

EVOLUTION OF THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE:

A CASE STUDY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1968

by

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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

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The development of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty was inspired by historical experience, and tempered by a revolutionary ideology and a contemporary international power struggle. A natural evolution of attitudes toward the Eastern European states has occurred within the Russian mind over the centuries. The Soviets did not always have the capabilities to insure this Eastern European buffer zone, but historically maintained this as an objective of Russian foreign policy. Having attained this strategic frontier position, despite the economic evolution of the Satellite States, and the introduction of the idea of polycentrism, or separate roads to socialism, the Soviets are determined to maintain their hold over the area they deem essential to the survival of the Soviet Union.

The preservation of this position in Eastern Europe, from the Soviet view, is essential for the future development of Soviet foreign policy and attainment of its objectives. This buffer zone makes possible the Soviet approach to international disarmament and arms limitation agreements between the East and the West. It further enhances and perhaps insures, a security of the Soviet European border while Soviet attention can be directed to the role of leader of the international communist movement in the world, and the security of the Sino-Soviet border.

The Soviet leaders believe it is essential for Soviet hegemony to exist and to be perpetuated in the Eastern European states because it enhances the attempts of the Soviet Union to develop her position in what may be a tri-polar world power structure in the 1970's and the 1980's.

Without the existence of at least a compatible, or as the Soviets term it, a friendly bloc of nations on her frontier, Soviet international attitudes would probably be manifestly more belligerent. This Soviet interpretation of their position in Eastern Europe is a logical historical development. The maintenance of this strategic frontier position by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the neutralization of the threat of the western nations as the Soviets saw it, was to insure the cohesiveness of the buffer states which are the touchstone of the Soviet security sphere.

Various motives entered into the decision to halt the liberal elements within Czechoslovakia. The historical and national interests probably carried the most weight in the Soviet analysis. The ideological motives were molded to suit the situation. Yet, the manifestations of internal dissent in the Soviet Union combined with economic stagnation, both of which were present in Czechoslovakia, may have given impetus to the decision to invade. There was also the desire to stabilize the states on the Soviet border in Europe so that Soviet attention could be turned to the Sino-Soviet border.

The doctrine of limited sovereignty, or the Brezhnev Doctrine, was the policy statement which outlined the justifications for using

military force to insure the continued existence of nations on the Russian border that were not hostile to the Soviet Union.

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INTRODUCTION

The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like
an incubus upon the brain of the living . . .

Karl Marx^{1*}

Since the 1917 Revolution in Russia, there have been two themes prominent in Soviet foreign policy: after the 1917 Revolution, Soviet policy was directed initially at the protection of the developing Soviet state by any means, with the subsequent continued protection of the Soviet heartland by attempting to break up the ring of non-communist states that surrounded the Soviet Union. Attempts were also made to manipulate the internal situations in foreign countries to keep them in a state of instability and, therefore, weakened.²

In formulating foreign policy, the Soviet image of the external world has been heavily influenced by a bitter and oftentimes tragic history. For over ten centuries, the Russian people have had to fight off armed hordes of hostile nations, from Ghengis Khan's Golden Horde in the thirteenth century to the Nazi Invasion of June, 1941, both of which reduced the city of Kiev to rubble.³

In the years from 1228 to 1462, the years conventionally given for Western Europe's Renaissance, Russian historians list ninety internal wars and one-hundred sixty foreign invasions. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Western Europe's enlightenment, Russia fought three great wars with Sweden ending with the annexation of Finland and the Baltic lands, and seven separate

*Numbers in superscript refer to corresponding numbers in the List of Footnotes at the end of each chapter.

struggles with Poland, ending with the Polish partitions. In the nineteenth century, there were the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War, and in this century, the First and Second World Wars.⁴

The impact of these successive wars has been incalculable. To survive, the Russians have had to gear their lives to the necessity for complete discipline under autocratic authority. The whole society has had to organize for military defense in order to command the forces necessary for the protection of the state. This permitted the Imperial Russian Government and eventually, the Soviet government to achieve a position of almost complete control over the populace.

In addition to creating the basis for an omnipotent state, this nearly constant state of siege greatly influenced Russian attitudes and expectations regarding the external world.

It produced a society driven largely by fear. Throughout Russian history, real circumstances have justified the fear by which the Russians have been governed. For ten centuries they survived the greatest trials experienced by any people in the world, because they have been so governed. They have survived these trials only because they learned at an early age to trust no one, to be suspiciously alert, to keep their own counsel and to substitute guile where superior strength was lacking.⁵

It should be pointed out, that long before the Marxian doctrines, the Russian state was the largest landowner, the largest factory owner, the largest employer of labor, the largest trader, and the largest owner of capital in Russia, or in the world.⁶ This centralization of the tsarist state also brought into being the world's largest bureaucracy.

The English Foreign Minister, Lord Palmerston, in reference to Russia's nineteenth century foreign policy, pointed out that:

. . . the policy and practice of the Russian Government have been always to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of a government would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it met decided resistance, and to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim.⁷

Russia's expansionist policies have been continued by the Bolshevik leaders. These same expansive forces, the same centralism, the same bureaucracy and large standing army have been bound together in an expansion-oriented domain. An empire so huge and cumbersome, and so difficult to coordinate, failed many times to bring decisive strength at a given point, yet four times in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries it was able to bring victorious Russian armies to the Rhine.⁸

It was the pressure of continuing demands made upon the empire by the unending wars that made regimentation a way of life for the entire empire. The military budget was always immense and the people had to be fixed in their jobs and areas in which they lived to accommodate tax-gathering and the military levies.⁹

The leaders of imperial Russia had as a traditional objective, the rectification of the Russian western frontier in order to gain more defensible lines for the protection of the empire. Historically, the Priphet Marshes in the West and the Carpathians in the Southwest were prime geographic features of prime importance to the defense of the empire.¹⁰ In 1815, the Russian Foreign Minister urged Alexander I to take advantage of the Russian advance into Paris to extend the

Russian borders to the Carpathians, and along the shortest line from the Oder River to the Baltic Sea.¹¹

Underlying this imperialistic policy are elements that predate Peter the Great. Going back to the early days of Muscovy, there prevailed an historical mission of expansion for the Russian nation, particularly as the defender of Eastern Christianity. The historical continuity of territorial expansion remained inherent in Russian imperial policies.

The totalitarianism of monolithic communism, today in a perpetual state of emergency, also has deep roots in the historical development of the Russian empire. Developing along with this fear of outsiders has been the spectre of terror within Russia. In Russian history, revolution and counterrevolution have been accompanied by "violent cruelty, torture, physical violence -- arbitrary, capricious and unrestrained," and this has been incorporated as a part of the Soviet heritage.¹²

When World War I erupted in Europe, the expansionist tendencies of the tsars came to the forefront. The Russian military staff had developed a plan of territorial expansion which has been followed today with few exceptions. The Russian imperial war plan had wide objectives in pushing toward further expansion, assuming that the Russian forces would be victorious, and was extremely ambitious. According to the plan, the Polish inhabited areas were to be united within the framework of the Russian empire.¹³ The Russian frontier in the Northwest would have been on the Baltic Sea, somewhere near

the port of Danzig, and East Prussia was to be annexed to Russia.¹⁴ A Czech Kingdom was to be created under a Russian protectorate.¹⁵ The strip of land lying between Austria and Hungary was to become a corridor from the Western to the Southern Slavs.¹⁶ The northeastern provinces of Hungary were to be ceded to Russia; Turkey was to be ousted from Europe, and Russia was to receive a major portion of her possessions in Europe, including Constantinople.¹⁷ In addition, there was to be ceded to Russia a certain area of Turkish territory on the Asiatic coast near the Bosphorous Straits, which would have given Russia domination of the Straits as well as the Black Sea, and at the same time, would have advanced her sphere of influence into the Eastern Mediterranean.¹⁸ The Slav states and the Balkans would have finally been brought under Russian control.

The Russian frontier thus would have passed near Frankfort on the Oder, within a two hour rail journey from Berlin, and in the south, Vienna would have been only thirty miles from the Russian frontier. Finally, her position at the Bosphorous Straits and in the Mediterranean would have impelled her to build a navy and would probably have forced her to seek the status of a first class sea power.¹⁹

Thus, expansionism, combined with an intense nationalism, emerged as the predominant factor in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' imperial policies, and is characterized by a statement from a minister of Catherine the Great, who asserted, "that which stops growing begins to rot."²⁰

After 1917, these policies were reinforced by the revolutionary

attitudes of the Bolsheviks and the inherently paranoid nature of the communist ideology which guided their thinking. As George Kennan points out, it is no coincidence that Marxism was able to flourish in Russia after 1917:

Only in this land that had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers, either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means.²¹

After the establishment of the Bolshevik regime and the further interpretation of the Marxist dogma by Lenin, the sense of national insecurity intensified even more than it had under the tsarist rulers. Marxist doctrines enabled the Bolsheviks to find expanded justification for their instinctive distrust of the outside world.

The Soviet view of world affairs was apprehensive and was related directly to the traditional and instinctive sense of insecurity. The emergence of the Bolsheviks and the introduction of their ideology only intensified this sense of insecurity and the fear of outsiders. Soviet attitudes toward the outside world, and in particular, western governments, were hostile from the start. The Bolshevik ideology included the following general beliefs:

. . . a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the western governments, a pervasive cynicism about the parliamentary and democratic sources of power, a denial that people owe them loyalty . . . a widely propagandized conviction that those governments were doomed by inexorable social forces to eventual destruction and openly avowed determination to do everything possible to prod these social

forces into the early accomplishment of their historic mission.²²

Early Bolshevik attitudes were not merely defensive, but in fact developed an aggressive momentum. Although immediately after the revolution in 1917, the slow and painful reconsolidation of Russia, which included internal warfare and fending off Allied invasion, did not permit the aggressive ideology to succeed, the fears of capitalist encirclement grew. The official communist ideology saw the expansion of the Soviet Union as the primary aim of the fast-developing doctrines of communism.

Because of the very nature and character of Soviet power, the Soviet government sought security of its state, not so much in alliances, but by attempting to extend Soviet power to new territories. The pushing forward of frontiers fit in with the doctrine of ideological expansion. The requirements of Soviet defense and the national policy of state security have thus emphasized the importance of having friendly political regimes in the countries which border the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet government has demanded similar systems in these countries, feeling that socialism would always be endangered unless this condition was established.²³

The Soviets have never forgotten the Allied intervention of Great Britain, France and the United States between 1918 and 1921, when these nations actually put troops on Russian soil. The motives were to prevent war material supplied to the tsarist military forces from falling into the hands of the Germans, and subsequently, the Bolsheviks.

But Allied forces ended up aiding the White Russian Forces. In the version of the Allied intervention, published by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, emphasis was placed on the role played by the Allies in support of the White Forces.²⁴ The history further stated that this Allied aid posed a threat to the border regions of Russia and choked off the sources of food and raw material.²⁵

The mistrust that the Bolsheviks held for the victorious Allies at the close of World War I was reinforced by the machinations of the British, French and American negotiators at the Versailles conference. The British and the French feared Bolshevism and wanted to prevent its influence from reaching to Central and Western Europe, particularly to Germany. In the Armistice agreements, the Germans were forced to renounce the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to turn over to the Allies the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which the Germans had received as part of the bargain, and all gold received as part of the treaty with Russia.²⁶ The Allies, still fearing the Bolshevik threat, incorporated into article XII of the Armistice, the stipulation that no specific date was to be set for the withdrawal of German troops from territories which before the war formed a part of Russia.²⁷ This fit into the schemes of the French and British for the establishment of a government in Russia sympathetic to the Allies. This, of course, never materialized.

After the assumption of power by Josef Stalin, the Soviet drive for state security continued as a major goal, along with the attempts to establish trade relations and to gain recognition for the Soviet Union. The protection of the western border was of extreme importance

to the Soviet rulers who wished to confirm Russia as a major power. Two major tactics emerged in the development of the Soviet security system: splitting the capitalists' powers so that they could not form a front against the Soviet Union, and the immediate neutralization of the states along the western edge of the Soviet Union so that they could never serve as bases for intervention.²⁸

Soviet efforts to neutralize these western neighbors paralleled efforts to insure a friendly Germany. However, the Eastern European countries were worried about the possibility of Soviet intervention, as these countries had been the object of tsarist aims for many years.

