Edward R. Maguire, Ph.D., "New Directions in Procedural Justice Research"

[SILENCE 00:00:00 - 00:00:48] Title slide
[MUSIC 00:00:49 - 00:00:53] Sam Houston State University College of Criminal Justice logo

Dr. Solomon Zhao: Good morning, uhhhh, everyone. And, uh, it's my great honor to introduce Doc [sic] Edward Maguire and he's a Professor School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Arizona State University. Before, he also taught in American University, George Mason University, and University of Nebraska – Omaha. I noticed at a graduate school when he was working on his dissertation, he was able to spend about six months in Vienna, Austria as an associate social affairs officer for United Nations. I firmly believe that –that good time in Vienna contributed a lot for his successful completion of his dissertation, and also turned into a book. [host chuckles] And after graduation Dr. Maguire dedicated – decided to answer the call from the governments and joined the COPS office for two years. Then he became a depressed realist and realized that university teaching is a much better job. [audience laughs]

(00:02:13) S –so I share the same experience with him because I worked for the government for a year, it was *disaster*. [audience laughs] Then so, when you are working on your dissertation, on your papers, no complain [sic]. You know university teaching is a much better calling, and uh –Dr. Maguire has published fifty n—two articles and twenty book chapters, plus a book. And his research area is increasing. Recently, he has expanded his research horizon to include gang-related research in Caribbean countries, particularly M-13, scary. I was a little bit concerned about his research on gang [sic] because it was both dangerous and easily to be inferenced. So yesterday I attempted to find out if there's any tattoo visible [host chuckles] on his body, I, uh, you know visible, I couldn't find any, so it make me feel safe. [audience laughs] He, uh, in addition, Dr. Maguire has secured many research grants at federal, state, and local levels. One grant I impressed the most [sic] is from the Inca American Development Bank. I know that most difficult grant – that's the most difficult grant to get because we are al –the bank is supposed to take our money, [audience laughs] not to give us money, so he's able to do that. Very extraordinary.

(00:03:58) Finally, Dr. Maguire works very hard and has a dedication to research. Here is an example. About eleven years ago I joined his research team, uh, in Philippine [sic]. Prior to my departure I scanned through the itinerary and noticed that there was a practical training at a twelve A.M. in a local bar. [audience laughs] I thought it was a typo or joke because we all travel more than 24 hours to get to Philippine [sic] on that night around 10 A.M. Unfortunately, the phone rang in my room at 11:50. It was Ed's voice, "Solomon, get ready for the training.", and my God, the sky collapsed in front of me at that moment. [audience laughs] Okay, having said all the good things or bad things, the floor is yours, and uh, his presentation is "New Directions in Procedural Justice Research".

[audience applauds]

(00:05:10) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Thank you, Solomon. It takes an old friend to say all those nice words. I appreciate that old buddy. It's a real pleasure to be here today. Uh, I feel like I have a kind of a kinship with Sam Houston State University because I have a –a number of friends here, uh, including Dr. Zhao, who I worked with at the University of Nebraska at Omaha many years ago, at my first academic job. Bill, uh, King, uh, we went to, um, undergraduate together at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell many years ago. Bill Wells, the department chair here, uh, was actually one of my Ph.D. students, and so now I feel particularly old coming here. He's a full professor and an administer. Um, anyway, real pleasure to be here today, uh, and I look forward to talking with you about this topic, procedural justice, uh, and –and legitimacy. I kinda joke with my friends that –you know that procedural justice has taken over my professional life in the – in recent years. Uh, and I'll get into, as we move on, why that happened. It was actually quite accidental. I didn't set out in my life to be a procedural justice scholar. It just kinda happened, and as we often find in academic careers, um, sometimes you just end up going down a particular trajectory and it just turns into a thing, right, and so that's what happened here with my –my foray into, uh, procedural justice research.

(00: 06:39) So, here's a little roadmap of what we're going to do today. I'm gonna start off with a brief introduction about procedural justice theory, what it is, and why it's important. I'm then going to kind of pick it apart a little bit and talk about some of the theoretical and conceptual issues, some of the empirical issues, um, and then talk a little bit about new directions in procedural justice research, where to go from here. And I'm particularly interested for this audience because I know we have a number of graduate students, uh, in the audience, and so for me, um, the new directions component is, I think, most important, um, because I think we have the next generation of scholars in the room. And so, it's time for the next generation to sort of pick up this line of research and move it forward, and there are a lot of important ways that it can be moved forward that my colleagues and I haven't gotten to yet, so there's a lot of work remaining to be done. And then I'll close with a discussion, and I should say you're - you're welcome to interrupt me at any time. I have no problem with that. Um, or your –you can ask me questions at the end. Uh, either one is okay with me.

(00:07:43) Okay. So, we'll start off with a –oh, my goodness. [pause] Uh, let's see here. Sir, we've got some issues with this device. Yeah, it's like [pause] maybe I'll try that. Okay. Well, just try that side button maybe? [pause] It's kinda got a mind of its own. Just stick with the side button? Okay, so I'm gonna start off now with an overview of procedural justice theory. This is the –this is the point at which students in the room [speaker chuckles] usually fall asleep, right. Oh no, we're gonna start talking about theory. I try my best to keep it interesting. So, procedural justice theory focuses on how authority figures interact with those who are subject to their authority. This is a very general theory. It has been applied to criminology, um, in fact I think it's had a very powerful *impact* on criminology and criminal justice in recent years. But I really think of procedural justice theory as being sort of a much more –much broader, much more general kind of theory. And we can all think about applications of this theory in every aspect of our lives. And so, for instance, I have a six-year-old daughter, and I like to think of her as a procedural justice warrior. Every day of her life [speaker chuckles], my six-year-old daughter is thinking about whether the way her mom and I are behaving is procedurally just. And often she decides that it's

not and she tells us "That's just not fair, dad." Right? That's procedural justice theory. And so how did this very general theory of the way superordinates interact with subordinates make its way into criminology and criminal justice? Because in our field, we have people who have authority over others, right? So, we have police officers, and correctional officials, and judges, and prosecutors, and all of these officials who are imbued by the state with authority and they interact with people who are subordinate to that authority. And so, what procedural justice is really focused on is *the way* those authority figures *interact* with those that are subject to that authority.

