumbed while surrounded by hundreds of packs of rice; Ol'ga Voskresenskaia died safeguarding her potato collection; peanut researcher Aleksandr Shchukin perished while working at his desk, as did medicinal plant curator Georgii Krier and oat specialist Lidiia Rodina. Chief of the city's food supply Dmitrii Pavlov asserted that in the confusion of the blockade, the administration overlooked the Vavilov Institute, and the scientists, who were aware of this, could have done anything they wanted with the collection without any negative consequences.<sup>245</sup> Perhaps, from today's point of view, they had a choice – eat some grain and live or save the collection and die – but from their perspective they did not: “Walking presented a challenging task...It was unbearably hard to stand up, move your arms and legs... And it would have been easy to eat the collection. Not at all difficult! But eating it was impossible, because it would have meant disposing of my entire life's work, the life's work of my friends...”<sup>246</sup> Twenty-eight scientists died of hunger in the vaults of the botanical Noah's Ark because the moral obligation they felt overshadowed other more essential needs:

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<sup>245</sup> Pavlov, *Leningrad 1941*, p. 129.

<sup>246</sup> From the Vavilov Institute's chief researcher Vadim Lekhnovich's recollections.

“saving those seeds for future generations and helping the world recover after the war was more important than a single person’s comfort.”<sup>247</sup>

The concern with others’ judgment and the possibility of a transgression being publicly exposed curbed many socially condemned actions. Such concern is tangible in the diaries and more so in the recollections. An episode from December 1941 serves as an illustration. A box of soy candy, received at the food distribution center for the celebration of the New Year and dragged by a teacher and two fourteen-year-old boys to an orphanage, fell off the sled. One of the boys recalled:

Candy spilled from the box onto the snow. Immediately, we were surrounded by the passers-by. The teacher gesticulated, moaned, and from her cries, it became clear that candy was being delivered to the orphanage. Two of us served as visual evidence. People formed a tight circle around us, grasped each other’s hands allowing us to arrange our load. Nobody from the crowd bent down. We gathered all the candy, picked up the plastic bags, readjusted the sled, and were on our way. People stood there for a while watching us go.<sup>248</sup>

While people could have started picking up candy (and undoubtedly, there was urgency, desire, and need), taking away from children openly, in public, was unacceptable under any circumstances and the collective model overpowered individualistic impulses.<sup>249</sup>

The siege, with its “mortal time,” gave plenty of opportunity to deal with daily crises by making right choices. Daniil Ivanovich Kiutinen worked as a baker. He died of hunger during his shift on February 3, 1942. A baker died from hunger in the midst of

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<sup>247</sup> Ethnobiologist Gary Paul Nabhan, the author of *Where Our Food Comes From: Retracing Nikolay Vavilov’s Quest to End Famine*, quoted one of the Vavilov Institute’s scientists in the radio program *The Splendid Table*, Ep. 450, 19:57 (aired on May 29, 2010). Source: <https://www.splendidtable.org/episode/450>

<sup>248</sup> Iurii Khriashchev ed., *Leningrad v bor’be mesiats za mesiatsem* (Lans, 1994), p. 67.

<sup>249</sup> Similar story is found in a diary of a 16-year-old Vladimir Trifonov. Only it involved spilling bread. The starving crowd helped pick it up but not a single loaf was taken. Entry for January 12, 1942. *Kronshtadt—Tallin—Leningrad (Voina na Baltike v iule 1941 – avguste 1942 godov)* (Sankt-Peterburg, 2001), p. 215.

plenty.<sup>250</sup> He preferred dying to taking away from others. A synthesis of personal and civic responsibilities, a sense of duty, that was directly tied to such notions as fairness, altruism, and patriotism, and was fostered within the family and by society. When inspector Berman reported a number of misappropriation cases in one of the home associations, her superior charged her with “blowing things out of proportion.” Appalled by such explicit disregard for professional obligations and the wellbeing of others, Berman wrote in her diary: “I am fighting for every gram of bread, and when I discover even a crumb that was stolen from starving residents, I regard such actions as marauding at the front. I cannot and shall not perceive it any other way, even if it goes against someone else’s wish.”<sup>251</sup> Forced to decide, a person had to make a decision that did not clash with his or her understanding of right and wrong.

In general, professional obligations and responsibilities (whatever the job title was) remained intact as long as a person was able to move. Undeterred by the constant targeting of the defense facilities by German artillery and aviation, people continued to work. In a letter to the District Executive Committee dated February 12, 1942, a head of the Frunze Plant reported on the physical condition of the workers: “deceased – 14%, sick – 68%, coming to work – 28%. Most of those 28% who come to work are physically not capable of any labor... In the last ten days, half of them are so weak that they cannot get to the plant by foot.”<sup>252</sup> Many factory workers tied themselves up to the equipment trying to stay up and not fall. Emaciated, they often were unable to endure physically

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<sup>250</sup> See Appendix V. Photo 2.

<sup>251</sup> A.G. Berman, entry for August 7, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 178.

<sup>252</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 4793. Op. 2. D. 7. L. 3.

demanding labor and died at their workstations. But other ailing and weak workers came to replace them because at that time “we could not permit ourselves to get sick.”<sup>253</sup> After visiting the Kirov Plant, Professor of Medicine Fëdor Isaakovich Mashanskii later wrote:

I was astonished to see the conditions in which people worked. The walls were studded with gaping holes left by artillery shells that could easily fit a person. The temperature inside was not higher than outside. Workers (mainly women and older men) wore thick layers of clothing that made them unwieldy to the point of stiffness. I saw many *distrofiia* patients with different stages of the illness and witnessed many deaths from starvation, but all those people were in the hospitals, the special clinics, or their own homes. Here, they worked. They worked intently and quietly...<sup>254</sup>

At a time when Leningraders were especially in need of medical assistance, the situation and surroundings – lack of staff and medications, destroyed facilities, absence of basic living needs, transportation, and dying patients – disrupted the work of medical personnel, making it all the more difficult. Of course, emaciation and edema deterred many of them from fulfilling their duties in hospitals and people’s homes.<sup>255</sup> Those doctors, who were still physically capable, attended to patients in the understaffed and overflowing medical facilities. In her notes, physician Sergeeva describes the extreme conditions under which their hospital was functioning: how all staff had to maintain a presentable appearance at times when there was no possibility to wash themselves or their scrubs (and yet they did it); how doctors had to choose between two patients, one of whom was definitely going to die and another one who could be saved; and how one of

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<sup>253</sup> From the recollections of the Metal Plant welder A. Korshunov. TsGA SPb. F. 9023. Op. 1. D. 8. L. 7.

<sup>254</sup> Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie*, pp. 534-535.

<sup>255</sup> The imperial practice of doctors visiting patients in their homes was retained by the Soviet medical practice after 1917. During the blockade, this tradition was not relinquished and physicians often had to travel long distances to visit patients.

the surgical rooms was turned into a storage room for dead bodies.<sup>256</sup> Nevertheless, even then the sense of duty prevailed. And when the nearby factory began to manufacture molasses from sawdust and “doctors received 100 grams of it daily as a nutritional supplement, [they] redistributed it among the most disadvantaged patients by prescribing a five-day course of treatment of 50 or 100 grams every second day.” Sergeeva did not know whether this “remedy” saved anyone’s life, but notes that “it had a great impact on the moral state of the patients: they received what they needed the most – care and attention.”<sup>257</sup>

A catastrophic shortage of fuel and electrical power coupled with hunger resulted in a disruption of the work of defense plants, electrical stations, and hospitals. In the period from September to December 1941, the daily generation of electricity fell to one-seventh of its output and immobilized a number of factories. Deprived of electricity, factory workers and engineers operated machinery manually, cut out parts, repaired ships, tanks, and assembled guns for as long as they physically could.<sup>258</sup> In December 1941, the Leningrad Military Council began equipping industrial facilities with gas generators, internal combustion engines, and individual docking stations.<sup>259</sup> By the middle of March 1942, there were 65 such mini-electric stations.<sup>260</sup> By taking steps to improve working conditions, the authorities stimulated reciprocal actions from the residents who continued to fulfill their obligations. Mechanic Kulagin remarked the impact of the administrative

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<sup>256</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 9631. Op. 1. D. 4.

<sup>257</sup> Sergeeva. Winter 1941–42 notes. TsGA SPb. F. 9631. Op. 1. D. 4. L.9-10.

<sup>258</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 9565. Op. 1D. 17. L. 1.

<sup>259</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 18. D. 1432. L. 17.

<sup>260</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 25. Op. 13a. D. 102. L. 2.

undertakings: “Life and work at the metal plant has not ceased even for a minute. It is hard to tell what would have become of it along with the thousands of hungry and freezing people if our power station had stopped.”<sup>261</sup>

At the end of January 1942, the Defense Council held a meeting with medical specialists to improve Leningrad’s sanitary conditions. Undernourishment and massive spread of *dystrofiia* resulted in a decrease of the body’s defense mechanisms. Coupled with thousands of corpses buried under the snow, consumption of water from rivers, the lack of laundry facilities, barbershops, bathhouses, and sewer, the city was facing a real threat of the increase and spread of various epidemics. On January 26, 1942, *Ispolkom* made a decision on the radical improvement of Leningrad’s sanitation.<sup>262</sup> In order to clean city streets, it was necessary to mobilize everyone still capable of standing up. Beginning on March 8, 1942, every Sunday people came out for spring cleaning. Chief of engineering administration, B. Bychevskii remembered how “one by one, people with yellow, bloated faces and swelled up arms and legs” began to come out of “the frost-bound buildings that seemed entirely lifeless [...] Their weak hands could not keep hold of shovels, little to say crowbars. After making a few tottering steps, people sat down to rest.”<sup>263</sup>

When by March 25 it was obvious that the clean-up work could not be done before the spring thaw, *Lengorsovet* ordered that all capable persons had to contribute to the clean-up every day from March 27 to April 8, 1942. It scheduled workloads by

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<sup>261</sup> Kulagin, *Dnevnik i pamiat'*, p.126.

<sup>262</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 5490. L. 4.

<sup>263</sup> Quoted in Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor'be za vyzhivanie*, p. 523.

people's station in life: blue-collar workers – 2 hours outside of working shifts; workers of the conserved plants – 8 hours; and housewives and students – 6 hours.<sup>264</sup> Around half a million Leningraders contributed to the spring cleaning. Chief Editor of the October Railway publishing house L. Muchnik recalled his participation “along with hundreds of others” in clearing the Vosstaniia Square, Ligovskii and Nevskii Prospects in April 1942. He recounted:

Everybody who could still stand showed up. Every one – regardless of rank, position, social standing, age, or gender. Even those who could hardly move their legs came... Physically disabled, two (sometimes three) people had to lift a crowbar together. Chunks of ice, shovels with snow, and various rubbish was picked up and piled onto the iron sheets or plywood collectively. A few Leningraders harnessed themselves to pull the load while another few pushed it in order to deliver waste to the designated areas.<sup>265</sup>

Recognizing the importance of the initiative, the blokadniki contributed to the city-wide effort and did everything in their power to ensure their own survival and protect their homes.

To motivate people, the authorities used city-wide campaigning from putting up posters, slogans, and banners everywhere, to having the Musical Comedy Theater groups perform on the streets of Leningrad for those who removed ice, snow, waste, and dead bodies.<sup>266</sup> Medical services provided immunizations for typhoid, dysentery, and other infectious diseases. The combination of the organization done by the authorities, the residents' efforts, and the preventative and skilled work done by the medical professionals eliminated the possibility of epidemics in the city.

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<sup>264</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 18. D. 1442. L. 163-164. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 411. Op. 2. D. 37. L. 28. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 25. Op. 10. D. 338. L. 99-101.

<sup>265</sup> L. Muchnik, “Podnimali lom vdvoëm,” in *Pamiat' Vypusk 2*, pp. 257-259. I. Korolëv, “Teplo. Solntse,” *Id.*, p. 267.

<sup>266</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 411. Op. 2. D. 37. L. 28.



What made those people get up in the morning and drag their feet to factories, hospitals, and schools? Was it the love for their family, city, homeland, or sense of personal responsibility? Was it their belief in victory? Although Leningraders' reasons differed, they all did what they had to do. Not all of them endured, many perished at home or on the way to work. What remains undisputable is the residents' profound connection to the city. They regarded Leningrad with such a piety that the efforts they exerted in its defense truly came from the heart and were not compelled by intimidation or force. Daniil Al'shits, who served at the Leningrad front, affirmed that despite assertions to the contrary,

Nobody coerced hundreds of thousands of Leningrad workers, clerks, and *intelligentsiia* to join *opolchenie*. Just like nobody coerced 60,000 Leningrad students to become part of *opolchenie*. There was no need to force us. Nobody forced hundreds of thousands of Leningraders – including women and children – to be on duty around buildings, put out German incendiary bombs on the roofs, and save the wounded during the shelling and air raids. The decision to get involved was entirely of each person's own free will.<sup>267</sup>

Moreover, it was not just a question of *who* made people defend the city; it was also a question of *what* made them do it. Ultimately, it was “archetypal national patriotism” and “territorial patriotism” that had more to do with defending native city, home, and family rather than the “achievements of socialism,”<sup>268</sup> and was a matter of personal choice. Baltic fleet officer Pëtr Kapitsa saw Leningraders' commitment in the amalgamation of their past and present experiences:

Extraordinary and legendary people live in our city! Clearly, the character of Petersburg's workers and intellectuals – their revolutionary organization, unity,

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<sup>267</sup> Daniil Al'shits, *Za nami byl nash gorod. Podvigu Leningrada – pravdivuiu i dostoinuiu otsenku* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nauka. Leningradskoe otdelenie, 2010), p. 309.

<sup>268</sup> Andrei Dzeniskevich, *Front u zavodskikh sten. Maloizuchennye problemy oborony Leningrada, 1941-1944* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nestor, 1998), p. 81.

and steadfastness – was formed by the years of struggle against tsarism and White Guard elements, creating a distinctly different kind of people. There is a direct link between the solidarity of Petersburg residents who were storming the Winter Palace and the besieged brotherhood that was forged by the common struggle and agony. What forces a worker debilitated by hunger to stand behind his factory press in a freezing shop without ceasing his work even during time of shelling and refusing to hide in the shelter? It is just one thought, ‘We do it for us and for the front. Every shell, every mine brings our victory closer. It is our payback for the death of our mates.’ Will anyone understand the scientists of the Plant Institute who were saving the unique seed collection? Emaciated, they watched boxes and jars full of seeds day and night, protecting them from accidents and damage while dying from hunger themselves. And none of them had as much as a thought of eating even a single kernel!<sup>269</sup>

W. Averill Harriman in his conversation with George Urban remembered how in September 1941 Stalin told him, “We are under no illusions that they [Soviet people] are fighting for us [the system]. They are fighting for Mother Russia.”<sup>270</sup> Indeed, while the Soviet newspapers told the stories of soldiers going into battle with Stalin’s name on their lips, the diaries and recollections speak of devotion, patriotism (personally interpreted in the ways that made sense), and the need to persevere.

The individual memories of the blockade along with the official accounts shaped those who survived it as well as the post-war generations of Leningraders. Born in St. Petersburg in 1901, Alexander Werth returned to his native city as a BBC war correspondent in 1943 and was the only Westerner who had a chance to witness some of the tragedy and talk to people there. Having worked in the USSR during the war, he concluded that,

Although living conditions were very hard almost everywhere throughout the war and truly frightening during some periods, people went on working as they had

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<sup>269</sup> Kapitsa, *V more pogasli ogni. Blokadnye dnevniki* (Leningrad: Sovetskiy pisatel’, 1974), pp. 281-282. Diary entry for March 22, 1942.

<sup>270</sup> George R. Urban ed., *Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 41.

never worked before, sometimes to the point of collapse and death. No doubt there were moments of panic and demoralization both in the Army and among civilians... Nevertheless, the spirit of genuine patriotic devotion and self-sacrifice shown by the Russian people during those four years has few parallels in human history, and the story of the siege of Leningrad is altogether unique.<sup>271</sup>

While every person lived through his/her own history of the blockade, making it a part of an individual experience and identity, different intimate accounts assembled under an overarching concept of the collective or social experience provide a coherent narrative of historical events where “local” patriotism was the major underlying motivation for those who continued to work, create, and live.

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<sup>271</sup> Alexander Werth, *Russia at War, 1941-1945* (New York: Avon Books, 1964), pp. xix-xx.

## CHAPTER II

### Family, Friends, and Acquaintances

Due to the change of the socio-political order in post-revolutionary Soviet Russia, traditional family – patriarchal in its structure for all peoples of the former Russian Empire – underwent significant changes. In an attempt to free women and erase gender inequality, Bolsheviks propagated the ideas of “communalization” (*obobscshestvlenie*) of the daily family routine, common-law marriages, and open relationships. However, by shifting the focus from the world revolution to building socialism in the USSR in the 1930s, the Soviet government turned to Russian sociocultural traditions, attempting thereby to revive an archaic family type. This “conservative” rollback necessitated the adoption of protective policy towards the family structure: lasting family relations were considered to be a powerful politically stabilizing factor.<sup>272</sup> As living conditions and social responsibilities changed, Soviet citizens “invited state involvement in family life, blurring the boundary between the personal and the political at the same time that they reaffirmed the boundaries of legitimacy, respectability, and propriety.”<sup>273</sup> And the state regulated the society via non-economic labor, political repressions, and the establishment of strict control over reproductive social behavior. However, the repressions did not weaken but strengthened family ties (as its members felt that consolidation was vital to

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<sup>272</sup> The “strategic” goal was to persuade people of the priority of national interests over individual and familial ones. German Sverdlov, “O predmete i sisteme sotsialisticheskogo semeinogo prava,” *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, No. 1, 1941.

<sup>273</sup> Lauren Kaminsky, “Utopian Visions of Family Life in the Stalin-Era Soviet Union,” *Central European History* 44 (2011), p. 65.

survival), contrary to Hannah Arendt's hypothesis of "atomization of the [Soviet] society."<sup>274</sup>

The pre-war family was a multifaceted and fluid unit that often had several generations either living in the same apartment (often communal) or fairly close to each other. Just like in the family structure of the imperial period, gender asymmetry was characteristic of the Soviet model. Only this asymmetry was not traditional: the nucleus of the Soviet family belonged to the mother. Women played the role of problem-solvers who were in control of a household budget and had to feed, clothes, comfort, and retained friendly relations with the neighbors. While family as a social structure has the flexibility to adapt and transition under the influence of external stressors, the internal connections within a unit depend on the emotional connection between its members (i.e. a maximal level of connection warrants deep emotional interconnection, whereas a minimal level creates autonomy and estrangement).

Diaries and recollections single out the family as another major source of support and encouragement that helped them bear hardships during the siege. While war-time conditions in Leningrad did not always promote a strengthening of familial bonds, at times tearing families apart (vividly described in Peri's *The War Within*), this thesis considers eye-witnesses' views of the family as a stimulus for the determination to pull through. Orientalist Virineia Stefanovna Garbuzova said that during the winter of 1941–

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<sup>274</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick came to such conclusions after analyzing the 1930s archival collection of an "enormous number of appeals" and letters sent to the authorities by the family members of those who have been arrested, asserting their innocence. She attributes the rarity of denunciatory letters about family members to strong emotional bonds within the family units as well as practical reasons. *Tear Off the Masks: Identity and Imposture in Twentieth-Century Russia* (Princeton-Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 222. Hannah Arendt, *Imperialism: Part Two of The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1968), p. 111.

42 Leningraders wanted “to live and help family and friends survive”<sup>275</sup> more than anything. Even those with reputations of hatefulness helped others.<sup>276</sup> Or when marriages broke down, “home, coziness, and compassion [were] the essence and the only light [...] in the vastness of the gloom, remaining the only stimulus that incited the will to live and Survive!”<sup>277</sup>

Diaries contain numerous stories about how family members, loved ones, friends, and strangers shared their frugal food reserves. They show how little children who received something to eat in kindergartens and schools without ration cards made an effort to bring it home for the family. They tell how grandparents secretly hid part of their portions for their grandchildren. The diaries depict how younger siblings took on the role of parent and even how ex-wives took care of their former in-laws. In contrast, there were also those who considered their relatives to be a burden, choosing to abandon or steal from them, and those who made a decision to keep physically stronger members of the family alive at the expense of the weaker ones. Although personal records contain various examples of both support and rejection, the majority found family essential to their survival.

When her mother died, A. Mamleeva had a choice to either stay put and die or make a tough change: “I woke from a stupor and realized that we had nobody to rely on

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<sup>275</sup> Aleksandr Boldyrëv, *Osadnaia kniga*, p. 21.

<sup>276</sup> Siege survivor Zina Savkova mentions a neighbor who, despite his intimidatingly antisocial demeanor, made a coffin for her grandmother, and helped her drag and bury it. In Savkova, *Ostat'sia chelovekom*, p. 21.

<sup>277</sup> Boldyrëv. Entry for January 23, 1942, in *Osadnaia kniga*, p. 45. Capitalization added in the original.

anymore. As the oldest one [of five children] I had to become a mother to them.”<sup>278</sup> A remarkable case of maternal self-sacrifice was described in *Mediki i blokada* (*Medical Personnel and the Siege*). In the winter of 1941–42, pediatrician Alexander Fëdorovich Tur of Clinic #1, which specialized in extremely malnourished children, received another baby patient. A Komsomol unit found the baby in one of the city’s apartments: he was lying next to his emaciated mother, who had blood gushing out of her vein. Starvation had completely suppressed lactation, and in desperation, she opened a vein in her arm and pressed the baby’s mouth to the cut, letting him suck on her blood.<sup>279</sup>

There were no “perfect” families. Even in peacetime, parents scolded children, children resented parents, wives argued with husbands, and in-laws were disapproving and condescending. The siege intensified feelings and interactions – exacerbating or softening them<sup>280</sup> – forging family dynamics that determined how relatives regarded each other and the role they played within the unit. Teenager Galia Zimnitskaia wrote in her diary about her neighbor Sonia, the mother of two little girls, who gave Galia three ration cards and asked her to get the bread but hold on to it. As it turned out,

Sonia’s husband would eat everything he could find in the house. Despite Sonia’s desperate attempts to hide bread from him, it always disappeared without a trace. Last night he shamelessly grabbed the skimpy ration from Sonia right at the doorstep in front of her children. Their girls are condemned to death.<sup>281</sup>

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<sup>278</sup> In *Pamiat’*. Vypusk 2, p. 394. N. Chubarkina “Sestra i podrug,” in *Pamiat’*. *Pis’ma o voine i blockade. 1945-1985*, p. 338.

<sup>279</sup> *Mediki i blokada: Vzgliad skvoz’ gody. Vospominaniia, fragmenty dnevnikov, svidetel’sva ochevidtsev, dokumental’nye materialy*. Kniga 2 (Sankt-Peterburg: Mezhdunarodnaia assotsiatsiia blokadnikov goroda-geroia Leningrada, 1997), pp. 168-169.

<sup>280</sup> Valeria Igosheva noted that “Relationship with mama and papa are good. The hunger brings people closer.” Entry for January 13, 1942, in *Detskaia kniga voiny*, p. 77.

<sup>281</sup> Galia Zimnitskaia, entry for January 8, 1942. *Id.*, p. 102.

Galia remembered how before the war this young man used to take his daughters for walks in the park, how attentive and gentle he was with them, and how that love and care went completely against his current behavior. “He must have gone mad from hunger,” she concluded.<sup>282</sup>

Accounts that speak of Leningraders’ dedication and sacrifice for family are prevalent. To save their children, mothers and fathers gave them their own meager portions of food. In her notes, physician Sergeeva told of engineer Rubtsov, who received a better ration as a specialist but died in the hospital because he was giving part of his ration to his wife and daughter.<sup>283</sup> Doctor Ignatovich’s neighbors – a married couple with a long-awaited child – gave their entire rations to their toddler and perished from hunger.<sup>284</sup> Vera Kostrovitskaia noted in her diary that her grandmother had died from hunger in February 1942, and in her room, “hanging from the nail by the bed there was a little pouch with a note ‘To Verusia.’<sup>285</sup> Inside the pouch, there were a few small cookies and a bar of chocolate, all *untouched*. Mama brought them to her in the beginning of September.”<sup>286</sup> Women often became blood donors in order to get additional rations so that they could save their children.<sup>287</sup> Men, who at the final stage of *distrofiia* went to the

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<sup>282</sup> Galia Zimnitskaia, entry for January 8, 1942, in *Detskaia kniga voiny*, p. 102.

<sup>283</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 9631. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 12.

<sup>284</sup> Z.A. Ignatovich. *Ocherki o blockade*, 1941-1944. RNB OR, Unpublished Fond 1273. L. 15-16. Also in Likhachëv, *Vospomonaniia*, pp. 331-332.

<sup>285</sup> Verusia is an endearing derivative of the name Vera.

<sup>286</sup> Vera Sergeevna Kostrovitskaia. RNB OR, F. 1274, ed. hr.2, l. 23. Emphasis added in the original.

<sup>287</sup> Sergei Iarov, *Blokadnaia etika. Predstavleniia o morali v Leningrade v 1941-1942 gg.* (Sankt-Peterburg: Nestor-Istoriia, 2011), pp. 38-40.



hospital and received a better ration, hid their portions and snuck home to bring food to their families.<sup>288</sup> Adult children gave part of their allotments to parents<sup>289</sup> and siblings.