In 1925, the signing of the Locarno Treaty by Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy and Belgium intensified Russian fears of the West. The Treaty of Locarno represented a policy defeat for the Soviet Union. In essence, the treaty recognized the status quo of the German frontiers with France and Belgium, and Great Britain and Italy pledged to militarily enforce these boundaries. Yet, there was no similar guarantee extended to Germany's eastern frontiers, and this would enable the Germans to continue to pose a threat of eastward expansion toward the Soviet Union.²⁹

On August 27, 1928, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which renounced war in Europe, was signed by fifteen European governments, but the Soviet Union was not invited to sign. This was the first multilateral agreement between nations on the western border of the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin, in a press statement on August 5, 1928, declared that the:

. . . real aims of the initiators of the pact obviously included the desire of isolation of the USSR and fighting against it. The negotiations for the conclusions of the pact clearly are a constituent part of the policy of encircling the USSR.³⁰

A month later the Soviet Union was asked to sign, and did. The USSR began immediately to use her membership to try to force Poland into a separate nonaggression pact, and the pressures on the small nations on the Soviet western border never abated from 1917 to 1940. The border states formed a solid front in the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and Soviet aims were now to split this solidarity in order to create a balance of power favorable to Russia. During the 1930's, separate treaties were thus concluded between many of the western border states and the Soviet Union, all of which were termed nonaggression pacts and embodied a type of collective security.

Early in the twentieth century, German armies had created devastation within the Soviet Union. They swept across the plains of Poland and descended through the Danube Basin into Southern Russia, sweeping before them some of the Slav nations and convincing others to join in the attack. Even if it appeared in 1918 that Germany was no military threat, there was always the possibility that the Germans would again threaten the heartland of Russia. Recalling the earlier intervention of the Allied governments, and fearing that pro-capitalist governments might surround the Russian borders, the spectre of encirclement still haunted the Soviets.

The basis for post-World War II expansion of the Soviet Union was

laid in the Soviet-German agreement of August 23, 1939. Josef Stalin thought that, at best, the Soviet Union could recover the territories lost after World War I, and if war came, he hoped that the western nations would deplete themselves in a mutually exhausting war in Western Europe.

At worst, Stalin hoped for a short-term gain, at least a buffer that the Nazi armies would have to traverse before gaining entry into the Soviet Union. The acquisition of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bessarabia, and the eastern half of Poland, were the first steps in laying the basis for the development of a security zone. The Soviets actually considered these territories as integral parts of the Soviet Union, and gaining them was, in effect, an expansion of influence for the Soviets. Within a few months, private industry, trade, and the banks were liquidated in these new lands.³¹ The "socially harmful" elements were deported to the eastern provinces of Siberia. These included tradesmen and small businessmen.

In November 1939, in a continued search for military security, the Soviet Union invaded Finland to gain seventy miles of territory, sacrificing the Finnish Communist Party in doing so. In this case, a hill commanding a river crossing became more important to Soviet policy than the dogmas of communism. "The capitalist world will have to draw back a bit," exclaimed Molotov before the Supreme Soviet in August, 1940. This new method for expanding the social revolution seemed much quicker than the old revolutionary methods.³²

During the early years of World War II, Soviet policy was

transformed from territorial expansion alone to one of territorial expansion and control. As the war developed after July 1943, Stalin, on the winning side, realized that fortunes were turning to his favor. The Soviets could now seek the spoils of victory which included Eastern Europe, and they succeeded beyond their wildest dreams.

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C H A P T E R I

POST-WORLD WAR II AND IDEOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS

With the Soviet victory over Germany in World War II, the path to Eastern Europe was thrown open. An Eastern European defense zone was achieved, offering advantages to the Soviets of military, economic, and political expansion.

From the ideological standpoint, the acquisition of the Eastern European sector, which included Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Rumania, could be explained as the continuing struggle of communism to insure its expansion against the capitalist states. Despite aid from the Allies during the war, from the Soviet standpoint there was no evidence to demonstrate any change in the "permanent conflict between capitalism and communism."¹ The Soviet Union thus felt it necessary to surround itself with pliant states to allow more time to prepare for the coming war with the capitalists. The Soviets could only believe that co-operation between East and West would be temporary, and therefore they proceeded to occupy Eastern Europe looking toward the inevitable conflict between ideological blocs.

While Josef Stalin was in power he was determined that the East European states would not fall under the influence or control of states that were hostile to the Soviet Union. Additionally, an international situation existed at the close of the war uniquely favorable to the Soviet Union. Disruption of the established balance of power and the collapse of existing governmental institutions are always temptations to expansion.

The plans for the extension of the strategic frontier began taking shape as it became obvious that the Soviet Union would emerge victorious from the Second World War. Soviet policy during World War II was directed to secure the political control of areas that fell under the military occupation of the Red Army.²

As early as 1942, the Soviet Union pressed for western recognition of the principle that she should regain, after the war, territory occupied in 1941. Stalin's idea was that Russia should be granted a special sphere of influence in Eastern Europe; in return Stalin would recognize the claims of the Allies in the countries to be liberated in the West.³

The Soviet sphere of influence encompassed five medium-sized countries and East Prussia. Three of these countries, however, were non-Slav and were collaborating with the Germans. During the war the planning for the strategic frontier was conducted mostly through the propaganda level, which was directed toward forming an alliance of the Soviet Union and the Slav nations in order to defend themselves against the Germans.

This so-called Pan-Slav movement did not resemble that of the nineteenth century, but was a euphemism for the realistic political program of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the Soviets envisioned a replacement organization for the soon-to-be defunct Comintern. The first all-Slav meeting was held in Moscow at the beginning of the war on August 10-11, 1941.⁴ This was an appeal to the non-communist Slav countries to support the Soviet Union. An all-Slav committee was selected as a

permanent body. The committee met again eight months later on April 4-5, 1942, and continued as a propaganda forum. A third all-Slav meeting was held on May 9, 1943, and at this time the announcement was made that a new Polish government and army had been formed. This move was to counter the Polish government-in-exile in London. Propaganda continued for closer ties between the Slav nations and the Soviet Union, but until the end of the war no major agreements were ever reached for a United Slav Front.⁵

By 1945, Russia had realized the most extravagant dreams of the Pan-Slavist by becoming master of all Slavic nations. In justifying the Yalta decision to shift the frontiers of Poland westward, the Soviet press used, word for word, the arguments of the nineteenth century Pan-Slavs and nationalists.⁶

Like their imperial predecessors, the Soviet state presided over the removal of an age-old grievance of the Orthodox Church. Immediately after the war, assisted by the Soviet secret police, the Greek Catholic Variates of Galicia were returned to the bosom of Orthodoxy.⁷

The policy of the Soviet Union then continued on two levels in the post-World War II period: ideological and spatial. The dynamics of the communist ideology and the continuing policy of the Soviets of ever-expanding on the Eurasian continent, would provide a consolidation of the Soviet periphery, and hopefully would create an impregnable fortress to protect the heartland of the Soviet Union.

The execution of this policy was carried out by the advancing armies during and after World War II, aided by the aggressive

bargaining of Stalin at the allied war conferences. Given a weakened Europe and Soviet military forces, these actions gave impetus to communist takeovers. Moscow-trained communists traveled in the baggage of the advancing Red Army and were able to establish a foundation of future communist rule as the Eastern European states were liberated.

By July 1945, when the Potsdam Conference convened, the Soviet Union directly or indirectly controlled the belt of states along her Western European frontier. There remained only the consolidation of these newly-acquired lands and the implementation of the Soviet defense plans in order to pursue the world revolution.

In the development of international politics after World War II, the relationship of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union was defined at the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conferences. These agreements generally stated that post-war Europe was to be controlled by regimes that were democratic and friendly to the Soviet Union. Since any state with a capitalistic economic system was feared, there was little doubt that this type of regime would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union.⁸

In his report on the twenty-eighth anniversary of the October Revolution on November 6, 1945, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, said:

As long as we live in a system of states, and as long as the roots of fascism and the imperialist aggression have not been finally extirpated, our vigilance in regard to possible new violators of peace should not be shaken.⁹

There was no effective opposition from the West as the Soviets pursued this strategy of territorial expansion, and from 1945 to 1948, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany, were absorbed into the communist sphere.

The Soviet approach after World War II was still based on the thesis of encirclement by capitalist nations bent on the destruction of the USSR. The Marxist-Leninist canons predicted that the capitalist circles would, out of fear and hatred, unleash a terrible war against the Soviet state. This view of the Soviets stems in part from a persecution complex fed by half truths during the past fifty years of the Bolshevik experiment.¹⁰

The Allied interventions after the First World War, the Soviet suspicions of the French and the British at Munich in 1938, the slowness of the Allies to open a second front during the Second World War, and the 1947 Truman-Marshall Plans all added to Soviet paranoia.

A. A. Zhdanov, Chairman of the Communist Information Bureau, elaborated on the Soviet position toward the Marshall Plan as it was proposed.

The ruling class of American imperialists has taken the path of outright expansion to enthrall the weakened capitalist states of Europe. It has chosen a new path of war . . . plans of fresh aggression are being hatched.¹¹

To counter the communist takeovers, the Western European nations, in conjunction with the United States, sought a defensive alignment in the West in order to combat the aggressive Soviet expansion. By the

end of 1947, the economic and ideological alignment of the Eastern European states against Western Europe had been completed. Western efforts to contain this expansion culminated in the defensive alliance outlined in the North Atlantic Pact, signed by the Western European nations on April 4, 1949.¹² Signatories were the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, and Luxembourg. In essence, these countries agreed that an attack on one was an attack on all, and that the necessary armed force would be used to restore the security of the North Atlantic area.

Thus, the Soviet consolidation of its new socialist countries and the West European counter-thrust backed by the United States had, by 1950, laid the basis for a polarity of East-West blocs out of which highly developed military systems would evolve on both sides.

The sovereignty of these new Soviet satellite states was a minor consideration in the Soviet plans. In Stalin's approach, particularly after the post-war cementing of the Soviet influence over the Eastern European states, the satellites were not eligible for any more sovereignty than the "sovereign" republics of the Soviet Union. Stalin also attempted to extend the principle of democratic centralism to the newly formed communist parties. This was not necessarily a doctrinal move and one need not dig too deeply into the Marxist doctrine to establish the reasoning for these moves. Mainly, they were to insure the Soviet security sphere.

The establishment of this security sphere by rectification of the western frontier, from the Soviet point of view, would guarantee

security for the Soviet Union. Due to the presence of the Red Army and fellow travelers from Moscow after the war, pressures were immediately brought on Czechoslovakia, a key area of the Soviet security zone, to voluntarily cede the Carpatho-Ukraine, formerly Ruthenia. This gave the Soviets direct access to Hungary, a vital rectification of their strategic frontier.¹³

Czechoslovakia seemed a threat to the Soviet regime even in 1947 as it retained some internal democratic freedom and continued its relations with the non-communist world. In the communist eyes, the fear of freedom is the essence of their theory of security. There must be a triumph of socialism. That is the ultimate aim, and in addition, the border states must be secured. To provide such security the transition from a people's democracy to complete Sovietization is imperative.

The partial, if not the full, impetus behind the Soviet drive for this security sphere stems from the inherited historical circumstances and the impetus of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The ideology is invoked when necessary or essential to Soviet goals. In realizing the long-standing goal of acquiring the Eastern European states as a strategic frontier, the ideological justifications for maintaining this position range over a wide spectrum.

In considering the post-World War II initial positions of Bolshevik ideology, it is apparent that they are based on elastic doctrines. The ideological beliefs are primary, yet they are subordinated to political objectives.¹⁴ Lenin said that Marxist ideology

serves the Bolsheviks as the justification for the political doctrine in the struggle for power. Throughout all of Lenin's doctrines one idea predominates, the primacy of power over the purity of dogma.¹⁵ The distillation of the Soviet dogmas, thus, must be recognized as their post-World War II policy took direction. On the Bolshevik interpretation of what was good for society concomitant with ideology and based on historical and national experience, George Kennan observes that:

. . . they always knew what was good for society and they would accomplish that good once their power was established and unchallenged.¹⁶

As in their historical development, the Soviets have a modern ideological development which reinforces the historical precedents of the last several hundred years. Beginning immediately after the revolution on November 17, 1917, the "Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia" was issued. Coming a few days after the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, the declaration proclaimed to gather support for the unstable government and affirmed the "right of peoples to free self-determination to the point of seceding and organizing independent states . . ."¹⁷ However, this right was only granted to the workers or that part of the population that was under the control of the Soviets. Early in the history of the Communist International, the paranoid tendencies of the ideology and the historical realities of intervention by the French, British, and Americans, moved the Second Comintern Congress, which met on the day of August 6, 1920, to establish

definite conditions for the communist parties which were about to join the International.¹⁸

Twenty-one conditions were laid down for the communist parties of the world to follow and are still relevant to party guidance today.