(00:10:17) Let's see here. Alright. So procedural justice itself refers to the *fairness* of the *processes* through which the police make decisions and exercise authority. Now I'm talking about procedural justice as applied to the field of policing at this point, and that's where I'll spend most of my time today. And so, the focus of procedural justice is really on those *processes*. And so procedural justice is often divided into these two aspects. One of them is the quality of treatment, and one of them is the quality of decision-making. So, let's imagine for a moment that you're a driver, okay, you've been pulled over by a police officer. I'm sure probably most of the people in the room have had this happen at least once, so I think this is a real referent we can think about, okay. And so, the driver –the officer comes up to you as you're sitting there waiting to see what's going to happen to you, and the officer says –maybe the officer yells at you "What do you think you're doing driving this fast in this area? I –you know, this is crazy!", and starts sort of treating you in a disrespectful manner. You would perceive that as being procedurally unjust and that's *quality* of treatment, that's a *quality* of treatment issue. How is one human being imbued with authority treating another human being who is subordinate to that authority? And so, we all want authority figures to treat us with dignity, with humanity, with compassion, with empathy, with all of these kinds of things. Those are *quality* of treatment issues, and that's a big part of what constitutes procedural justice. The other part is quality of decision-making. So, for instance, suppose you're Hispanic and you're sitting there wondering "Did I just get pulled over because I'm Hispanic? Did my race factor into the decision to pull me over?" Or "Did my race factor in – into any of the other discretionary decisions that the officer is making?" That's quality of decision-making, right? We would expect that the decision-making procedure used by that authority figure needs to be fair. It can't be based on extralegal factors, like how old you are, what your sex is, what your age is, so that's quality of decision-making. We take those two pieces, quality of decision-making and quality of treatment, we put them together, and that's what we typically mean when we talk about procedural justice.

(00:12:42) And so the theory –the theory here is we have procedural justice on the far left of the diagram, and the theory says that procedural justice influences legitimacy. We're gonna spend a lot of time today talking about what legitimacy means. We're gonna break that down. Okay, and that via legitimacy, sort of indirectly, procedural justice influences a variety of what we call beneficial or pro-social outcomes. And so, these outcomes are typically things like a person's willingness to cooperate with legal authorities, a person's willingness to comply with the law, or the demands or requests made by legal authorities, and a variety of other pro-social outcomes. Okay, and so this is procedural justice

theory in a nutshell. Procedural justice influences legitimacy, which in turn influences these pro-social outcomes, okay?

(00:13:42) So, moving on to the next. But when we test procedural justice theory, we're typically including a variety of other variables in that left-hand column, so it's not just procedural justice. One of the other variables we're looking at is called *distributive* justice. Distributive justice will figure prominently into today's talk. You can almost think of procedural justice and distributive justice as involved in a tug-of-war in the procedural justice scholarship in terms of which one matters more. Okay? Distributive justice is all about outcomes. It's not how did the officer treat me, it's, was the outcome I received fair? So, let's say you go back to that scenario where you're a driver, you've been pulled over by a police officer, you were driving ten miles over the speed limit, we can all agree that if you get a citation for $10,000 yo –it's distributively unjust. It's an unfair outcome, right? And so, we can work backwards, $9,000, $8,000, $7,000, as long as it's in four digits we're gonna go ahead and call that distributively unjust, okay. But where is that line, okay. Ten miles over a speed limit, is it $50, is it $100? We all have different thresholds for how much we're willing to sort of put up with, um, in an outcome administered by an authority figure, right? And so, in Deterrence Theory in criminology it's all about getting th –the sort of the right amount of punitiveness to match the infraction, okay? And that's what distributive justice is all about. It –does the person who had an interaction with an authority figure, does that person view the *outcome* as fair. That's distributive justice. And procedural justice is, was the *process* that led to the outcome fair. So, there's that bifurcation between the process and the outcome, and we're gonna spend more time on that as we move forward.

(00:15:35) Okay, the next variable that you often see in these models of procedural justice that social scientists produce is perceived effectiveness. Perceived effectiveness is simply, do you believe the *institution* represented by that authority figure is an effective institution? Typically, that's measured by, does it do a good job of controlling crime, does it do a good job of controlling disorder, these kinds of measures. So that's perceived effectiveness. And then the last one is risk of sanctions. This is Deterrence Theory. Um, it's your willing –your ab –willingness to comply with legal authorities, your willingness to obey the law, these kinds of things. It's in part going to be a function of, you know, what's the likelihood that you're going to get caught, what's the likelihood you're going to get punished. Okay? And so, you see these variables - procedural justice, distributive justice, perceived effectiveness, and risk of sanctions - you can think of them as like *competing* with one another to determine which one has the largest effect on all of those outcomes to the right - legitimacy, cooperation, compliance, and other pro-social outcomes. Now I've got distributive justice, perceived effectiveness, and risk of sanctions running through legitimacy here, but they could also have direct effects on those outcomes on the far right. So, typically what happens when social scientists *test* procedural justice theory, they're *testing* a model that looks like this and they're trying to determine how much effect does procedural justice have on these outcomes relative to the other variables included in the model.

(00:17:10) And so, just a bit of nomenclature here, in the literature you often see procedural justice referred to as a *normative* factor and it's contrasted with the other three factors, which are often

referred to as instrumental factors. So, in a lot of this research, you'll see that language used, normative versus instrumental factors. But a way to think about it is it's like a competition between these independent variables. It's procedural justice versus all these other potential explanations for why people obey the law, why people comply, or cooperate with legal authorities.

(00:17:45) And so, we've gotten into a lot of detail, but we can sorta back away from some of that detail now and extract from it kind of a bottom-line proposition of procedural justice theory, which quite simply is this: Fair procedures matter. They don't just matter because they're the right thing to do –ohh, where'd we go here? My goodness. [pause] Yikes. Giving away all my punchlines here. [pause] Fair procedures matter not just because they're the right thing to do, but because they enhance cooperation and compliance with the law and legal authorities. In other words, when we're dealing with *teaching* authority figures like police, prosecutors, judges, and other representatives of criminal justice institutions how to behave when interacting with people who are subject to their authority, we should be teaching them to behave in a procedurally just way with these people, whether they're offenders or not; because when we behave –when criminal justice authority figures behave in fair ways, we see increases in compliance with the law, and we see increases in cooperation and compliance with the legal authorities that represent the law. Okay? So again, it's not just because it's –it's not a *moral* argument here that we're making, although we could make one, but it's an effectiveness argument. Behaving *fairly* toward people in the criminal justice system enhances their cooperation and compliance. This is a very, very powerful dynamic that we can take advantage of. Not only do fair procedures matter, but what most of the research suggests is that they matter *more* than all of those other instrumental variables that we talked about. Whether the institution is perceived as effective, distributively just, and so forth, fair procedures matter.

(00:19:53) Yikes. Okay. So now, just very briefly, we'll go over the empirical support for procedural justice theory. And so, these are some the commonly observed effects that we see. Where proce –so where y –where you see the green plus sign, that's procedural justice produces an increase and where you see a red minus sign, it's procedural justice produces a decrease. So, we see procedural justice increasing people's internalized sense. When we asked people in surveys instruments about their internalized sense, their sort of, their duty, their internally-felt duty to obey the law, or to comply with legal authorities, procedural justice has –has the effect of increasing that moral sense that I should obey the law, or I should listen to this authority figure. It increases willingness to cooperate. It increases compliance. This is just being law-abiding. And so, Tom Tyler's 1990 book, very powerful, very influential book is called *Why People Obey the Law*, which I think is a perfect title and his solu –his answer is they obey the law when legal authorities behave in procedurally just ways that then imbue the law with a sense of legitimacy and encourage people to comply with it because it's legitimate. The increase – procedural justice increases *support* for criminal justice institutions, *satisfaction* with those institutions, and *confidence* in those institutions. This is what the research tells us. We also have research that looks at these sort of anti-social, or the opposite of pro-social outcomes. So, it can reduce violence.