Svetlana Vasil'evna Magaeva was ten when the siege began. Her mother, a schoolteacher, walked around the city looking for children whose parents had passed away and took them to orphanages where they received basic care and nutrition. Without people like Svetlana's mother, the children would have died from hunger and cold. One day she did not return home and Svetlana feared the worst. As it turned out, her mother fainted from hunger on the street but someone helped get her to the hospital. Svetlana "went to visit her there almost daily right after breakfast at the orphanage." Part of the breakfast – *balanda* (thin flour soup) – the girl "saved in a toy teacup and brought it for mom to eat." At that time, it seemed to her that if she did not do that, her mother would die. Although Svetlana's effort was tangible, she still perceived her mother's survival as "miraculous."<sup>290</sup>

Everyday routine, rituals, and role distribution became a common practice in many families, and Leningraders attempted to maintain a semblance of normal life: washing up, doing laundry, and cleaning the living quarters.<sup>291</sup> Teenager M.S. Karetnikova remembered how much her mother wanted them to survive:

[E]very morning she made us get up and live: fetch water, do our beds, and wash up. All of it took physical strength which we did not have. But this was not it. In order to survive, you had to take care of someone besides yourself. Doing it for

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<sup>288</sup> Iarov, *Blokadnaia etika*, p. 111.

<sup>289</sup> I.V. Nazimov, entry for January 2-3, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 125.

<sup>290</sup> Svetlana Magaeva, "Vospominaniia o voine: fiziologiia blokady" (*Neskuchnyi Sad*, #5-6(26) 2007.)

<sup>291</sup> E. Pavlova, entry for February 12, 1942, in *Pamiat'. Vypusk 2*, pp. 180-181, 191. V. Gevorskaia, "Mama," in *Pamiat'. Pis'ma o voine i blockade. 1945-1985*, p. 150.

your mama and grandma goes without saying. But there were also our sick neighbor who swelled up from hunger beyond recognition and my orphaned friend Lena who only had her dying grandma...<sup>292</sup>

In families where both parents worked, children were responsible for keeping the household (bringing water and firewood) and getting the bread ration, which entailed standing in lines for hours. Women distributed daily portions of food to family members.<sup>293</sup> Some split it in half and made two “meals” out of it, some had breakfast, lunch, and dinner. Everybody developed his/her own “eating routine” which was a topic of discussion with relatives and strangers.

L. Reikherth (later editor-in-chief of *Science*) was six when the siege began. As an adult, he tried to block the memories of it, often stopping his mother in mid-sentence when she attempted to reflect on those years. His curiosity was piqued upon the discovery of mother’s “household books,” two thick notebooks that contained her records of the events of 1941–42. As it turned out, Reikherth’s mother used the example of swimmer Boris Deviatkin’s strict daily regimen as a way to egg on her children and herself.

She managed to feed us thrice every day regardless of whether it was a bread-crumble, a spoonful of skilly,<sup>294</sup> or boiling water. She put us to sleep only in the evening. When leaving home, she always left us a list of chores: cut firewood, sweep the floors, or something else. She made us go to the children’s health clinic while we were still able to move. She never cried or sighed in our presence and always tried to save us from psychologically damaging experiences.<sup>295</sup>

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<sup>292</sup> Sobolev, *Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, p. 372.

<sup>293</sup> E. Pavlova, “Iz blokadnogo dnevnika,” in *Pamiat’*. Vypusk 2, p. 180.

<sup>294</sup> Skilly is a thin soup made by adding wheat flour to boiling water.

<sup>295</sup> L. A. Reikherth, “Mat’ i dvoe nas,” in *Pamiat’*. Vypusk 2, pp. 416-417.

The desire to live and save loved ones was demonstrated by children as well. Svetlana Magaeva spoke of a case she witnessed in the orphanage. Olia, a 12-year-old girl, was trying to keep her 5-year-old brother, Serēzha, from dying of starvation. The emaciated girl gave her entire scant portion of food to Serēzha, who ate it with indifference but continued to waste away. All the efforts made by the teacher and doctor to convince Olia of the need to eat fell on deaf ears. After Serēzha died, the girl refused to leave his side. When he was finally taken away, Olia lay down, sighed, and passed away. Magaeva spoke of it as “a mature death full of dignity and conscious awareness of a duty fulfilled. It is likely that Olia’s sudden passing was the result of losing the motivation to survive. The girl had nobody left in the whole world, and she ceased waging war against death.”<sup>296</sup> Medical professionals who lived through the siege described a number of similar cases that could not be explained from a physiological perspective. Balancing between life and death and often no longer able to move, those, who had a reason to live (children begging not to die) resisted if only for a while.<sup>297</sup>

Even though the majority of the city’s population was women, children, and the elderly, male deaths were higher in the first months of the siege and thrice as common as those of women in January 1942.<sup>298</sup> Drawn into all spheres of public life and having

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<sup>296</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Zhizn’ i smert’ v blokadnom Leningrade: Istoriko-meditsinskii aspect* (Sankt Peterburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2001), p. 163.

<sup>297</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad*, p. 139.

<sup>298</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2b. D. 1332. L. 21. NKVD Administration reported to *Gorkom VKP(b)* on the death toll in the city for the first three months of 1942: 70,853 (73.2%) – men vs. 25,916 (26.8%) – women in January; 57,990 (60.4%) – men vs. 38,025 (39.65) – women. Numbers began to even in March, and by summer the trend was reversed.

equal rights with men, women had to perform tasks they were not suited for.<sup>299</sup> But as the number of men drastically decreased, women ended up constituting the “backbone” of the family and the city. Faced with numerous daily tasks – what to feed their families, how to heat and light the home, where to get water, what to do to ensure children’s survival, how to bury the dead – they constantly had to find ways to solve them. Both official and personal records note that women were more resilient to physical and emotional stress: “men turned out to be more fragile; they broke down faster.”<sup>300</sup> This resilience had to do with “the strikingly apparent” differences in the physiology and development of male and female bodies and had been explained by medical scientists after the siege.<sup>301</sup>

However, there might have been another reason why women held on longer: their nurturing and caregiving instincts. Librarian M. Gol’zblat recalled how “mothers and wives, straining themselves by pulling heavy sleds, dragged the dead to cemeteries... Women ended up being stronger, and now you often witness not the wife leaning on her husband’s arm, but a woman who is motherly and firmly leading a doomed head of the family.”<sup>302</sup> Serving in the Baltic navy, Pëtr Kapitsa spent the first blockade winter in

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<sup>299</sup> I mean physically demanding and strenuous labor (e.g. positions at industrial plants, construction sites, military or intelligence services, and others).

<sup>300</sup> Pëtr Kapitsa, diary entry for January 17, 1942. *V more pogasli ogni. Blokadnye dnevniki* (Leningrad: Sovetskiy pisatel’, 1974), p. 261. Speaking of the quantitative gap in the death toll of women and men, Vasilii Pavlovich Argirovskii reiterates the rumor he has heard that “its ratio is 2:28.” Entry for December 24, 1941. On December 28, 1941, the ratio he quotes is “1:5.” RNB OR, Fond 1469.

<sup>301</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds., *Life and death in Besieged Leningrad*, p. 175.

<sup>302</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. R-97. Op. 3. D. 969. L. 4. (M. Gol’zblat’s recollections. 1944). The head of the 23<sup>rd</sup> hospital, Nazimov remarks that the site of “women pulling children sleds with sick, weakened men” was typical for the streets of Leningrad in his entry for March 24, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 160.

Leningrad. He witnessed how the shipwrights who helped the sailors repair vessels were leaving work carrying

the leftovers of thin soup to feed their families – wives and children. In order not to fall, some prop each other up. If someone falls, workers walk around him. They have no strength to take the trouble to assist the fallen. So, he silently waits, hoping that after getting some rest he'll be able to make it to the control gate. There are quite a few workers' wives with sleds waiting for their husbands by the gate. Women will drag the bread-winners home and will bring them back to the dock the next day. Those [workers] who have lost families try not to leave the dock: they stay here day and night.<sup>303</sup>

But as the first tram re-launched on April 15, 1942, “not a single man was sitting down. Women did. And men, who were weaker at that time than women, were standing up, remembering that they are the stronger sex.”<sup>304</sup>

The absence of public transit<sup>305</sup> forced many people who worked far from home to stay at work overnight, sometimes living there indefinitely. Suslova recalled that archive personnel had a staff room that was “a center of the archive's life” in the after-work hours. People discussed “work issues, read (sometimes aloud), sewed, knitted, and listened to radio programs, music, and concerts.”<sup>306</sup> Some working (or temporarily unemployed) families that could not provide adequate care for their children turned to childcare facilities, relying on their help. Though enhancing cooperation, remaining at

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<sup>303</sup> Kapitsa. Diary entry for January 14, 1942. *V more pogasli ogni*, p. 257-258. Also in Likhachëv. *Vospominaniia*, p. 336.

<sup>304</sup> Savkova, *Ostat'sia chelovekom*, p. 11.

<sup>305</sup> Dates for public transit shut off, just like electricity, the functioning of the public bath houses, hairdressers, laundry facilities, etc., depended on the district serviced. There was no immediate shut-down of the entire city.

<sup>306</sup> Suslova. Recollections. TsGA SPb. F. 9631. Op. 1. D. 6. L. 14.

work had short-term and long-term ramifications like the disruption of family order or the estrangement from children.<sup>307</sup>

Romantic love as a theme is rarely present in the diaries. But even the subtle entries that describe husbands' or wives' attempts to save their "better halves" (sometimes at the expense of their own lives) testify to deep emotional connections and show how durable some of them were. Sensing her husband's nearing death, Ol'ga Berggol'ts' wrote on January 14, 1942:

I must persist and survive because I have to pull you through, because if you perish, I'll cease to live. Even without physically dying I'll cease to exist... I'll be begging anyone and everyone for food, buying it from profiteers, and working like mad to earn money... Hold on a while longer, my one and only, my happiness, my amazing and best human being in the world!<sup>308</sup>

Finding it unbearable to watch her husband starve, Nataliia Zavetnovskaia, who was also starving and whose legs were so swollen that she barely could walk, went to the black market to exchange valuables for bread so she could feed it to him.<sup>309</sup> Revealing the details of intimate life was something that most people were embarrassed about and uncomfortable doing. And although there were some relatively healthy residents, most of Leningraders' physical and mental states prevented them from forging romantic relationships.<sup>310</sup> Descriptions of the emaciated, androgynous bodies that filled the bath

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<sup>307</sup> Descriptions of the mother-child connection breakdown can be found in Aleksandra Mironova's diary. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 71.

<sup>308</sup> Berggol'ts, *Vstrecha: Dnevnye zvezdy. Chast' 1. Dnevnye zvezdy. Chast' 2. Glavy, fragmenty. pis'ma, dnevniki, zametki, plany* (Moskva: Russkaia kniga, 2000), p. 266.

<sup>309</sup> Nataliia Zavetnovskaia, in the letter to her daughter on February 5, 1942. RNB OR, Unpublished Fond 1273. L. 72.

<sup>310</sup> Prolonged starvation has an adverse effect on the endocrine system. Disrupted function of the adrenal, thyroid, and pituitary glands and the hypothalamus shuts off the synthesis of such hormones as T3, T4, TSH, estrogen, and testosterone. As a result, reproductive functions are suppressed and libido disappears. See i.e. Doreen A. Samelson EdD MSCP, *Feeding the Starving Mind: A Personalized, Comprehensive Approach to Overcoming Anorexia and Other Starvation Eating Disorders* (Oakland, CA:

houses in the winter and spring months of 1942 penned by some diarists vividly explain why intimate relationships were atypical.

Familial relations served as a behavior model for children, teaching them to sympathize with others. Parents molded children's outlook on how to treat people outside of the family circle. At the final stage of *distrofiia* and suffering from diarrhea brought on by hunger, 11-year-old Dima Liakhovich guiltily apologized for the "accidents" to a teacher who took care of him. She gently urged him not to be embarrassed, and he kissed her hands. Although asked not to do it, Dima awkwardly insisted, repeating that this was what papa did when he was sick and mama was taking care of him.<sup>311</sup> Historian Gennadii Sobolev, who survived the siege, shared an account of another child siege survivor, Liudmila Andreeva. Her mother received a package from Liudmila's father that he managed to pass along with a soldier who arrived from the front. It contained army biscuits and a few briquettes of dried pea soup. In the morning, her mother told the children that she had decided to cook a large pot of soup from the two soup briquettes and to invite all the neighbors in their four-storied building capable of moving for lunch. They asked everyone who was able to open the door. Reflecting on that event, Liudmila wonders "...why [her] mama chose to throw neighbors a feast when she could have left all of the soup briquettes for her own starving family. And why did none of [them] ever

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New Harbinger Publications, 2009), pp. 24-26. Some diarists recorded visits to the bath houses in the winter and spring months of 1942 where male and female sectors were merged to accommodate a higher number of women. They wrote that, because all people looked like skeletons, it was almost impossible to tell a man from a woman and nobody paid any attention to one another. However, there were exceptions: men/ women who worked at canteens, stores, or held administrative positions forged intimate relationships because they were in better physical condition.

<sup>311</sup> Svetlana Magaeva and Elena Martilla, *Mucheniki Leningradskoi blokady* (Moskva: Sestrichestvo vo imia prepodobnomuchenitsy Velikoï Kniagini Elizavety, 2007), p. 39.

question her decision, deeming it the only right one?”<sup>312</sup> Acts like these taught children to help the disadvantaged and were presented to them as something ordinary and something that one would not even think about twice.

Placed in an ethical and pragmatic dilemma, non-biological or distant relatives often chose to replace immediate families. Eleven-year-old Vera Fëdorovna Galaktionova saw her entire family – father, mother, and two brothers – starve to death by the end of December 1941. When Vera’s aunt Taisiia Efimovna dropped by to check on the family, the girl was still alive but so weak that she could not stand by herself. Taisiia Efimovna wrapped her in a blanket, tied her to a sled, and transported her to a close relative who lived on the other side of the city. Upon arrival, Taisiia herself died of hunger and exhaustion. The relative had four children of her own but took Vera in. Unfortunately, Taisiia Efimovna had forgotten to take Vera’s family ration cards, and nobody had enough strength to travel back to get them. Therefore, they had to survive on one worker’s card and the cards of four dependents: 750 grams of bread divided among six people.<sup>313</sup>

Such sacrifice may seem extraordinary but, given the circumstances, it was quite common. As loved ones died, Leningraders sought support from those still alive in their immediate circle. During the first blockade winter, many chose to share their temporary homes with other people instead of living alone.<sup>314</sup> Some people did it because of the fear of dying and having their corpses eaten by rats, for some it ensured their survival, and

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<sup>312</sup> Sobolev. *Leningrad v bor’be za vyzhivanie v blockade*, p. 372.

<sup>313</sup> Magaeva and Martilla, *Mucheniki leningradskoi blokady*, p. 13.

<sup>314</sup> Galia Zimmitskaia, entry for February 9, 1942, in *Detskaia kniga voiny*, p. 106. Z. Shevardina, “Peli shëpotom,” in *Pamiat’*, p. 132.



some offered help precisely because they knew they could. After the death of all family members and neighbors, Vera Berkhman remained alone in a huge communal flat. Next-door neighbor Boris Moiseevich asked her, “How do you live in the empty apartment?” and then added: “I’ve been meaning to ask you whether you would consider moving into our place? I have a spare room. I’ll be happy to help you... My wife and mother-in-law are very outgoing. You’ll be in a family.”<sup>315</sup> One of the authors of *Blokadnaia Kniga* (*A Book of the Blockade*) and a siege survivor, Daniil Granin formulated the reasoning behind mutual help: “People saved themselves by saving others. And even if they died, they picked someone up walking their final path. And if they survived, it was because somebody needed them more than a person needed himself.”<sup>316</sup> Reflecting on the winter of 1941–42, Vera Berkhman wrote in June 1942:

What’s important to note is that all of those (almost all of those) who perished succeeded in raising the banner of the spirit over the flesh and were doing so until their very last breath. People buried their loved ones in exchange for their ration cards or whatever the cost might have been; people struggled through distances to get to their families; they buried mere acquaintances (fellowmen), not relatives, fought death, and cheered on those who gave up.<sup>317</sup>

The accounts of helping those outside of the immediate family are numerous. In fact, one of the common themes that appear in the diaries is staying at or visiting friends, family, neighbors, co-workers, or acquaintances and sharing whatever little there was to eat. That does not mean that there were no people who preyed on one’s weakness and misery. Aware of the absence or sickness of a person, neighbors entered the apartments looking for things to eat or something they could sell. Family members took away entire

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<sup>315</sup> Vera Berkhman, diary entry for June 16, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh*, p. 109.

<sup>316</sup> Granin and Adamovich, *Blokadnaia kniga*, p. 48.

<sup>317</sup> Vera Berkhman, diary entry for June 15, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh*, p. 101.

or parts of portions from others. But above all, it was strangers who received cruel and rude treatment from people in the bread or canteen lines, near the ice-holes when getting water, on the streets, or out of sight. Although every *blokadnik* mentioned both vicious and kind deeds, it was the ability to work together and share available resources that ensured the people's survival. Revealing how hunger changed people's habits, relations with others, and personalities, biology student T. Fadeeva affirmed that "a human remained a human as long as he realized that he had to do what he must. Without such realization, physical strength dissipated and so did humanitarian principles."<sup>318</sup> Individual interpretations of social norms and personal norms determined whether a person chose to fight on his/her own or to remain a part of a larger unit. In practice, cooperation provided advantages as opposed to the focus on self, which strained daily struggles and in the end proved ineffective as a strategy for staying alive.

In addition to familial bonds, the support of friends played an enormous role in keeping up spirits. Just like in the case of other close relations, friendships changed for better and for worse in the course of the siege. Their breakdown was not always a result of intensifying hunger and had to do with the initial emotional attachment, individual dynamics, attitudes, and dispositions. In many cases, friendships grew stronger. Writing letters to her friend, Stasia Antonevich disclosed:

My dear Raya, my one and only friend! During this dire time, we reassessed our friendship in a new way. I do not know how we would have made it without each other and without the moral support we rendered one another. In moments of danger, we literally covered each other with our bodies. At the most difficult times, we shared every bite and every breadcrumb.<sup>319</sup>

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<sup>318</sup> Recollections of biology student T.S. Fadeeva, "Nas dressiruiut golodom i strakhom" (*Sovetskaia Rossiia*. January 26, 1999).

<sup>319</sup> Stasia Antonevich. Diary 1942. TsGALI SPb, F. 97. Op. 3. D. 709. L. 9-10.

Some Leningraders were more reserved in their expression of personal affections, some described friendly deeds more emotionally, and some made kind-hearted comments in passing. But at a time when it would have been easy to rationalize and walk away, or dismiss the pleas, they all had a friend who at some point lent a helping hand. People assisted friends get home, placed them into hospitals, took care of their children or brought them to orphanages, moved in together, got their rations for them, fetched water and firewood, buried them, and of course shared what little they had to eat.<sup>320</sup>

Some friendship ties were forged out of despair. Those who seemed to no longer care or love anyone, who grumpily uttered words of resentment often ended up being capable of selfless acts. Vera Berkhman fondly spoke of her apartment neighbor – “a complex individual” – who helped her stay alive and with whom they “took turns in dragging each other back into life.”<sup>321</sup> Describing Mariia Aleksandrovna as a “wholesome person of the old times,” Vera questioned her motivations: “What was it that roused her hands, legs, head, and her trembling heart to slice off a piece of bread from her dependent’s portion every day and give it to me, someone who had no ration card, often with a grumble as if sentencing – ‘here, survive’?.. She was irritated by my condition [*distrofiia*], said vile things to my face, and yet pulled me back to life...”<sup>322</sup> It seemed that Mariia Aleksandrovna was willing to do anything in order to avoid being left alone in a huge communal apartment. And Vera expressed her gratitude in any way she could. One

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<sup>320</sup> N. Neshitaia, “Povestka,” in *Pamiat’. Pis’mo o voine i blockade. 1945-1987*, p. 128. *Id.*, A. Kuris, “Ostavliat’ sebe schitau prestupnym,” pp. 129-130. Vera Inber, *Pochti tri goda* (Moskva: Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1968), p. 194. Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia*, p. 492. V.G. Kuliabko, entries for October 15 and October 19, 1941, in *Budni podviga*, p. 98.

<sup>321</sup> Vera Berkhman, diary entry for June 12, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh*, p. 92.

<sup>322</sup> *Id.*, pp. 97-98.

morning. returning home from a night shift at the hospital, Vera found Mariia Aleksandrovna lying motionless in her room. She wrote: “her eyes were full of agonizing fear, and she was lying in malodorous puddles, everything was dripping or had already dripped onto the floor, her hands and legs were soiled.<sup>323</sup> What a horror! And her gaze! And the worst thing is that there is no chance I’d have enough strength to get the sheet from underneath her, not a chance!”<sup>324</sup> Hardly able to move from exhaustion and starvation, Vera got another starving neighbor to help roll Mariia Aleksandrovna on her side. Then she cleaned her, changed her clothes and linen, put a hot water bottle into Mariia Aleksandrovna’s hands and to her feet, and gave her some tea. Vera wrote about her efforts that day: “a hideous skeleton of a person got up at night to render feasible help to another skeleton-person whose leg was cramping up, whose heart was weakening, and whose scurvy joints were aching.”<sup>325</sup> Why? Because Vera felt obligated and owed her own survival to her neighbor.

Accounts that speak of care and the support of family, friends, and those outside of the family circle are plentiful and touching in their description of the things people were capable of doing to save loved ones. In many ways, Leningraders were compelled to help others out of duty, sometimes resenting them or feeling obligated, as there were no other viable survival options. But even then, a person had to have courage, moral strength, and the will to not despair, break down, or eat someone else’s piece of bread and share his own piece, think about somebody besides themselves, and act in defiance of

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<sup>323</sup> In people diagnosed with alimentary dystrophy, diarrhea indicated the final stage of malnutrition. Generally after the onset of diarrhea, fatality was just a matter of a few days.

<sup>324</sup> Vera Berkman, diary entry for June 12, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivikh*, p. 92.

<sup>325</sup> *Id.*, p. 102.

nature's most fundamental self-preservation instinct. Inna Ivanovna Liubimenko noted that "while nasty scenes could be often witnessed in the ration queues (even at the House of Scientists' cafeteria some men on occasion hawkishly snatched the plate that seemed fuller to them from a waitress), sacrificing oneself – not necessarily for one's closest relatives – was a fairly common matter in family circles."<sup>326</sup> Engaged in constant self-monitoring spurred on by a new, cruel reality, *blokadniki* struggled to determine what was right and what was wrong. They measured an essentially pragmatic desire to preserve themselves against an ingrained concept of the collective that impelled them to reach out to each other, often paying the highest price for remaining human in such inhumane conditions.

Deeply interlaced with the notions of patriotism and devotion to the homeland, the nuclear family was regarded as a steadfast foundation of ethical norms and self-sacrifice and was promoted as such by the media. The written accounts and recollections do not dispute this optimistic view of immediate and accidental families, but they add the description of how all families went through extreme privation. And while some families broke down, others grew stronger and closer. The period of "mortal time" became the determinant of a family's stability and potency. It also revealed that some people's motivations within the familial circle were not so altruistic, and that complete strangers were at times more capable of selfless acts than loved ones.

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<sup>326</sup> E. Basargina, O. Kirikova, "Vospomonaniia I.I. Liubimenko o mesiatsakh voyny i blokady v Leningrade. 22 iunia 1941 – 12 iulia 1942 gg." (Document publication from the archival fonds of the Russian Academy of Sciences, SPb Branch.) URL: <http://www.ranar.spb.ru/rus/books6/id/679/>

## CHAPTER III

### Art and Culture

“Light doesn't shine in the light; it shines in the dark.”  
Erich Maria Remarque, *Three Comrades*

Regardless of the name the city of Leningrad has had in any given historical period, it has come to be the largest center of visual and performing arts, literature and music, and culture and poetry in Russia. The members of the cultural elite, or *intelligentsiia*, who had not left the city – either by choice or otherwise – perceived art as a stimulus for survival. In the beginning of the siege, the city administration had doubts about the practicality of retaining performing arts and music life in the city, and the management of the Radio Committee considered music to be inappropriate to the situation. But with the growing patriotic trends, the demand for this work at the front and inside the city also increased, making the authorities recognize creative arts as one of the most powerful instruments in promoting the patriotic spirit. The Nazi siege added an external motivation to reinforce a sense of national unity and pride.<sup>327</sup> As a reactionary force to harsh events, the city culture not only sustained the creators and the residents, inspiring hope and evoking pride, but also proved to be beneficial to the authorities as well. While keeping tabs on the expression of the negative (hardships and hunger), they encouraged any dissemination of information that had to do with art (as it was supposed to serve as evidence of the overall cheerful attitude in Leningrad). Thus, despite everything, cultural life in Leningrad continued to flourish, although this “flourishing” greatly differed from what it used to be like in peacetime. Daily worries and survival

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<sup>327</sup> Katlin Harris, “The Three Major Shifts in Soviet Music during World War II” (*Monarch Review*, Vol. 3, November 2016): 74.

dilemmas that consumed the residents' time and energy overshadowed the desire for entertainment.