Item two of these guidelines proclaims:

Every organization desiring to join the Communist International shall be bound systematically and regularly to remove from all the responsible posts in the labor movement all reformists and followers of the "center" and have them replaced by communists even at the cost of replacing at the beginning "experienced" men by rank and file working men.

Other steps direct that the party in power remove unreliable elements, and incorporate the elements of democratic centralism, and item fourteen states that:

Each party should be obliged to render every possible aid to the Soviets in their struggle against counterrevolutionary forces . . .¹⁹

The first Soviet Constitution presented to the world on December 30, 1922, incorporated the so-called two-camp positions, dividing the socialists and the capitalists:

In the camp of capitalism there reigns national hostility, inequality, colonial slavery and chauvinism, the oppression of nationalities, pogroms, and imperialist atrocities.

It goes on to state the prime fear which will be voiced over and over through the next decades:

On the other hand, the instability of the international situation and the danger of new attacks render inevitable the creation of a common front by the Soviet Republics against the capitalist encirclement.²⁰

In 1923, Stalin, then the People's Commissar' of Nationalities, expressed the official point of view of the Soviet government concerning self-determination:

It should be remembered that apart from the right of the peoples to self-determination, there is also the right of the working class to strengthen their power and to this latter the right of self-determination is subordinated.²¹

George Kennan analyzes Stalin's position:

From enthusiasm to imposture the step is perilous and slippery; the demon of Socrates affords a memorable instance how a wise man may deceive himself, how a good man may deceive others, and how the conscience may slumber in a mixed muddly state between self-illusion and voluntary fraud.²²

Stalin continues,

There are times when the right of self determination conflicts with the other higher right, the right of the ruling working class to strengthen its power. On such occasions the right of self-determination cannot and must not serve as an obstacle to the cause of realizing the right of the working class to its own dictatorship, the first must bow to the second.²³

On this particular occasion, Stalin was justifying the invasion of Poland.

In September 1928, at the Sixth Congress of the Communist

International, an elaboration was made upon the twenty-one conditions established in 1920 as the guidelines for international communism. The changes directly related to the Soviet Union, again incorporating the nationalism of the Russians and the desire for the preservation of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the changes held that the Soviet Union was the citadel of world revolution, "she is the prototype of the fraternity of nationalities in all lands united in the world union of socialist republics."²⁴

The preservation of the Soviet Union must be the primary task of the proletariat. In the event of the imperial states declaring war upon and attacking the Soviet Union, the international proletariat must retaliate by organizing bold and determined action and struggle for the overthrow of the imperialist governments.²⁵

And finally, "[c]ommunist parties owe exclusive allegiance to Moscow. Local interests must be subordinated to the line set forth by the Soviet Union."²⁶

There are no automatic, or consistently correct interpretations between any part of the ideology and a particular act. Their doctrine relies on a vast accumulation of political commentary and judgments, many time-worn and now of questionable validity. Many of the judgments were directed at European economic conditions of a century ago and at social mores long abandoned. To add to the complexity or confusion, every assertion in the bulk of writings by Marx, Engles, and Lenin, is held to be a part of a single science. These are the canons of communism in which any sentence may be treated as having probative value.²⁷

There are particular interpretations of these canons, or creative extensions of the doctrines. "Facts are stubborn things," Lenin would say, yet these facts could cause a particular tactic or plan of a given moment to be abandoned or a particular position reinterpreted.²⁸ A new approach is not a revision, from the Soviet view, but the application of communist doctrine to genuine psychological and political needs. Marxism makes a "science," through dogma, of history, politics, sociology, individual psychology, "even the subtle realms of the soul."²⁹ It is a predictive science and it works to fulfill its own prophecies. Since it includes its own verification, it also includes its own morality.³⁰ This infallible ideology, together with an underlying nationalism, has directed Soviet foreign policy.

After the revolution, the Bolsheviks at first used nationalism as an appeal in their struggle for survival. From 1921 onward, however, the internal needs of the Soviet state took precedence over the Bolshevik commitment to nationalism. Yet, this commitment to domestic goals did not supplant the Marxist-Leninist goals. The two would compliment each other as one ideological-national movement. However, nationalism, the same political force that the Soviets were to make use of outside the security sphere, became a threat in the Soviet's own sphere of control. This nationalism took the form of "bourgeois nationalism" and in Eastern Europe "national deviationism."³¹

In the late 1950's, Kennan wrote:

Forty years of intellectual opportunism have wrought a strange corruption of the communist mind rendering it incapable of distinguishing sharply between fact

and fiction in a single segment of its experience, namely in its relationship to any external power.³²

The defensive aspects of the imperial Russian policy thus combined with the aggressive communist ideology in the modern day Soviet policy apparatus. The ethnic argument, Pan-Slavism, even Orthodoxy, found room in the Soviet scheme of internal and international affairs. The limited goals that the tsars reached out for but never achieved were finally seized by their successors. These goals have been expanded further by the aggressive communist ideology. Eastern Europe is under full domination of the Soviets and the borders of Germany have been pushed back to where they were in the Middle Ages.

This long sought-after position in Eastern Europe is evidence of some continuity between the old regime and the new. The historical continuities of Russia combined with the Marxist ideology can offer an unlimited number of justifications for maintaining this security sphere.

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C H A P T E R I I

THE REFORMIST TRENDS

The unconditional subordination of the international communist movement to the Soviet Union after World War II, occurred after the installation of the people's democratic regimes in the capitals of Eastern Europe. There were early tendencies toward the solution of domestic problems by local leaders, while still adhering to Soviet leadership. The yugoslavs led in the drive for the so-called separate paths to socialism. Because of party conflicts, an unwillingness to subordinate themselves to the Soviet Union, and a continuing disagreement on the Yugoslav role in the consolidation of the Balkans under Yugoslav leadership, the communist parties of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union engaged in a political and propaganda feud that lasted until 1955, when a reconciliation was effected by Josip Tito and Nikita Khrushchev in an agreement by which the Soviets recognized Yugoslavia's right to an independent road to socialism.

During the period of hostility between the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavs, considerable emphasis was placed by the Yugoslavs on reorganizing economic structures that had been established along the patterns of a Soviet command economy. In order to streamline their industrial system, the Yugoslavs transferred the control of the basic industries to worker committees, and established a system of market exchange, evolving later to principles of free competition and adapting to the needs of the consumer.¹ The "revisionist" Yugoslavs, as they were

called by the Soviets, discarded the Stalinist command economy as early as 1950, thus demonstrating that the Soviet style of progress was not satisfying the needs of the socialist workers.²

The Soviet Union, in order to bring the Yugoslavs back into the satellite fold, applied innumerable pressures on the Yugoslavs, including economic boycott, military maneuvers, propaganda campaigns, and threatening border incidents. But the Yugoslavs were able to show that an independent-minded regime could pursue goals to socialism and could withstand the Soviet threats and pressures. This example added impetus to demands that would manifest themselves in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and later in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

After Josef Stalin's death, the unifying influence of his political and economic system of colonization crumbled and the Soviet leaders started to search for substitute cohesive factors to continue the socialist unity of the Eastern European states. Stalinist policies had decelerated progress in the economic and industrial sectors in both Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.³

Their relaxation of control on Eastern European nations reflected an awareness that the Stalin policies had been a failure. Moderation in some of the economic policies seemed acceptable as long as the security of the Soviet Union was not threatened and the Eastern European buffer zone was not endangered. By 1955, however, the Soviet conception of security in Eastern Europe continued in the context of the East-West political struggle.⁴ To leaders of the Kremlin, the preservation of the East-West balance of power was an historic achievement of the

Soviet state. It was to them progress in the world revolution and a platform for further extending Soviet influence in Western Europe.

On February 25, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, delivered his sensational speech denouncing the Stalinist cult of personality, and this denunciation shook the foundations of the European communist empire.⁵ In the long harangue by Khrushchev, thirty years of conditioning to Stalin's dictates of oppression, economic policies, social ordering of nationalities, the vaunted Soviet experience in socialism, and even some aspects of Marxist-Leninism, were denounced or reinterpreted.⁶

In this denunciation, Khrushchev was probably trying to dissociate his regime from the political and economic disasters resulting from the Stalinist policies, and to take a different approach to the consolidation of power within the bloc nations generally. The ideology and the leaders, however, would remain the same.

The denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev developed the concept, or perhaps expanded the realization, that Soviet political leadership could no longer be based on the subjection of nations to a world discipline of communism, but on the recognition of other national states as independent equals, as was accomplished in the Tito-Khrushchev agreement of 1955, endorsing the Yugoslav independence within the socialist states, while still maintaining that theory of the ideological epicenter in Moscow. However, as this doctrine applied to Eastern Europe, the Soviets could still rely on superior military forces to compliment the idea of ideological supremacy.

The denunciation of Stalin, however, had a shattering effect upon the Eastern European leaders.⁷ They were literally cast adrift. How far and in what direction should they de-Stalinize? The more adventurous followed in part the Tito model of socialism. The weaker continued to maintain the status-quo in their particular countries, and continued to solicit Soviet help to support their governments.

How did these states rehabilitate the victims of the cult of personality? The moral and political unity of the Soviet Bloc had been shaken, and now a re-evaluation of policy had to be resolved because of the volte-face of the first communist of the Soviet Union. Yet, from the standpoint of the Soviet leaders, there was upon the death of Stalin, an almost immediate realization that the Stalinist system of national political and economic programs could not be continued.⁸ The influence of the Yugoslav experience prompted acceptance of the fact that more autonomy for each country was necessary if a viable system for the communist nations was to be developed. Additionally, the developing Sino-Soviet dispute at this juncture added to the factors which combined to produce a diversity of ideology within the Marxist framework that was to grow and mature in Eastern Europe.

The uniformity was now discarded. Many of the national leaders indicated that the policies they would adopt would embody a form of socialism tailored to some extent to the nature and traditions and customs of their countries.⁹ In effect, Khrushchev had unwittingly given the go-ahead for domesticism and for internal autonomy through his denunciation of Stalin.

As the nature of the complex forces set loose by the Khrushchev denunciation of Stalin was realized, the Soviets had second thoughts and sought to restrict to a minimum the personnel and policy changes within Eastern Europe.¹⁰ During the summer of 1956, the Soviets showed support for the former Stalinist leaders in Eastern Europe, yet in Poland and Hungary the forces of reform broke through.