(00:21:36) So, Professor Wells and I, working with a –with a group of, uh, a group of colleagues, back when the Occupy protests of 2011 were happening, we went out in New York City to the encampment at Zuccotti Park where the Occupy protesters were, um, waging a –quite a spirited protest, it was the sixth month anniversary of Occupy Wallstreet, and we surveyed 302 protesters. We carri –we did the exact same thing in Washington D.C. with another team of researchers. And what we found was that the variables that had the strongest influence on people's willingness to use violence against police – We asked them "How –What degree of support do you have for using violence against police officers?" And we found a fair number of people who were willing to use violence against police officers because there was a very unhealthy dynamic between the police and protesters. But when we conducted our analyses to say, okay, "What factors explain why people are willing to behave in a violent way toward police officers?", the number one variable, stronger than race, was procedural justice. If they believed that police had treated them in an unjustly forceful way, they were more willing to essentially retaliate and use violence back against police. Okay. And we found a similar dynamic, a little bit different, but a similar dynamic in Washington D.C., um, where procedural justice also had strong influences. And so, procedural justice reduces people's willingness to use violence. We see in the procedural justice literature evidence that people become less *defiant*. Defiance is a big issue in criminal justice. If we behave in procedurally unjust ways towards offenders, we can make those offenders more defiant. We see that particularly with domestic violence offenders. And we also see reductions in negative affects, so these are things like "Am I angry with the police or correctional officials?", um, "Am I frustrated with them?" All these sorts of negative emotions or negative affect type of things. We see procedural justice reduces those things. And then there was a meta-analysis. You can think about a meta-analysis as being a study of studies. And so, this giant meta-analysis that my colleague Lorraine Mazerolle did, um, also found some strong effects of procedural justice on legitimacy, which was the first part of that model, um, that I showed you. The procedural justice theory model.

(00:24:17) Okay. So, moving on. What are the implications for policy or practice? I'm just gonna go over this briefly, um, with one example, and that is, uh, President Obama's task force, uh, on 21st century policing. And so, this was a task force that was, um, given the mandate to review, uh, the current state of American policing. It was the first na – presidentially appointed panel to review police procedures in nearly 50 years. In the 1960s, we had four such panels, but we went many years without having one and so this was sort of a big moment in American policing. A number of leaders in the police profession were involved in this task force. They came up with, uh, a report, um, with recommendations for how American police ought to move forward, um, given, um, the many crises that we've been grappling with in policing in recent years. And so, I just want to point out that the term procedural justice appears *thirty-nine* different times in the task force's report, and it figures prominently in a number of the recommendations that the task force made for reforming American police agencies. I think arguably procedural justice has probably had a more dramatic impact in policing than it has in other elements of the criminal justice system. Um, certainly the volume of research that has taken place on procedural justice is –it's much larger in policing than it is in corrections, and that it is in courts, and so forth. Um, and so I think in policing is where we see more of this going on, but this theory is totally applicable to all parts of the criminal justice system and so there's lots of work remaining to be done there.

(00:25:59) Okay, so I want to move on to some theoretical and conceptual issues having to do with procedural justice theory, and the first one I want to talk about is, what is legitimacy? And so, you remember when I showed you that model where you've got those four variables on the left, you've got legitimacy in the middle, and then you've got those outcomes on the right. That's the theory, okay? Well so legitimacy occupies this sort of linchpin position in that model. It's right in the middle of that model and a lot of those effects are posited to run through legitimacy. So, it's a fair question to ask, "Okay, what's legitimacy?" Here's one, bah. Ahh. [pause] Here's one definition of legitimacy. Okay, so this is from the organization theory literature, it's not from criminology, but it says, "Legitimate authorities are those that are perceived as 'desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions." If you're somebody who is involved in *testing* theoretical models, a definition like this should make you start pulling some hairs out of your head because it's really – it's a good definition, but now imagine taking that definition and trying to measure it. Right? Going out to actual human beings and trying to measure, turn that into a set of measures. That's a challenging thing to do.

(00:27:31) Here's another definition. This is from Tom Tyler, who arguably is sort of the father of procedural justice theory. He says, "Legitimacy is 'a quality possessed by an authority, a law, or an institution that leads others to feel obligated to obey its decisions and directives", and notice I've highlighted the word 'voluntarily'. This is an internalized sense of obligation to obey. One of the things we found from research, for instance in Africa and some Caribbean countries, where, uh, police are, uh, police are accused of using heavy-handed methods, accused of being corrupt, and so forth. They're accused of being incompetent and all these kinds of accusations about police in certain developing countries. So, one of the things we know from doing this kind of research in certain developing nations, is that people feel obliged to obey the law and legal authorities, but it's not an internalized or a moral sense of duty; it's –they feel like they have to because they are afraid of what will happen to them if they don't. They're afraid that they'll be shot and killed by police for instance, extra judicial killings and these kinds of things. When we talk about obligation to obey, we're not talking about *that*. We're talking about that internalized sense of obligation, not coming out of a sense of fear.

(00:28:49) Okay. So, Tom Tyler has done a lot of research on procedural justice and legitimacy over the years. And so, one of the things that I did here is, I just pulled out a few of Tom Tyler's dimensions of legitimacy in different work. So, in 1990, Tom Tyler measured legitimacy and he said "Okay, I'm forming these measures and there are two dimensions to the measures." When I say dimensions, think about this, remember when you took the GRE test? And you had the mathematical aptitude portion, and you had the, uh, I think the other, what is it verbal or something like that, right? That's what I mean by dimensions, and so you're measuring overall aptitude, but you're breaking it down into dimensions. So that's what we're doing here. We have legitimacy as the overarching concept but we're breaking it down into certain dimensions; and so, as we're trying to measure this thing, what are we measuring? Well in 1990 Tom Tyler said, well it has two dimensions. It has obligation to obey, and it has support. In other words, the degree of support –I support the police, or I support courts, or things like that. Okay.

(00:29:57) In 2001, Tyler said, well legitimacy has four dimensions. It consists of affective feelings, institutional trust, legal cynicism, and there's obligation to obey again. The following year, Tyler measured it again and he said it's institutional trust, and its obligation to obey. And then the following year he measured it again, and now it's affective feelings, kind of sense of emotion, institutional trust, and obligation to obey. Now, I'm not including this slide here to pick on Tom Tyler. He's done some fascinating and groundbreaking research in this area. We have Tom Tyler to thank for this body of research. My only suggestion is that doesn't it appear that legitimacy is a little bit of a moving target in this body of research, right? We don't have a stable set of measures that we use to measure legitimacy. And remember when I showed you that slide where you've got procedural justice and those other factors on the left, and you've got the outcomes on the right, and legitimacy is the linchpin linking that whole model? But what is it? And so, that's one of the key issues that we have in this body of research.