While the city authorities provided additional sources of food for the artistic community, hunger plagued them no less than other *blokadniki*.<sup>328</sup> Those who remained hopeful continued to live and work, trying to retain dignity in the circumstances that presupposed its breakdown. Theater director Aleksandr Dymov made a sarcastic entry in his diary on January 25, 1942:

Dearest fellow editor, Mr. Stomach! I am weak and frail. I have to make great effort to move my legs, and my face has forgotten how to smile a long while back. I've been tormented by the inveterate and chronic – like rheumatism – hunger for a long time. But I am trying not to fall because once fallen I'll very quickly be trampled over by death. I am still holding out and even writing *Notes from The Dead City*. This is the reality. But I have not yet forgotten how to think clearly and read books; I want to philosophize... I want to think about not only the grub but many other things that have nothing to do with food. I want to dream about the future, a wonderful future. But wonderful not because it is filled to the top with potatoes, bread, and sunflower oil. You see, I want to be a human being. Do not refuse me this pleasure. Trust me, you will be relieved as well. Otherwise, both you and I will be ashamed for these days.<sup>329</sup>

Observations made by the scientists and medical specialists during the siege verified that “the primacy of intelligence and determination to work and create” greatly increased chances of survival because otherwise “despondency, anxiety, apathy, and self-intimidation” only ensured the development of *distrofiia*.<sup>330</sup> Prominent linguist Dmitrii Sergeevich Likhachëv made a similar conclusion:

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<sup>328</sup> In addition to Category II ration, many of the prominent cultural workers and scientists had additional sources of provision: their places of work provided supplemental rations on occasion and organized cafeterias for employees. See for example, the order dated December 26, 1941 by Andreenko on the extra food (without ration cards) to be delivered to the members of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 4 D. 60. L. 189. Also, for a detailed explanation of the ration system refer to an Appendix III.

<sup>329</sup> Granin and Adamovich, *Blokadnaia kniga*. Chast' 2, p. 225-226.

<sup>330</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. 348. Op. 1. D. 44. L. 9.

The human brain was the last to die. At the time when arms and legs ceased to function, when fingers no longer could fasten the buttons, when there was no strength left to close your mouth, when the skin blackened and tightly hugged the teeth, and the face revealed skull bones with denuded and laughing teeth, the brain continued working. People kept diaries, wrote philosophical opuses, conducted scientific research, deliberated sincerely, ‘from the heart,’ demonstrated unusual steadfastness, and did not give in to daily fuss and worthlessness. Painter Leonid Chupiatov and his wife died from hunger. Even as he was dying, he continued painting. When he ran out of canvas, he used plywood and cardboard...<sup>331</sup>

Chupiatov was not the only one. Artist and architect Moisei Vakser passed away on February 4, 1942 at the in-patient hospital of the Fine Arts Academy. There were three things on his bedside table: Balzac’s *Lost Illusions*, a pencil, and a drawing pad. His last entry in the diary that he called “The Cave Man Notes”<sup>332</sup> read:

In the Academy that smells like life [...] I was drawing with one hand... almost with my nose, pastel crumbled; I was fatigued from the tension caused by hatching, but it raised my spirits, brought me up, and I felt like I was back in the saddle... Undoubtedly, we’ll survive! Art is a great thing that is worth living for.<sup>333</sup>

But a desire to live could not sustain a physically depleted body by itself. Children’s writer and poet Daniil Kharms died on February 2, 1942. Folklore illustrator Ivan Bilibin lost his fight with hunger on February 7, 1942.<sup>334</sup>

Actors and musicians who refused evacuation and stayed in the city continued performing. Working in the unheated building, actors remained true to the profession by wearing costumes (at times barely dressed) and applying full character make-up. On

<sup>331</sup> Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia*, p. 342.

<sup>332</sup> Just like his teacher Aleksandr Sergeevich Nikol’skii, Vakser lived in the dim basement of the Hermitage.

<sup>333</sup> Ari Vakser, *Vakseril’ia* (Tel-Aviv: Beit Nelli, 2001), p. 23.

<sup>334</sup> Anna Ostroumova-Lebedeva, *Avtobiograficheskie zapiski*, vol. 3, p. 277. Entry for February 20, 1942.



December 7, 1941, violinist Lev Margulis wrote in his diary: “Around 14:00 I was at the Philharmonic Hall. We performed Beethoven’s *5th* [Symphony] and *1812* wearing coats. The audience had coats on and was shivering with cold.”<sup>335</sup> Vera Inber was among those who came to that concert and echoed Margulis: “It is hellish cold. The chandeliers are quarter-lit at best. Orchestra members are wearing quilted jackets or half-length fur coats... The concertmaster is heavily unshaven—perhaps, he had nothing to warm the water with or there was no light.”<sup>336</sup> This concert, like many others, was broadcast over the radio. After the war, Karl Eliasberg remembered how on a few occasions he had Germans approach him after the Symphony’s performances saying that they fought at the Leningrad front and heard the Leningrad Orchestra’s concerts of Beethoven, Brahms, Mozart, and Haydn. What shook them the most was the fact that the Soviets were playing pieces written by the “enemies.”

For those who were not artists themselves, books, theater, and music became a source of strength and distraction. Actor Nikolai Kondrat’ev noted, “The Musical Comedy Theater is the only theater that currently performs in Leningrad. Moreover, it is the only place where you can listen to music. Because of this and the desire to forget about the extent of our current reality’s strain, Musical Comedy gets a big audience.”<sup>337</sup> Powerful classical music gave an additional boost of vigor to many residents. Listening to pieces by Strauss, Liszt, and Mendelssohn, Maria Mashkova observed that “everything inside me is unthawing, seceding, and the feeling of hunger hides away... It turns out that

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<sup>335</sup> Lev Margulis, diary entry for December 7, 1941. *Chelovek iz orkestra. Blokadnyi dnevnik L’va Margulisa* (Sankt-Peterburg: Lenizdat, Komanda A, 2013).

<sup>336</sup> Vera Inber, diary entry for December 7, 1941. *Pochti tri goda. Leningradskii dnevnik* (Sovetskaia Rossiia, 1968), pp. 41-42.

<sup>337</sup> Nikolai Aleksandrovich Kondrat’ev, diary. TsGALI SPb. F. 338.

this world still contains music, books, poems, and friends and not just ration cards and black corpses.”<sup>338</sup> Although, just like the ever-changing pulse of the city, the pulse of the performing arts was uneven. Hunger weakened and disabled many artists, and when on January 25, 1942, the Musical Comedy’s electricity was cut off, its troupe was sent closer to the Ice Road. The month-long silence was broken on March 4, 1942, with an operetta by Imre Kálmán, *Silva*.

When Vladimir Mayakovskii’s<sup>339</sup> poems were published in the besieged city in 1941, they were instantaneously sold out. “The war is raging. There is hunger; it is freezing cold. Is it even possible to think about books and poetry? Yes, it is! It is possible to not only think but also live through art, make it your life,” teenager Zina Savkova remembered. – “Theaters of the besieged city are open, volunteer acting troupes are performing, and independent companies of dancers, singers, and musicians are working.”<sup>340</sup> Another diarist remarked that “instead of breakfast, I decided to go to the theater... Watched Musical Comedy’s operetta *The Bat*<sup>341</sup>... the theater is full.”<sup>342</sup> The musicals staged did not aim at raising patriotic spirit;<sup>343</sup> their significance was in maintaining a degree of sophistication and cultural development among the *blokadniki*.

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<sup>338</sup> Maria Mashkova, entry for March 10, 1942. RNB, Fond 1407, ed. hr. 21.

<sup>339</sup> Russian Soviet poet, artist, and playwright. Admired Lenin and generally supported the Bolshevik movement (although his relationship with the Soviet state was complex).

<sup>340</sup> Savkova, *Ostat’sia chelovekom*, p.38.

<sup>341</sup> *Die Fledermaus* by Johann Strauss.

<sup>342</sup> Aleksandr Avgustyniuk, entry for December 22, 1941, TsGAIPD SPb, F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 1. L.24.

<sup>343</sup> The repertoire of the Musical Comedy troupe for the first blockade year was as follows: July-September 1941 – Franz Lehár *Eva*, Leo Fall’s *Die Dollarprinzessin*, Imre Kálmán *Mariza*; November 1941-January 1942 -- Jacques Offenbach *La Périchole*, Imre Kálmán *Die Bajadere* and *Silva*, Nikolai Strel’nikov *Kholopka*, Louis Verneuil *Les Trois Mousquetaires*; spring-summer 1942 – Boris Aleksandrov *Wedding in Malinovka*, Carl Zeller *Der Vogelhändler*, and Rudolph Friml’ *Sailor’s Love*.

The aspect of culture submerged them into a relatively civilized reality, detaching (even for an hour or two) from their otherwise primitive existence. Feeling the characters' emotions, being around other people, and silencing the thoughts of food made people better and allowed them to retain (albeit not everyone and not always) sympathy.

Volunteer performances helped both actors (by keeping them busy) and the audience (by shifting their focus onto something enjoyable). A professor of the Theater University recalled that a teacher from an orphanage on Mokhovaia Street that used the university's shelter<sup>344</sup> asked him if any of the acting students would mind performing for the children during the air raids to help them cope.<sup>345</sup> And "Leonid Fëdorovich Makar'ev organized the first concert group for children. Throughout October we performed daily, sometimes twice a day."<sup>346</sup> These shows where children listened to fairytales and songs distracted them from their perplexing reality and created a semblance of normalcy.

Considering performing as their contribution to "defense" and with the hope of getting something to eat, "workers of culture" (*rabotniki kul'tury*)<sup>347</sup> played for soldiers at the front and in the hospitals to boost their morale. In December 1941, actor Feodosii Griaznov wrote:

There is this realization that, despite everything we are going through, we give all our strength to the soldiers and officers by staging performances without getting paid and that we are doing something useful by allowing them to take a break and

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<sup>344</sup> Most of the institutions had their own bomb shelters.

<sup>345</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. 352 Op. 1 D. 80 L.7.

<sup>346</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>347</sup> It is an umbrella term that encompasses representatives of such professional fields as music, theater, film, radio, art, literature, etc.

rest. Although, it is a pity that we are not being fed for that... But it simply means that they cannot. The city's food supply issue is imperative in its urgency.<sup>348</sup>

These volunteer artist teams staged 24,000 concerts and 600 plays in the first year of the siege.<sup>349</sup>

A group of composers was among those who did not evacuate or enlist in the army, remaining in Leningrad. Boris Vladimirovich Asaf'ev worked in a small room at the Pushkin Theater and without so much as a piano, he wrote the Fourth Symphony "Motherland." His letter dated February 25, 1942, said: "I am alive and in great spirits... I compose a lot of light, clear, and austere music that is stylistically very new to me."<sup>350</sup> Prior to being flown out in October, Dmitrii Shostakovich was composing his famous *Seventh Symphony* dedicated to Leningrad, working on it with "inhuman intensity."<sup>351</sup> The world of art, in contrast with the material one, sometimes seemed to have the power to postpone death. Coming back home on a February evening in 1942, 18-year-old artist Elena Martilla sensed that if she went to bed that night, she would not wake up. She decided to fight by painting. Completely engulfed by the project, Elena finished only once the sun came up.<sup>352</sup> She lived to see the end of the siege.

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<sup>348</sup> From the diary of actor Feodosii Griaznov (entry for December 24, 1941) in *Dozhivëm li my do tishiny? Zapiski iz blokadnogo Leningrada*. Sost. Koval'chuk, Rupasov, Chistikov, (St.Peterburg: Nestor-Istoriia, 2009), p. 165.

<sup>349</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 4.

<sup>350</sup> Andrei Kriukov, *Muzyka v gorode-fronte* (Muzyka. Leningradskoe otделение, 1975), p. 58.

<sup>351</sup> Quoted by Peggy Daniel in *Tanglewood: A Group Memoir* (New York: Amadeus Press, 2008), p. 63.

<sup>352</sup> Magaeva, Martilla, *Mucheniki Leningradskoi blokady*.

Reading and books also helped people cope and survive. The Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library (SPL)<sup>353</sup> remained open during the siege.<sup>354</sup> Officials and library members requested books, related to issues at hand: books on wild edible plants, starvation, lighting, cooking, physiotherapy, military technology, field surgery, and military engineering.<sup>355</sup> Besides thematic literature, library employees satisfied abundant requests placed by individuals and hospitals – “those who wanted to escape into the world of fantasy for a short while”<sup>356</sup> – for fiction; for historical and archaeological works on Pushkin, Peterhof, Pavlovsk, Gatchina; for information on university enrolment; for synopses of plays, operas, shows, and their reviews. While the number of people who used the library was a fifth<sup>357</sup> of the pre-war period, the SPL continued fulfilling the orders placed by its readers throughout the entire siege.

For Leningraders, books equaled life as they ensured both physical and mental survival. After the death of her family, Irma Issi remained in her cold apartment alone. In her words, “the only thing that saved [me] was books, books, and books.”<sup>358</sup> Books were burned warming people in the freezing cold of their apartments;<sup>359</sup> they were sold or

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<sup>353</sup> Now the Russian National Library.

<sup>354</sup> Before the war, Leningrad had 52 libraries. 22 of them continued serving residents on daily basis during the siege.

<sup>355</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. R-97. Op. 3. D. 969. L. 7-8. (M. Gol'zblat's recollections. 1944.). TsGALI SPb. F. R-97. Op. 3. D. 969. L. 22. (Petrovskaia's recollections. August 1944.). TsGALI SPb. F. R-97. Op. 3. D. 696.

<sup>356</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. R-97. Op. 3. D. 969. L. 8. (M. Gol'zblat's recollections. 1944.)

<sup>357</sup> TsGALI SPb. F. 5039. Op. 4. D. 19. L.1. (as of June 10, 1942). Per the report TsGALI SPb. F. R-97. Op. 3. D. 696. L. 21, ratio between the number of the SPL visits in the first half of 1941 and its second half was 100:10.

<sup>358</sup> Irma Issi, “Kak my vyzhili. Moia voina, moia blokada...” In Glezerov, ed., *Blokada glazami ochevidtsev. Dnevnik i vospominaniia: Kniga tret'ia*, p. 68.

<sup>359</sup> *Ibid.*

exchanged for food;<sup>360</sup> binding glue served as a source of nourishment.<sup>361</sup> Reading belles-lettres, novels, adventure literature, and poetry – just like keeping diaries – became a way to deal with unbearable daily pressures. People used reading as the means of keeping their sanity and postponing mental deterioration. For some, this escapism allowed the perception of the “impossible actuality” as a “frightening dream filled with nightmarish visions.”<sup>362</sup>

For others, reading had nothing to do with escapism. On the contrary, it was a form of confrontation. Yearning to get answers to or explanations of the terrible predicaments immediately at hand, the *blokadniki* turned to literature for clarification. Thus, Lidiia Ginzburg observed that Tolstoy’s *War and Peace* was one of the works that “people read avidly in order to verify the accuracy of their perceptions... And the reader told himself: well then, this means that my feeling of this is right. It means that this is how it is. Those who had enough strength to read, indeed avidly read *War and Peace*.”<sup>363</sup> Self-validation and comprehension of the situation by means of reading served as a healing method for people psychologically numbed by fear and grief. Ol’ga Berggol’ts saw her writing as the only way to survive: “I must write. I must do something in order to live and not go crazy... We must carry on, and I shall write and work because anything

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<sup>360</sup> Vitalii Bianki, *Likholet’e*, p. 174.

<sup>361</sup> Pavel Luknitskii, *Skvoz’ vsiu blokadu. Dnevnik voennogo korrespondenta* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1978), p. 180.

<sup>362</sup> Ostroumova-Lebedeva, *Diary: June 12, 1941 – February 12, 1944*. RNB OR, Fond 1015, ed. hr. 57.

<sup>363</sup> Lidiia Ginzburg, *Prohodiashchie kharaktery. Proza voennykh let. Zapiski blokadnogo cheloveka* (Moskva: Novoe izdatel’stvo, 2011), p. 152.

else means death.”<sup>364</sup> Having the same kind of therapeutic effect, diary writing eased emotional burdens and required discipline, giving some kind of structure to a daily routine. In addition to Ol’ga Berggol’ts and Vera Inber, there were many other scribes in the besieged city. They kept journals and diaries, wrote essays and poems to save their minds from madness and to make sense of the dreadfulness around them. Countering the atrocious atmosphere of the blockade, diary writing, book reading, drawing, performing arts, music, and other expressions of spiritual and intellectual life became a means of self-defense, preservation of self, and, in many cases, ensured physical survival.

With all the rumors circulating, radio became a source of vital information and motivation. It brought residents together, made it easier to withstand struggles and hunger, offered words of reassurance, and uplifted Leningraders’ spirits. “Music on the radio is a huge consolation. Particularly on the days of darkness and cold. You are lying under the blanket and listening to Borodin’s symphony, Tchaikovsky’s concert for piano and orchestra, or ‘Life for the tsar’... Splendid,” wrote Aleksandr Bardovskii on December 3, 1941.<sup>365</sup> “Radio helped,” echoed Tat’iana Kononova in her January 1942 notes.<sup>366</sup> The city had 460,000 individual and over 1,700 public loudspeakers, and residents always gathered around them to hear the latest news and updates.

Due to electricity shortages, some of the district substations had blackouts and radio broadcasting was frequently interrupted. Per poet Ol’ga Berggol’ts (who worked as

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<sup>364</sup> Berggol’ts, Diary entry for January 14, 1942, in *Dnevnye zvezdy*, p. 266.

<sup>365</sup> Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Bardovskii, *Dnevnik*, entry for December 3, 1941. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 7. L. 65.

<sup>366</sup> Tat’iana Alekseevna Kononova, *Notes*, entry for January 27, 1942. RNB OR, F. 1273, ed.hr. 1, l. 2.

a broadcaster for the radio committee and whom Leningraders lovingly called “the muse of the besieged city”), people could withstand the absence of bread but not radio.

Frightening people with cloth masks that covered up their faces began emanating from the snowbound depths of the city heading to the radio committee building... There were many of them, and they all came asking the same anxious question: why did the radio fall silent? How soon will it begin to speak again? Is it possible to make it happen now, immediately? Because otherwise, it is unbearable to go on like this.<sup>367</sup>

Berggol'ts spent the entire siege in Leningrad. Various diaries speak of the broadcasts where she recited poems about death, fear, hunger, and daily suffering. Her soothing solemn voice entered *blokadniki* homes, giving them hope and the desire to fight.

The Leningrad Radio Broadcast Network had twelve broadcasters and was on air 24 hours a day, transmitting the latest news, music, book and poetry readings, words of encouragement, and air-raid warnings, thereby becoming a symbol of solidarity and social connection during the siege.<sup>368</sup> Airtime between programs was filled with the sound of a ticking metronome. Its beat increased from continuously sounding 55-60 beats a minute to an alarming 120-150 beats a minute when the *Luftwaffe* planes approached, thus, warning people of air-raids. The sound of the metronome was associated with the beating heart of Leningrad. Psychologically it had an immensely soothing effect: as long as people heard it, they knew that the city was still alive and “its heart was beating.”<sup>369</sup>

As a means of propaganda, the Radio Network targeted partisans and residents of the German-occupied territories, frontline soldiers, the Baltic navy, and children. It also

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<sup>367</sup> Berggol'ts, *Dnevnye zvezdy*, p. 199.

<sup>368</sup> Radio broadcasting was unstable due to electrical issues in the city until February 1942. Once resolved, radio broadcasting functioned without interruption.

<sup>369</sup> Berggol'ts, *Govorit Leningrad*, p. 171.



broadcast in German, Finnish, Swedish, and Estonian.<sup>370</sup> In many ways, besieged Leningrad's life was regulated by radio announcements: air-raid alarms, shelling warnings, changes in rationing, instructions in case of night raids, fire protection, and communal vegetable gardens. Serving as a source of moral and cultural motivation, education, organization, and propaganda, the radio mobilized the residents and united them into a uniform and monolithic defense circuit.

Devising the formula for the army's effectiveness, Leo Tolstoy asserted that it was the product of the quantity (masses) and the factor unknown, with the latter being the spirit of the army. For Leningrad, where civilians turned into combatants, art and culture (for the majority by the way of radio) constituted a part of that unknown. The spirit triumphed on Sunday evening of August 9, 1942. Barely alive from starvation, the musicians – who due to weakness managed to play only parts of the piece after a week of rehearsals – premiered Shostakovich's 7<sup>th</sup> *Symphony*. The music was broadcast through the loudspeakers across Leningrad and its frontline. The actual musical excellence of the piece is debatable, but as an expressive means of psychological warfare, the *Leningrad Symphony* became a remarkable symbol of defiance and resistance. Unbroken and proud, the residents listened. Silenced by a Soviet barrage, their tormentors also did. And it became crystal clear: those who survived in the absence of actual nutrition by nourishing their souls could not be subjugated.

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<sup>370</sup> The foreign department of Radio Committee employed Finnish poet Armas Äikiä and two Austrian brothers, Fritz and Ernst Fuchs. Ol'ga Berggol'ts wrote texts that brothers voiced in German. The records were later transmitted via broadcasting center for the Nazis to hear. Both Fritz and Ernst survived the siege. Berggol'ts. *Dnevnye zvezdy*, p. 184.

## CHAPTER IV

### Self-Interest and Moral Decay

“Wherever you turned, there was villainy and nobleness, self-sacrifice and extreme egoism, thievery and integrity.”<sup>371</sup>

*Homo homini lupus est.*

The onset of the “mortal time” drastically changed Leningraders’ lifestyles, daily patterns, social interactions, and personal behavior. Daily conditions that threatened survival necessitated the employment of either individual or collective strategies to preserve the self. The choice depended on a personal assessment of the risks and psychological makeup. Disrupting physical and social environments, the war morphed the rates and types of crime and delinquency.<sup>372</sup> After the imposition of martial law on June 22, 1941, the *militsiia*<sup>373</sup> was reorganized and governed by the Military Council of the Leningrad Front and the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Municipal Council until the end of the war. Duties of the *militsiia* and other NKVD units<sup>374</sup> also changed,

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<sup>371</sup> Likhachëv, *Vospomonaniia*, pp. 336-337.

<sup>372</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 990. L. 80-86.

<sup>373</sup> Legitimate body of power – within the NKVD structure – *militsiia* units were entrusted with the tasks related to the city’s order and security: participation in the internal defense of the city, building anti-landing barriers, internal and external defense lines, ensuring the evacuation of the population, fighting crime, imposing the curfew, security checks of the incoming transport, arranging mass burials, and so forth. The *militsiia* also provided protection and ensured the security of the NKVD USSR Military Auto Road #101 (the official designation of the “Road of Life”).

<sup>374</sup> On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, Leningrad’s law-enforcement system had a number of interconnecting services and departments (i.e. the Criminal Investigation Department, Anti-Corruption Squad, forensic services, strategic equipment and communications, traffic control, and border patrol). On July 17, 1941, a special unit of military counterintelligence within the NKVD structure has been formed. These units ensured the internal security of the Soviet armed forces and had 1,224 agents serving at the Leningrad front in 1942. Rearguard and security duties were distributed between *militsiia*, border patrol, and the chief of the Leningrad front’s rare Georgii Andreevich Stepanov. They entailed establishing control and check points, observation posts, allocation of duty patrols, night watch, ambushes, intelligence groups, etc. In addition, the NKVD infantry divisions (1<sup>st</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>) actively participated in the military operations under the command of the Red Army. Russian State Military Archive. F. 32880. Op. 5. D. 22. L. 104.

and they were assigned such diverse tasks as internal city defense, participation in the MPVO (Local Anti-Air Raid Defense) system, detection of “moles,” deserters, and defeatists, countering threats, passport and curfew control, help with evacuation and orphan placement, organization and control of the housing defense groups,<sup>375</sup> protection of civilians, industrial security, and direct cooperation with the NKVD and NKO (*Natsional’nyi Komitet Oborony*, National Defense Committee). The *militsiia* also had to accompany bread delivery trucks to the stores, be present during the ration card exchange, remove dead bodies from the streets, and issue death certificates.<sup>376</sup> Timely mobilization, proper instructions, reinforcement, strict regulations, relocation of criminal elements, and proactive residential involvement ensured the maintenance of public order throughout the siege.<sup>377</sup> Additionally, the NKVD had a large number of voluntary and involuntary informants in the city.<sup>378</sup> Using a “carrot and stick” method, NKVD recruited from three main categories of residents: those who wanted to retain Category I ration, canteen or store employees, and medical personnel. The motivating factors for cooperation included increased rationing, the possibility of evacuating family members, improvement in living conditions, former arrests history, or availability of discrediting

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<sup>375</sup> Similar in function to the neighborhood watch.

<sup>376</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 36. D. 186. L. 9-29.

<sup>377</sup> As of September 3, 1941, the NKVD active personnel was 12,916 people (including 1,186 *militsiia* members). RGASPI. F. 83. Op. 1. D. 18. L. 5-14. In June 25, 1942, the numerical strength increased to 77,062 people (6,912 *militsiia* members). TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 3. D. 44. L. 31.

<sup>378</sup> Lomagin gives a number of “a few hundred to 1,500” enlisted each month. Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 211.

information.<sup>379</sup> The combination of strict repressive policies, public collaboration, and increased patriotism effectively promoted stability.<sup>380</sup>

Due to the situation created by the siege, the delinquency rates and crime activities in Leningrad differed from the rest of the Soviet Union. While in all of the USSR the number of crimes heard in a civil criminal court remained the same or decreased (1943), the cases tried by military tribunals increased. Leningrad demonstrated the opposite correlation. The only index that remained analogous on the national and municipal level was the number of people who breached wartime decrees and regulations (on hours of employment, frivolous abandonment of workplace, mobilization and utilization of manpower).<sup>381</sup>

In Leningrad, the first period of the war was characterized by the emergence of anti-Soviet activism (actions/agitation that undermined the current order), the spreading of rumors, and political leaflets. The criminal activities of the second period from December 1941 to March 1942 were not political and were almost entirely instigated by hunger and had to do with the city's food supply. As hunger raged, Leningraders' feelings numbed and they regarded death with "dull indifference."<sup>382</sup> In some, such indifference slowly etched away kindness, readiness to defend the weak, and the ability to sympathize. Daily encounters with the dead on the streets, in buildings, and apartments

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<sup>379</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, pp. 211-213.