But the leaders of the Eastern European states were entrapped within a dilemma without any clear-cut directives from the Soviet Union. They were divided, so local improvising resulted in attempts to adjust policies to the fluid interpretations emanating from Moscow.¹¹

The de-Stalinization issue developed into a bitter struggle for power between the former executors of Stalin's policies and those who supported the national or separate path to socialism. The reforms demanded by the critics throughout Eastern Europe began with the development of policies to insure a slowdown of industrialization, a better price structure, the end of the forced delivery system for peasants, and the granting of permission to leave the collective farms.¹² These demands could not only be supported by the example of Yugoslavia, but by the reforms introduced in Hungary in 1953-54, immediately after Stalin's death. The new changes were being put forth not necessarily as a change in relation to Soviet policy, but in the name of each nation following its own path to socialism. This new national communism, however, could clearly be interpreted by the Soviets as a "rightist deviatist democracy."¹³

In late August 1956, the Soviets issued a printed circular to

all communist parties in Eastern Europe warning that the Yugoslav model of government showed the ideological weakness of a social democratic type government and should not be used as a model for communist development.¹⁴ This pronouncement followed the factory workers riots in Poland in June 1956, when the workers attacked the headquarters of the security police and the communist party headquarters.¹⁵ In October 1956, the Polish Communist Party, following the Soviet lead, dropped the Stalinist followers from the Polish Politburo and on October 20, the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, denounced Stalin and called for a Polish road to socialism.¹⁶ In Poland, the Soviets tolerated a measure of domestic autonomy while Gomulka rebuilt the Polish Communist Party. This was in response to the de-Stalinization speech by Khrushchev which eroded the standing of most of the communist party members in Eastern Europe because of their Stalinist past. The threat of Soviet intervention was present during this time, but the Poles were finally allowed to continue on their separate road. However, a few days later in Hungary the Russians invaded the country, removed the Hungarian Premier, Imre Nagy from power, and crushed the Hungarian liberal movement. The Hungarians had made the fatal mistake of threatening that they would dissolve their relationship with the Soviet Union and withdraw from the Warsaw Pact.¹⁷

The events in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and the underlying causes foreshadowed the Czechoslovakian crisis which occurred twelve years later. These crises of 1956 involved limited de-Stalinization of the countries' political systems, and the rehabilitation of individuals

who suffered under the Stalinist policies. Another cause of unrest involved the Stalinist economic policies, the impact of which later brought Czechoslovakia to her knees. The justification for the intervention in Hungary in 1956 became an echo in 1968. Khrushchev asserted in 1956:

The imperialists engineered a plot against the peoples' Hungary. Fascist-like cutthroats, most of whom had been sent from abroad began to exterminate the progressive people. The government of Hungary asked the government of the Soviet Union for help in defeating the counterrevolutionary gangs.¹⁸

As the Soviets were trying to hold together the Eastern European states in 1956 by any method including invasion, the leader of the Italian Communist Party, Palmiro Togliatti, further elaborated on the separate road to socialism theme by outlining what he called polycentrism. In June 1956, in the Italian communist paper, L'Unita, he declared: ". . . the Soviet model cannot and should not be obligatory, the whole system is becoming polycentric."¹⁹ Meanwhile, Khrushchev insisted that no regime should display its deviations as an example for others to follow, and that in foreign policy and later as it applied to intra-block policy, there should be complete obedience to Moscow.²⁰ This pronouncement simply restated earlier versions of conduct expected from communist countries elaborated on in the 1920's.

In December 1956, at the Eighth Congress of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti outlined his concept of polycentrism by stating:

The communist movement must be homogeneous on the

international as well as the national level. This unity may be understood in two ways: as a result of pressure from without, of mechanical endorsement of or slavish adherence to all directives. This kind of unity we reject. But there can be a unity which is based on the differences and originality of individual experience, on mutual criticism and the enhanced autonomy of the various parties: we feel the need for the unity of the second type.²¹

Polycentrism, as defined by the late Togliatti, has become one of the most important realities in world affairs. Its development has caused much consternation within the Soviet Union's pact of nations in Eastern Europe. De-Stalinization greatly promoted the spread of polycentrism, and aroused the nationalist passions of the bloc nations to pursue their independent roads.

The doctrine of the unshakable unity of the Soviet Bloc was based on the infallibility of the Soviet leadership, or more particularly upon that of Stalin. His death simply presented the opportunity for the growth of independent states within the socialist camp.

In 1964, Togliatti drafted a memorandum which was published after his death, in which he maintained that the Soviet Union had been developing a centrifugal tendency, whereby the individual parties were moving away from centralized control exercised by Moscow.²² He castigated the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states for their slowness in overcoming the regime of restrictions and suppression of democratic and personal freedom introduced by Stalin, and concluded: "One must consider that the unity one ought to establish and maintain lies in the diversity and full autonomy of the individual countries."²³

Togliatti was not the first to suggest the idea of separate roads to socialism, even though he coined the word polycentrism. Tito, in his repudiation of Moscow control, set the earliest example for the other countries in Eastern Europe. Before the beginning of the 1960's, Khrushchev discussed, in rather ambiguous terms, the role of other communist parties. During a speech at the anniversary session of the Soviet Supreme Congress on November 6, 1959, he quoted Lenin as saying: "All nations and countries will achieve socialism but they will not all attain the goal in the same way."²⁴

However, he did not stress the different ways, and in fact warned that it was dangerous to pursue too many roads to socialism. He suggested that the enemies of socialism were those who proposed to achieve socialism by different paths.²⁵

In the communist view, the emergence of communist-ruled states and the forcible transformation of their societies is part of the historical process. There is the logic that unity among the communist states is the necessary conclusion of such a process and that it is the verification of the communist ideology. Conversely, the manifestations of diversity are a principal threat to the authenticity of the ideology.²⁶ The result has been the attempt to maintain a balance between ideological unity and the diversity of domestic reforms.

In the communist parties, domestic policy was shaped within the separate nations, but the ideological concepts were to be agreed upon jointly by the entire group of socialist countries. No aspect of society was outside their purview and both concepts of power and

ideology were related to the universal process of historical change. A communist power already established which came under pressure for domestic change ordinarily engaged in a continuous consultation with the various ruling parties of the eastern bloc. As a result, a policy of the established regime helped to enforce Marxist-Leninism or, if it varied, it then constituted a threat to the ideology.²⁷

Therefore, if the balance between ideological unity and domestic reform was disturbed, particularly toward domestic reform efforts which discredited the party leaders, then the Soviet Union felt that this transformation was developing into a threat to the ideological security of the socialist nations in Eastern Europe, and hence to the security of the Soviet Union itself.

The quarrel between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties is an example of the development of the doctrine of separate roads to communism or a lack of consultation with other communist parties as to liberal changes. The reason for the disagreement was Tito's unwillingness to allow the spread of Soviet influence through the presence of Soviet military officers, secret police, and technological experts. The Soviets tried to crush Tito with economic and political pressures, but were unable to do so. Because of this experience, the Soviets resolved that there would be no break-away states like Yugoslavia in the future, especially among those states which border the Soviet Union.²⁸

The principle of separate paths to socialism was approved by the Twentieth Communist Party Congress of the Soviet Union for tactical

reasons, and this separate path doctrine was an interpretation which Moscow accepted with reservations. The Soviets stated that each country's experience must be given consideration, but this would only slightly vary from that of the Soviet Union since the latter was the epicenter of all the socialist experiences. The Soviets continually warned against the dangers of exaggerating the importance of national characteristics.²⁹

While the socialist states around Czechoslovakia were deeply involved in Georgi Malenkov's new course policies in 1954-55, which featured collective leadership, the downgrading of the state police activities, and the building up of light industry over heavy, the Czech leaders continued their Stalinist policies. Despite Khrushchev's speech denouncing Stalin, the Czech leadership remained as orthodox and conservative as ever.³⁰

Certain aspects of the de-Stalinization process, as it had been implemented in the other Eastern European countries, were perceived as direct threats to the security and survival of the Czechoslovakian government. By 1961 in Czechoslovakia there had not been a review of the purge trials as there had been in the other Eastern European countries.³¹ And for good reason, since a review of such trials would have shown the regime in power to be heavily implicated in those purge activities. Antonin Novotny himself had reviewed and prepared charges for these trials, and this naturally reinforced his opposition to any liberalization under the de-Stalinization precepts.³² Finally, Novotny, the Czechoslovakian Party Leader, did permit a review of the purge

trials, but limited the years covered to 1949-51, the years when he was not in power.

By 1962, the pressures were mounting for the review of the purge trials of the 1950's, primarily from the Slovak intellectuals whose grievances were intimately connected with grievances against the Stalin era. During the Stalinist period, the leaders of the Slovak party had been purged on charges of bourgeois nationalism, and the Slovaks were now demanding the redress of those grievances, posthumously where necessary.³³

There were some minor steps taken toward liberalization in Czechoslovakia in 1962, and again in 1965, when general political amnesties were proclaimed and a few political prisoners were freed. During this time the regime's hostility toward religion softened. There was some relaxation of restrictions on writers, and the limitations on foreign tourists were lifted.³⁴ Yet after years of Stalinist restrictions those relaxations merely stimulated demands for more freedom. Until 1963, Czechoslovakia was known as the model satellite. The Czech party had continually refused to de-Stalinize, and permitted Stalinist followers and methods to continue within the regime.

The almost disastrous state of the economy was also a long-smoldering problem in Czechoslovakia. By 1963, Czechoslovakia had reached a negative economic growth rate, and Czech products did not compete on the world market. Incompetent, politically appointed managers, and a centralization of the economic structure by First Secretary Novotny brought about an economic situation that seemed

nearly insoluble.

The direct application of the Stalin command economy to the Czechoslovakian situation was instrumental in bringing about this economic deterioration. Stalinist planning had been designed for a backward agrarian nation and was now being superimposed on one of the most industrialized states in Europe.³⁵ Czech wares lost out in the international market place, and it cost the country two dollars in production to earn one dollar in hard currency.³⁶ To restore the Czech economy to a competitive position in the world market would require a massive infusion of hard currency and sweeping reforms of the national economy.

In 1963, the Czech economy became the only one in the world to experience a decline in industrial output, national income, and real wages. The quality of all types of industrial products was appalling. In the first seven months of 1964, defects in industrial products cost the country 365 million Czechoslovakian crowns (about fifty-three million U. S. dollars).³⁷

In February 1964, in an effort "to struggle against rejects," a department store in Prague put on display an electric shaver that would not shave, an electric iron that would not iron, and a food cooker that would not cook.³⁸ In 1964, a shoe factory in Slovakia was producing shoes whose soles fell off after a few days' wear.³⁹ And the Elektrosvit factory in Nove Zamky, Slovakia, which had recently won the Red Flag Award for splendid results, delivered 500 refrigerators to Brno, all of which proved to be defective.⁴⁰ Accumulating in

storehouses throughout Czechoslovakia were many unmarketable items and commodities. The total value of this inventory is estimated to be approximately one-fourth of Czechoslovakia's national income.⁴¹

The declining economic position appeared to be the catalyst for a host of grievances which had built up over the past decade. The percentage increase in the gross national product had gone from 6.8 per cent in 1960 to 2.5 per cent in 1965.⁴² The years between 1960 and 1965 had varied from 1.0 per cent to a minus 2.0 per cent growth rate.⁴³ In a capitalistic society this would be tantamount to a continuing recession. Warehouses were stacked with unsold goods, and food lines and panic buying were frequent occurrences.⁴⁴

The relative technological backwardness of the Czech industrial base resulted in a decline in growth in the gross national product, and with a bureaucratic management structure, sustained a downward trend in economic development. The interest of the Czechoslovakian planners was an ever-rising demand to increase production and expansion without concern for the quality or marketability of goods produced.⁴⁵ The politically imposed structure inhibited modernization of industry. The refusal of managers of the system to replace outmoded equipment in factories resulted in production losses. By 1964, 45 per cent of the productive equipment of heavy industry and 65 per cent of the equipment of light industry had become obsolete.⁴⁶ The direct result was that the continued use of this equipment contributed to a lower productivity for the Czech worker when compared to his western counterpart.

To recover from an almost impossible situation, Czech economists designed a model economy which would place the Czechs in a market demand situation operating on a profit basis as opposed to the former, planned volume-oriented system. Enterprises were to be independent of state directives and quotas and from state financial aid. This system would force a supply and demand market and permit factory profits to cover the costs of production.⁴⁷

On October 17, 1964, the Czechoslovakian Communist Party newspaper, Rude Pravo, published in a 12,000 word article the Draft Principles for the Perfection of the System of Planned Management of the National Economy.⁴⁸ This document bore the stamp of Dr. Ota Sik, Head of the Academy of Sciences and a member of the Party Central Committee. The document in essence proposed to scrap the current centralized economic planning and to substitute for it the mechanism of a market economy. The new plan, referred to as the "Draft Principles," was thoroughly considered by the Czech Presidium and the Central Committee's Economic Commission, and only minor revisions were made.⁴⁹ The Central Committee issued a resolution in January, 1965, approving the "Draft Principles" without substantial change.⁵⁰

The political question of how much power would be surrendered by the communist party in Czechoslovakia over the economic control of the country became of major concern. The party was to have total power to build socialism, yet over the last twenty years there was a distinct lack of economic progress. This brought up the question of the proper role of the party in the new economic plan.