(00:31:08) Now, Justice Tankebe is a scholar in England. He's actually, uh, from Ghana originally, uh, works in England; and he published a criminology article in 2013 where he said that these are the dimensions of legitimacy. It's lawfulness, procedural fairness, distributive fairness, and perceived effectiveness. One of the things you might pick up on is that those bottom three were actually not part of legitimacy in the original model. There were in the left-hand column, they were things that *caused* legitimacy. They weren't *part* of legitimacy. So again, legitimacy seems to be a little bit of a moving target. *Criminology* is our best journal, by the way. And so, this idea of legitimacy, and how you measure it, and what it means is a little bit of a moving target in this body of research.

(00:31:56) Here's another one. John Jackson does some great research in England and throughout Europe in fact on procedural justice and legitimacy-related issues. And Jackson says legitimacy has two dimensions, it's consent and moral validity. You might note that you haven't seen either of those two in all of the definitions we've used so far today. And so, what I -what the takeaway from all of this, is that the meaning and measurement of legitimacy in the social sciences is currently in an intense state of uncertainty and debate. It is a moving target. For the next generation of scholars who we have in the room, here's some work. You've got your work cut out for you. There's plenty of work here to be done, and its important work, okay, because this theory is a very dominant theory in criminology and criminal justice right now. We've got police agencies being trained all over the country in this theory, but yet there are certain aspects of this theory that we don't have nailed down yet, and it's important to do that.

(00:32:55) So, I want to move on to the next theoretical and conceptual issue. Earlier I talked to you about procedural and distributive justice. Procedural justice is about processes, distributive justice is about outcomes. So, you get pulled over by the officer, you're asking yourself two types of questions according to the theory. Did the officer behave in a fair manner toward me? That's procedural justice. Did the officer give me an outcome I deserved or that's fair? That's the distributive justice. Okay? And so, an essential part of procedural justice theory is that those are different dimensions, those are different attitudes that you have in your brain. What it suggests for instance is that you can be happy with the process, upset with the outcome, or vice versa. They're separate dimensions of your attitudes.

Okay? And so that's the next question, is to what extent do those things overlap? Okay? Let's see here. Alright, there we go. So, a key finding in this body of research is that processes matter more than outcomes. It's a foundation of this body of research, is that processes measure –matter more than outcomes. The question is, are they actually separate perceptions?

(00:34:17) Come on now. Cooperate. Okay. Now, I'm not a neuroscientist, and I'm not arguing that we can cut your brain in half, and that half your brain does one thing and half does the other. But I think it makes –I think this image makes a powerful point, which is, you know, is it possible that you can clearly separate those two perceptions, or those two attitudes? Is it possible for you to hold in your brain simultaneously "I think the process was fair, I think the outcome was not fair," or, are those two things, do they sort of overlap very heavily? That's the question. So, I want to provide some insights on that question. I'm gonna kinda take a dog leg right here for a minute. I want to provide some insights from related research on attitudes toward police, where the question was, what are of the dimensions of perceived service quality? So many years ago, I worked with –actually a group of students, when I was teaching at George Mason University, who had a police chief call up and ask, um, "Would you come into my community and do a survey of citizen satisfaction with my police department?" I had a group of students at the time, honors students, who were looking for a project to carry out, and so it was sort of a marriage made in heaven. I took the group of honors students, paired them up with the police department that wanted a pro bono survey done; put together a working group of officers, working group of honors students. They came with a survey instrument. And what we decided was, we would try to measure, um, the uh, degree of service quality being provided by this agency. And just rec –just before that, a scholar Steve Mastrofski had just come out with a model of service quality, in which he articulated that there are these six dimensions of service quality. That when we rate the quality of service of police departments, that it's in these six dimensions. So, things like, um, responsiveness, and empathy, and I don't remember the specific dimensions, but anyway, there were six of them. So, we decided, okay, let's see if that's true. Let's test these six dimensions. So, we came up with a measure of service quality, tested it in this local police agency, and at the end of it what we found is that there are not six dimensions of perceptions of service quality, there's one. We jokingly referred to it as the service quality blob. And the reason we said that is because people don't have these sort of finely distinguished, at least in this sample, people didn't have these finely distinguished attitudes toward police, in which you have six different, independent dimensions that are free to vary at will. Right? They just had one. It was one continuum from they thought the police were high service quality to they thought the police gave low service quality. Okay?

(00:36:59) And so, this was actually my foray into procedural justice research, because I up until that point, I had only been a consumer of that research, not a producer of it. But when I started –when I did this service quality study, and we found that people's attitudes couldn't be broken down into these different dimensions, I started to wonder, "I wonder if that's true in procedural justice research?" Because procedural justice research has all these attitudes, these concepts that are being broken down. There's legitimacy, and obligation to obey, and procedural justice, and distributive justice, and all these different dimensions; but do people really think like that? Are these dimensions of people's attitudes

and perceptions separable? And that's what led me down this line of research. And that's what led me to start wondering about distributive justice and procedural justice.

(00:37:48) And so one of the things we find is that the correlations, when we measure these things, the correlations between procedural and distributive justice– Well first of all, in most of the literature that you read, you'll never find the correlation between procedural and distributive justice. It's just not reported. Okay? I challenge you to go read the literature on this, and in probably nine out of ten studies, you won't find this correlation reported. But, in the handful of studies that do report it, and in all of my research in which we look at this, we are routinely finding correlations between procedural and distributive justice above point 8-5, okay? That's a really, really strong correlation, and it usually indicates that there is a problem with something that we call in social science, discriminant validity. Discriminant validity has to do with the overlap between concepts. Can we measure, can we distinguish between concepts that are related? If they're so overlapping that we can't distinguish between them, then we may just be measuring the same thing. Okay? In one study, my correlation between procedural and distributive justice was point 9-9-8. Okay? That's almost a perfect correlation. And so, what it would suggest is that, at least in that setting in those studies, those measures of procedural and distributive justice are tapping into *one* thing. But remember, procedural justice theory says that procedural justice is much more *important* that distributive justice in shaping these outcomes. But procedural justice and distributive justice *may* be measuring the same underlying concept. So, we don't really have this sorted out yet. This is again, a challenge for the next generation of researchers to start to sort out.