<sup>380</sup> Nikita Lomagin, "Upravlenie NKVD po Leningradskoi oblasti pri osushchestvlenii politicheskogo kontrolya v period bitvy za Leningrad," *Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta* Ser. 2 (2005, vyp. 1), p. 56.

<sup>381</sup> Viktor Lunev, *Prestupnost' XX veka: mirovye, regional'nye i rossiyskie tendentsii* (Moskva: Wolters Kluwer, 2005), pp. 155-156.

<sup>382</sup> Dmitrii Lazarev, *Leningrad v blockade* (Trudy Gosudarstvennogo muzeia istorii Sankt-Peterburga. Vyp. 5. Sankt Peterburg., 2000), p. 203.

desensitized people further, at times leading to the distinct overstepping of ethical boundaries. Moral decay manifested itself through cheating, stealing, looting, and occasionally murder. Hunger-driven, these crimes were dictated by the desire to survive. “A person can get used to many things... But it is impossible to get used to hunger. To have a bite of just anything – this desire could not be suppressed by anything,” remembered I. Korolëv.<sup>383</sup> However, there were also those who cited the rise of delinquency as a license for deviant behavior or enrichment opportunity.

Introduced on July 18, 1941, ration “cards became the main objects of illegal and criminal activities during the siege.”<sup>384</sup> Despite the fact that *Lengorispolkom* ratified the use of twelve different forms and four statutory documents in an attempt to regulate card distribution on July 26, 1941<sup>385</sup>, card fraud thrived. In addition to those who attempted to use fraudulent cards to feed the hungry, there were people driven by venal interests. One of the fraud investigation cases involved Z-va, a head of Home association #110, who used the cards to get food but also “sold them and profiteered.”<sup>386</sup>

In their daily fight for life, the *blokadniki* resorted to various tricks for manipulating the rationing system and the bread lines in an attempt to get more food. During the winter of 1941–42, waiting time in line could easily exceed 10-12 hours. Those at the queue’s end attempted to speed up the process by getting rid of people in

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<sup>383</sup> I. Korolëv, “Teplo. Solntse,” in *Pamiat’*. Vypusk 2, p. 267.

<sup>384</sup> Barber and Dzeniskevich, *Life and death*, pp. 29-30.

<sup>385</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 18. D. 1422. L. 95-109.

<sup>386</sup> A.G. Berman, entry for May 22, 1942. In David, ed., *Budni Podviga*, p. 168. Punishment for such crimes varied depending on the circumstances. The most common was imprisonment for the period from two to five years. Conditioned by wartime, such crimes as food theft (particularly of “collective property”), robbery, burglary, murder, and cannibalism were punishable by long-term imprisonment or death with the prior confiscation of the personal property. The sentencing was revised after the war. B. Belozërov, *Front bez granits. 1941-1945 gg.* (Sankt-Peterburg: RDK-print, 2001).

front of them, spreading the rumor that bread was just delivered to a neighboring store. People often left their spots in the line and went to the other shop. Among those who admitted the wrongdoings were the architect Esfir' Levina and the musician Kseniia Matus. They both forged numbered tickets (the stores gave those out to keep the lines systematic) in order to get their rations faster.<sup>387</sup>

Profiteering from others' misery is another topic commonly touched upon in the diaries. *Blokadniki* regarded those who profiteered with open hatred and scorn. Excuses and justifications were dismissed. Taking advantage of the Leningraders' semiconscious condition and the dim lighting, sales clerks cut out a greater number of coupons from the ration cards than necessary and provoked the ire of residents:

How repulsive are these well-nourished, *sonsy* 'coupon-cutters' that removed coupons from the bread cards of starving people, stealing their food in canteens and stores. It was quite simple to do: 'by mistake' they cut out more than allowed, and a hungry person discovered the deception only after getting home when nothing could be proved.<sup>388</sup>

Some diarists expressed strong opinions – “these predators in human form have to be destroyed”<sup>389</sup> – and others merely recorded their observations. A.G. Berman, an inspector of one of the city's accounting bureaus responsible for verifying the proper distribution of the ration cards, noted on May 4, 1942: “Nobody from our accounting bureau, none of the inspectors lost family members. None of them died from *distrofiia*, and none seem to

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<sup>387</sup> Quite often the stores ran out of food, forcing those who stood in line for many hours (sometimes over 12 hours) go to another distributing location. Esfir' Gustanovna Levina, entry for February 3, 1942, TsGAIPD. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 57. L. 6. Kseniia Markianovna Matus, entry for January 29, 1942, quoted by Alexis Peri in Goldman, Wendy Z. and Filtzer, Donald, eds., *Hunger and war: food provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indian University Press, 2015), p. 175.

<sup>388</sup> A.G. Berman, entry for September 20, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 181.

<sup>389</sup> Izrail' Nazimov, entry for January 26, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 133.

be debilitated by hunger like I am.”<sup>390</sup> Her admission indicates that manipulation and card fraud at her organization (and most likely at other similar ones) was fairly common.

Although not prevalent, cheating patients out of their rightful share of food also happened at the health facilities. Varvara Vraskaia, who picked her daughter up from the hospital on November 6, 1941, noticed that the November 7<sup>th</sup> coupon was already missing.<sup>391</sup> The cases of food theft in the facilities for children (orphanages, placement centers, kindergartens) by the teaching staff were rare. Only one diarist mentioned that a newly-hired teacher was fired after the children complained that “while distributing food, she scooped some porridge from the tray with her hand and was eating it in the corner.”<sup>392</sup> Although an adult could easily take advantage of a child by stealing his food, taking from children was a line not many dared to cross, despite dire hunger.

The picture was quite different in public and institutional cafeterias. Having access to the means of survival – food – some personnel took advantage of it. Getting a “lucrative job” (*khlebnoe mesto*) was not easy, and people “dreamed of a job that had anything to do with a canteen or a food store. Those who worked there seemed privileged, but getting a foot in the door was impossible.”<sup>393</sup> Both personal records and official reports provide ample examples of dishonorable behavior. Leningrad authorities were aware of the situation, but state inspections were conducted sporadically due to the lack of assessors and the problem could not be eradicated. Even those who advocated against embezzlement and otherwise behaved honestly had a hard time resisting the

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<sup>390</sup> A.G. Berman, entry for May 4, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 166.

<sup>391</sup> Varvara Vraskaia, *Recollections*. RNB OR, F. 1273, ed.hr. 13, l. 17.

<sup>392</sup> Aleksandra Mironova, entry for March 3, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 61 L. 12.

<sup>393</sup> Evgeniia Mironova, entry for June 15, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 170.

possibility of getting a little bit of food when tempted. Poet Vera Inber made a note in her diary about “a mother [who] did not register the death of her infant. [She] keeps getting his ration of milk (condensed or soy)<sup>394</sup> and sells it at 100 rubles per liter. With this money she buys bread and feeds her husband.”<sup>395</sup> Accepting the “benefaction,” some rationalized that this food would be used to feed children and starving parents, and some did it because they could no longer bear the hunger. This basic need to survive or save someone else took precedence over honesty.

While stores and cafeterias had the highest numbers of thefts,<sup>396</sup> locales where provisions were delivered to also had a problem with thieving. Thus, Vladimir N., secretary of political organization at the Leningrad Front, whose battalion was sent to help with urgent loading and unloading work at the Borisova Griva station, witnessed “the most brazen pilfering.”<sup>397</sup> Assuming that the superiors knew about the theft, he nevertheless justified people’s motives: “Emaciated workers are in no condition to do the job, and there is nothing to supplement their ration with legally...The supervisors turn a blind eye to stealing as it helps them achieve key performance objectives.”<sup>398</sup> In attempts to minimize the cases of theft, the methods of lecturing, persuading, threatening, and disciplining were employed. For the most part, workers stole to feed themselves, and

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<sup>394</sup> Regular milk was substituted with soy and condensed. Thus, in November 1941, Leningrad Milk factory has produced 570 tons of soy milk and only 56 tons of cow milk. TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 17. D. 402. L. 239.

<sup>395</sup> Inber, *Pochti tri goda. Leningradskii dnevnik*, p. 18.

<sup>396</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 4380. Op. 7. D. 33. L. 2.

<sup>397</sup> Vladimir N., entry for March 10, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 155.

<sup>398</sup> *Ibid.*



those who embezzled for profit were in the minority.<sup>399</sup> Undoubtedly, people's decisions to steer clear of profiteering/theft or not varied. The major reason was hunger itself: under the circumstances, people had to do with what little they could get to stay alive. (As the Russian saying goes – “*ne do zhiru, byt' by zhivu*” – “it is not about thriving, it is about surviving,” or, “beggars cannot be choosers.”) Severe punishment and active *agitprop* also impacted such decisions. And some simply did not deem stealing morally acceptable.

As hunger raged, bread (or any other food for that matter) became the local currency. In December 1941, the price of bread went up from the state-levied 1 ruble 70 kopeks per kilogram to 400 rubles on the market, and in January-February 1942 the barter system prevailed.<sup>400</sup> While the *kolkhoznyi rynok* (collective farm market), where people sold products for the face value, was state-regulated, the *tolkuchki* were prohibited because the items were sold or re-sold for more than face value, which was illegal. In addition, the quality-control agencies<sup>401</sup> were unable to inspect all unregistered products and confiscate those that endangered public health. In her recollections, Zinaida Ignatovich talks of Maria Petrovna K. who got some salt at the *tolkuchka* and made soup to feed her daughters and sons-in-law. The ambulance that arrived after receiving the call for food poisoning could not help: everyone who ate the soup was pronounced dead. Chemical analysis of the remaining salt acquired at the *tolkuchka* revealed that Maria

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<sup>399</sup> Vladimir N., entry for March 10, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 156.

<sup>400</sup> Nazimov noted that on Klinskii and Sennoi markets the trade was not for money: Samovar costed 2 kg of bread, watch – 5-6 kg of bread, pack of cigarettes without filter – 100-150 grams of bread (entry for February 8, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 144).

<sup>401</sup> Main state-wide inspection agency was Sanitary and Epidemiological Inspection Service. Its work revolved around foodstuff quality control.

Petrovna was sold poisonous nitrates that physically resembled crystals of salt and had a slightly salty taste.<sup>402</sup>

The chance of being cheated at the *tolkuchka* was very high.<sup>403</sup> In the attempt to regulate the products for sale, the head of the Municipal Market Administration (*Gorupravlenie rynkami*) Kirillov suggested legalizing *tolkuchki* temporarily.<sup>404</sup> He reasoned that

because the barter system is stimulated by the population's basic need for food and essential goods, we must state that repressive measures are not going to prevent this trend from happening. Efforts to eradicate *tolkuchki* altogether from the market squares proved equally useless as they re-emerged in the neighboring alleys.<sup>405</sup>

While there was no official legalization of the barter markets, the *militsiia* kept them under tight control to prevent open exploiting, manipulating, and profiteering. At the beginning of 1942 when the first cases of cannibalism were reported, the *militsiia* paid very close attention to those who had meat or meat products to sell.

People were ready to exchange any valuables they had for something to eat. Anything could have been traded “for a piece of bread: a bicycle, samovar, sewing machine, and even a bed or furniture.”<sup>406</sup> From October 1, 1941, onwards, the authorities recovered a total of 192 tons of foodstuffs and arrested 1,524 people for its embezzlement

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<sup>402</sup> Zinaida Ignatovich, *Recollections*. 1973. RNB OR, F. 1273, l. 10.

<sup>403</sup> Iarov, *Blokadnaia etika*, p. 30.

<sup>404</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 17. D. 402. L. 251.

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>406</sup> Depending on the locale, the rules of trade varied: some places one could buy food for money, in other places people swapped valuables for bread. Prices for food also fluctuated. Thus, Misha Tikhomirov mentioned that “bread is 300 rubles per kilo, rice – 500, butter – 750,” in the entry for December 27, 1941, (*Zvezda*, 2010, #2). Khodorkov recorded the price of bread at 350 rubles, entry for January 14, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 127. Avgustyniuk notes that a kilo of bread costs 500 rubles, a kilo of butter is 1500 rubles, in the entry for February 25, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb, F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 1. L.32.

as a result of searches.<sup>407</sup> Another report demonstrates how desperate the situation in Leningrad had become: trade school students were selling “sweet earth” – dirt collected from the location where one of the Badaev warehouses with sugar and confectionaries burned down – for 10 rubles a glass.<sup>408</sup> What may seem to be a case of preying on people’s misery was another example of the frantic attempt to survive: trade school students were among the most disadvantaged groups in the besieged city (along with refugees).

Plunder, burglary, and *maroděrstvo*<sup>409</sup> served as vehicles for both enrichment and survival. Apartment theft reached “horrific magnitude”<sup>410</sup> and was facilitated by the fact that many homes were abandoned because of the owners’ evacuation or death.<sup>411</sup> It was not only strangers that committed the crimes: “Even your own neighbors force the locks open, steal firewood, break into apartments, shamelessly take all things valuable, appropriate and sell them, thus, profiteering... Markets are full of people with things of their own and stolen.”<sup>412</sup> Quite often Leningraders suspected building superintendents (*upravdom*) in the embezzlement of others’ property as they were responsible for sealing

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<sup>407</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 990. L. 86.

<sup>408</sup> From January 4, 1942, information report addressed to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov by a head of Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b)’s organization and information department (*orginstruktorskii otdel*) Antiufeev. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 5760. L. 3. Also in Ol’ga Berggol’ts, *Dnevnye zvezdy*, p. 142.

<sup>409</sup> *Maroděrstvo* or marauding was classified as a military crime that had to do with stealing things from the injured or dead. During peacetime, it was “looting.” Because Leningrad was considered a city-front, martial law imposed a classification of criminal activities appropriate for wartime.

<sup>410</sup> Z.S. Livshits, entry for March 22, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 54.

<sup>411</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24 Op. 2v. D. 5890. L. 23.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.* Evdokimov speaks of a neighbor’s 14-year-old son who stole food from people in his building. He called the boy a “fake thief” because he was not a stranger. A.F. Evdokimov, entries for April 14 and 15, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, pp. 163, 164.

the empty apartments.<sup>413</sup> Sometimes superintendents resorted to bribing those building residents, who were likely to report their theft and appropriation to the authorities. Concealing or failing to report evacuees and the deceased allowed caretakers and *upravdom* an additional source of personal gain – extra ration cards. Those whose life could be prolonged by the cards also practiced this concealment of the dead; ration cards, issued for a period of ten days, permitted supplementing a miniscule portion of the rationed food for at least those ten days.<sup>414</sup> However, the intent (non-disclosure of the dead) was not always a part of regular residents' motivations to survive (unlike in cases where the main incentive was profiteering).<sup>415</sup> When in January 1942 the city authorities authorized families to keep the ration cards of the perished, frozen corpses still remained in the apartments: the *blokadniki* were too emaciated and weak to remove them.

By the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, cases of organized robberies peaked.<sup>416</sup> Dated January 4, 1942, an information report addressed to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov by Antiufeev, the head of the Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b)'s organization and information department (*orginstruktorskii otдел*), stated that “theft and profiteering increased,” and “in the last few days there were six break-in robberies in the

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<sup>413</sup> Livshits entry for March 22, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 54. Head of Leningrad militia administration E. Grushko wrote about it in his steno gram after analyzing the statistical records. In Iarov, p. 34. Official records also confirm the fact that superintendents, neighbors, and cleaning personnel stole from the empty apartments. *E.g.* see report by the Military Procurator Panfilenko dated April 11, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24 Op. 2v. D. 5890. Ll. 23-25.

<sup>414</sup> Mina Bochaver, *Eto – bylo*. RNB OR, F. 1273, d. 7, l. 59.

<sup>415</sup> In the beginning of the “mortal time,” people continuously reported their relatives' deaths forming long lines at the Registrar's offices. And while the concealment of some deaths was a fact, the order issued by Executive Committee of *Lengorsovet* on January 4, 1942 reports the lack of staff who registered deaths requiring additional help, thus, indirectly confirming that the majority of Leningraders followed the rules. TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 18. D. 1436. L. 80.

<sup>416</sup> See the Public Prosecutor's office report for the period from July 1, 1941 to August 1, 1943. TsGA SPb. F. 4380. Op 7. D. 33. L. 1–16.

Lenin district.”<sup>417</sup> Indeed, many of these robberies occurred at night and were perpetrated by groups, who often carefully planned and staged them. It is also clear from the reports that many robberies were committed in the “heat of the moment,” spontaneously, instigated by a sudden change in the surroundings, and not premeditated. Thus, on January 10, 1942 unknown individuals stole “25 kilograms of candy and 17 jars of jam” from a food truck abandoned during the shelling because assistant manager Fillipova was wounded and taken to the hospital, leaving it unguarded.<sup>418</sup> On January 12, 1942, the report states that a store was looted by a crowd (24 were arrested), “50 kilograms of bread were stolen and part of it was *trampled underfoot*.”<sup>419</sup> Considering that food was the most precious thing in the besieged city, the fact that the bread ended up on the floor and was crushed and that 24 people were detained speak to the impulsiveness of their actions as opposed to those actions being part of an operation that was well-planned.

Unlike robberies or other crimes committed for personal gain, stealing rations exchanged for coupons was hunger-driven and often served as a final cry for help. It occurred in crowded places like stores, markets, or bakeries and was frequently discussed by the diarists.<sup>420</sup> Those who delayed when putting away the bread and cards or did not hide them right away were the main targets of such assaults. Nina Andreeva, who was 11 when the war started, remembered that to prevent theft her mother had sewn a special pocket into the lining of Nina’s fur coat at chest level so that she could quickly put away

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<sup>417</sup> From January 4, 1942, information report addressed to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov by a head of Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b)’s organization and information department (*orginstruktorskiy otdel*) Antiufeev. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 5760. L. 2.

<sup>418</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 5932. L. 2.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

<sup>420</sup> Nataliia Zavetnovskaia, entry for December 31, 1941. RNB OR, F. 1273, l. 32.

ration cards returned by a sales clerk.<sup>421</sup> Because it was easier to take things away from the weak, the hungry went after children.<sup>422</sup> Thus, engineer Livshits witnessed two incidents in one day: a teen attempted to grab a piece of bread from a woman near the bakery, and later in the canteen “a woman snatched bread from a scared child, turned away, and stuffed it in her mouth.”<sup>423</sup> When taking a closer look at the records of this particular kind of theft, it becomes clear that the majority of those who committed wrongdoing were children and adolescents. In most cases, they were orphans, whose parents died from hunger or bombings. Left without any means and destined to die, they resorted to stealing. Antiufeev’s report to Zhdanov reads: “14- to 15-year-old orphaned teens are the most desperate. Orphanages do not take them. Children crowd by the stores and bakeries and often snatch bread and other food from customers’ hands.”<sup>424</sup>

Once an offender got his hands on the lusted after piece of bread, he immediately began eating it, often without even attempting to flee. It was as if the flight-or-fight response was extinguished by the more powerful survival instinct: hunger. Having snatched a tarrying man’s bread off the counter, a “puny and gaunt” 11- or 12-year-old girl ran outside and began taking large bites, swallowing them without chewing. A few people from the line ran outside and began “hitting her with frenzy. Blood trickled from

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<sup>421</sup> Nina Petrovna Andreeva, “V adu blokadnogo kol’tsa,” in Elena Tonchu, ed., *Leningradskie madonny* (Sankt-Peterburg: Mezhhregional’naia obschestvennaia organizatsiia “Soiuz zhenshchin Sankt-Peterburga i Leningradskoi oblasti” Soiuza zhenshchin Rossii, 2010), p. 225.

<sup>422</sup> Klavdiia Karataeva was 13 at the time of siege and recollects that she had to team up with her sister when going to get their family rations “because the boys could take our bread by force.” In *900 blokadnykh dnei: Sbornik vospomonanii* (Novosibirsk, 2004), p. 110. Vera Lisovskaia also recalls such assault, in *900 blokadnykh dnei: Sbornik vospomonanii*, p. 156.

<sup>423</sup> Z.S. Livshits, entry for June 18, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 174.

<sup>424</sup> January 4, 1942, information report addressed to Zhdanov and Kuznetsov by a head of Leningrad Municipal Committee VKP(b)’s organization and information department (*orginstruktorskii otdel*) Antiufeev. TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2v. D. 5760. L. 1-2.

her nose, soiling her hands and bread. The girl did not pay any attention to the crowd and continued shoving pieces of food in her mouth. It seemed that it was easier to tear off her arms than to unclasp her fingers.”<sup>425</sup> The hunger was so overwhelming that everything else faded in comparison. Nevertheless, when the physical craving briefly waned, a feeling of shame arose: “coiling into a small lump, the girl fell onto the wet pavement and wept inconsolably.”<sup>426</sup>

Those who described such incidents regarded them differently than instances of personal enrichment that were harshly judged and moralized. People correlated their circumstances with those of little thieves and, while able to sympathize, could not justify such deeds. Beatings did not serve as methods of revenge, rather, those whose bread was stolen were attempting to get at least some part of their ration back. After all, life itself was at stake and depended on the meager portion received. Despite the frequency of such acts of mobbing, cases that resulted in fatalities are yet to be discovered.<sup>427</sup> As a rule, order was restored quickly, and some noted that people from the crowd often stopped the beatings. Thus, 11-year-old Irma Issi witnessed how a man who snatched bread from her mother at the store was beaten by the crowd. When it finally became clear that all hope to get the ration back was lost, Irma’s mother shouted: “Let him go! Can’t you see that he is no longer a human being?” When Irma asked what she meant by that, her mother explained that,

*distrofiia* has three stages. The third final stage results in a complete exhaustion of the nervous system. A person is incapable of controlling his own actions and no

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<sup>425</sup> Zinaida Aleksandrovna Ignatovich, *Recollections*. 1973. RNB OR, F. 1273, l. 29-30.

<sup>426</sup> *Id.*, p. 30.

<sup>427</sup> Iarov, *Blokadnaia etika*, p. 38. According to his research, there are no known official records that can prove otherwise.

longer comprehends what he is doing; he leads a life of the most primitive animal. His main concerns are centered on food: what and where he can get something to eat. It means that a human being ceases to remain human. The most dreadful thing about it is that now he is capable of eating another human being. Therefore, I am begging you to be very cautious and never enter buildings with strangers.<sup>428</sup>

The first official record describing the cases of cannibalism is dated January 12, 1942.<sup>429</sup> According to the special NKVD report № 10042, the number of people arrested for “the consumption of human meat” was 4 in November 1941, 43 in December 1941, 366 in January 1942, 612 in February 1942, 399 in March 1942, and 75 in April 1942.<sup>430</sup> Military procurator Anton Ivanovich Panfilenko’s memorandum contains information that allows a closer look at the details and statistical data of these gruesome acts. His analytical report stated that “the predominant majority of such crimes involved the consumption of the dead,” and were instigated by famine, and that the cases of selling human meat (or dishes made from it) were few in number.<sup>431</sup> Russian Medievalist and linguist Dmitri Likhachëv asserted that,

cannibalism cannot be indiscriminately judged. It was not conscious for the most part. Those who carved out parts of a corpse’s flesh rarely ate the meat themselves. They either sold it, tricking a buyer or fed their families with it to save their lives... When your child is dying and you know that the only thing that can save him is protein, you’ll carve a corpse.<sup>432</sup>

While there is no discord regarding the motives, there is a discrepancy between personal observations and official reports on the primary use of the meat acquired: Panfilenko

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<sup>428</sup> Irma Issi, “Kak my vyzhili. Moia voina, moia blokada...,” in *Blokada glazami ochevidtsev*, p. 141.

<sup>429</sup> Lomagin. *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 748.

<sup>430</sup> *Id.*, p. 775-790.

<sup>431</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2b. D. 1319. L. 38-46.

<sup>432</sup> Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia*, p. 332.



indicated that the meat was predominantly consumed, and Likhachëv opined that it was intended for sale.

Descriptions of gruesome sights are contained in many diaries. After burying her husband, former nobility Tat'iana Velikotnaia recorded in the diary she kept for her son:

Sasha, if you could only see what goes on at the Shuvalov cemetery! The coffins are not closed! Some have been pried open with the departed lying there in a semi-nude condition because they have been stripped of their clothes. There are naked, beheaded, or partially dismembered corpses. I was horrified at the sight of an emaciated body that had a part of its upper leg carved out. What for? To try to melt out some non-existent fat to sell?<sup>433</sup>

While some people indeed went insane from hunger, there were those who were able to reason and rationalize their actions. During questioning Igor' Vladimirovich Sh-ko, who was arrested for *trupoedstvo* (corpse-eating), explained:

Of course, I know that I did a despicable thing, but my actions were influenced by the unbearable desire to live, the aspiration to preserve myself at any cost. And ever increasing weakness, the feeling of hunger, and fear of my own death numbed all other emotions, and at that time it seemed that nothing could stop me.<sup>434</sup>

Another category of people who resorted to cannibalism was refugees and deserters/criminals (although these were few in numbers). Their situation was hopeless: the former often were unable to find work and the latter did not want to get caught. In either case, receiving ration cards was not feasible. In some ways, thousands of unearthed corpses all over the city provoked those, whose mental state was weakened as a result of constant hunger.