The party's gradual abdication of responsibility over the matters concerning economic reform as it was outlined in the economic model, required careful ideological explanations. Always keeping in mind that the ideological index was the gauge by which the Soviet Union could judge whether Czechoslovakia was still a communist state or whether it was evolving into the "weak" social democratic type.⁵¹

Added to the economic and national minority considerations for reform was the influence of the Czechoslovakian intellectuals. Of particular concern was their attitude toward West Germany, and the proposals for the liberalization of the restrictions on censorship. From 1962 to 1967, much of the effort of the intellectuals took the form of committees working on problems of democratization and technical backwardness in the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences.⁵²

The intellectuals were now designing a new political model to compliment the new economic plan which, hopefully, was to be implemented throughout the country.⁵³ What impressed the Czech intellectuals was the flourishing West European and West German economics. Increased contact between the Czechs and the West Europeans, and in particular the West Germans, brought the realization that Germany was neither pro-Nazi nor militaristic, a theme continually repeated throughout the Warsaw Pact.⁵⁴ What made the most penetrating impression on the Czech intellectuals was the West European economic progress in comparison to the state of the Czechoslovakian economy. There was a realization that only massive technological aid from Western Europe could make the Czech economy competitive again in world markets. This

realization was further substantiated by the rising hatred of Novotny for his slowness in allowing economic reform, and the awareness of the inferiority and the backwardness of Soviet technology compared to that of Western Europe.⁵⁵

West Germany's new approach to East-West relations also appealed to the Czech intellectuals. By 1967, West Germany had abandoned the Hallstein Doctrine, a position of avoiding contact with Eastern European nations which recognized East Germany, and took a position of recognizing existing political boundaries along with offers to establish full diplomatic relations with Eastern European governments.⁵⁶ Of special importance was the declaration by the West German government that it regarded the Munich agreement of 1938 with Czechoslovakia null and void. On January 31, 1967, Rumania and the Federal Republic of Germany established diplomatic relations.⁵⁷ Hungary at this time was widely recognized as prepared to take Rumania's lead, and had shown a readiness to take up formal ties with the Federal Republic, even offering to negotiate a mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force with the Soviet Union or its allies.⁵⁸

The political initiatives of the West Germans added impetus to changes taking place in the labor and cultural sectors in Czechoslovakia since 1962. By 1964, the labor unions were undergoing reforms to make them more representative of the factory workers, and this also gave the workers a voice in the management of their particular factory.⁵⁹ In the schools, the Soviet-designed practices of

requiring the youths to attend political meetings was discontinued.⁶⁰

Slowly the changes continued. Textbooks were de-politicized and subject matter was to be modernized. In higher education, entrance exams were reinstated and studies de-politicized. Additionally, the humanities were reinstated and teaching methods and qualifications for the teachers were upgraded.⁶¹ Government attitudes toward religion were revised and anti-religious propaganda was stopped. Without formally ridding themselves of the censor, the intellectuals constantly expanded the bounds of their writings.⁶² Short stories, novels, even avant-garde poetry began to appear, and radio and television became forums for the exchange of ideas. The changes taking place were uncoordinated and piecemeal, yet as they occurred, these changes begot others. By early 1967 the cumulative "revisions" were gathering for the confrontation with the established order.

A writers' conference, sponsored by the Czechoslovakian Writers' Union, was held in June 1967, in Prague, and this conference furnished a platform for the dissatisfied intellectuals to plead their case. At the conference the young novelist, Ludvik Vaculik, denounced the mediocrity of the Novotny regime and blasted its repressive policies.⁶³ Vaculik declared that "everything good created in Czechoslovakia in recent years," had come about, "despite the fact that our ruling circles had behaved this way for years on end."⁶⁴ Playwright Paval Kohut read the Soviet writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn's protest against Moscow censorship, implying that the same conditions existed in Prague.⁶⁵

After the pronouncements of the Writers' Conference, the Novotny regime was quick to react. The leaders of the Writers' Union, including Vaculik and Kohut, were expelled from the Czechoslovakian Communist Party and another leading Czech writer, Jan Prochazka, was forced to surrender his candidacy for the Central Committee.⁶⁶ The Writers' Union journal, Literarni Noviny, was taken over by the Czechoslovakian Ministry of Culture.⁶⁷ Novotny declared that the writers were a hostile element, and he asserted that "[w]e certainly cannot tolerate accusations that in part we have been passing through a second dark age."⁶⁸

Demands now rose from liberal party intellectuals for a national assembly composed of persons truly representative of the people, and on July 6, 1967, a committee of experts from the Czechoslovakian Academy of Sciences was appointed to study possible reforms of the political system. The committee was to study:

. . . the necessity to analyze social reality as far as the division into social and common interest groups is concerned . . . and to propose the most suitable forms for the movement of the society, including the plurality of parties in the West.⁶⁹

It was clear now that the Czech intellectuals were questioning the communist system of government, and in their search for a new political model would seek a redistribution of power within the society.

In October 1967, Czech students staged a demonstration at the Charles University, and the Polytechnic University in Prague. Obstensibly, they were protesting against a power failure which was

interfering with their studying, but the demonstration also expressed the general dissatisfaction and frustration that the students felt toward the inefficient and bureaucratic state government.⁷⁰ Police clashed with the students in order to put down the demonstration and in the process injured some of the student protestors.⁷¹ Later it was officially admitted that excessive violence had been used in putting down the demonstration. After the police assaulted the college protestors with clubs, sending a few to the hospital, indignation at police brutality spread throughout Prague. Sit-in demonstrations and demands for more freedom soon became the dominant cry from the city's campuses.⁷²

Meanwhile, Dr. Ota Sik, directing a committee of the Academy of Sciences which was to study methods to improve the Czech economy, was still suggesting reforms to revitalize the faltering economy. Many of these suggestions stemmed from the earlier published and party-approved economic plan of January 1965. Early in 1967, Novotny had recommended the adoption of a few of the measures which had been proposed by Sik in the new economic model. However, there was no encouragement given by the government to incorporate these changes into the economic structure of Czechoslovakia.⁷³ It appeared that there would be no major economic changes unless there were major political changes. Many elements were now crystallizing to demand greater reforms and these demands would cover the entire social and economic fabric of the Czechoslovakian state.

At a Central Committee meeting on October 31, 1967, Alexander

Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party, openly accused Novotny of "behaving like a dictator." Dubcek further charged that Novotny had bungled the economic affairs of Czechoslovakia, particularly to the detriment of Slovakia.⁷⁴ Novotny suggested that if Dubcek did not approve of the current economic programs, then perhaps the two enemies could be separated, in which case Slovakia would no longer receive financial credits from the central government.⁷⁵

The infuriated leader of the Slovaks countered by announcing that before the economy could be discussed, the political leadership must be discussed from top to bottom. Heated debates erupted within the Presidium of the Central Committee between the Novotny and Dubcek supporters.⁷⁶ Finally, in a desperate effort in early December, Novotny requested aid from the Soviet Union through the Soviet Ambassador in Prague. The result was a sudden visit from Leonid I. Brezhnev. Evidently the Soviet party chief felt it more discreet not to interfere and stated, "[c]omrades this is not my affair, it is the affair of the Czech workers and for you to decide."⁷⁷

The bitter October-January struggle had started, the struggle which finally brought the Slovak leader Dubcek to the leadership position in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. Unable to resolve the differences within the party presidium, the presidium directed that the entire 110-man Central Committee be convened on December 19, 1967.⁷⁸ The Central Committee met continuously, taking only a short break for Christmas, then reconvening and continuing the debates.

Finally, in a heated session from January 3 through January 5, the majority of the Central Committee upheld Dubcek as the Czechoslovakian Communist Party's First Secretary.⁷⁹

It was the press, radio and television that first gave the Czech citizens evidence that important changes had taken place with Dubcek's election. Suddenly they began to discuss important topics formerly unmentioned. Individual commentators expressed their own views and articles and calls for the freedom of speech and press proliferated.⁸⁰

At the same time, behind the scenes, a military coup was in the making. At least one tank division was mobilized. However, General Vaclav Prchlik informed the liberals of the situation and in a tense confrontation among the presidium members, Novotny was asked to explain the troop movements. Novotny disclaimed any knowledge and the necessary orders to stop these movements were issued.⁸¹

The reform forces now gathered with Alexander Dubcek who had assumed power from Novotny and who hoped that a tempering of demands would permit two irreconcilable elements to co-exist: the element of reform and the contrasting demands of an ideology which was opposed to reforms.

Since the de-Stalinization campaign, the liberalization of Czechoslovakia had been delayed for ten years. Once the Stalinist Novotny slipped from power, the demands upon Dubcek for political and economic reform became almost overwhelming.

Dubcek was a Slovak and this sparked a latent Slovakian nationalism which was to add to the pressures for reform. Slovakia is the

poorer, less developed part of Czechoslovakia, strongly Catholic in religion, and deeply nationalistic. Since 1919, the Czechs had ruled the Slovaks from Prague.⁸²

Since Dubcek was elected head of the Czech party from the position of Slovak Party Chief, an apparatus existed to channel demands for redress to the Czech Central Committee. In the past, there had been open disagreement between Novotny and the Slovak party, and many grievances stemmed from World War II. One grievance was the accusation that the Czechs had done little to resist the German occupation.⁸³ The Slovaks pointed out that the assassination of the German SS officer, Heydrich, was carried out by members of the exile government in London, which was worried about the Czech inactivity affecting the bargaining position of Czechoslovakia at the end of the war.⁸⁴ The Slovaks were also demanding the reorganization of Czechoslovakia as a federal state.

The causes of ferment in Czechoslovakia were deep-rooted and the potential of the proposed reforms was far-reaching. The establishment of a viable economy and political reorganization of the states involved far-reaching structural changes in the government and in the economy.

This sudden tide of liberalization within the heartland of the Soviet strategic frontier, to Soviet eyes, showed tendencies of a weakening of the bloc and intensified the real or imagined danger of ideological subversion. This was reinforced by the moves toward the abolition of censorship and state police activity, the opening of the

Czech frontiers, the rehabilitation of purge victims, and the decentralization of authority on all levels, in addition to the introduction of a new economic model to replace the outmoded Stalinist command system.⁸⁵ While many elements of the proposed reforms were being carried out during the past years, the major reform demands now surfaced.

Although the Soviets, at this point in time, would follow a dual policy, they sensed the impact of the rise of Dubcek and the gathering of reformers around him to reshape the economic and political structure of Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev's indifference to Novotny during his December 1967 visit to Prague perhaps indicated a Soviet realization that there were more disadvantages to supporting Novotny than there were in the acceptance of at least a tolerable new regime.

The Soviets could accept a new regime, but that regime had to be prepared to accept in the long run the Soviet lead on major issues, primarily on that of foreign policy.

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C H A P T E R I I I

THE REFORMS CRUSHED

The bloody mire of Mongolian slavery, not the rude glory of the Norman epoch, forms the cradle of Muscovy, and modern Russia is but a metamorphosis of Muscovy.

Karl Marx¹

When Alexander Dubcek took over the leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on January 5, 1968, he shortly thereafter promised to seek what was termed the democratization of Czechoslovakian political life. Simultaneously, he pledged his loyalty to the "principles of Marxism-Leninism," and to the Soviet Union.² The initial Soviet reaction to the selection of Dubcek to the post of First Secretary was one of approval. One of the first telegrams congratulating him on achieving the top party position was from Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet Party Chief wished Dubcek success, "from the bottom of my soul," and in the interest of the "cause of strengthening the friendship and all around co-operation of the socialist countries and the unity of the international communist movement."³

Since Dubcek had been schooled as a communist in the higher communist political schools in the Soviet Union, he could be expected to carry on in the Marxist-Leninist traditions. Toward the end of January 1968, Dubcek visited Moscow, probably to demonstrate to the Soviet leaders the Czechoslovak faithfulness to the principles of communism. At the close of the January meeting between Dubcek and

Brezhnev, a communique was issued stating that there was a full identity of views on all questions discussed.⁴ Although the areas of agreement were not with these assurances from the leader of the revealed Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Dubcek probably felt that he was free to implement his program of liberal communism, which included the concept of free public debate, a thing that had never been tried before in any communist country, not even Tito's Yugoslavia.

During late February and March, 1968, political reforms under the new liberal communism began to unfold. Dubcek began the removal of conservative supporters of Antonin Novotny, who was now serving as the President of Czechoslovakia. On March 6, 1968, Jeri Hendryck, Secretary for Ideological Matters, and a Novotny supporter, was released from his position.⁵ By the end of the week, the leaders of the Czech labor movement, all Novotny supporters, had resigned their posts. During the same week, restrictions were lifted on radio, television, and the press, by the repeal of the 1966 censorship law.⁶ Bans were also lifted against the importation of western literature into Czechoslovakia. An information explosion began. Czech newspapers immediately began to comment on activities within the Soviet Union relating to the trials of Soviet writers and to the harsh treatment of student protestors by police in Cracow, Poland.⁷

By late February and early March the Soviet stance of noninterference was being severely strained. In Czechoslovakia, the defection to the United States of General Jan Sejna, a Novotny confidant, added to the reformers cries to oust Novotny.