(00:39:38) So, one of the things that we, um, one of the things that, uh, that we started to look at, was we started to look at some social psychological theories on the way people think on these kinds of issues, and there's a fascinating theory out there called fairness heuristic theory. And what fairness heuristic theory suggests is that a lot of times when –like let's say you get pulled over by a police officer and you get a ticket for 100 bucks. And you're trying to think to yourself, "Is this fair?" Well, you don't actually –you have a missing variable problem, or missing data problem here because you don't know what everyone else got for a ticket. You don't know if other people got 200-dollar tickets and you got a hundred-dollar ticket. Or other people got a 50-dollar ticket, and you got a hundred-dollar ticket. So, you don't know, right? You don't know. You're missing information to make a solid distributive justice judgement here. So, fairness heuristic theory makes the argument that, when you don't know if an outcome is fair, you use process information, in other words procedural justice judgements, to make that cognitive leap. In other words, if the cop is a jerk to you, you are much more likely, according to fairness heuristic theory, to think that the cop is administering outcomes in an unfair way. That's known as a cognitive shortcutter, or heuristic. Okay?

(00:40:59) And so we decided to test it. Come on now. Cooperate. There we go. So, we did two laboratory style experiments where we used actors. We put a bodycam on them. We had them approach a vehicle. We had a series of drivers of different races and ethnicities behind the wheel of a vehicle. This particular lad right here is my 19-year-old son, Alex Maguire, who's a student at Virginia Tech, who volunteered to participate in this study. All the other drivers, if you happen to read this, were

his buddies. Um, and, and so what we did is we experimentally manipulated how the officer, um, the actor who played the officer in these videos, how the officer interacted with the driver. Okay? And so, we had a procedural justice condition, we had a procedural *injustice* condition, and we had a neutral condition. It was sort of a stripped-down encounter without positive and without negative. It was kind of just neutral. Okay. And so, we experimentally –so we took three videos. Did the procedural injustice, neutral, and procedural justice. The officer was following a script in each of those three videos to make sure that we captured those conditions well. And then what we did was with two different samples of people, one was a national sample of adults, and one was a set of college students at two universities, and we gave them a survey instrument in which they were randomly assigned to look at one of those videos. And then we asked them a series of questions where we measured a variety of different things, and you'll see these papers. Some of them are already coming out, and others are still in press, and still being written. But, um, for purposes of this question about distributive and procedural justice, here's what we did.

(00:42:43) So, we asked people a simp –now in this scenario, everybody got a citation, um, for the exact same amount, so there was no difference in outcomes across these conditions. They were held constant. But we asked people, "To what extent do you believe the officer behaved in a biased manner due to the age of the driver?" And then we asked the same question about the sex of the driver, and about the race of the driver. And what you see in this chart, was that in every case, the people who were exposed to the procedural justice condition said there was, um, let's see, yeah, that there was less bias; and the people that were exposed to the procedural *injustice* condition said there was more bias. So, this question about bias as a distributive justice question, in other words, do you think this person got a ticket because he was male? Do you think this person got a ticket because he was young, or because of his race? And so, in a number of racial categories here. But anyway, what we find is that people are in fact using information about the process to make judgements about the outcome. And so, coming full circle, there's a reason we would expect procedural and distributive justice to be related, and fairness heuristic theory provides us that reason. So, much remains to be learned about the relationship between procedural and distributive justice. Process and outcome judgements might not be entirely separable. *This*, for those of you who are interested in being involved in this line of research, is another sort of new direction where you can make some pretty serious contributions to the literature. Just like the definition of legitimacy that I pointed out earlier, we're still trying to sort this out.

(00:44:33) Okay. Now we have the 'what causes what?' issue. In the Tyler model, procedural justice, distributive justice, and perceived effectiveness are independent variables that were located on the left of that diagram, and they influenced legitimacy and everything that came afterwards. Okay? Obligation to obey was a part of legitimacy. But when we look at the Tankebe model, procedural justice, distributive justice, and effectiveness are –ooh, *components* of legitimacy, not predictors of it. They're not influencing legitimacy, they *are* legitimacy, in the Tankebe model. And obligation to obey is now not part of legitimacy anymore, now it's an outcome, it's caused by legitimacy. These are *dramatically* different renditions of the social world. Okay? And none of this is sorted out yet, and so it's kind of a mess in the literature right now. There's a lot of work to be done to try to figure out which, if either, of

these scholars is right about the way these processes work. And so, this whole 'what causes what?' issue is a very clear challenge for the next generation of researchers doing work in this area.

(00:45:52) And then the last part of this section is just 'other potential mediators.' When you look at the early research on procedural justice, here's what it said. It said that the reason procedural justice matters is because it influences our sense of ourselves, our social identity, and our degree of connection with the world. Okay? Our social identity is sort of how we're connected to other groups, groups that are around us, okay? And the argument was always that the reason procedural justice matters is because when police officers come along, for instance, and treat you in a lousy way, it's almost like they're diminishing your humanity in a way. They're diminishing your connection to mainstream America if we're talking about the US. That was the underlying theory originally. That whole social identity piece has disappeared. It was a foundation of the original theory, but you never see it anymore. And so recently I was working with a group of scholars in England who study soccer violence. You know, so these are soccer teams that come together, and two teams will fight, and riot, and light fires, and tip police cars over, and beat each other up, and these kinds of things. Well for these guys, for this group of scholars, these are social psychologists, what they argue is that a lot of the dynamics that happen between police and rioters in that context, have to do with social identity. They're not procedural justice scholars, but they're saying that in the context of crowds, both protests and in this soccer violence, they call it football hooliganism, I love that term, but that in that context social identity is a really, really important dynamic. And so, you've seen social identity sort of disappear from the procedural justice landscape, and it needs to come back. These things are important. We need to study procedural justice effects on social identity. The other thing is that we don't know a lot about emotions. And so, we're doing some research right now, uh, Professor Wells and I did some research in a prison sample, um, on the effect of procedural justice on anger, and then the downstream effects of anger on people's willingness to cooperate and comply, and so forth. We're doing some laboratory experiments where we're looking at the effect on anger, um, and what we find, for instance, is we're finding racial differences in anger. And so, certain racial groups are much more likely to beha –to feel angry in response to procedural injustice than other racial and ethnic groups. And so, that whole set of dynamics still needs to be explored. It's a really important thing.

(00:48:23) Okay. And then moving on to empirical issues. I'm gonna keep this really brief because I think if I come up here and talk to you about statistics you might throw some darts at me. So, we're gonna go a little bit down the road on this, but not very far. The first thing I want to talk about is construct validity. I always give a really lousy definition of construct validity when I teach research methods, so you should never give a definition like this, but I amuse myself with this definition. It's the extent to which a measure measures what its intended to measure. That's a totally tautological definition, I know that. But construct validity is, are we measuring the thing that we're trying to measure and are we measuring it well. That's what construct validity is. Okay? When I look at the research on procedural justice and legitimacy, I see construct validity issues everywhere I look and most of them go undiagnosed, just unrecognized; and so, one of my missions as a researcher is to sorta try to clean up. Do a little bit of a house cleaning on how we measure these kinds of things and making sure we're measuring what we

think we're measuring. So, there's this concept that comes from an old article by, uh, Cronbach and Meehl. This comes from a 1955 article that's on construct validity, and this article for me is sort of prescient because it identifies for me what the major issue is in this line of research in terms of house cleaning. The sort of –Some of the messes that remain to be cleaned up in this very important body of research have to do with a concept called a nomological network. And so, I want you to think about all of the concepts that we've talked about today. I just want you to take a moment and imagine in your mind this network of concepts that we've talked about. So, what have we talked about? We've talked about procedural justice, so imagine in your mind you've got a little bubble representing procedural justice. Now you've got distributive justice. Now you've got obligation to obey, legal cynicism, willingness to cooperate, compliance. So, you've got all these bubbles, right, that you're picturing, okay? Now the question is how do these things relate to one another? That's really what this body of research is trying to figure out and we have a lot of work left to do to really, I think, understand that nomological network of different concepts.