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<sup>433</sup> Tat'iana Velikotnaia, diary entry for February 2, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh*, p. 36.

<sup>434</sup> From the Military Tribunal of Leningrad and Leningrad region's records, dated December 21, 1941, in *Budni podviga*, pp. 135-138.

The emergence of cannibalism cases perplexed the authorities since punitive measures for this type of crime were not proscribed in the Soviet criminal code. After a joint council of civil and military attorneys, the decision to classify it as a violent crime with the most severe penalty – Article 16-59-3, a “special category” – was made.<sup>435</sup> The breakdown of the offenders’ demographic data revealed the following: 63.5% of these crimes were committed by women and 36.5% by men, with no significant variations within the four age groups; occupation-wise, the largest group belonged to blue collar workers at 41%, with those without regular occupation at 31.4%, the unemployed at 22.4%, white collar workers at 4.5%, and peasants at 0.7%.<sup>436</sup> Given the higher percentage of women and the number of dependents in the city, it is possible to presume that women committed the crime to save the lives of their children (or other relatives) and not just their own. The most interesting is the percentage of native Leningraders<sup>437</sup> who violated the law: 14.7%. The other 85.3% were “individuals with limited education” and had arrived in the city at various points.<sup>438</sup> The fact that only 2% of all those arrested had

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<sup>435</sup> *Budni podviga*, pp. 129-130.

<sup>436</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2b. D. 1319. L. 45. Military procurator Anton Ivanovich Panfilenko’s memorandum on crime rates and statistics.

<sup>437</sup> “Native” Leningrader (or Muscovite, or Kievan, or resident of any other Soviet city) was a person, who was born in the city and whose parents and/or grandparents were also born there. With the onset of industrialization in the late 1920s, there was a migration influx from the countryside to Leningrad as the growing industrial city. Over 300,000 refugees from Karelia, the Baltics, Ukraine, and Leningrad region entered the city after the beginning of the war.

<sup>438</sup> TsGAIPD SPb. F. 24. Op. 2b. D. 1319. L. 45. It also must be noted that for the period from July 1, 1941 to July 1, 1943 out of 1700 arrested for the violation of the Criminal Code Art. 16-59-3 (special category – “consumption of human meat”) 78.6% were sentenced to serve time in prison (for *trupovedstvo*), and 21.4% received the capital punishment sentence (for cannibalism). TsGA SPb. F. 4380. Op. 7. D. 33. L. 14. Andrei Dzeniskevich, “Banditizm (osobaia kategoriia) v blokirovannom Leningrade” (*Istoriia Peterburga*, no. 1(1), 2001), pp. 50-51.

previous convictions speaks to the scope of the shift of the mass psyche triggered by hunger.

Clearly, hunger pushed socially acceptable limits, and the diaries illustrate how these boundaries were overstepped and perceived by the residents. In the perception of the besieged, thieves were not those who got something to eat via a tortuous way. To them, theft meant using a piece of bread as a means of preying on the unfortunate and, thus, trampling on mercifulness and compassion by humiliating and stealing from the hungry. Thieves used people's suffering to their advantage: taking bribes to advance one's evacuation, trading a loaf of bread for valuables, stealing and marauding to make a profit at a time when the city was overflowing with corpses and abandoned apartments were left unsupervised. Those lucky ones who got the "crumbs" off someone's feast on a rare occasion were not considered thieves. In the same vein, people recognized the hardships, frequently excusing or forgiving a perpetrator:

I discovered that all my work in the garden has been in vain. Someone stole the entire cabbage crop. What a pity! On the other hand, if they stole the cabbage, it means they ate it, and if they ate it, they stayed alive! To hell with them. Even though they are thieves, after all, they are Leningraders like me.<sup>439</sup>

Although the validity of the diarists' judgments can be disputed, the fact that the logic and morale of those stuck in the blockade ring diverged from the norm cannot be.

In passing judgments about the "arrogant and shameless"<sup>440</sup> deeds (often condemning but at times justifying), the diarists' rhetoric amalgamated tenets of their Soviet upbringing and their own moral standards. Day by day, Leningraders pondered

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<sup>439</sup> Avgustyniuk, entry for September 25, 1942. TsGAIPD SPb, F. 4000. Op. 11. D. 1. L.38.

<sup>440</sup> Z.S. Livshits, entry for March 21, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 159.

and contextualized the concepts of “legitimacy and entitlement”<sup>441</sup> within the “enclosed” social stratum where “a colossal reformulation of values [was] taking place.”<sup>442</sup> While the state reports and figures inform on the types of crime, their scope, demographics, and prevention, the records left by eyewitnesses illustrate the residents’ perception and interpretation of morality tried by tragedy.

Besides shelling and bombing, Leningraders faced an arsenal of adversities foreign to a normal city dweller. Becoming a “norm”<sup>443</sup> in the course of daily practices, dehumanization of death<sup>444</sup> was a result of Leningraders’ physiological changes due to starvation and psychological defense mechanisms that impacted residents’ social behavior patterns.<sup>445</sup> Physician Ol’ga Sergeeva affirmed that “if it was not for the decreased sensitivity and reaction time because of emaciation and cold, I am sure that people would have been unable to psychologically handle the conditions.”<sup>446</sup> Frequent remarks and thoughts on the topic of internal “change” in the diaries allow us to conclude that Leningraders were aware of it and often reflected on it.<sup>447</sup> Regarding these transformations as involuntary and disturbing, people found them outside of the norm.

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<sup>441</sup> Alexis Peri, “Queues, Canteens, and the Politic of Location in Diaries of the Leningrad Blockade, 1941-1942,” in *Hunger and war: food provisioning in the Soviet Union during World War II*, Wendy Z. Goldman and Donald Filtzer, eds. (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indian University Press, 2015), p. 164.

<sup>442</sup> Z.S. Livshits, entry for March 22, 1942, in *Budni podviga*, p. 54.

<sup>443</sup> In the way that diarists spoke of corpses on the streets one can rightfully conclude that they were regarded as objects that were now a part of new horrifying reality.

<sup>444</sup> By dehumanization of death I mean lack of emotional reaction at the sight of dead bodies.

<sup>445</sup> For more on the medical research of the siege, see Barber and Dzeniskevich, eds. *Life and Death in Besieged Leningrad, 1941-44*.

<sup>446</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 9631. Op. 1. D. 4. L. 12.

<sup>447</sup> Mariia Mashkova, entries for February 17, 18, 1942. RNB, Fond 1407, ed. hr. 21.

Undeniably, there were cases of theft, marauding, *trupovedstvo*, and ration card fraud. Forensic psychology holds that the expression of criminal behavior depends on three main factors – social, psychological, biological – and tends to spike in extreme conditions.<sup>448</sup> The situation in Leningrad was precisely that. And yet given the circumstances, the crime rate in the first year of the siege in the city of almost 3 million people was minuscule (1.04%): 31,100 convictions for felonies, infractions, and misdemeanors, and 21,605 people found guilty of breaching the “employment obligation” decree<sup>449</sup> issued on June 26, 1940.<sup>450</sup> These figures, coupled with individual records, permit the conclusion that despite the rise of crime, people acted honorably, worked, and maintained reasonably civil practices and attitudes for the most part.

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<sup>448</sup> P. Salovey, & J. Mayer, “Emotional intelligence. Imagination, Cognition, and Personality” (*Imagination, Cognition and Personality*, Vol. 9(3) 185-211, 1989-90); A. Raine. *The Psychopathology of Crime: Criminal Behavior as a Clinical Disorder* (New York: Academic Press, 1993).

<sup>449</sup> Decree by the Presidium of Supreme Council of the USSR “On the eight-hour work day, seven-day work week, and on the prohibition of voluntarily leaving workplace in the institutions and organizations.”

<sup>450</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 4380. Op. 7. D. 33. L. 15.

## CHAPTER V

### Religion and Faith

Let me tell you a secret. Not all of us will die, but all of us will be changed.  
1 Corinthians 15:51

The turn to religiosity was colossal in scope during the siege: at times of imminent death many *blokadniki* prayed, asking God for protection and salvation. However, unlike those in imperial Russia, the generation raised after the Socialist Revolution of 1917 in an officially atheist society never received religious education.<sup>451</sup> Yet, many people turned to God for help without even knowing or understanding how to address Him. During shelling, orphans who listened to the explosions clasped their hands and fervently pleaded, “Shells, shells, do not fall onto our Leningrad, onto our children.”<sup>452</sup> Historically, religion has always had the potential to be a unifying (dividing) force that brings people, groups, and societies together. Documentary evidence – reports, diaries, criminal investigation documents, photographic material – demonstrating that people debilitated by hunger filled the churches of the besieged city testifies to the fact that religious faith was a vitally important part of people’s lives, and that religiosity played an important role in the city’s defense and Leningraders’ survival.

Unbearable hardships created the necessity for additional support, a source of strength and encouragement, and for many, this void was filled by faith. Before the

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<sup>451</sup> The Bolsheviks, firm believers in dialectical materialism, regarded religious life as antithetical to Marxism. Lenin and the new Soviet government sought to eradicate religion in its entirety and, after expropriating the Orthodox Church’s wealth, the persecution of the clergy and anti-religious activities began. During the 1920s, places of worship were shut down or destroyed, monasteries closed, church publications forbidden, and theological education outlawed. Tatiana Chumachenko, *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002).

<sup>452</sup> Svetlana Magaeva, “Vospominaniia o voine: fiziologiia blokady” (*Neskuchnyi Sad*, #5-6(26) 2007.)

beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the relations between the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and the state seemed to be “on the eve of disintegration.”<sup>453</sup> However, the invasion by Nazi Germany put the ROC on the verge of demise. Supporting schismatic groups, the German forces permitted the work of various sects loyal to the new regime in the occupied territories.<sup>454</sup> It is true that some church hierarchs, who suffered under the Soviet rule, hoped for the Germans to overturn the “godless authorities.” The collaboration of some Orthodox priests under Nazis is a also fact, but German religious policies (one of many elements of the greater occupational policy) adhered to the principle of *divide et impera*, aiming at the disintegration of the ROC without the slightest intention to mend religious life in the USSR.<sup>455</sup> On the other hand, the Orthodox clergy who supported the ROC consolidated their efforts and often helped or joined partisan units.

As a multi-confessional and multiethnic city, St. Petersburg (renamed to Leningrad in 1924) had 80 non-Orthodox and Old-Believer churches, chapels, and houses of worship in 1917. By 1941, only three of them – the Choral Synagogue, St. Maria of Lourde Roman Catholic Church, and The Leningrad Mosque<sup>456</sup> – remained. However, the synagogue was the only non-orthodox place of worship that functioned during the

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<sup>453</sup> Gerhard Simon, *Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R.* (Berkley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 66.

<sup>454</sup> I.e. Baptists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Methodists, Adventists, Molokans, Dukhobors, Skoptsy, Khlysty, Apokalypsists, and others.

<sup>455</sup> Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, *Churches and Religion in the Second World War*, translated by Brian Doyle (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 232. Although, what was true for the occupied territories did not apply to Leningrad that was encircled.

<sup>456</sup> The mosque patterned after Gur-e Amir, the tomb of Tamerlan in Samarkand, was turned into medical equipment storage and remained closed from 1940 to 1956. St. Maria of Lourde Roman Catholic Church remained closed between July 1941 and August 1945.

siege in addition to the Baptist community (officially registered in 1945) that gathered in the apartments of its members.<sup>457</sup> According to the records of the Choral Synagogue, there were over 180,000 Jews in the city before the siege.<sup>458</sup> Nevertheless, the city's predominantly Russian population adhered generally to the Russian Orthodox faith. The diarists do not mention any religion or religious holidays other than Orthodox.

Because of Bolshevik anti-religious policy, by 1941 the Leningrad Orthodox eparchy had only "21 churches; there were no monasteries, theological academies, religious publishers, and so on... The total number of ordained priests, including catacombal,<sup>459</sup> in Leningrad was around 55."<sup>460</sup> Ten of these churches were inside the blockade ring, and daily liturgical prayer and worship were held in all of them except for the Serafimovskaia cemetery church. The latter was closed for the period from January to April 1942 to store dead bodies.<sup>461</sup> The basements of some temples had been transformed into bomb shelters; many were used to store cultural treasures.<sup>462</sup> Kazanskii Cathedral's cellar housed a kindergarten.

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<sup>457</sup> There is very little information about the synagogue community – only that it donated money to the Defense Fund and the city administration allotted flour for the baking of matzah. I also did not find any information on the Baptist community.

<sup>458</sup> Vladimir Tsypin, *Evrei v blokadnom Leningrade* (St.Peterburg: Tsentr i Fond Kholokost, 2016), p. 75.

<sup>459</sup> Underground priests to underground church groups.

<sup>460</sup> Mikhail Shkarovskii, "Religioznaia zhizn' blokadnogo Leningrada po novym dokumental'nyim istochnikam."

<sup>461</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 8557. Op. 9. D. 213. L. 107.

<sup>462</sup> St. Isaac and Sampsonievskii Cathedrals stored masterpieces from the Hermitage and other museums, Vladimir Cathedral – volumes from Public Library, and Krestovozdvizhenskaia church was used as a film vault.



On June 22, 1941, the Locum Tenens of the Patriarchal Throne Metropolitan Sergii (Stragorodskii) of Moscow addressed pastors and parishioners and blessed people in their fight to liberate the native land.<sup>463</sup> Four days later, he pronounced a prayer of supplication for Russian and Soviet victory, and in his patriotic rhetoric, the war was described as an assault on Russia, not the Soviet Union. On July 26, the head of the Leningrad eparchy Metropolitan Aleksii (Simanskii)<sup>464</sup> wrote his speech “The Church calls for the defense of the Motherland,” directing it to the clergy and congregation. But it was his words about patriotism and the religiosity of the Russian spirit spoken at the liturgy on August 10 that had a profound effect on Leningraders:

Just like at the times of Dmitrii Donskoi and St. Aleksandr Nevskii,<sup>465</sup> like at the times of struggle against Napoleon, the Russian people’s victory can be attributed not only to the Russian nation’s patriotism but also to its deep faith in God’s help and a just cause...We shall have the unwavering faith in our final triumph over falsehood and vice, in the ultimate victory over the enemy.<sup>466</sup>

Starting on June 23, 1941, Leningrad parishes initiated voluntary contributions for war needs – money, clothing, food – through the Soviet Red Cross<sup>467</sup> and National Defense<sup>468</sup> Funds. According to the state report, by the end of the year 1941, local

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<sup>463</sup> Ol’ga Vasil’eva ed., *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg. Sbornik dokumentov* (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Krutitskogo podvor’ia; Obschestvo liubitelei tserkovni istorii, 2009). pp. 38-40.

<sup>464</sup> In 1945, Metropolitan Aleksii succeeded to the position of Patriarch of Moscow and all of Russia after Metropolitan Sergii passed away on May 5, 1944.

<sup>465</sup> Aleksandr Nevskii and Dmitrii Donskoi were princes of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries revered in Russian history for leading Russian forces to victory over foreign invaders.

<sup>466</sup> *Pravda o religii v Rossii* (Moskva, 1942), p. 104.

<sup>467</sup> Red Cross Fund accepted food, clothes, medication, and financial donations and was established by the Soviet Red Cross Society that partook in medical personnel training, hospital work, blood donations, etc.

<sup>468</sup> National Defense Fund (Red Army Fund) was a public initiative for voluntary contributions (moneys, valuables, jewelry, etc.) to the needs of the front. It received generous donations and a nationwide support by all social circles as well as the Russian Orthodox Church.

parishes collected 2,144,000 rubles (the average salary of a blue-collar worker in 1940 was 375 rubles).<sup>469</sup> Moreover, as stated in a January 12, 1943, telegram sent by Metropolitan Aleksii to Joseph Stalin, the Leningrad diocese raised and transferred to the national Defense Fund 3,182,143 rubles to that date.<sup>470</sup> In a letter to *Lensovet* dated June 24, 1941, the clergy of Prince Vladimir Cathedral expressed their desire to open up a “lazaret” (infirmary) for the wounded and sick soldiers subsidizing it with the cathedral’s entire fund of over 700,000 rubles.<sup>471</sup> Younger priests enlisted in the army and *opolchenie*, and helped with the construction of the defense fortifications around the city, MPVO (Local Air Raid Defense), and with camouflaging the golden domes against air raids.<sup>472</sup>

Aware of the Church’s active participation in the financial and spiritual mobilization of the population, the city authorities not only welcomed the help, but also encouraged the initiatives espoused by Leningrad clergy and supported it by regularly supplying parishes with lamp oil, candles, flour, and wine for lay communion.<sup>473</sup> The Soviet government saw religion as a potent source of patriotism and an important factor in the country’s defense capable of promoting compliance under a secular authority. The use of the religious aspect by Nazi Germany as an instrument in the ideological war against communism and the incessant queries of the allies on issues of “religious

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<sup>469</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 209. L. 154.

<sup>470</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 17. D. 693. L. 3.

<sup>471</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 79. L. 1.

<sup>472</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 62. L. 73.

<sup>473</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 209. L. 156; TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 80. L. 1-9.

freedom” also impacted the decision to reverse anti-religious policies on local and national levels. Likewise, the ROC had to make a choice whether it was going to support the Soviet government or oppose it. Despite the overall antipathy towards the new power due to numerous grievances suffered at its hand, the Church was aware that acting independently from the state was out of the question. The understanding that Nazi suppression pertained not only to classes but nations impacted the ROC’s choice to side with the USSR.<sup>474</sup> Although both the Soviet authorities and the Church were later accused of opportunism, many overlook that “politics is the art of the possible, the attainable – the art of the next best.”<sup>475</sup> Both needed each other’s cooperation given the urgency of the collective war effort, and their internal disputes had to be set aside.<sup>476</sup> This “policy of compromise” allowed the restoration of religious life and church in the Soviet Union.

Protoierei Glebov recalled that “during the war, many began to pray openly without any secrecy. The fear of state authorities vanished: the war erased it. The need for faith and the Church overpowered the fear.”<sup>477</sup> Archpriest Valentin Biriukov remembered that in the army they quickly learned to pray. Before the bombing, one of the officers told him and other young soldiers: “It’s time to pray to God! All of you pray

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<sup>474</sup> This “deliberation” on the part of the ROC is arguable. Almost immediate response to the news of the Nazi Germany’s invasion by Metropolitan Segrii, who called for the defense of native land, rules out any sort of collective discussion within the Church on the course of action. His attitude was sincerely pro-Soviet, which in many ways pre-determined the possibility of the “policy of compromise.”

<sup>475</sup> The phrase is attributed to Otto von Bosmarck and is often used as a Realpolitik’s slogan with pragmatic goals overweighing ideological ones.

<sup>476</sup> Roger Reese, “The Russian Orthodox Church and ‘Patriotic’ Support for the Stalinist Regime during the Great Patriotic” (*War & Society* Vol. 33, Iss. 2, 2014). Gerhard Simon, *Church, State and Opposition in the U.S.S.R.* (Berkley-Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 67.

<sup>477</sup> From the interview with Protoierei Boris Glebov, Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral of St. Petersburg.

in any way you know or can. If we all do it now, we'll be all right.”<sup>478</sup> Dmitrii Likhachëv admitted, “we prayed in the morning. The children also did.”<sup>479</sup> In such ominous moments, “there was no middle ground. Everything was real. The sky opened up and in the sky, one could see God. Good people clearly saw him. Miracles happened.”<sup>480</sup> Many turned to faith and were baptized. The terminally ill, the hungry, and those with a *distrofiia* III diagnosis (the final and often terminal stage of starvation) remembered words from the Gospels and called on God for help.<sup>481</sup>

Things unimaginable in the anti-religious atmosphere even a month before the invasion were taking place. State publishers printed church leaflets with appeals to join the partisan movement and stay strong in the “holy struggle against invaders.” Orthodox priests spoke in front of Red Army soldiers (many of whom wore crosses), raising their spirits. Churches and cathedrals opened and operated without any restrictions from the government. The Church also played a role – although somewhat indirectly – in the construction of the ice road across Lake Ladoga: records that contained seasonal observations of the river’s ice-thickness kept for centuries by the Valaam monks, allowed hydrologist Churov’s team to chart and plan the commencement of vital deliveries along

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<sup>478</sup> Valentin Biriukov, “Molites’, vrag pod oknom” (*Tikhonovskii blagovest.* – 2011. #2(86)).

<sup>479</sup> Likhachëv. *Vospomonaniia*, p. 340.

<sup>480</sup> *Id.*, p. 342.

<sup>481</sup> Tat’iana Velikotnaia recorded in her diary on March 30, 1942, “It is the Passion Week, I should read Evangely more often.” She died two days later on April 1, 1942. In *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivikh*, p. 80.

the route.<sup>482</sup> The rebirth of the Russian Orthodox Church was spawned at the most dreadful time the country had experienced.<sup>483</sup>

By July 1941, “the churches were full, two liturgies were served daily: the early and the late.”<sup>484</sup> Although the statement about the full churches might be an exaggeration, it has a simple explanation: prior to the war, the churches were often empty and when attendance increased after June 22, 1941, the change seemed drastic. Every church had fire and air defense brigades comprised of parishioners. Special prayers for the Red Army soldiers’ victory and their deliverance from the enemy’s captivity were pronounced during the Divine Liturgies. The *moleben*, a traditional liturgy of thanksgiving and supplication, of 1812 for those who fought against foreign invaders in the Patriotic War was also served.<sup>485</sup>

By the end of September 1941 when the Germans had ceased their attempts to take the city, the legend of Leningrad’s miraculous safeguarding by divine forces was born. The Metropolitan Iliia Salib (or Karam of Mount Lebanon) prayed fervently for the protection of Russia for three days without sleep, food, or water. He had a vision of the Virgin Mary who told him God’s will:

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<sup>482</sup> Iurii Bakhnykin, “Russkaia pravoslavnaia tserkov’ v blokadnom Leningrade” (*History magazine*, #09, 2005). Also in Reid, *Leningrad*, p. 202.

<sup>483</sup> “At first glance, it seems paradoxical that World War II, the most tragic even in the history of our country, became the salvation of the Russian Orthodox Church.” Tat’iana Chumachenko, *Church and State in Soviet Russia: Russian Orthodoxy from World War II to the Khrushchev Years* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), p. 3.

<sup>484</sup> Services were adjusted to the wartime conditions: morning liturgy began at 8:00 and the evening ran from 16:00 to 18:00. From the interview with Protoierei Boris Glebov, Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral of St. Petersburg.

<sup>485</sup> Mikhail Shkarovskii, “Religioznaia zhizn’ blokadnogo Leningrada po novym dokumental’nym istochnikam” (*St. Petesburg Dukhovnaia Akademiia*, 27.01.2015).

There will be no military success until all closed places of worship, monasteries, theological academies, and seminaries are re-opened; until the priests are released from prisons to perform their spiritual duties in the temples. The city of Saint Peter<sup>486</sup> is not to be forsaken. While my image remains within its walls, not a single enemy will enter. The miracle-working icon of Our Lady of Kazan'<sup>487</sup> is to be taken around the city in a cross procession. <sup>488</sup>

When Metropolitan Iliia visited the Soviet Union in November 1947 and came to Prince Vladimir Cathedral, he relayed the vision and confirmed his getting in touch with the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviet government to deliver God's message.<sup>489</sup> Unfortunately, the procession with the Kazan' Icon along the city's borders where the Germans later halted cannot be verified.<sup>490</sup>

Tales of amazing visions, omens, and God's help that circulated in the besieged city clearly demonstrate that many residents believed in and sincerely hoped for a miracle and that perhaps some of them got them. Describing the siege, Archpriest Valentin Biriukov who served at the Leningrad front defending the Ice Road, said that "there were all the conditions for death and none for life. None, except for the faith in God."<sup>491</sup> His

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<sup>486</sup> St. Petersburg/Leningrad.

<sup>487</sup> Revered as the "liberator and protector of Holy Mother Russia," Kazanskaia Icon of Mary and baby Christ came to Russia from Constantinople in the thirteenth century. Its miraculous qualities of helping achieve military victories stem from the year 1612 when Princes Minin and Pozharskii (who prayed in front of the icon, took it in front of their regiments, and carried it into battles) freed Moscow from Polish invaders. Later, it was successfully used in the Battle of Poltava of 1709 against Swedish aggressors and again in 1812 against Napoleon's army. In 1710, Peter I moved the icon from Moscow to St. Petersburg.

<sup>488</sup> Mikhail Shkarovskii, "Religioznaia zhizn' blokadnogo Leningrada," in D. Shkaev ed., *Iazycheskie verovaniia i khristianstvo Russkogo Severa* (Moskva: RAN, 2012), pp. 78-79.

<sup>489</sup> GARF. F. 6991. Op. 1. D. 66. L. 152-153.

<sup>490</sup> *Ibid.* Curiously, the Icon of Our Lady of Kazan' was later taken to Moscow and Stalingrad. During the battle for Stalingrad, it stayed on the right bank of the Volga River which the Nazis did not cross. It is rumored that Zhukov transported the icon to various fronts during the Patriotic War. This fact was confirmed by Zhukov's daughter Maria in her book *Marshal Zhukov: Sokrovennaia zhizn' dushi* published in 1999.