The Czech press continued to criticize the Soviet Union and now began criticizing the internal relations among the Warsaw Pact nations. Demands were now heard for the restoration of the Archbishop of Prague, who had been forced from his See twenty years earlier and now resided in Rome.⁸

On March 9, Czechoslovak communists met in sixty-six district conferences throughout the country to discuss how to rid the government of the Stalinist Novotny.⁹ Meanwhile, Novotny had published a communique stripping his old friend General Senja, who had defected the month before, of his rank and revoking his decorations. On March 16, 1968, Dubcek proclaimed in a speech in Brno, Czechoslovakia, that "it is no longer possible to continue the old methods," referring to outdated political and economic structures.¹⁰ The Soviets understandably now became alarmed.

The East German Communist Party was watching the Czechoslovakian developments closely and their party newspaper, Neues Deutschland, hinted that counterrevolutionary forces were at work both in Czechoslovakia and Poland.¹¹

During the month of March 1968, more evidences of discontent and a desire for further reform came from the Czechoslovaks. Demands increased for a multi-party system. The 1948 death of Jan Masaryk was being investigated, and the Soviet security police were being directly implicated in the affair. It was announced that Czechoslovakian foreign policy was now being re-evaluated in the light of Czech national interests.¹² On March 22, 1968, Antonin Novotny finally

surrendered his power by resigning as President of Czechoslovakia.¹³ Novotny had been President of Czechoslovakia since 1953. The alliance of intellectuals, economists and Slovaks had made possible the overthrow of the most solidly entrenched communist leader in Eastern Europe, and this was done not only in a peaceful process, but was done in conformity with the system. It was done with socialist due process, accomplished within the framework of the Czechoslovak Communist Party apparatus.

By mid-March, the Soviets were experiencing increased pressure from East Germany and Poland to restrain the Czech reforms. The East Germans now found it necessary to ban the import of Prague's German language newspaper because it had now become too critical of the East German regime.¹⁴ Concurrently, the East Germans were jamming Czechoslovakian radio broadcasts intended for the minority Czech population of Bohemia.¹⁵

The Soviets now faced a dilemma as to what measures were to be employed to guard against too much liberalization in Czechoslovakia. Military preparations, a definite option of the Soviet decision alternatives, probably started in February, 1968, perhaps earlier, when Carpathian military district air mobile and light armored units were placed on alert for possible duty in Czechoslovakia.¹⁶

The first overt pressure by the Soviets was applied on March 23, 1968. At this time, the members of the Warsaw Pact were invited to Dresden, East Germany, and Dubcek was required to give an account of the internal changes taking place in Czechoslovakia.

In a joint communique issued after the Dresden conference, the last passage explained:

Confidence was expressed that the proletariat and all working people in Czechoslovakia under the leadership of the communist party of Czechoslovakia would insure further progress of socialist construction in the country.¹⁷

There were no outward signs of danger to the power of the new Czech communist leaders. At the Dresden meeting, the Czechs pressed the Soviets with great urgency for large, hard currency loans to use in modernizing the Czech economy.¹⁸ The Soviets at that time were not prepared to pledge the amount needed, and the Czechs were not willing to forego the option of seeking credits from West Germany.¹⁹

The Soviets feared that the Czechs would seek massive aid from West Germany in order to modernize. Rumania at that time had a \$375 million dollar trade deficit with West Germany. If the Czechs received economic aid from the West Germans, then the West Germans would replace the Soviet Union as the major economic influence in Czechoslovakia. This would contribute toward economic isolation of East Germany. The continuing friendship of President Josip Tito of Yugoslavia and the Secretary General Nicolae Ceausescu of Rumania intensified Soviet fears of a revival of the Little Entente of the 1930's, which was seen in Moscow as clearly anti-Soviet.²⁰ While inter-bloc trade was deteriorating, West Germany's trade with Eastern Europe had increased tenfold between 1950 and 1967.²¹

According to Czechoslovak sources, the initiators of the request

for the meeting at Dresden on March 23 were the East Germans and Poles. Prior to the Dresden meeting, the West German government announced that Bonn would respect and recognize the present western frontier of Poland, but further renounced the recognition of East Germany, since East Germany was not a foreign country.²² The Ulbricht regime in East Germany and the Gomulka regime in Poland were heavily dependent on the maintenance of an image of West Germany as Nazi-dominated and revenge-seeking to sustain themselves in power.

The first real sign of Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia was shown by the April Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which launched an ideological campaign signaling a shift in Soviet policy. A resolution from the April Plenum asserted:

The contemporary stage of historical development is characterized by a sharp aggravation of the ideological struggle between capitalism and socialism. The entire apparatus of anti-communist propaganda is now directed toward weakening the unity of the socialist countries and the international communist movement.

The resolution further called for an irreconcilable struggle against hostile ideology.²³

Ideology was now being invoked to justify whatever action the Soviet government might deem necessary in handling the activism of the Czech liberals. This pronouncement should have provided the Czech reformers an indication of future Soviet demands for slowing down the liberal reforms.

On April 9, 1968, Alexander Dubcek presented his Action Program to the Central Committee Plenum for approval and forwarding to the National Assembly. This seventy page document reflected the work of several teams which had been hard at work since January under Dubcek's guidance. It outlined a combination of nationalistic, pragmatic and authoritarian principles, outlining changes for the Czechoslovak government and economy. Upon introducing the Action Program to the Plenum, Dubcek insisted on the need for adoption of:

. . . laws which will insure freedom of speech and criticism, freedom of press and assembly, together with socialism and the inviolability of Czechoslovak socialist statehood and socialist achievement.²⁴

Dubcek still attempted to maintain, for the benefit of the Soviet leaders, a balance between Soviet enunciated, ideological orthodoxy and his new liberal reforms. Dubcek had yet to announce that he found fault with his predecessors' foreign policy. He also indicated no need for revision of Marxist teaching and continued to stress Soviet-Czechoslovakian friendship.

On April 22, on the occasion of the ninety-eighth anniversary of Lenin's birth, V. V. Grishin, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the city of Moscow and candidate member of the Politburo, attacked the Czech liberals in a Moscow speech. Without referring to Czechoslovakia by name, he warned against the "imperialists' design to build bridges to the socialist countries," and labeled this activity as, "ideological sabotage against world socialism."²⁵

As time progressed, the Soviet responses intensified, newspapers

and radio broadcasts from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Allies continually pointed out the defects of the newly instituted Czech regime.

On May 4, Dubcek made a surprise trip to Moscow, probably to explain the effect of Czech reforms on bloc security and to reaffirm faith in the Soviet leadership. This visit was termed an explanatory mission to Moscow, and would add to the existing political and military pressures taking shape.

Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, had departed Prague just prior to Dubcek's latest invitation to Moscow, and while Dubcek was there, Yakubovsky renewed demands for the stationing of Warsaw Pact troops on Czech soil.²⁶

The Soviets followed a dual policy toward the Czechs. While the Czechoslovaks were pressing for reforms, Soviet troops were maneuvering in Poland and in East Germany. As late as May 9, Novoe Vremia published an interview with Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Jiri Hajek, in which he expressed his loyalty to the USSR, but spoke of a new foreign policy, "more in harmony with Czechoslovak specifics."²⁷ Pravda, during that time, published a criticism of the Novotny regime, and accused the former First Secretary of having permitted "violations of socialist legality,"²⁸ but on the day of May 9, Soviet troop movements were reported along the Czechoslovakian-Polish border, and areas east of Berlin were declared restricted areas to western military observers and journalists.²⁹ This dualism permitted the Soviets a greater latitude and flexibility in their policy decisions.

On May 17, less than two weeks after Dubcek's return from Moscow, Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin came to Czechoslovakia under the guise of vacationing in Karlovy Vary to take a closer look at Czech attitudes. While Kosygin quietly entered the country, the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshall Andrei Grechko, arrived the same day with a Soviet military delegation to discuss items of mutual defense with Czech defense representatives. By now Soviet contingency planning for the occupation of Czechoslovakia was probably well-advanced.

The Soviet press began to step up attacks against the Czech reformers. Resolutions of solidarity were adopted throughout the Soviet Union by the various factory workers' committees.³⁰ There followed during the months of May and June, an intense propaganda battle each week increasing in intensity as the summer approached. It was against this background that the Czech leaders agreed to a staff and communications exercise on their soil conducted by forces of the Warsaw Pact. This agreement was concluded while Premier Kosygin was conducting his visit to Prague and Karlovy Vary in early May. Also during this visit, the problem of hard currency credits was discussed, but nothing was resolved.³¹

The political and military pressures now began to mount. A combination of weekly visits by either political or military representatives of the Soviet Union became the primary pressures to maintain the primacy of the Czech Communist Party. These visits were supported by military maneuvers and Warsaw Pact propaganda attacking the Czech liberals by radio, press, and even leaflet distributions in downtown

Prague.

On May 30, in Rude Pravo, the Czech Communist Party newspaper, Dubcek stated that he would recognize the right of the minority within the Central Committee to dissent.³² He further stated that he rejected the "false unity represented by the blind obedience to orders from above."³³ To further back himself into a corner, Dubcek agreed that clashes of view within the party should be discussed publicly and that the party's position and right to the leading role could be challenged. This position is in direct opposition to the Soviet political system in which the communist party is the primary guardian of the state and hence the ideology, and its authority cannot be challenged. Any progressive changes in the socialist nations must flow from the historical process of communism through the party to the people. Now Dubcek was proposing that the party could be openly criticized and even suggesting that the party may not play the leading role within Czechoslovakia. It is no wonder that orthodox communist leaders in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact viewed Dubcek with increasing alarm.

During May and June, the Czech Communist Party also followed a dual approach of trying to appease the Soviets and to convince them of their ideological purity on one hand, and on the other, to meet with and encourage visits by Western Europe trade and business officials. It appeared that the Czechs were trying to push forward their economic plans despite Soviet pressures.

Military pressures now emerged as a primary force in the expanding

situation. By late May, 1968, East German, Polish and Hungarian troops were already positioned on Czech soil. The staff exercises, earlier agreed to by the Czech Defense Ministry, were not to begin until June 20, 1968.³⁴ These military exercises were to reinforce the security of the Warsaw Pact against a resurgent "West German danger." However, the first Soviet troops did not arrive to take part in the staff exercises until June 20, 1968.³⁵

On June 27, 1968, the weekly magazine, Literarni Listy, published an article entitled, "Two Thousand Words," signed by seventy Czechoslovakians from all walks of life.³⁶ Its writer was Ludvik Vaculik who had earlier participated in the Writers' Conference in the summer of 1967, and as a result was barred from the Czechoslovak Communist Party. His article played an important part in the reform momentum, and for the Soviets was probably the catalyst in the case against the so-called counterrevolutionaries. "Two Thousand Words" was addressed to "farmers, civil servants, scientists, artists, and everyone."³⁷

It made two major points: indicted the past regime in Czechoslovakia and endorsed a liberalization, with the stipulation that the reforms had not gone far enough and had not yet earned the communist party the right to rule. The article, while embracing communism and the party, demanded that a new Central Committee be elected, and that it be democratic. Blasting the past communist leaders, the communist bureaucracy, the waste in government, and abuse of power and censorship laws, the article horrified the Soviet leaders and Warsaw Pact members.

By July 11, 1968, the Soviets had formulated their answer to "Two Thousand Words," and attacked its contents in an article in Pravda, which stated, in part: "Our society cannot remain indifferent at a time when the foundations of socialism in a friendly fraternal country are being subjected to attack."³⁸

Following this attack, and while the military staff elements of the communications' exercise remained in Czechoslovakia, on July 14, 1968, the Czechoslovak radio announced that the heads of five Warsaw Pact countries, excluding Czechoslovakia, were meeting in Warsaw, Poland to take up the Czechoslovak case.³⁹ Also on the same day, Pravda ominously compared the Czechoslovak situation to that of Hungary in 1956, and spoke of Czech efforts to restore capitalism.⁴⁰ In a press interview on July 15, while the Warsaw Pact was in session, Lieutenant General Vaclav Prchlik, the Czech party spokesman for defense, suggested that basic revisions be made in the Warsaw Pact military command structure, and demanded more authority for Warsaw Pact staff and command officers.⁴¹

The result of the meeting in Warsaw, Poland was the so-called "letter from the five," released on July 19, 1968. The letter was addressed to the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, and in part stated:

We cannot accept that foreign forces should lead your country to danger from the way of socialism and expose Czechoslovakia to the danger of being divided from the socialist community . . . We shall never consent to seeing endangered the historical achievements of socialism . . . The document "Two Thousand Words" constitutes open opposition to the Communist Party and is an appeal to struggle against constitutional power.