(00:50:40) And so, in doing so, there are three types of linkages that Cronbach and Meehl talk about, and to me one of the great challenges for the next generation of researchers on this topic is exploring these three linkages that Cronbach and Meehl laid out more than fifty, sixty years ago. So one is, when you picture that network of concepts in your mind, how do those concepts relate to one another? What causes what? Okay. Cronbach and Meehl use the language of observables, that's the term they use, but by that they simply mean measures. So, you've got the underlying latent concept, legitimacy, or obligation to obey, or whatever it is. Right? But then you have a measure of that concept, an actual measure, you have data. Okay. That's what Cronbach and Meehl would call an observable. And so now, you've got the conceptual work of 'how do these concepts relate to one another'. Now you've got the *empirical* work of 'how do the measures of these concepts relate to one another'. And then you have the work, and this is why much of this, uh, research ends up using a method called structural equation modeling and confirmatory factor analysis, is how do those concepts relate to observables. And that's as far as I'm gonna get, by the way, just even mentioning structural equation modeling is as far as I'm gonna get into statistics today. But how do those concepts relate to the measures that are intended to measure them. If we did a better job of exploring those three linkages, we could march this body of research forward in a really dramatic way. And that's my ne –that's my *challenge* to the next generation of researchers on this topic.

(00:52:19) And so, some examples, distributive justice, conceptually, can we separate distributive justice from procedural? Sure. You've got outcomes, you've got processes. But empirically, when we look at them, we find strong correlations between them. That might just be that we are measuring them poorly or it might mean that the underlying concepts are not separable. We don't know. We still have that to figure out. Institutional trust is one of the components of legitimacy, which sat in the middle of that conceptual model. Legitimacy was the linchpin in the middle, right? But you know what we find? We routinely find that there's a huge correlation, almost close –very, very close to one between institutional trust and procedural justice. In other words, institutional trust is part of the dependent variable but it's highly correlated with the independent variable. There's overlapping conceptual content there. This is

the kind of work that Cronbach and Meehl are telling us to do when we explore, uh, construct validity. And then legal cynicism, I won't get into it too much, but be careful of legal cynicism. It's an interesting concept. You've got at least three sort of branches of scholarship on legal cynicism. We've actually measured some of these different ones using the same data sets, and they're almost entirely uncorrelated with one another. They're completely different branches of scholarship, all using the same terminology to mean different things. And so, you've got to be a little careful with that.

(00:53:48) And then Other Validity Issues. I won't get too much into this, but we see statistical conclusion, uh, validity issues where people are misinterpreting their own models, not doing regression diagnostics, and just sort of a bunch of little messes with regards to the statistics used in this line of work. I think we've got some –you got a lot of structural equation models in this line of research, um, being estimated by people who I think just don't know that kind of modeling very well, and they end up kind of mixing it up and drawing some inappropriate conclusions from their own results. Um, you've got some internal validity issues. Mos –almost all of this research is cross-sectional. Um, you get a handful of randomized trials, but most of it's cross-sectional, so you've got some internal validity issues. Got some external validity issues, for instance we know from research in the Caribbean and Africa that we see different findings than we see in the US, England, Australia, Canada; so, you've got some developing world versus developed world kind of dynamics where things are different. Um, most of Asia, most of the huge countries in Asia have not yet –these issues haven't really been studied. And you've got different authority dynamics in North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, and so forth and so we would expect that we might some differences there. So, we've got some external validity issues to work through as well.

(00:55:02) So, my New Directions component of this talk is –sorry I didn't. My New Directions component of this talk is gonna be very brief. Okay, let's see if we can get there. New directions. This is how I think about the work on procedural justice and legitimacy. And so, I've kind of poked at this body of research and theory today and I've criticized it in some way, but I want to come back full circle and say, this is an amazing body of work that has very powerful implications for how we do the work of policing, and corrections, and courts. It even has implications, there's a new book out applying these things to parenting. Um, so it has really, really, powerful implications for a lot of areas of social life. And so, the reason, uh, I'm being kind of tough on it is because I think it's so important, and these are sort of basic social dynamics that we really need to get right. We really need to understand them well. But there's some weaknesses there we need to acknowledge, and we need the, well, the current and the next generation of scholars to start to fill in the blanks. And so, I think of it like this, I think of it as a big giant puzzle where a lot of the pieces are still missing. And instead of just replicating the same old research that's already been done, the idea is to find where we have missing pieces, and I've outlined several of those missing pieces today. And to start collecting new data sets, using new instruments, using new methods, to one-by-one start filling in those puzzle pieces so that we can understand at a much deeper level, and we can have more confidence in our understanding of these authority dynamics that are so important. And with that, folks, I am happy to take questions.

[audience applauds; 00:57:02 – 00:57:08]

Dr. Solomon Zhao: Very good presentation. And I hope that the airline CEOs should all [Maguire laughs] listen to the procedural justice. And also, I'm happy about, you know the high correlation between independent variable versus dependent variable, though messy ho –they are, you know, R-square point 5 is really good for me. Okay, any questions?

(00:57:35) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Yes?

Audience Member #1: So, you know the whole theory, Garbage in – Garbage out? If we're using Tyler's, like, legitimacy scale, um, [inaudible: 57:45 – 57:49] he basically doesn't know what he's talking about [inaudible: 57:51 – 57:54] how is he measuring it. Should we not be using that scale?

(00:57:59) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** I wouldn't say that you shouldn't be using it, but –

Audience Member #2: Could you repeat the question for the video – [inaudible]

(00:58:03) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Yeah, so the question is, um, is, um, whether researchers should continue to use Tyler's measures of legitimacy. Well first of all there are multiple measures of legitimacy, right, so it's kind of a moving target as I pointed out earlier. I don't necessarily see a problem with using them, but if you go back to that slide on the idea of a nomological network. So you've got a bunch of –assuming you've got a bunch of dimensions of legitimacy that are consistent with one of Tyler's pieces, I would just really do a deep dive on whether those things are measured well, whether they hang together in the way one would expect them to hang together, whether they're associated with other variables in the way one would expect them to be associated, and draw some inferences from that. So, in other words, going back to that idea of a nomological network and how those concepts and measures all relate to one another, I think, most people don't do that. So here is the most common approach to measurement in this line of research, is to take a group of survey items, add them up, report a Cronbach's alpha coefficient, and move on. There's not a lot of reflection on, well did I measure this thing well? And does it relate in the ways I expect to relate to other measures. Are there any internal inconsistencies in my measure? And so, there's a lot of this kind of detailed measurement work that needs to be done, and I would say as long as you do that measurement work, and it comes out the way you want it to come out, then you can use that measure. But I just wouldn't skip all of that sort of construct validation work and it ordinarily does get skipped in this line of research. Great question. Thank you.