<sup>491</sup> Valentin Biriukov, "Molites', vrag pod oknom" (*Pravoslavnyi Sankt-Peterburg*, №1 (229), January 2011). Online version: <http://www.pravpiter.ru/pspb/n229/ta007.htm>

own survival experience after being wounded Archpriest Valentin attributes to Blessed Kseniia,<sup>492</sup> who came to help nurses with all the ill and injured during the siege.<sup>493</sup> Besides all the lore, there were plenty of miraculous stories of survival when help came out of nowhere. Siege survivor Nina Mikhailovna Fëdorova revealed how in the late fall of 1941 in the absence of food her mother Nataliia boiled old newspapers until they turned into a homogenous mixture and fed it to the 7-year-old Nina and her 3-year-old brother Anatolii. One day when Nataliia went to get their rations, an air raid started and a marine who was trying to save her pushed her down. Getting up, she saw three icons on the snow: of St. Nicholas, St. John, and the Mother of God. The reverse of the latter said, “Baker’s Holy Mother of God.” The next day a soldier gave Nataliia a kilogram of oats on the street. This gift saved their lives that winter.<sup>494</sup> While the exaggeration and possible fabrication of such stories cannot be ruled out, they testify to the growing religiosity (or the need to believe in something that offers consolation and hope) and desire to uplift the spirit and brighten up the days of strife.

In times of fear, hunger, and suffering, Orthodox priests led the tired-out congregation by their own example of stamina, patience, and endurance. Keeping up people’s spirits, they instilled faith and hope that God would not abandon the Russian nation in its struggle.<sup>495</sup> It was this faith that became a source of physical and emotional

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<sup>492</sup> Kseniia Peterburgskaia is a patron saint of St. Petersburg, an orthodox *iurodivaia* (traveling monk/nun or ascetic in the Russian Orthodox tradition).

<sup>493</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>494</sup> Vladimir Zobern, *Bog i Pobeda. Veryiushchie v velikikh voynakh za Rossiiu* (Moskva: Eksmo, 2014), p. 516.

<sup>495</sup> The Orthodox Church traditionally referred to the nation as *Russian* (the entire population of the old country were subjects of the Russian Empire), and to the new state and government as *Soviet*.

strength for those who lived in and defended the city. Without any interference from the city authorities, the assembly of Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral organized a bomb shelter in the cathedral's basement that accommodated 500 people. It had some water and medical supplies, and people could spend the night there in case of emergency. The congregation helped neighboring residents by giving money, firewood, and candles, by allotting plywood to replace shattered window glass, providing wooden planks for constructing coffins, and by making traditional furnaces (*burzhuiki*) out of iron sheets.<sup>496</sup>

The number of diaries belonging to the religiously devout – or at least those who can be easily identified as believers – is limited. Some writings contain brief mentioning of religiosity or awkward prayers. Thus, pondering about the current situation, school student Valeria wrote in her diary:

Mama definitely believes in God. She thinks that papa prays for us, perhaps, aunt Sofa does, and, most certainly, gran Zhenia with aunt Liuba do [all died in December 1941]... Who knows? I don't understand much about it. After all, I am not a believer. Although considering all fortunate things that have been happening to us lately, I am ready to believe in Providence.<sup>497</sup>

Of course, the lack of direct statements and declarations of faith in personal records do not prove the absence of such. Thus, the famous blockade poet Ol'ga Berggol'ts – who not only kept records during the siege but also collected siege diaries sent to her by residents after the war – was a religious person just like Anna Akhmatova, another Leningrad poet evacuated at the end of 1941, but neither spoke of their faith. The diaries of Dmitrii Likhachëv, Tat'iana Velikotnaia, and Vera Berkhman remark on visiting the church, reciting prayers, and observing religious holidays. They also speak of people

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<sup>496</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 4769. Op. 3. D. 147. L. 11-20, 57-58.

<sup>497</sup> Valeria Igosheva, entry for May 1, 1942, in *Detskaia kniga voiny*, p. 80.



whose fight for survival directly or indirectly was influenced by faith.<sup>498</sup> Most Soviet citizens who were religiously devout – the census of 1937 indicates that 57% of the population “confessed allegiance to one or another form of religion”<sup>499</sup> – belonged to the older generation raised in the pre-Soviet period<sup>500</sup> and, generally, consisted of women and the elderly. But, even writing the word “God” – perhaps involuntarily – that is frequently encountered on the pages of various diaries speaks to the fact that people were hoping for some kind of miracle or the protection of a higher force despite their atheistic upbringing.

Information on the scope of Leningrad’s Orthodox congregation is primarily drawn from the wartime notes and recollections of the clergy, their correspondence with parishioners, communications, and reports to the authorities, as well as the NKVD records. According to the reports submitted by the housing political educators,<sup>501</sup> the rise of religiosity began in August 1941.<sup>502</sup> Testifying at the Nuremberg Trials, Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin stated that on the Holy Saturday of 1942 “there was an enormous line of people waiting outside of Prince Vladimir Cathedral to fulfill their Christian devotion”

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<sup>498</sup> Thus, Likhachiov recorded how historian Vasiliy Komarovich sensing his death dated each page of his dissertation. “He counted days. And he saw God: his notes not only bear the dates but also Christian holidays.” In Dmitrii Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia*, p. 343.

<sup>499</sup> Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, *Churches and Religion in the Second World War*, translated by Brian Doyle (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), p. 29. In 1913, almost the entire population of the Russian Empire considered itself religious. It took the state a little over 20 years to cut the number of believers almost in half and raise a new generation of “godless atheists.”

<sup>500</sup> This fact is confirmed in the Order #20 issued by the Reich Main Security Office “On the church issue in the occupied territories” dated October 31, 1941. It states that the young generation is indifferent towards religiosity “in the result of communistic and atheist education.” In *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg.*, p. 531.

<sup>501</sup> Housing political educators – during the siege each apartment building had a superintendent whose duties entailed dealing with rumors, enemy’s propaganda, and information update. They organized lectures on political, military, and historical topics, spoke with people during air raids in bomb shelters and other crowded places. They also helped building managers with injured residents, setting up water boiling and heating stations, etc.

<sup>502</sup> Lomagin, *Neizvestnaia blokada*, p. 244.

and touch the Holy Shroud.<sup>503</sup> An additional source of data is also available from the photo- and cinematographic material archived.<sup>504</sup> For example, the state archive and the Museum of Leningrad Defense contain numerous photos taken by V.G. Kulikov and A.A. Shabanov during Easter 1942 and Christmas 1943 as per orders of the city authorities.<sup>505</sup> The 17,423,100 rubles donated during the sieges<sup>506</sup> by the Leningrad Orthodox diocese and parishioners is also a strong indicator that the level of religiosity in the besieged city was very high.

The patriotic devotion<sup>507</sup> of the Orthodox Church to its native land was not limited to its declared support of the Soviet government or to blessing people in their fight with the aggressors. Its contributions to the national funds for “military needs and presents” to the soldiers, the wounded, and the sick testify to “inexhaustible love and devoutness to the matter of saving the *Otechestvo*<sup>508</sup> and a firm belief that God’s wondrous help will not be lacking.”<sup>509</sup> In changing the international focus to a national-patriotic one, the state’s ideological work conducted through the masses incorporated all aspects of life from cultural and historical to theological and personal. The Orthodox

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<sup>503</sup> *Nurnbergskii protsess*. Sbornik materialov v 2-kh tomakh (Moskva: Gosizdat, 1954), Vol. 1, p. 774.

<sup>504</sup> See Appendix V.

<sup>505</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op.33. D. 76. L. 153.

<sup>506</sup> For the period from July 1, 1941 to December 31, 1944, the contributions made by the city residents amounted to 14,982,395 rubles and 65 kopeks. TsGA SPb. F. 9324. Op. 1. D. 22. L. 10, 22, 24.

<sup>507</sup> Still eliciting debate, the concept of the ROC’s “patriotic devotion” is being questioned for its sincerity. The diametrically opposed ideological rivals, the Church and the atheist state, found themselves on “one side of the barricades.” Those who retained loyal regard for the imperial ways (“white” patriots) condemned the ROC for its unnecessary conformism in dealings with the Soviet authorities.

<sup>508</sup> Native land.

<sup>509</sup> From Metropolitan Aleksii’s words to Leningrad congregation. *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina*, Sbornik tserkovnykh dokumentov (Moskva, 1943), p. 64.

Church acted as a catalyst and a binding component, becoming the pillar of statehood and patriotism. Just like during the time of the tsars when the ROC was imperative to the “dissemination of Russian culture and of norms and values throughout the enormous empire,”<sup>510</sup> in its address to the public, the clergy touched on the subject of the traditional piety Russian people felt towards their homeland, their heightened sense of duty, a strong belief in righteousness, and faith in God. Providing examples from the country’s historical past and remembering prominent military leaders and heroes – “just like during the times of Saint Aleksandr Nevskii and Saint Dmitrii Donskoi, on the ice of Lake Chudskoe, on the banks of the Don River, and at the Kulikovo Field, when the great battle between justice and injustice was fought, now ... the battle between the offensive German and the defensive Slavic worlds is being waged,”<sup>511</sup> – the Church contributed to and promoted patriotic education. Thus, in the fall of 1941, Kazanskii Cathedral held an exhibition on the “Russian nation’s heroic past.” In 1942 it was replaced by the “Patriotic War of 1812.” The military uttered vows of honor and commitment in front of the statues of Mikhail Kutuzov and Michael Barclay de Tolly. As a resting place for such prominent Russian military leaders as St. Prince Aleksandr Nevskii and Alexander Suvorov, Aleksandr Nevskii Lavra’s monastery was also visited by soldiers who were leaving for the front.<sup>512</sup>

Places of worship (like other densely populated areas) became the targets of Nazi shelling and bombings throughout the siege. They conducted particularly ruthless attacks

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<sup>510</sup> Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, *Churches and Religion in the Second World War*, p. 27.

<sup>511</sup> From Metropolitan Aleksii’s address to Leningrad congregation in March 1942. *Russkaia Pravoslavnaia Tserkov’ i Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina*, p. 57.

<sup>512</sup> Mikhail Shkarovskii, *Tserkov’ zovët k zashchite Rodiny. Religioznaia zhizn’ Leningrada i Severo-Zapada v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny* (St.Peterburg, 2005), pp. 108-109.

during religious holidays such as Easter and Christmas. Thus, the *Luftwaffe*'s mass air raids that began at 17:00 on April 4, 1942 and lasted all night until the morning of April 5, 1942, which coincided with Orthodox Easter, targeted cathedrals and churches, the most crowded places in the city.<sup>513</sup> Serving as a senior priest in Prince Vladimir Cathedral, Nikolai Lomakin remembered how those who were still alive tried to find a place to hide after two bombs fell on the temple. People ran to him asking why the Germans bombed the cathedral: "We thought that Germans believed in God, that they loved Christ, that they do not harm those who believe. Where and what is their faith if they are so vicious on the Saturday of Holy Week?"<sup>514</sup>

Despite the bombings, services continued and with time, people remained for the entire duration of the liturgy. Fulfilling his priestly duties, Archimandrite Vladimir who attended to two parishes (Prince Vladimir Cathedral and St. Prince Vladimir Church) regularly risked his life. He testified:

At the time of the shelling, I tried not to interrupt the liturgy and comforted sufferers who came to pray. Even with broken glass falling on our heads, I did not suspend the service. Quite often people brought me to the church on a sled because I could not walk. On Sundays and holidays I went to Lisii Nos, often walking 25 kilometers under fire and overcoming other obstacles, but I never refused the duty entrusted to me.<sup>515</sup>

One of the parishioners who frequented Prince Vladimir Cathedral later recalled that services in December 1941 were held in the churches where

temperatures [inside] fell to zero. Cantors sang dressed in their coats with collars lifted up, wrapped in shawls, wearing *valenki*<sup>516</sup> and *skouphos*.<sup>517</sup> Church

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<sup>513</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 209. L. 243.

<sup>514</sup> *Niurnbergskii protsess*, Vol. 1, p. 774.

<sup>515</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 209. L. 245. Mikhail Shkarovskii, *Tserkov' zovët k zashchite Rodiny. Religioznaia zhizn' Leningrada i Severo-Zapada v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voyny*, p. 36.

<sup>516</sup> Russian wool felt boots.

members who stood and prayed looked the same. Despite all fears, the cathedral's attendance did not diminish. On the contrary, it increased. Services were unrushed and held in full. There were many communicants and penitents, heaps of prayer notes for health and for peace of soul, endless general *molebens* and *pannychidas*.<sup>518</sup>

Understanding the significance of their roles to the community, ecclesiastics of St.

Nicholas Cathedral sent a petition to *Lengorispolkom* asking for “permits allowing free movement at the time of air raids for religious servants N.I. Lomakin, V.A. Dubrovitskii, P.F. Maslov, and N.D. Uspenskii.”<sup>519</sup>

Many members of the clergy either lived at places of worship or moved close to them to save strength and be available to those in need. Metropolitan Aleksii who spent all 872 days of the siege in the city, visited local churches and talked to the clergy and the laity, doing everything in his power to continue services and spiritual guidance. He carried on daily services at Nikol'skii Cathedral where he moved to, and every evening after serving the *moleben* to St. Nikolas he walked around the cathedral praying that the saint would save the city and the cathedral from destruction.<sup>520</sup> Another siege survivor remembered that Metropolitan Aleksii was

so approachable and easy to talk to that even brave Leningrad teens who put out fires caused by incendiary bombs confided their simple matters in him. Anybody in grief or need could come to him. He was like a father and a comforter for the believers... Those who were not religious deeply respected the courageous

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<sup>517</sup> Also, *skufiya*, *skoufos*, a monastic cap worn by Orthodox Christian clergy.

<sup>518</sup> A service for the commemoration of a deceased person. “Kak my perezhivali v Leningrade pervyi god voiny.” (*Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*. 1943, # 3), pp. 30-31.

<sup>519</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 187. L. 70.

<sup>520</sup> Nikolai Lomakin, “Za oboronu Leningrada – za nashu Sovetskuyu Rodinu” (*Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, April 1945, #4), pp. 26-27.

metropolitan for his refusal to evacuate and leave behind his children of God who were in mortal danger.<sup>521</sup>

Like the laity, many priests refused to evacuate in the beginning of the war and faced extreme cold and hunger. During the second and third waves of evacuation<sup>522</sup> when the authorities made a decision to leave in Leningrad only those who were vital to the fulfillment of the war front's needs and the population's essential demands, the parish clergy continued its services. Only two permanent and three catacomb priests were evacuated.<sup>523</sup> This decision constituted the state's unofficial recognition of the religious role in the defense of the city. Although this role had been recognized by the authorities much earlier – when the decision to provide parishes with flour, wine, candle wax, and firewood came in response to the November 1, 1941, letter from Nikol'skii Cathedral's clergy.<sup>524</sup> Another concession made to the Church was permission to conduct large religious processions (on Easter and Christmas) around the churches, which functionally lifted the ban on religious services outside of places of worship.

While living in as equally inhumane conditions as their parishioners, the priests donated their own money to the flock. In the letter sent to Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral on January 18, 1942, singer Evgenii Radeev expressed gratitude for sending him “150 rubles and a piece of bread... You saved me from death. I am feeling much better. Your money bought me some firewood at the market.”<sup>525</sup> The clergy often gave

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<sup>521</sup> V. Teplov, “900 dnei v osazhdennom Leningrade” (*Zhurnal Moskovskoi Patriarkhii*, 1957, #11), pp. 55-56.

<sup>522</sup> Spring and summer of 1942.

<sup>523</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 62. L. 131. *Id.* D. 209. L. 173.

<sup>524</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 62. L. 75. *Id.* D. 180. L. 107, 120. *Id.* D. 80. L. 1.

<sup>525</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 4769. Op. 3. D. 147. L. 22.

their food rations away, which at times resulted in the priests dying of hunger themselves. Learning that Hieromonk Simon, who visited their abode before Holy Unction, died five days later, Vera Berkham suffered pangs of conscience remembering how she did not want to add two cubes of sugar she received to the common table for sharing a meal with him.<sup>526</sup> Mariia Dubovitskaia, ballerina at the Kirov Theater and daughter of Archpriest Vladimir Dubovitskii, said that

[T]here has not been a single day during the war when my father missed work. He was a minister of St. Nicholas Naval Cathedral. Quite often watching him falter from hunger, I cried begging him to stay at home afraid that he was going to fall somewhere and freeze to death. But he replied, ‘I have no right to languish, darling. I must go, bring people’s spirits up, console them in their grief, strengthen, and reinforce their spirit.’ And he walked to his cathedral. Throughout the entire siege – whether there was shelling or bombing – he has not missed a single service. I remember walking him out, watching how the snow hit his back, wind blew up his frock, and wondering what force made him carry on if the last piece of anything he had to eat he gave to me... Father donated money that we had to the city’s defense fund just like many other priests did.<sup>527</sup>

People found consolation in listening to prayers. “One night papa<sup>528</sup> heard me reciting the ‘Our Father’ prayer. ‘Say it one more time,’ he said. I did, and he repeated after me. ‘Recite all the prayers,’ he asked. I was lying in bed reciting them in order.”<sup>529</sup> A deeply religious person, Tat’iana Velikotnaia mentioned how a few days before her husband died he told her that they had to order thanksgiving *moleben* for their son Sasha’s survival, and urged her to take communion.<sup>530</sup> In her diary, she wrote that

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<sup>526</sup> Vera Berkham, diary entry for June 15, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivikh*, p. 99.

<sup>527</sup> V. Kononenko “Popravka k zakonu sokhraneniia energii” (*Nauka i religiia*, 1985, #5), p. 9.

<sup>528</sup> Velikotnaia wrote her diary for her son Alexander. By “papa” she meant Alexander’s father and her own husband, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Velikotnyi.

<sup>529</sup> Tat’iana Velikotnaia, diary entry for January 16, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivikh*, p. 25.

<sup>530</sup> *Id.*, pp. 26-27.

“before death, a person’s soul seeks closeness with God, the ideal of eternal truth and eternal life.”<sup>531</sup>

Funeral services were also performed for the dead. Leningraders delivered dead relatives to the church cemeteries on sleds or pieces of plywood and ordered *pannychidas*. “We read the burial service for the father in Prince Vladimir Cathedral,” wrote Dmitrii Likhachëv.<sup>532</sup> Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin witnessed many times how, “debilitated by hunger, people wanted to bring the dead to the cemetery to bury, but unable to do it themselves and drained of all strength, they fell right next to the remains and died.”<sup>533</sup> Bodies could be encountered anywhere: streets, apartment buildings, hospitals, fields, cemeteries, and churches. After burying her husband, Tat’iana Velikotnaia went to the church to request a service. She was stunned by “how many deceased” there were: “I counted ten coffins to my right and eight to my left. And these are only the ones that are open for the burial service. By the entrance door near the front icons, there are closed coffins on the floor waiting for their turn.”<sup>534</sup> Nikol’skaia Bol’sheokhtinskaia Church was “surrounded by piles of bodies that partially obstructed its entrance. Each pile contained anywhere from 30 to 100 people.”<sup>535</sup> 100 to 200 coffins were brought to the cathedral daily, and a priest walked around them performing the

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<sup>531</sup> Tat’iana Velikotnaia, diary entry for January 16, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh*, pp. 26-27.

<sup>532</sup> Likhachëv, *Vospomonaniia*, p. 347.

<sup>533</sup> Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin, in *Niurnbergskii protsess*, Vol. 1, p. 773.

<sup>534</sup> Tat’iana Velikotnaia, diary entry for February 8, 1942, in *Zapiski ostavsheisia v zhivyykh*, pp. 39-40.

<sup>535</sup> Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin, in *Niurnbergskii protsess*. Vol. 1, p. 773.



funeral service.<sup>536</sup> However, the great number of bodies brought to the churches can hardly serve as evidence of religious faith in itself. The reasons might have been more pragmatic: church cemeteries' convenient proximity to some residents' homes, or hope that the body would be actually buried and the location of the grave would be known.

Due to the paucity of ordained clergy, quite often one priest or deacon ended up fulfilling a number of roles in the church or taking on all the responsibilities. Thus, protopresbyter Pavel Fruktofskii of Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral alone carried out liturgies, mass, confessions, unction, burials, etc. The parish petition for awarding Fruktofskii a medal "For the Defense of Leningrad" written in the fall of 1943 read: "During the winter of 1941–42 in the absence of public transportation, swollen from hunger father Pavel who lived 15 kilometers away from the cathedral came to work on a daily basis, being the only priest in our community."<sup>537</sup> He "sometimes came on duty absolutely ill and had to spend the night in the freezing cathedral because he had no strength to walk back home."<sup>538</sup> Out of 55 ecclesiastics, over one-third – 20 clergy in total – perished by the end of the siege. Twenty-one of those who survived were awarded medals "For the Defense of Leningrad." Upon comparison, the casualty ratio among the clergy (2.75) is comparable to that of the civilians (2.5).<sup>539</sup>

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<sup>536</sup> Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin, in *Niurnbergskii protsess*. Vol. 1, p. 772.

<sup>537</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 67. L. 132.

<sup>538</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 33. D. 67. L. 132.

<sup>539</sup> The numbers vary depending on how the calculation is done and whether civilians who evacuated are included in them. These are my rough estimates.

Many of those who lived through the siege came to believe in God because they had witnessed the inexplicable – from a scientific perspective – miracle of survival.<sup>540</sup> The bitter experience gave rise to a desire to help others. Without mutual assistance, the besieged would not have survived. With the passing years, many realized that the salutary principle of collective aid during the blockade coincided with a Christian commandment.<sup>541</sup> After the war, Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin summed up the Church's dedication to his fellow man and the role it played during the siege:

Russian people, Leningraders fulfilled their patriotic duties to the very end. Despite the cruelest bombardments and raids by the German aviation, exceptional order and organization prevailed in the city. And the Orthodox Church has drunk from the cup of all sufferings together with the nation. Its prayers and sermons instilled courage and solace in the hearts of believers, and it laid a plentiful sacrifice on the altar of the native land.<sup>542</sup>

Given the circumstances and extreme conditions, the population's psychological crisis was predictable. It is reasonable to believe that some of those who sought help from and refuge in the Church were not religious in the sense that they embraced the spiritual belief system of the Russian Orthodox Church as practiced before the Revolution. Not being able to find rational explanations or ways to deal with grim prospects, some Leningraders attempted to find a universal solution, and religion channeled it. The fear of death (so irrational in peaceful times but so definite during the siege) played a crucial role in revising the personal belief systems (for some) and in the spike in overall church attendance. The idea of God's will and patronage provided an emotional outlet for the faithful congregation, the clergy's practical help and willingness to listen satisfied those

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<sup>540</sup> Svetlana Magaeva "Chudo vyzhivania blokadnikov," in Magaeva and Martilla, *Mucheniki Leningradskoi blokady*, pp. 50-52.

<sup>541</sup> *Id.*, p. 4.

<sup>542</sup> Archpriest Nikolai Lomakin, in *Niurnbergskii protsess*. Vol. 1, p. 776.

with more pragmatic motives, and praying in public created the impression of spiritual and psychological communion and assisted in overcoming the inescapable disintegration of daily routine.

## CONCLUSION

Nazi Germany's siege of Leningrad from 1941 to 1944 is of particular importance in military, political, and social history. Here, the focus on soldiers is shifted to the civilians who became combatants under extreme circumstances. The tragic events that took place in Leningrad have been described in hundreds of personal records, but this chronicle of the "mortal time" – as it was for Leningraders during the siege – was altered by the official Soviet historiography's presentation of the defense of Leningrad as an optimistic 900-day heroic tale. While the emotional anguish and physical suffering were omitted in the descriptions of daily life and beyond the fact that the city withstood and did not surrender, the question of what the *blokadniki* went through and how the majority managed to survive and remain sane have yet to be thoroughly explored and incorporated into the historical narrative. Personal records do not dispute the "beautified" version of the siege, but they add another dimension to it. Occasionally ugly and shocking, this dimension brings closer the understanding of what people experienced when they realized that hunger was capable of damaging ethical norms, and that there was nothing more dreadful than the weakening of self-control that could happen despite one's will. Each story of the siege had an individual identity and own history that often did not conform to the politicized one. And yet, these two histories fused; both used personal experiences to create meaningful chronicles of the tumultuous events and the shaping the collective memory. The center of one chronicle was the drama and at the center of another was heroism. Reaching beyond state-proclaimed patriotism, the diarists sought motivations for the reasons to live in their city with their families, and their "collective" customs, religion, work, books, music, and art.

While not all of the factors were equally important to all Leningraders, choosing a survival strategy (individual or collective) took time. One of the things that the Soviet scholarship has accurately pinpointed (which gave it the basis for further manipulation of the “hero saga”) was the original impetus for the struggle: patriotism. Although this work looks at other sources of strength, all of them intricately tie to the notion of patriotism and individual interpretations of it. Its politicized pre-war version was replaced by the national and civil one with the focus on the personal aspect of it. The idea that, in case of defeat, the USSR not only faced demise but the enslavement and extermination of its population, made an enormous impact. It underscored the importance of homeland (as in family, city, country) and the justness of their struggle. The extermination aspect of the war (never before declared by any invader)<sup>543</sup> determined the resolve of the people to endure exceptional privations.

Initially high, the patriotic mood started to wane with the losses suffered by the Red Army, encirclement, and understanding that the war would last longer than anticipated. It received a major boost by the way of Stalin’s speech on November 7, 1941. During the “mortal time,” when the feelings of despondency reached their highest in January 1942, the patriotic language in the diaries began to decrease. However, belief and hope in a final victory was unwavering save for a few turncoats. As rationing increased, the second wave of evacuation began and survival strategies were refined, the sense of national patriotism climbed and remained high until the end of the war.