The last passage stated: "In this struggle, you can count on the solidarity and all-around assistance of the fraternal socialist countries."⁴²

The letter was clearly a warning from the Warsaw Pact to Dubcek. Dubcek either ignored the warnings contained in the pronouncement from his Warsaw Pact Allies, or perhaps he felt that he could still reconcile the ideological requirements with liberal reforms being instituted in this country.

The pressures continued through attacks by the Soviet news media. On Friday, July 19, 1968, Pravda announced a plot by NATO to detach Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact, and furthermore disclosed the discovery of an arms cache in Northern Czechoslovakia.⁴³ It seems that the police of Karlovy Vary were contacted by an anonymous telephone caller and, acting on this information, the Czech police discovered under a bridge in Sokolov in Western Bohemia, twenty Thompson submachine guns, thirty revolvers, and ammunition wrapped in plastic bags.⁴⁴ The East German and Soviet troops had just completed maneuvers in this area. Although the Czech police "discovered" the arms cache, the finding of the arms was announced in Pravda on July 19, the same day as the discovery.

The announcement by the five pact nations, the arms cache, the Warsaw Pact troops lingering within Czechoslovakia, and the intensified barrage of propaganda from the Soviet press was followed by a Soviet demand for a meeting of the two presidiums in the Soviet Union. The Soviet moves should have alarmed Dubcek and his supporters. These

activities were supported in the background by massive military shuffling of Soviet and Warsaw Pact field elements and by new Soviet reserves being called up to fill understrength units. The reasons given for the delayed exit of troops from Czechoslovakia who took part in the communications exercise in mid-June were not very imaginative. Pact troop commanders stated that the troops were exhausted by the exercise and that they needed to make mechanical repairs on their equipment. Additionally, the bridges out of Czechoslovakia would not support the weight of the Soviet armor; the bridges apparently had been strong enough for the armor to come into Czechoslovakia. In a final note of explanation of the presence of those troops, the generals averred that they did not want to complicate Czechoslovakian highway traffic by a quick withdrawal. This wry sense of humor demonstrated the Soviet displeasure of the events taking place in Czechoslovakia.

With these indications of what appeared to be indecision on the Soviet part, Dubcek persuaded the Soviets to meet with him in a small Czech village, Cierna nad Tisou, only a few minutes from the Soviet Ukrainian border. Dubcek evidently hoped that he could persuade the Soviets of his ability to control the so-called "new style socialism."

Prior to his leaving for the Cierna conference, Dubcek again left his "new style socialism" open to attack. On Saturday, July 27, at 7:00 in the evening, Dubcek announced on Czech national television his decision to "take not one single step aside from the path on which we have begun."⁴⁵ Upon departing for Cierna, he was reported to have said: "Where we are going we must wear the faces of angels over the

jaws of wolves."⁴⁶

Meanwhile, Soviet and Warsaw troops which had taken part in the May communications' exercises continued to delay their exit from Czechoslovakia. These troops formed a threatening backdrop for the unprecedented meeting of the Soviet Presidium and the Czechoslovakian leaders from July 29 to August 1, in Eastern Czechoslovakia at Cierna nad Tisou, and subsequently at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. During the Cierna meetings, massive Warsaw Pact military maneuvers and troop movements were taking place on the Polish-Czechoslovak border. The second meeting, which took place at Bratislava, was opened to other Warsaw Pact leaders, and the final communique issued from the round of meetings which terminated on August 2, 1968, hailed the unity and understanding of the communist parties.⁴⁷

It would appear that from this meeting, and the professed unity and understanding that the proposed reforms of Dubcek might at least be allowed to proceed within the bounds of democratic communism and the guidelines established by the Soviets at Cierna and Bratislava. Therefore, the Czechoslovakians signed an agreement with the West Germans on August 3, for an exchange of trade missions. This was done in spite of severe threats, propaganda, and the presence of thousands of foreign troops on the Czech borders. By now there were continuous movements of the Warsaw Pact military forces. The intense political and military pressures, the earlier warnings couched in the familiar jargon of the communist dialect, would foretell disaster for the Czechs. All the indications and justifications thus far were in

preparation for what was referred to by the minister of Alexander I as the rectification of the borders of Russia.

At Cierna, the Soviets demanded that the Czechs remove several hundred key personnel of the Dubcek government, reinstate the old party conservatives, and insisted that the mass media must be brought under control.⁴⁸ Furthermore, Soviet propaganda was now insisting that time was running out.

Soviet suspicions must have been heightened when two outspoken revisionists visited Czechoslovakia in August. Yugoslavia's Marshal Tito visited Prague August 9-10, and was followed on August 15-16 by Rumanian Party Chief Nicolae Ceausescu. In between the two independent communist visits to Prague, Walter Ulbricht, the East German leader was visiting in Karlovy Vary in Northern Bohemia. Ulbricht departed on August 12 without the agreements he sought to insure prior consultation between Czechoslovakia and East Germany on future economic initiatives to West Germany.

The areas of disagreement between the Eastern European nations bordering Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union now seemed insoluble. The Czech unresponsiveness to Soviet demands at Cierna was to simply delay a confrontation. Apparently the Soviet Union only waited to see if any of the Cierna demands would be immediately implemented by the Czech leaders.

Soviet press attacks continued against the Czech liberals, and Soviet military leaders visited East Germany and Poland on August 15 and 16, presumably to co-ordinate the final military details of the

pending invasion. The sudden occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet, East German, Bulgarian, Polish and Hungarian military forces took place on August 20 and 21 and brought to an end the liberal reforms of the Czechoslovakian government.

Moscow had mobilized approximately thirty-five divisions of Soviet, East German, Polish, Bulgarian and Hungarian troops along the north, east, and southeast borders of Czechoslovakia for the invasion.⁴⁹ The invasion began late in the evening of August 20. The efficiency of the Soviet military machine was awesome. By early morning on August 21, lead elements of several Soviet divisions had reached the outskirts of Prague. By 6:00 a.m. an entire division had been unloaded at the Prague-Puzyne Airport from Soviet transport aircraft. While the seizure of the main population centers was taking place, Warsaw Pact motorized elements were moving to seal the Czechoslovakian-West German border, exactly as the Warsaw Pact had planned in 1966 during its exercise "Moladu."⁵⁰

In reviewing the decision to invade Czechoslovakia to halt the liberalization trend, a brief look at the character of the Soviet leaders who made the decision may help to better understand the situation. The Soviet Union was and still is ruled by a group of men who rose to prominence during the great purges of 1936-39. In those days it was a certain sign of active participation in the purge if one survived.⁵¹ The current Soviet leaders had survived and as a consequence were morally and in many respects intellectually crippled. Combined with this moral and intellectual sterility, many of the

members of the Central Committee possessed only a vague knowledge of the world situation or foreign policy except what they read in the party handouts.⁵² Even the director of Eastern European affairs, was until 1967, more involved with the industrial development of the city of Gorky than in attempting to explore Soviet Eastern European relations.⁵³

During their rise to power within the party, the political atmosphere in which these current Soviet leaders achieved their positions is almost incomprehensible. Of 1,200,000 party members arrested from 1936 through 1939, only 50,000 ever came out of jail.⁵⁴ Leonid Brezhnev was active in party affairs in the Ukraine in 1931, and progressed to membership in the Ukrainian Central Committee. During the purge, he was one of three survivors of that 102-man committee. Brezhnev was probably active in the campaign to crush the peasantry in the Ukraine, where ten million peasants were starved, killed or deported. Andrei Kirilenko, Central Committee member, was also involved in the Ukrainian peasant campaign.⁵⁵ Mikhail Suslov, Central Committee member, was active in the Caucasus area at the time of the Ukrainian terror, and later at the close of World War II, he was the political administrator of Lithuania where he ruthlessly supervised the crushing of a local partisan movement.⁵⁶ Kiril Mazurov was instrumental in conducting the purges of the railroad workers and later in 1940 was responsible for the deportation of the Poles and Western Ukrainians.⁵⁷ The list of activities of the Soviet party leaders could continue. No less than thirty-six members of Stalin's

Central Committee were members of the Central Committee elected in 1966, and the politburo members were predominately Stalinists.⁵⁸

These Soviet leaders, having risen to power under such circumstances, knew well the effectiveness of seizing and holding power with all the available forces at their disposal. And like their colleagues who led the Eastern European communist states, they realized that they must sustain themselves in power.

The occupation of Czechoslovakia was no unique or isolated act on the part of the Soviet leaders, and in retrospect did not express any new doctrines. It was a continuation of a consistent policy aimed at strengthening and improving the position of the Soviet Union on the Eurasian continent. When the national and great-power interest of the Soviet Union was at stake, Russian leaders past or present never allowed the sovereignty of other nations to present an obstacle, particularly if it was felt the security of Russia was threatened.

While the relationship of the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union is officially based on the principle of equality and noninterference, there were nevertheless elements which negated these principles long before the enunciated Brezhnev Doctrine. These elements are the primacy of the party, the preservation of centralized planning and economic controls, and the adherence to the precepts of proletarian internationalism, which is a euphemism for allegiance to Moscow. Yet all of these relate to one main goal, and that is the preservation of the Soviet Union and its continued hold on objectives outlined throughout history in Eastern Europe.

The fear of losing a part of their empire had brought forward the preventive measures employed by both the Russian and Soviet rulers for generations. In the past, before real or imagined enemies had a chance to move, they suffered the gravest consequences. Whole strata of the Russian society, civil servants, army officers, intelligentsia, and peasants, in the past had been liquidated, victims of purges taken as preventive measures by the Russian and Soviet governments.

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C H A P T E R I V

POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

There are a number of political and military variables and complexities which moved the Soviet leaders to order the invasion of Czechoslovakia. This blend of motives was bound up in the "historical science" of Marxism-Leninism which was alleged to be the principle guiding their decisions. A major consideration was that the Soviets were willing to use force to maintain the Soviet security zone, the Socialist Commonwealth. There was no theoretical innovation in the decision to invade. The Soviets were only attempting to meet the challenge of a new style economy in the Warsaw Pact with armed force. The invasion, however, repressed but did not eliminate the powerful economic and political forces that were developing in the Warsaw Pact.

What was developing politically was the attempt by socialist countries to use forces of nationalism to develop the potential of their individual states. No longer emulating the Soviet economic model, these countries felt they must devise their own necessary economic changes to meet competition in world markets. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was attempting to prevent, or at least limit, the American and Western European economic influences from penetrating Eastern Europe. It also sought to prevent a unified and potentially hostile West Germany.

The Soviets needed Czechoslovakia for their overall strategic plans and particularly for the objective of neutralizing Western Europe. A unified Warsaw Pact under firm control of the Soviet Union

would present a united socialist front for future Soviet diplomatic ventures. On the other hand, divisiveness in the Pact would show weakness in the socialist bloc and would result in the erosion of Soviet supremacy in Eastern Europe and in the world. This lack of unity would also project a weakened ideological image, and the ideology, for the most part, was the primary common bond between these states. Since the upswing of latent nationalism in the Eastern European countries, even this common ideological bond was under attack. If the Czechs were allowed to update their industries with modern German technology and German financial credits, what would stop the other Warsaw Pact nations from insisting on the same type of help from Western Europe? Already Rumania had received such help and Hungary was awaiting the outcome of the Czech experiment before seeking aid from the West Germans. Twenty years earlier, Yugoslavia had cast off the Soviet model. There were already too many examples of modifications or complete rejection of Soviet economic influences.

The Soviets had for several years tolerated the enlarging nationalism in the Eastern European states. Now, with the instability manifested in Czechoslovakia, an opportunity was presenting itself to quell these outcries and re-establish, at least temporarily, the domination of the Soviet Union over her security sphere, particularly regarding foreign policy negotiations outside the bloc-by-bloc nations. Czechoslovakia would provide the opportunity to demonstrate to other pact nations the seriousness of deviation within the socialist commonwealth.