[pause: 00:59:50 – 00:59:58]

Dr. Edward Maguire: Yes.

Unseen Person: Here ya go.

DrEdwardMaguire_20170413_Lecture_CollegeOfCriminalJustice

(01:00:03) **Audience Member #3:** So then, if there are so many measures, which measures would you, in like, more like survey questionnaire research, what measures would you suggest using?

Dr. Edward Maguire: Which, um, like which dimensions? Which concepts?

Audience Member #3: Which, because you said Tyler has a lot of different, uh, measures and then there's all these other theorists. Which ones are, in your opinion, with all of this under consideration the *best* ones to use when measuring procedural justice?

(01:00:31) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** So, measuring procedural justice itself is –so the question is, which, given all of these issues, which measures should we actually use. And that's a great question. So, measuring procedural justice itself is really not that controversial in this line of research. So, measuring, you know, the quality of treatment and quality of decision-making, those measures hold up pretty well. There's not really a problem with those. A lot of the problems hold up with, uh, or a lot of the problems emerge with measures of legitimacy. And so, the really challenging part is making a theoretical argument and then designing some measures that are consistent with that theoretical argument. When I review papers on this topic, it's really interesting. Sometimes people will make an eloquent theoretical argument or conceptual argument about legitimacy, and what constitutes it, and so forth. And then they introduce the measures, and it almost like the measures are completely disconnected from that beautiful argument that they just made. So that idea of translating a theoretical and conceptual model into a set of measures that match that model, that to me seems to be one of the common breakdowns in this line of work. Um, and so what I would say is, if you're able to make an elegant theoretical argument, and then select some measures that match it, and then do that construct validation work on those measures and it passes, then use that. I'm not advocating for any one dim –one definition over another. Um, what I'm advocating for is better testing of whichever one you select.

[pause: 01:02:08 - 01:02:19]

Audience Member #4: Um, first of all, I'd like to thank you very much for your very insightful, very well-articulated presentation. Uh, I myself have learned a great deal from your –from your work. Uh, your passion for this area, uh, was manifested very clearly, um, in your talk. So, thank you very much. I'm doing a paper, um, on broken window policing. Um, so while the reviewers, uh, of my paper said that, uh, broken window policing may have some backfire, uh, when there's more a presence of the policing targeting those minor, misdemeanant, um, behavior. Um, people will feel like, you know, um, they are targeted. So, they fear my inquiries. So, from you presentation I understand that procedural justice in policing is a very over mar—uh, overarching perspective. So, I'm just wondering, linking my article to your presentation, I'm just wondering how that overarching, uh, concept or perspective can be incorporated into very specific policing programs, such as broken window policing or oriented policing? That has been, um, you know, quite popular in the past some years. So, what's your intake –what's your input in this regard? Thank you.

(01:03:35) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Thank you for that great question. I think, um, when we're evaluating police strategies or tactics like broken windows policing, or similar kinds of things, I think it's important to carry out citizen surveys, um, to ask residents their perceptions of those initiatives. And I think we can link the literature on disorder to the literature on procedural justice pretty easily by measuring people's perceptions of the extent to which the police carrying out those initiatives are doing so in a way that is procedurally just. And, uh, I think we could marry those two bodies of research together, and I think to good effect. I think that's important work to do. But we'd have to survey the citizens and develop those measures of procedural justice to do that. Thank you.

[pause: 01:04:23 - 01:04:31]

Audience Member #5: Hey Ed. Um, it's kind of a follow-up question to what Ling asked. Um, could you talk about some of the innovative things that police agencies are doing right now around procedural justice, if you're aware of any agencies doing some innovative things?

(01:04:46) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Yeah, I mean I don't know about specific agencies necessarily, but there's a wave of, um, reform happening right now where agencies are adopting, um, training, uh, meant to enhance procedural justice. There's been a couple of experiments, there was one in Chicago, uh, and another one in the UK, both randomized experiments testing the effectiveness of procedural justice training on a variety of outcomes and finding some mixed effects, but some beneficial effects, nonetheless. Um, and, uh, I think that, um, I gave a talk for, uh, for the major cities, uh, chiefs of Texas a couple years ago, and it was only slightly related to procedural justice, but I do remember –This was for you Professor Wells, but I do remember when I gave that talk, um, and I explained procedural justice theory, I remember some of the comments from the chiefs being "I'm so happy to hear what this is because everybody's telling us we need to do it but we don't necessarily know what it means." Um, and I think that was a really powerful takeaway for me, that, you know, this wave of sort of pressure on American police agencies to be adopting procedural justice reforms may not be matched by mechanisms for ensuring that they actually know what to do. Um, and uh, there's a very cool body of research in public administration. Usually when we ask agencies or organizations to do things and they don't do them, our knee-jerk reaction is to attribute that to resistance to reform. But there's a cool body of research in public administration which suggests that a lot of times what we attribute to resistance to reform is not resistance, it's they simply don't know what to do. It's not that they're resisting you, it's that you have to teach them what to do. And I think we're in a moment in American policing right now where there's a lot of pressure on police departments to do this thing, but they don't necessarily know what to do. Um, and certainly there are some, um, there are some, uh, some university-based partnerships and trainers, and so forth who are going around the country doing training on this thing; but it's a big country, or a lot of agencies, a lot of police to be trained. And there's a lot of work to be done to take this concept and translate it for people who are working on the streets, so they know exactly what to do with it.

[pause: 01:07:03 - 01:07:11]

Audience Member #6: So, what issues do you see emerging if you are to study procedural justice in individuals from other countries? So, we're kind of looking at this in individuals who have immigrated from, uh, Central America to the United States. So, are there any issues you see, or any things to keep into consideration when studying this in individuals who aren't from America?