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<sup>543</sup> *Vernichtungskrieg*, the war of “pitiless and complete extermination of the enemy” was to be conducted until the end only “with the annihilation of one side or the other.” Geoffrey Megargee, *War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), pp. 12, 38, 126. Also Joachim C. Fest, *Hitler* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1973), pp. 676-677.

Remarkably, collective behavior remained almost constant throughout the siege with a minor setback at the beginning of the winter of 1941–42.

Leningraders were tested by unbearable conditions in the winter of 1941–42. It took a while for the residents to grasp the scale of the tragedy. The imposed information vacuum, the limited social circles, and the numerous rumors contributed to the intense re-evaluation of reality and the observation of self and others. Due to physical weakness and absence of public transport, many *blokadniki* had a very restricted traveling range, which hindered their ability to witness and analyze the bigger picture. As the communal environments shrunk, the factor of family – both immediate and accidental – became increasingly important. As in other cases, the winter period tested the stability of relationships and the dependability of partners. Some families withstood the test by privations, some deteriorated little by little, and a few collapsed right away. As Leningraders lost their loved ones, the need for help and support pushed them to seek out other close relations.

The besieged person's weakening of will happened with either a stark speed, at times unexpectedly, or gradually, which pushed people to seek out defense strategies. However, it was this gradual reassessment of ethical norms that made the concurrent breakdown of all of them impossible. The shift in conduct depended on the upbringing, support level, adaptability of life style, and an individual's ability to endure. Although, none of these factors alone guaranteed moral steadfastness. Some behaved decently and conscientiously and some reprehensibly and callously. There were those who took their civil and work duties selflessly, those who were broken emotionally, and those who openly expressed discontent. Striving to survive, some remained hopeful and helped

others do the same, and some wanted to survive at somebody else's expense. Tragically, the same person, under different circumstances, could behave as a hero or a crook. In addition, based on the behavior of a few people, some made resolute conclusions that such behavior (good or bad) was a norm. The interruption of social/familial connections, the chaotic atmosphere, and the desire to survive by any means possible escalated criminal behavior. While the emergence of different types of crime and the time it took to curb them varied, the steady rise began in November–December 1941 and decreased in the summer of 1942.

The principle of the *kollektiv* greatly impacted people's decisions to act in certain ways. It was hard to forsake the norms and do something abysmal in the face of condemnation. On the other hand, some people who witnessed stealing, cheating, or marauding deemed such actions acceptable under the circumstances. However, the complete breakdown of the system of values and principles of conduct was not possible; surviving alone was not feasible in Leningrad, and, to receive help, one had to adhere to socially acceptable rules. Those who belittled or openly despised others could not expect to be treated with respect. Those who did not share could not count on others being merciful to them. Those who exhibited hostility, advanced at another's expense, or enriched themselves by taking from others were shut out. What is more, the exact things that were supposed to ensure the collapse of moral norms reaffirmed and strengthened them. Reproaching themselves for certain actions or criticizing others, the *blokadniki* involuntarily re-confirmed traditional values. By suspiciously asking a sales clerk to double check the weight of bread or yelling at someone who was trying to cut in line, people maintained the limits of what was communally regarded as just.

As the days stretched into weeks and weeks stretched into months, Leningraders found new ways to cooperate. In addition to “internally triggered” motivating factors, there were two “external” ones: religion and art. Serving as consolation, clarification, and inspiration, both uplifted people and gave them hope. The upsurge in the demand of various forms of art (books, theater) was immediate at the onset of the war. It gradually increased changing only in the type and expression (radio concerts, diary writing) making it crucially important during the “mortal time.” Just like art, religiosity as a motivational factor peaked during the deadliest stage of the siege (when hope in a miracle was high), decreasing somewhat in the spring (not in the spirituality but the numbers – death, evacuation, and public works greatly reduced those who attended churches), and steadily rose again after 1943.

Although not everybody was ready to make sacrifices for the sake of others, there were always people who helped loved ones and the strangers by dragging a loaded sled, seeking out orphans or the sick, or offering someone in need a place to stay. Analyzing Leningraders’ behavior through their diaries, Sergei Iarov summed it up:

While understanding that it was easier to survive without sharing, people shared. While knowing that they could not be compensated, people gave what they could. While starving themselves, people found strength to feed others. There was something absolute and immutable in the price paid to let someone live. It was the life itself, and giving more than life was not possible.<sup>544</sup>

The final outcome affirmed that, while survival strategies varied, the readiness to fight until the end was held by the majority.<sup>545</sup> Although between 800,000 and 1.2 million

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<sup>544</sup> Iarov, *Blokadnaia etika*, pp. 321-322.

<sup>545</sup> Despite the diversity in the interpretations in the scholarly community of the public opinion, the principle of historicism must be retained remembering that the mentality of a person living in the 1930-40s in the USSR cannot be assessed using the system of current values, discussed outside of the cultural context, or evaluated without taking into account the country’s past and historical traditions that have been formed by centuries.



people starved to death during the siege, the Nazis did not succeed in forcing them to relinquish the city.

The siege of Leningrad also tested the Soviet system's confidence in the priority of public interests above individual ones and proved the efficacy of collective survival tactics and the government's ability to organize and mobilize. Diaries and other documents disclose that the consolidation of the efforts made by both authorities and residents (their mobilization and regulation coupled with effective propaganda and the people's readiness to defend their loved ones, homeland, and very right to live) were all at play during the winter of 1941–42.

For the siege survivors who lived through a very particular war-time experience that drastically differed from everybody else's, the memory of the Leningrad Blockade became a part of Leningraders-Peterburgers' unique self-consciousness and mentality. In conditions when "physiological survival seems impossible to us today, the vast majority of the *blokadniki* did not turn into a mad, downtrodden mob, ready to gnaw each other's throats for bread crumbs; they did not lose dignity, or ability to work, to creatively think, to learn, and to evolve."<sup>546</sup> And this pride of retaining human face in the inhumane conditions is passed from the generation of the survivors to their descendants. In his recollections, Dmitrii Likhachëv classified them: "Were Leningraders heroes? Not just heroes, they were martyrs."<sup>547</sup> Daniil Granin thought of Leningrad "as a symbol of

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<sup>546</sup> Iakov Cherkasskii, "Riadami stroinymi prokhodiat leningradtsy, zhivye s mērtvymi..." (*Ruskaia Germaniia*, #5, 2014.) [http://www.rg-rb.de/index.php?option=com\\_rg&task=item&id=13313&Itemid=13](http://www.rg-rb.de/index.php?option=com_rg&task=item&id=13313&Itemid=13)

<sup>547</sup> Likhachëv, *Vospominaniia*, p. 358.

innocent people's suffering."<sup>548</sup> And although both opinions are valid, Leningraders' actions illustrate how their understanding of the common tragedy roused the sense of a shared destiny and "welded people together."<sup>549</sup> And while such unity was not constant for everyone all the time, the sense of achievement and the increasing awareness generally helped residents carry through.

This work was written not to downplay the suffering experienced by the *blokadniki* or to deny the cases of "moral *distrofiia*" that undoubtedly occurred and have become the focal point of recent publications. My goal was to identify factors that served as sources of strength and motivation to carry on and endure based on the personal records. Most people whose diaries, memoirs, and recollections are used in this thesis are no longer alive. But they left behind piercing testimonies of everyday life, emotional, and physical struggle that they witnessed and were part of during the siege of 1941–44.

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<sup>548</sup> Daniil Granin, "Istoriia sozdaniia 'Blokadnoi knigi'" (*Druzhba narodov*, 2002, #11).

<sup>549</sup> This kind of unity was exhibited by other nations (not only the Soviets) in the wartime. Writing about the civilians' experiences in the wartime London during the Blitz, Jean Freedman concluded: "It was the emotional and ideological state that people tried to create during the war, and in such striving, many felt that they had succeeded. Whether national unity was strong or weak, a governmental imposition or the spirit of a great people, most agree that it was a wartime phenomenon." In Jean R. Freedman, *Whistling in the Dark: Memory and Culture in Wartime London* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), p. 64. Although in Leningrad, this solidarity continued after the end of war.

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*TsGA SPb (Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sankt-Peterburga)* Central State Archive of Saint-Petersburg

*TsGALI SPb (Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Literatury i Iskusstva Sankt-Peterburga)* Central State Archive of Literature and Art of Saint-Petersburg

*TsGAIPD SPb (Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Istoriko-Politicheskikh Dokumentov Sankt-Peterburga)* Central State Archive of Historical-Political Documents of Saint-Petersburg

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### **Electronic Resources**

Besieged Leningrad: Archival documents of the WWII. (Ленинград в осаде. Архивные документы второй мировой войны.) Available at <http://blockade.spbarchives.ru>

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Siege diaries on the site "Leningrad. Pobeda." (Дневники.) Available at <http://leningradpobeda.ru/diary/>

### **Film**

*Blockade*. 7-part documentary. Directed by Liudmila Galdkova. Narrated by Daniil Granin. 181 min. TV Channel "Kul'tura", Russian Federation, 2003. («Блокада» (Россия, Даниил Гранин, 7 серий). Автор проекта Бэлла Куркова. Режиссер Людмила Гладкова. 181 минут. Телеканал «Культура», 2003.)

## APPENDIX I

### Russian Terms

<i>balanda</i>	thin flour soup
<i>blokadnik/ blovadniki</i>	the besieged or the blockaded (singular/plural)
<i>burzhuika(i)</i>	sing. (pl.) small, metal stoves with flues that had to be affixed to the ventilation outlet as it produced a lot of soot. Because the apartments had no such outlets Leningraders' faces have been tarnished by <i>burzhuika</i> 's smut. These little stoves were used to heat water for tea and prepare food and were stoked with whatever fuel was at hand: books, furniture, parquet flooring.
<i>distrofiia</i>	dying from starvation; termed "alimentary dystrophy"
<i>distrofik</i>	person affected by <i>distrofiia</i>
<i>druzhina</i>	Voluntary People's Druzhina (also translated as Voluntary People's Guard, People's Volunteer Militia/Squad) were detachments for maintaining public order and helping those in need.
<i>GKO</i>	State Defense Committee ( <i>Gosudarstvennyi Komitet Oborony</i> )
<i>Gorkom VKP(b)</i>	Municipal Committee of Soviet Union (or All-union) Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)
<i>kollektiv</i>	group, team, crew, personnel, association, staff, body, or unit
<i>kollektivizm</i>	collective/collaborative effort, collectivism
<i>Komsomol</i>	abbreviation of Communist (Kom-) Union (so-) of Youth (mol).
<i>komsomol'tsy</i>	members of Komsomol (plural)
<i>lazaret</i>	infirmary
<i>Lengorispolkom or Ispolkom</i>	Leningrad Municipal Executive Committee
<i>Lengorsovet or Lensovet</i>	Leningrad Municipal Council
<i>LenOblGorLit</i>	Leningrad Regional Municipal Literature

<i>liudoedstvo</i>	cannibalism
<i>militsiia</i>	agency – within the NKVD structure – authorized by the state to ensure civil order and public safety, protect citizens and property, enforce the law, prevent, and investigate criminal activities. Similar in its duties to police.
<i>moleben</i>	liturgical service of supplication or thanksgiving.
<i>“mortal time”</i>	the most extreme period from November 1941 to May 1942.
<i>MPVO</i>	Local Air Raid Defense ( <i>Mestnaia Protivovozdushnaia Oborona</i> )
<i>opolchenie</i>	People’s Militia; national irregular troops formed from the population at the times of national emergencies.
<i>pannychida</i>	service for the commemoration of a deceased person.
<i>PVO</i>	Air Raid Defense ( <i>Protivovozdushnaia Oborona</i> )
<i>Doroga Zhizni</i>	ice and water route across Lake Ladoga. Road of Life/Ice Road
<i>skoupfos</i>	also <i>skufiya</i> , <i>skoufos</i> , monastic cap worn by Orthodox Christian clergy.
<i>Sovnarkom</i>	Council of People’s Commissars
<i>Stavka</i>	General Headquarters for the Soviet Armed Forces
<i>stolovaia/stolovye</i>	communal buffet, canteen, cafeteria (singular/plural)
<i>trupoedstvo</i>	corpse-eating
<i>upravdom</i>	building manager
<i>valenki</i>	Russian felt boots

## APPENDIX II

### CHRONOLOGY

1941		
<b>June</b>	<b>22</b>	Germany invades the USSR without warning.
	<b>26</b>	Finland declares war on the USSR.
	<b>27</b>	By the decision of the city commission bureau and All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) (VKP(b)) Municipal Committee, the Leningrad City Evacuation Committee was established. First evacuation of the treasures from the Hermitage and the State Russian Museum commences. Camouflaging of the buildings begins.
	<b>28</b>	<i>Narodnoe opolchenie</i> (People's Volunteer Militia divisions) starts to form. First stage of evacuation begins (children). <sup>550</sup>
	<b>29</b>	
<b>July</b>	<b>1</b>	Evacuation of museum treasures launches.
	<b>7</b>	Politbureau of VKP(b) Central Committee ordered evacuation of 500,000 workers' family members. <sup>551</sup>
	<b>11</b>	<i>GKO</i> (State Defense Committee) issues a decision to evacuate 80 Leningrad plants and 13 <i>TsKB</i> (Central Construction Bureau).
	<b>18</b>	Food rationing is introduced by the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars ( <i>Sovnarkom</i> ). 800 grams of bread for workers,

<sup>550</sup> TsGA SPb. F.7179. Op.53. D.58. L.30-32

<sup>551</sup> TsGA SPb. F.7384. Op.36. D.59.

	<b>23</b>	600 grams for office personnel, and 400 grams for nonworking adults and children. Introduction of 24-hour control posts in every building of the city.
<b>August</b>	<b>1</b> <b>11</b> <b>19</b> <b>27</b> <b>29-30</b>	All higher learning institutions (universities) commence entrance exams. Mandatory order to evacuate all mothers and children under the age of 14 is issued. Kirov Theater troupe, choreographic college, and conservatoire are evacuated. Soviet troops leave Novgorod. Last train arrives in Leningrad. Germans cut off the last remaining rail line (Mga) that connected Leningrad with the rest of the Soviet Union.
<b>September</b>	<b>2</b> <b>4</b> <b>6</b> <b>8</b>	First decrease in bread ration. First artillery bombardment of the city by Germans. First aerial bombing of the city by Germans. Germans take Shlissel'burg encircling Leningrad. The siege begins. First massive aerial bombing of the city by Germans: 200 high-explosive and 6,327 incendiary bombs dropped. The Badaev warehouse burns down as a result of the bombing raid. <sup>552</sup> Second decrease in bread ration (500 grams for workers and 300 grams for office personnel and children)

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<sup>552</sup> Later, a lasting legend that the fire was the reason for the prolonged mass hunger was created. In reality, the warehouse lost 3,000 tons of flour and around 2500 tons of sugar in the fire. In the first days of the siege, the city used 2,100 tons of flour daily. So, the burnt down products would have sustained the city's population for one and a half days.

	<p><b>11</b> as well as meat, grains, fats, sweets.<sup>553</sup></p> <p>First food barges arrive in Osinovets. Second reduction in food rations.</p> <p><b>12</b> The longest-lasting shelling of Leningrad (18 hours and 33 minutes).</p> <p>First attempt by the Red Army to break the siege. Formation of the Neva Bridgehead (Nevskii Piatachok). Heaviest bombardment of the city: 528 high-explosive and 2,870 incendiary bombs dropped.</p> <p><b>17</b></p> <p><b>19</b> Second attempt by the Red Army to break the siege at Nevskii Piatachok.</p> <p><b>22-28</b></p>
<b>October</b>	<p><b>1</b> Third reduction of the bread ration (400 grams for workers and 200 grams for office personnel and children).</p> <p><b>4</b> 10 air raids within one day.</p> <p><b>13</b> 12000 incendiary bombs dropped on the city.</p>
<b>November</b>	<p><b>3</b> New school year begins for the students of the 7-10<sup>th</sup> grades.</p> <p><b>13</b> Fourth reduction of bread ration. General Kirill Meretskov and 4<sup>th</sup>, 52<sup>nd</sup>, and 54<sup>th</sup> Soviet Armies launch offensive.</p> <p><b>16</b> Delivery of food to the city by air cargo begins.</p> <p><b>17</b> Checking the ice thickness of Lake Ladoga.</p> <p><b>18</b> Reporting of ice thickness of 10 cm which enabled travelling of loads under 1 ton across the lake.</p>

<sup>553</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 36. D. 62. L. 165-166.

	<p><b>20</b> Fifth and final reduction of the bread ration (125-250 g). First horse-drawn sleighs across frozen Ladoga Lake commence the opening of the Ice Road/Road of Life (road #101).</p> <p>Damaged by German bombings the city's electricity is shut off.</p> <p><b>21</b> As ice thickness reaches 20 cm, auto transport begins to use the ice road across the Ladoga Lake.</p> <p><b>22</b> 60 trucks brought 33 tons of flour and 2.5 tons of sugars and fats into besieged Leningrad across the frozen Lake Ladoga; this was the first of many over-ice truck runs that would ramp up to bring in 100 tons of supplies each day. The population of Leningrad, however, required about 600 tons of supplies for survival.</p> <p><b>23</b></p> <p>One of the heaviest raids of the city: 940 shells fired.</p> <p>Thawing decreased the ice thickness of Lake Ladoga and led to limiting the supply deliveries; only 61 tons of food made its way into the city on this date.</p> <p><b>25</b></p> <p><b>30</b></p>
<b>Nov. 10 – Dec. 30</b>	Tikhvin Offensive.



<b>December</b>	<b>6</b>	City's plumbing and electrical systems fail due to damage. Heating of the buildings ceases. Public transport stops functioning. City's authorities issue a decision to supply population with boiling water.
		Traffic across Lake Ladoga halts. <i>Lengorispolkom</i> issues an order to manufacture <i>burzhuiki</i> .
	<b>8</b>	Red Army takes Tikhvin. 8 tram routes are discontinued servicing the city.
	<b>9</b>	Tanks move across the ice to reinforce the city. Trucks bring 687 tons of food over the lake in a single day, supplying the minimum daily requirement to feed the population.
	<b>22</b>	Another 786 tons of food transported into Leningrad.
		First increase in the bread ration (200-350 g). <sup>554</sup>
	<b>23</b>	
	<b>25</b>	
<b>1942</b>		
<b>January</b>	<b>2</b>	New Year celebrations for children are held at schools, theaters, culture centers, and clubs. Children received bread, cookies, and other food as presents.
		Tram service stops.
	<b>3</b>	Decision on increasing the establishment of the city orphanages is issued.
	<b>7</b>	Winter term finals at the Leningrad State University.
	<b>19</b>	The State Defense Committee (GKO) orders mass evacuation (over 500,000 people) across Lake Ladoga.

<sup>554</sup> TsGA SPb. F.7384. Op.18. D.1431. L.127.

	<p><b>22</b> Second increase in the bread ration (250 grams for dependents). Lowest winter temperatures record at - 40°C.</p> <p><b>24</b> Main Leningrad newspaper <i>Leningradskaia Pravda</i> and Radio Leningrad temporarily stop working due to lack of electricity.</p> <p><b>25</b> The lowest electrical production recorded. Bread baking is interrupted.</p> <p><b>27</b></p>
<p><b>January 7-April 30</b> Luban' Offensive – third attempt to break the blockade.</p> <p>Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 101,825 deaths in the month of <b>January</b>.<sup>555</sup></p>	
<b>February</b>	<p><b>8</b> <i>Lengorispolkom</i> made a decision to have orphanages operating on the 24-hour basis.</p> <p><b>10</b> Military Council of Leningrad Front issues an order to clean the city and take other measures (restore bathhouses, laundry facilities, sanitary control brigades and posts) in order to prevent pandemics.<sup>556</sup></p> <p>Third increase in food rationing (300 grams for dependents).</p> <p><b>11</b> First Komsomol youth brigades tending to the needs of community created.</p> <p><b>14</b></p>
<p>Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 108,029 deaths in the month of <b>February</b>.<sup>557</sup></p>	

<sup>555</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21.

<sup>556</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384. Op. 36. D. 79. L. 116–119.

<sup>557</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21.

<b>March</b>	<b>5</b>	Partisan region sends 222 horse sleds with food to Leningrad. City's Musical Comedy Theater launches new season.
	<b>7</b>	Cargo tram operation is restored.
	<b>8</b>	First all-city voluntary Sunday work to clean the city.
	<b>19</b>	Leningrad Executive Committee decision on allowing individual vegetable gardening.
	<b>22</b>	Fourth increase in bread ration (400 grams for dependents).
	<b>25</b>	Order to clean the city from snow, waste matter, filth, ice, and corpses <sup>558</sup>
<b>March 15-April 15</b> Volunteer work to clean the city's streets from dirt, filth, ice, ruins, and corpses. Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 98,112 deaths in the month of <i>March</i> . <sup>559</sup>		
<b>April</b>	<b>5</b>	Air raid defense units (PVO) and Soviet aviation repulsed a massive Luftwaffe attack on the city and Baltic fleet. Pushkin Academic Theater stages a concert celebrating the 700-year anniversary of the victory in the Battle on the Ice.
		Red Army opened a railway connection between the northern Russia and Leningrad.
	<b>8</b>	Functioning of the public tram is restored.
	<b>15</b>	Ladoga's ice road shuts down. Nazi troops exterminate the last defenders of the Nevskii Piatyachok (around 200,000 soldiers).
	<b>24</b>	

<sup>558</sup> TsGA SPb. F. 7384 Op. 18 D. 1442. L. 163-164.

<sup>559</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21.

Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 85,541 deaths in the month of <i>April</i> . <sup>560</sup>		
May	4	Reopening of schools.
	5	Inspection of “house books” to calculate the actual number of residents is launched.
		City zoo opened its doors to the Leningraders.
	15	The Pioneer Palace <sup>561</sup> re-opened.
	17	Lake Ladoga’s summer navigation resumes.
	22	
Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 53,256 deaths in the month of <i>May</i> . <sup>562</sup>		
June	16	Laying of the fuel pipe-line at the bottom of Lake Ladoga is complete.
		Art exhibition of local artists opens at the Artists Union’s Large Hall.
	18	6-10 <sup>th</sup> grade students mobilized into communal units for weeding and watering vegetables.
	19	
Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 33,785 deaths in the month of <i>June</i> . <sup>563</sup>		
July	3	Pioneer Palace held graduation ceremony for city’s high-school students.

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<sup>560</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21.

<sup>561</sup> Pioneer Palaces were centers of extra-curricular activities that housed various workshops, study and hobby groups (chess, music, woodworking, choir, art, dance, math, computers, engineering, plane modeling, etc.).

<sup>562</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21.

<sup>563</sup> *Ibid.*

	<b>6</b>	Soviet 2 <sup>nd</sup> Shock Army encircled by Nazis.
	<b>9</b>	Movie theaters show “Leningrad’s struggle.”
	<b>11</b>	2 <sup>nd</sup> Shock Army is destroyed, General Vlasov defects to Germany.
Civil Registry Office (ZAGS) recorded 17,743 deaths in the month of <i>July</i> . <sup>564</sup>		
<b>August</b>	<b>9</b>	Leningrad premier of Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 7 by the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra (cond. Karl Eliasberg).
	<b>15</b>	End of mass evacuation of city’s population.
<b>Year 1944</b>		
<b>January</b>	<b>14</b>	Launch of the final offensive that breaks the siege.
	<b>27</b>	Soviet forces lift the 872-day siege of Leningrad. Roughly 980,000 military and between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000 civilians perished during the siege. Leningrad celebrates with fireworks.

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<sup>564</sup> TsGA SPb. F.4904. Op.1. D.7. L.21.

### APPENDIX III

Changes in bread ration (grams per day)

Category	July 18	Sept. 2	Sept. 11	Oct. 1	Nov. 13	Nov. 20	Dec. 25	Jan. 24, 1942	Feb. 11, 1942
I Blue-Collar Workers	800	600	500	400	300	250	350	400	500
II White-Collar Workers	600	400	300	200	150	125	200	300	400
III Dependents	400	300	250	200	150	125	200	250	300
IV Children (under 12)	400	300	300	200	150	125	200	250	300

The ration of other foodstuffs rarely fluctuated. If they did, they were infrequent and insignificant (*e.g.* fish instead of meat) (grams per month)

	Blue-Collar Worker	White-Collar Worker	Dependent	Child (under 12)
<b>Meat</b> [Fish also was rationed from July to September 1941]				
July-September	2200	1200	600	600
September-January 1942	1500	800	400	400
<b>Grains/ cereal and Pasta</b>				
July-September	2000	1500	1000	1200
September- February 1942	1500	1000	600	1200
<b>Fats</b>				
July-September	800	400	200	400
September-November	950	500	300	500
November- February 1942	600	250	200	500
<b>Sugar</b>				
July-September	1500	1200	1000	1200
September-November	2000	1700	1500	1700
November- February 1942	1500	1000	800	1200

## MEAT

To avoid any confusion and further error, it must be noted that generally the meat (including horse meat) was replaced with powdered eggs, meat stew cans (containing 1/3 of meat in addition to stock, beans, and vegetables), and other foods in accordance with the following coefficient:

1 kg of meat was replaced by	1 kg of fish or meat stew cans
"	750 g of canned meat;
"	2 kg of by-products of the 2 <sup>nd</sup> and 3 <sup>rd</sup> categories (head, leg, lung, spleen meat);
"	3 kg of meat jelly or vegetarian-blood headcheese;
"	170 g powdered eggs;
"	300 g speck.