Czechoslovakian liberal reforms combined with Rumanian requests for aid to West Germany thus posed a serious threat to the Soviet strategic position in Eastern Europe. If both of these countries continued on their separate paths, the result would be a considerable deterioration of the USSR's position and the opening of wider opportunities for separateness for other pact nations. Rumania had weakened the southern position of the Warsaw Pact and the Czechs were now preparing to weaken the northern sector. By restoring their control over Czechoslovakia, the Soviets, at least temporarily, would be able to block potential deviations by other Warsaw Pact nations. The invasion would also result in propping up neo-Stalinist leaders within the pact who were opposed to the Czech liberal moves, and probably any reforms which threatened the established leaders' powers.

The Soviet leaders showed indecision about how to contain the situation which daily grew more critical in Czechoslovakia. The political and military maneuverings from March through August suggest that the Soviet decision-makers were widely split. Their vacillation probably was a result of careful consideration of potential international action and the reaction that an armed intervention could bring.

In Eastern Europe, the outdated Soviet economic model and the lack of modern technological processes were combining with a resurgent nationalism to form pressures for a revitalization of economic life. The Soviet leadership had to identify a tolerance level for the acceptance of change, particularly within ideological bounds, or at least in regard to the degree of Soviet control. Traditional fears of

German aggression seemed to pervade the Soviet Union throughout the Czechoslovakian liberal period.

To keep West Germany weak and divided was another major consideration. This necessitated the controlling of East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia's insistence on the right to receive economic aid from the West, and West Germany's recognition of the western boundary of Poland, could result in the isolation of East Germany, or could at least make East Germany more susceptible to West German views. A momentum of change could have extended further as all of the Eastern European states were facing common economic problems. There was even the possibility that the effectiveness of the Warsaw Pact military forces would be impaired. Another risk was not that Czechoslovakia would break away, but that Czechoslovakia would infect the remaining Warsaw Pact states. Already to the east of Czechoslovakia in the Ukraine, demands for more autonomy were surfacing after many years of silence.¹

The divisive elements in the Soviet Union had to be considered and their importance in the overall Soviet security position. The ethnic and racial diversity of the USSR has had a profound effect on Soviet policy development since the October revolution. Population figures available in 1955 show that Great Russians comprised 58 per cent of the population inhabiting the areas of Northern and Central Russia.² The 1959 census revealed that the Great Russians actually made up only 55 per cent of the total population of the USSR.³ This census suggests that the Great Russians could possibly be a minority

in their country in ten to fifteen years.⁴ The various Slav groups, primarily the Russians and the Ukrainians, will be a minority by the year 2000.⁵

The second largest group, 40,000,000 Ukrainians, have been a source of trouble for Moscow for over 300 years.⁶ Of all the peoples in East Europe, the Slovaks were regarded by the Ukrainians as the nearest to them in tradition and culture. A glaring example of the nationalism of the non-Russian nationalities is the persistence with which various ethnic groups have clung to their languages and, in some cases since the 1959 census, some of these language groups have increased.⁷

Commenting after the Czechoslovakian invasion, the Party Chief of the Ukrainian Communist Party, Pyetr Y. Shelest, urged a campaign against ideological laxness, "Ukrainian particularism" and "the putrid theories spread by hostile propaganda about the necessity of democratization and liberalism of socialism," indicating the fears Soviet officials had of deviationism.⁸ In discussing the Czech episode, he asserted that they (the Soviets) had inveighed often against the "insidious" cultural influences emanating from Eastern Europe. The Soviet rulers may well have feared that the Ukraine might turn into a breeding ground for Czechoslovakian liberal ideas.

Shelest was trying to dissuade Ukrainian nationalists from absorbing these contagious reforms that were creeping across the Ukrainian border from Eastern Europe. A new crop of intellectuals was finally emerging in the Ukraine. The Stalin purges of the 1930's had involved

the wholesale liquidation of most Ukrainian writers and intellectuals and there was the fear that these emerging intellectuals might be infected by the Czech "new style socialism." If the Czechs were successful, there would almost certainly be an intensification of nationalist sentiment in the Soviet populations. Since the Soviet state is a multi-national state, the crushing of the Czech movement would thus serve as an example to all the various nationalities under Soviet control.

The strategic military considerations involving an imbalance in the Warsaw Pact structure were monumental. Such an imbalance as a neutralized or independent communist state within the Warsaw Pact was unthinkable to the Soviet leaders.

Czechoslovakia is an avenue into the Ukraine, and this potential danger was noted after the invasion in a Pravda article by Sergei Kovalev on September 26, 1968, in which he stated:

Implementation of such self-determination, that is, Czechoslovakia's separation from the socialist commonwealth . . . would harm other socialist countries. Such self-determination as a result of which NATO troops might approach Soviet borders and the commonwealth of socialist nations might be dismembered, in fact infringes on the vital interests of these countries' peoples, and fundamentally contradicts the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination.⁹

Military considerations for the continued preservation of the Warsaw Pact were a primary motivation in the decision to invade Czechoslovakia. Militarily, the Warsaw Pact nations offered excellent offensive and defensive positions to the Soviet Union. East Germany

and Poland controlled the major invasion route into the Soviet Union. This northern plain has always occupied a special place in Soviet planning because the plain is ideally suited for the operations of conventional military forces.

The position of Czechoslovakia was pivotal. It was the vital link between the USSR's northern and southern group of forces in Eastern Europe. It also served as an alternate route into West Germany, or conversely, since Czechoslovakia touches the Soviet Union, a route into the USSR.

Through Poland, East Germany, Rumania and Bulgaria the USSR exercised greater control over the Baltic and Black Seas and this enabled the Soviets to plan naval operations on the northern and southern flank of the Western European nations. Additionally, this factor enabled the supply of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe by sea. Finally, and not the least important, the Soviet naval forces could exist from the Baltic and Black Seas into the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

The Czech salient position offered the possibility of a rapid build-up of Soviet strategic forces along the West German border. Having the capability to mobilize and build up the conventional Soviet ground forces in Czechoslovakia along the West German border would provide the Soviets a greater flexibility in their military planning. Czechoslovakia, lying within the heartland of the Warsaw Pact and touching on the Soviet Union, provided a central area for the command and co-ordination of Warsaw Pact and Soviet strategic military efforts.

Additionally, Czechoslovakia provided a logistical axis to the forward areas of the Warsaw Pact for offensive military operations.

Thus, a gap existed in the forward wall of the Soviet security zone and attempts to fill this gap by placing Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia was opposed by the Czechs. The reliability of the Czech forces, considering the political reform moves underway, was most suspect. The absence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia under these conditions added to the weakness in the forward positions of the security sphere. Soviet occupation would insure control of the 250 mile Czech-West German border.

The refusal to accept Soviet troops on Czech soil could also be interpreted as a reluctance to accept the risk of a nuclear confrontation by the Czechoslovaks as part of the forward Soviet defense. In keeping with the Soviet military doctrine of continued development of military forces for the impending ideological-social struggle of the systems, the nuclear confrontation was considered a primary means of resolving this meeting with non-socialist forces. Throughout the 1960's, the Soviet military doctrine continually emphasized that the use of rocket forces and nuclear weapons was inescapable in the next conflict.¹⁰

For the USSR, the nations of Eastern Europe meant added military and economic potential. The highly developed war industries of East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia increased the industrial capability for arms support, particularly to aid the national liberation movements in many of the third world nations, a political and ideological

extension of Soviet revolutionary doctrines.

Another strategic factor would be the important uranium deposits in Northern Czechoslovakia, which would be jeopardized by a Czech political unreliability or withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia was one of the main sources of uranium ore for the Soviet Union, and the loss of this supply would be a disastrous blow to the Soviet military and civilian nuclear potential.¹¹

The Warsaw Pact enabled the Soviet Union to present a united front of the socialist nations in both political and military categories; and, as an equal to NATO, this unified front of socialist countries placed the Soviets in a stronger bargaining position in Western Europe. The Soviet position supporting withdrawal of atomic weapons from Western Europe and their plans for the establishment of atom-free zones were contingent on a united Warsaw Pact.¹² The political, military and economic disadvantages resulting from a neutral, and recalcitrant Czechoslovakia were, therefore, overwhelming. Neither for the short term nor for the long term could Czechoslovakia be permitted to become "unfriendly" to the Soviet Union.

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C H A P T E R V

CONCLUSION

The invasion of Czechoslovakia yielded mixed results for the Soviet Union. From a positive standpoint, the ability of the Soviet military forces to insure the cohesiveness of the Warsaw Pact was definitely reaffirmed. The elimination of the Czech reform forces demonstrated to the other Warsaw Pact nations that the Soviet Union must be consulted on all changes within the pact, particularly in the area of domestic reform. The imposed fraternity of nations would henceforth present a solid front to West Europe. This would insure prior Soviet approval in regard to future economic agreements between Eastern Europe and Western Europe.

On the negative side, the invasion by the Soviets exhibited a regression to Stalinist tactics. Until the Czech invasion, it appeared that the trend of Soviet policy was toward non-intervention or at least attempts to control the Warsaw Pact by various economic and military alliances. It had been twelve years since the Soviet leaders used military forces in Hungary to quell the liberal elements there in 1956.

The decision to invade probably was not expected to cause such an intense reaction world-wide from other communist parties. The invasion split many communist parties in Europe. It also presented to neutralist nations an example of the aggressive tendencies of the communist ideology.

In reaction to the invasion, the Mexican Communist Party stated on August 21, 1968: "We believe that this military intervention in socialist Czechoslovakia will harm the cause of communism in the world and aggravate problems existing in our movement."¹ Yugoslav President Tito announced on August 21: "The sovereignty of a socialist country has been violated and trampled upon. A heavy blow has been inflicted on the socialist and progressive forces in the world."²

The Finnish Communist Party organ, Kansan Uutiset, on August 22, proclaimed: ". . . it is very difficult if not impossible for the Soviet Union to find grounds for the necessity of a military intervention that could be accepted."³

Judging by the reactions of the various communist parties throughout the world, one can conclude that the Soviet Union, by the invasion of Czechoslovakia, destroyed much of the good faith and political leadership which she had spent twelve years in building. Additionally, the defense efforts of NATO began to assume a fresh, new sense of importance, and the West European efforts to continue to support military forces to offset the Warsaw Pact military alliance were encouraged.

Ironically, demands for economic reform and wider civil liberties, which the Soviets attempted to halt in Czechoslovakia, have continued since the invasion. Most changes taking place in Eastern Europe since the invasion, however, have had the sanction of the Soviet leaders.

The entrenched bureaucratic-ideological nature of the Soviet leadership probably will not mellow, but may strive for more "creative

application" of Marxism-Leninism.

The Soviets thus attempted by military means in Czechoslovakia to delay an almost overwhelming desire of the Eastern European nations and of national segments within the Soviet Union, to advance national ambitions, whether economic, political or cultural. The Soviets will continue to suppress the economic and political reforms until these can be incorporated into the Soviet security scheme. However, the sacrifice of world prestige and leadership of the socialist nations appears to be the price the Soviets have paid.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, like the imperial incursions in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Eastern Europe and Manchuria, may have been, in part, to divert attention from more pressing problems at home. As the Soviets have reached the plateau of an industrialized society, they also have inherited the complexities of such a society.

The danger of conflict with China, the potential divisions of the Eastern European states, and the explosive problems of the ever-increasing nationalities within the borders of the Soviet Union, are the chief dilemmas of the USSR. These, combined with the cracks in the ideological wall created by the invasion of a "fraternal socialist nation," will add to the basis of conflict within the Soviet bloc of nations, and perhaps within the Soviet Union itself.

The doctrine by which the Soviet Union apparently will attempt to solve future problems within Eastern Europe was outlined by Leonid Brezhnev in a speech before the Fifth Congress of the Polish United

Workers Party in Warsaw, November 12, 1968. He stated, in part:

. . . when internal and external forces hostile to socialism attempt to steer the development of a socialist country toward the restoration of a capitalist's order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country, but for all socialist states. It goes without saying that the action of rendering military aid to a brother country . . . can be invoked only in the event of direct action by the enemies of socialism . . . this action constitutes a threat to the common interest of the socialist camp.⁴

A simpler explanation is that when the Soviet Union perceives a threat to its economic and military heartland from a contiguous nation, the threat had to be quickly liquidated.

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