(01:07:29) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Yeah, I love that question. So, the question is whether –is what adaptations do we need to make when studying, uh, groups uh, in the US but who are originally from elsewhere. Um. And so, I recently completed a paper with, uh, a couple of scholars from George Mason University, um, on Ghanaian immigrants, um, who, I think there were about 300 Ghanaian immigrants, who were living in Alexandria, Virginia. And so, there was a doctoral student at George Mason University who, himself, was from Ghana, Daniel Price. And so, Daniel went, uh, and did, uh, surveys of these people, uh, managed to find 300 people in one community all from Ghana, and did surveys of them. And so, one of the things that his dissertation committee, which I was on, uh, encouraged him to do was to clearly attempt to separate their attitudes toward police in their home country from their attitudes toward police in the US. Um, and to ta –and there's some really fascinating work out there if you, uh, if you look at some of the ethnographic work on immigrant experiences in the US, and, you know, where, you know, people afraid to, you know, afraid to answer the door when the police come to the door because back at home that meant something very different than what it means here, right? And, but not only that but for African immigrants in particular, um, the Amadou Diallo incident in New York City many years ago sort of really conditioned the way they started to think about the US police as well. Um. We saw dramatic differences between how immigrant *youth* perceive the police, and how older immigrants, their parents perceive the police, um, because immigrant youth of color, um, were getting, in a lot of this research suggests, they're getting –they feel harassed by police and so forth. And so, their attitudes tend to be a little different. So, trying to parse out those different things, the a –like the immigrant generation differences, and then police at home versus police in their country of origin differences, I think those are some of the challenges in that line of research. But that's awesome research. I'm glad you're doing it.

[pause: 01:09:39 – 01:09:43]

Dr. Solomon Zhao: Okay, uh, Dr. Maguire, I have a question. You just talked about the procedural justice, uh, applied to other countries. So, in your, uh, study with Ghana, uh, you know, residents, have you include [sic] all –in that literature, have they include a measure of, uh, acculturation or assimilation? Because, as an immigrant, you come to here, your understanding is different. Understanding of culture is different. Dynamics is different. You know, when, uh –so, for example, when we study about the, uh, Mexican immigrants, we ask questions "Where were you born?", "Will you speak English at home?", and uh, you know, things like that. In that literature, have you seen them incorporate assimilation or acculturation?

(01:10:30) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** No, that's a great point for this scholar here. I mean I think a direct measure of assimilation would be great. Usually people use a proxy, which is just how long you've been here. You know, my –I don't typically study on immigration-related issues but my, um, just by, my uh, exposure to this I think first came when I was visiting the Colorado Springs Police Department many years ago, and for those of you who study immigration this won't be a surprise, but I don't and so this was a surprise for me. I just couldn't believe this was happening. Uh, I went on a call with a patrol officer, uh, for a group of people who were fighting and arguing and so forth. And uh, these folks happened to be of Mexican descent, and all of them happened to be of Mexican descent, and what was happening is one group of older Mexicans was calling a group of younger Mexicans, "wetbacks". And so, as somebody who is new to this lit –this uh, this body of research and this dynamic, I was just surprised that one group of Mexicans would be calling another group of Mexicans, "wetbacks". And the officer explained to me that there were these generational issues in that community, where some were more assimilated than others, and that the people that had been there longer really looked with disdain upon the newer sort of generation of people that had come in and conceived of them as "wetbacks". But in most of the research, in ends up being a proxy variable, which is just how long you've been here. Which is not a great measure of assimilation cuz you could've been here for a long time and still not've assimilated, right? So, I think that's a useful –I think that's a useful move forward, to do that.

(01:12:03) **Dr. Solomon Zhao:** Yeah, for example, just like the, uh, the Asian was dragged off the airplane, right, on Sunday. So a lot of Chinese, uh, media, they say that it's a discrimination. But for me, have been here for over twenty-seven years, I don't think that's a discrimination because I have a lot of knowledge, assimilation, than those people who are in China or in Asian countries. So, I think that might be –

(01:12:30) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Yeah, great point.

Dr. Solomon Zhao: Any other questions. [inaudible 01:12:33 - 01:12:35] Students here.

Audience Member #7: I'm not a student but I sat [inaudible 01:12:37 - 01:12:38]

[audience laughs]

(01:12:40) **Dr. Solomon Zhao:** Here.

(01:12:45) **Audience Member #7:** I'm gonna ask a question that can probably be answered with a quick Google search, so I'm sorry about that. But um, can you talk a little bit about the application of procedural justice to victim cooperation, specifically in terms of sexual assault and intimate partner violence; and whether you see it as being a similar model or actually needing to conceptualize a new model to explain the specific barriers to police interaction that those types of victims often encounter.

(01:13:11) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** Right. I'm not –I'm not really familiar with that literature. Um, we are just proposing and working with a group of, uh, police and other scholars to propose a randomized trial, um, that would look at these issues in burglary cases, which are certainly less compelling than sexual assault cases. Um. But I'm not really familiar with that line of research. I think it would be highly applicable, but I wouldn't have any detailed information about that.

(01:13:43) **Audience Member #7:** Okay, thank you.

Dr. Edward Maguire: Thanks.

Audience Member #7: And I also really enjoyed your talk. I have some –I have ideas now.

Dr. Edward Maguire: Thank you.

(01:13:50) **Audience Member #8:** Hi. Yeah, thank you for coming. Uh, thinking about your example of the traffic stop and just kind of police culture in general, um, has there been any research that looks at aggregate individual traits of organizations, like maybe a police agency or department, and if they're better at having these positive outcomes? Like as far as from this aspect.

(01:14:12) **Dr. Edward Maguire:** I'm not familiar with any research like that. There is, um, I'm sur –we have, I think, some correctional scholars in the room who I think will know more about what I'm about to say than I do, so correct me if I'm wrong. But there's some interesting, um research coming out of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, um, from their research unit. Who is it, Camp and Saylor, and so folks like that? Um, it's been a while since I've looked at this research, but what they have developed –And I'm not a specialist in corrections. But they have developed some interesting measures of, uh, sort of culture and climate inside Federal Bureau of Prison facilities, where they take individual-level surveys and aggregate them up to form organization-level scores. It strikes me that that's kind of a model that one could do in policing. I'm not familiar with it having been done, but it's a very cool idea, right? So, developing organization-level measures of these phenomena that we're talking about. Um, it would be quite a challenge, but I think it would be awesome. Um, I hope you do it.

[speaker and audience laugh]

(01:15:17) **Audience Member #8:** Thank you.

Dr. Solomon Zhao: Okay, uh, that's conclude –uh the presentation. I want to conclude with that remark. When I was teaching, uh, Ph.D. classes, and I always tell the students, for example a policing class, "If you come here, and you believe you know something about policing, when you're out of here, end of the semester, you have more questions. That's a good class." So, I don't, uh uh –I think the definition of a good lecture, a presentation is, instead of say "Here's my research. This is the only right way to learn about procedural justice." No. We come here, and we learn more about procedural justice, now I'm

more confused than when I come in. [Dr. Maguire laughs] And I have more questions about procedural justice, so I think that's a very successful lecture. And also, graduate students, you will have more opportunities to talk with Dr. Maguire about all your bubbling ideas. Okay, thanks.

Dr. Edward Maguire: Thank you.

[audience applauds]

[SILENCE 01:16:32 - 01:16:43] Ending slide.