## FATS

It was permitted to substitute animal fats with vegetable ones, condensed milk, speck, or lard in the equal amount; or with cheese – 1.5 kg, sour cream – 2 kg for 1 kg of animal butter. Although, in November and December of 1941, there was neither butter nor its substitutes, nor other foods to replace the fats, and nothing was allotted in those two months.

## GRAINS

After the 20th of December, as a replacement of grains or cereals people received a mix of 50% rye flour and 50% cotton seed cake.

## SUGARS

Sugar and confectionaries were distributed without delay and in the allotted portions. Interesting that from the beginning of the siege until January 1942, the sugar was not delivered to Leningrad. As of September 10, 1941, the sugar supply was to last 60 days, but with proper planning – halting the production of such products as ice-cream, sodas, etc. – this supply lasted over 110 days.



## CATEGORIES

In November-December 1941 the ration cards were distributed to the following categories:

Blue-collar worker (Category I)	34,4%	of the city's population
White-collar worker (Category II)	17,5%	"
Dependent (Category III)	29,5%	"
Child (Category IV)	18,6%	"

From October 1 to December 25, 1941, Categories II, III, and IV (two-thirds of residents) received the same minimal ration.

### **All products for children have been distributed ply and in the amounts apportioned.**

However, beginning at the end of November 1941, the allocation depended on the availability of the provisions that were delivered into the city. Because of the limited deliveries, people received less of the ration portions in the month of November, December, and January.

## APPENDIX IV

## DIARISTS

D – diary      N – notes      R – recollections      L – letters

#	NAME	OCCUPATION	D/R
1	Al'shits, Daniil	Historian, member of <i>Opolchenie</i>	D/R
2	Andreeva, Nina Petrovna	13 y.o.	R
3	Argirovskii, Vasilii Pavlovich	Linguist, son of a priest	D
4	Asknazii, Atta Abramovich	Research Institute of Physical Training employee	R
5	Avgustyniuk, Aleksandr Ivanovich	Railway employee	D
6	Bardovskii, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich	Russian literature teacher of #156 school, Smol'ninskiy district and PhD student of the Leningrad Institute of education improvement	D
7	Bazanova, Valentina	14 y.o.	D
8	Berggol'ts, Ol'ga	Poet	D
9	Berman, A.G.	Inspector of one of the city's accounting bureaus responsible for verifying the proper distribution of the ration cards	D
10	Berkhman, Vera	Nurse	D
11	Bianki, Vitalii Valentinovich	Writer	L/N/R
12	Bochaver, Mina Aronovna	Textile factory worker	R
13	Bogdanov, Vladimir	Turner	D
14	Boldyrëv, Aleksandr Nikolaevich	Professor of Middle-Eastern studies/in Apr. 1942 served as a naval interpreter	D
15	Borovikova, Aleksandra Nikiforovna	Woodworking engineer	D
16	Bubnova, Maia Aleksandrovna	8th grade student (15 y.o.) and komsorg of #221 school, Kuibyshevskii district	D
17	Buriakova, S.N.		D
18	Cherkasova-Cherniavskaia, Nadezhda	Nurse, Evacuation hospital # 88	D
19	Daev, Vladimir Grigor'evich	Writer	R
20	Davidson, A.B.	11 y.o.	R
21	Dubovitskaia, Maria Vladimirovna	Ballerina	R

(continued)

#	NAME	OCCUPATION	D/R
22	Dymov, Aleksandr Grigor'evich	Theater Director	D
23	Eliseev, Nikolai	Peasant/soldier	D
24	Evdokimov, Aleksei Fëdorovich	Blue-color worker, forman at the military plant "Krasnoznamënets"	D
25	Evgen'ev-Maksimov, Vladislav Evgen'evich	History & Culture Lecturer	D/R
26	Fadeeva, T.S.	Biology student	R
27	Fedulov, John	12 y.o.	R
28	Firsenkov, Ivan	Blue-collar worker, Molotov Plant	D
29	Freidenberg, Ol'ga	Philologist	D
30	Galaktionova, Vera	11 y.o.	R
31	Garbuzova, Virineya Stefanovna	Orientalist	R
32	Gel'fer, Gesel' Aizikovich	Foreman, engineer. The Stalin Plant	D
33	Ginzburg, Lidiia Iakovlevna	Writer	D/R
34	Glebov, Boris	Protoierei of Spaso-Preobrazhenskiy Cathedral	R
35	Glinka, Vladislav	PhD, Department of Russian Culture, Hermitage	R
36	Glinskaia, Ekaterina Prokof'evna	Head of surgery department. Frunze district	D
37	Gol'zblat, M.	Librarian	R
38	Gorbunova, Nina Georg'evna	Head of orphanage #58	D
39	Gotkhart, Sofia Izrailevna	Univ. student worked at a hospital	R
40	Griaznov, Feodosii Aleksandrovich	Actor	D
41	Grishkevich, Aleksandr Pavlovich	Head of publication department of the Leningrad Municipal Committee of VKP(b)	D
42	Ignatovich, Zinaida Aleksandrovna	MD, PhD of Medical sciences	R
43	Igosheva, Valeria	Teen	D
44	Inber, Vera Mikhailovna	Poet, writer	D
45	Issi, Irma	11 y.o.	R
46	Ivanova, Nina		R
47	Ivanova, Valentina Aleksandrovna		R
48	Kaganovich, Iulia Iakovlevna	Chemical Technology PhD student	R
49	Kapitonova, Vera Mikhailovna	Chief of the Agitprop department in Moscow district <i>Raikom</i>	D

(continued)

#	NAME	OCCUPATION	D/R
50	Kapitsa, Pëtr Iosifovich	Officer of the Baltic Fleet	D
51	Kapranov, Boris	Peasant. Fire brigade member.	D
52	Karetnikova, M.S.	Teen	R
53	Kholmovskaia, Tat'iana Fëdorovna	Singer of Kirov Theater (Mariinskii), worked in the hospital	D
54	Khodorkov, Lev	Chief engineer of the 8 <sup>th</sup> HES (Hydro-Electrical Station). Transferred to the 5 <sup>th</sup> HES during the siege	D
55	Khuze, Ol'ga Fëdorovna	University lecturer, Library studies	D
56	Kniazev, Georgii Alekseevich	Historian. Head of the Academy of Science Archives.	D
57	Kogan, Lev Rudol'fovich	Dean of the History of Literature Department, Leningrad Library Institute	D
58	Kondrat'ev, Nikolai Aleksandrovich	Actor	D
59	Kondrat'eva, Valentina	Student of the Industrial Technology Institute	D
60	Kononova, Tat'iana Alekseevna		D/N
61	Konoplëva, Mariia Sergeevna	Fine art expert/Archivist. Russian museum and Hermitage employee	D
62	Korneeva, Glafira Nikolaevna	Head of School #3, Sverdlovskiy district	D
63	Korol'kevich, Anatolii Vital'evich	Actor, Leningrad <i>MuzComediya</i>	D/R
64	Korshunov, A.	Metal Plant's welder	R
65	Kostromina, Nina	13 y.o.	R
66	Kostrovitskaia, Vera Sergeevna	Ballet instructor.	D
67	Kudrin, Ivan Stepanovich	Neurosurgeon. Practiced and taught anatomy to medical students	N/R
68	Kulagin, Georgii Andreevich	Metal plant mechanic	D
69	Kuliabko, Vladimir G.	Engineer-consultant at the Leningrad Mechanic-Technological Institute	D
70	Leinov, Pëtr		R
71	Leliukhina, Sofia	Architect	R
72	Lepkovich, Arkadii	Adjuster at the Broadcasting station	D
73	Levina, Esfir' Gustavovna	Architect. Architectural planning Management of <i>Lensovet</i>	D
74	Likhachëv, Dmitrii Sergeevich	Scientist	D/R
75	Lisovskaia, Vera	Teen	R
76	Liubimenko, Inna Ivanovna	Historian	D/R

(continued)

#	NAME	OCCUPATION	D/R
77	Livshits, Z.S.	Engineer at the ship manufacturing plant	D
78	Lomakin, Nikolai	Archpriest	R
79	Luknitskii, Pavel	Military journalist	D
80	Magaeva, Svetlana	Child	R
81	Malysheva, Vasilisa Petrovna	Newspaper editor. The Molotov Factory, Sverdlovskiy district	D
82	Margulis, Lev Mikhailovich	Leading violinist of the Symphony Orchestra	D
83	Martilla, Elena Oskarovna	Artist	D
84	Mashkova, Maria Vasil'evna	Bibliographic historian. The State Public Library employee	D
85	Matiushina, Ol'ga Konstantinovna	Artist. Petrogradskiy district	D
86	Meerson, Sofiia Iakovlevna	<i>Lentorgreklama</i> center employee	D
87	Michurina-Samoilova, Vera Arkad'evna	Actor. Leningrad Pushkin Academic Theater	D
88	Miliutina, Zaria	School student	R
89	Mironova, Aleksandra Nikolaevna	History teacher	D
90	Mironova, Evgeniia Ivanovna	Agricultural worker until the spring of 1942. After that – active member of the military	D
91	Mukhina, Elena	16 y.o. School #30	D
92	Murina-Pevtsova, Antonina Ivanovna	Engineer at a factory	R
93	Nazimov, Izrail' Veniaminovich	Head physician of the 23 <sup>rd</sup> hospital. Kirov district	D
94	Nikolaev, Vladimir	10 y.o.	D
95	Nikol'skii, Aleksandr Sergeevich	Artist	D
96	Ots, Liudmila	School student.	D
97	Osipova, Nataliia Petrovna	Factory planner. The Molotov Factory	D
98	Ostroumova-Lebedeva, Anna Petrovna	Artist	D
99	Ostrovskaiia, Sof'ia Kazimirovna	Translator, editor	D
100	Pavlova, Anna Vasil'evna		R
101	Pelevin, Mikhail Petrovich	15 y.o.	R
102	Peterson, Valia	14.y.o., school #239	D
103	Peto, Ol'ga Richardovna	MD	D/N

(continued)

#	NAME	OCCUPATION	D/R
104	Petrovskaiia, Ol'ga Mikhailovna	Librarian. Russian National Library	R
105	Podraiskaia, Raia	16 y.o.	L
106	Polzikova-Rubets, Kseniia Vladimirovna	History teacher, Hermitage lecturer. School #239 School	D
107	Popel', Roman	9 y.o.	D
108	Postnikova, Edit Petrovna		R
109	Pozhedaeva, Liuda	7 y.o.	R
110	Reikhert, L.	6 y.o.	R
111	Riabinkin, Iura	16 y.o.	D
112	Savkova, Zinaida	Teen	R
113	Sel'tser, Ksaverii Naumovich	Journalist	D
114	Sergeeva, Ol'ga Aleksandrovna	MD	D/R
115	Shamshur, Vladlen Petrovich	School student	R
116	Shaporina, Liubov' Vasil'evna	Translator. Artist	D
117	Sheliukhina, Nataliia	7 y.o.	R
118	Sheremet'eva, Galina	7 y.o.	R
119	Shilov, Aleksei	Historian. Archivist	D
120	Shnitnikova-Lagarp, Zinaida	Demographer, statistician	D
121	Shutkevich, Nataliia Sergeevna	Dean of Electric-thermal Dept of LCTI	L
122	Siasina, M.E.	Artillery range worker	R
123	Sinakevich, Ol'ga Viktorovna	Math teacher	D
124	Skriabina, Elena	Russian literature professor	D
125	Smirnov, Leonid	16 y.o. Blue-collar/soldier	D
126	Smirnovskaia, Anastasiia Mikhailovna	Teacher	R
127	Sokolova, Elizaveta Aleksandrovna	Theater director.	D
128	Solov'eva, Ol'ga Pavlovna	15 y.o.	R
129	Sudomina, Anna	15 y.o.	R
130	Suslova, E.N.	Head of the GAORSS archives (now TsGA SPb)	R
131	Tikhomirov, Misha	16 y.o.	D
132	Tomigas, Vladlen	Marine officer	D/N
133	Umanskaia (Kechek), Anna Stepanovna	16 y.o. student. Worked at a hospital	D

(continued)

#	NAME	OCCUPATION	D/R
134	Trifonov, Vladimir	16 y.o. signalman	D
135	Vakser, Moisei	Artist/ architect	D
136	Vasil'eva, Mariia	Geologist	D
137	Vasiutina, Evgeniia Konstantinovna	Technician/estimator (later – writer)	D
138	Veide, Elizaveta	13 y.o.	D
139	Velikotnaia, Tat'iana	Nobility, nurse, Berkhman's siter	D
140	Veller, Lazar' Ivanovich	Rector of Leningrad Chemical Technological Institute	D
141	Vinokurov, Aleksei Ivanovich	Geography teacher	D
142	Vladimirov, Ivan Alekseevich	Artist	D
143	Vladimirova, Galina	Child	R
144	V.N.	Party official	D
145	Vop(t)intseva, Valentina Georgievna		R
146	Voznesenskaia, Kapitolina	14 y.o.	D
147	Vraskaia, Varvara Borisovna	Linguist, German language teacher. Leningrad State University	R
148	Yanovich, Tat'iana L'vovna	Housewife	D
149	Zabelin, Anatolii Alekseevich	Dean of the Engineering Univeristy, scientist	D
150	Zabolotskaia, Lidiia Karlovna	School inspector of the Sverdlovskii district Department of Education	D
151	Zagorskaia, Aleksandra Pavlovna	Head of the <i>Krasnyi Futliarshchik</i> cooperative association.	D
152	Zakhar'eva, Nina	MD	D
153	Zavetnovskaia, Nataliia Petrovna	Housewife	D/L
154	Zelenskaia, Irina Dmitrievna	Head of planning department. 7th Hydro-electical Station	D
155	Zhilinskii, Ivan Ivanovich	Chief of the planning analytical department of <i>Oktiabr'</i> railway	D
156	Zhitomirskii, Viktor	Engineer	D
157	Zimnitskaia, Galia	14 y.o.	D
158	Zlotnikova, Berta Abramovna	Technical Control Department employee.	D

## APPENDIX V

## Photo 1.

**Nuremberg Document 221-L: OKW secret directive dated October 7, 1941 on the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad.** Source: *Niurnbergskii protsess nad glavnyimi nemetskimi voennymi prestupnikami. Sbornik materialov (v semi tomakh)* (M., 1961, vol. 7, p. 625.)

**Geheime Kommandosache**

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht F.H.Qu., den 7.10.41  
 Nr. 44 1675/41 A.K. Chefs. WFSt/Abt. I (I Op.)

**Cheffache!** 14 Ausfertigungen  
2. Ausfertigung  
 Nur durch Offizier!

Besug: OKH (Op.Abt.) Nr. 41 244/41 G.K.  
 vom 18.9.41

Ob. d. M.  
 op. 1698/41  
 Eing. 7.10.  
 Anlagen:

An Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.)

**Der Führer hat erneut entschieden, dass eine Kapitulation von Leningrad oder später von Moskau nicht anzunehmen ist, auch wenn sie von der Gegenseite angeboten würde.**

Die moralische Berechtigung zu dieser Maßnahme liegt vor aller Welt klar. Ebenso wie in Kiew durch Sprengungen mit Zeitzündern die schwerste Gefahren für die Truppen entstanden sind, muß damit in Moskau und Leningrad in noch stärkerem Maße gerechnet werden. Dass Leningrad unterminiert sei und bis zum letzten Mann verteidigt würde, hat der sowjetrussische Rundfunk selbst bekannt gegeben.

Schwere Seuchengefahren sind zu erwarten.

Kein deutscher Soldat hat daher diese Städte zu betreten. Wer die Stadt gegen unsere Linien verlassen will, ist durch Feuer zurückzuweisen. Kleinerer, nicht gesperrte Lücken, die einfließen der Bevölkerung nach Innerrußland ermöglichen, sind daher nur zu begrüßen. Auch für alle übrigen Städte gilt, dass sie vor der Einnahme durch Artilleriefeuer und Luftangriffe zu zermürben sind und ihre Bevölkerung zur Flucht zu veranlassen ist.

Das Leben deutscher Soldaten für die Errettung russischer Städte vor einer Feuergefahr einzusetzen oder deren Bevölkerung auf Kosten der deutschen Heimat zu ernähren, ist nicht zu verantworten.

- 2 -



- 2 -

Das Chaos in Rußland wird umso größer, unsere Verwaltung und Ausnützung der besetzten Ostgebiete umso leichter werden, je mehr die Bevölkerung der sowjetrussischen Städte nach dem Innern Rußlands flüchtet.

Dieser Wille des Führers muß sämtlichen Kommandeuren zur Kenntnis gebracht werden.

Der Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

J. A.  
gez. J o d l

F.d.R.

F.A.M.

Hauptmann d.G.

Berlin, 11. 10. 41

Stab. am 11. 10. 41  
5. St. I. 16. 10. 41

ab  
auftrag

I, Spride am

Größe Nord

aus. Inst. Off. Generalstabs Nord

ka. St. Gen.

1 ✓  
2 ✓  
3 ✓

bedachte: Fickelmeier der Heile Kommando und Kommando - 3 -

Für Kommando am Stab. B.d.L. 1. St. I. 16. 10. 41 Stabs. Stabs. am 29. 9. 41. nicht aufgeföhrt bei O.K.W. am 11. 10. 41. nicht.

am [L.S.] mit f-1

St. 16. 10. 41 am f-1


St. 1. 10. 41 bei I. 16

St. 1. 10. 41

3

**Photo 2.**

Daniil Kiutinen, baker. 59 y.o. Date of death: February 4, 1942. Reason: *distrofiia*.



Source: Alla Leskova, "Pekar' iz Leningrada" (*Rossiiskaia Gazeta*. 02.04.2015. Rodina #415(4)).

**Photo 3.**

June 29, 1941. Child evacuees at the Moscow train station. Photo by Chertov.



**Photo 4.**

Sept. 1941. Barricade construction in Avtovo district. Photo by Mikhailov, Fedoseev.

**Photo 5.**

Oct. 10, 1941. Evacuation. Photo by Fedoseev.



**Photo 6-9.**

First shelling damage and victims. Photos by D. Trakhtenberg.







**Photo 10.**

Removal of the dead after shelling of Vosstaniia Square. 1941



Fire fighting unit training 1941



Construction of anti-tank ditches in 1941



Construction of the near-front defense line. July 1941





Barricade construction September 24, 1941



Debris removal after German air raid. September 19, 1941



Street damage after bombing. September 9, 1941




Bread ration norms and cards

<b>НОРМЫ ВЫДАЧИ ХЛЕБА В ОСАЖДЕННОМ ЛЕНИНГРАДЕ ДО 25 ДЕКАБРЯ 1941г.</b>				
ДАТА УСТАНОВ- ЛЕНИЯ НОРМЫ (в граммах)	РАБОЧИЕ	СЛУЖАЩИЕ	КУЖИВЕНЦЫ	ДЕТИ
11 СЕНТЯБРЯ	500	300	250	300
1 ОКТЯБРЯ	400	200	200	200
13 НОЯБРЯ	300	150	150	150
20 НОЯБРЯ	250	125	125	125

<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>Карточка на ХЛЕБ</b> на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> НОРМА 200 гр. в день Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ ПРИ УТЕРЕ КАРТОЧКА НЕ ВОЗОБНОВЛЯЕТСЯ	
<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>КАРТОЧКА</b> на МЯСО и МЯСНОПРОДУКТЫ Норма 400 гр на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ При утере картонка не возобновляется	<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>КАРТОЧКА</b> на МЯСО и МЯСНОПРОДУКТЫ Норма 400 гр на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ При утере картонка не возобновляется
<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>КАРТОЧКА</b> на МЯСО и МЯСНОПРОДУКТЫ Норма 400 гр на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ При утере картонка не возобновляется	<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>КАРТОЧКА</b> на МЯСО и МЯСНОПРОДУКТЫ Норма 400 гр на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ При утере картонка не возобновляется
<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>КАРТОЧКА</b> на МЯСО и МЯСНОПРОДУКТЫ Норма 400 гр на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ При утере картонка не возобновляется	<b>ЛЕНИНГРАД</b> <b>КАРТОЧКА</b> на МЯСО и МЯСНОПРОДУКТЫ Норма 400 гр на <b>ОКТЯБРЬ 1941 г.</b> Фамилия _____ Имя, отчество _____ При утере картонка не возобновляется

Dec. 1941. Forged bread ration cards. TsGA SPb. F. 8134. Op. 3. D. 379. L. 199



Listening to the radio announcement by the public loudspeaker



November 1941 on Nevskii Prospect





Winter 1941–42



Evacuation across Lake Ladoga in 1941



First horse sleds with food going to Leningrad. November 24, 1941



1942. Food trucks traveling across Lake Ladoga. Foto TASS



Central library



By a bomb shelter



Dividing bread rations in February 1942






Black market near Kuznechnyi rynek. Winter 1941–42



Getting water on Nevskii Prospekt. Photo by Trakhtenberg.





Woman transporting a *dystrophic*. February 7, 1942





Bol'sheokhtinskoe cemetery





Getting hot water in a bombshelter. 1942



Loading bread



Lunch delivery to one of the plants in May 1942



April 1942. A.I. Bokonovets with her 7th grade Biology class in school # 239. Photo by Roslik.



1942. Medical care of a dystrophic. TsGA SPb. F. 8557. Op. 9. D. 13. L. 9.



Woman with stage III *distrofiia*



Getting firewood



Photos of siege survivor S.I. Petrova in

May 1941,

May 1942,

and

October 1942





April 7, 1942. *Distrofik*. Photo by Konovalov.



July 12, 1942. Orphanage #17, Smol'ninsk district.



Near a canteen. June 1942



Information Posts.



Ads



Cleaning the streets on Volodarskii prospect. March 8, 1942





Cleaning the field by Volkov cemetery. Spring 1942



Spring 1942.



May 1942. Veronika Opakhova and daughters Lora (13 y.o.) and Dolores (4 y.o.). Photo by Fedoseev.




Teens assembling machine guns at a factory



15-year-old metal turner Vera Tikhova (often referred to as “La Giaconda of the Blockade”) completed 1.5 adult norms a day. Photo by Vasilii Fedoseev.



Service at St. Nicholas Cathedral during the siege. The Metropolitan of Leningrad and Novgorod Aleksii (Simanskii)



Orthodox priest speaks to a partisan unit. Photo by M. Trakhman






Partisan Priest Fëdor Puzanov



Line to enter the Spaso-Preobrazhenskii Cathedral. Easter 1942



Oct. 15, 1943. Orthodox Clergy with Medals "For the Defense of Leningrad." Photo by Konovalov.



## VITA

**SVETLANA P. MOROZOVSKAYA**

### EDUCATION

- |                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| 2015 – present. | Master of Arts student in History at Sam Houston State University, Thesis title: “Staying Alive in Besieged Leningrad: Motivational Factors for Survival”                          |
| 2010            | Certificate in Paralegal Studies, University of California San Diego Extension, San Diego, California.   |
| 2008            | Diploma in Clinical Counseling, Vancouver College of Counselor Training, Vancouver, BC, Canada.  |
| 1996            | Bachelor of Science in Linguistics & International Communication, Moscow State Linguistic University, Russian Federation. Graduated with “red diploma” ( <i>magna cum laude</i> ). |

### EMPLOYMENT

- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| 2010 - present | <u>Technical Writer</u> . Vachon Law Firm, San Diego, California. Responsibilities include: conducting legal research, writing press releases, litigation achievements, and articles for the firm’s website, developing and maintaining its content, proofreading for accuracy and consistency, editing for language and content issues, drafting pleadings, discovery, and other legal documents.  |
| 1994 –2011     | <u>Interpreter/Translator</u> . Government and Private Sector. English (B), Russian (A), Ukrainian (A). Interpreting modes: simultaneous, consecutive, summary. Specializations: foreign affairs, law, free trade negotiations, aviation, engineering, education, medical field, psychology, sports, telecommunications, finance, performing arts, literature, conferences and personal matters.  |
| 2004-2008      | <u>Russian Language &amp; History Teacher</u> . Russian Community School, Vancouver, BC, Canada. Responsibilities included: developing, planning, and implementing creative & effective language and history curriculum, assessing oral and written language proficiency of students, evaluating student performance, presenting information on cultural, traditional, ethnic, and societal specificities of Russia, implementing cross-curricular teaching, assigning tasks and correcting homework, encouraging independent learning. |

1992-1993      English Language Teacher, District School #32, Odessa, Ukraine.  
Responsibilities included: preparing lesson plans, adapting curriculum to meet student needs, identifying and correcting student knowledge deficiencies, assigning grades and supervising state exams, assigning and correcting homework, facilitating activities to promote student emotional and social growth, participating in parent-teacher conference and staff meetings, providing teaching method assessments, student evaluations, and feedback.

## **ACADEMIC AWARDS/GRANTS**

2016              Graduate Research Grant  
*College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Sam Houston State University*

2016-2017      Special Graduate Studies Scholarships  
*The Office of Graduate Studies; College of Humanities and Social Sciences, Sam Houston State University*

## **MEMBERSHIPS**

Lambda Epsilon Chi (LEX) Honor Society, the national honor society founded by the American Association for Paralegal Education.

Phi Alpha Theta (National History Honor Society)

## **ARCHIVAL EXPERIENCE**

### **Russian Federation:**

State & State-Affiliated Archives: GARF, RGALI, RGASPI (Moscow); TsGA SPb, TsGAIPD SPb, TsGALI SPb, RNB (St. Petersburg).

Private Archives: GMMOBL (Gosudarstvennyi memorial'nyi muzei oborony i blokady Leningrada) (St. Petersburg); "A muzy ne molchali:" Shostakovich School # 235 (St. Petersburg).